

***Hermeneia and Apophansis:*  
The early Heidegger on Aristotle**

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[p. 67]

**I**

Aristotle's treatment of *logos apophantikos* is found within the treatise that bears the title *Peri Hermeneias*, *On Hermeneia*. And it was to this treatise -- or, more accurately, to the first four sections of it -- that the early Heidegger turned again and again in his courses during the 1920s in an effort to retrieve from this phenomenon a hidden meaning.

*On Hermeneia* is a treatise about the general forms of declarative sentences, sentences that claim, rightly or wrongly, to present things in words just as those things are in reality. The first four of the fourteen sections of *On Hermeneia* are introductory. They lead into the subject matter by discussing: the relation of thought and language, and the possibility of propositional truth and falsehood (section 1); the definitions of nouns and verbs (section 2) and of sentences in general (section 3); and the definition of declarative sentences (propositions, judgments, assertions) in particular (section 4). The remaining ten sections of the treatise discuss the forms of propositions with regard to their quality (affirmative and negative judgments), their quantity (universal, indefinite, and particular judgments), and their modality (assertions about existence, necessity, and mere possibility).

*On Hermeneia* is the second work within Aristotle's five so-called logical treatises that Byzantine scholars collected under the title *Organon* as a "tool" or "instrument" for scientific thought. As such, *On Hermeneia*, like the four other "logical" works, seems to stand outside of philosophy as a methodological antechamber. Heidegger, of course, vigorously contests this state of affairs and calls for the restoration of logic to its rightful place within ontology, the science of beingness (*GA* 24, 253f.).

Be that as it may, the five treatises of the *Organon* appear to fall into three groups, each group corresponding to one of what medieval thinkers, Thomas Aquinas in particular, called the three acts of the intellect. The [p. 68] first act of the intellect is the simple act of apprehending the essence of *ousia* of a thing in an idea -- what Aristotle calls *he ton adiaireton noesis* (*On the Soul*, G, 6, 430 a 27) -- an idea which is expressible in a term, predicate, or category and concerning which there is no falsehood (*ouk esti to pseudos, ibid.*). Corresponding to this act of the intellect is Aristotle's book *The Categories*.

The second act of the intellect is the complex one of synthesizing a predicate with a subject (*synthesis noematon hosper hen onton* 430 a 27) in order to posit something about something (*ti kata tinou legein*). The resultant synthesis is expressible in a declarative sentence that may be either false or true (*kai to pseudos kai to alethes*). Corresponding to this second act of the intellect is Aristotle's treatment of the forms of declarative sentences, *On Hermeneia*.

The third act of the intellect is the act of discursive reasoning, the linking up of sentences with each other in syllogisms, whether deductive or inductive, in order to arrive at new opinions or beliefs. Deductive syllogisms are studied with regard to their form and with regard to their matter in, respectively, the *Prior Analytics* and the *Posterior Analytics*, and inductive reasoning is discussed in the *Topics* and in *Sophistical Refutations*.

## II

In *On Hermeneia* Aristotle's concern with the question of truth (*aletheia*) is, at best, indirect and narrow. It is indirect insofar as the treatise is focused on the forms of sentences that make claims to truth or falsehood rather than on the nature of truth itself. And the concern with truth is narrow insofar as the treatise touches on only one kind of truth, what we may call, at some risk, scientific truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, is interested in the treatise only insofar as it can tell him something basic about "truth," both as an ontic condition (*aletheia* as *on hos alethes*) and as a human performance (*aletheuein* as a power of *psyche*). Since Heidegger's interpretation of the treatise is phenomenological in the broadest sense, his goal is to discover something about the givenness (*ousia/parousia*) of entities and about how human beings enact the givenness of entities. And to the degree that his interpretation is "deconstructive," he seeks to show that the performance of truth discussed in the treatise (namely, *apophansis*: propositional judging or asserting) is not the original performance of truth, and that the kind of truth that appears in such judgments is only one form of truth, in fact a derived one.

Heidegger finds in the Aristotelian corpus a hierarchy of enactments of *aletheia* (the givenness or disclosedness of things). The first and primary locus of the enactment of such givenness is entities themselves as self-giving [p. 69] or autodisclosive (*on alethes*). That is, distinct from and even prior to human acts of co-performing the givenness of things, the very essence of entities is to appear; by nature they are phenomena. The second and derived locus of the enactment of the givenness of entities is the human essence taken as the power to co-perform that givenness (*a-letheuein*). But the primary mode of the human co-performance of givenness is not judgment but intuition, whether sensuous or noetic, because intuition presents its object immediately and without the possibility of falsehood. Sensuous intuition always aims at its proper object (*to idion*) and in that sense is always disclosive (*On the Soul*, G, 3 427 b 11). Noetic intuition (cf. *Metaphysics* Theta, 10) discloses its proper object by just "seeing" or "touching" (*thigein*) it. *Noesis* discovers and never covers over (*pseudesthai*); at worse it is not error but simply non-seeing (*agnoein*).

After intuition, both sensuous and noetic, comes *logos* as a mode of the human co-performance of the givenness of entities. But within *logos* Heidegger himself emphasizes the preverbal over the verbal functions, and within the preverbal he privileges the "practical" *logos*-virtues (*phronesis* and *techne*) over the "theoretical" (*nous*, *episteme*, *sophia*). In short, the result of Heidegger's re-reading of the of the enactment of givenness in the Aristotelian corpus is:

1. the location of the primary enactment of the givenness of entities within those entities themselves, in their very essence as self-givenness, and
2. the recognition of a hierarchy of modes of the secondary, human co-performance of givenness, namely,
  - 2a. non-synthetic disclosure (noetic, sensuous),
  - 2b. preverbal synthetic disclosure (practical, technical, intellectual), and
  - 2c. verbal synthetic disclosure (the proposition or judgment: *logos apophantikos*).

For Heidegger, although apophantic statements certainly do co-perform the givenness of things, neither that performance nor the givenness that it achieves is original enough. Nonetheless, insofar as *some* modality of the givenness of entities is co-performed in a *logos apophantikos*, we should be able to find in the structure that underlies *apophansis* the clues to a more original -- perhaps even *the* original -- human co-performance of disclosedness.

For the early Heidegger the clue to any such discussion of *aletheuein* and *aletheia* remained the question of *logos*. In the opening pages of *Sein und Zeit* (hereinafter: *SZ*) he traces out the first steps of his approach to resolving the question about the essence of *ousia*, the meaning of the givenness of things:

The problematic of Greek ontology (like any other ontology) must take its clues from human openness [*Dasein*]. Both in ordinary and in [p. 70] philosophical usage, [the Greeks] defined openness, the essence of human being, as *zoion logon echon*, the living entity whose essence is essentially defined by the ability to speak. *Legein* is the clue to arriving at the essential structures of the entities we encounter in speech and discussion. (*GA* 2, 34 = *SZ* 25).

But Heidegger goes on to say that the *logos* which governs phenomenology in general and the phenomenology of human existence in particular "has the character of *hermeneuein*" (*SZ* 37) in the primordial sense of *Kundgebung* and *Auslegung*: communicating, spelling out, making manifest, i.e. *aletheuein* and (in a broad sense) *apophainesthai* (*SZ* 33). Hence the general direction of the early Heidegger's approach is set out: through *logos* as *hermeneia* to the co-performance of *ousia/aletheia*. Therefore, in our own efforts to penetrate to the core of Heidegger's analysis of *apophansis* in Aristotle, we shall take *hermeneia* as our clue.

### III

The word *hermeneia* is widely used throughout Aristotle's works, and it has several meanings. Strangely enough, however, in the treatise *On Hermeneia*, where we might most expect it to be clarified, the word itself, apart from its appearance in the title, does not show up at all. Neither does the verb *hermeneuo*, the noun *hermeneutes*, or the adjective *hermeneutikos*. What, then, does *hermeneia* mean?

One might be tempted to think that *hermeneia* in Aristotle means "hermeneutics," that is, a second-order exegesis, explanation, or "translation" of such first-order activities as actions, declarations, or texts. Or, further, one might think *hermeneia* means the third-order activity of working out methodologies for such second-order explanations. In fact, at *SZ* 37-8 Heidegger

does list these as two possible meanings of *Hermeneutik*. Concerning hermeneutics as a second-order activity, he mentions "working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends," as well as "the methodology of the science of history."

But neither of these is the meaning of *hermeneia* in the treatise *On Hermeneia* or, for that matter, in any other treatise of Aristotle's. For one thing, there is not a word about exegesis, translation, interpretation, or methodology in the treatise *On Hermeneia*. For another, if these matters had been the subject of this treatise, its title most likely would have come down to us not as *Peri Hermeneias* but as *Peri hermeneutikes* (as an [p. 71] abbreviation of *Peri tes technes hermeneutikes*) and, in Latin, not as *De interpretatione* but as *De interpretativa* (= *De [arte] interpretativa*) or even as *De exegetica* (= *De [arte] exegetica*, from *Peri [tes technes] exegetikes*). Let us say, then, quite simply, that *On Hermeneia* is not about "hermeneutics" in the usual sense that term has today.

What, then, can we say positively about the meaning of *hermeneia* in the title and, implicitly, in the text of "*On Hermeneia*"? The noun *hermeneia* (or the verb *hermeneuo*) in Aristotle has a generic meaning and two specifications. Generically it means expression, manifestation, or communication (*semainein*). In increasingly determinate specification it can then mean: verbal *semainein*, called *lexis* or *dialectos*; and declarative verbal *semainein*, called *apophansis* or *logos apophantikos*. That is:

<i>hermeneia</i> -1	[ <i>semainein</i> ]:	self-expression or communication in any form;
<i>hermeneia</i> -2	[ <i>legein</i> ]:	self-expression or communication in discourse;
<i>hermeneia</i> -3	[ <i>apophainesthai</i> ]:	self-expression or communication in declarative sentences.

This threefold meaning structures the introductory four sections of the treatise *On Hermeneia*. There Aristotle moves systematically from *semainein* in general, to *legein* as a particular form of *semainein*, to *logos apophantikos* as yet a further specification. The remainder of the treatise (sections 5-14) parses out the various forms of *apophansis*, but Heidegger almost never deals with those sections. Rather, he prefers to remain with the introduction, and his commentary generally retraces Aristotle's steps. But Heidegger's intention, of course, is to find out what judgment conceals. Therefore his interpretation, as a deconstruction and a retrieve, moves in the opposite direction: from judgment (*hermeneia*-3) to language in general (*hermeneia*-2), to the question of "sign" (*hermeneia*-1) -- or better: from propositional truth, to the as-factor, to transcendence -- in order then to step back to what we may term *hermeneia*-0, not as a higher genus than self-expression but rather as that which makes any and all forms of self-expression possible, *Hermeneia*-0 is what Heidegger in 1925 called [*das*] *schon verstehende Sichbewegen*" of human existence, the movement of authentic temporality, which is the meaning of transcendence: "*eine eigentümliche Bewegung..., die das Dasein selbst ständig macht*" (GA 21, 146f.). Heidegger's overarching purpose is, as he says at SZ 166, to show that the theory of meaning (*Bedeutungslehre*) is rooted in the ontology of human existence.

[p. 72] We now take up the three meanings of *hermeneia* in Aristotle, and we link them up at each stage with Heidegger's interpretation.

## IV

*Hermeneia-1*, the broadest and most general sense of the term in Aristotle, means to make manifest and therefore understandable, hence to communicate. In this broadest sense *hermeneia* need not be communication in sound (it could be by a gesture of the hand or the raising of an eyebrow); and if it is in sound, it need not be in the articulate sounds of human language (it could be the roar of a lion or the chirping of a cricket). *Hermeneia-1* means the same as *semainein* in the basic sense of indicating something to another (*ti deloun*, *On Hermeneia*, 17 a 18), with the overtones of both intelligibility and sociality. This basic meaning perdures (granted, with a very different root) in the Latin word *interpretari*. The verb root *pretari* (which does not exist independently in Latin but only with the prefix *inter*, "among" goes back to the Sanskrit *prath*: to spread out and thus to make flat or plain. *Prath* underlies such Greek words as *platus* (broad), *platos* (extension), and *plateia* (open space, plaza, piazza). The connotation of *interpretari* is: to lay out in the clear (cf. the etymology of the English word "ex-plain": to flatten out, make plain, make clear).

For Aristotle *hermeneia-1*, the power of *semainein*, extends even to animals. In *The Parts of Animals* he says that birds, when they sing, use their tongues *pros hermeneian allelois*: for the purpose of communicating to one another (B, 17, 66 a 35). And in the *Politics* he notes that the sounds animals make are a sign (*semeion*) of their sorrow and pleasure and that animals use their voices to communicate these feelings to each other (*tauta semainein allelois*; A, 1, 1253 a 8 ff.).

The condition for the possibility of *hermeneia* in this most basic sense of communication is only that an entity be *empsychon* at least at the animal level and therefore have the possibility of revelatory openness to other entities in *pathos* and *phantasia*, that is, that it have, to some extent, world. And that which is communicated in *hermeneia-1* is *what* an entity has of world and *how* it has world at all. *Hermeneia-1* communicates *pathemata* (Latin, *affectus*), not, however, as "mental representations" of the world. Rather, it communicates the content and form of its having of world. If we may invent a phrase, *hermeneia-1* communicates *to on echomenon* in the double sense of the entity that is had and the mode of the having of the entity. This usage is consonant with Heidegger's interpretation of *ousia* as the "had-ness" of the entities one has, and [p. 73] I introduce it in order to undercut the notion that *pathemata* are "interior states" that one discovers by supposedly looking "inside" in some kind of introspection. If there is any "interiority" here at all, it lies entirely in the opposite direction. The supposed interiority of *psyche* is its exteriority or openness to the other. The nature of *pathos* is such openness, such having-of-world, and if there is a difference between the ways animals and human beings have world, that difference is interior to *pathos* itself. Human beings have a unique way of living otherness, not because they can supposedly withdraw into some form of interiority where impressions are processed. Rather, human *psyche*, for all its asymptotic self-presence, is even more exteriorized, more *pathetike*, than is the animal's, for the human being, in knowing the other as this or that, knows it *as other* and, even more, knows itself as the locus of the as-factor that registers such otherness.

To anticipate for a moment: We have used the general term *to on echomenon* to characterize the content of any *pathos*, whether animal or human: but the specific and proper content of human *psyche* is *to on legomenon*. This is a difficult phrase in Aristotle; and the difficulty is enhanced by the fact that the Latins sometimes translated it as *ens rationis*, with overtones of a "mental entity" as a representation or image of an *ens naturae*. Heidegger, however, interprets *on legomenon* as an entity considered insofar as it is within *logos* -- in the most formal terms, a phenomenologically reduced entity, an "innerworldly entity" already bound up with human projects, questions, doubts, illuminations. *On legomenon* points outside, to the human eye that sees, to the hand that grasps, to the social world of human intercourse, to the future where we live in our possibilities.

But Aristotle seems to give a contrary impression when, in speaking of *hermeneia-2* (human speech) at the beginning of *On Hermeneia*, he says that words are *semeia* of *pathemata* in

the *psyche*, just as *pathemata* are *homoiomata* of *pragmata* in the world. But for Heidegger, this is not a theory of mental representations. Rather, *psyche* always comports having-world in some way or another, even in the animal way. For human beings the specific form of *psyche*, namely, *Faktizität* and *Befindlichkeit*, comports being-in-the-world. Therefore, the *pathemata* that are communicated in words are the moments of the human being's affects in the world (both that which affects and the being-affected itself) but never "ideas" as mental images.

Moreover, according to Heidegger, the *homoiosis* of *pathemata* and *pragmata* has to do with the incorporation of entities into the world of human purposes and projects, such that the *Woraufhin* of entities is the same as the *Worin* of human existence (SZ 86). This is Heidegger's interpretation [p. 74] of the Aristotelian dictum that in knowledge the knower and the known are identical in act (*to auto kat'energeian*: *On the Soul*, G, 5, 430 a 20 and 7, 431 a 1). In other words, the import of Heidegger's interpretation of *semainein*, especially at the human level, lies in its rereading of the semantic character of signs. "Signs," Heidegger writes, "always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something" (SZ 80). Thus words are signs not of mental images but of being-in-the-world.

## V

The second and narrower sense of *hermeneia* is in fact the one that Aristotle privileges throughout his work: articulated *linguistic* self-expression and communication. In *On Sophistical Refutations* 4, 166 b 11, 15, Aristotle describes *hermeneia-2* as *ti tei lexei semainein*: to indicate or express something in speech, *lexis* (the Latin *locutio*), for which Aristotle uses equally the word *dialektos* (Latin *articulatio*). If the first meaning of *hermeneia* focused our attention on the key term *semainein*, this second meaning calls our attention to the word *logos*. That is to say, whereas *hermeneia-1* was a possibility for any entity that had an animal *psyche* with *pathos* and *phantasia*, *hermeneia-2* belongs only to *zoion to ton logon echon*. Or to reverse the proposition, human nature may be defined as a specific form of *hermeneia*: The genus of human beings is *pathos* and his specific difference is the power of *logos*. This means, finally, that a human being is the *pathos* that can speak, indeed that can speak itself *as pathos*: beyond itself, othered, decentered. Which is another way of saying that human beings, qua openness (*Dasein*), can have a conscience.

Before it indicates speech or word or the faculty of discursive thinking, *logos* means a relation or bond between two things. The basic meaning of *legein* is to collect or gather (cf. *karpologos*, a fruit picker, or in Aristophanes, *andres korpologoi*, dung-collectors ["Peace," 9]). But *legein* means not only to collect or synthesize into a unity but also to bring forth the synthesized. In its unity, for understanding (GA 9, 279). In Fragment 93 Heraclitus says that the Lord Apollo, whose oracle is at Delphi, *oute legei, oute kryptei*.... The parallelism of *legein* and *kryptein* shows that *legein* means the *disclosure* (un-hiding) of what has been gathered together. *Logos*: synthetic disclosure, and for that reason disclosure that can take the form of speech, where nouns and verbs are synthesized for the purpose of expressing one's *pathos*, one's disclosive submission to the world.

Aristotle holds, as we have seen, that animals are capable of some [p. 75] degree of *semainein*: they too can give something forth to be "understood" by another. That is, even the inarticulate noises of animals (*agrammatoi psophoi*: *On Hermeneia*, 16 a 28; cf. *The History of Animals*, 400 a 33) can be *phonai semantikai*. But what is it that separates such "indicative voicings" from meaningful nouns, verbs, and sentences? What is the difference between a *pathos* that can merely express itself and a *pathos* that can actually speak?

What differentiates human beings from animals lies the changed character of the *semainein* and, deeper still, of the *pathos*. *Pathos* in the undifferentiated sense is world-openness. It is the first condition of animal *psyche*: the ability to have the world appear to one (cf. *meta phantasias*: *On the Soul* B 8, 420 b 33) or, as Heidegger puts it, to be captured by the world (*GA* 29-30, 344ff.). But in discussing the kind of *semainein* that distinguishes human being, Aristotle in the second section of *On Hermeneia* uses two words that Heidegger takes as clues to the condition of the possibility of language:

(1) *Syntheke*: Aristotle says that, whereas some animals are capable of indicating their *pathe* in sound, those *phonai* are *semantikai* by nature (*physei*, 16 a 27) and as an instrument (*organon*, 17 a 1) of nature. However, a human sound such as a noun or verb signifies by convention or consensus (*semantike kata syntheken*, 16 a 19 and 27).

(2) *Symbolon*: Just after the second usage of *kata syntheken*, and as if in apposition to it and in contrast to signification by nature, Aristotle states the condition of the possibility of such convention or coming-together: Sounds become words *hotan genetai symbolon* (16 a 28). Here is the key phrase that Heidegger takes as delineating the specific nature of human *pathos* and the birth of human *semainein*. Human nature is born only when *symbolon* emerges.

In ordinary fifth-century usage a *symbolon* referred to each of the two halves of an object - originally a knucklebone or vertebratum, later other objects such as rings - that two parties to an agreement (= *symbole*) had broken between them, each party keeping one piece as proof of identification. In that case, *ymbalein* meant to put the two pieces together to consummate the contract; and in general it meant to unite or synthesize, even to collect, like *legein*. Here in Aristotle's text Heidegger translates *symbolon* - taken as the ground of *syntheke* - to mean: the state of being held together (*Zusammengehaltenwerden*) such that meaning (*Meinen*) and agreement (*übereinkommen*) come about.

Human beings, by their very nature, hold themselves together with something else insofar as they relate to another entity and, on the basis of this relation to the other, can intend this other as such. (*GA* 29-30, 446) [p. 76]

and:

What Aristotle saw under the rubric of *symbolon* - what he saw darkly and approximately and without giving any explanation, but with the insight of a genius - is nothing other than what today we call *transcendence*. Speech happens only in an entity that, by its very nature, *transcends*. That is the meaning of the Aristotelian thesis: A *logos* is *kata syntheken* [17 a 1f.] (*ibid.*, 447)

According to Heidegger, it is to the complex happening of *symbolon* as transcendence that the conventional words of a language accrue (rather than physical sounds getting "invested" with intelligible meaning); and it is this transcendence, one's being-in-the-world, that the words express. Moreover, the specific words are not only established by agreement but also are ordered to effect agreement. Thus at 16 b 20f. Aristotle adds, almost in passing, a phrase that illumines the teleology of language: *Hitesi gar ho legon ten dianoian, kai ho akousas eremesen*: The speaker brings his discursive powers to rest (in the word with its power of signification), and the listener agrees. *Symbolon* as transcendence not only underlies the whole realm of *syntheke* - social agreement and convention - but in fact exists to effect it.

This particular dimension of sociality is borne out as well by Aristotle's insistence that *hermeneia-2* is not a matter of natural necessity but of well-being, the good-for-man (*he d'hermeneia heneka tou eu*: *On the Soul*, B 8 420 b 20). The range of *logos*, and therefore of

*hermeneia-2*, is vast, and Aristotle implies that the field of its purposefulness extends, like sensation, as wide as does *to eu* (*On Sense*, 437 a 1). The multiplicity of living forms of *logos* (for example, the various forms of persuasion) and not just of *logos* as assertion, was dealt with in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (cf. 17 a 5f.), which Heidegger reads as a treatise on the sociality of *Dasein qua* transcendence:

Aristotle investigates the *pathe* in the second book of his *Rhetoric*. Contrary to the traditional approach to rhetoric, which conceives of it as an academic discipline, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* must be understood as the first systematic hermeneutic of everyday social existence. (SZ 138)

## VI

There is in *On Hermeneia* a decisive narrowing of *logos* and *hermeneia* in the direction of one privileged form of expression and disclosure: *apophansis*. This is the meaning of *hermeneia-3*, and it takes the form of asserting an opinion about a state of affairs with the possibility that the [p. 77] claim may or may not be correct. Aristotle calls that kind of sentence a *logos apophantikos*, a declarative sentence (17 a 1-3). This is the exact meaning of the title of Aristotle's treatise: *Peri Hermeneias* means *Peri Logou Apophantikou*: Concerning (the forms of) declarative sentences.

What kind of showing or *apophansis* is operative in a *logos apophantikos*? In a rough kind of literalism *apo-phansis* means "showing-from," like the Latin "*de-monstratio*," and in fact *apophanesthai* can have the broad and neutral meaning of "to show."

But the specificity of *apophansis* as it is used in *On Hermeneia* lies in the *apo-*. Any *logos* (sentence), insofar as it is meaningful, puts forth a synthesis of *pathemata* for consideration and, in that sense, shows (expresses, communicates) something in speech. In considering *hermeneia-2* we saw this kind of showing to be the general characteristic of any *lexis* at all, and it is operative even in, for example, the prayer "Please save me" or the wish "Would that I were king." But a *logos apophantikos* does more. The very structure of a declarative sentence expresses the claim that it is showing that which is being alleged *just as* it is in reality. Of course the claim is, in a Husserlian sense, an "empty" one that has the possibility of being fulfilled or not, supposedly by a check of reality. But in *On Hermeneia* Aristotle does not consider how one might check it out. Which is to say that *On Hermeneia* considers only the form or forms of declarative sentences along with their empty claims to truth and the very real possibility that they will be shown to be false.

Insofar as we are dealing only with the *form* of the declarative sentence, we are being directed into the knotty issue of the relationship of the subject and the verb of the sentence and specifically into the grammatological question of the mode or mood (*egklisis*, "inclination"; Latin, *modus*) of the verb, expressed in its conjugated form. We cannot go into that here except to note that the main focus of *On Hermeneia* is on the one particular verb-mode of the indicative, what the later Greeks called *he horistike egklisis*, the form of the verb that expresses the intention to determine (*horizein*) things, i.e., to present them as they are, within their *horos*. (The Latins called this mode by a number of names: *indicativus*, *pronuntiativus*, *definitivus*, *finitivus*). Heidegger himself implicitly expresses the formal intention of *apophansis* taken in this sense when, in "What is Metaphysics?," he defines the attitude of scientific research:

...[I]t gives the subject-matter itself - explicitly and solely - the first and last word. This dedication to the subject-matter in questioning, defining, and grounding entails a peculiarly delimited submission to entities themselves, in order that these entities might reveal themselves. (GA 9, 104)

[p. 78] In *On Hermeneia* Aristotle is interested only in statements directed to *pragmata*, sentences that appeal to the listener to give consent to the asserted content because of the nature of *to pragma auto* as it evidences itself, and not because one's feelings have been swayed by the eloquence of an orator or the beauty of a poem or the exigencies of religious convictions. That is why Aristotle in *On Hermeneia* focuses his attention on declarative sentences in the indicative mood.

How, then, does a *logos apophantikos* show a *pragma*? What structure allows the showing to take place? The peculiarity of apophantic sentences (and for this reason they cannot be the primary co-performance of disclosure) is not that they can be true, but that they can be either false or true. The falsifiability of the truth-claim of apophantic sentences is the crucial point. An apophantic sentence has a specific claim-character. Not only does the sentence catch the listener's attention, as Aristotle says (16 b 20 f.) and call upon him or her to assent. Rather, it also makes the claim that *what* it is giving the listener to think about is in reality as it is presented in speech. Apophantic sentences are those that present a state of affairs as being true or false, whether or not the state of affairs is in fact the way the sentence presents it.

Aquinas puts this succinctly in the Prooemium to his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*. *Interpretatio* in the real and full sense, he says, is not a matter simply of verbally proposing something for consideration (Boethius' *vox...quae per se aliquid significat*) but rather entails proposing something as true or false ([*exponere*] *aliquid esse verum vel falsum*). The real interpreter is one who makes a claim for what he or she shows. The claim could be correct or incorrect (in which case the interpreter, as interpreter, would be right or wrong). But in either case, what constitutes the possibility of correct *hermeneia* is the same as what constitutes the possibility of incorrect *hermeneia*: the structure of composing and dividing (*synthesis*, *diairesis*). Aristotle says that falsehood (and therefore truth in the narrow sense of correctness) is possibly only where there is *synthesis*, and he adds that *synthesis* in itself is also a *diairesis* (*On the Soul*, G 5, 430 b 1 ff.). It is not the case that affirmative judgments compose the subject and the predicate, whereas negative judgments divide them. Rather, composition and division both occur in every judgment, whether affirmative or negative, whether true or false. Hence, *synthesis* and *diairesis*, whatever that might be, is the condition for the possibility of both correct and incorrect *hermeneia*.

That is, in *apophansis* I assert something about something (*ti kata tinos legein*). I perform an explicit act of synthesis in that I predicate a quality of the subject matter or simply the existence of non-existence of [p. 79] it. Of course, in the very act of predicative synthesis I also perform the distinction between the predicate and the subject. In the most obvious example, "Socrates is human," I certainly synthesize "Socrates" and "humanness," but in the very act of synthesizing ("Socrates is *one* human being") I recognize that humanness is not exhausted in Socrates but is repeatable in a potential infinity of other subjects, and thus, without separating them, I keep the subject and predicate distinct. The unity of the bivalence of showing-[S and P]-as-belonging-together and showing-them-as-distinct (*synthesis* and *diairesis*) is what Heidegger designates the unified as-structure.

Once Heidegger had moved back from *apophansis* to its root in the bivalent apophantic as, the door was open for him to shift the discourse one step deeper to the hermeneutical as. The strategy that comes to the fore in *SZ* is clear, and I need not belabor it here. Briefly: To know an entity in the practical mode of comportment entails knowing that entity as for such and such a purpose. Indeed, the "as-for" dimension (*Wozu*) is what is priorly known when one knows an entity. That is, one can get involved with an entity only by being already beyond it, only by having already understood it as being for something. This primordial, unthematic, prepredicative understanding of an entity's practical essence (its "what-it-is-for-ness") is what Heidegger called the "hermeneutical as." It is evidenced in the fore-having of a usable entity; it can be explicated in praxis, without assertions. But it is also the underlying structure that ultimately makes possible assertoric composition of a subject with its logically distinguishable predicate: *synthesis* and

*diairesis*. To synthesize is to distinguish, and the assertoric synthesis-distinction (the "apophantic as" operative in *hermeneia*-3) rests on the prepredicative synthesis-distinction of entities and their practical essence; and for Heidegger that composition and division is performed on the basis of the original (i.e. the hermeneutical) as.

This unified as-structure, rooted in praxis, that Heidegger retrieved from Aristotle's discussion of *hermeneia* led to the issues of transcendence and ultimately temporality. Heidegger interpreted human beings, insofar as they already know the beingness-dimension of entities, as transcendence, i.e., as being already beyond entities and disclosive of the possibilities in terms of which entities can be understood. This kinetic exceeding of entities he called the human being's *Immer-schon-vorweg-sein*, his condition of being "always already ahead" of entities. This movement is the co-performance of disclosure in humanely primordial sense, and it corresponds to the *diairesis*-moment of the hermeneutical as. In the oral version of his course *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (February 27, 1930) Heidegger said that *diairesis*, seen as human transcendence, "pulls us asunder, as it [p. 80] were, and grants us a stretching-ahead, takes us away into the possible... ." But at the same time the human being returns *from* that transcendence *to* entities so as to know them in terms of possibility, i.e., "so as to allow the possible - as what empowers the actual - to speak back to the actual in a binding way... , binding or bonding it: *synthesis*." Clearly the unity of *diairesis* as transcendence to the essence of beings and *synthesis* as the return to beings in their essence points to the kinetic structure that grounds the hermeneutical as, just as the hermeneutical as in turn makes possible the truth and falsehood of Aristotle's *hermeneia*-3.

**End**