

HEIDEGGER'S NEW ASPECT

On *In-Sein*, *Zeitlichkeit*, and *The Genesis of BEING AND TIME* ¹

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In 1983 Otto Pöggeler wrote: "Regrettably, even today there is still no reliable overview of Heidegger's early lecture courses based on the extant student transcripts and Heidegger's manuscripts." Ten years later, and the lacuna has been filled with Theodore Kisiel's *The Genesis of Heidegger's BEING AND TIME*. This brilliant and complex work provides, in its own words, the first "reliable, complete, and relatively uninterrupted story" of how Heidegger got from there to here, where "there" is 1915 and "here" is the spring of 1926. By the end of his treatise Kisiel can make the justifiably proud claim: "BT can now be understood genealogically." (K 457).²

This "book about a book" (K 312) announces itself as both a synchronic and a diachronic study: on the one hand, a doxography of Heidegger's "interlocking concepts" as they evidence themselves in the stages leading to SZ, and, on the other, a *Begriffsgeschichte*, a "saga of conceptual genesis" (K 376) that is gathered together and summarized in the Genealogical Glossary that is Appendix D.

Kisiel calls it a "Book of Genesis," and it is very much a *De Genesi ad litteram*, a commentary focussed exactly on the letter: on the letter of Heidegger's own manuscripts with attention even to what Heidegger crossed out (K 346); on the letter of his handwritten emendations to students' transcripts, even on a hyphen whose omission from the GA [208] volume changed the meaning of a text (K 546, n. 6). This cathexis on the letter is grounded in the ten years of research that Kisiel conducted in virtually every public and private archive related to Heidegger. (He suggests that "*Zu den Sachen selbst!*" could mean: "Get to the archives!") It is that kind of relentless detective work that anchors the philosophical interpretations in this volume. It also grounds Kisiel's frequent broadsides against that School of Scandal called the *Ausgabe letzter Hand* (he calls it the edition of the dead hand) which makes editorial decisions in Heidegger's name: the unannounced rearrangement of passages, omissions of texts, and retrojection of Heidegger's later notes into his earlier lectures as if they were contemporaneous (cf. K 394). Not to mention the reach of the "dead hand" across the Atlantic to work havoc with English translations of the GA -- or in Kisiel's more colorful words: the "paramilitary assaults on scholarship by Heidegger's literary executors" with their "asinine arguments...backed by authoritarian intimidation and threats" (K 544, n. 2, and 545, n. 4). Kisiel calls himself the "repairman of the German edition" (K 545, n. 4) and, unlike the Maytag man, he has been kept quite busy. He has been a prime mover in the ex post facto publication of errata lists to Gesamtausgabe volumes -- not just printer's errors but truly *sinnstörende Fehler* such as the more than eighty mistakes that Kisiel found in GA 20

¹ This paper was delivered at SPEP in Seattle, September 29, 1994, and retains the spoken style.

² Otto Pöggeler, *Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie* (Freiburg: Alber, 1983), 429, n. 15. In the present essay "K + number" refers to pages in Theodore Kisiel's *The Genesis of Heidegger's BEING AND TIME* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). "SZ" abbreviates *Sein und Zeit*, 11th edition (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1967), references to which are given by both page and line.

alone.

Over the years an extraordinary number of good commentaries on Heidegger have been published, but this is a qualitatively different work within the genre. It does not just turn a page in Heidegger scholarship; it turns a corner and lets us see Heidegger in a new aspect and as if for the first time, the way William Richardson's book did thirty years earlier. Richardson's volume in 1963 and Kisiel's in 1993 have, each in its own way, opened up a new corridor of Heidegger commentary, and both have simultaneously closed a door behind them, rendering passé in one stroke previously accepted readings. After Kisiel's book, the question is not whether but only how much of the scholarship on the early Heidegger will have to be revisited and revised.

The book at one and the same time demands and defies a brief outline. To oversimplify grossly: Kisiel distinguishes three complex genealogical streams that flow into the broad river that is SZ. First and most important, there is the primal soup, the creative mix that wells up and overflows into "*lavalas*," the flash flood of Kriegsnotsemester 1919, where Kisiel finds "the initial appearance of Heidegger's lifelong topic" (K 223): factual life (already foreshadowed, he says, in the Scotan *haecceitas* of the Habilitationsschrift). Kisiel traces this torrent of onto-phenomeno-theo-logical beginnings through Heidegger's lectures on the phenomenology of life and on Paul and Augustine. [209] These extraordinarily rich first 200 pages of the book consciously raise the question whether all of Heidegger's work after the turn is not already there in early 1919. Kisiel ends the book with a series of questions that he means to be answered in the affirmative:

Could it be that the hermeneutic breakthrough of 1919 already contains *in ovo* everything essential that came to light in the later Heidegger's thought? Could it be that there is nothing essentially new in the later Heidegger after the turn, for all is to be found at least incipiently in that initial breakthrough of the early Heidegger? Could it be that not only BT but all of Heidegger can be reduced to this First Genesis, the hermeneutic breakthrough to the topic in KNS 1919? (K 458)

The second stream is the ontological, with an emphasis on fundamental ontology and destruction. Here the courses on Aristotle from 1921 to 1924 are the key, although Heidegger's Aristotle is ambiguous at this stage, at once the Greekest of the Greeks and yet as modern as Husserl and arguably more relevant. The issue of being, very much to the fore in the Habilitationsschrift but somewhat submerged from 1919 through 1921, resurfaces in Heidegger's Aristotle courses, but not yet as the question of being qua being. (For that one must wait until 1925 and the reflections on ἀλήθεια, κίνησις, οὐσία, and φύσις.) At this stage Heidegger works on the dianoetic and practical "virtues" found in *Nicomachean Ethics* Z, especially τέχνη and φρόνησις, which will inform so much of SZ.

Kisiel finds in each of these two currents a specific origin of SZ. Within the first current he finds, in Heidegger's review-article on Jaspers, the origin of SZ in radical phenomenology as a pretheoretical science of the "stream of life"; and within the second he finds, in Heidegger's 1922 essay on Aristotle, the origin of fundamental ontology and the destruction of the history of ontology.

When these two tributaries, each deriving from its distinct origin, flow together into the river that will become SZ, they do so at the point of a third "origin," that of temporality, in the lecture of July 25, 1924, "*Der Begriff der Zeit*." Within the broad channel formed by the two streams, Kisiel distinguishes (to drop the metaphor) three drafts of SZ. First, the Hermeneutic or Dilthey Draft/s: the two essays of 1924 (July and November, respectively) that both bear the title "*Der Begriff der Zeit*," plus the Kassel Lectures of 1925. Second, the Phenomenological-Ontological or Husserl Draft: *The History of the Concept of Time* (April to July, 1925). And then the Kantian-Existentialist or Final Draft, *Sein und Zeit* itself (March to October, 1926). [210]

The first thing one must say about this book is that it does not deliver on its title. Aristotle is clear (*De partibus animalium*, I, 1, 640a 14-18) that philosophical analysis, whether focussed on nature (τὰ ζῶα) or art (οἰκοδόμησις) -- or even on genesis (καὶ περὶ γενέσεως) -- should first envision the entity as completed and in appearance, and then work backwards to its causes (πρῶτον τὰ φαινόμενα...εἶθ' οὕτω τὰς αἰτίας τούτων). The reason is that becoming is becoming only to the degree that it is gathered up (even if only proleptically) into being. Ἡ γὰρ γέσεσις ἔνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν: genesis is for the sake of, and gets its meaning from, the to-be-completed entity. Likewise, the oblique passage in *Topics* 6, 139 b 20: ἡ γένεσις ἀγωγὴ εἰς οὐσίαν: genesis has its being as a transition unto being, unto the completed entity.

Thus the title *The Genesis of Heidegger's BEING AND TIME* might lead one to think this book cashes out the generation of SZ in SZ itself, that specific text dating from the spring and summer of 1926. But on Kisiel's own admission the book comes to an "abrupt halt" (K 457) in February of 1926. Kisiel's *Genesis* is a cliffhanger: it takes us to the edge of the Grand Canyon -- roughly up through *Logik: Aristoteles* (1925-26) -- but then stops on this side of the divide.³ At most, his final chapter throws a few rocks across the canyon, in the form of brief sketches of (1) the ontic foundation of ontology in resoluteness, (2) the primacy of possibility, and (3) the horizontal schemata of temporality. It then closes with the promise of a sequel on SZ itself.⁴

This is not a criticism, only a description. If the incompleteness of Kisiel's work is any *culpa* at all, it is a *felix culpa*, insofar as it allows us time to catch our breath, time to pause and ask: What is the οὐσία that defines the final draft of SZ and thus helps determine one's reading of its γένεσις? Granted that one must "retrospective distortions" of Heidegger's trajectory, nonetheless, given the claim that "we already know how the Story ends" (K 3), what exactly is the τέλος whereby the genealogist decides which elements of the Heidegger's evolution came to fruition in SZ and which not?

Recall that what distinguishes SZ from the 1925 course *History of the Concept of Time*, or the 1924 essay "The Concept of Time," is Heidegger's final determination of the structure of temporality in conjunction with Dasein as possibility. Heidegger took this momentous step sometime between February 26 and October 13, 1926. Those nine months constitute the real gestation of BT, the period

³ "It is not our purpose to do a section-by-section genealogy of BT, although we are now in a position to do so. This can be ventured on another occasion. [...] Even though the book BT has hitherto been the goal of this Story [etc.]: K, 424, my emphasis. Nor will it do to say that the overlap between *History of the Concept of Time* (the "penultimate" draft of SZ) and SZ itself (the "final draft") obviates the need for the section-by-section genealogy of SZ, for the following reasons given by Kisiel himself: (A) Even granted that the "final draft 'repeats' the penultimate draft, as far as it goes, sometimes section by section," nevertheless "Heidegger's repetitions are never mere copy work. His very sense of repetition always involves innovation [etc.]: K 422; and (B) "...the experienced reader can at certain points easily construe this penultimate draft to be a mere rehearsal of BT to the point of viewing it as a raw and boring duplicate. Our Genesis Story is meant to subvert this tendency [etc.]: K 362.

⁴ But note the intriguing circularity: "A full genealogical account of BT can be claimed only after we have also traversed the steps leading to its demise, the sequel to the Story of the genesis of BT." (K 10) And yet: "The Demise of Heidegger's *Being and Time*: we stand at the threshold of an entirely new story, the sequel to 'The Genesis of Heidegger's *Being and Time*.' It can be told in the same way.... The telling of this new story must be left for another occasion. But as a sequel it will have its roots in notable portions of the first Story." (K 445)

when all the genetic material -- the themes and trajectories that Kisiel lays out in the first 420 pages of his book -- fuse and mature. Those months mark [211] a radical ontogenetic advance over the previous ten years, with the result that BT is qualitatively different from all earlier drafts.

The defining achievement of that period was Heidegger's reshaping of his treatise along a new axis that runs from *In- Sein*, through *Zeitlichkeit*, to *Geschichtlichkeit*, beginning with Heidegger's recasting of *In- Sein* and specifically of the interrelationships among *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, and *Rede*. This complex restructuring determines the οὐσία that is SZ in its final draft. In what follows I briefly retrace it, beginning with a crucial passage from Kisiel's book.

Verstehen, Kisiel points out, while conspicuously absent in the previous years, finally emerges in Heidegger's thought in the summer of 1925; and even though the treatment of it in *History of the Concept of Time* is "somewhat disjointed" (K 376), genealogically it is more revelatory than the treatment accorded it in SZ where (this, now, is the crucial passage):

understanding is neatly and tightly interlocked, almost in scholastic fashion, in temporal equiprimordiality with disposedness and discursiveness. This equiprimordiality of in-being is the veritable "formal" deep structure of BT, which will be plumbed ever more deeply in later years in order to enter into the core and center of our immediacy, the "clearing of being" itself. (K 377)

I take it that this text asserts or implies four things about disposition, understanding, and discourse in SZ: (1) they are the three equiprimordial constitutive ways of "being-in"; (2) as such they are the three *ex aequo* constitutive components of the clearing, the "Da" of Da-sein taken as the "place of being" (τόπος εἰδῶν); (3) as temporally equiprimordial, these three moments are also homologous to the ekstases of *Gewesenheit*, *Zukünftigheit*, and *Gegenwärtigen*; and (4) as a unity, this triad is the deep structure of SZ and the entrée to Heidegger's central topic, *die Lichtung des Seins*.

To be sure, the issue of the structural moments of the clearing is as critical as it is simple. It is the *pons asinorum* of Heidegger scholarship. You either get over that bridge or you don't. You do your SZ-work on one side of the river or on the other. (Of course, you can try to wade across downstream when Heidegger isn't watching, but for what it's worth that's illegal.)⁵

In the received tradition, the triad that structures *In- Sein* is *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, and *Rede*. As far as one can trace it back, that tradition first [212] surfaces in Alphonse de Waele's *La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger* (1942), a work that profoundly influenced a generation of Louvainians in the 50s and 60s. However, the doctrine first came to North America via another

⁵ Petrus Tartaretus/Tarteret (a.k.a. Tarteret), the Scotist rector of the University of Paris (1494) may have been the first to record the phrase "pons asinorum," specifically in his *Expositio* on Aristotle's *Organon* (ca. 1480-90) with regard to the *inventio medii* ("...communiter propter eius apparentem difficultatem pons asinorum dicitur..."): see Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* (Leipzig: Foch, 1927), IV, 206, n. 165 (but cf. IV, 34, n. 134 re Sanrucius' *Dialectica ad mentem Scoti*). Tartaretus also provides the only extant drawing of the famous hexagonal bridge ("Ut ars inveniendi medium cunctis sit facilis, plana atque perspicua, ad manifestationem ponitur sequens figura..."), a photograph of which is reproduced in Prantl, *loc. cit.*

channel, Werner Brock's "An Account of *Being and Time*," published as the introduction to a translation of some of Heidegger's essays in *Existence and Being* (1949). By 1961 it had settled in with Thomas Langan's *The Meaning of Heidegger*, and by 1963 it was confirmed and canonized by William Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* and by Otto Pöggeler's *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Today it remains, with notable and few exceptions, the received truth and settled doctrine about the constitutive moments of the existential structure of the clearing.⁶

The thesis that *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, and *Rede* constitute the triadic structure of the clearing not only is wrong in itself but also renders incomprehensible the structural relation of the clearing to temporality. And since Heidegger's elaboration of the structure of temporality in 1926 is what makes SZ be SZ, that is quite serious indeed. None of what follows is new, but as we stand at the genealogical divide in the genesis of SZ, it might bear repeating.⁷

To take the first point: The received doctrine is wrong in itself for at least four reasons. First, it does not correspond to the text of SZ. It is one thing to say the three phenomena are equiprimordial, as Heidegger does, quite another to say they are *ex aequo* constitutive "components" of the clearing, as Heidegger does not. It is one thing to say that *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* are defined and determined by *Rede*, as Heidegger does, quite another to say that, alongside these two, *Rede* is the third structural component of the "Da," as Heidegger does not.

Second, the received doctrine turns *totum* into *pars*: it takes *Rede* or *λόγος*, which is the whole of Dasein, and reduces it to the status of merely one component of that whole. But if *Rede* were not the same as being-in-the-world, if it were not the already articulated synthetic-differential whole of being-in-the-world and, as such, the defining essence of *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen*, it would be impossible to understand how Dasein could see beings as... at all, much less articulate them in words.

Third, the received doctrine, by reducing *Rede* to one constitutive moment within the whole of the clearing, suppresses the true "third" moment of that whole, namely, *das verfallende Sein bei....* And by thus missing the entity-oriented moment of disclosedness, it radically obscures the relation between the clearing and the ontological difference. [213]

Fourth and as a corollary, the received doctrine is oblivious to the fact that in the final analysis there are not three constitutive moments of the clearing or of care, but only two, insofar as

⁶ A list of such exceptions would include Burt Hopkins, *Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993); Graham Nicholson, *Illustrations of Being* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 1992); Hubert Dreyfus, *Being in the World* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); Fernand Couturier, *Monde et être chez Heidegger* (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1971); and W.B. Macomber, *The Anatomy of Disillusion* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

⁷ The slipperiness of the issue becomes evident when scholars disagree with themselves from one page to the next. Cf. Françoise Dastur, *Heidegger et la question du temps* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 44 and 45; for the latter position see also her "Language and Ereignis," in John Sallis, ed., *Reading Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 358. Or compare Walter Biemel's *Le Concept de monde chez Heidegger* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris: Vrin, 1950), 96ff. with his *Martin Heidegger* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1973), 52 (ET 46).

Befindlichkeit and *Verstehen* (like *Existentialität* and *Faktizität*) are but two aspects of one moment. Thus, in the case of *Sorge*, "already-aheadness" (*Sich-vorweg-im-schon-sein-in*) is one moment, "falling-in-with" (*das verfallende Sein bei...*), is the other (SZ 192). Missing this bivalence of *Sorge* skews one's understanding of the relation between presence and absence within the clearing and has disastrous consequences for the structure of temporality. That brings us to the second point.

The received doctrine about *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, and *Rede* also renders incomprehensible the relation of the structure of care to the structure of temporality. Rather than arguing the case, let me simply illustrate it by citing the claim that Division Two of SZ is shot through with a "many-sided confusion" ("*eine vielfache Verwirrung*") that comes glaringly to the fore in the treatment of temporality in SZ §68:

First, *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen* and *Artikulation* [i.e., *Rede*] are put forth as the basic moments; but then fallenness gets added on as a fourth moment -- or even bumps *Artikulation* -- despite the fact that fallenness is a modification of temporalization as a whole.⁸

While it may not be immediately apparent just where the confusion lies, this much is certain: once the structure of the clearing is missed, the corresponding structure of temporality is lost.

I turn now to that structure. I wish to offer a brief and merely preparatory re-reading of temporality in SZ §65 and, more briefly, of historicity in §74. But doesn't this risk being altogether too pedantic? Yes, absolutely. Isn't it too much *ad litteram*, too focussed on the letter? Yes, perhaps; but at least that's in keeping with the spirit of Kisiel's book. What is more, at this crucial juncture -- with a new translation of BT about to appear, with the sequel to *Genesis* ticking away like a time bomb on Kisiel's hard drive -- this might be a last chance to look before we leap across the genealogical divide.

The English coinage of "future-as-coming-towards" and "is-as-having-been" has been in circulation for over three decades now. It has never worked; in fact, it has worked against a clear understanding of SZ §65 and §74. For that reason this coinage should be -- gracefully but definitively -- pulled out of circulation. In the interests of understanding the οὐσία that gives meaning to the γένεσις of SZ, I wish to suggest another set of terms for translating *Zukünftigkeit* and *Gewesenheit*. [214]

Zukünftigkeit had at least two year's development prior to the account of it given in SZ. Beginning with "*Der Begriff der Zeit*" (July, 1924) Heidegger saw the future as intertwined with existence as being-towards-death. In the longer text by the same name -- "*Der Begriff der Zeit*" of November, 1924 -- Dasein's "future" was further seen as bound up with Aristotelian φρόνησις, reread now in terms of conscience, guilt, and resolution. And in the spring of 1926 Heidegger's account took a decisive step forward by linking the phenomenon of "futurity" with Dasein-as-possibility, such that the 1924 formulation "Dasein is its time" was replaced in SZ by "Dasein is its possibility" (K 439; cf. SZ 143).

Gewesenheit, on the other hand, makes its debut in this section (325.24--326.8), and a fateful

⁸ Otto Pöggeler, "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger" in Rudolf Bernet et al., eds., *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Freiburg: Alber 1983), 178, repeated virtually verbatim from Pöggeler, ed., *Heidegger* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969), 52, n. 25 (ET 24, n. 25).

debut it is, insofar as the disastrous consequences of misunderstanding the structure of *In- Sein* seem to cluster around the phenomenon of *Gewesenheit*. The term is conspicuously absent not only from the last chapter of Kisiel's book, but also from his Genealogical Glossary, and even from the "Index of Subject Matter." Given that temporality is the culmination of the analyses in SZ and that *Gewesenheit* is the touchstone for understanding temporality, one might adjudge this a serious omission. I think, to the contrary, that the absence is fortuitous, another *felix culpa*, insofar as the book reserves its judgment, declines to show all its cards on the dicey issue of temporality in SZ. That is definitely a plus.

The movement of the demonstration in §65 is from possibilized to possibilizer (in an adapted sense: *de esse ad posse*), from anticipatory resolution to the existential movement ("temporality") that makes it possible. One might think the demonstration analogous to transcendental method's move from *de facto* to *de jure*, except that it is more complex and less linear. Anticipatory resolution, the understanding of oneself as finite and mortal, is an existentiell possibility of Dasein, grounded in the existential possibility that is Dasein; and appropriating oneself as existential possibility is made possible by that very possibility.

The demonstration *de esse ad posse* is broached four times in §65, once for each of the three ekstases, *Zukünftigkeit*, *Gewesenheit*, and *Gegenwärtigen*, and once by way of summary. The strands of possibilized and possibilizer are more intricately interwoven in the account of *Gewesenheit* than in that of *Zukünftigkeit*. Everything depends on getting it right on the relation between the two ekstases; and while that is beyond the scope of this paper, I hope to take a step in that direction by simply paraphrasing (that is, interpreting) SZ 325.14--326.25. [215]

BECOMING (325.14-33)

De esse (325.14-19): Anticipatory resolution means understanding and becoming yourself as a finite whole. That means living as possibility, indeed as the possibility to end all possibilities. Anticipatory resolution, as full and finite self-understanding, means existentiell becoming your existential becoming.

Ad posse (325.19-30): This entails that you can become your becoming, can maintain yourself as possibility (this is what it means to exist), right up to the end. What lets you become such becoming is that very becoming itself. Resolution is made possible by existential self-becoming (call it simply "becoming") taken as the structural anticipation of the possibility to end all possibilities.

Summation (325.30-33): You can become yourself existentiell only because you already are becoming yourself existentially: Dasein's being is this existential becoming.

ALREADINESS (325.24--326.8)

De esse (325.34-38): Anticipatory resolution -- i.e., understanding yourself as finite and mortal becoming -- means three things *ex aequo*: (a) appropriating the finitude to which you have been relegated; (b) coming back to yourself precisely as you become yourself; and (c) coming back to how you already are (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). In short, anticipatory resolution means: coming back to and appropriating your "alreadiness."

Ad posse (325.38--326.8): This entails that you can be your alreadiness, indeed, that to be at all is to be-how-you-already-are.

Summation (326.6-8): You can appropriate your alreadiness only because you already are your alreadiness.⁹

PRESENTING¹⁰
(326.9-16)

De esse (326.9-13): Understanding yourself as finite and mortal becoming discloses the "situation": it clarifies your current state of affairs and lets you authentically encounter present entities in the present moment.

Ad posse (326.13-13): That is possible only because, structurally, you are a "present" in the sense of a "presenting of things." [216]

SUMMATION: TEMPORALITY
(326.17-25)

De esse: Anticipatory resolution is the existentiell movement of returning to how you already are, and thus presenting things.

Ad posse: This is possible only because, structurally, you are the existential movement of "temporality": becoming-how-you-already-are-and-thus-presenting-things. The temporal meaning of authentic care (**ahead-already**, and thus having-present) is: **becoming-one's-alreadiness**, and thus **presenting**. Clearly, the model for "temporality" is φύσις.¹¹

There are two distinct forms of "coming back" or returning (*Zurückkommen*) in authentic temporality. First (and more frequently used in SZ), resolution is the return to one's true self as finite and mortal possibility. Paradoxically, this is a return "back to the future," a return "forward" to one's already-aheadness. When conscience calls you back to your real self, the call is not just a *Rückruf*, but a *vorrufender Rückruf* (280.33): it calls you back to yourself by calling you forward to the mortal becoming that you already are. (It is misleading, therefore, to say that in anticipatory resolution Dasein "returns from its *Zukünftigkeit* to its *Gewesenheit*."¹²)

The second return, mentioned less frequently in SZ, moves in the opposite direction, not "back to the future" but back from the future to the present. This is the return from becoming-how-you-

⁹ Apriori-structurally you are relegated to becoming: thrown becoming. This means (a) you always already are becoming; (b) your alreadiness is defined as becoming; and in that sense (c) your alreadiness is defined by ("comes from": 326.7-8) your becoming.

¹⁰ How to translate *Gegenwart* and *Gegenwärtigen*? The "-wart" in *Gegenwart* is cognate with the "-wards" in "towards" (the root has to do with turning), whereas the "-wärt" in *Gegenwärtigen* is cognate with "ward" and has to do with guarding. *Gegenwärtigen*: "to present and preserve"?

¹¹ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare*, ed. Medard Boss (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987), 203.7-11.

¹² "Im entschlossenen Vorlaufen in den Tod kommt das Dasein aus seiner Zukünftigkeit auf seine Gewesenheit zurück...." Pöggeler, *Denkweg*, 61.

already-are to the presenting-of-things. Corresponding to these two returns there are two distinct retrievals: the retrieval of one's essential alreadiness and the retrieval of supervenient past possibilities. As I shall indicate below, these two returns and two retrievals are frequently confused, with unhappy results.¹³

As translations, "becoming" instead of "future-as-coming-towards," and "alreadiness" instead of "is-as-having-been," are closer to Heidegger's own usage. In his course *Logik: Aristoteles* (1925-26), he tells his students on February 26, 1926, that *Zukunft* is an inadequate term for Dasein's original self-becoming. Then, invoking Pindar's γέννοι' οἴος ἐσσί,¹⁴ he says: [217]

The command "Become what you are," taken in an ontic sense, is possible only if, in an ontological sense, I am what I'm becoming, i.e., if the essence of my can-be -- aheadness -- has the structure of expectation, that is, the structure of time itself.¹⁵

Likewise, "alreadiness" instead of "is-as-having-been." What is this "already"? Heidegger asks.

This "already" is a *temporale* determination that pertains to every time-characteristic of Dasein. The already is the indication of the apriori of facticity.¹⁶

The "apriori": Heidegger mentions this again at SZ 85.17 when he says that "ein *apriorisches Perfekt*" -- a perfect tense with apriori aspect -- characterizes the very being of Dasein. And in a marginal note (GA 2, 114) he glosses the phrase with a concatenation of terms that includes: *vorgängig; a priori; πρότερον τη φύσει*; and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι rendered variously as (a) *das jeweils schon voraus Wesende*, (b) *das Gewesen*, (c) *das Perfekt*, and (d) *das jeweils Frühere*. The "already" is not that which has been and still is, but that which at any given moment is always prior to and beyond our determination,¹⁷ always already operative and determining us, the "perfect" in the sense of the "*per-factum*" or τέλειον: that which is gathered into the τέλος and "approaches us" from there as always already operative.

All such meaning is lost when one translates *das Gewesen* as "what-is-as-having-been." We often forget that English and German grammar privilege a view of the verb in terms of tense, whereas Greek, which rules Heidegger's perspective here, privileges aspect (*Aktionsart*, to which he briefly

¹³ The first meaning of *Zurückkommen* is found, e.g., at SZ 326.05, 339.02, 383.11, 383.34, and 391.06. The second sense is found, e.g., at 353.28 and 366.17.

¹⁴ Pythian Ode II (ca. 476/5 B.C.), line 72: *The Works of Pindar*, ed. Lewis Richard Farnell, 3 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1932), III, The Text, 7.

¹⁵ GA 21, 413.13-17. The last phrase, "*d.h. der Zeit selbst*," found in the Simon Moser Nachschrift at 818.16, is omitted from GA 21. Call the "repairman of the German edition."

¹⁶ I translate from Moser, 819.18-21 rather than from GA 21, 414.4-7.

¹⁷ Cf. "...φύσις meint jenes, was einer ursprünglich und eigentlich schon ist: das schon Gewesende...": *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Neske, 1966), 77.

alludes at SZ 349).¹⁸ Whether in ancient or modern Greek, verb tenses indicate the temporal relation between a given action and some "datum point"; that is, they answer the question: "At what time did this event occur with respect to my speaking about it, or with respect to some other action?"

Greek aspect, on the other hand, answers the question: "How is the nature of this or that action being conceived, specifically as regards its completeness or incompleteness as distinct from its tense?" In modern Greek, for example, when your teacher tells you γράψε (present imperative, with imperfective aspect), she means "O.K., start writing" or even "Write regularly" -- that is to say, the action is conceived as incomplete, continuous, or repeated. But when she tells you γράψε (aorist imperative, with perfective aspect), she means "Write this down" -- that is, the action is seen as complete in this given moment, without reference to action completed in the past and continuing in the present.¹⁹

The matter becomes more complex when, as in the case of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, one is dealing with Aristotle's artificial supplement for the [218] non-existent perfect tense of the verb εἰμί. Heidegger further compounds the complexity when, alongside the three known aspects (simple, progressive/repeated, and completed), he invents a fourth one, which he calls "apriori" aspect. That, in fact, is what he means by "*das apriorische Perfekt*," not a different perfect tense but a different (indeed, novel) aspect of the perfect tense.

If we translate *das Gewesen* as "what-is-as-having-been," we are privileging a linear view of time that sees some given process of development as having achieved its fulfillment, which fulfillment continues to have effect today. You received your doctorate after five or six years of study, and no matter how long ago that was, you have become and still are a doctor. The action occurred in the past and continues to impact you in the present, precisely as what you have accomplished in the past. You are-as-having-been. And indeed it is possible to read the Greek perfect that way. In the verb μαθαίνω, "I learn," the perfect tense μεμάθηκα means: "I now know, I still know, as having completed a long process of learning." Likewise, the perfect tense οἶδα means "I know and still know, precisely as having completed a long process of 'seeing' that resulted in, and still informs, my present act of knowing." These examples illustrate an ordinary perfect tense with completed aspect in present time, with the formal sense of "is-as-having-been."

As far as I have been able to find out, this legitimate sense of "is-as-having-been" is mentioned in Greek grammar only in late antiquity -- and then only *virtualiter* -- in the commentary of the Byzantine grammarian Stephanus (before A.D. 700) on the immensely influential Τέχνη γραμματική

¹⁸ The best work in English on aspect is Robert I. Binnick, *Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Part II, especially (for our purposes) chapters 5 and 6. On the formal distinction between aspect and *Aktionsarten*, cf. *ibid.*, 139-149 and 202-207.

¹⁹ Besides Binnick (see n. 18) for modern Greek I draw on Peter Mackridge, *The Modern Greek Language* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 102-124, and W. Householder, Kostas Kazazis, Andreas Loutsouda, *Reference Grammar of Literary Dhimotiki* (The Hague, Mouton, 1964), chapter 5: 5.15. For ancient Greek I use K. L. McKay, *Greek Grammar for Students: A Concise Grammar of Classical Attic with Special Reference to Aspect in the Verb* (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1974), 214-224; and Hardy Hansen and Gerald M. Quinn, *Greek, An Intensive Course: Preliminary Edition* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980), Unit 2.1, 3(b).

of Dionysius Thrax (ca. 170-90 B.C.).²⁰ Stephanus defines Dionysius' *parakeimenos*-tense (ὁ παρακείμενος sc. χρόνος, literally "[the time] lying close/alongside" -- what we call the "perfect tense") as ἐνεστῶς συντελικός, i.e., "[the] present [as where something has been] completed," i.e., the "completed present" or "present perfect." Here ἐνεστῶς, the second-perfect participle of ἐνίστημι, means "being-present as standing-in-this-place," and συντελικός means "completed" or "brought to perfection." In commenting on Dionysius' list of Greek tenses, Stephanus writes: Ὁ δὲ παρακείμενος καλεῖται ἐνεστῶς συντελικός: "But the *parakeimenos* is called being-present-as-having-been-completed." That is: It has the time-value of: "is-[and-perduring]-as-having-been [completed]" or "is-as-having-been."²¹

But that is certainly not the aspect Heidegger hears in the ἦν εἶναι, nor does it corresponds to what he understands by πρότερον τη φύσει. In using the ἦν εἶναι to describe Dasein's structure (SZ 85.17), Heidegger does not call it the "perfect tense [*simpliciter*]" but the *apriorisches Perfekt*: "perfect tense, apriori aspect." What Heidegger does here is strike a novel middle path between the Scylla of the completed-and-present [219] aspect of the Greek perfect ("is-as-having-been") and the Charybdis of a "Platonizing" aspect, according to which the ἦν of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι would have an objective-transcendent signification, denoting some original eternal ὄντως ὄν.²² For Heidegger, *das jeweils Frühere*, "what is, in each instance, prior," is not chronologically prior in any sense. Rather, it is the existentially apriori (see note 17 of the present text), that which in each case is always already ontologically operative in Dasein: *das schon voraus Wesende*, as he says, and "*nicht ein ontisch Vergangenes*" (GA 2, 114, marginalium). Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι does not designate any past at all, not even a past that still weighs upon the present and allows of a retrieval of its latent possibilities, the way one can retrieve a still hidden meaning from Kant, or revive a personal relationship, or work through a childhood trauma. There is room for that in Heidegger -- he deals with it under the rubric of historicity -- but that

²⁰ For Dionysius' text: *Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica* / Τέχνη Διονυσίου γραμματικῆ, ed. Gustav Uhlig, in *Grammatici Graeci*, I, i, (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1883; reprinted, Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1965). Alan Kemp's English translation, "The ΤΕΚΗΝΕ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΗ of Dionysius Thrax" in Daniel J. Taylor, ed., *The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period*, (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1987), 170-189, replaces T. Davidson's 1874 translation, which first appeared in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Stephanus' commentaries on the text are preserved only in fragments in *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam*, ed. Alfred Hilgard, in *Grammatici Graeci*, I, iii (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1901; reprinted, Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1965). On Stephanus (fl. between A.D. 400 and 700) see Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, III/A, ii, 2401a and b, s.v. "Stephanos," no. 13; and J. R. Martindale, *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), II (A.D. 395-527), 1030, s.v. "Stephanus 16." Note the anomaly of his absence from Robert A. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 361-363 and 464-465.

²¹ *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam* (n. 20): *Scholia Vaticana* §13, Περὶ ῥήματος, 251.4. Cf. further, *ibid.*, *Scholia Marciana*, 405.14-15: πεπληρωμένος: "[is as] having been fulfilled" (cf. Mark 1:15!).

²² Cf. Friedrich Ueberweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 4th ed. (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1871 [originally 1862-66]), I, 174f. (For very indirect evidence of Heidegger's use of Ueberweg, see Martin Heidegger and Elisabeth Blochmann, *Briefwechsel 1918-1969*, ed. Joachim W. Storck [Marbach am Neckar: Deutsches Literaturarchiv, 1989], 36.) See also Friedrich Bassenge, "Das τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι, τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι etc. etc. und das τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι bei Aristoteles," *Philologus* 104 (1960), 14-47 and 201-222, esp. VII, 205-222.

is distinct, even qualitatively different, from the experience of *Gewesenheit* in authentic temporality.²³

Let us take a concrete example. The problem of *Gewesenheit* is glaringly manifest in Heidegger's July 1924 lecture, "*Der Begriff der Zeit*," where just a slight misreading can render the heart of the text incomprehensible. In that lecture Heidegger for the first time links temporality with being-towards-death and resolution -- a decisive step forward in the genesis of SZ. The text repeatedly, if idiosyncratically, speaks of Dasein's "*Vorlaufen in das Vorbei*." Kisiel correctly interprets this (K 316) as Dasein's anticipation of its "goneness" or death (not "anticipation of the past," as the current English translation has it). Moreover, says Heidegger, by living into and out of this ultimate possibility, Dasein also comes back to its past and present.²⁴ This "coming back" is the second return mentioned above, not the "back to the future" but the return to "what-is-as-having-been" in the legitimate sense of that phrase.

Into this "present perfect" of the "is-as-having-been" (*die Vergangenheit* and *die Gegenwart*) Dasein's alreadiness (*die Gewesenheit*) irrupts to clean house. As Heidegger puts it, "*das Vorbei als eigentliches Wie*," anticipated-death as the authentic way-to-be,²⁵ breaks into the everyday and takes it all -- the busyness, the bustle, the bullshit -- back into that "how." "[D]as Vorbei nimmt alles mit sich in das Nichts" -- not "the past takes everything with it into the nothing" (ET 12E.22-23) but: one's anticipated death, in a Bergmannesque *danse macabre*, takes all that tidy bourgeois security and whistles it into the pit:

...They all go into the dark,
The vacant interstellar spaces, the vacant into the vacant, [220]
The captains, merchant bankers, eminent men of letters,
The generous patrons of art, the statesmen and the rulers,
Distinguished civil servants, chairman of many committees,
Industrial lords and petty contractors, all go into the dark...

That is what is lost by translating *gewesen* as "having-been" and *das Vorbei* as "the past."

I mentioned earlier that, under the rubric of historicity, Heidegger treats the possibility of retrieving supervenient past possibilities, as distinct from retrieving one's essential alreadiness. In the interest of taking the final step along the new axis of SZ -- *In-Sein*, *Zeitlichkeit*, and *Geschichtlichkeit*

²³ See, for example, Martin Heidegger, "Unbenutzte Vorarbeiten zur Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1929/30: 'Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt -- Endlichkeit -- Einsamkeit,'" *Heidegger Studies*, 7 (1991), 6-12, esp. 11, where *Gewesenheit* in the framework of historicity is described as: "eigentlich hinter sich gebracht und gehalten im wesenhaften Vor-sich-bringen." One must distinguish between the *Wiederholen* of oneself in individual resolution and the *Wiederholung* of possibilities from one's past. It is to latter that John D. Caputo refers to in his *Radical Hermeneutics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 86, when he writes: "As factual being, thrown into the world, Dasein carries its past with it, not in the sense of that which is over but in the sense of what Dasein has been (*gewesen*) all along."

²⁴ "...auf seine *Vergangenheit* und *Gegenwart* zurückkommt." Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 13.32-33.

²⁵ Not "the past as authentic 'how'": *The Concept of Time*, 13E.5-6.

-- I offer, in four theses, a brief sketch of how the "derivative" retrieval discussed in SZ §74 is related to the "primordial" retrieval treated in §65.

1. Dasein inherits a social as well as a personal culture (383.20-30): Thrownness means being constitutionally relegated not to a merely private and individual world but to a communal heritage as well, a specific history and ideology ("the average public interpretation of existence in a given period," 385.24-25) fraught with inherited and mostly inauthentic possibilities (383.35).

2. Dasein can "free up" what has been "handed down": Two key verbs are placed in opposition to each other in §74, and they usually get confused in translation. The first and most important is *sich überliefern*, the second is *überkommen*.

(A) *Sich überliefern* most emphatically does not mean "handing down to oneself" but rather "freeing up" or "liberating" an already operative but hidden possibility so that one can actively relate to it. To "free up" or "liberate" is the only translation of *überliefern* that works. (Cf.: "*Überliefern, délivrer* [from the Latin "de-liberare"], *ist ein Befreien, nämlich in die Freiheit des Gespräches mit dem Gewesenen.*"²⁶)

(B) *Überkommen*, on the other hand, describes the relatively neutral process of merely inheriting possibilities from your history and culture. Such possibilities "come down" or are "handed down" to you, usually in inauthentic form. They are *überkommende Möglichkeiten* (383.35).

The relation between *überkommen* and *sich überliefern* and is this: Possibilities are handed down to you -- they are just there as personal or social [221] baggage -- but you can then choose, or not choose, to free them up for authentic appropriation. Most important, to *überliefern* **YOURSELF** is most assuredly not to "hand yourself down" but to "free yourself up" for your *Gewesenheit*. I believe that Kisiel is clear on these points. But the existing and forthcoming translations certainly are not. By obliterating this distinction, they eviscerate the meaning of §74. Here we have not the γένεσις of *Being and Time* but its φθορά.²⁷

3. "Freeing up" accomplishes two things. Corresponding to the two returns, resolution lets one liberate both (a) the ultimate existential possibility and (b) possibilities inherited from one's tradition (possibilities that are-as-having-been). In the first case you return to your authentic mortal self; in the second you draw out possibilities that are congruent with that mortal self: Dasein "chooses its hero"

²⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Was ist das -- die Philosophie?* (Tübingen, Neske, 1966), 8; *ibid.*: "*ausliefert, d.h. befreit,*" 21. See Friedrich Kluge, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*, 18th edition, ed. Walther Mitzka (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1957 [first edition, 1887]), 440: "**liefern** Ztw. Lat. *liberare* "befreien,...." The entry goes on to say that the word has developed the Middle Latin sense of *remittere*, i.e.: to send someone back to where he/she came from. (Cf. P.G.W. Glare, *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, combined edition [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, reprinted 1983], 1611, s.v. "*remitto*.")

²⁷ **REGARDING THE "FIRST RETURN":** The new translation of SZ unfortunately follows Macquarrie-Robinson in rendering the *Sichüberliefern* of *Entschlossenheit* (e.g., SZ 386.27) as "handing oneself down." **REGARDING THE "SECOND RETURN":** Worse yet, the forthcoming translation renders "*Sichüberliefern überkommenener Möglichkeiten in sich*" (383.34f.) as "handing oneself over to traditional possibilities"; and renders "...*konstituiert sich in der Entschlossenheit je das Überliefern eines Erbes*" (383.33--384.1) as "...handing down a heritage is always constituted in resoluteness." And so on.

(385.29).

The combination of the two -- freedom for death within an authentically chosen inherited possibility (384.12-14) -- is what Heidegger calls "historical living" (*das Geschehen*) or "authentic historicity" (*Geschichtlichkeit*), or more dramatically, "fate" (*Schicksal*). When performed communally it is called "living history together" (*Mitgeschehen*) or "shared history" (*Geschick*). The model for this historicity is homologous with that of temporality -- $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ -- but with the addition of an important nuance: not just becoming-your-alreadiness-and-thus-presenting, but also: liberating inherited possibilities and integrating them with your authentic self. Authentic temporality provides a norm for that, even if an extremely formal one:

Only anticipating your death drives out every accidental and 'provisional' possibility.
Only freedom for death gives you your goal outright, i.e., thrusts you into your finitude.
Once you grasp it, the finitude of your existence snatches you out of the endless multiplicity of readily available possibilities -- comfort, sloughing off, taking things lightly -- and delivers you to the simplicity of your fate. (384.4-11)

4. When explicit, "freeing-up" is "retrieval": Resolute freeing up, whether of one's own mortality or of culturally inherited possibilities, mostly happens implicitly (383.33-36). When such freeing-up becomes explicit, it is called retrieval (385.25-26). It entails expressly knowing the historical provenance of the possibilities one frees up, so that one can preserve them in radical possibility just as resolution preserves oneself in radical possibility. The purpose of retrieval, whether of oneself or of one's inherited possibilities, is not to revive what-is-as-having-been, but to live into one's becoming (385.32ff.).²⁸ [222]

How to conclude, when Theodore Kiesel's own account is not yet concluded? We stand at the genealogical divide, the point of the real gestation of *Sein und Zeit*: the new axis that runs from *In-Sein* through *Zeitlichkeit* to *Geschichtlichkeit*. Just as Heidegger, in December of 1926, stopped on the verge of completing Division 3 of Part One of SZ (and allegedly destroyed his notes and drafts), so Theodore Kiesel stops at the brink of completing his genealogy of SZ. This "abrupt halt" is a salutary pause. It gives us time to appreciate the immense and painstaking research that has brought us to the edge of this cliff, time to take stock of the $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (and possibly the $\phi\upsilon\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$) of SZ, time to take a long look before we leap.

²⁸ On §74, as well as on the entirety of SZ, see the most thorough, and thoroughly documented, commentary to date on the book: Jean Greitsch, *Ontologie et temporalité: Esquisse d'une interprétation intégrale de SEIN UND ZEIT* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1994).