

Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind

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[Note: This article was commissioned as a review of work on Heidegger between the years 1966-1981.]

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The period after World War Two saw the emergence both of the so-called later Heidegger and of the corresponding problem of the unity of his thought. Although his major work, *Sein und Zeit*, 1927 (=SZ) had announced Heidegger's intention of working out the meaning of being (*Sein*), his publications up through 1943, with the exception of the brief *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, presented only his preparatory analysis of human openness (*Dasein*). However, Heidegger's post-war publications seemed to emphasize "being itself" (the history of being, being as language, pre-Socratic notions of being, the withdrawal of being in the modern world) and indeed almost seemed to hypostasize being into an "other" with a life of its own. This state of affairs, combined with Heidegger's announcement in 1953 that SZ would be left a torso, gave rise to such questions as whether his later thought was still phenomenological, how it might be continuous with his earlier writings, and how, if indeed at all, it was to be understood.

A first wave of scholarly engagement with the later Heidegger was issued in a number of important writings which, because they were published before 1966, fall outside the scope of the present essay. H.-G. Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960), while based on Heidegger, opened up original new paths into hermeneutics and its application to literary as well as philosophical texts. Significant interpretations appeared in German (Allemann, Demske, von Herrmann, Löwith, Marx, Pöggler, Pugliese, Schulz, Volkmann-Schluck, Wiplinger), French (Biemel, Birault, Chapelle, Guilead, Levinas, Wahl), English (King, Kockelmans, Langan, Richardson, [p. 288] Seidel, Spiegelberg, Vycinas), Italian (Chiodi, Vattimo) and Dutch (IJsseling). Secondary literature on Heidegger from 1945 through 1965 ran to almost 1800 titles.

From 1966 until his death in 1976 Heidegger published some essays, a seminar and a lecture course [1-8], but, most importantly, he began the publication of his *Gesamtausgabe*. Among the most significant works that will appear in this Collected Edition are the heretofore unpublished texts and notes from his lecture courses and seminars from 1923 through 1944. Some of these have recently appeared [9-18], but the entire project will require some years to be completed.

The present report is devoted exclusively to Heidegger's own publications between 1966 and today, and particularly to the topics of (1) the development of his early thought in dialogue with Husserl and Aristotle and (2) the unity of his thought around the notion of *Ereignis* (the opening up of the open space required for meaning), for these two topics come to the fore most clearly in Heidegger's latest publications. The secondary literature on Heidegger continues to expand (almost 2000 titles since 1966), and some of these works are listed in the bibliography at the end. Inevitably, some very good studies had to be omitted for lack of space.

A word about the title of this essay is in order. One cannot speak of a "philosophy of mind" in Heidegger without serious and major qualifications. The center of his thought remained, in the broadest

sense, the correlation between the being of entities and human being. Thus he considered the issues of mind, consciousness, and knowledge -- in short, subjectivity -- to be two steps removed from "the thing itself," first because they were derived problematics in relation to human openness (*Dasein*), and secondly because *Dasein* in turn received its meaning from the nature of being itself. It is true that the question of intentionality ("mind") served as Heidegger's *entrée* to working out the meaning of human being, but in the process Heidegger shifted the weight from intentionality to what he called transcendence. Nonetheless, with the qualifications that will emerge below, we may try to gain access to Heidegger's own topic via the problematic of mind. The first step is to locate, by way of a schematic overview, the general lines of Heidegger's central issue.

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I. THE QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING

Heidegger began philosophy in 1907 with the reading of Franz Brentano's 1862 dissertation, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* [2, p. 81]. He learned that the Greek particle *on* has both a gerundive sense (to-be-in-being: *sein*) and a substantive sense (that-which-is-in-being: *das Seiende*). From that was born his question: If that-which-is-in-being has several senses, what is the meaning of being of entities in its very ground or "analogical unity"? In another phrasing: What is it that lets being come about at all in human experience? Or: What is that "gives" or "dispenses" being within the range of human experience? The focus is not on the being-of-entities but on what *makes possible* the experience of the being of entities.

The question may seem to coincide with that of traditional metaphysics, viz., the investigation of entities in their common being (ontology) and of being in its highest instance (theology). But Heidegger was interested not in the ontological or theological characteristics of the being of entities, but rather in what it is that *allows for the experience* of all modes of being; or: what it is that "gives/dispenses" the being of entities to human experience. Heidegger takes a step back, as it were, back behind all ontological and theological ways of discussing being, and he seeks to discuss the *provenance* of all modes of the experienced being of entities. On the way to SZ Heidegger transformed the question of being in two ways, one which we may call "phenomenological" and the other "kinetic."

The phenomenological transformation. Being for Heidegger is always the being of entities, but he interprets such being not as the raw existence of entities but as their meaningful disclosure to human experience. Whereas entities may exist apart from whether or not human beings exist, being as the meaningful givenness of entities never "is" apart from human experience. Being is the meaning of entities. But Heidegger's question concerns the meaning of being. This question about the *meaning of being* (also called the question of the "truth" or *disclosure* or *giving/dispensation* of being) concerns how it happens that the being-of-entities (not just entities, but entities *in their being*) is given or dispensed to human experience. That question shifts the emphasis from the relation of intentionality between human experience and the meaningful entities it encounters, to the relation of transcendence between human experience and whatever it is that makes possible the being of entities. As we shall see below, Heidegger's phenomenological transformation of traditional ontology entailed an ontological transformation of traditional phenomenology.

The kinetic transformation. Heidegger allows that the tradition did discuss the being of entities in more or less explicit correlation with human experience, but he claims that metaphysics failed to see whatever it is that gives or "dispenses" (makes possible) the being of entities. that being is intrinsically kinetic, i.e., an ontological movement of disclosure that is bound up with the ontological movement of human being itself. Thus metaphysics interpreted the being of entities as one or another form of stable presentness in conjunction with human being as a stable subject. Heidegger's kinetic transformation of the being-question entailed (1) working out the meaning of *kinesis* in Aristotle as an ontological presence-by-absence; (2) determining human nature as an ontological [p. 290] movement

of presence-by-absence (transcendence); and (3) interpreting the "dispensation of being" (*Seinsgeschick*) as an ontological movement that renders entities present-in-their-current-form-of-being by somehow remaining "itself" in relative absence (*a-letheia*). As we shall see below, Heidegger's kinetic transformation of the being-question entailed the retrieval or articulation of what Aristotle and the Greeks left unsaid.

In their unity, Heidegger's two transformations of traditional ontology point to a single issue: the essence of human being as a pres-ab-sential movement (called "transcendence") that makes it possible for entities to appear in their being, or equally, for the being of entities to show up in human experience. The name Heidegger gave central issue is itself a kinetic term, *Ereignis* or appropriation, which is Heidegger's interpretative translation of *kinesis* in Aristotle. In the last section of this essay we shall see how appropriation is the unifying issue of Heidegger's thought.

II. THE POLEMIC WITH HUSSERL

In recent publications [8, 14, 17] Heidegger has clarified for the first time explicitly and at length his debts to and disagreements with Husserl. By analyzing how Heidegger's own thought grew out of and yet away from Husserl, we shall see how Heidegger began to transform phenomenology from a philosophy of mind into a philosophy of appropriation.

A. *Heidegger's debts to Husserl*

Phenomenology was born of the effort to gain an *a priori* science of mind as the foundation for scientific philosophy and ultimately for philosophically grounded empirical sciences. The first step in that direction was Franz Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874). Brentano methodically bracketed the metaphysical claim of the existence of mind as a substance in order to focus presuppositionlessly on mental experiences just as they directly reveal themselves to immanent apperception. The goal of his empirical-descriptive (as contrasted with an experimental-genetic) psychology was first to describe the essential structure of mental experiences and then to arrange and classify them according to their natural order. Inner apperception -- not to be [p. 291] confused with a supposed introspection -- reveals that the common characteristic of all mental experiences is directedness toward or reference to a meant object (*Beziehung auf ein Objekt, intentionale/mentale Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes*), whether or not that object actually exists in the world. The essence of mental experience is intentionality -- the minding-of-the-meant.

Whereas Brentano only showed *that* intentionality characterizes mental experience, Edmund Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1900/01, (=LU) worked out the essence of intentionality, at least in its logical performances, with regard to: its bivalent structure of *intentio* and *intantum*; the way the *intantum* is had, viz., in the "how" of its being-intended; the possibilities of empty and fulfilled intention; and the nature of truth as an intentional identity-synthesis of the meant and the perceived.

But as far as Heidegger was concerned, the major achievement of LU was the discovery that the being of entities can itself be rendered present as a phenomenon through categorial intuition. Taking expressed language as his clue, Husserl showed that not all parts of an assertion can find intuitive fulfillment in sensuous perception. For example, in the statement "The paper is white," the intentions represented by "paper" and "white" can indeed be filled in by the corresponding sense perceptions, but the state of affairs corresponding to "is" (the paper *as being* white) does not appear to sensuous intuition. It remains a surplus over and above the content of sensuous intuition and so requires another act, founded on sensuous intuition, to render it immediately present: the categorial intuition. The dimension of the categorial corresponds to what the tradition called "being." More specifically, it is the "being-as" dimension of phenomena ($X \text{ as } Y = X \text{ is } Y$). Therefore, by freeing being from its mere status as a copula and by seeing it as a directly given phenomenon, Husserl showed that the full range of phenomenological immediacy covers not just entities but entities-in-their-mode-of-being, entities *as*

being such or so. Intentionality in its full range is intrinsically ontological, a disclosure of entities in their being.

Heidegger's debts to LU were chiefly three and concerned the goal, the theme, and the method of philosophy.

1. The goal: *The meaning of being.* By discovering that the being of entities is an immediately given phenomenon, Husserl, [p. 292] unbeknownst to himself, had opened the way to a phenomenological solution of the traditional being-question. If all intentional comportment has its *intentum* in the "how" of its being intended, then categorial intuition likewise sees being in the "how" of *its* being intended or revealed. To Heidegger this suggested a question that went beyond Husserl: What is the nature of the empty intention that can be "filled in" by being? Or: What is the relative absence from out of which being is disclosed as presence?

2. The theme: *The being of intentionality.* Husserl had demonstrated that the essence of all comportment is intentionality, indeed as a movement (directedness to) that reveals (renders present). To Heidegger this suggested the need to think out the unity of movement and revelation in terms of presence-and-absence. In Aristotle, movement (*kinesis*) is the momentary presence that an entity has on the basis of its stretch towards the privatively absent; and revelation (*aletheia*) is the becoming present of what was heretofore absent. But the intention of being is a stretch into relative absence (empty intention) that allows being to come from absence to presence (fulfilled intuition). Thus the goal and the theme of philosophy came together in the one issue of pres-ab-sence: human being's intentional movement (presence by absence) as correlative with the revelation of being (presence from out of absence).

3. The method: *Phenomenology.* Husserl's investigations into logical comportment provided the model that should characterize all phenomenology, viz., rigorous analytic description of the *a priori* (i.e., the being) of the various modes of intentionality. For Heidegger phenomenology was a method for letting intentionality show itself (*legein* as *apophainesthai*) just as it shows itself to be (*phainesthai*). Phenomenology was the ontology of intentionality. And since intentionality itself is intrinsically ontological, the phenomenology of intentionality could lead to solving the question of the meaning of being in its analogical unity. The goal, the theme, and the method of philosophy thus form a unity. Husserl bequeathed to Heidegger a descriptive method for analyzing the kinetic-disclosive essence of intentionality for the sake of raising and answering the question about the absence that allows the being of entities to become present.

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B. *Heidegger's transformation of phenomenology*

Heidegger's debts to LU were transformed into tasks insofar as Husserl's later works (1) failed to follow up the ontological implications of the discovery of categorial intuition, (2) overlooked everyday intentionality in order to study pure consciousness, and (3) legislated the reductions as the necessary means for moving from the natural attitude to transcendental consciousness. In Heidegger's eyes these shortcomings were due to Husserl's inadequate pre-grasp (*Vorgriff*) of the task of philosophy.

Heidegger's topic was the traditional being-question, phenomenologically transformed: how one "minds being" in its various instantiations and its analogical unity. Husserl's ultimate interest, on the other hand, was the relatively modern one, traceable to Descartes, of building a pure logic or *mathesis universalis* on the foundation of pure consciousness. This ultimate goal prescribed the penultimate theme of his philosophy: the epistemological clarification of pure consciousness insofar as it can become the object of universally valid statements in an *a priori* psychology. And just as the goal prescribed the theme, so the theme dictated the method: that of bracketing intentionality in the natural attitude so as to

reach transcendental consciousness.

We may spell out Heidegger's disagreements with Husserl in three areas: the field of phenomenology, its theme, and its method.

1. The field: Everydayness vs. theoretical comportment. For Heidegger intentionality was primarily operative in the realm of ordinary habitual experience -- e.g., work, conversation, history, religion -- and it deserved to be treated on its own terms and not, as Husserl would have it, by analogy with or from the viewpoint of theoretical comportment. Heidegger maintained that Husserl's logical-theoretical interests not only prevented him from seeing everydayness as the basic field of intentionality, but also led him to read the natural attitude from a prejudicial natural-scientific viewpoint. His analyses of perception, for example, tended to interpret perception as a mere "staring" at objects (cf. his descriptions of the famous cube on his desk) rather than realizing that human beings first of all have the things of their world in pragmatic concerned dealings (*Umgehen mit*) and "perceives" any single thing only within a totality of other useful things (a hammer with nails, [p. 294] shingles, etc.). Moreover, Husserl tended to see human being in the natural attitude, e.g., the empirical ego, simply in connection with psychophysical and neurological processes, hence as a thing-entity of nature. In that regard, Heidegger considered the "natural attitude" in Husserl to be not natural enough.

In Heidegger we may speak of a transposition of the ontological as-factor from the theoretical dimension that Husserl discussed in terms of the categorial intuition to the practical dimension of everydayness. In ordinary experience human beings live in their concerns and projects and thus already have a practical, if unthematic, understanding (*hermeneia*) of the being of themselves, other people, tools and nature. For example, when we employ tools for purposes, we know the tool as *for* something, and this pragmatic as-factor indicates that human being already understands the being-dimension of the tool (X as *being* Y). In fact, Heidegger claims that the Greeks basically experienced being in this practical modality, as evidenced by their appropriation of the word *ousia* -- which refers to things of practical concern, like tools and houses -- for "being." For Heidegger humans give evidence that they are a living understanding of the being of things (= the "hermeneutical as") whenever they perform a task (using a hammer to nail) or spell out a pragmatic concern ("Give me the lighter hammer"). Theoretical statements with their categorial or "apophantic" as-factor ("This hammer weighs two kilos") are, for Heidegger, derivations from and a leveling down of the primary practical way that one understands being.

2. The theme: Facticity vs. pure consciousness. Heidegger claimed that Husserl, fascinated by his rediscovery of the ideal content of logical acts and in keeping with his epistemological and logical interests, neglected the ontological question of the being of real intentional acts (and more generally, the question of the meaning of being as such) in order to focus on pure consciousness. Heidegger, on the other hand, influenced by Dilthey, found historical existence (facticity) to be "the point where all philosophical inquiry arises and to which it returns." We may note four points of difference between Heidegger's reading of facticity and Husserl's characterization of pure consciousness.

(a) Worldliness vs. immanence. For Husserl consciousness is immanent being, i.e., self-transparent in such a way that its direct [p. 295] intentional acts are interior to reflective intentional acts. For Heidegger, human beings in their lived, factual intentionality are being-in-the-world, i.e., always "outside" the supposed immanence of consciousness and concernedly absorbed in worldly contexts of meaning: the use-world of implements, the co-world of sociality, and, running through both of these, the self-world of concern for their own interests. Evidence of human worldliness is the fact that we always find ourselves in moods, that is, "tuned in" to a given worldly context.

(b) Fallenness vs. apodictic self-givenness. For Husserl apodictic self-givenness is the index of the presence that direct intentional acts have for second-order reflective acts; the self-

givenness of consciousness is in contrast with the givenness of transcendent entities which may not be as they appear and indeed may not be at all. For Heidegger human being as being-in-the-world is so absorbed in its intentional interests and in public opinions (*das Man*) that our true nature is usually hidden from us (fallenness), and we know ourselves not directly but by reflection (*Relucenz*) from our projected concerns (*Praestruktion*). Far from being a negative factor that would argue against intentionality in everyday life, fallenness testifies that we are so utterly intentional as to be lost in our interests. It also indicates the need to "wrest" self-givenness from everyday absorption, but not by a reduction to some disengaged consciousness. Rather, intentionality can thematize itself *from within* its own movement, e.g., by the breakdown of tools or especially by the "call of conscience."

(c) **Thrownness vs. self-position.** For Husserl consciousness is absolutely self-positing (so much so that the annihilation of the world leaves it untouched) and as such is absolutely constitutive of the meaning of transcendent reality. For Heidegger human being in its facticity does not posit itself over against the world and then constitute it presuppositionlessly from some supreme vantage point. Rather, we find ourselves already thrown-open (posited into possibilities), which possibilities in turn constitute the meaningfulness or being-dimension of the things we meet in the world. As already thrown-open (*geworfen*), we are already opened up (*vereignet*) by possibility, and we attain authentic selfhood, not self-position, by personally reappropriating our openness.

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(d) **Mineness vs. pure consciousness.** For Husserl "consciousness" is finally "pure consciousness," seen in its eidetic whatness apart from concretization in a corporeal individual. For Heidegger factically lived intentionality is always individuated as one's own (*Jemeinigkeit*), is known only in "having oneself" in historical situations (*Mich-Selbst-Haben*), is bodily and emotively determined (*Befindlichkeit, Stimmung*), is always co-existing with others (so much so that for the most part "everyone is the other and no one is himself"), and in the final analysis is projected towards the ultimate personal possibility that is one's death. In short, "We ourselves are the entities to be analyzed." Moreover, factual human being can never be reduced to an atemporal eidetic whatness, for our essence is our very temporal existence, the need to become the projected possibility that we already are.

3. The method: Hermeneutical induction vs. phenomenological reduction. Method in phenomenology is not a technique imposed on the subject matter but simply a way of seeing the issue--intentionality--in its being. If, following Husserl, we speak of intentionality as "constitution" ("the property of an act which makes the object present"), then phenomenological method is the interpreter's way of re-seeing how intentional acts constitute modes of presence. As such, phenomenological method entails looking away from the thematically intended object so as to see its "how" or mode of presence, i.e., its being.

For Husserl intention or constitution is performed by the absolutely self-positing transcendental ego. Therefore the moment of "looking away" becomes a radical bracketing of the entire natural attitude (with its already operative understanding of the being of entities) so as to see how entities are intended by pure consciousness (phenomenological-transcendental reduction), indeed in their essential whatness freed from individuating characteristics (eidetic reduction).

But for Heidegger everyday intentionality already understands being, and therefore phenomenological method is simply the thematization of ordinary life. That does entail a "looking away" from the thematic objects of intentional acts. However, this is not a reflective "looking back" to pure consciousness, but rather a thematic "looking ahead" into the realm of projected possibilities that is the practical being-dimension of entities, their way of [p. 297] being present. Phenomenological method for Heidegger is not reduction but induction (*epagoge*: cf. *Physics A*, 2, 185, b 13), a second-order hermeneutics that explicates the first-order hermeneutical understanding of being that we already are.

By "induction" Heidegger does not mean reasoning from particulars to universals but rather re-*seeing* (*Hinführung zu*) the being-dimension one has already seen, bringing it into explicit view, and reading entities in terms of it. When the entity to be analyzed is oneself, then hermeneutical induction is "resolve": consciously seeing and reappropriating the appropriation-by-possibility that one already is. In 1921 Heidegger called this "*die Wiederholung des Lebens*."

This brief presentation of Heidegger's disagreement with Husserl with regard to the field, the theme and the method of phenomenology has merely sketched out the parameters within which Heidegger intended to work out, in a phenomenological way, this question of the analogical unity of being. He filled in that area with his study of Aristotle.

III. THE RETRIEVAL OF ARISTOTLE

Heidegger was convinced that Aristotle's treatises constituted an implicitly phenomenological philosophy of everydayness without the obscuring intervention of a philosophy of subjectivity. But it was also clear that Aristotle moved within the Greek horizon of being as the stable presentness of entities. Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, therefore, had two tasks: that of explicating what Aristotle said about the appearance of being in everyday life and that of retrieving what Aristotle did not say about movement as the condition of that appearance.

Aristotle described wisdom as "philosophizing about truth: (*Meta*, A, 3, 983 b 2), not about the concept of truth but about the presentation process that lets entities be seen as what and how they are. We may follow out Heidegger's examination of that presentation process in Aristotle under three headings: the place and kinds of truth; the structure of linguistic truth; and the kinetic condition of truth; Heidegger worked out these questions in his 1925-26 course on logic [10].

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A. *The place and kinds of truth*

The tradition has generally appealed to Aristotle as the source of its double claim that the proper locus of truth is the judgment or assertion and that the essence of truth consists in the correspondence of a judgment with an objective state of affairs. Apart from the problems inherent in the position itself (e.g., how mental representations can accord with worldly facts), Heidegger challenges the claim that this doctrine can be found in Aristotle. Heidegger finds in the Aristotelian treatises a hierarchy of the "places" of truth:

1. entities as autodisclosive (*on alethes*)
2. human being as disclosive of entities (*psyche as aletheuein*)
 - a. in intuition (*aisthesis, noesis*)
 - b. in composition (*logos*)
 - i. preverbal: disclosive comportment (*episteme, sophia; phronesis, technē*)
 - ii. verbal: disclosive speech (*logos apophantikos*).

Four remarks about this hierarchy are in order.

1. For Aristotle the primary and proper locus of truth (disclosure) is not human being at all but entities themselves. In *Metaphysics* IX, 10, a text which Heidegger defends as authentic, Aristotle says that the most proper characteristic of entities insofar as they are encountered by us is their self-disclosure in their whatness and howness (*eidōs*). The being of entities is their appearing, and humans are revelatory in a secondary sense, i.e., insofar as we take things just as they reveal themselves to be (1051 b 6-9).

2. When Aristotle considers truth or disclosure as a performance of human being, he asserts that its primary locus is not judgment (*logos apophantikos*) but intuition, whether sensuous or,

above all, noetic. Because judgment is by nature a synthetic and dia-logistic disclosure of a complex state of affairs (*legein*: to bind together, *dialegein*: to say one thing through another), it has the possibility of falsehood as well as of truth and so is not the primary mode of human disclosure.

3. Intuition is the primary mode of disclosure because it immediately presents its object without the possibility of falsehood. [p. 299] Sensuous intuition always aims at its proper object (*to idion*) and in that sense is always true (*De An.*, III, 3, 427 b 11). Noetic intuition discloses its proper object by just "seeing" or "touching" (*thigein*) it. It discovers and never covers over (*pseudesthai*); at worst it is not error but simply non-seeing (*agnoein*, 1052 a 1-4).

4. Moreover, when Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI considers human being insofar as it "has *logos*" (*to logon echon*), he considers *logos* in its prelinguistic or preverbal function of disclosive comportment [18]. He first distinguishes the two parts of *logos* -- the theoretical, ordered to the eternal and unchanging and the practical, ordered to the changeable -- and then asserts that the function of both parts is disclosure. The theoretical modes of disclosure are *sophia* (wisdom) and *episteme* (discursive knowledge), whereas the practical modes are *phronesis* (prudence or circumspect insight: *umsichtige Einsicht*) and *techne* (know-how about the being of what is to be produced: *Sichauskennen*). These four modes of composite-revelatory behavior are called *hexeis*, ways that humans essentially "have themselves" as disclosive in preverbal comportment. For Aristotle the best of these modes (*beltiste hexis*) was wisdom, whereas for Heidegger, with his practical and historical interests, the best of prudence. But since human being as prudential is always posited in a world, Heidegger combined the two practical disclosive virtues into his notion of concern: human beings ultimately act for their own good (*phronesis*) and to that end carry out practical projects (*techne*).

The results of Heidegger's reading of the place and kinds of disclosure in Aristotle are: first, the location of disclosure primarily in entities themselves, i.e., in their being, and, secondly, the unfolding of a panoply of modes of disclosure in human beings, with judgment or assertion being the last. Within the *logos*-modes of disclosure Heidegger emphasizes the preverbal over the verbal: *logos* is a preverbal "reading" (*Rede*) of the world *as such* and so, before it is ever spoken out in language. And within the preverbal he emphasizes -- against Aristotle -- the practical over the theoretical. This shift, of course, was basic to his own treatment of concern, tool-use, and the worldhood of the world in SZ.

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B. *The structure of linguistic disclosure*

In order to work out a phenomenology of disclosure in human being's linguistic or verbal comportment, Heidegger turned to Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, a treatise on intelligibility (*hermeneia*) both in the broad sense of reference and in the narrow sense of assertion (*apophansis*). Here above all Heidegger's effort was to retrieve from Aristotle a heretofore unarticulated phenomenology of facticity. The following presents in rough fashion Aristotle's schematization of language in the treatise, with help from *De Anima*.

<p>Non-signifying/ referential <i>psophos monon</i></p>	<p>Signifying/referential <i>phone semantike</i></p>
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	Simple utterance <i>phasis</i>		Complex utterance: discursivity <i>logos</i>				
	Noun <i>onoma</i>	Verb <i>rhema</i>	Non-presentative <i>ouk</i> <i>apophantikos</i> (Optative, subjective, imperative moods)	Presentative <i>apophantikos</i> (Indicative mood)			
				Affirmation <i>kataphasis</i>		Negation <i>apophasis</i>	
				true	false	true	false

According to this diagram, the structure of disclosive language consists of: (1) sounds that refer (2) to complex states of affairs, (3) in such a way that they present something *as* something (4) with the claim that it is or is not the case, (5) with the possibility that the claim may be either true or false (correct or incorrect). Heidegger first explains this position and the "retrieves" what it leaves unsaid.

1. Reference. Whereas animals make sounds, only humans can make an utterance, i.e., a meaningful or referential sound (*phone semantike*). Aristotle delineates the characteristics of reference [p. 301] in five interconnected ways.

(a) The sound must be *meta phantasias* (*De An.*, II, 8, 420 b 33), that is, about an *eidōs*, not as some "species" in the sense of a "mental representation" but about something that can show itself in the world of human possibility [19].

(b) A referential utterance is found only *hoti genetai symbolon* (*De Interp.*, 16 a 27), only when there is a binding together (*syn + ballein*) of human being and the being of a worldly entity.

(c) Meaningful sounds are *hermeneia* (420 b 19) in the broad sense, i.e., *delousi ti* (cf. *De Interp.*, 17 a 18): they create a circle of intelligibility by showing something, even if they do not yet show it from itself (*apo-phainesthai*).

(d) Referential utterances are not *physei* but *kata syntheken* (17 a 1): they do not arise from nature but from convention, i.e., by the historical actions and social intercourse of men.

(e) Finally, referential utterances are intrinsically social (cf. *ho akousas eremesen*, 16 b 21), oriented towards others with whom the speaker shares the world, and directed to effecting the hearer's agreement.

In summary, for Heidegger the referential character of language shows that we are: in the world; transcendent to the being of entities; hermeneutical, i.e. caught up in intelligibility; historical; and social.

2. Mere utterance vs. talk. While all utterances are referential, not all referential utterances constitute talk (*logos*). Nouns and verbs, for example, are indeed referential sounds, but, taken by themselves, they are only namings (*phaseis*). A noun names a thing without reference to time; a verb has a reference to time and to synthesis (*legomenon kat'heteron*, 16 b 5), yet it posits neither the time nor the synthesis but remains only a sign (*semeion*) of such positing. Talk requires synthesis with regard to time.

3. Mere talk vs. apophantic talk. While all talk refers to complex states of affairs in a temporal synthesis, not all talk is presentative (*apophantikos*) of a state of affairs so as to let it be seen from itself. According to Aristotle prayers, commands, wishes, definitions and the like are indeed talk but not apophantic talk, not talk which can be either true or false. Aristotle refers discussion of mere talk to the *Poetics* and the *Rhetorics* (17 a 7), and in that latter treatise Heidegger found the basis for his own [p. 302] discussion of "mere talk" (*Gerede*) in SZ [19].

4. Apophantic talk: Two levels of disclosure. Insofar as apophantic or presentative talk does not something forth to be seen, it is always true or disclosive in the broad sense of bringing something out of hiddenness; the opposite of *to alethes* in this wide sense is to *lathanomenon*, that which does not appear. However within this broad revelatory function, apophantic talk can be either true or false in the narrow sense of correctness/ incorrectness. The first level of disclosure has no counterpart of falsehood: it is a simple tendency to disclose. This primary presentational disclosure is our dianoetic participation in noetic intuition; Heidegger calls it "the disclosive having of an entity" (in its being), or more simply, the pre-having (*Vorhabe*). The second level of truth is embedded within primordial disclosure and runs the risk of presenting something incorrectly as well as correctly. The basis of predicative truth-or-falsehood is prepredicative presentational disclosure.

5. Disclosure in affirmation and denial. Assertoric or categorial talk, whether affirmation or denial, presumes the prepredicative appearance of the phenomenon and then speaks from (*apo-*) the phenomenon so as to show it (*-phainesthai*) as such and so or as not such and so, with the possibility that such showing may be correct or incorrect. What constitutes the possibility of correct assertoric talk is the same as what constitutes the possibility of incorrect assertoric talk: the structure of composing and dividing (*synthesis, diairesis*). Aristotle says that falsehood (and therefore truth in the narrow

sense of correctness) is possible only where there is *synthesis* (*De An.*, 430 b 1), and he adds that *synthesis* in itself is also a *diairesis*. It is not the case that affirmative judgments compose the subject and predicate whereas negative judgments divide them. Rather, composition and division both occur in every judgment, whether affirmative or negative, whether true or false. Hence, *synthesis* and *diairesis* are two names for a single bivalent phenomenon. The unity of *synthesis* and *diairesis*, whatever that might be, is the condition for the possibility of both correctness and incorrectness.

Aristotle did not question "below" the composing-dividing structure of assertoric talk to the [p. 303] underlying condition of its possibility. Heidegger's retrieval of Aristotle finds that underlying phenomenon to be movement in the form of what he calls the "hermeneutical as."

C. *Movement as the ontological condition of truth*

Heidegger's articulation of linguistic disclosure in Aristotle had two major results: first it showed that apophantic *logos* has a moment of primordial disclosure with no counterpart of falsehood; secondly, it showed that, within that primordial disclosure, affirmation and denial can be either true or false because of the unified structure of *synthesis-diairesis*. In his retrieval of the unsaid in Aristotle's position, Heidegger brought these two insights together and (1) interpreted the unity of *synthesis and diairesis* in terms of the primordial disclosure in terms of movement.

1. *Primordial disclosure as the hermeneutical as.* To know an entity is to know it as being such and so. And in the practical mode of comportment, that entails knowing the entity as "being for" such and such a purpose. Indeed, the "as-for" dimension (Wozu) is what is priorly known when one knows an entity. That is, we can get involved with an entity only by being already beyond it, by having already understood it as being for something. This primordial, unthematic, prepredicative understanding of an entity's being is what Heidegger called the "hermeneutical as." This is the underlying structure that makes possible assertoric composition of a subject with its logically distinguishable predicate: *synthesis* and *diairesis*. To synthesize is to distinguish, and the assertoric synthesis-distinction (the "apophantic as") rests on the prepredicative synthesis-distinction (the "hermeneutical as") of entities and what they are for.

2. *Primordial disclosure as transcendence.* Heidegger interprets human being, insofar as it already knows the being-dimension of entities, as "transcendence" to that dimension, i.e., as being beyond entities and disclosive of the possibilities in terms of which entities can be understood. This kinetic exceeding of entities he calls our *Immer-schon-vorweg-sein*, our "always already being out ahead" of entities. This movement is disclosure in the primordial sense; Heidegger calls it "world-disclosure," and it [p. 304] corresponds to the *diairesis*-moment of the hermeneutical as. In his lecture course, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (Feb. 27, 1930 [20]) Heidegger said that *diairesis*, seen as human being's transcendence, "pulls human being asunder, as it were, and grants it a stretching-ahead, takes it away into the possible..." But at the same time we return *from* that transcendence *to* entities so as to know them in terms of possibility, i.e., "so as to allow the possible -- as what empowers the actual -- to speak back to the actual in a binding way..., binding or bonding it: *synthesis*." Clearly the unity of *diairesis* as transcendence to the being of entities and *synthesis* as the return to entities in their being constitutes the *kinetic structure of the hermeneutical as*, which in turn makes possible truth and falsehood in assertions. Human being is nothing other than this disclosive movement of transcendence and return: excess to being and access to entities.

Heidegger's study of Husserl and Aristotle transformed the traditional question of being by putting it on a phenomenological and a kinetic base. Husserl provided Heidegger with a method for analyzing the intentional disclosure of being, Aristotle let Heidegger see the kinetic basis for that disclosure. Disclosure and movement came together in the answer Heidegger gave to the question of the meaning of being: *Ereignis* or appropriation.

IV. THE UNITY OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT: OPENNESS

Heidegger scholarship is haunted by a tendency to hypostasize being into an autonomous "other," separate from entities and from human being. Often Heidegger's own way of speaking about being seems to abet this misunderstanding. But it is sure that being is not a thing or event off by itself (cf. *Physics* B, 1, 193 b 5: *ou choriston on*) but rather is only the disclosive structure of entities, distinguishable from entities but neither separate from nor reducible to them. Moreover, it is distinguishable only by human beings (cf. *ibid.*, *all'e kata ton logon*), specifically through our kinetic structure of transcendence-and-return. When Heidegger speaks of the meaning of being (or equally: the time-character of being, the truth of being, the clearing of being [8]), he is simply naming [P. 305] that which *gives or dispenses the being/intelligibility of entities within human experience*. Thus, when we speak below about "appropriation," we are simply referring to the unified source of the many ways that entities are disclosed in their being to human understanding.

At the beginning of SZ Heidegger stated a threefold program that he filled out over the next fifty years: (1) the analysis of the kinetic structure of human being with regard to disclosure, (2) the analysis of the kinetic structure of disclosure in its analogical unity, and (3) a reinterpretation of the history of metaphysics in the light of the kinetic structure of disclosure. In order to see the unity of Heidegger's thought around the notion of appropriation, we shall follow this threefold program.

A. *The kinetic structure of human being*

A recent publication of Heidegger's [9] allows us to see the simplicity and unity of the analyses of human being's kinetic structure as worked out more densely in SZ. To state it schematically: human being as transcendence (existentially-factically ahead of itself in possibilities) holds open the world within which one can have meaningful access to entities. As an "excess" that has "access" to entities, human being is called the "there," that is, "openness," the open area of intelligibility. The kinetic structure that holds this area open is called "care." The first division of SZ works out the bivalent structure of care, while the second division defines that structure in terms of movement.

1. *The bivalent structure of care.* We have already seen that the structure that makes for human being's practical disclosive activity (e.g., in using tools) is transcendence-and-return, one's excess-and-access. SZ spells out the excess-dimension in terms of existentiality and facticity (or project and positedness) and spells out the access-dimension as presence-to (*Sein bei*). By existentiality and facticity, taken as a unity, Heidegger means that human being is posited or thrown into its proper condition of living ahead of itself in possibility, and specifically in the possibilities that constitute given worldly contexts. By presence-to-entities Heidegger means that humans understand entities, relate to them, and are usually [p. 306] absorbed in them (fallenness). The definition of care is: "being-already-out-ahead-in-possibilities as being-present-to-entities." It merely articulates Heidegger's understanding of the unity of *diairesis-synthesis*.

2. *The "temporal" structure of care.* The second division of SZ first of all shows that the ultimate term of human being's already-aheadness is one's death, not in the sense of a future demise but as ever-present finitude that is concretized in one's dying. "Being *towards* death" is not to be understood as a directionality towards a moment that has not yet come. Rather, it means that, as finite, human being is always "at the point of death." Secondly, division two discusses how human being might appropriate its essentially finite condition. The "call of conscience" is the radical awareness of one's essential finitude; when heeded, that awareness issues in a decision to accept and affirm what one already is. This "resolve" is disclosure of oneself to oneself in the form of a "retrieval" of oneself.

The analyses of finitude and self-disclosure round out the proper wholeness of human being's kinetic structure and allow it to be defined in its "temporal" structure. By "temporality" Heidegger means nothing chronological or linear but rather the way in which human being's essential movement is

generated (*zeitigt sich*).

(a) As ahead of itself, human being is always *becoming* its proper possibility, death. This becoming or coming-towards (*Zukommen*) constitutes what is called the existential "future" (*Zukunft*).

(b) However, what human being is becoming is what it already and essentially is: its finitude concretized in its dying. In the existential scheme, the "past" as something by-gone is replaced by the "already-essential" or "alreadiness" (*Gewesenheit*). This is Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *to ti en einai* (he translates: *das jeweils schon voraus Wesende*), and it points to the *a priori* determination that is registered in human being's facticity. The existential "future" and existential "alreadiness" belong together: human being is becoming what it already is.

(c) The unified movement of becoming one's alreadiness gives human being its proper "present moment" or situation, within which it can authentically understand itself and properly render entities present instead of just being absorbed in them.

The upshot of SZ is that the bivalent structure of care finds its meaning in "temporal" movement. Again, excess (becoming what [p. 307] one already essentially is) makes possible access (the meaningful presence of entities). The next question is how "time is the original essence of being" ([16] lecture of February 24, 1931).

B. *The kinetic structure of disclosure*

In the late 'twenties Heidegger had hoped to read off the disclosure of the being of entities, as itself kinetic, from the kinetic nature of human being as world-disclosive. His recently published work, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* [9], was a failed attempt in that direction. In the 'thirties Heidegger tried a different approach to the problem of the kinetic unity of disclosure: through interpretations of Hölderlin [15] and above all Aristotle [1, pp. 239-301].

1. *Movement in Aristotle.* Whereas his earlier analyses of *De Interpretatione* read movement simply in terms of human being's transcendence-and-return, Heidegger's later interpretations of *Physics* II and III studied movement in terms of the self-disclosure of entities. In both cases, however, *kinesis* is an ontological affair. It is the kind of being that characterizes moving entities. A moving entity is one that does not fully appear (is not completely present) and yet does appear in its incompleteness. Its presence is always fraught with absentiality: a not yet and a no longer, a coming into and a going from presence. But such relative absentiality is precisely what lets the entity *be* a moving entity. Therefore, to know a moving entity as what it truly is means to keep present to mind not only the *present entity* but also the *presence of the absentiality* that makes it a moving entity. The presence-of-its-absentiality is the moving entity's being-structure. We may call it "pres-ab-sentiality."

Aristotle's word for the pres-ab-sentiality of moving entities is *dynamis*, a word for "being." It does not mean "mere possibility" but rather "imperfect presence" or "movement into presence." As Heidegger interprets it, it means the same as *kinesis*. Indeed, he translates both words coequally as *Eignung* and *Ereignung*: "the appropriation into presence of what is not fully present," an entity's coming into presence from out of absence. It is crucial to note that the absential dimension of an entity's [p. 308] emergence into presence is *itself present in its own way*, viz., as "privative presence," and therefore can be experienced. (Examples: anticipation of the future of an entity or retention of its past [2, p. 13]).

Dynamis and *kinesis* are the origin of Heidegger's term *Ereignis*. This word describes a moving entity's disclosive structure, its being. Since being is always and only the disclosive structure of entities, "appropriation" does not name a separate hypostasis but only the common way that all moving

entities disclose themselves.

2. Appropriation in Heidegger. Aristotle held that, properly speaking, only natural entities -- as contrasted with artifacts -- have their being as movement. However, Heidegger maintains that all entities, insofar as they are autodisclosive phenomena, have their being as movement into appearance. They may come from complete unknownness into knownness, or from distortion into clarity, or from forgottenness into remembrance. All of these are modes of appropriation, ways an entity comes into presence. Thus, to see an entity as disclosed is to see it as kinetic. And that means not only seeing the present entity but also (indeed priorly) co-seeing the being of the entity, its pres-ab-sentiality.

[p. 309]

There is an essential between the self-disclosive structure of human being and the autodisclosive structure of entities only on the basis of the former does the latter happen. Human being is present to itself -- that is, is the openness of Da-sein -- only by being appropriated into its own self-absence. But the openness (Da) is the arena in which entities show up as this or that, i.e., in their being. The openness is given by the human being's kinetic self-absence; and that absence in turns allow for the finite presence of entities as this or that.

Heidegger's unfortunate tendency to hypostasize being can be seen in the following statement in which he summarizes his thought: "Being itself recedes, but, as this recess, being is precisely the pull that claims human being's being as the place of being's own arrival" (*Nietzsche*, II, p. 368). Translated, that means: the disclosure of entities has a privative dimension that is registered in human being's transcendence in such a way as to allow the disclosure of entities.

C. *Metaphysics and openness [Ereignis]*

Heidegger undertook what he called a phenomenological deconstruction of traditional ontology in order to show that, ever since classical Greek thought, the meaning of being has been interpreted in terms of time, but only one moment of time. He found evidence of this in the fact that Plato and Aristotle named being with the words *ousia* and *parousia*, "presentness." Thus entities were understood as presently disclosed, but the kinetic [p. 310] pres-ab-sential disclosing of entities was overlooked. Correlative with this interpretation was the understanding of human being's *logos* as a rendering *present* of entities. The one-dimensional "temporality" of human being was correlative with the one-dimensional temporality of being. In fact there is no temporality here but rather an attempt to read presentness in terms of, and to reduce it back to, the eternal. Time and movement were seen as indices of the weakness, the relative non-being, of the world. In his reinterpretation of metaphysics, Heidegger sought to use the kinetic-disclosive meaning of being as a clue to unpacking traditional ontology so as to show the kinetic source of its categories. He meant neither to "destroy" metaphysics nor to ground it, but rather to find the ground from out of which metaphysics arose. That ground turns out to be no "ground" at all but rather the movement of appropriation, which Heidegger, citing Heraclitus, calls a "game" (cf. Frag. 52: *paizon*). And human being's highest calling is to "play along" with that game, i.e., to realize and accept its own kinetic involvement with appropriation.

Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics entailed an analysis of (1) pre-metaphysical Greek thought, (2) metaphysics from Plato to the present, and (3) the possibility of overcoming metaphysics.

1. The pre-Socratics. Heidegger claims that the archaic Greek thinkers did in fact experience the disclosure of entities in both its positive and privative dimensions (*a-letheia*) but did not thematize either the privative dimension itself (*lethe*) or its conjunction with human being's transcendence. In Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus he finds the same topic addressed: the openness of things (*aletheia*), indeed the *emergence* of things into openness (*physis*) in such a way that things bring with

them an intrinsic absentiality [13]. As Heidegger reads them, the pre-Socratics were aware of the privative dimension of presence and named it (e.g., *kryptesthai philei*, Heraclitus, Frag. 123), but did not investigate it for itself. It remained, as it were, in their penumbral vision as they focused on the emergent, radiant entities that were the issue of this pres-ab-sentiality. For Heidegger, the very implicitness of the appropriation process is what constituted the beauty and the enchanting naïveté of the archaic Greek world and made possible their celebration of the up-front-ness of things in the poetry, art and [p. 311] religion. The archaic Greeks were, so to speak, "all eyes," caught up in seeing the world as resplendently "there" without the mediation of subjectivity or anthropocentrism. They lived the everyday natural attitude at its best -- the experience of the emergent openness of things -- while the archaic thinkers preserved in word the privative presence that lets things be open.

Heidegger's purpose was not to "restore" ancient Greece but to explicate what it left implicit and to articulate what it left unsaid, i.e., *lethe* and human being's transcendence. Because privative presence is intrinsically privative (and thus "loves to hide"), it lends itself to being overlooked, and when it is overlooked, human being becomes absorbed in entities as presently disclosed and forgets the pres-ab-sentiality that lets them be. The emergence of human being as the "measure of all things" in fifth-century Greece heralded the end of the penumbral awareness of appropriation and the beginning of what would become metaphysics: the understanding of the world -- the realm of human possibility -- as the correlation between stably disclosed entities and stably disclosive human being.

2. Metaphysics as the "forgetting" of what discloses the being of entities. The appropriation process (*physis*, *aletheia*) is an entity's movement into appearance. According to Heidegger it was with Plato that the bi-dimensionality of appropriation (movement, appearance) was forgotten, with the result that only one moment of it was seen, the eidetic appearance of entities as what they are: *eidos*. The *eidos* loses its reference to the entity's emergence into disclosure and becomes instead that-as-which an entity presents itself for possible intellectual viewing by human being. As *physis* and *kinesis* (privative presence) drop out of the picture, any hope of grasping the corresponding kinetic nature of human being is lost. The being of entities is interpreted as stable disclosedness, and human being is understood as the one who renders entities meaningfully present in that stable appearance. And since only what is unmoving and eternal is, for Plato, truly stable, only the eternal shows itself as true being (*ontos on*). Temporal, moving entities are relegated to the status of *me on*, not-really-in-being. Concomitantly, a new term emerges to designate the being of entities: *ousia*, "presentness-in-reality," and the proper formation (*paideia*) of human being consists in its ability to see eidetic presentness in a correct (*orthotes*) vision. Thus, according to Heidegger, truth comes to be understood not as the [p. 312] pres-ab-sential disclosure of entities but as human being's intellectual correspondence with entities in their disclosed presentness.

Aristotle effects a decisive shift away from Plato's emphasis on *idea/eidos*, but without recovering the original Greek sense of kinetic disclosure. To be sure, for Aristotle an entity that is still moving and becoming is no longer, as it was for Plato, a *me on*; rather, it is the primary instance of *ousia*. It is a stable thing (*hypostasis*) that is in the process of being brought forth (*morphe*) into what it is (*eidos*). In short, it is an *ergon*, a "work" in the unique Greek sense of that which appears as being brought forth and rendered stable. Its being is *energeia*, presentness as an *ergon*, or (since *telos* means the same as *ergon*) *entelecheia*. While this vision of entities does regain some of the archaic sense of movement, it falls short of the pre-Socratic insight precisely to the degree that it follows after and is to some extent controlled by Plato's *idea/eidos*. *Kinesis* in Aristotle is entirely for the sake of appearance and presentness, so much so that the absential dimension of disclosure is not seen as intrinsically privative (*kryptesthai philei*) but as *not-yet-in-appearance*. *Ousia* dominates in Aristotle as much as in Plato, and although Aristotle gives priority to *prote ousia* (that which is in *ousia*: existence) over *deutere ousia* (that *as which* something is in *ousia*: essence), nonetheless the controlling viewpoint is still *ousia*, presentness. The emergent character of appropriation which issues in *ousia* lies back behind both existential and essential *ousia* and is not recovered by Aristotle.

From classical Greece onwards, metaphysics would continuously manipulate the whatness and thatness of *ousia* by giving primacy to one or another of them (ontology) and in turn would trace *ousia* back to its highest instance in a self-present God (theology). But all such "ousiology," according to Heidegger, does not raise the question of the kinetic process that lies behind stable presentness. (Even Aquinas' *esse entium* and *ipsum esse subsistens* is, for Heidegger, only an existence-oriented modality of ousiology.) The forgetting of pres-ab-sentiality has its source not in some psychological defect of human being but rather in the intrinsically privative (self-concealing) nature of pres-absentiality itself. Human being's fallenness or absorption in entities-as-present is thus a normal consequence of the very nature of disclosure. The fact that metaphysics thematizes the presentness of entities and traces it back to God does not [p. 313] break out of fallenness but in fact reinforces fallenness by elevating it to the level of a thematic science. The history of metaphysics consists in the various transformations of the understanding of the presentness of entities. For Heidegger the fullest form of such forgetting of pres-ab-sentiality is the widespread contemporary attitude of *Technik*, which interprets entities as totally disclosed or disclosable for human being's use.

3. Overcoming metaphysics. The overcoming (*Überwindung*) or surpassing of metaphysics refers to overcoming the forgottenness of the opening of the open (*Ereignis*). As early as 1920, in a course on the phenomenology of religion, Heidegger called this overcoming *die Umwandlung der Philosophie*, i.e., the transformation of human being's philosophical awareness into a recognition of the privative dimension of disclosure and of the corresponding structure of human transcendence. This "turn" was the goal of Heidegger's thought from the early 'twenties onward. In SZ it was discussed in a preliminary way as "resolve" (*Entschlossenheit*), human being's acceptance of itself as ordered to the appropriation process; in later writings it is talked about in terms of *Gelassenheit*, letting oneself go along with the appropriation process. The *Kehre* is human being's turn towards (its recognition of) the pres-absentiality that is already operative both in his own kinetic structure and in the kinetic structure of disclosure but that is obscured by fallenness, metaphysics and the attitude of *Technik*. To "take the turn" is to awaken to the privative dimension of disclosure. This means getting "behind" the historical formations of presentness (*idea, energeia, esse*, etc.) which make up the history of metaphysics, thus getting "to" the kinetic source of all such formations: appropriation. In that sense Heidegger can say that appropriation "gives" the various forms of presentness in metaphysics while being itself "withheld" in the double sense of being intrinsically privative (self-concealing) and thus overlooked (forgotten). To awaken to appropriation, therefore, means to overcome the history of forgetfulness and to enter into the true movement that is disclosure, not so as to extinguish the privative dimension of disclosure (an impossibility) but rather to recognize and to accept it in its pres-ab-sential bivalence [2, pp. 44 f.]. In short, the "turn" -- the unifying goal of Heidegger's thought -- means re-appropriating the structure of appropriation.

We have seen that Heidegger's latest publications reveal the unity of his thought precisely by revealing its genesis. His philosophy is not an existential anthropology and not a philosophy of "mind." It is not a metaphysics and least of all a study of some platonically separate thing called "being." Rather it is a phenomenology of movement or appropriation: the analysis of human being's experience of the pres-ab-sential disclosure of entities in its analogical unity.

[Note: The bibliography is under construction.]