

"Heidegger, Martin (1889-1976),"

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Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
editor Edward Craig,

London and New York: Routledge, 1998,
IV, 307-323.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1889-1976)

Martin Heidegger taught philosophy at Freiburg University (1915-1923), Marburg University (1923-1928), and again at Freiburg University (1928-1945). Early in his career he came under the influence of Edmund Husserl, but he soon broke away to fashion his own philosophy. His most famous work, *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) was published in 1927. Heidegger's energetic support for Hitler in 1933-34 earned him a suspension from teaching from 1945 to 1950. In retirement he published numerous works, including the first volumes of his *Collected Edition*. His thought has had strong influence on trends in philosophy ranging from existentialism through hermeneutics to deconstruction as well as on the fields of literary theory and theology.

Heidegger often makes his case in charged and dramatic language that is difficult to convey in summary form. He argues that mortality is our defining moment, that we are thrown into limited worlds of sense shaped by our being-towards-death, and that finite meaning is all the reality we get. He claims most of us have forgotten the radical finitude of ourselves and the world we live in. The result is the planetary desert called nihilism, with its promise that an ideally omniscient and virtually omnipotent humanity can remake the world in its own image and likeness. Nonetheless, he still holds out the hope of recovering our true human nature, but only at the price of accepting a nothingness darker than the nihilism that now ravishes the globe. To the barely whispered admission, "I hardly know anymore who and where I am," Heidegger answers: "None of us knows that, as soon as we stop fooling ourselves."

And yet he claims to be no pessimist. He merely wants to find out what being as such means. Heidegger's main work, *Being and Time* was an attempt at that. He called it a fundamental ontology: a systematic investigation of human being (*Dasein*) for the purpose of establishing the meaning of being in general. Only half of the

book -- the part dealing with the finitude and temporality of human being -- was published in 1927. Heidegger elaborated the rest of the project in a less systematic form during the decades that followed.

Heidegger distinguishes between an entity (anything that is) and the being of an entity. He calls this distinction the "ontological difference." The being of an entity is the meaningful presence of that entity within the range of human experience. Being has to do with the "is": what an entity is, how it is, and the fact that it is at all. The human entity is distinguished by its awareness of the being of entities, including the being of itself. Heidegger names the human entity "Dasein."

Heidegger argues that Dasein's own being is intrinsically temporal, not in the usual chronological sense but in a unique existential sense: Dasein ek-sists (stands-out) towards its future. This ek-sistential temporality refers to the fact that Dasein is always and necessarily becoming itself and ultimately becoming its own death. When used of Dasein, the word temporality indicates not chronological succession but Dasein's finite and mortal becoming.

If Dasein's being is thoroughly temporal, then all of human awareness is conditioned by this temporality, including one's understanding of being. For Dasein, being is always known temporally and indeed is temporal. The meaning of being is time. The two main theses of Being and Time -- that Dasein is temporal, and that the meaning of being is time -- may be interpreted: being is disclosed only finitely within Dasein's radically finite awareness.

Heidegger arrives at these conclusions through a phenomenological analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world, that is, as disclosive of being within contexts of significance. He argues that Dasein opens up the arena of significance by anticipating its own death. But this event of disclosure, he says, remains concealed even as it opens the horizon of meaning and lets entities be understood in their being. Disclosure is always finite: we understand entities in their being not fully and immediately but only partially and discursively; we know things not in their eternal essence but only in the meaning they have in a given situation. Finite disclosure -- how it comes about, the structure it has, and what it makes possible -- is the central topic of Heidegger's thought. "Time is the meaning of being" was only a provisional way of expressing it.

Dasein tends to overlook the concealed dimension of disclosure and to focus instead on what get revealed: entities in their being. This overlooking is what Heidegger calls the forgetfulness of the disclosure of being. By that he means the forgetting of the ineluctable hiddenness of the process whereby the being of entities is disclosed. He argues that this forgetfulness characterizes not only everyday "fallen" human

existence but also the entire "history of being," that is, metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche. He calls for Dasein to resolutely reappropriate its own radical finitude and the finitude of disclosure, and thus to become authentically itself.

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1 Life and works

Martin Heidegger was born on 26 September 1889 in Messkirch, southwest Germany, to Roman Catholic parents of very modest means. From 1899 to 1911 his intention was to become a priest, but after two years of theological studies at Freiburg University, a recurring heart condition ended those hopes. In 1911 he switched to mathematics and the natural sciences, but he finally took his doctorate in philosophy (1913) with a dissertation on The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism (published, 1914).

Hoping to get appointed to Freiburg's chair in Catholic philosophy, he wrote a qualifying dissertation in 1915 on a theme in medieval philosophy, Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning (published, 1916). However, the job went to someone else, and in the autumn of 1915 Heidegger began his teaching career at Freiburg as a lecturer.

At this time Heidegger was known as a Thomist, but his 1915 dissertation was strongly influenced by the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. When Husserl joined the Freiburg faculty in the spring of 1917, Heidegger came to know him personally, if not well. Their relation would blossom only after World War I.

Heidegger was drafted in 1918 and served as a weatherman on the Ardennes front in the last three months of the war. When he returned to Freiburg his philosophical career took a decisive turn. In a matter of weeks he announced his break with Catholic philosophy (9 January 1919), got himself appointed Husserl's assistant (21 January), and began lecturing on a radical new approach to philosophy (4 February).

Many influences came to bear on Heidegger's early development, including St. Paul, Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and Nietzsche. But the major influences were Husserl and Aristotle.

Heidegger was Husserl's protégé in the 1920s, but he never was a faithful disciple. He preferred Husserl's early work,

Logical Investigations (1900-01), to the exclusion of the master's later developments. Moreover, the things that Heidegger liked about Logical Investigations were generally consonant with the traditional scholastic philosophy he had been taught.

First, Husserl's early phenomenology considered the human "psyche" not as a substantial thing but as an act of revealing (intentionality), one that revealed not only what is encountered (the entity) but also the way in which it is encountered (the entity's being).

Secondly, the early Husserl held that the central issue of philosophy was not modern subjectivity but rather "the things themselves," whatever they might happen to be, in their very appearance; and he provided a descriptive method for letting those things show themselves as they are.

And finally phenomenology argued that the being of entities is known not by some after-the-fact reflection or transcendental construction but directly and immediately by way of a categorial intuition. In short: For Heidegger, phenomenology was a descriptive method for understanding the being of entities as it is disclosed in intentional acts.

As Heidegger took it, all this contrasted with Husserl's later commitment to pure consciousness as the presuppositionless "thing itself" that was to be revealed by various methodological "reductions." Heidegger had no use either for the neo-Kantian turn to transcendental consciousness that found expression in Husserl's Ideas (1913) or for his further turn to a form of Cartesianism. Against Husserl's later theory of an unworldly transcendental ego presuppositionlessly conferring meaning on its objects, Heidegger proposed the historical and temporal situatedness of the existential self, "thrown" into the world, "fallen" in among entities in their everyday meanings, and "projecting" ahead towards death.

In the 1920s Heidegger began interpreting the treatises of Aristotle as an implicit phenomenology of everyday life without the obscuring intervention of subjectivity. He took Aristotle's main topic to be "disclosure" (aletheia) on three levels: entities as intrinsically self-disclosive; human psyche as co-disclosive of those entities; and especially the human disclosure of entities in discursive, synthetic activity (logos), whether that be performed in wordless actions or in articulated sentences.

Going beyond Aristotle, Heidegger interpreted this discursive disclosure as grounded in a kind of movement that he named "temporality," and he argued that this temporality was the very essence of human being.

Using this new understanding of human being, Heidegger reinterpreted how anything at all appears to human beings. He argued that humans, as intrinsically temporal, have only a

temporal understanding of whatever entities they know. But humans understand an entity by knowing it in its being, i.e., in terms of how it happens to be present. Therefore, as far as human being goes, all forms of being are known temporally and indeed are temporal. The meaning of being is time.

The development of this thesis came slowly and achieved a provisional formulation in Being and Time (1927). In public Heidegger dedicated the book to Husserl "in respect and friendship," but in private he was calling Husserl's philosophy a "sham" (Scheinphilosophie).

Meanwhile, in 1923 an unsuspecting Husserl helped Heidegger move from a lecturer's job at Freiburg to a professorship at Marburg University (1923-1928); and when Husserl retired in 1928, he arranged for Heidegger to succeed him in the chair of philosophy at Freiburg. Once Heidegger had settled into the new job, the relationship between mentor and protégé quickly fell apart. If Being and Time were not enough, the three works Heidegger published in 1929 -- "On the Essence of Ground," Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, and "What is Metaphysics?" -- confirmed how far apart the two philosophers were.

Heidegger's career entered a new phase when the Nazis came to power in Germany. On 30 January 1933 Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor, and within a month the German constitution and all important civil rights were suspended. On 23 March Hitler became dictator of Germany, with absolute power to enact laws, and two weeks later, harsh anti-Semitic measures were promulgated.

A conservative nationalist and staunch anti-Communist, Heidegger supported Hitler's policies with great enthusiasm for at least one year, and with quieter conviction for some ten years thereafter. He was elected rector (president) of Freiburg University on 21 April 1933 and joined the Nazi Party on May 1 with the motive, he later claimed, of preventing the politicization of the university. In his inaugural address as rector, "The Self-Assertion of the German University" (27 May 1933), he called for a reorganization of the university along the lines of some aspects of the Nazi revolution. As rector he proved a willing spokesman for, and tool of, Nazi policy both foreign and domestic.

Heidegger resigned the rectorate on 23 April 1934 but continued to support Hitler. His remarks in the classroom indicate that he backed the German war aims, as he knew them, until at least the defeat at Stalingrad in January 1943. The relation, or lack of it, between Heidegger's philosophy and his political sympathies has long been the subject of heated debate.

Heidegger published relatively little during the Nazi period. Instead, he spent those years rethinking his philosophy and setting out the parameters it would have, both in form and focus, for the rest of his life. The re-thinking is most noticeable in

three texts he published much later: (1) the working notes from 1936-38 that he gathered into Contributions to Philosophy: On Ereignis (Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis), published posthumously in 1989; (2) the two volumes of his Nietzsche, published in 1961, which contains lecture courses and notes dating from 1936 to 1946; and (3) the "Letter on Humanism," written in the autumn of 1946 and published in 1947.

At the end of the war Heidegger was suspended from teaching because of his Nazi activities in the Thirties. However, in 1950 he was allowed to resume teaching, and thereafter he occasionally lectured at Freiburg University and elsewhere. Between 1950 and his death he published numerous works, including the first volumes of his massive Gesamtausgabe (Collected Edition). He died at his home in Zähringen, Freiburg, on 26 May 1976 at the age of 86 and was buried in his hometown of Messkirch. His literary remains are held at the German Literary Archives, at Marbach on the Neckar.

Heidegger, a Catholic, married Elfride Petri (1893-1992), a Lutheran, on 21 March 1917. They had two sons, Jörg, born in 1919, and Hermann, born in 1920, both of whom served in the Wehrmacht during World War II and were taken prisoner on the Eastern Front. In February of 1925 Heidegger began a year-long affair with his then student, Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). In February of 1950 they resumed a strong but often stormy friendship that lasted until Arendt's death.

2 Temporality and authenticity

Heidegger was convinced that Western philosophy had misunderstood the nature of being in general and the nature of human being in particular. His life's work was dedicated to getting it right on both scores.

In his view, the two issues are inextricably linked. To be human is to disclose and understand the being of whatever there is. Correspondingly, the being of an entity is the meaningful presence of that entity within the field of human experience. A proper or improper understanding of human being entails a proper or improper understanding of the being of everything else.

In this context "human being" means what Heidegger designates by his technical term "Dasein": not consciousness or subjectivity or rationality, but that distinctive kind of entity (which we ourselves always are) whose being consists in disclosing the being both of itself and of other entities. The being of this entity is called "existence." (See §4 below.)

Heidegger argues that the structure of human being is comprised of three co-equal moments: becoming, alreadiness, and

presence. (These are usually, and unfortunately, translated as: "coming towards itself," "is as having been," and "making-present.") As a unity, these three moments constitute the essence of human being, which Heidegger calls "temporality": opening an arena of meaningful presence by anticipating one's own death. Temporality means being present by becoming what one already is.

Becoming: To be human means that one is not a static entity just "there" among other things. Rather, being human is always a process of becoming oneself, living into possibilities, into one's future. For Heidegger, such becoming is not optional but necessary. He expresses this claim in various co-equal formulae: (a) The essence of human being is "existence" understood as "ek-sistence," an ineluctable "standing out" into concern about one's own being and into the need to become oneself. (b) The essence of human being is "factual," always already thrust into concerned openness to itself and thus into the ineluctability of self-becoming. (c) The essence of being human is "to be possible" -- not just able, but above all needing, to become oneself.

The ultimate possibility into which one lives is the possibility to end all possibilities: one's death. Human beings are essentially finite and necessarily mortal, and so one's becoming is an anticipation of death. Thus, to know oneself as becoming is to know oneself, at least implicitly, as mortal. Heidegger calls this mortal becoming "being-unto-death."

Alreadiness: Human being consists in becoming; and this becoming means becoming what one already is. Here the word "already" means "essentially," "necessarily," or "inevitably." "Alreadiness" (Gewesenheit) names one's inevitable human essence, and specifically one's mortality. In becoming the finitude and mortality that one already is, one gets whatever presence one has.

Presence: Mortal becoming is the way human being (a) is meaningfully present to itself and (b) renders other entities meaningfully present to itself. To put the two together: Things are present to human being insofar as human being is present to itself as mortal becoming. In both cases presence is bound up with absence.

How human being is present to itself: Since mortal becoming means becoming one's own death, human being appears as disappearing; it is present to itself as becoming absent. To capture this interplay of presence and absence, we call the essence of human being "pres-abs-ence," that is, an incomplete presence that shades off into absence. Pres-abs-ence is a name for what classical philosophy called "movement" in the broad sense: the momentary presence that something has on the basis of its stretch towards the absent.

Pres-abs-ence is an index of finitude. Any entity that appears as disappearing, or that has its current presence by anticipating a future state, has its being not as full self-

presence but as finite pres-abs-ence. The movement towards death that defines human being is what Heidegger calls "temporality." The quotation marks indicate that "temporality" does not refer to chronological succession but rather means having one's being as the movement of finite mortal becoming.

How other things are present to human being: Other entities are meaningfully present to human being insofar as human being is temporal, always anticipating its own absence. Hence the meaningful presence of things is also temporal or pres-abs-ent, always partial, incomplete, and entailing an absence of its own. Not only is human being temporal but the presence of things to human being is also temporal in its own right.

All of Heidegger's work argues for an intrinsic link between the temporality or pres-abs-ence that defines human being and the temporality or pres-abs-ence that characterizes the meaningful presence of things. But the meaningful presence of things is what Heidegger means by being. Therefore, Heidegger's central thesis is: As far as human experience goes, all modes of being are temporal. The meaningful presence of things is always imperfect, incomplete, pres-abs-ent. The meaning of being is time.

Heidegger argues that this crucial state of affairs -- finite human being as an awareness of the finitude of all modes of being -- is overlooked and forgotten both in everyday experience and in philosophy itself. Therefore, his work discusses how one can recover this forgotten state of affairs on both those levels.

As regards everyday life, Heidegger describes how one might recall this central but forgotten fact and make it one's own again. The act of reappropriating one's own essence -- i.e., achieving a personal and concrete grasp of oneself as finite -- is called "resolution" (in other translations: resoluteness or resolve). This personal conversion entails, first, becoming clear about the intrinsic finitude of one's own being, and then choosing to accept and to be that finitude.

Awareness of one's finitude. Human being is always already the process of mortal becoming. However, one is usually so absorbed in the things one encounters ("fallenness") that one forgets the becoming that makes such encounters possible. It takes a peculiar kind of experience, more a mood than a detached cognition, to wake one up to one's finitude. Heidegger argues that such an awakening comes about in special "basic moods" (dread, boredom, wonder, etc.) in which one experiences not things but that which is not-a-thing or "no-thing." Each of these basic moods reveals, in its own particular way, the absential dimension of one's pres-abs-ence.

Heidegger often uses charged metaphors to discuss this experience. For example, he describes dread as a "call of conscience," where "conscience" means not a moral faculty but the heretofore dormant, and now awakening, awareness of one's finite

nature. What this call of conscience reveals is that one is "guilty," not of some moral fault but of an ontological defect, namely the fact of being intrinsically incomplete and on the way to absence. The call of conscience is a call to understand and accept this "guilt."

Choosing one's finitude. One may choose either to heed or to ignore this call of conscience. To heed and accept it means to acknowledge oneself as a mortal process of pres-abs-ence and to live accordingly. In that case, one recuperates one's essence and thus attains "authenticity" by becoming one's proper (or "authentic" self. To ignore or refuse the call does not mean to cease being finite and mortal but rather to live according to an improper (inauthentic or "fallen") self-understanding. Only the proper or authentic understanding of oneself as finite admits one to the concrete, experiential understanding that all forms of being, all ways that things can be meaningfully present, are themselves finite.

Summary: The essence of human being is temporality, i.e., mortal becoming or pres-abs-ence. To overlook mortal becoming is to live an inauthentic temporality and to be a fallen self. But to acknowledge and choose one's mortal becoming in the act of resolution is to live an authentic temporality and selfhood. It means achieving presence (both the presence of oneself and that of other entities) by truly becoming what one already is. This recuperation of one's own finite being can lead to the understanding that what conditions all modes of being is finitude: the very meaning of being is time.

3 Being-in-the-world and hermeneutics

In Being and Time Heidegger spells out not only the reasons why, but also the ways in which, things are meaningfully present to human being.

Being-in-the-world. In contrast to theories of human being as a self-contained theoretical ego, Heidegger understands human being as always "outside" any supposed immanence, absorbed in social intercourse, practical tasks, and concern for its own interests. Evidence for this absorption, he argues, is that human being always finds itself caught up in a mood -- that is, "tuned in" to a given set of concerns.

The field of such concerns and interests Heidegger calls the "world"; and the engagement with those needs and purposes and the

things that might fulfill them he calls "being-in-the-world" (or equally "care").

Heidegger's term "world" does not mean planet Earth, or the vast expanse of space and time, or the sum total of things in existence. Rather, "world" means a dynamic set of relations, ultimately ordered to human possibilities, which lends meaning or significance to the things that one deals with -- as in the phrase "the world of the artist" or "the world of the carpenter."

A human being lives in many such worlds, and they often overlap, but what constitutes their essence -- what Heidegger calls the worldhood of all such worlds -- is the significance that accrues to things by their relatedness to human interests and possibilities. Although being-in and world can be distinguished, they never occur separately. Any set of meaning-giving relations (world) comes about and remains effective only insofar as human being is engaged with the apposite possibilities (being-in). Being-in holds open and sustains the world.

In Being and Time Heidegger studies the world that he considers closest to human beings: the world of everyday activity. The defining moment of such a world is practical purposes ordered to human concerns -- e.g., the need to build a house for the sake of shelter. A group of things then gets its significance from the direct or indirect relation of those things to that goal.

For example, these specific tools get their significance from their usefulness for clearing the ground, those trees get their significance from being suitable for lumber, these plants from their serviceability as thatch. A dynamic set of such relations (e.g., "useful to," "suitable as," "needed for"), all of which refer things to a human task and ultimately to a human possibility, constitutes a "world" and defines the current significance that certain things (for example, tools, trees, and reeds) might have.

The significance of things changes according to the interplay of human interests, the relations that they generate, and the availability of material. For example, given the lack of a mallet, the significance of a stone might be its utility for pounding in a tent peg. The stone gets its current significance as a utensil from the world of the camper: the desire for shelter, the need of something to hammer with, and the availability of only a stone. (When the camper finds a mallet, the stone may well lose its former significance.)

Hermeneutical understanding. Heidegger argues that the world of practical experience is the original locus of the understanding of the being of entities. Understanding entails awareness of certain relations: for example, the awareness of this as that, or of this as for that. The "as" articulates the significance of the thing. In using an implement, one has a practical understanding of the implement's relation to a task (X as useful for Y). This in

turn evidences a practical understanding of the being of the implement: one knows the stone as being useful for pounding in a tent peg. In other words, prior to predicative knowledge, which is expressed in sentences of the type "S is P," human beings already have a pre-theoretical or "pre-ontological" understanding of the being of things (this as being for that).

Since the "as" articulates how something is understood, and since the Greek verb hermeneuein means "to make something understandable," Heidegger calls the "as" that renders things intelligible in practical understanding the "hermeneutical as." This "hermeneutical as" is made possible because human being is a "thrown project," necessarily thrust into possibilities (thrownness) and thereby holding the world open (project).

Hermeneutical understanding -- that is, pre-predicatively understanding the "hermeneutical as" by being a thrown project -- is the kind of cognition that best befits being-in-the-world. It is the primary way in which humans know the being of things. By contrast, the more detached and objective "apophantic" knowledge that expresses itself in declarative sentences ("S is P") is evidence, for Heidegger, of a derivative and flattened out understanding of being.

Summary: As long as one lives, one is engaged in mortal becoming. This becoming entails having purposes and possibilities. Living into purposes and possibilities is how one has things meaningfully present. The ability to have things meaningfully present by living into possibilities is called being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is structured as a thrown project: holding open the possibility of significance (project) by ineluctably living into possibilities (thrownness). This issues in a pre-predicative hermeneutical understanding of the being of things.

Thus mortal becoming qua being-in-the-world engenders and sustains all possible significance. In another formulation: Temporality determines all the ways that things can have meaningful presence. Time is the meaning of all forms of being.

4 Dasein and disclosure

Heidegger calls human being "Dasein," the entity whose being consists in disclosing and understanding being, whether the being of itself or that of other entities. Insofar as Dasein's being is a disclosure of its own being, it is called "existence" or "ek-sistence": self-referential standing-out-unto-itself. Dasein's very being consists in being related, with understanding and concern, to itself.

But not just to itself. Existence occurs only as being-in-the-world; that is, the openness of human being to itself entails the openness of the world for other entities. One of Heidegger's neologisms for "openness" is "the there" (das Da), which he uses in two interrelated senses. First, human being is its own "there": as a thrown project, existence sustains its own openness to itself. And secondly, in so doing, human being also makes possible the world's openness as the "there" for other entities. Human being's self-disclosure makes possible the disclosure of other entities.

Heidegger calls human being in both these capacities "being-the-there" -- Dasein, or sometimes Da-sein when it refers to the second capacity. In ordinary German Dasein means existence in the usual sense: being there in space and time as contrasted with not being at all. However, in Heidegger's usage Dasein means: being disclosive of something (whether that be oneself or another entity) in its being.

In a word, Dasein is disclosive. And since human being is radically finite, disclosure is radically finite.

The Greek word for disclosure is aletheia, a term composed of the privative prefix a- (un- or dis-) and the root lethe (hiddenness or closure). Heidegger finds the finitude of disclosure inscribed in the word a-letheia. To disclose something is to momentarily rescue it from (a-) some prior unavailability (lethe), and to hold it for a while in presence.

Heidegger discusses three levels of disclosure, ranging from the original to the derivative. Those three levels, each of which involves Dasein, are: (1) disclosure-as-such, (2) the disclosedness of entities in their being, and (3) disclosure in propositional statements. Heidegger's chief interest is in the first level. There, disclosure/aletheia is the original occurrence that issues in meaningful presence (being).

Heidegger argues that levels 1 and 2 are distinct but inseparable and, taken together, make possible level 3. The word "truth" properly applies only at the third level, where it is a property of statements that correctly represent complex states of affairs. Therefore, to the question "What is the essence of

truth?" -- that is, "What makes the truth of propositions possible at level 3?" -- Heidegger answers: Proximally, the disclosure of entities in their being (level 2); and ultimately, disclosure-as-such (level 1). His argument unfolds as follows.

Level 1: Disclosure-as-such is the very opening up of the field of significance. It is the engendering and sustaining of world on the basis of Dasein's becoming-absent. Insofar as it marks the birth of significance and the genesis of being, disclosure-as-such, or world-disclosure, is the reason why any specific entity can have meaningful presence at all.

There are three corollaries. First, the disclosure of world never happens except in Dasein's being; indeed, without Dasein, there is no openness at all. The engendering and sustaining of the dynamic relations that constitute the very possibility of significance occurs only as long as Dasein exists as mortal becoming. And conversely, wherever there is Dasein, there is world.

Secondly, disclosure-as-such never happens apart from the disclosedness of entities as being this or that. In speaking of disclosure "as such," Heidegger is naming the originating source and general structure of all possible significance that might accrue to any entity at all. The result of disclosure-as-such is the fact that referral-to-mortal-Dasein (i.e., significance) is the basic state of whatever entities may happen to show up.

Thirdly, disclosure-as-such is always prior to and makes possible concrete human action in any specific world. Such concrete actions run the risk of not being disclosive (i.e., being mistaken about the meaning of something). By contrast, world-disclosure is always disclosive insofar as it is the opening up of the very possibility of significance at all.

Aletheia/disclosure-as-such -- how it comes about, the structure it has, and what it makes possible -- is the central topic or "thing itself" of Heidegger's thought. He sometimes calls it the "clearing" of being. He also calls it "being itself" or "being-as-such" (that is, the very engendering of being). Frequently, and inadequately, he calls it the "truth" of being.

Level 2: What disclosure-as-such makes possible is the pre-predicative availability of entities in their current mode of being. This pre-predicative availability constitutes level 2, the basic, everyday disclosedness of entities as meaningfully present. This disclosedness is always finite, and that entails two things.

First, what disclosure-as-such makes possible is not simply the being of an entity but rather the being of that entity as or as not something: e.g., this stone as not a missile but as a hammer. I know the stone only in terms of one or another of its possibilities: the entity becomes present not fully and immediately but only partially and discursively. Thus the entity's

being is always finite, always a matter of synthesis-and-differentiation: being-as-and-as-not.

Secondly, disclosure-as-such lets an entity be present not in its eternal essence but only in its current meaning in a given situation; moreover, it shows that this specific entity is not the only one that might have this meaning. For example, in the present situation I understand this stone not as a paperweight or a weapon but as a hammer. I also understand it as not the best instrument for the job: a mallet would do better.

Even though it is a matter of synthesis-and-differentiation, this pre-predicative hermeneutical understanding of being requires no thematic articulation, either mental or verbal, and no theoretical knowledge. It usually evidences itself in the mere doing of something. Nevertheless, in a more developed but still pre-predicative moment, such a hermeneutical awareness might evolve into a vague sense of the entity's being-this-or-that ("whatness"), being-in-this-way-or-that ("howness"), and being-available-at-all ("thatness"). Still later, these vague notions might lose the sense of current meaningfulness and develop, at level 3, into the explicit metaphysical concepts of the essence, modality, and existence of the entity.

This second level of disclosure that we have been discussing may be expressed in the thesis: Within any given world, to be an entity is to be always already disclosed as something or other. This corresponds to the traditional doctrine of metaphysics about a trans-generic (transcendental) characteristic of anything that is: Regardless of its kind or species, every entity is intrinsically disclosed in its being (omne ens est verum).

Heidegger argues that while it is based on and is even aware of this second level of disclosure, metaphysics has no explicit understanding of disclosure-as-such or of its source in being-in-the-world. What is more, he claims that the disclosedness of entities-in-their-being (level 2) tends to overlook and obscure the very disclosure-as-such (level 1) that originally makes it possible. He further argues that there is an intrinsic hiddenness about disclosure-as-such, which makes overlooking it virtually inevitable. (See §6 below.)

Level 3: Being-in-the-world and the resultant pre-predicative disclosedness of entities as being-thus-and-so make it possible for us to enact the predicative disclosure of entities. At this third level of disclosure we are able to correctly represent to ourselves, in synthetic judgments and declarative sentences, the way things are in the world. A correct synthetic representation of a complex state of affairs (a correct judgment) is true, that is, disclosive of things just as they present themselves.

Such a predicative, apophantic sentence ("S is P") is able to be true only because world-disclosure has already presented an

entity as significant at all and thus allowed it to be taken as thus and so. This already disclosed entity is the binding norm against which the assertion must measure itself.

But at level 3 it is also possible to misrepresent things in thought and language, to fail to disclose them just as they present themselves in the world. At level 1 Dasein is always and only disclosive. But with predicative disclosure at level 3 (as analogously with hermeneutical disclosure at level 2) Dasein's representing of matters in propositional statements may be either disclosive or non-disclosive, either true or false.

One of Heidegger's reasons for elaborating the levels of disclosure is to demonstrate that science, metaphysics, and reason in general, all of which operate at level 3, are grounded in a more original occurrence of disclosure of which they are structurally unaware. This is what he intends by his claim "Science does not think." He does not mean scientists are stupid or their work uninformed, nor is he disparaging reason and its accomplishments. He means that science, by its very nature, is not focussed on being-in-the-world, even though being-in-the-world is ultimately responsible for the meaningful presence of the entities against which science measures its propositions.

5 Hiddenness, Ereignis, and the Turn

Hiddenness. Heidegger claims that disclosure-as-such -- the very opening up of significance in Dasein's being -- is intrinsically hidden and needs to remain so if entities are to be properly disclosed in their being. This intrinsic concealment of disclosure-as-such is called the "mystery." Since Heidegger sometimes calls disclosure-as-such "being itself," the phrase becomes "the mystery of being." The ensuing claim, that the mystery of being conceals itself while revealing entities, has led to much mystification, not least of all among Heideggerians. Being seems to become a higher but hidden Entity that performs strange acts that only the initiated can comprehend. This misconstrual of Heidegger's intentions is not helpful.

How may we understand the intrinsic concealment of disclosure-as-such? One way is to understand the paradigm of movement that informs Heidegger's discussion of revealing and concealing.

Taken in the broad philosophical sense, movement is defined not as mere change of place and the like, but as the very being of

entities that are undergoing the process of change. This kind of being consists in anticipating something absent, with the result that what is absent-but-anticipated determines the entity's present being. Anticipation is the being of such entities, and anticipation is determined from the absent-but-anticipated goal.

For example, the acorn's being is its becoming an oak tree; and correspondingly the future oak tree, as the goal of the acorn's trajectory, determines the acorn's present being. Likewise, Margaret is a graduate student insofar as she is in movement towards her Ph.D. The still-absent degree qua anticipated determines her being-a-student.

The absent is, by nature, hidden. But when it is anticipated or intended, the intrinsically hidden, while still remaining absent, becomes quasi-present. It functions as the "final cause" and raison d'être that determines the being of the anticipating entity. That is, even while remaining intrinsically concealed, the absent-as-anticipated "gives being" (Es gibt Sein) to the anticipating entity by disclosing the entity as what it presently is. This pattern of absence-dispensing-presence holds both for the disclosure of Dasein and for the disclosure of the entities Dasein encounters.

It holds preeminently for Dasein. Dasein's being is movement, for Dasein exists by anticipating its own absence. Dasein's death remains intrinsically hidden, but when anticipated, the intrinsically hidden becomes quasi-present by determining Dasein's being as mortal becoming. The absent, when anticipated, dispenses Dasein's finite presence.

The same holds for other entities. The anticipated absence determines Dasein's finite being. But Dasein's being is world-disclosive: it holds open the region of meaningful presence in which other entities are disclosed as being-this-or-that. Hence, the intrinsically hidden, when anticipated, determines the presence not only of Dasein but also of the entities Dasein encounters.

Therefore, the very structure of disclosure -- i.e., the fact that the absent-but-anticipated determines or "gives" finite presence -- entails that its ultimate source remain intrinsically hidden even while disclosing the being of entities. This intrinsic hiddenness at the core of disclosure is what Heidegger calls the "mystery." Heidegger argued that the "mystery" was the ultimate issue in philosophy, and he believed Heraclitus had said as much in his fragment no. 123: "Disclosure-as-such loves to hide."

Ereignis. The paradigm of movement also explains why Heidegger calls disclosure-as-such "Ereignis."

In ordinary German Ereignis means "event," but Heidegger uses it as a word for movement. Playing on the adjective eigen ("one's own"), he creates the word Ereignung: movement as the process of

being drawn into what is one's own. For example, we might imagine that the oak tree as final cause "pulls" the acorn into what it properly is, by drawing the acorn towards what it is meant to be. This being-pulled is the acorn's movement, its very being.

Likewise, Dasein is "claimed" by death as its final cause and "pulled forth" by it into mortal becoming. This being-drawn into one's own absence, in such a way that world is engendered and sustained, is what Heidegger calls "appropriation." It is what he means by Ereignis.

The word "Ereignis," along with the image of Dasein being appropriated by the absent, emerges in Heidegger's thought only in the 1930s. However, this later language echoes what Heidegger had earlier called Dasein's thrownness, viz., the fact that Dasein is thrust into possibilities, anticipates its self-absence, and so is "already" involved in world-disclosure. Both the earlier language of thrown anticipation of absence, and the later language of appropriation by absence, have the same phenomenon in view: Dasein's alreadiness, its constitutive mortality that makes for world-disclosure.

The paradigm of movement also helps to clarify Heidegger's claim about the concealing-and-revealing, or withdrawing-and-arriving, of being itself (that is, of disclosure-as-such). In a quite typical formulation Heidegger writes: "Being itself withdraws itself, but as this withdrawal, being is the 'pull' that claims the essence of human being as the place of being's own arrival" (Nietzsche II, 368). This sentence, which describes the structure of Ereignis, maybe be interpreted as follows:

The "withdrawal" of disclosure-as-such
(i.e., the intrinsic hiddenness of world-disclosive
absence)
maintains a relation to Dasein
(which we may call either "appropriation" or "thrown
anticipation")
that claims Dasein
(by appropriating it into mortal becoming)
so that, in Dasein's being,
(insofar as Dasein's being is the openness that is
world)
being itself might arrive
(in the form of the relations of significance whereby
entities have being-as-this-or-that).

The Turn. One can notice a certain shift within Heidegger's work beginning around 1930, both in his style and in the topics he addresses. As regards style, some have claimed his language becomes more abstruse and poetic, and his thinking less philosophical than mystical. As regards substance, he seems to introduce new topics like "appropriation" and the "history of being."

The problem is to discern whether these and other shifts count as what Heidegger calls the Turn (*die Kehre*). Some argue that beginning in the 1930s Heidegger radically changed his approach and perhaps even his central topic. The early Heidegger, so the argument goes, had understood being itself (i.e., disclosure-as-such) from the standpoint of Dasein, whereas the later Heidegger understands Dasein from the standpoint of being itself. But to the contrary it is clear that even the early Heidegger understood Dasein only from the standpoint of being itself.

Heidegger clarifies matters by distinguishing between (a) the Turn and (b) the change in thinking that the Turn demands, both of which are to be kept distinct from (c) the various shifts in form and focus that his philosophy underwent in the 1930s. The point is that, properly speaking, the Turn is not a shift in Heidegger's thinking nor a change in his central topic. The Turn is only a further specification of Ereignis. There are three issues here.

First, the "Turn" is a name for how Ereignis operates. Ereignis is the appropriation of Dasein for the sake of world-disclosure. For Heidegger, this fact stands over against all theories of the self as an autonomous subject that presuppositionlessly (i.e., without a prior world-disclosure) posits its objects in meaning. In opposition to that, Ereignis means that Dasein must already be appropriated into world-disclosive absence before anything can be significant at all.

Ereignis also means that Dasein's appropriation by, or thrownness into, world-disclosive absence is the primary and defining moment in Dasein's projection of that disclosure. This reciprocity (*Gegenschwung*) between appropriation/thrownness on the one hand and projection on the other -- with the priority going to appropriation/thrownness -- constitutes the very structure of Ereignis and is what Heidegger calls the Turn. The upshot of this reciprocity is that Dasein must be already pulled into world-disclosive absence (thrown or appropriated into it) if it is to project (i.e., hold open) disclosure at all. In a word, the Turn is Ereignis.

Secondly, the "change in thinking" refers to the personal conversion that the Turn demands. To become aware of the Turn and to accept it as determining one's own being is what Heidegger had earlier called "resolution" and what he now describes as "a transformation in human being." This transformation into an authentic self consists in letting one's own being be defined by the Turn.

Thirdly, the shifts in Heidegger's work in the 1930s -- and especially the development and deepening of his insights into thrownness and appropriation -- are just that: shifts and developments within a single, continuing project. Important as they are, they are neither the Turn itself nor the change in personal self-understanding that the Turn requires.

6 Forgetfulness, History, and Metaphysics

Heidegger sees a strong connection between the forgetting of disclosure-as-such, the history of the dispensations of being, and metaphysics.

Forgetting disclosure-as-such. Because disclosure-as-such is intrinsically hidden (this is what is meant by the mystery), it is usually overlooked. When the mystery is overlooked, human being is "fallen," that is, aware of entities as being-thus-and-so, but oblivious of what it is that "gives" being to entities. Fallenness is forgetfulness of the mystery. Another term for fallenness is "errancy," which conveys the image of Dasein "wandering" among entities-in-their-being without knowing what makes their presence possible. Since disclosure-as-such is sometimes called "being itself," fallenness is also called "the forgetfulness of being."

However, disclosure-as-such need not be forgotten. It is possible, in resolution, to assume one's mortality and become concretely aware of disclosure-as-such in its basic state of hiddenness. Such awareness does not undo the intrinsic hiddenness of disclosure-as-such or draw it into full presence. Rather, one accepts the concealment of being itself (this is called "letting being be") by resolutely accepting one's appropriation by absence.

The history of the dispensations of being. Heidegger's discussions of the "history of being" sometimes verge on the anthropomorphic, and he often uses etymologies that are difficult to carry over into English. Nevertheless, his purpose in all this is clear: to spell out the world-historical dimensions of fallenness.

As we have seen, disclosure-as-such "gives" the being of entities while the "giving" itself remains hidden; and this happens only insofar as Dasein is appropriated by absence. When one forgets the absence that appropriates Dasein, and thus forgets the hidden giving that brings forth the being of entities, fallenness and errancy ensue. Fallen Dasein then focusses on the given (entities-in-their-being) and overlooks the hidden giving (disclosure-as-such). Nonetheless, the hidden giving -- the "mystery" at the heart of disclosure-as-such -- still goes on giving, but now in a doubly hidden way: it is both intrinsically hidden and forgotten.

When the hiddenness is forgotten, a disclosure is called a "dispensation" (Geschick) of being. The word connotes a portioning-out that holds something back. A certain form of the

being of entities is dispensed while the disclosing itself remains both hidden and forgotten.

In German, "dispensation" (Geschick) and "history" (Geschichte) have their common root in the verb schicken, "to send." Playing on those etymologies, Heidegger elaborates a "history" of being, based on the "sendings" or "dispensations" of being. (The usual translations of Geschick as "fate" or "destiny" are not helpful here.)

In Heidegger's view each dispensation of being defines a distinct epoch in the history of thought from ancient Greece down to today. He calls the aggregate of such dispensations and epochs the "history of being." Because the whole of these dispensations and epochs is correlative to fallenness, Heidegger seeks to overcome the history of the dispensations being and return to an awareness of the hidden giving.

Heidegger believes the parameters of each epoch in the history of being can be glimpsed in the name that a major philosopher of the period gave to the being of entities in that age. A non-exhaustive list of such epoch-defining notions of being includes: idea in Plato, energeia in Aristotle, act in Aquinas, representedness in Descartes, objectivity in Kant, Absolute Spirit in Hegel, and will to power in Nietzsche. What characterizes each such epoch is (a) an understanding of being as some form of the presence of entities and (b) an oblivion of the absence that bestows such presence.

Nonetheless, even when forgotten the absence is never abolished, and thus traces of it remain in the various dispensations. Therefore, in studying the texts of classical philosophy Heidegger searches for and retrieves the unexpressed absence (the "unsaid") that hides behind what the text actually expresses (the "said").

Metaphysics. The various ways that presence or being has been dispensed, while absence has been overlooked, are called in their entirety "metaphysics." Heidegger argues that metaphysics as a philosophical position began with Plato and entered its final phase with Nietzsche.

The Greek philosophers who preceded Socrates and Plato were, in Heidegger's view, pre-metaphysical insofar as they had at least a penumbral awareness of disclosure-as-such and at least named it (Heraclitus, for example, called it logos, aletheia, and physis). However, none of these thinkers thematically addressed disclosure-as-such or understood the correlative notions of ek-sistence and Dasein.

Heidegger calls the penumbral awareness of disclosure-as-such among archaic Greek thinkers the "first beginning." And he hoped that a "new beginning" would follow the end of metaphysics. If the first beginning was not yet metaphysical, the new beginning will

be no longer metaphysical. Heidegger considered his own work a preparation for that new beginning.

But metaphysics persists. The history of the dispensations of being has reached its fullness in the present epoch of technology. As Heidegger uses the word, "technology" refers not to hardware or software or the methods and materials of applied science. Rather, "technology" names a dispensation in the history of metaphysics, in fact the final one. It names the way in which entities-in-their-being are disclosed today.

Heidegger maintains that in the epoch of technology entities are taken as a stockpile of matter that is, in principle, completely knowable by human reason and wholly available for human use. With this notion metaphysics arrives at its most extreme oblivion of disclosure-as-such. In our time, Heidegger says, the presence of entities has become everything, while the absence that brings about that presence has become nothing. He calls this nil-status of absence "nihilism."

Overcoming metaphysics. But Heidegger does see a glimmer of light in the dark epoch of nihilism. In this final dispensation of metaphysics, the hidden giving does not cease to function, even when it is completely forgotten. It continues dispensing presence -- paradoxically even the nihilistic presence which obscures the absence that gives it. Because the hidden giving goes on giving even when it is forgotten, we can still experience it today (in a mood not unlike dread) and retrieve it. This recovery of world-disclosive absence requires resolution or, as Heidegger now calls it, "the entrance into Ereignis."

To enter Ereignis today is to experience a different kind of nihil ("nothing") from the one that defines nihilism. The absence that bestows presence is itself a kind of "nothing" (not-a-thing). This absence is no entity, nor can it be reduced to the being of any specific entity or be present the way an entity is. That is why it is so easily overlooked. Its "nothingness" is its intrinsic hiddenness.

To enter Ereignis is to become aware of and to accept the disclosive nihil that rescues one from nihilism. Thereupon, says Heidegger, metaphysics as the history of the dispensations of being ceases and a new beginning takes place -- at least for those individuals who achieve authenticity by way of resolution. But metaphysics will continue for those who remain inauthentic, because dispensation is correlative to fallenness.

Summary: The forgetting of disclosure-as-such is metaphysics. Metaphysics knows entities-in-their-being but ignores the very giving of that being. The aggregate of the epochs of metaphysics is the history of the dispensations of being. The history of these dispensations culminates in the epoch of technology and nihilism. But world-disclosive absence can still be retrieved; and when it is retrieved, it ushers in (at least for authentic individuals) a

new beginning of ek-sistence and Dasein.

7 The Work of Art

One of Heidegger's most challenging essays is "The Origin of the Work of Art," originally drafted in 1935 and published in an expanded version only in 1950. There he distinguishes between the work of art as a specific entity (for example, a poem or a painting) and art itself, the latter being understood not as a collective name for, but rather as the essence and origin of, all works of art. Heidegger asks what art itself is, and he finds the answer to be: a unique kind of disclosure.

Dasein is disclosive of the being of an entity in many ways, some of them ordinary and some of them extraordinary. An outcome common to both kinds of disclosure is that the disclosed entity is seen as what it is: it appears in its form.

Examples of ordinary, everyday ways of disclosing the being of entities include showing oneself to be adept at the flute, or molding clay into a vase, or concluding that the accused is innocent. Each of these ordinary cases of praxis, production, and theory does indeed disclose some entity as being this or that, but the focus is on showing what the entity is rather than on showing how the entity's being is disclosed.

On the other hand, extraordinary acts of disclosure bring to attention not only the disclosed entity but above all the event of disclosure of that entity's being. Extraordinary acts of disclosure let us see the very fact that, and the way in which, an entity has become meaningfully present in its being. In these cases not only does an entity appear in its form (as happens in any instance of disclosure) but more importantly the very disclosure of the entity "is established" (sich einrichten) in an entity and is seen there as such.

Heidegger lists five examples of extraordinary disclosure: the constitution of a nation-state; the nearness of god; the giving of one's life for another; the thinker's questioning as revealing that being can be questioned; and the "installation" (Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen) of disclosure in a work of art. Each of these cases discloses, in its own particular way, not just an entity but the very disclosure of that entity's being. Heidegger seeks to understand the particular way in which art itself discloses disclosure by "installing" disclosure in the work of art.

In his essay Heidegger refers mainly to two works of art: van Gogh's canvas "Old Shoes," painted in Paris in 1886-1887 and now hung in the Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam; and the 5th century

B.C.E. Doric Temple of Hera II -- the so-called Temple of Poseidon -- at Paestum (Lucania), Italy. We shall focus on the temple at Paestum as we attempt to answer two questions: What gets disclosed in a work of art? and How does it get disclosed?

(1) What gets disclosed in a work of art? Heidegger gives three answers. First, a work of art lets us see disclosure in the form of "world" and "earth." A work of art discloses not just an entity or an ensemble of entities but the whole realm of significance whereby an ensemble of entities gets its finite meaning. The temple at Paestum not only houses (and thus discloses) the goddess Hera, but more importantly lets us see the social and historical world -- rooted as it was in the natural setting of Lucania -- that Hera's presence guaranteed for the Greek colonists. A work of art, Heidegger argues, reveals the very event of disclosure, which event he calls the happening of world and earth, where "earth" refers not only to nature and natural entities but more broadly to all entities within a specific world.

Secondly, a work of art lets us see the radical tension that discloses a specific world of significance. Heidegger understands being-in-the-world as a "struggle" (Streit or polemos) between a given world and its earth, between the self-expanding urge of a set of human possibilities and the rootedness of such possibilities in a specific natural environment. Here, "struggle" is another name for the event of disclosure whereby a particular world is opened up and maintained. What a specific work of art discloses is one particular struggle that discloses one particular world -- for instance, the world of the Greek colonists at Paestum.

Thirdly, a work of art shows us disclosure-as-such. The movement of opening up a particular world is only one instance of the general movement of aletheia: the "wresting" of being-at-all from the absolute absence into which Dasein is appropriated. Thus a work of art not only shows us a particular world-disclosive struggle (the way the temple of Hera shows us the earth-world tension at Paestum) but also lets us see the "original struggle" (Urstreit) of disclosure-as-such, whereby significance is wrested from the double closure of intrinsic hiddenness and fallenness.

In short, what a work of art reveals is disclosure in three forms: as world and earth; as the struggle that opens up a specific world and lets its entities be meaningful; and as the original struggle that structures all such particular disclosures.

(2) How does a work of art disclose disclosure? The specific way that art discloses disclosure is by "installing" it in a given work of art. Here, "to install" means to bring to stability; and "to install disclosure" means to incorporate it into the physical form of a work of art. There are three corollaries.

What the installing is not: Heidegger does not claim that the work of art "sets up" the world and "sets forth" the earth for the

first time. That is, installing the disclosure of earth and world in the work of art is not the only or even the first way that earth and world get disclosed. The sanctuary of Hera was not the first to open up the world of Paestum and disclose the fields and flocks for what they are. Tradesmen and farmers had been doing that -- i.e., the disclosive struggle of world and earth had been bestowing form and meaning -- for at least a century before the temple was built.

What the installing is and does: Art discloses, in a new and distinctive way, a disclosure of earth and world that is already operative. Heidegger argues that the temple as disclosive (a) captures and sustains the openness of that world and its rootedness in nature, and (b) shows how, within that world, nature comes forth into the form of natural entities while remaining rooted in itself. Heidegger calls these two functions, which happen only in art, the "setting up" of world and the "setting forth" of earth.

The work of art lets us see -- directly, experientially, and in all its glory -- the already operative interplay of human history's rootedness in nature and nature's emergence into human history. In Heidegger's words, art "stabilizes" (zum Stehen bringen) the disclosive struggle of world and earth by "installing" it in a particular work of art, such that, in and through that medium, disclosure "shines forth" brilliantly in beauty.

The two ways art discloses disclosure, and their unity: Art itself is a specific and distinctive way that Dasein is disclosive: it discloses disclosure by installing it in the physical form of a work of art. This installation has two moments: the creation and the preservation of the work of art.

Creation is an artist's Dasein-activity of incorporating disclosure -- the world-openness that is already operative -- into a material medium (stone, color, language, etc.). This incorporation of disclosure is carried out in such a way that the material medium is not subordinated to anything other than disclosure (for example, it is not subordinated to "usefulness"). Rather, the medium becomes, for whoever experiences it, the immediate disclosure of disclosure.

Preservation is the corresponding Dasein-activity of maintaining the power of disclosure in the work of art by resolutely letting disclosure continue to be seen there. Creation and preservation are the two ways that Dasein "projects" (holds open and sustains) the disclosure that is installed in the work of art. The unity of creation and preservation is art itself, which Heidegger calls Dichtung -- not "poetry" but poiesis, the creating-and-preserving installation of disclosure in a disclosive medium.

Disclosure is the central topic of all Heidegger's

philosophy, and this fact shines brilliantly through his reflection on the origin of the work of art. Art, both as creation and as preservation, is a specific and distinctive Dasein-activity: the disclosure of disclosure in a medium that is disclosive. In the work of art, as in Heidegger's own work, it's aletheia all the way down.

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