

## "Time and Being," 1925-27

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in

*Thinking about Being*,  
edited by Robert W. Shahan and J. Mohanty,  
Norman, Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press,  
1984, pp. 177-219.

and

*Heidegger: Critical Assessments* [4 vols.],  
ed. Christopher Macann,  
London: Routledge, 1992,  
vol. 1, pp. 29-67.

It is very significant that Heidegger chose Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, the lecture course he gave in the summer semester of 1927, to be the first publication in his monumental Gesamtausgabe.<sup>1</sup> The text is rich in many ways, but one of its major claims to fame may rest in a footnote, taken from Heidegger's own manuscript of the course, that appears on page 1 of the published version. This elliptical footnote, which in fact functions like a subtitle for the whole volume, asserts that the lecture course represents a "New elaboration of Sein und Zeit, Part One, Division Three."<sup>2</sup>

This footnote promises quite a bit indeed. It is well known that when Heidegger published Sein und Zeit in February of 1927, the book was lacking its crowning section--Part One, Division Three--entitled "Time and Being." The absence of this section, coupled with Heidegger's announcement in 1953 that it would never appear, has raised doubts about the feasibility of his philosophical program and had led to an abundance of speculation, much of it misleading, about the so-called "turn" from the work of the early Heidegger to that of the later Heidegger. But now it would seem that the problem can be solved. The lecture course Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, which Heidegger began on Saturday, April 30, 1927, just over eight weeks after the publication of Sein und Zeit, would appear to fill out the missing section that was to be the climax of Heidegger's magnum opus. Indeed, on the second day of lecturing Heidegger provided his students with an outline of the course, and Parts Two

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<sup>1</sup>Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., Gesamtausgabe II, 24 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975). English translation by Albert Hofstadter, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). In the present essay I use my own translations from the German, and I refer to the German pagination. N.B.: Apparatus in this essay: I follow William J. Richardson's abbreviations for Heidegger's works: Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. xxxi. The number indicates the German page, and the letter indicates the paragraph on that page.

<sup>2</sup>"Neue Ausarbeitung des 3. Abschnitts des I. Teils von 'Sein und Zeit'."

and Three of that outline promised to be a complete elaboration of "Time and Being."<sup>3</sup> And if we required further confirmation of the hypothesis that Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie fulfills the promise of Sein und Zeit, we would seem to find it in the new, 1977 Gesamtausgabe edition of Sein und Zeit. There Heidegger has annotated the title of all of Part One of his treatise in the following way:

The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of Temporality [notation: "The published portion covers only this much"] and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being [notation: "For this, cf. the Marburg lecture course of 1927, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie"].<sup>4</sup>

But, for better or worse, the matter is not all that simple. To begin with, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (hereafter: GP) makes almost no advance into the uncharted territory of what Sein und Zeit (hereafter: SZ) called "Time and Being." To be sure, if in the lecture course Heidegger had covered all the material that he outlined for his students, he would have filled out "Time and Being," albeit in a different order from what he had promised in SZ. But in fact the very few pages in GP that push into the area of "Time and Being" (on a strict reading, GP, 441-45) were reserved to the second half of the second-to-last meeting of the course (July 23, 1927) and, on the whole, are among the least satisfying of all the lectures. We are faced, then, with a paradox, or perhaps even with an error. The footnote at the beginning of GP promises us an elaboration of "Time and Being," but the text itself delivers, on a strict interpretation, only four pages of such an elaboration or, on a very broad interpretation, only 28 pages (GP, 441-69), most of which provide only schematic hints.

What are we to make of all this in terms of the philosophical program that Heidegger outlined in SZ and that he claimed to have fulfilled over the course of his philosophical career?

Heidegger's one and only topic from beginning to end--what he called the issue of philosophy--was the kinetic structure of the disclosure of entities, that is, the movement that constitutes the analogical unity (or meaning) of the being of entities. At various points in his career Heidegger called this kinetic structure of disclosure the "time-character" of being or the "truth" of being or the "clearing" of being. What all these titles point to in common is the bivalence that is intrinsic to the movement of disclosure. The "being" or disclosive structure of entities is a phenomenological movement made up of a dimension of relative absence and a dimension of relative presence. Now, whereas traditional philosophy had always known about the presential dimension of entities, Heidegger took upon himself the task of pointing out the absential dimension of such disclosure. This absential dimension (in Greek: altheia) is intrinsic to the presential dimension (in Greek: altheia) of the kinetic disclosure of things. To put this in an imperfect nologism, we may say that Heidegger's one and only topic was "pres-ab-sence," the kinetic bivalence that makes up the disclosive structure (or "being") of entities.

Now, whereas Heidegger had always intended to work out pres-ab-sence as a meaning of being, in his early works--and especially in SZ and GP--he approached the problem from within a transcendental framework. He did so specifically from an analysis of Dasein's projection of temporal schemata that would be the horizon for the meaning of being. In his later works, however, Heidegger shifted away from the language and viewpoint of the transcendental framework and showed that the movement intrinsic to the disclosive structure of entities was responsible for the projective movement of Dasein. This shift constituted a regaining and a deepening of the archaic Greek viewpoint, where the autodisclosure of entities requires and governs the disclosive movement of man.

The main importance of GP for our purposes is that it did not complete the vector of SZ,

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<sup>3</sup>Heidegger announced the projected outline of the course on May 4, 1927 (cf. GP 32 f.). For the dating of lectures I rely on the Kyoto Manuscript of Simon Moser's Nachschrift of GP, a copy of which I have placed in the Phenomenology Archives at the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.

<sup>4</sup>The notes read, respectively: "Nur dieses in diesem veröffentlichten Stück" and "Vgl. dazu Marburger Vorlesung SS 1927 (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie)" (new SZ 53, notes a and b). On p. 134 note b of the new Gesamtausgabe edition of Wegmarken Heidegger remarks: "The whole of the lecture course [Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie] belongs to Sein und Zeit, First Part, Third Division, 'Time and Being'."

indeed that it hardly advanced beyond the analyses contained in that work. That is, GP represents Heidegger's last effort to work out the kinetic meaning of being from within a transcendental framework. In the last part of this essay I shall use the incompleteness of GP as an occasion for discussing how Heidegger shifts away from the language and viewpoint of transcendental philosophy and effects the "turn" into the pres-ab-sential structure of being.

On the way to that issue we notice some important questions that emerge with the publication of GP. If GP was intended to be a "new" elaboration of "Time and Being," what happened to the first draft of that section? Were there other early programs for working out the kinetic meaning of being? What is the relation between the transcendentalism of GP and the very different approach of Heidegger's later thought? These are not just historical questions. They touch on the major issue of philosophy, the meaning of being.

In order to work out these questions and to arrive at the heart of Heidegger's thought, I divide this essay into four parts: I. Discussion of the history of writing of SZ; II. Comparison of the structures of various programs for elaborating the meaning of being, from 1925 through 1927; III. An analysis of the argument of GP; and IV. Clarification of the significance of GP for the major issue, the meaning of being as pres-ab-sence.

### I. HISTORY: THE GENESIS OF BEING AND TIME

Whatever the conditions of its gestation, SZ in the form we know it is a premature work, rushed into print under publish-or-perish conditions. Heidegger himself once spoke of the "strange publication" of his "long-guarded work," and some 30 years after its appearance he remarked: "The fundamental flaw of the Book Sein und Zeit is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early."<sup>5</sup> The haste is revealed in a number of ways. There is, for example, the laundry list of topics, scattered throughout the published pages of SZ, that Heidegger promises to treat in the unpublished part. One has the sense that Heidegger is just postponing these problems without having a clear idea of how he will answer them. Above all, the haste of composition can perhaps be seen in Heidegger's inability to bring the work to completion. What, then, were the academic pressures that gave us this truncated work?

#### A. The Politics of Publish-or-Perish<sup>6</sup>

The history of Heidegger's academic promotions between 1923 and 1927 is a story of books that he promised but never published or that he published but never completed. For example, he was called from Freiburg to Marburg in 1923 on the strength of some chapters of a projected book on Aristotle, which in fact never got into print. What he did in that instance was to rewrite his 1922 Freiburg course on Aristotle and submit it to the philosophy faculty at Marburg. This draft received rave reviews from Paul Natorp and Nicolai Hartmann, both of Marburg, and in recommending Heidegger for a position there they called this essay absolutely astonishing (vollends etwas Überraschends). With high scientific quality, they said, it shows how the history of philosophy from the Middle Ages through Luther to modern thinkers is determined by Aristotle. Its method and careful etymologies, they went on, show a philosophical delicacy which step by step discovers heretofore unnoticed connections between issues. His method sheds light even for experts in the field, especially on decisive points passed over by nineteenth-century scholars. Needless to say, Heidegger got the job. And two years later, when Heidegger was applying for promotion, Hartmann would again remark on

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<sup>5</sup>SD 88 (E.T., 80); US 93 (E.T.a 7).

<sup>6</sup>For the material of this section, which is drawn from my work in progress, The Genesis of "Sein und Zeit." I have relied in part on conversations with: Martin Heidegger, spring, 1971; G.-G. Gadamer, E. Tugendhat, and W. Beemel, January and Maya, 1975; M. Müller, K. Rahner, and F.-W. von Herrmann, fall, 1976; J. Ebbinghaus and Fritz Heidegger, summer, 1977; and on my articles, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography," in Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker, Thomas Sheehan, ed. (Chicago: Precedent Press, 1981) and "The Original Form of Sein und Zeit: 'Der Begriff der Zeit,' 1924," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, X, 2 (May, 1979), 78-83 (Italian translation in Luomo, un segno, Rome, III, 1-2 [August, 1979], 111-21).

the powerful achievement, philological exactness (Akribie), and penetrating interpretation that characterized this manuscript on Aristotle, and he would emphasize how it illuminates whole epochs of thought in a way long unknown in philosophy.

But the work never appeared. Although in the summer of 1925 it was declared ready for the press, Heidegger's interest now lay in the new project that was to make his name. SZ had been maturing for some while. In his last two lecture days as Privatdozent at Freiburg (July 18 and 25, 1923), Heidegger had read material that would become Part One, Division One, of SZ, and a year later at Marburg, in July of 1924, he presented the "Urform" of SZ as a 6,000-word lecture entitled Der Begriff der Zeit, which contained most of the essential theses of SZ from being-in-the-world to within-time-ness. Another year later, in the summer of 1925, he read the first draft of SZ in the Marburg Lecture course, Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. But just as this course got underway there began the politics of publish-or-perish.

On May 1, 1925, Nicolai Hartmann, then Ordinarius in the chair that had been vacated by the recent death of Paul Natorp, informed the University of Marburg that he would leave in October for Cologne. On May 19 Heidegger told the dean of his availability for Hartmann's position, and at a faculty meeting the following week Hartmann proposed Heidegger as his successor.

Then the trouble began. On June 24, after Hartmann had recommended to the faculty that Heidegger's name be the only one (unico loco) that they propose to the Ministry in Berlin as fitting for the position, Professor Rudolf Wedekind of the philosophy faculty raised the issue that would block Heidegger's promotion for two more years: his dearth of publications. Hartmann responded that, besides the still-promised book on Aristotle, the young scholar had a new and absolutely outstanding work (eine neue und ganz hervorragende Arbeit) in manuscript and ready for publication. To the best of my knowledge these words of Hartmann on June 24, 1925, are the first public mention of SZ, even though Hartmann gave the work no title. In any case, the faculty that day voted against an unico loco nomination. Instead, they proposed a three-person list with Heidegger's name in first place. On July 8, 1925, they briefly reversed themselves and proposed Heidegger unico loco by a vote of 6 in favor, 4 opposed, and 1 abstaining, but on July 18 they reverted to their former decision. The choice of Heidegger, incidentally, was not without opposition from the theology faculty, which used Rudolf Otto as its spokesman against Heidegger.

Between July 18 and August 3, 1925, Hartmann in the name of the faculty drafted in his own hand an extraordinary document to be sent to Berlin to the Minister for Science, Art and Education in support of Heidegger's nomination. In that document he calls Heidegger a researcher and teacher of the first rank, one who, besides his work on Aristotle, which is yet to be published, has recently produced a systematic work, now in press (sic), which is entitled--Zeit und Sein! (It seems impossible to ascertain whether that title, Time and Being, was a slip of the pen on Hartmann's part or actually the first title that Heidegger may have proposed for the work.) The book, says Hartmann, does nothing less than to broach the ultimate and basic questions of ontology in a synthesis of phenomenology--here for the first time freed from all [Husserlian] subjectivism--with the great tradition of metaphysics that stretches from the Greeks through the medievals to the moderns. Hartmann remarks that whereas older practitioners of phenomenology see it as a preliminary laying of foundations and thereby frequently give the impression of one-sidedness or narrow-mindedness, Heidegger's work gets right down to basic problems, breaks through stalemated position, and opens new horizons. There is simply nothing comparable to it in the broad field of Heidegger's contemporaries, he writes. Therefore, Heidegger's nomination, even though it is accompanied by that of Heimsoeth and Pfänder, stands far above the other two.

With a recommendation like that, Heidegger should have had the job in a walk. But it was not to be so. All through 1926 and most of 1927 the philosophy faculty at Marburg fought a running battle with the Ministry in Berlin over Heidegger's nomination. On January 27, 1926, the Minister wrote to the dean that, with all due respect for Heidegger's success in the classroom (which by then was somewhat legendary), the historical significance of the chair of philosophy at Marburg precluded Heidegger's being appointed to it until he had gained the respect and recognition of his colleagues by more publications. The Minister called for a new list of nominations.

On February 25, 1926, the faculty met and unanimously voted that Heidegger be urged to have

SZ typed in several copies and given to the dean so that it might be submitted to a group of scholars for their evaluation. At the same time they underlined the urgency of having Heidegger produce the text at least in galley proofs. The dean paid a personal visit to Heidegger's office to pass on this news, and Heidegger replied that he was prepared to have the text in press by April 1, 1926.

In a little over eight weeks--until early March in his first-floor study at Schwanallee 21, Marburg, and thereafter at the farmhouse of Johann Brender near his retreat in Todtnauberg--Heidegger pulled together his lecture notes of Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs into SZ. On April 2, 1926, six days before Husserl's birthday celebration in Todtnauberg (see the dedication in SZ), Heidegger wrote to the dean that the work was now in press and that by May 1, 10 to 12 signatures (160-192 pages) would be ready--that is, roughly the material up to the chapter on Sorge, or, in other terms, the material on Dasein that was covered in Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. However, it was June 18 before the dean forwarded the galley pages to Berlin in the face of the Ministry's renewed call for other names and an expanded list. Finally, on November 25, 1926, came the Minister's reply. Having examined the proof sheets, he still cannot give Heidegger the job. The pages were returned, as Heidegger recalled, marked "Inadequate."

Three months later, in February of 1927, the book was published as the fragment we know, minus "Time and Being" and all of Part Two, "Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology." Heidegger had published and perished. He had rushed his "long-guarded work" into print and in so doing had "ventured forth too far too early," perhaps chiefly in an effort to get a job. That venture was to block the fulfillment of his philosophical program for years to come.

#### B. The Missing Sections of "Being and Time"

What was the status of the "second half" of SZ when its "first half" was published in February of 1927? Had Heidegger completed by then a draft of "Time and Being," and, if so, what form did it take and why did it not appear? My purpose in raising and answering these questions is to search out what is unique about GP.

(N.B.: In the rest of the essay I shall abbreviate references to the structure of SZ in the following way. The whole of SZ was to be comprised of two Parts, each of which would contain three Divisions. I shall abbreviate the Parts of SZ with Roman numerals and the Divisions of SZ with Arabic numerals. Thus, SZ I.1 means SZ Part One, Division One. SZ II.3 means SZ Part Two, Division Three, and so on. As everyone knows, the only published sections of the work are Part One, Divisions One and Two, i.e., SZ I.1 and I.2.)

Much of SZ II ("Basic Features of a Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology, Using the Problematic of Temporalität as a Clue") was sketched out by the spring of 1926. Specifically, a first draft of SZ II.1 ("Kant's Doctrine of Schematism and Time, as a Preliminary Stage in a Problematic of Temporalität") was delivered in the lecture course Logik from January 28 through February 26, 1926. And a first draft of SZ II.3 ("Aristotle's Essay on Time, as Providing a Way of Discriminating the Phenomenal Basis and the Limits of Ancient Ontology" was hinted at in SZ § 81 and was read on July 6 and 13, 1927, in the lecture course of GP. But what of SZ I.3, "Time and Being"?

Heidegger's letter to the dean, written from Todtnauberg on April 2, 1926, merely said that the work was in press, but neither that it was completed as a whole nor how much beyond the 160 to 192 pages was finished at that time. Two weeks later, on April 16, 1926, Mrs. Malvina Husserl wrote to Roman Ingarden about Heidegger's "just completed work" ("seines eben vollendeten Werkes"), and on April 28 Edmund Husserl wrote to Gustav Albrecht about Heidegger's "book which is now in press" ("seines eben in Druck befindlichen Buches"). But many years later Heidegger remembered showing Husserl at this time the "nearly finished manuscript" ("das nahezu fertige Manuskript") of SZ, and in 1963 he claimed that 15 signatures (ca. 240 pages) were forwarded to the dean and eventually to the Ministry in Berlin, that is, up through § 47 of the chapter on death.<sup>7</sup> On the basis of Heidegger's letter of April 2, 1926, I believe that it is most likely that during that month he sent off to Niemeyer Publishers something like the first 190 pages of SZ (i.e., up to around chapter vi of SZ I.1). While it is conceivable that he had finished all of SZ I.2 by this time, I think that it is not probable, just as it is very

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<sup>7</sup>Cf. Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," note 55.

unlikely that he had actually completed SZ I.3 by the spring of 1926.

However, there are three bits of evidence that attest to the possibility that Heidegger completed a first draft of SZ I.3 sometime between April and December of 1926. None of these reports, however, is very strong; at best they provide clues or hints.

First: Concerning the famous footnote at the beginning of GP, F.-W. von Herrmann, the editor of GP, has written:

The designation "New elaboration" means that an older one preceded it. The first elaboration of the Division "Time and Being" came about in the train of writing Divisions One and Two. As Martin Heidegger has communicated to me orally, he burned the first draft [die erste Fassung] soon after he wrote it.<sup>8</sup>

But was this first draft anything more than a sketch? We cannot be sure.

Secondly, Heidegger informed H.-G. Gadamer that SZ I.3 was ready to be printed along with I.1 and I.2 in early 1927, but it was held back because volume VIII of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung had to be shared with (besides SZ) Oskar Becker's 370-page treatise on "Mathematische Existenz: Untersuchungen zur Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene."<sup>9</sup>

Thirdly, a footnote in the first edition of SZ (but omitted in later editions) at p. 349 refers the reader ahead to SZ I.3 chapter two for a clarification of the origin of Bedeutung and the possibility of Begriffsbildung (the latter being a topic that Heidegger covered in his seminars of 1926-27 and 1927-28). This is the only reference to a specific chapter within SZ I.3, and it would seem to indicate that Heidegger had at least some kind of outline of "Time and Being" when he wrote the footnote.

But what about the content of this famous missing section? Thanks to an exchange between Heidegger and Max Müller, we have a sketch of some of the material from the first draft of SZ I.3. Müller writes:

In the first elaboration of Sein und Zeit, Part One, Division Three, which, as I mentioned above, was to bear the title "Zeit und Sein" and was to bring about a "turn" in the treatment of being itself, Heidegger, according to a personal communication, attempted to distinguish a threefold difference:

(a) the "transcendental" ["transzendente"] difference, or ontological difference in the narrower sense: the differentiation of entities from their beingness.

(b) the "transcendence-related" ["transzendenzhafte"] difference or ontological difference in the wider sense: the differentiation of entities and their beingness from being itself.

(c) the "transcendent" ["transzendente"] difference, or theological difference in the strict sense: the differentiation of God from entities, from beingness, and from being.

But because it was not experienced but only set up speculatively, this attempt at a draft was given up as itself being "onto-theological," because it ventures an assertion about God which even now in the experience of "essential thinking": is not immediately made.<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, in a marginal note to SZ 39 (published in the Gesamtausgabe version of SZ), where Heidegger gives the projected outline of his treatise, he glosses the title "Time and Being" with the following: "The transcendence-related difference. / The overcoming of the horizon as such. / The turn around into the origin. / Presence from out of this origin."<sup>11</sup> While cryptic in many ways, this gloss allows of the following interpretation. When one makes the transcendence-related difference between the beingness of entities and being itself, then one has overcome horizontal perspectives, which in fact

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<sup>8</sup>Editor's Afterword to new Gesamtausgabe edition of SZ, p. 582.

<sup>9</sup>Personal communication from Gadamer, Boston, April 12, 1974.

<sup>10</sup>Max Müller, Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle Verlag, 1949), p. 73f.

<sup>11</sup>"Die transzendenzhafte Differenz. / Die Ueberwindung des Horizonts als solchen. / Die Umkehr im die Herkunft. / Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft," new SZ 53 note a.

are based on the correlativity of subjectivity and beingness, and has turned around into the origin, l~~o~~th~~e~~, whence arises al~~o~~theia. (We shall return to this towards the end of the next part of this essay.)

What might have made Heidegger destroy the first draft or sketch of SZ I.3? Besides the dissatisfaction that Heidegger reported to Müller, there is other evidence that soon after SZ went to the press he had hesitations about his program or at least about its formulation. On February 13, 1952, exactly 25 years after SZ appeared, Heidegger told the students in his Aristotle seminar at Freiburg that immediately after the printing of SZ he was startled (ich habe . . . einen Schrecken bekommen) to realize that while, as regards the issue, being was indeed alluded to and present in In-der-Welt-sein, nonetheless, as regards the formulation, being, as it were, only "limped along behind" (kinkt es gleichsam hinten nach). Perhaps the shock of this realization is what prompted Heidegger, in the spring of 1927, to reformulate "Time and Being" all over again with GP's new draft focused on what he called the four "basic problems" of phenomenology, namely, the ontological difference, the whatness and howness of being, the unity and multiplicity of being, and the truth-character of being. This outline of the crowning section of Heidegger's treatise held up at least through the following summer, his last semester at Marburg, when he repeated that four-fold division in his course on Leibniz (July 10, 1928), although he rearranged the outline slightly. In the Leibniz course, what was the fourth section in GP (it is now called "The veritative character of being") is made to precede what was the third section in GP, which is now called "The regionality of being and the unity of the idea of being." But the whole program seemed to be in trouble. That fall (October 14, 1928), during his first semester as Husserl's successor in Freiburg, Heidegger told W. R. Boyce Gibson that it would be "some little time"--not likely by the next issue of the Jahrbuch--before the rest of SZ appeared.<sup>12</sup>

After the spring of 1929 we hear nothing more about the completion of Heidegger's magnum opus. The project of SZ, which basically remains enclosed within the Marburg period, had apparently ground to a halt. In the 1953 Foreword to the seventh edition of SZ we read: "While the previous editions have borne the designation 'First Half', this has now been deleted. After a quarter of a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were presented anew."<sup>13</sup>

## II. STRUCTURE: THREE OUTLINES OF THE PROGRAM

Over a span of exactly two years (May 4, 1925-May 4, 1927), Heidegger offered three different outlines of his treatise on the meaning of being (cf. the accompanying chart):

1. May 4, 1925: The outline of the course Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GZ), which appears on p. 10f. of the published version.<sup>14</sup>
2. April, 1926: The outline of SZ, published on p. 39f. of that work.
3. May 4, 1927: The outline of GP, published on p. 32f. of the text.

### History of the Concept of Time (GZ), 1925

- I. The phenomenon of time: the concept of time

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<sup>12</sup>W. R. Boyce Gibson, "From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary," Herbert Spiegelberg, ed., Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, II (1971), 72. For Heidegger's rearrangement of the order of GP, see his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Klaus Held, ed., Gesamtausgabe, II, 26 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), pp. 193-94.

<sup>13</sup>SZ v = Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans. (London: SCM, 1962), p. 17.

<sup>14</sup>In the classroom Heidegger entitled his course Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs: Prolegomena zur Phänomenologie von Natur und Geschichte. In the published version the title has been changed: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Petra Jaeger, ed., Gesamtausgabe, II, 20 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979). I follow Heidegger's own title, and I abbreviate it: GZ.

1. Preparatory description: the field where time appears (=SZ I.1)
  - i. Phenomenology and the being-question (= SZ Introduction)
  - ii. Dasein and the being-question
  - iii. Everydayness and being-in-the-world (= SZ I.a, chaps.i-iv)
    - 1) Introduction
    - 2) Descartes
    - 3) Worldhood of the world
    - 4) Reality of the outer world
    - 5) Spatiality
    - 6) The "who"
  - iv. Being-in and care (= SZ I.1, chaps. v-vi)
    - 1) Entdecktheit (Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Auslegung, Rede, Sprache)
    - 2) Fallenness
    - 3) Fear and dread
    - 4) Care
2. The laying-free of time itself (= SZ I.2, chaps. i-iii)
  - i. Death
  - ii. Conscience and guilt
  - iii. Time as Dasein's being

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\*The course ends here.                      3.            The conceptual interpretation of time (= SZ I.2, chaps. iv-vi)

II.      History of the concept of time from today backward (= SZ II)

1.      Bergson
2.      Kant and Newton
3.      Aristotle

III.     The question of being-in-general and the being of history and nature in particular (= SZ I.3)

I.      Dasein as temporality; time as the horizon of the being-question

1.      Preparatory analysis of Dasein
  - i.      The task of this analysis
  - ii.     Being-in-the-world as Dasein's basic state
  - iii.    The worldhood of the world
    - 1)      Introduction
    - 2)      Worldhood
    - 3)      Descartes
    - 4)      Spatiality
    - iv.     The "who" and the "they"
  - v.      Being-in
    - 1)      The "there" (Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Auslegung, Rede, Sprache)
    - 2)      Fallenness
  - vi.     Care as Dasein's being
    - 1)      Dread
    - 2)      Care
    - 3)      Reality of the outer world
    - 4)      Truth
2.      Dasein and temporality
  - i-111. The laying-free of temporality (cf. p. 436b)
  - iv-vi. Temporal interpretation of Dasein: first repetition of the preparatory analysis\*

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\*The text ("First Half") ends here.                      3.            Time and being

- i. Working out Temporalität
- ii. Answering the question of the meaning of being
- iii. Thematic analysis of Dasein, or renewed repetition of the preparatory analysis of Dasein
- iv. Methodology
- II. Destruction of the history of ontology
  - 1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time
  - 2. Ontological foundation of Descartes's cogito sum
  - 3. Aristotle's The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GP), 1927
- I. Discussion of four traditional theses on being
  - 1. Kantian: being is not a real predicate
  - 2. Medieval-Aristotelian: being comprises essentia and existentia
  - 3. Modern: being's basic modes are res extensa and res cogitans
  - 4. Logic: being as the "is" of the copula
- II. The fundamental ontological question about the meaning of being in general; the basic structures and modes of being
  - 1. The problem of the ontological difference
    - i. Common time and temporality
    - ii. Temporality as self-transcendence and as horizon
    - iii. Time as the horizon for the question of being
    - iv. Being and entities\*
  - 2. The problem of the basic articulations of being (whatness, howness)
  - 3. The problem of the modifications of being and of the unity of being's multiplicity
  - 4. The truth character of being
- III. The scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology
  - 1. The ontic foundation of ontology and the analysis of Dasein as fundamental ontology
  - 2. The apriority of being and the possibility and structure of a priori knowledge

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- \*The course ends here.
  - 3. The basic elements of phenomenological method: reduction, construction, and destruction
  - 4. Phenomenological ontology and the concept of philosophy

By comparing these three outlines we shall be able to see concretely the following: what SZ intended to accomplish but did not; whether and how GP promised to complete SZ; and above all what the so-called "turn" in Heidegger's thought means. Because the outline of SZ is fairly well known, I will begin with that and then compare it with the earlier outline (in GZ) and the later outline (in GP).

#### A. Being and Time, 1926

SZ was projected in two Parts. Part One, which as a whole was called "fundamental ontology," was to use a new understanding of human temporality (Zeitlichkeit) to determine the nature and structure of the time-character (Temporalität) of being in general and of its possible variations. Part Two, which was to be devoted to the destruction of the history of ontology, would use the time-character of being, which had been worked out in the fundamental ontology, as the clue for reducing the content of traditional ontology to the primordial and implicitly temporal experiences in which being has always been understood. It is worth pointing out that words like "temporality" and "time" had almost nothing to do with naturalistic chronos. Rather, they referred to the phenomenological movement of disclosure (what the Greeks called alētheuein), both in that part which human nature contributes to disclosure and in that part which is intrinsic to the nature of disclosure itself.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>In this regard, see my essay "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21," The Personalist, LX, 3 (1979), 312-24, esp. pp. 315 and 320-23 (Italian translation in Filosofia,

Each Part of SZ had three Divisions, and in its published form the treatise got no further than Part One, Division Two. Part One as a whole bears the title: "The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality [= SZ I.1 and I.2] and the Explanation of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being [= SZ I.3, unpublished]." That is, SZ I.1 would establish that the structure of human existence is care (Sorge); SZ I.2 would interpret the meaning of care to be temporality or existential movement (Zeitlichkeit); and SZ I.3 would show how Zeitlichkeit, in its horizon-forming function called Temporalität, determines the "temporal" or kinetic meaning of being.

SZ I.1 reads human being as constituted by three moments: (1) existentiality: human being is ahead of itself; (2) facticity: human being is ahead of itself by being already in a world of meaningfulness; (3) fallenness: human being's already-ahead-ness opens up the realm of intelligibility within which man is present to--and for the most part absorbed in--the things of his concern. Now, these three moments which make up the structure of care can in fact be reduced to two: Existentiality and facticity are but two faces of one phenomenon: man's already-ahead-ness, his being in excess of himself and other things. In turn they make possible man's encounter with worldly things. Thus, Dasein is (1) already projected possibility, which (2) renders possible the encounter with entities. Dasein's relative self-absence allows things to be present, or his excess allows him access to entities.

In SZ I.2, after showing what Dasein is already-out-towards (namely, his ownmost possibility of death) and how Dasein is called to accept that aheadness (namely, in conscience and by resolve), Heidegger goes on to spell out the temporal or kinetic structure of care.

(1) As ahead of himself, man is becoming his ownmost possibility. The moment of existentiality is grounded in man's existential futurity whereby he is becoming (or coming towards) himself.

(2) But to become that possibility means that, in going forward, one is returning to and indeed is reappropriating what he "already is," his finitude. The moment of facticity is grounded in existential Gewesenheit. This word does not refer to the "past" (Vergangenheit) but to one's own "alreadiness," to one's essential and already operative possibility which one can appropriate anew.

(3) The two moments of becoming what one already is make it possible that man encounter things as meaningful. The moment of having access to worldly entities is grounded in the present as a letting-be-present.

Thus, human temporality--or better, existential movement--is the unifying ground of the structure of care, and it is generated (zeitigt sich) in the aforementioned three moments of self-transcendence (called the "ekstases"). In fact, man is nothing other than this transcendence. Just as we collapsed the three moments of care into two, so we may do the same for the three moments of existential movement or temporality. (1) By becoming what he already is, (2) man lets things be present. Or,

(1) because we are in kinetic "excess" of ourselves and things, (2) we have meaningful "access" to ourselves and things.

In fact, these two moments, in which one can hear distant echoes of "potentiality" and "actuality," are rooted in Heidegger's retrieval of the hidden meaning in the Aristotelian notion of movement (kinēsis) as a phenomenon of actual presence (energeia) grounded in a hidden but dynamic potentiality (dynamis). In Heidegger's retrieval, the moment of "potentiality" (man's relative self-absence in the sense of his already being out towards his nothingness) releases from itself the moment of actual presentness in which entities are met in their being. In its own way, then human temporality or movement is a matter of presence-by-absence or pre-ab-sence.

While that is as far as the published form of SZ got, the next Division, SZ I.3, was to take the crucial step. The one and only issue of the treatise is the movement of disclosure. From one perspective this movement, which Heidegger called primordial time, is that which unifies Dasein's self-transcendence, and here it is called "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit). But from another perspective this movement opens up and shapes the horizon that gives all modes of being their kinetic or temporal character, and here it is called the "time-character" (Temporalität) of being. Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität are the same primordial movement of disclosure seen on the one hand as human self-

transcendence and on the other hand as the transcendental horizon that conditions the kinetic meaning of being. In SZ I.2, § 69, section "c" (SZ 365), Heidegger did make a stab at showing how Zeitlichkeit forms the horizontal schema for understanding man's being, but he did not spell out how it shapes the horizon for understanding other modes of being. That task was reserved for SZ I.3.

By carefully noting hints that are scattered throughout the published portion of SZ, we can see that SZ I.3 was to unfold in four steps. The following is an effort to reconstruct the format of those four steps. The numbers in parentheses refer to the pages and paragraphs in SZ where the hints can be found.

The first step is usually called the "working out" (Ausarbeitung) of the being-question or the "laying free of the horizon" (Freilegung des Horizontes). This initial step was to show simply that the most primordial mode of the generation of temporality as the movement of self-transcendence is the horizontal schema of presence-by-absence which possibilizes the understanding of being in terms of time (cf. SZ 231b, 437c). What is here called the "time-character" of being is only a preliminary name for that movement which Heidegger would later prefer to call the "truth" or "clearing" of being: disclosure as presence (altheia) by absence (lethe).

The second step, closely bound up with the first, was to be the "answering" (Beantwortung) of the being-question by an elaboration of the temporal or kinetic determination (presence-by-absence) of being in general and of its possible variations: readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, Dasein, and subsistence (SZ 231b, 333b). Here too Heidegger was to have worked out much of what we called the laundry list of topics alluded to throughout SZ I.1-2: how the intentionality of consciousness is grounded in the unity of Dasein's self-transcendence (363 note), how time has its own mode of being (406a), how space and time are coupled together (368b), the condition of notness and negativity (286a), the distinction between the "who" of existence and the "what" of presence-at-hand in the broadest sense (45a), the temporal constitution of discourse and the temporal characteristics of language patterns (349c), the differentiation between the ontic and the historical (403c), the concrete elaboration of the world-structure in general and its possible variations (366d), how the forgetting of the world leads to ontologies of entities-within-the-world as "nature" and to ontologies of value (100d), the clarification of whatness, howness, something, nothing, and nothingness (see WG in Wegmarken, 69). Specifically within the section on truth were to be discussed: the existential interpretation of science (357a), the "is" of the copula and the "as" scheme (349c, 360c), how Bedeutung arises (349c), the possibility of Begrifflichkeit (39b) and Begriffsbildung (349c), and the full treatment of logos (160a). Presumably in this section too Heidegger would have discussed the possibility of regional ontologies, which is based on what he called the "non-deductive genealogy of the different possible ways of being" (11b), as well as the question of the ontological determination of positive-ontic science ("the kind of research in which entities are uncovered") and its kind of truth (230b).

The third step of SZ I.3 was to be a further repetition (within SZ I.2, chapters iv-vi already constituted a first repetition) of the existential analysis of Dasein on the same and truly ontological level at which the concept of being would have already been discussed (333b). This treatment was to be the proper realization (Durchführung 13b) of the Dasein-analytic, and it would be the thematic analysis of human existence (436b) as contrasted with the preparatory and primordial analyses that made of SZ I.1 and I.2. As contrasted with the first repetition of the preliminary Dasein-analysis in SZ I.2--chapters iv-vi, which were also called the "temporal interpretation of Dasein" (see 17c, 234c, 304c, 333b)--the treatment of Dasein in SZ I.3 would be called the "renewed repetition" (erneute Wiederholung: 333b, cf. 17b). Among the topics to be discussed here was, for example, that of "an adequate conceptual interpretation of everydayness" (371f.).

The fourth step of "Time and Being" was to be methodological. Whereas SZ § 7 had offered only a "preliminary idea of phenomenology" (28a), SZ I.3 was to present the "[full] idea of phenomenology" (357a). As far as I can see, this is the only topic that Heidegger, in SZ, promises to treat in this fourth area. The outline of GP, as we shall see below, offered a rich panoply of topics to be covered under the rubric of methodology.

#### B. History of the Concept of Time, 1925

If we now compare the outline of SZ with the earlier outline of the course "Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs" (GZ), we discern the following issues. (Here I prescind from Heidegger's long introduction

on phenomenology.)

(1) The world-analysis (GZ I.1, chap. iii = SZ I.1, chap. iii). The most developed material of GZ is the analysis of the Umwelt, a theme which Heidegger had elaborated ever since his 1919-20 course at Freiburg (which was also called Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie). In GZ, out of the 25 lectures devoted to the preparatory analysis of Dasein (June 6 through July 31, 1925), 11 of them were dedicated to the analysis of the environment (June 22 through July 13).

Within the 1925 course we notice a different order from SZ. The Descartes section of GZ is placed before the paragraphs on the worldhood of the world--just the opposite from SZ. Moreover, in 1925 Heidegger places immediately after the worldhood analyses the section on the reality of the outer world, whereas this material is saved for later in SZ (SZ § 43, "Dasein, worldhood, and reality").

(2) Being-in and Care (GZ I.1, chap. iv = SZ I.1, chaps. v and vi). The material which SZ spreads over two chapters ("Being-in as such" and "Care as the being of Dasein") is here lumped together under the comprehensive heading Das In-Sein, with the four articulations: discoveredness, fallenness, dread, and care.

(3) Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität. The 1925 lecture course makes it clear that by "time" (Zeit) Heidegger means the temporality of Dasein as self-transcendence (Zeitlichkeit) rather than the horizontal time-character of being itself (Temporalität). Time, says Heidegger on July 31 (p. 442 of the published text), is Dasein itself. It is that whereby human existence is its proper wholeness as being-ahead-of-itself. In fact, we should not say that "Time is," but rather that "Dasein, as time, generates (zeitigt) its being" (cf. SZ 328c). In other words, GZ did not get as far as the major differentiation between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität which is central to SZ and whose import Heidegger stressed to Father Richardson when he wrote that the temporality (Zeitlichkeit) characterized in SZ I.2 is not yet "the most proper element of time that must be sought in answer to the being-question."<sup>16</sup> It seems that the lecture course GZ was indeed on its way to Temporalität as the arena of presence-by-absence that gives all modes of being their temporal determination, but we will have to wait until January 11, 1926, during Heidegger's course on logic, before that concept properly emerges (Logik, p. 199).

(4) "Time and Being" (GZ III = SZ I.3). We notice that the projected content of GZ III, which generally corresponds to SZ's "Time and Being," includes not only a fundamental ontology of the meaning of being in general (die Frage nach dem Sein überhaupt) but also two regional ontologies (... und nach dem Sein von Geschichte und Natur im besondern). The whole course, in fact, bore the subtitle: "Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of Nature and History." The "Prolegomena" cover the existential analytic, the destruction of the history of ontology, and the fundamental ontology of being in general--in short, the material of the whole of SZ as Heidegger originally projected it.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, neither SZ nor GP promises any regional ontologies at all. At most they might have shown the derivability of regional ontologies from fundamental ontology under the rubric of a "non-deductive genealogy of the possible modes of being" (SZ 11b).

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<sup>16</sup>M. Heidegger, "Vorwort" to Richardson, Heidegger, p. xiii.

<sup>17</sup>If we take the Critique of Pure Reason as prolegomena to a future metaphysics, and if we follow out the parallels with SZ, then we get something like the following:

Critique	I. Transcendental Doctrine	
as aproprae-	of Elements	6SZ I.1-2=GZ I=GP II.1-2
deuticII.	Transcendental Doctrine	
of Method, ch. 4 (History)		6SZ II.1-3=GZ II=GP I.1-4
I. Transcendental Philosophy		
System (Metaphysica generalis)		6SZ I.3 =GZ III=GP II.2-4
II. Rational Physiology		6 = regional ontologies

(5) The Destruction of the History of Ontology (GZ II = SZ II). Finally we note the different location and the different content of the material on the history of ontology. In GZ it appears between the existential-temporal analytic and the elaboration of the meaning of being. That is to say, if SZ were to follow the outline of GZ, it would run as follows: SZ I.1-2; II.1-3; and then I.3. Moreover, the content of this area is different in GZ. Whereas SZ proposed to treat of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle, here in GZ Heidegger proposes to treat Bergson, Kant and Newton, and Aristotle.

### C. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1927

In our comparison of GZ and SZ, the main points of interest concern the location and the content of what was to remain unpublished in SZ. What SZ calls "Time and Being" was, in GZ, comprised of both fundamental and regional ontologies and placed after the destruction of the history of ontology. In SZ this section is composed only of fundamental ontology (the kinetic-temporal meaning of being and its variations), and it precedes the destruction. As we turn now to the outline of GP and compare it with those same unpublished portions of SZ, we note the following:

(1) The kernel of "Time and Being" (GP II and III) now has a two-fold articulation: 1. fundamental ontology and 2. methodology.<sup>18</sup> The section on fundamental ontology (GP II) is in turn articulated into four basic problems that are systematically derived from four traditional theses on being: (i) the ontological difference, drawn from Kant's thesis on being; (ii) the basic articulations of being as whatness and howness (or thatness), drawn from the Aristotelian and medieval thesis that the being of entities is both essentia and existentia; (iii) the unity and the multiple modifications of being, drawn from the modern thesis that the basic modes of being are res cogitans and res extensa; and (iv) the truth-character of being, drawn from the thesis of logic that all entities can be expressed through the "is" of the copula. We have seen above that these four theses remain operative, although in a slightly rearranged order, as Heidegger's outline for "Time and Being" as late as his course on Leibniz during the summer of 1928. And we recall that the truth-character of being was to be treated in the second chapter of SZ I.3 (see SZ, first edition, 349 n.), whereas here it is relegated to the fourth chapter of GP II.

(2) The term "ontological difference" makes its debut (GP II.1) and seems to include both the Ausarbeitung of the being question (that is, the interpretation of Temporalität as temporal horizon) and the Beantwortung (thematic answering) of the being question, but it does not include the question of the variations of being. Moreover, within the chapter on the ontological difference there are four steps in the elaboration of the meaning of being, the first two of which are generally co-extensive with the material of SZ I.1-2. Those four steps are the following:

(i) Time and Temporality (Zeit und Zeitlichkeit): Here Heidegger moves from Aristotle's notion of time (= SZ II.3) as the number of motion, to the roots of original time in man's threefold self-transcendence.

(ii) Time as self-transcendence and time as horizontal (Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität): In this section the move is from temporality as constitutive of man's being, and towards temporality as formative of the horizon which determines all experience, including the understanding of being. It would seem from the title of this section (GP 389) that here Heidegger advances beyond the material contained in SZ I.2, that is, beyond Zeitlichkeit and into Temporalität. However, that is not the case; indeed, this section gets no further than the material found in SZ § 69, section "c." One external proof of that is found in the programmatic sentence that opens the following section: "Now we must get an idea of how Temporalität, on the basis of the Zeitlichkeit that grounds Dasein's transcendence, makes possible Dasein's understanding of being" (GP 429).

(iii) Time as the horizon for the determination of being (Temporalität und Sein): Here begins the new elaboration of what SZ called "Time and Being." However, as I shall show below, the advance beyond SZ is quite minimal.

(iv) Being and entities (Sein und Seiendes): Here the ontological difference was to be clarified

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<sup>18</sup>AT GP 78b Heidegger says GP II and III deal with the ontology of Dasein.

on the basis of the distinction between Dasein's transcendence into the temporal ecstases and his return to the entities rendered intelligible within that horizon. Here too there is hardly any real advance beyond SZ.

(3) The historical-destructive part (GP I) is again relocated before the systematic treatment of the fundamental ontological question about the meaning of being, just as it was in GZ. In a sense, then, GP reverts to the pre-SZ model of GZ, where the historical-destructive part of the treatise was contained within, rather than following after, fundamental ontology. Furthermore we notice that the historical-destructive part of GP that is, GP I) now deals with being rather than with time, and that what SZ reserved for treatment at SZ II.3 (namely, Aristotle and time) is incorporated within GP II.1.

(4) In GP there is no mention of the second repetition of the Dasein-analytic that is promised in SZ. In fact, there is not even an explicit mention of the first repetition of the Dasein-analysis (= SZ I.2 chaps. iv-vi), although pages 362-88 of GP present material from SZ I.2, chap. vi. While it is possible, but not probable, that GP III.1 ("The Ontic Foundation of Ontology, and the Analysis of Dasein as Fundamental Ontology") might have contained such a second repetition, it is more likely that this section would have been only methodological in nature, as indeed Heidegger seems to indicate when he delineates the scope of the section: "So the first task within the clarification of the scientific character of ontology is the demonstration of its ontic foundation and the characterization of this founding" (GP 27).

#### D. Conclusions

What may be concluded from this tedious comparison of outlines? In the first place, it is clear enough what Heidegger intended to do, namely, to show that the kinetic meaning of disclosure ("being") is presence-by-absence. That is, he wanted to show that the presence or alötheia or intelligibility of entities happens on the basis of a prior and possibilizing absence or löthe or unintelligibility. Indeed, he wanted to show that man is correlative to both these moments of the disclosive process by virtue of his self-transcendence. That is, man's relative self-absence or already-ahead-ness is correlative to the löthe-dimension of disclosure, and his being-present-to-things is correlative to the alötheia-dimension of disclosure. It is also clear that in this early period Heidegger intended to complete SZ by drawing the kinetic meaning of being as pres-ab-scence from out of the self-transcendent and horizontal temporality of Dasein.<sup>19</sup>

In the second place it is clear that Heidegger's conception of the program for elaborating the temporal meaning of being is somewhat fluid from 1925 through 1927 (and even through 1928, if we count the reshuffling of the four basic questions in Heidegger's course on Leibniz). Not only is the program fluid; perhaps it is even in trouble. One sign of that is the way Heidegger keeps rearranging the order of "Time and Being" in relation to the destruction of the history of ontology. I take these rearrangements as a symptom of the deeper problem of the relation of system and history in Heidegger's program. In a word: How can a systematic ontology be reconciled with the historicity of human existence? If the transcendental condition which renders possible the systematics of being in SZ I.3 is Dasein's own temporality and historicity, then the inquiry into being is itself characterized by historicity. To answer the question of the meaning of being in terms of time is in effect to show that the question of being is itself historical and that one has to question, historically, the very history of the question of being. It seems that Heidegger is aware of this problem and aware that the problem of system and history becomes the problem of relativism. Is the last work in this matter to be veritas

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<sup>19</sup>"We ourselves the source of the idea of being. But this source must be understood as the transcendence of ekstastic Dasein. Only on the basis of transcendence does there take place the articulation of the various ways of being. A difficult and ultimate problem is to define the idea of being in general. Because the understanding of being belongs to transcending Dasein, the idea of being can be drawn from the subject." "From the Last Marburg Lecture Course," translation (slightly revised here) by J. Macquarrie in The Future of Our Religious Past: Essays in Honour of Rudolf Bultmann, James M. Robinson, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 321 = Wegmarken, p. 383.

temporis filia?<sup>20</sup>

In the third place, and closely linked to the former two, is the question of the relation between time as self-transcendence and time as the horizon for the meaning of being. This is the problem of the relation of priority between Dasein and being, if indeed we can speak of these as "two." Does being have the structure of pres-ab-sence because of Dasein's pre-ab-sential self-transcendence? Or is Dasein self-transcendent because being has intrinsically the structure of pres-ab-sence?

In the fourth place, lurking behind the above questions of history and system, temporality and truth, self-transcendence and being-as-the-transcendent, there is the question of the so-called "turn." We must say from the outset that the turn is not a move away from the fundamental standpoint of SZ (being as pres-ab-sence); it is not a new phase in Heidegger's development after the collapse of the SZ program in all its various forms. Rather, the turn was build into Heidegger's program from the start, and it always meant an overcoming of (1) the metaphysics of actuality and (2) the humanism of subjectivity.

Re #1: From the early twenties Heidegger always conceived of the turn as the step back from all forms of the metaphysics of actuality (being as presence) and into not only the Greek alētheia (which is still a matter of presence) but even further back to the possibilizing ground of alētheia, namely, lēthe (absence).<sup>21</sup> To become aware of the lēthe-dimension is not to extinguish it but to let it be. In that sense the turn is to be understood as "Die Umkehr in die Herkunft" (this is the gloss at SZ 39, which we mentioned above)--that is, the return to, the awareness and positive appropriation of, lēthe as the source or origin of intelligibility, so as then to see the "derivation" of being-as-presence from out of this absence: "Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft" (ibid.). To overcome the metaphysics of actuality does not mean to abolish it but to reinsert it into the dimension of potentiality. But actuality (energeia) embedded in potentiality (dynamis) is what Aristotle means by movement (kinēsis). If one properly understands Heidegger's retrieval of the problematic of kinēsis in Aristotle, then one can see how Heidegger's turn towards the lēthe-dimension of disclosure means a regaining of being as movement.

Re #2: Insofar as all modes of being human are correlative to modes of being itself, the modern humanism of subjectivity merely corresponds to the latest phase of the metaphysics of actuality. A positive recovery of the pre-metaphysics of "potentiality" (lēthe, or dynamis properly retrieved) would correspondingly entail the discovery of a pre-humanistic understanding of man in terms of his living-into-possibilities (his self-absence). The correlativity between man's pres-ab-sence (SZ: Zeitlichkeit) and the pres-ab-sence that is being or disclosure (SZ: die Temporalität des Seins) is what Heidegger's thought is all about. We can also recognize here the problematic of "authenticity" or proper selfhood. Man comes into his own by resolving not to be his own but to let himself go into the potentiality he already is. In so doing he wakes up to the fact that his transcendence is rooted in and governed by the lēthe-dimension of disclosure. (Transzendenz aber von Wahrheit des Seyns her: das Ereignis, new

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<sup>20</sup>At GP 460a Heidegger speaks of "veritas temporalis," but clearly in a sense different from either Gellius' or Galilico's (cf. Friedrich Heer, The Intellectual History of Europe, Jonathan Steinberg, trans. [Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co., 1966], p. 307). Some of the material of this paragraph is drawn from SZ 20-21.

<sup>21</sup>Cf. "Summary of a Seminar": "As its privation, the concealing of being belongs to the clearing of being. The forgottenness of being, which constitutes the essence of metaphysics and became the stimulus for Being and Time, belongs to the essence of being itself. Thus there is put to the thinking of being the task of thinking being in such a way that forgottenness [= lēthe!] essentially belongs to it. The thinking that being with Being and Time is thus, on the one hand, an awakening from the forgottenness of being . . . but on the other hand, as this awakening, not an extinguishing of the forgottenness of being, but placing oneself in it and standing within it. Thus the awakening from the forgottenness of being to the forgottenness of being is the awakening into appropriation." Translation (here slightly revised) by Joan Stambaugh in On 'Time and Being' (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 29 f. = SD 32.

edition of SZ, 51 note a).

What then of the shift in language that characterizes Heidegger's work in the thirties? This does not make up the turn (Kehre) in the proper sense but is only a shift in direction (Wendung) within the turn.<sup>22</sup> It merely evidences Heidegger's awareness that the turn from all forms of the metaphysics of stable presence into the non-metaphysics of privative absence (lethe) could not be carried out within the language of the last form of metaphysics, transcendental horizontality.

The turn was to come into its own in SZ I.3. Here the whole project was to turn around, both in terms of how one thinks (the abandonment of subjectivity and "the overcoming of the horizon as such") and in terms of what is to be thought (positive appropriation of "Vergessenheit, Lethe, Verbergung, Entzug . . .").<sup>23</sup> Heidegger's abandonment of the program of SZ did not mean abandonment of the turn that had been built into that program from the beginning, but only of the transcendental language of metaphysics. SZ I.3, he later wrote, "was held back because thought failed in adequately [showing] this turn and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics."<sup>24</sup>

Yet for all that, Heidegger claims to have carried out the turn and to have answered the question of the meaning of being. "Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of Being and Time is decisively fulfilled in the thinking of the turn," he wrote to Father Richardson. And he specified: The clearing of the realm of intelligibility on the basis of lethe as withdrawal is what "being" means.<sup>25</sup>

The above analyses of the various early programs for working out the temporal or kinetic meaning of being have brought us to the point where we can begin to study and evaluate the contents of GP. We shall see that GP does not in any way complete SZ. However, the fact that GP fails to complete SZ--indeed, that it failed to complete itself--has a positive meaning. It was a distant warning of the coming shift away from the transcendental language and framework of SZ so as finally to bring about the turn into "the thing itself."<sup>26</sup>

### III. ARGUMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

GP was delivered in 22 two-hour lectures on Wednesdays and Saturdays from April 30

<sup>22</sup>Cf. Heidegger, "Vorwort" in Richardson, Heidegger, p. xvii.

<sup>23</sup>Cf. new SZ 53 note a; new Wegmarken notes (on p. 328) to Humanismusbrief 159.

<sup>24</sup>In the new Wegmarken Heidegger glosses the "Sagen" of the old text with "Sichzeigenlassen." Wegmarken 159 = 328.

<sup>25</sup>"Vorwort" to Richardson, Heidegger, p. xix; *ibid.*, "Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit) erbringt Anwesen (Sein)," p. xxi.

<sup>26</sup>Prof. Hans Seigfried, in a paper distributed at the Twelfth Annual Heidegger Conference (Villanova, Pa., May 27, 1978), has argued against the fact and the possibility of the turn in Heidegger's thought. He admits that "Heidegger himself [in the Humanismusbrief and the Vorwort to Richardson's book] claims the necessity and the fact of a turn in the pursuit of the Being and Time project." However, "the claim is untenable and a simple mistake"; indeed "in clearer moments, it seems, Heidegger himself recognized this mistake. . . ." The roots of Seigfried's misreading lie in his dogged neo-Kantian interpretations of Heidegger. Cf. his "Descriptive Phenomenology and Constructivism," PRP 37 (1976), 248-61.

through July 27, 1927, excepting June 2-15 and July 7-12. Preceding the three Parts was a programmatic Introduction which revealed their systematic interrelation (GP 1-33).

#### A. Introduction

The course opens with and sustains throughout (GP 2, 36, 81, 175f., 263, 353, 467) an implicit critique of Husserl's phenomenology. How does one single out "the basic problems of phenomenology"? Not from any current definition of the art! Not only are there widely divergent conceptions of the nature and tasks of phenomenology, but even if these could be harmonized into a unified definition, this would provide little help in sorting out, much less in solving, the basic problems of phenomenology. For it is emphatically not the case "that phenomenological research today has gotten to the center of the philosophical problematic and defined the proper essence of that problematic from out of its possibilities" (GP 3).

For Heidegger, phenomenology is neither scientific philosophy itself, nor one science among others, nor a pre-science for grounding the properly philosophical disciplines (ethics, logic, and so on). Rather, it is the method for doing scientific philosophy at all. Accordingly, in opposition to Husserl's tendency to separate phenomenology, as scientific philosophy itself, from the authority of the philosophical tradition, Heidegger asserts that phenomenology is only "the more explicit and more radical understanding of the idea of scientific philosophy as this has been ambitioned throughout its development in ever new and coherently unified endeavors from the Greeks to Hegel" (GP 3). Thus, far from allowing any "dogmatic" (= Husserlian) definition of phenomenology to delineate the basic problems (GP 4), Heidegger will turn to history, both to discern in a preliminary way what scientific philosophy has claimed to be and to carry out a phenomenological-critical discussion of four traditional theses on being. This discussion, it becomes clear, is a "retrieve"--"the disclosing of a problem's original and heretofore hidden possibilities so that by the development of them the problem is transformed and thus for the first time has its content as a problem preserved" (KPM 195). From out of the four traditional theses Heidegger will shape the four basic problems of phenomenological philosophy. The circularity here is both obvious and, for Heidegger, inevitable (cf. SZ 152f.), and it points to the fundamental divergence of his "historical" approach from Husserl's presuppositionless one.

A glance at the tradition shows that philosophy by its nature is scientific (not Weltanschauung) and specifically the science of being (and not of the acts and structures of consciousness). In a work, philosophy is ontology, "the theoretical-conceptual interpretation of being, its structure and possibilities" (GP 15). And if phenomenology is to ontology as method is to science, then explaining the basic problems of phenomenology entails demonstrating "the possibility and necessity of the absolute science of being" (ibid.).

The three Parts of GP are the steps to accomplishing this goal. Part One: An analysis of four traditional theses on being will point up their one common problem: an inadequate determination of the meaning of being due to an inadequate determination of Dasein as phenomenological locus of the understanding of being. Part Two: Heidegger will determine the unified meaning of being from out of human temporality by resolving the four "basic problems of phenomenology" retrieved from the four traditional theses. Part Three was to lay out four elements of the methodology of ontology.

#### B. Four Traditional Theses on Being

Heidegger's discussions of each of the four theses is divided into three parts, roughly: (a) a presentation of the thesis, (b) a discussion of its implicit problem-area from a phenomenological viewpoint, and (c) a preliminary indication of the direction to be taken for an adequate resolution of the problem. In the following summaries I restrict myself to only the essential strands of the argument: how each thesis points beyond itself to the need for a fundamental ontology.

1. The Kantian thesis (GP 35-107): Kant states his thesis on being within the context of his refutation of the ontological argument for the existence of God, but Heidegger's interest is only in the ontological, not the theological, import of the thesis. Negatively, Kant's thesis declares that being is not a "real" predicate, i.e., does not deal with or in any way increase the conceptual content of a thing; it does not concern the res (whatness, hence "realness") of the thing. Positively, the thesis maintains that being consists in the "absolute position" of the thing as object in relation to the empirical faculty of

judgment (perception). Although Kant leaves the thesis as such at that (apart from his application of it in refutation of the ontological argument), Heidegger pursues a double problem inherent in it. On the one hand, what Kant means by being as perception is unclear, for perception (Wahrnehmung) can mean either the act of perceiving (Wahrnehmen) or the thing perceived (das Wahrgenommene) or the state of perceivedness (die Wahrgenommenheit, "the being-perceived of what is perceived in the perceiving comportment," GP 79). Heidegger takes it that the last is what Kant means by being, but the very unclarity in which Kant left the issue points to the need for a fundamental clarification of the manifold being-structure of perception. On the other hand, it would seem that perceivedness is not itself being, but must presuppose the actuality or being of the thing in question as prior to the possibility of being-as-perceivedness. This twofold unclarity of the Kantian thesis points to the need for a fundamental clarification of the manifold being-structure of perception.

Heidegger attempts this clarification by an analysis of intentionality. Perception is a perceptive being-directed-towards the perceived, such that the perceived as such is understood in its perceivedness. In this seeming commonplace one must avoid two things: on the one hand, erroneous objectivist readings of intentionality whereby it is taken as a relation of two things-on-Hand: an on-hand psychic subject and an on-hand physical object. Perceiving would then be a psychic act that a subject happens to perform when there happens to be a physical object on hand. Rather, Heidegger shows that perceiving is intrinsically relational, even when that to which it relates (its Wozu) is only a hallucination. Intentionality, therefore, has an a priori character of relating: it is relationality as such. On the other hand, one must avoid an erroneous subjectivizing or immanentizing of intentionality which might express itself in the question, "How do intentions reach an 'outside' world?" Intentionality is neither subjective nor objective but is rooted in transcendence itself. Here for the first time in the course Heidegger introduced his term "Dasein" in place of "subject": man's very being-structure (Dasein) is transcendence; transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality just as intentionality is the aratio cognoscendi of transcendence. For Dasein there can be no "outside" to which it must penetrate because there is no "inside" in which it can be trapped. This clarification of perception as intentional likewise clarifies the second problem, the relation between being as perceivedness and being as actual presence-at-hand. As intentional, perceiving is always directed to the thing perceived so as to discover it; the thing's perceivedness is its discoveredness (Entdecktheit). But if perception really discovers the thing as it is in itself (for such is the nature and goal of perception), then it must be guided beforehand by a prior understanding of the way-of-being and the kind-of-being (Vorhandensein) of the thing perceived. Perceiving must have a prior pre-conceptual understanding of that thing, one in which its being is disclosed (erschlossen). In the perceivedness that goes with this understanding, there is the prior disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of the being of perceived things.

This discussion of the intentional character of perception opens onto the later discussion of the ontological difference between being and entities. Kant's assertion that being is not a real predicate says as much as that being is not an entity. The distinction between the perception of a thing as the perceivedness or discoveredness of an entity and the prior disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of the being of the discovered thing points to the ontological difference between being and entities which is made on the basis of Dasein as transcendence: not just intentional transcendence to entities but transcendence "beyond" entities to (i.e., the prior understanding of) their being.

This preliminary clarification of the Dasein-relatedness of being calls for a fuller analysis of how transcendence, determined by temporality, makes possible man's understanding of being. Likewise, the distinction drawn here between the disclosedness of being and the discoveredness of entities demands an analysis of the ontological difference between being and entities. Both tasks are reserved for GP II.1.

2. The Aristotelian and medieval thesis that the being of entities includes both whatness (essentia) and presence-at-hand (existentia) (GP 108-171). Just as the Kantian thesis shows the subject-relatedness of the notion of the existence (Wirklichkeit) of things, so the medieval essentia and existentia, when traced back to their Aristotelian origins, likewise reveal their relation to the intentional comportment of man and therefore call for an ontology of existence as a fundamental delineation of the

unified meaning of being. Kant had shown that existence entailed relation to the subject (perception), but he took over unproblematically from scholasticism the notion of essence (in his Realität). Heidegger will show that essence too points back to the subject, specifically to productive comportment or poiesis in the broadest sense.

From Suarez' Disputationes metaphysicae and, to a lesser degree, from Aquinas' De ente et essentia, Heidegger lays out a basic medieval lexicon of essentia and existentia and traces the various words (quidditas, forma, natura on the one hand, actualitas on the other) back to their corresponding Aristotelian terms. But those Greek words all point implicitly to the horizon of man's productive comportment (poiesis). Why is existentia conceived as actualitas or energeia? Because of a relation to action (Handeln, praxis) or production (Herstellen, poiesis) whereby something is brought forth and made accessible to man. The same with essentia: The forma or morphe of something is determined by its eidos prohaireton, which, as priorly directing production, has the character of revealing what something is "before" it is actualized (to ti ên einai, quod quid erat esse). That which, in production, is "prior" to actualization (viz., the eidos or essentia or nature of the product) is free from all the imperfection and incompleteness of the actual thing and so determines what something "always already was," to ti ên einai, das jeweils schon voraus Wesende or Gewesenes--used for the otherwise lacking perfect form of einai (cf. new SZ 114 note a).

Just as the words for existence and essence point to man's "poetic" activity of letting things come forth as they are into accessibility or use, so too the words for entities. The hypokeimenon is what "lies present" (keisthai) in the area of man's comportment as available to his use. As an ousia, an entity, according to the pre-philosophical use of ousia, is a present possession or usable reality; its state of being (ousia, essentia) is usability based on producedness. All of this is the unthematic and implicit horizon according to which the Greeks understood being, and it points to the need not only for a retreat from the medieval essentia and existentia to the Greek experience of being, but even more for a thematization and elaboration of what was only implicit in the Greek energeia and ousia.

A more original grasp of the basic articulation of being into essence and existence requires, preliminarily, a discussion of the intentional structure of productive activity and, in the long run, an ontology of human existence as poiesis and praxis. Just as perception is perception of something as it is in itself, so too production, as intentional comportment, presupposes an understanding of the product's being-in-itself. Producing is at once a relating of the product to oneself and a freeing of it for its own being. This letting-free of one's products is essential to man's transcendence as intentional.

But can "production" serve as the clue to all kinds of entities? What about nature, which requires no human production? Answer: Nature is known as such only in productive activity wherein hylê, as what is not produced, is required for what is to be produced.

But finally, the essence-existence distinction, even if rooted in production, does not apply to one kind of entity: human existence, where whatness or essence is of the unique sort, "whoness." Hence, even as clarified thus far, the essence-existence pair remains problematic until clarified in terms of the full meaning of being as such, its unity and multiplicity; and this, in turn, must await an ontology of man as the locus of the understanding of being. Not only does the second thesis point to the need for a deeper "return to the `subject'" but it also calls for a clarification of the meaning of being and of the basic articulations of being. All this is left to GP II.2. (Just how important Heidegger thought this analysis of the Aristotelian and medieval thesis to be is shown by the fact that he took it over whole into his 1928 course on Leibniz as the section, "Essentia. Die Grundverfassung des Seins überhaupt"--and that he referred to it again in the 1935 course Einführung in die Metaphysik, p. 140 = Introduction to Metaphysics, Doubleday/Anchor, p. 154; Yale, p. 184; as well as in Nietzsche II, 14.)

3. The modern thesis (GP 172-251), from Descartes to Husserl, differentiates the being of the critically normative self-conscious subject from that of its possible objects, but it misses the unique being of subjectivity. Heidegger shows the insufficiency of the modern turn to the subject by attacking Kant's understanding of personhood.

For Kant the essence of the ego lies neither in the transcendental unity of apperception (personalitas transcendentalis) and even less in the empirical self-consciousness of the ego of

apprehension (personalitas psychologica), but rather in the moral ego, calculating, acting, taking itself as its goal, self-conscious before the law (personalitas moralis). But even here Kant misses the proper being of acting, wherein the moral person is goal for himself, and instead Kant sees the existence of the person on the model of the existence of a thing. The reason: Kant too reads being as "producedness" insofar as he takes over unquestioned the medieval notion of finite being as createdness. Only a creative producer can know a substance in its full being; man as a finite and therefore receptive knower is confined to phenomenal reality. Thus Kant continues unbroken the metaphysical tradition which reads being as produced presentness (Vorhandensein).

For a more adequate treatment of the being of subjectivity Heidegger summarizes much of SZ I.1 on being-in-the-world (GP 219-47). The point is that even before explicit self-reflection and quite apart from any supposed introspection, man as being-in-the-world already co-grasps himself as mirrored in the matrix of purposefulness called world. Transcending himself into that matrix of meaning, man is at once for-the-sake-of-his-own-being and an understanding of being as such. Thus the proper being of subjectivity can only be decided out of a proper analysis of transcendence, and this will point not only to the unified meaning of being but also to differentiations of being that are more basic than subjectivity and nature. These questions are referred to GP II.3.

4. In investigating the thesis of logic (GP 252-320) that the "is" of the copula applies to all entities regardless of their mode of being, Heidegger selects the characteristic view of Aristotle, Hobbes, Mill, and Lotze in order to show the rich manifold of meanings (whatness, thatness, trueness) that can attach to being taken as the "is." But here lies a double problem. First, the multiplicity of meanings is not systematically derived from a prior idea of the unity of being; and secondly, the designation of being as copula, by taking the assertion as a series of words to be connected, misses the priority of the sense of "is" in terms of truth.

To arrive at a more adequate basis for the "is," Heidegger rejects the notion of the assertion as a series of words corresponding to ideas and ultimately to objects, and cuts through to the logos apophantikos as intentional comportment embodying an understanding of being. But even this assertoric disclosure of being in apophantic predication and verbal communication rests on a deeper foundation. Being-in-the-world is the primordial hermeneutic (= event of interpretative understanding of intelligibilities) which discloses entities in their original and non-derived syntheses with the lived purposes of existence. Transcendence is original truth. The intentional structure of truth as disclosure, grounded ultimately in temporality, alone can provide access to the unified meaning, and with that to the truth-character, of being in GP II.4.

### C. Towards Fundamental Ontology

Each of the four theses, when broken down to its inner problems and possibilities, has pointed beyond itself to the need for reformulating the idea of being in general on the basis of an adequate ontology of human existence. Thus we are led to GP II, "The Fundamental Ontological Question About the Meaning of Being in General and its Basic Structures and Modes." Whereas Heidegger here proposed to present and then to push beyond SZ's analysis of temporality and spell out the time-character of being by resolving the four basic problems of phenomenology, the course (there were only six lecture days left) did very little more than summarize the published portions of SZ.

What is interesting for our purposes are the few steps that Heidegger takes at GP 441-445 beyond SZ and in pursuance of its promise to determine the meaning of being in general from the horizon opened up by man's temporal self-transcendence. The reasons for this interest are twofold: positively, to find out how and at what point SZ I.3 would have built off of SZ I.2, and negatively, to find out why and at what point that continuation became impossible for Heidegger.

GP 389 begins the summary of the main material of SZ. BEing shows up only in the understanding of being, which is intrinsic to Dasein; therefore, only by discovering the structures and ground of this understanding can we define the meaning of being in general. But all understanding is fundamentally the projection of possibilities into which one lives and from out of which one understands oneself. Projective understanding is rooted in Dasein's basic state of self-transcendence, being-in-the-world; and this in turn is grounded in the generation (Zeitigung) of temporality, or better, in temporality

as self-generation in the primordial form of authentic, self-appropriated existence. I am who I really am by anticipating the most basic possibility which I already am, my death. Authentic existence is the threefold structure of self-transcendence: being present to oneself and to things in the moment of existential insight (Gegenwart as Augenblick) by becoming (Zukunft as Vorlaufen) and renewing (Gewesenheit as Wiederholung) the most proper possibility that one is.

This primary temporality underlies the derived temporal structures of dealing with, e.g., tools in one's environment. A tool is for attaining some end: it has its being as "in-order-to-ness." Whenever I use a tool, not only do I already understand its being (what it is: a tool; how it is: available for doing something), but more, I implicitly relate myself to that being in a temporal way. I have the tool present to me (Gegenwart as Gegenwärtigen) by retaining it (Gewesenheit as Behalten) in terms of an expectation of what it can accomplish (Zukunft as Gewärtigen). Ordinary usage overlooks these moments and their temporal base, but when the tool is damaged or missing or just put up with, its structure, modified but still temporal, becomes noticeable. Not only that, but the various forms of breakdown of equipment make visible the modifications of the temporal moments of tool-oriented self-transcendence. Three examples will reveal the private modifications of these ekstases.

1. To lack or miss something. To come out of the theater and find one's car stolen is certainly to experience the not-there-ness (das Nichtvorfinden: GP 441 = SZ 335b) of the car. But not every instance of not-there-ness is an instance of missing (we don't miss last year's flue attack), rather only those in which something needed is lacking. We cannot say exactly, therefore, that to miss means to not-have-something-present, for it is precisely to have something present as needed (the car) when in fact it is not around. The experience of missing something reveals the private modification of the ekstasis of having-present into having-unpresent. To express this privative character, Heidegger calls the modified ekstasis an UNgegenwärtigen as contrasted with a NICHTgegenwärtigen (cf. the Greek μη on vs. ουκ on). To miss is to make present something expected but not present.

2. To be surprised by something which unexpectedly but handily shows up. Your car gone, you are about to step on a bus when a horn honks behind you--your best friend is offering you a ride. Having the bus present in terms of that expected ride means not expecting a more comfortable ride in a car. The non-expectation, however, is not an absolute absence of expectation (Nichtgewärtigen) but a relative or privative un-expectation (Ungewärtigen, GP 442b = SZ 355c), which, in fact, is what allows us to be surprised. The experience of surprise reveals the privative modification of the futural ekstasis of tool-use from expectation to un-expectation.

3. Merely putting up with an implement. Say no friend offers you a ride and you have to take the bus home. You have the bus present, you retain it in terms of the expected arrival home, but you really do not "take the bus into account" (das Nichtrechnen mit, SZ 355d) or "retain" it to that end; rather, you merely put up with it. This "not taking into account," however, is not absolute non-retention but a privative "un-retention." You "hold on" to the bus by putting up with it as second-best. This phenomenon reveals, in tool-use, the privative modification of the ekstasis of alreadiness from retaining to un-retaining.

This is the point (GP 441 = SZ § 69a) where the "new working out" of "Time and Being" was to take off. Having seen--at least in the cases of Dasein and tools--the elaboration of the unity of self-transcendence, we now await the elaboration of the corresponding horizontal schemata (the "whereunto" of the direction of self-transcendence) which condition the meaning of whatever is experienced in correlation with the ekstasis. At one pole, the threefold self-transcendence; at the other pole, the threefold horizontal schema--the whole constituting the ekstasis-horizontal correlation that is primordial temporality. We expect, too, that each horizontal schema will have both a positive and a privative moment. Out of the interrelation of presence and absence both in temporality as a whole (where becoming and alreadiness function as relative absence for having-present) and within each moment of temporality (which includes both positivity and privation) we would expect the elaboration of the analogically unified meaning of being in general as presence-by-absence in correlation with man's own existential presence-by-absence.

In fact, however, the further step Heidegger takes in that direction is very cautious--if not

downright hesitant. "In order not to complicate too much our view of the phenomenon of temporality, which in any case is difficult to grasp" (GP 435b), he imposes a double limit on the treatment. On the one hand, he restricts himself to the experience of dealing with tools only, and on the other he treats only of the horizontal schema that corresponds to the one ekstasis of having-present.

Correlative to but distinct from the self-transcendent moment of having a tool present, there is the horizontal schema whose time-character is called presence (Praesenz). (In order to show the distinctness of the ekstastic and horizontal poles in their correlativity, Heidegger generally, but not consistently, uses German-based words for the ekstastic pole: e.g., Zeitlichkeit, Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart; and Latin-based words for the horizontal pole: Temporalität, Praesenz, Absenz; cf. GP 433 and Logik, 199). Having-present, as an ekstastic moment, has a schematic indication (Vorzeichnung, GP 435a) of that out-towards-which transcendence is, viz., the horizon of Praesenz (also called Anwesenheit) Praesenz thus constitutes "the condition of the possibility of understanding readiness-to-hand as such" (434). Having-present, in fact, project all it has present and could possibly have present in terms of this horizon of presence or presentness and so understands those things as having a "presential sense" (433b) and as "present things" (als Anwesendes, 436a).

But recall that in the breakdown of a tool there occurs a privative modification of having-present to having-unpresent, or, from the viewpoint of the tool, a modification of its being from readiness-to-hand to un-readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit, Abhandenheit, 433b), from presentness to unpresentness (Anwesenheit, Abwesenheit, 436a).

Thus there is in general no horizon corresponding to "missing" as a determined [mode of] having-present, but rather a specifically modified horizon . . . of presence. Belonging to the ekstasis of having-unpresent, which makes "missing" possible, there is the horizontal schema of absence (441a).

This absential modification of the presence . . . which is given with [the experience of] missing is precisely what allows the ready-to-hand to become conspicuous [as lacking] (442b).

At this point Heidegger's advance stops. We have seen that the horizontal schema of Praesenz encompasses presentness, along with unpresentness as its privative modification. But this has been demonstrated only in the one horizontal schema corresponding to the one ekstasis of having-present in the one area of tool-use. Left undiscussed are: the other temporal schemata (with their privative modifications) in which tools are experienced: all the temporal schemata of non-tools; and above all, the analogically unified temporal meaning of being as such and in general.

But, although the advance stops quickly, Heidegger asks some weighty and portentous questions about the ground it covered and failed to cover. "Within the ontological," he says (438b), "the potential is higher than the actual" and "everything positive becomes especially clear from the privative" (439c). Why? "Parenthetically we may say that the reasons lie equally in the essence of temporality and in the essence of the negation that is rooted in temporality" (ibid.). However, if the rule that the potential underlies the actual and that the privative clarifies the positive helped to open the advance beyond SZ, it also has momentarily blocked further progress.

The modification of presence to the absence in which that presence, as modified, maintains itself cannot be interpreted more precisely without going into the characterization of this modification in general, i.e., into the modification of presence as "not," as negativum, and without clarifying this in its connection with time (442a).

If the absential modification allows things to show up as lacking, then we meet the fundamental but difficult problem: To what extent is there not precisely a negative moment (if we formally call the ab-sential a negation) that constitutes itself in the structure of this being, i.e., above all in readiness-to-hand? To ask the question in terms of basic principles: To what extent does a negative, a not, lie in Temporalität in general and likewise in Zeitlichkeit? Or even: To what extent is time itself the condition of the possibility of nothingness at all? (442 f.). Time, we know, was only the first name for what Heidegger later called the truth of being. In both cases being is seen as pres-ab-sence. The last question above, therefore, is very close to asking: To what extent does presence itself, which must transcend the acts in which it is performed, contain within

itself a privation (absence, nothingness, lethe) which is the possibility of that very presence? The question teeters there. Granted that the modification of presence to absence has a character of negativity,

where does the root of this `not' in general lie? Closer consideration shows that even the not--or nothingness as the essence of the not--can likewise be interpreted only from out of the essence of time and that only from time can the possibility of the modification, e.g., of presentness to absentness, be clarified. Hegel is finally on the track of a fundamental truth when he says: Being and Nothingness are identical, i.e., belong together. Of course the more radical question is: What makes possible such a most primordial belonging-togetherness? We are not sufficiently prepared to press on into this darkness . . . (443a,b).

GP is hardly a completion of SZ. But its formal significance, apart from the intrinsic interest of its content, lies in its incompleteness. To be sure, it shows how Heidegger might have completed SZ if he had chosen to continue in a transcendental framework. But more importantly it leads to the brink from which, beyond the transcendental framework, the absence can begin to be seen for itself.

#### IV. SIGNIFICANCE: "THE THING ITSELF"

In asking about the significance of this publication, we must distinguish between what it may contribute to Heidegger scholarship and what it offers by way of insight into the phenomenological "thing itself," being as pres-ab-sence.

There is plenty for Heidegger scholarship. We meet the first mention of the "ontological difference," although the concept does not get developed. (On November 17, 1925, Heidegger did speak of "ein fundamentaler ontologischer Unterschied," but in reference to Husserl's ideal-real distinction in Logical Investigations. See Logik, p. 58.) There are analyses of Aquinas, Scotus, Suarez, Hobbes, Mill and Lotze. There is a suggestive insight into the three stages of phenomenological method (reduction, construction, destruction) some months before Heidegger's contributions to Husserl's drafts for the Encyclopedia Britannica article.<sup>27</sup> More important, the work provides a good portion of Heidegger's Aristotle-interpretation, including the lengthiest analysis of Physics IV, 10-14 that we shall ever have from his courses (GP 330-61) and the first published, but by no means last, analysis of Aristotle's De interpretatione (GP 255-59; cf. Logik, pp. 127-42).

Important for the "thing itself" is the fact that the course gives us Heidegger's final attempt to work out the meaning of being from within the transcendental framework. I take that incompleteness as more than merely a function of "the limited number of lecture hours" (editor's epilogue, GP 473), for on a simple extrapolation from the hours devoted to GP I, which began in late April, GP II would have been finished only by mid-September and GP III not until the end of October. Moreover, one must ask why the handful of pages that push into "Time and Being" were reserved to the second half of the second-to-last meeting of the course (July 23) and, on the whole, are among the most unsatisfying of the whole work. We have seen from Heidegger's own indications that his program was wrapped in some uncertainty in 1927. This uncertainty may have a positive meaning insofar as it gives a distant warning of the coming shift that would allow a more adequate determination of the "thing itself." The following intends to give some clues for that determination.

The question that haunts GP and prompts the shift away from the transcendental framework is this: If entities are understood in terms of their presence, and if presence is projected in terms of privative absence, what is the root of privative absence? This is "the problem of the finitude of time" (GP 437), which, in a later formulation, is the problem of the lethe-dimension of altheia: "Wherever altheia emerges, lethe itself (which is what essentially becomes present in altheia) remains absent

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<sup>27</sup>See Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology, with a Letter to Edmund Husserl," trans. Thomas Sheehan, Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture, XII (1977), 111-21.

precisely so that some thing can become unhidden as an entity.<sup>28</sup> That is: entities become present against a background of privative absence which is intrinsic to the emergence of presence itself.<sup>29</sup>

The point where GP breaks off and Heidegger's next phase begins is the brink from which he sees that the l~~eth~~-dimension is intrinsic to being itself. The privative absence is not forged by man's projective self-absence, nor is it merely the unexplainedness of this or that entity (which finally is embedded within a claim of the total intelligibility of reality) nor is it some occasional limit. Rather this privative negativity is intrinsic to being as pres-ab-sence. But to speak of being hiding and revealing "itself" seemingly is to fall into the worst kind of metaphysical or mystical anthropomorphism.

How may we solve this problem? Discussion of the positive appropriation of absence--which is the turn--may be aided by two prefatory notes, one about the model and one about the language of the discussion.

1. Clearly the major model of Heidegger's exploration of being as pres-ab-sence is Aristotle's discussion of kinēsis in terms of dynamis and energeia, even though, to be sure, the model gets much transformed when put at the service of Heidegger's problematic.<sup>30</sup> In his seminar of 1928, "Phenomenological Exercises: Interpretation of Aristotle's Physics, II" (thus the title, although it dealt with Physics III), Heidegger declared that the horizon from which Aristotle prepared the radical grasp of the conception of being was kinēsis, movement; the point, therefore, is to find the relation between movement and being (July 16, 1928). But being (ousia, or more specifically energeia) means always-being-the-same, self-identity, presentness and completion, whereas moving entities are intrinsically "on the way" and incomplete: every "now" points to another and different now, every moment is a "yes, but. . . ." Moving entities are ἄνω and αὐριστον. Yet Aristotle's genius is that he grasped this privative state as mode of being through the concept of dynamis. Dynamis, when seen in terms of kinēsis, is neither "potentiality" nor "mere possibility" but the positive event of appropriation-unto-energeia (Eignung, Ereignung); and an entity which has its being as dynamis is on δυνάμει ἢ δυνάτον, and appropriated entity that is precisely in the state of being-appropriated-unto-energeia. Dynamis in this sense is, in effect, co-extensive with kinēsis as energeia atēlos: presence-by-absence. As bound up with kinēsis (and quite apart from the arithmos kinēseos), energeia, Heidegger says, is a Zeitbezeichnung, a time-designation (July 9). Of course, Heidegger's transformation of this model entails the reversal of the Greek priority of energeia over dynamis into the priority of dynamis over energeia. Intrinsic to that transformation is Heidegger's claim that the human understanding of being is itself the Ur-kinēsis.

2. Following the lead of Heidegger's later writings, discussion of the turn could well profit from retiring the term "being" from the Heideggerian lexicon. Not only does the word, especially capitalized, almost inevitably suggest a metaphysical super-entity, but equally, talk of "being itself" can lose sight of

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<sup>28</sup>This is a strict paraphrase rather than a translation of the text at Wegmarken 199 which more literally would be rendered: "Whenever unhiddenness emerges, hiddenness itself (which essentially becomes present in this unhiddenness) remains absent so that the unhidden thing can appear as an entity."

<sup>29</sup>Cf. "Physis . . . is a going back into itself, i.e., towards itself as always going forth." Martin Heidegger, "On the Being and Conception of Physis in Aristotle's Physics B, 1," trans. Thomas Sheehan, Man and World, IX (1976), 263 = Wegmarken, p. 363.

<sup>30</sup>Cf. my article, "Getting to the Topic: The New Edition of Wegmarken" in Research in Phenomenology, VII (1977), reprinted as chapter 18 of Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor of Martin Heidegger, John Sallis, ed. (New York: Humanities Press, 1978). Also my "Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle: Dynamis and Ereignis," in Philosophy Research Archives, IV, 1978.

its analogical character. Heidegger is not after a univocal something subsisting on its own. Over and above the being of Dasein, the being of implements, the being of things present-at-hand, and the being of ideal objects, there is no second level of "being itself." Heidegger was merely searching for the analogically unified meaning of being that is instantiated in all cases of the being of. . . . To translate das Sein I hesitantly suggest for now the term "givenness," first, because it clearly implies a phenomenologically correlative locus of experience from which it is distinct but never separate--various forms of human perception (Vernehmen; cf. EM 106) in the broadest sense; and secondly, because the phrase "givenness itself" seems less likely to denote something behind or in addition to the givenness of entities, but rather to connote a shift of phenomenological focus onto the unified analogical structure of givenness as a priori determinative of the regional modes in which things (or one thing) can be differently given in experience.

But with "givenness" we have not yet arrived at Heidegger's problematic. Givenness denotes the state of an entity as given (das Seiende als Seiendes = Seiendheit), whereas Heidegger's question is not about the givenness of the given but about the very giving of givenness itself. If being is the givenness of entities (ontic disclosure or truth), what gives givenness (ontological disclosure or truth)? Or: If being accounts for ("is") the meaningful presence of things, what is the mode of the meaningful "presence" of being?

In one sense we already know the answer: Absence possibilizes presence, possibility allows actuality, l@the is the condition of al@theia. Furthermore, we already know the correlation-structure between man's self-transcendence and the pres-ab-sence that is "being." What is still undecided is the question of priority within that correlation. Let us begin by reviewing the correlation.

In terms of the phenomenologically transformed dynamis-energeia model, Heidegger deepens Husserl's empty-fulfilled model. Man is projected beyond himself towards his own self-absence, thereby opening an empty horizon which may be filled in by the entities which are given to experience. But this means that man has two distinct kinds of experience related to two distinct kinds of givenness. On the one hand, man experiences the recessive or withdrawn horizon which is the prior condition of the fulfilling presence of entities. On the other, he experiences the present entities. First, note their relatedness: Just as the experience of one's own privative absence is the basis of the experience of things (relative self-absence yields the realm of presence), so correlatively the experience of the givenness of the recessive possibilizing horizon is the basis of the experience of the meaningful givenness of present entities. Now note the difference: The givenness of the possibilizing horizon cannot properly be collapsed into the givenness of present entities. On comparison of the two, the horizon has a unique mode of givenness. It remains relatively absent or withdrawn in favor of the entities given within it. But at the same time it still is given to experience, although in the privative mode of relative absence. Specifically, the withdrawal or absence is given as correlative to the experience of one's own self-absence, whereas entities are given as correlative to the experience of one's own presence. At one and the same time, man's presence-by-absence or temporal existence is correlative to (1) the presence of fulfilling entities and (2) the presence-by-absence of the conditioning horizon. In other words, any possible givenness of entities is based on the correlativity of the temporality of existence with the movement or "time-character" of givenness itself.

The correlation established, the question now is whether the movement or time-character of givenness, as the condition of possible experience, is primarily due to man's kinetic temporality. More specifically: whether the possibility of error is rooted in man's finitude or in the finitude of the pres-ab-sence of givenness itself. Heidegger broaches the question in his essay "On the Essence of Truth."

Dasein as self-transcending has a disclosive function both with regard to a particular entity that happens to show up and with regard to the meaning-fraught complex of human purposes called "world." But everyday experience overlooks the world while it focuses on a particular entity: it conceals the world that it holds open. Or is it rather that the world, the realm of openness, "conceals itself" in favor of the unconcealed entity? Yes, Heidegger asserts, the non-disclosure of al@theia is its most proper element. It is not something effected by Dasein's projective self-transcendence, yet nonetheless it is preserved as absential by Dasein's self-absence. The "withdrawal" of givenness itself is

prior even to Dasein's revealing-concealing relation to entities, yet Dasein preserves the lethe-dimension of altheia (= "the mystery") by being projected beyond himself into the emptiness within which entities can appear.

Whereas SZ had read the correlation of Dasein and lethe from Dasein's viewpoint, Heidegger's later position reads the correlation from the viewpoint of the lethe. The later writings speak of man as "drawn out" or "claimed," correlative to the "self-concealing" of the dimension which lends entities their presentness. But one experiences this withdrawal only as it is registered in one's being drawn into absence (Geworfenheit, Angezogenheit, etc),<sup>31</sup> and one experiences the epochal givenness (Geschick) of worlds of sense only as this is registered in how one makes entities present in meaning. There can be no hypostatizing of "something" that withdraws or gives, no objectification of "something" that disposes over the movement that is one's temporality. There is only the experience of the self as ultimately not at its own disposal.<sup>a</sup> From a Derridean perspective we might speak of man as being at the disposal of "meaning."<sup>62</sup> This is hardly to import some romantic mysticism into philosophy, but only to take seriously and rigorously the full structure of the phenomenological correlation.

The later Heidegger claims to have transcended the transcendental framework and yet to have fulfilled SZ's intentions of showing that the meaning of being is presence-by-absence. If GP had been completed, its last sentence might possibly have read: "The meaning of being is time; that is, givenness is given temporally because of the transcendental projection of the temporal horizons of possible experience." If per impossibile GP had been completed in the late thirties, its last sentence might have read: "The meaning of being is 'movement'--that is, givenness is given in the unique state of withdrawal, and thereby man is drawn out into absence and into the finite possibilities of meaning." In both periods the "thing itself" is the same: being as pres-ab-sence in essential correlation with man as pres-ab-sence.

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<sup>31</sup>WD 5 = What is Called Thinking? F. Wieck and J. G. Gray, Trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 9.

<sup>32</sup>Cf. Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXX (1969), esp. 44-57.