

**KEHRE and EREIGNIS:
A Prolegomenon to *Introduction to Metaphysics***

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Interpretations of Heidegger often fail to distinguish between two very different matters -- on the one hand “the turn” (*die Kehre*), and on the other hand “the change in Heidegger’s thinking” (*die Wendung im Denken*), that is, the shift in the way Heidegger formulated and presented his philosophy beginning in the 1930s. Failure to make this distinction can be disastrous for understanding Heidegger, and the danger becomes more acute the closer one gets to texts like *Introduction to Metaphysics*, where both the “turn” and the “change” begin to come into their own.¹

The first issue, the *Kehre* or “turn,” is emphatically not an alteration in Heidegger’s thinking, not an episode that could be dated to a period in his philosophical career. Rather, it is one name among many for the abiding topic of Heidegger’s work: the radically inverted meaning of being, grounded in finitude, that stands over against the metaphysical ideal of being as full presence and intelligibility. The turn is indeed a kind of movement, but not the movement that Heidegger’s thought underwent in the 1930s. Rather, Heidegger associates the turn with *Ereignis* (usually translated “appropriation”), and specifically with the way *Ereignis* operates: “*Die im Ereignis wesende Kehre.*”² The turn is the inner movement of *Ereignis* whereby (a) finitude opens a clearing in human being (b) in which entities can appear as this or that.

The second issue, the “change in thinking,” refers to a shift in how Heidegger formulated and expressed that inner movement of *Ereignis*. It is a change in *das Denken/Sagen der Kehre*.³ If the turn refers to Heidegger’s central topic -- the giving of being in connection with the opening up of *Dasein* -- then the “thinking and saying of the turn” refers to Heidegger’s efforts to articulate that state of [p. 4] affairs. And as a sub-set of that, “the change in thinking” refers to Heidegger’s shift in orientation from the transcendental-horizonal approach of 1926-28 to the *seinsgeschichtlich* (dispensing-of-being) approach of the remainder of his career. But this shift in orientation is not the turn itself. The distinction here is between the *Kehre* -- the inner movement of *Ereignis* -- and a change in how Heidegger expressed that movement.⁴

In his famous letter to William J. Richardson (April, 1962) Heidegger acknowledged “*eine Wendung in meinem Denken*,” “a change in my thinking,”⁵ and to this day the best analysis of that shift in orientation remains Richardson’s majestic *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. That book definitively proved that the breakthrough from the earlier to the later Heidegger took place in his lecture “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” first delivered in December of 1930, and that *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the lecture course of summer 1935, clearly indicates that “Heidegger II has taken full possession.”⁶

Richardson takes pains to distinguish between (1) Heidegger’s focal topic, *die Sache des Denkens* (which Heidegger explicitly identified with the *Kehre* operative in *Ereignis*) and (2) what Richardson calls the “shift of focus” or “‘reversal’ in manner and method”⁷ that unfolded in Heidegger’s work in the 1930s as he continued pursuing that single topic. If Heidegger characterized his professional

career in the phrase “*auf einen Stern zugehen*,” then the *Kehre* operative in *Ereignis* was the “one and only star” that guided his journey, not any twist or turn along the way.⁸

But this crucial distinction is not always maintained in the scholarship. The shift of focus to which Richardson refers is what many Heideggerians erroneously call “the *Kehre* in Heidegger’s thinking,” a confusion that flies in the face of Heidegger’s insistence that

First and foremost the *Kehre* is not a process that took place in my thinking and questioning. It belongs, rather, to the very *issue* that is named by the titles “Being and Time”/“Time and Being.” [. . .] The turn operates within the *issue itself*. It is not something that I did, nor does it pertain to my thinking only.⁹

The present essay, which is intended as a prolegomenon to a fresh reading of *Introduction to Metaphysics*, attempts to sort out what Heidegger means by the turn operative in *Ereignis*. (I reserve for another occasion a discussion of the “change in thinking” that took place in Heidegger’s work in the 1930s.) The essay focusses on the meaning of *Ereignis* that Heidegger developed in *Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis* (1936-1938) and from that vantage point looks back to Heidegger’s interpretation of the pre-Socratics in *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935).¹⁰

Although, as Richardson correctly argues, 1935 marks the official debut of [p. 5] the later Heidegger, nonetheless important details still had to be worked out. *Introduction to Metaphysics* certainly does give evidence of Heidegger’s changed approach to the meaning of being, but nowhere in that lecture course does Heidegger thematically explain the *Kehre* operative in *Ereignis*, nor do those terms, with their technical meanings, even appear in the text. Instead, Heidegger elaborated the *Kehre* and *Ereignis* indirectly and unthematically via interpretations of Sophocles, Parmenides and Heraclitus. It would take him at least another year to make *Kehre/Ereignis* the focus of explicit treatment, and that first happened in his *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. Only there did the turn operative in *Ereignis* move to center-stage and the corresponding change in Heidegger’s presentation of that topic get locked in.

In what follows I argue that Heidegger’s focal topic was not “being” (the givenness or availability of entities for human engagement) but rather what *brings about* being, namely *Ereignis*, the opening of clearing within which entities can appear as this or that. This clearing occurs when *Dasein* -- which I translate as “openness” -- is opened up by its own finitude. But neither *Ereignis* nor the turn is an event in the usual sense of the term (much less an event that occurred in Heidegger’s thinking) but rather the presupposition of all human events. The essay then argues that *Ereignis* was almost -- but not quite -- envisioned by the early Greek thinkers, and it concludes that in the 1930s Heidegger changed his orientation but not his central topic.

1. HEIDEGGER’S TOPIC WAS NOT “BEING,” EITHER IN ITS TRADITIONAL ONTOLOGICAL SENSE OR IN A PHENOMENOLOGICALLY TRANSFORMED SENSE.

In order to sort out what “the turn operative in *Ereignis*” is, we must first be clear about what Heidegger’s topic was and was not. We begin with two negatives: (1) Heidegger’s fundamental topic was not “being” *tout court* (the is-ness of whatever is) and (2) it was not a phenomenologically reinterpreted being (being as the givenness or availability of entities for human engagement).

In the first place Heidegger's focal topic was not "being" (*das Sein*) in any of its traditional philosophical meanings. That is, it did not coincide with the three overlapping ways in which classical metaphysics had treated being, namely as

A. *ontological*: any entity's

- ! thatness (existence: not-being-nothing)
- ! whatness (essence: being this or that)
- ! howness (mode: being in this way or that) [p. 6]

B. *transcendental*: any entity's trans-generic status as

- ! something (*res*)
- ! one (*unum*)
- ! distinct from others (*aliquid*)
- ! desirable (*bonum*)
- ! knowable (*verum*)¹¹

C. *theological*: the highest entity's state of perfect self-coincidence,

- ! not only between its thinking and the object of its thought,¹²
- ! but also and above all within itself.¹³

But likewise Heidegger's central topic was not "being" in a phenomenological sense. It is true that Heidegger's first step in retrieving the unsaid from the classical tradition was to see that, in all the above instances, the being of entities is implicitly some form of the presence of entities: not merely their presence-to-themselves or their presence-out-there apart from human beings, but their *presence to and availability for possible human engagement* -- their humanly specific ("ad hominem") givenness and accessibility. In this implicit phenomenological sense, the being of entities is their ability to be of concern to human beings, that is, to be significant, understandable, usable. Thus in what follows, the term "givenness" always means "humanly specific givenness," and I use it interchangeably with "availability" and "accessibility" -- i.e., usability, understandability -- to name the being of entities.¹⁴

One of Heidegger's major achievements was to have rendered that implicit state of affairs explicit, by phenomenologically shifting the meaning of $\hat{J}\hat{I} \text{ g}\acute{\text{E}}\text{<"4}$ from an entity's "being-out-there" to its "appearing-as" ($\text{n}\text{"}\backslash\text{<gFh"4}$, *Erscheinung*¹⁵), i.e., its intelligibility in the broadest sense.¹⁶ Throughout his work Heidegger insisted that, properly understood, $\hat{J}\hat{I} \text{ D}\text{<}$ (whatever-is) is $\hat{J}\hat{I} \text{ } \hat{I}\text{< } \bar{\text{n}}\text{H} \bullet 80\text{hXH}$ (whatever-is as *accessible*) and that "being" means not the mere ontological thereness of entities but their givenness as the available.¹⁷ This change is visible in Heidegger's reinterpretation of $\text{@}\hat{U}\text{F}\backslash\text{"}/\text{Sein}$ (an entity's being) as $\text{B}\text{"D}\text{@LF}\backslash\text{"}/\text{Anwesen}$ (an entity's presence/givenness to possible human engagement), in keeping with the principle "Being as the givenness of entities *concerns Dasein*."¹⁸ Thus *das Sein des Seienden = das Anwesen des Anwesenden =* $\text{B}\text{"D}\text{@LF}\backslash\text{" } \text{J}\text{@}\hat{O} \text{B}\text{"D}\text{`<J}\text{@H}$ = the givenness/availability/accessibility (hence the usability and understandability) of whatever is. The *realm* of givenness-itself (i.e., the field of possible concern) is what Heidegger called "world," and the a priori human engagement with that realm is what he called "being-in-the-world."¹⁹ [p. 7]

Heidegger found this phenomenological notion of being to be the dominant, if implicit, view in ancient Greek philosophy. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, for example, he argues that one of the earliest names for the appearance of entities was $\text{n}\text{bF4H}$. The emergence ($\text{n}\text{b}\text{g4}<$) that this Greek word indicates is not some pre-human appearance of entities, their coming-to-be prior to or apart from the receptive openness that is human being. Rather, $\text{n}\text{bF4H}$ refers to the givenness of entities *within* $\hat{J}\hat{I} \text{ <}\text{@}\text{g}\hat{A}\text{<}$, and $\text{n}\text{b}\text{g4}<$ names the emergence of such givenness in correlation with that receptive openness.²⁰ Thus in *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger equates $\text{n}\text{bF4H}$ and $\bullet 8\text{Zhg4}$.²¹ And from beginning to end, he argued that the givenness of entities requires a human site -- a "dative" -- in order to occur at all.²²

Nonetheless, being as the givenness and availability of entities was not Heidegger's fundamental topic. In either form -- whether as the mere-thereness (Sein) of entities, or as their givenness (Dasein) -- being is still that which makes entities be as they are, either in the form of their ontological thatness, whatness, and howness, or in the form of their phenomenological emergence, stable appearance, and availability as this or that. Both of these issues lie within the confines of metaphysics and its ontological difference (entities-in-their-being).²³ Thus even when Heidegger phenomenologically reinterpreted the various instances of "is" as so many forms of "is-present-as," he still had broached only *die Leitfrage*, the guiding question of metaphysics. This serves, at best, as the antechamber to the *Grundfrage*, the fundamental question that reaches beyond metaphysics to the topic of Heidegger's own thought.²⁴

2. HEIDEGGER'S OWN QUESTION WAS: WHAT BRINGS ABOUT BEING AS THE GIVENNESS OR AVAILABILITY OF ENTITIES?

(A) Heidegger's fundamental question was: What produces (Dasein, *läßt sein*) availability? What enables being as Dasein/Anwesen to be given at all?²⁵ And insofar as this givenness requires a correlative human site in order to occur, the question becomes: What is responsible for the *correlation* between an entity's givenness and the dative of that givenness? Whatever the answer to that question may turn out to be, it is what Heidegger meant by *die Sache des Denkens*, the single topic of his thought. Provisionally and heuristically we may designate this focal issue as "the enabling power" that makes possible the correlation of givenness/being and its dative.

Heidegger calls this enabling power "*ein drittes*,"²⁶ a *tertium quid* (Sophist 250b) or *tertium quid* over and above both being as an entity's givenness and the dative of that givenness. Insofar as it makes Dasein possible, this enabling [p. 8] power is "beyond" or other than being-as-givenness, in a way that is analogous (but only analogous) to what Plato called *ἰδέω* (idea). This enabling power as *tertium quid* is also "beyond" the ontological difference, insofar as it lets that unity-in-difference come forth.²⁷

(B) The fundamental question "What brings about givenness?" entails a *preparatory*-fundamental question: What is the dative of such givenness? Heidegger's answer was: intentional or open comportment.²⁸ And the essence of such comportment he called "*Dasein*."²⁹

Heidegger insisted that *Dasein*, as the essence of human being and acting, means being-the-*Da*.³⁰ Here the *Da* is understood as the open (*das Offene*).³¹ And for Heidegger the open is the same as *Lichtung*,³² *Welt*,³³ *Sein*,³⁴ being-as-such,³⁵ the truth of being,³⁶ difference,³⁷ and *Ereignis*.³⁸ In other words the *Da*, taken in its fullness, is nothing less than *die Sache des Denkens*. It would be preferable, therefore, to avoid translating *Dasein* with variations on the word "there" (being-there, there-being, being-the-there). Rather, *Dasein* means "open-ness," i.e., being-open and being-the-open in all the senses of "open" just listed.

For Heidegger the verbal emphasis in *Dasein* falls on the second syllable: *Da-sein*, being the open.³⁹ The point is that the open is what we have-to-be (cf. *zu-sein*).⁴⁰ But human beings do not open up the open by their own subjective powers. Rather, the open is thrown- or pulled-open (*geworfen/ereignet*), drawn-out in such a way that, within that opened site, the availability of entities occurs. This *openedness* is what Jean Beaufret had in mind when he interpreted *Dasein* as *l'ouverture*,⁴¹ and it is the meaning we intend when we render this key term as "openness."

The word “openness” captures important meanings that Heidegger retrieved from Aristotelian RLPZ for his own understanding of *Dasein*.⁴² In *De Anima* Aristotle argues that RLPZ is the very essence of human being; that, qua receptive, it has its nature as possibility;⁴³ and that, as this possibility, it is essentially open to and revelatory of the being of entities other than itself.

For Aristotle human RLPZ, whether in sense perception (JÎ "fFhV<gFh"4) or intellectual knowledge (JÎ <@gĀ<), is a BVFPg4< J4, a transcendental openness-to-receive.⁴⁴ By its very nature, RLPZ is *g6J46Z (Latin, *susceptiva*), actively open to receive the forms (i.e., the being) of other entities.⁴⁵ This is what medieval philosophers meant when they described the soul as *quod natum est convenire cum omni ente*.⁴⁶ Precisely as such receptive openness, RLPZ in its noetic form is ontologically structured to reveal the being of everything that appears: ° RLP¬ J • Ð<J" BfH |FJ4 BV<J" (' 8, 431 b 21). In short, for Heidegger: [p. 9]

1. RLPZ, properly retrieved, is the openness that the being of entities requires (*braucht*) in order to be revealed: Ô J` B@H gĀ* ä< (' 4, 429 a 27-28).⁴⁷
2. The very essence of RLPZ is to “belong to” (*zugehören*: to get its *raison d'être* from) being.
3. And that essence consists in letting-be-seen the being of all entities: Ô <@ØH gĒ* @H gĀ* ä< (' 7, 432 a 2).

(C) The *tertium quid* that makes possible the correlation of (a) the givenness of entities and (b) intentional comportment as the dative of this givenness -- the central topic of Heidegger's thought -- goes by a host of titles, all of which, in spite of their distinct nuances, are fundamentally the same: *Da*, *Welt*, *Offene*, *Zeit*, *Lichtung*, *Ereignis*, *Kehre*, *Seyn*, *Sein*, *Ermöglichung der Offenbarkeit des Seienden*, and the list goes on.⁴⁸ We emphasize again: None of these titles directly names being as the givenness/availability of entities (° B" D@LF\ " J@Ø B" D` <J@H, ° •8Zhg4" J@Ø •80h@ØH), much less as the mere ontological thereness of entities (JÎ gĒ<"4 J@Ø Ð<J@H). What these titles designate is not the availability of entities but *what brings that about*. They refer not to B" D@LF\ " but to its *origin*. What, then, is this “enabling origin” of givenness?

3. HEIDEGGER’S ANSWER TO HIS FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION WAS: EREIGNIS, THE OPENING OF A CLEARING IN HUMAN BEING.

These two moves -- the phenomenological interpretation of being as the givenness of entities, and the thematization of open comportment as its dative -- were only preparatory to raising the fundamental question concerning the *tertium quid* that makes possible the correlation of the two. For that, Heidegger focussed on the dynamics that bring together givenness and human being, and specifically on the reciprocity of needing and belonging. This reciprocity (*Gegenschwung*⁴⁹) between the fact that givenness needs a dative (= *das Brauchen*) and the fact of the dative’s belonging to givenness (= *das Zugehören*) is what Heidegger means by *das Ereignis*, and it is the central topic of his thought.

Heideggerians usually describe this reciprocity as the “relation between being and *Dasein*.” Precisely here, in the way the story of being is generally told, lies the danger of a major misunderstanding. It is an easy error to let an entity’s being-as-givenness slide back into its being-as-mere-presence, to reduce B" D@LF\ " to mere @ÜF\ ". In turn this slippage fosters a quasi-

hypostasization of being, whereby *das Sein* is represented as something (however ethereal) that lies [p. 10] “out there” beyond entities, something we can “pursue” and possibly “relate to,” as if it were an ontological object standing over against us.⁵⁰

In the literature this bifurcated view -- *Dasein* on one side, being on the other -- has generally taken two forms, with their apposite narratives: (1) the now passé “dominant *Dasein*” story, according to which human beings transcendently “project” being, as if they themselves were the source of the availability of entities, and (2) the still popular “Big Being” story, according to which Being Itself, lying hidden somewhere beyond our ken, occasionally pulls back the veil and reveals Itself to properly disposed human beings -- who in our days are, almost exclusively, paid-up Heideggerians.

Heidegger rejected both forms of this crude confabulation, whether *Dasein* projecting being,⁵¹ or being projecting itself to *Dasein*.⁵² His own story -- complex at first glance, but finally quite simple - was that of *Ereignis*, the opening of the clearing.

Again: the specific issue in *Ereignis* is the reciprocity between “need” (*das Brauchen*) and “belonging” (*das Zugehören*): entities need a clearing in order to be understood as this-or-that, and the *raison d'être* of human being is to belong to and be that clearing. This reciprocity is a matter of give-and-take: the clearing is “given” only when human being is “taken,” drawn or thrown into its essential openness. *Ereignis* and *Kehre* are the same, and they are this movement of give-and-take, of belonging-and-needing:

1. **EREIGNIS:** The back-and-forth reciprocity of needing and belonging is what constitutes *Ereignis*: “*Dieser Gegenschwung des Brauchens und Zugehörens macht das Seyn als Ereignis aus.*”⁵³
2. **KEHRE:** In turn, this reciprocity that constitutes *Ereignis* (“*das in sich gegenschwingende Ereignis*”⁵⁴) is what Heidegger means by the *Kehre*, the back-and-forth-ness (*reci-proci-tas*) between belonging and needing: (a) *Ereignis* is the opening of a clearing in human being, (b) which is needed for the appearance of being, that is, for entities to be understood as this or that. “*Die Er-eynung des Da-Seins durch das Seyn und die Gründung der Wahrheit des Seins im Da-sein -- die Kehre im Ereignis.*”⁵⁵

The single topic of Heidegger’s philosophy is this giving of the clearing (= *Geschick des Seyns*) by the opening up of *Dasein* (= *Ereignis*). This grounding movement is inherently “reciprocal” (“*Gründen ist hier kehrig*”⁵⁶); it is the “reciprocal grounding of being and its dative” (“*die kehrige Gründung von Sein und Da-sein*”⁵⁷), and as such it is the turn that operates at the heart of *Ereignis*. [p. 11]

In short, as openness is opened up (*ereignet*), there occurs givenness-as-such (“world” or “clearing”) as the possibility of the meaningful givenness of this or that entity. But this is only a formal indication of where the turn is located and how it is structured. The sketch needs to be fleshed out. What exactly is *Ereignis*, and how does it work?

4. THE CLEARING OCCURS WHEN OPENNESS IS OPENED UP BY ITS OWN FINITUDE.

What is it, finally, that opens up openness? Heidegger’s most formal answer is: “the self-

withdrawing” (*das Sichentziehende*⁵⁸). The “self-withdrawing” is that which intrinsically withdraws and, in the process, draws us out into §6FJ" F4H. As Heidegger put it: “What withdraws from us draws us along with it by that very withdrawal.”⁵⁹ This withdrawal is what he means by *Ereignis*: the inner movement that opens up openness. “*Entzug ist Ereignis.*”⁶⁰

But what is it exactly that “intrinsically withdraws,” that “refuses to become present” because “its very essence” is to remain “hidden”?⁶¹ What is it that draws us out with it and, in the process, gives givenness-as-such? It would be easy to fall back on the “Big Being” story and to hypostasize *das Sichentziehende* into “Being Itself” in its absential mode (“the Lethe”) and to have “It” (whatever “It” is⁶²) do the drawing-out and the giving. But that would be only metaphysics in another form, and thus the destruction of everything Heidegger stood for.

Heidegger’s own story is quite different. Its backdrop, which often remains implicit, is very traditional and Aristotelian. Although in the final analysis Heidegger “undid” that tradition, he first took care to master it, and he recommended that Heideggerians do the same. “You would be well advised,” he told his students in 1952, “to put off reading Nietzsche for the time being and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years”⁶³ – the way Heidegger himself did. It was out of that Aristotelian background, properly reinterpreted, that Heidegger elaborated his own story of *Dasein* and the movement of *Ereignis*.

In Aristotelian metaphysics, being (“reality”) is analogical: it comes in degrees, ranging hierarchically from the most perfect to the least. The degree of an entity’s being is the degree of its perfection, and perfection (JĪ JX8g4@<) is measured by how far an entity has “come full circle” (cf. JX8@H as circle⁶⁴) and “returned to” or fulfilled its essence. The highest degree of “having come full circle” is God’s perfect self-coincidence, which entails perfect presence-to-itself: <` OF4H <@ZFgTH. Short of God, everything else has being to the degree it approximates that ontological-cognitive closure. [p. 12]

Conversely, to the degree that an entity is still “open,” it is ontologically im-perfect. But human being is *essentially* open (|6FJ" J46` <). Never all-at-once and complete, it is ever in a state of becoming, always on the way to itself, but never arriving at full self-presence. Human being is defined by its constitutive lack-in-being -- what *Being and Time* called ontological “guilt” (*Schuldigsein*). Unable to overcome this essential lack, we can never complete the circle and become fully self-coincident.⁶⁵

Our inevitable lack-in-being *is* our finitude, which opens us up. It “throws” or “pulls” us into our ineluctable becoming -- and thereby opens the open. *Ereignis* is not a matter of Big Being (“the Lethe”) heteronomously “appropriating” us from some Beyond.⁶⁶ Rather, it is our own intrinsic self-absence that draws us out into openness, into the movement of becoming, and thereby into the possibility of understanding both givenness-itself (world) and the givenness of this or that entity.

Fated to be always open, human being is likewise fated to be exposed and receptive. *Dasein* is thrown into the necessity of being-present-unto,⁶⁷ into needing the presence of other entities. But such other-presence, like *Dasein*’s own self-presence, is never all-at-once and complete but always partial and imperfect. Condemned to Fb<hgF4H and *4" \DgF4H, we know only the *finite* intelligibility of entities. Our lack-in-being makes it impossible for us to know by way of intellectual intuition, and makes it necessary for us to know only through *entwerfen auf*. . . , “taking-as” or “projecting.” We take things *as* this or that, thereby see them *to be* such and so, understand that they *are* one thing or another, and thus know their *being*.

On one hand this synthetic-differential knowing is a plus. Our very finitude -- thrown and only

thus able to “take-as” -- guarantees that we do understand the being of things. We are condemned to ontology, which, before it is a thematic science, is a matter of relating to entities mediately through their being-as. . . , rather than directly by intellectual intuition. On the other hand, such mediate knowledge of entities is a defect, a mark of imperfection. “Ontology is an index of finitude. God does not have it.”⁶⁸ In any case, the finitude registered in our openness is what guarantees that there is being as the finite availability and understandability of entities.

Whether in the earlier language of thrownness and projection or in the later language of *Ereignis* and *Geschick*, it is *Dasein*'s own finitude or lack-in-being -- always “withdrawing,” ever “absent” and intrinsically “hidden” -- that makes possible the emergence of being-as-such.⁶⁹ For Heidegger, therefore, this lack-in-being, as the source of the giving of being, was from beginning to end *die Sache des Denkens*, the issue most worthy of thought.[p. 13]

5. THE TURN IS NOT AN “EVENT” IN THE USUAL SENSE (MUCH LESS AN EVENT THAT TOOK PLACE IN HEIDEGGER’S THINKING) BUT RATHER THE PRESUPPOSITION OF ALL HUMAN EVENTS.

Inasmuch as it is the same as *Ereignis*, the turn cannot be an event that took place in Heidegger’s thought. In fact, it is not an event at all in the usual sense of that term.⁷⁰ One can certainly date when Heidegger’s *insight* into the turn led to *die Wendung im Denken*, the reorientation of his thinking (namely, 1930-1938, and especially 1936-1938). But it is a very different matter with the turn itself. When Heidegger was asked how the turn took place (“*ist geschehen*”) within his thinking, he did two things. First he denied the premise: “There is no particular kind of happening connected with the turn.”⁷¹ And then he located the turn where it properly belongs: “The supposed ‘happening’ of the turn,” he wrote, “‘is’ *Sein* as such,”⁷² that is, *Ereignis*, the opening up of *Dasein*.⁷³

It follows that the only way to understand how the turn functions (as contrasted with “when it took place”) is from within the turn itself, i.e., from within one’s own *Ereignis*. “*Es läßt sich nur aus der Kehre denken.*”⁷⁴ Insofar as *Ereignis* is the “most proper, exclusive, and ineluctable” fact of human being, it constitutes the ultimate *praesuppositum* of everything we are and do.⁷⁵ Whether we reflect on *Ereignis* or ignore it, whether we embrace it as the ground of our being or flee from it, it is always the presupposed. That is to say: *Ereignis* is that ultimate state of affairs which always-already (BD`) subtends (ßB`) and grounds (6g\ : g<@<) human being: JÎ BD@{(B@6g\ : g<@< BDäJ@<.⁷⁶

One’s own grounding in this ultimate *praesuppositum* is what the early Heidegger called “thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*) and what the later Heidegger called “being-opened-up” (*Ereignetsein*).⁷⁷ So too the act of resolutely embracing that groundless ground is what the early Heidegger called “taking over one’s thrownness” (*Übernahme der Geworfenheit*),⁷⁸ and what the later Heidegger called “taking over the fact of being-opened-up” (*Übernahme der Er-eignung*).⁷⁹ Thrownness and openedness are the same.⁸⁰

Our already-opened-ness constitutes the ultimate circularity of human being and is the basis of all the other circularities that characterize thinking and acting -- for example, the hermeneutical circle, the so-called “relativism” of *Dasein*, and so forth.⁸¹ It is thus the basis of the circular protreptic in which Heidegger’s thinking reaches its culmination: (X<@4’ @I@H |FF\, “become what you essentially are.”⁸² This exhortation indicates the final goal of Heidegger’s work: to re-appropriate one’s

openedness in the sense of embracing the *praesuppositum* that makes one be human. This is the force behind Heidegger's [p. 14] frequently repeated admonition to let oneself be caught up in *Ereignis/Kehre* rather than spending one's career talking about the reorientation that took place in his thinking.⁸³

6. *EREIGNIS* WAS ALMOST -- BUT NOT QUITE -- ENVISIONED BY THE EARLY GREEK THINKERS.

As Heidegger sees it, there were strong intimations of *Ereignis* in pre-Socratic philosophy, and in *Introduction to Metaphysics* he finds virtually all the elements of this topic in the texts of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Even these thinkers, however, failed to pose the fundamental question of *Ereignis* either explicitly or in its fullness. Let us consider the positive side first.

(1) In Heidegger's view, Heraclitus and Parmenides were aware of the process whereby entities become accessible, and they named this movement with such kinetic titles as *•8Zhg4"*, *nbF4H*, *8` (@H*: the unconcealing / emerging / gathering of entities into givenness.

(2) They further understood that being-as-givenness does not occur "out there," independent of human beings. They saw that it requires an open site in order to happen, and they understood this openness as belonging to (getting its *raison d'être* from) givenness.⁸⁴

(3) They also were aware of the correlativity between the fact that givenness needs a dative (*das Brauchen*) and the dative's belonging to givenness (*das Zugehören*).⁸⁵ Parmenides expressed that very state of affairs when he said that *gĒ<"4* and *<@gĀ<* are *JĪ "ŪJ`* (fragment 5).

(4) Most importantly, beyond merely understanding the movement of entities into accessibility, Heraclitus also had a sense of the emergence of givenness-itself (*die Bewegung des Erscheinens*) and even intimated that the source of that movement-into-presence was a withdrawal-into-absence (*das Sichverbergen*). The text Heidegger principally has in mind here is Heraclitus' fragment 123: *nbF4H 6DbBJgFh"4 n48gĀ*, which Heidegger interprets to mean: The source of the emergence of givenness-itself is, by its very nature, concealed.⁸⁶

It would seem, then, that all the elements of *Ereignis* are present in these early texts. But not quite. What Heraclitus and Parmenides lacked was insight into the "fit" of these constituent elements. Beyond naming the correlation of givenness-itself and receptive openness, and apart from hinting that an intrinsically concealed absence is the source of being as givenness, these early Greek thinkers failed to say exactly *how* that correlation happens or *what* brings about [p. 15] the emergence of givenness-itself. In other words, they lacked a developed and thematic grasp of how absence (finitude) opens up human being in such a way that, within that clearing, entities can be understood. As far as Heidegger was concerned, the Greeks simply did not think *Ereignis*.⁸⁷

7. CONCLUSION: IN THE 1930S HEIDEGGER CHANGED HIS ORIENTATION BUT NOT HIS CENTRAL TOPIC.

The reorientation of Heidegger's thinking that became visible in *Introduction to Metaphysics* was far less dramatic -- and the difference between the earlier and the later Heidegger much less pronounced -- than is usually suggested in the literature. In that regard Richardson's assessment of the later Heidegger's relation to the earlier is as correct as it is succinct: "The difference: only one of focus."⁸⁸

Moreover, the reorientation was not due to Heidegger's altering, much less surrendering, the topic he originally settled on in *Being and Time*. As he told Richardson, the "change in thinking" was not an "about-face" (*eine "Umkehr"*),⁸⁹ nor was it "a consequence of altering the standpoint of *Being and Time*, much less of abandoning its fundamental issue."⁹⁰ Rather, it was merely a filling out (*Ergänzung*)⁹¹ of the question posed in *Being and Time*. The reorientation took place, he said, as a result of his "sticking with the issue-for-thought of *Being and Time*, i.e., inquiring into the perspective that *Being and Time*, at p. 39, had already designated by the title 'Time and Being.'⁹² Specifically the reorientation was the result of Heidegger's enhanced appreciation of how human being is opened up and, in particular, how thrownness -- which he came to read as being-opened-up -- always has priority over projection.⁹³

In other words, what *did* change (but more slightly than scholars usually allege) was only, as Richardson says, the "manner and method" of Heidegger's approach,⁹⁴ whereas what stayed the same were both the *question* and the *answer* that Heidegger had in place by 1927.

The question was never focally about being or about human being, that is, about either side of a supposed noetic-noematic divide between the understanding of being (*Seinsverstehen*) and the understandability of being (*Seinsverständlichkeit*). The question was always about the apriori fit" of the two, the *tertium quid* that brings together and thus makes possible both givenness and its dative. Inasmuch as this fit is *das transcendens schlechthin*,⁹⁵ it is beyond or other than what it brings together. In 1943 Heidegger listed some names for what his question was always about: the "meaning," "truth" or "openness" that makes it possible for us to understand entities in their being.⁹⁶ [p. 16] "*Das Ereignis*" and "*die Kehre im Ereignis*" were only two in a long line of titles for *what must always already be the case* if givenness and its dative are to come together at all. But the various titles aside, the question remained the same.

And so did the answer. In both the earlier and the later Heidegger, the "giving" of being as presence requires the "taking" of *Dasein* by absence, that is, the opening of human being by finitude. Before the 1930s Heidegger described this movement of give-and-take as the interface of *Geworfenheit* and *Entwurf*: being thrown-open as grounding the possibility of taking-as. During the 1930s Heidegger began describing the same issue as the interplay of *Ereignet-sein* and *Es-gibt-Sein*: being-opened-up as the ground for understanding the being of entities, *Ereignis* as making possible *Seinsgeschick*. But at no stage in his thinking did Heidegger conceive of the opening up of the open as an achievement of subjectivity.⁹⁷ Rather, he always saw the open as grounded in *Dasein's* being opened up by its own finitude.

Introduction to Metaphysics stands on the brink of the full-blown reorientation that Heidegger's thought would undergo between 1936 and 1938. Delivered as a lecture course one year before the term "Ereignis" moved to center-stage, the *Introduction* does not thematically explain *Kehre* or *Ereignis* for themselves. Nonetheless, those issues are there without the titles -- for example, in Heidegger's discussion of the bivalent reciprocity between *das Brauchen* (being's need of its dative) and *das Zugehören* (the dative's belonging to being). Likewise, *Dasein's* nature as thrown-open-ness is present in Heidegger's allusions to homelessness and neediness (cf. *Not, Nötigung*).⁹⁸ In this 1935 lecture course Heidegger was beginning to find the language that had repeatedly failed him in 1926-1928, when he first attempted the transition to "Time and Being."⁹⁹

Therefore, yes, *Introduction to Metaphysics* does represent a step forward in thinking and saying the turn; however, such thinking and saying is not the turn itself. And yes, it does represent a shift in Heidegger's *presentation* of his abiding central topic. But in the end, *Introduction to Metaphysics* simply allowed Heidegger's thinking to catch up a bit with the single issue he spent his life pursuing.

**End of text.
Endnotes follow.**

Endnotes

[p. 263]

1. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, ed. Petra Jaeger, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 40, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983). Hereinafter the various volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* are abbreviated as: GA plus the volume number. Citations in these notes frequently refer to texts by page and line. The line-count does not include the "header" or any empty lines on the page but does count the lines of section titles.

2. "... die Kehre, die eben das Wesen des Seins selbst als das in sich gegenswingende Ereignis anzeigt": GA 65, §140, 261.25-26. "Das Ereignis hat sein innerstes Geschehen und seinen weitesten Ausgriff in der Kehre": §255, 407.7-8. Cf. (1) the Kehre *operative in* Ereignis: "Die im Ereignis wesende Kehre": §255, 407.8. Cf. "die (im Ereignis wesende) Kehre": GA 9, 193, note "a" = Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 148, note "a." Compare within GA 65: (2) the Kehre *in* Ereignis: §10, 30.2-3, §13, 34.10-11, §22, 57.10, §141, 262.3-4; §146, 267.12, §197, 320.19, §202, 325.9-10, §255, 407.6; (3) the Kehre *of* Ereignis: §190, 311.4, §217, 342.25, §226, 351.22, §227, 354.9-10; (4) the Ereignis *of* the Kehre: §190, 311.13-14; (5) Ereignis and *its* Kehre: "Ereignis und dessen Kehre": §11, 31.18-19, and "Die Er-eignung in ihrer Kehre": §217, 342.22.

3. "das Denken der Kehre": cited from Martin Heidegger's "Vorwort" (hereinafter cited as "Vorwort") to William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963): xvii.25 and 28. Also "[das] Sagen dieser Kehre": GA 9, 328.3 = *Pathmarks*, 250.3.

4. Cf. "... eine Wendung. . . , die seinen [d.h. des Denkens] Gang der Kehre entsprechen läßt": "Vorwort," xix.27-28. [p. 264]

5. "Vorwort," xvii.25 (see also Richardson, *Heidegger*, 243, n. 86). Cf. "eine Wandlung des Denkens": "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," GA 9, 187.21-22 = *Pathmarks*, 143.33; and "Wandel des Fragens," *ibid.*, 202.4-5 = *Pathmarks*, 154.18.

6. Richardson, *Heidegger*: "breakthrough": 243.17; "Heidegger I becomes Heidegger II": 254.12; "With EM [= *Einführung in die Metaphysik*] Heidegger II has taken full possession": 296.15.

7. Richardson, *Heidegger*, respectively 243.19 and 624.28 ("shift of focus") and xxvi.17 ("reversal").

8. "Auf einen Stern zugehen, nur dieses. / Denken ist die Einschränkung auf einen Gedanken, der einst wie ein Stern am Himmel der Welt stehen bleibt": GA 15, 76.8-11 (Martin Heidegger, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, second edition, [Pfullingen: Neske, 1965], 7.6-9) = Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 4.8-11. Cf. "Jeder Denker denkt nur einen einzigen Gedanken": Martin Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken?* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1954), 20.24-25 = Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?* trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 50.5.

9. "Die Kehre ist in erster Linie nicht ein Vorgang im fragenden Denken; sie gehört in den durch die Titel 'Sein und Zeit', 'Zeit und Sein' genannten Sachverhalt selbst. . . . Die Kehre spielt im Sachverhalt selbst. Sie ist weder von mir erfunden, noch betrifft sie nur mein Denken": "Vorwort," xix.1-3 and 6-8, emphasis added. "Vorwort," xvii.29-31, shows that the pairing "Sein und Zeit" / "Zeit und Sein" does *not* indicate that the *Kehre* was to "take place" between Divisions Two and Three of Part One of *SZ*, but only that Division Three, "Time and Being," was to spell out the *Kehre*.

10. The term “die Kehre” made its debut on Thursday, July 12, 1928, in Heidegger’s course *Die metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik: GA 26*, 201.30, 35 = Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984) 158.30, 34. There it described the transformation (not “overturning”! cf. *GA 9*, 249.21-29 = *Pathmarks*, 191.8-15) of the received ontology of entities into a meta-ontology or metaphysical ontics (including the metaphysics of Dasein *qua* ontic), grounded in temporally interpreted being. This transformation is primarily a matter of the movement intrinsic to being-itself (its emergence as finite); and as early as 1926 Heidegger saw that the articulation of this “turn in being” would require a “change in thinking” (“Vorwort,” xix.25-27). Hence “die Kehre” and “die Wendung im Denken” were distinguished from the beginning. By *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, 1936-1938, “die Kehre” had attained the settled sense it would keep for the remainder of Heidegger’s career. viz., the inner movement of Ereignis: cf. *GA 9*, 193, note “a” = *Pathmarks*, 148, note “a”; *GA 9*, 328.4-11 and note “d” = *Pathmarks*, 250. 4-10 and note “d”; *GA 79*, 69.9 (Wandel im Sein) and 71.17ff.: (Sich-kehren, Kehre, einkehrt, kehrige) (also in *Die Technik und die Kehre*, 38.11 and 40.21ff.) = Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 38.12 and 41.11ff.; *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 182.29-30 (II, 56.29-30) = *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 184.4-5. See also the author’s “Time and Being, 1925-27” in Robert W. Shahan and J. N. Mohanty, eds., *Thinking About Being: [p. 265] Aspects of Heidegger’s Thought* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), especially 184-186, 192-193, and 208-216.

11. Aristotle laid the basis for these trans-generic (“transcendental”) notions in the *Metaphysics* when he asserted both the universality of being (JĪ Đ< 6" h` 8@L : V84FJ" BV<JT<: B 4, 1001 a 21) and the fact that being is not a genus (@ŪP @l` < Jg *¥ Jä< Đ<JT< «< gĒ<" 4 (X<@H @ŪJg JĪ Đ<: B 3, 998b 22). In keeping with that:

(1) Aristotle asserted the convertibility of gĒ<" 4 and •8Zhg4" at *Metaphysics* " 1, 993 b 30-31: a6" FJ@< rĤH \$Pg4 J@0 gĒ<" 4, @àJT 6"Ā J-H •8Ohg\ "H (cf. the Scholastic axiom “ens et verum convertuntur”).

(2) He likewise asserted the convertibility of “being” and “one” at I, 2, 1053b 25: 8X(gJ" 4 * z ÆF" Päh JĪ ũ< 6"Ā JĪ a<, and at 1054b 13: J"ŪJĪ FO: "\<g4 BTH JĪ «< 6"Ā JĪ Đ< (cf. “unum convertitur cum ente”: *Summa Theologica* I, 11, 1, resp.). At B 3 he argued that although “being” and “oneness” are the two characteristics most predicated of all things (JĪ ũ< 6"Ā JĪ «<. . . 6" J• BV<JT< : V84FJ" 8X(gJ" 4 Jä< Đ<JT<: 998b 20, 21; cf. I, 2, 1053b 20-21), neither one of them can be a genus of entities (998b 22, as above), because whatever might serve to differentiate each species within that genus (i.e., each “specific difference”) would, of course, itself also have the characteristics of being and oneness (•<V(60 : ¥< (•D J•H *4" n@D•H ©6VFJ@L (X<@LH 6"Ā gĒ<" 4 6"Ā : \ "< gĒ<" 4 ©6VFJO<: 998b 23-24), and that would be illogical (cf. *Topics* Z 6, 144a 36--b 11). Therefore, “being” and “oneness” have to be transgeneric.

On that basis Thomas Aquinas in *Quaestiones de veritate* (in *Quaestiones disputatae et quaestiones duodecim quodlibetales*, III-V [Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1942]), qu. I, art. 1, responsio (pp. 2-3), spelled out three other transgeneric characteristics of an entity, each of which “adds” something over and above what “being” (“ens [quod] sumitur ab actu essendi”) says, not by supplying what is not included in the notion of being, but by articulating a mode or manner of being that is not explicitly expressed in the word “being” (“dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius [sc. ‘ens’] non exprimitur”). He argues that this “exprimere” can happen in two ways: secundum quod consequitur omne ens

A. *in se*:

1. *res*: quidditas/essentia entis
2. *unum*: indivisio entis

B. *in ordine ad aliud* (or: secundum ordinem unius ad alterum).

(B.i) concerning “divisio unius ab altero”:

3. *aliquid* (“aliud quid”): divisio ab aliis (as vs. “indivisio entis”)

(B.ii) concerning “convenientia unius entis ad aliud” (on the presupposition of

“aliquid quod natum est convenire cum omni ente,” viz., anima):

4. qua vis appetitiva: *bonum*: convenientia ad appetitum

5. qua vis cognitiva: *verum*: convenientia ad intellectum

See also Heidegger’s remarks on the analogia entis: GA 33, 26-48 = Martin Heidegger, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1 1-3*, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington and Indianapolis: [p. 266] Indiana University Press, 1995), 21-39; also Martin Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809)*, ed. Hildegard Feick (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1971), 233.20-31 = Martin Heidegger, *Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985), 192.28-38. GA 42 omits these notes, which date from ca. 1941. On *verum* and *ens* see GA 65, §225, 349.30.

12. The formulae abound in Aristotle, *Metaphysics 7*: “βῆ < *¥ < @gĀ ò < @0H 6" J • : gJV8OR4< J@0 < @OJ@0: 7, 1072 b 19-20; J"ŪJĪ < < @0H 6"Ā < @OJ` < : 7, 1072 b 21; \$FJ4< ° < ` OF4H < @ZFgTH < ` OF4H: 9, 1074 b 34-35; < ` OF4H Jè < @L: X<â : \": 9, 1075 a 4-5; @àJTH *z \$Pg4 "ŪJ- "βJ-H ° < ` OF4H JĪ < žB" < J" "fä<": 9, 1075 a 10.

13. Cf.. • *4" \DgJ@< B•< JĪ : - \$P@< à80<: *Metaphysics 7 9*, 1075 a 11.

14. (1) Re “accessibility”: See GA 65, §210, where Heidegger links *Sein/•8Zhg4"* as the *Unverborgenheit des Seienden* (334.10) with *Sein/•8Zhg4"* in Aristotle as *Zugänglichkeit/Freistehen des Seienden* (333.28-29; cf. 332.23). (2) Re “ability to be of concern”: “Im Sein als Anwesen bekundet sich der Angang, der uns Menschen so angeht, daß wir im Vernehmen und Übernehmen dieses Angangs das Auszeichnende des Menschseins erlangt haben”: Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), 23.33-36 = Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 23.5-8; also Heidegger’s interpretation of “ereignet” as “concerné,” i.e., “getroffen, aufgerührt, umschlossen,” cited in Jean Beaufret’s contribution to *Dem Andenken Martin Heideggers. Zum 26. Mai 1976* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 13.11-15. (3) Re “significance”: One of Heidegger’s earliest titles was “das Bedeutsame” (Tuesday, March 18, 1919, Kreisnotsemester, in the course “Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem”: “. . . nicht Sachen mit einem bestimmten Bedeutungscharakter, Gegenstände, und dazu noch aufgefaßt als das und das bedeutend, sondern das Bedeutsame ist das Primäre, gibt sich mir unmittelbar, ohne jeden gedanklichen Umweg über ein Sacherfassen”: GA 56/57, 72.34--73.3.

15. “Sein west *als* Erscheinen”: GA 40, 108.31; indeed, “nur als Erscheinen”: *ibid.*, 147.29-30.

16. On the Greek < @OJ` < as “intelligible” in the broad sense, see the author’s “Nihilism: Heidegger/Jünger/Aristotle,” in Burt C. Hopkins, ed., *Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 287, n. 33.

17. The centrality of being as disclosure (*esse ut verum esse*) in the phenomenological tradition was clear from the beginning: cf. Erich Przywara, “Drei Richtungen der Phänomenologie,” *Stimmung der Zeit*, 115 (1928), 252-264, esp. 253-254. Heidegger states the thesis: “[D]as Sein selbst’ ist das Sein in seiner Wahrheit, welche Wahrheit zum Sein gehört, d.h. in welche Wahrheit ‘Sein’ entschwindet”: GA 9, 366, note “a” = *Pathmarks*, 278, note “a.” [p. 267]

18. “. . . das Sein als. . . An-wesen geht das Da-sein an”: “Vorwort,” xix.24-25, emphasis added. Also *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 23.33-36 = *Time and Being*, 23.5-8.

19. Heidegger is clear that being-as-presence does not mean presence to a *subject*: “Das B" DV im gĒ<" 4, das Her- und schon bei-wesen meint nicht, daß das Anwesende als Gegenstand auf *uns*, die Menschen, zukomme”: *Was heißt Denken?* 144.32-33 = *What is Called Thinking?* 237.21-24.

Rather, it means accessibility for possible significance.

20. “Wenn jedoch zum Sein als *nbF4H* das Erscheinen gehört, muß der Mensch als Seiender diesem Erscheinen zugehören”: *GA* 40, 148.15-16 (cf. *ibid.*, 148.8-10). “Zu ihr [= *nbF4H*] gehört Vernehmung, ihr [d.h. der *nbF4H*] Walten ist Mitwalten von Vernehmung”: *ibid.*, 147.33-34 (cf. 147.22-25).

21. “Sein west *als* Erscheinen” and “nur als Erscheinen”: *GA* 40, 108.31 and 147.29-30. But Erscheinen is *•8Zhg4*: “in die Unverborgenheit treten”: *ibid.*, 147.30. But that is what *nbF4H* is: “das. . . aus dem Verborgenen sich bringen”: *ibid.*, 17.18-19; cf. “Anwesen und Erscheinen”: *ibid.*, 76.13. Therefore, Heidegger equates the two: “die *•8Zhg4*” und die *nbF4H*, das Sein als Unverborgenheit”: *ibid.*, 129.9-10; also 142.5. Cf. “*nbF4H* in sich schon *•8Zhg4*”, weil *6DbBJgFh"4 n48gÄ*”: *GA* 2, 282, note “a”; “*•8Zhg4*” . . . als Grundcharakter der *nbF4H*”: *GA* 65, §186, 306.7 and §207, 329.24; “Hervorkommen-aus-der-Verborgenheit (im Sinn der *nbF4H*)” equated with “das Aufgehen-in-die-*•8Zhg4*”: *GA* 15, 331.5-8 = Martin Heidegger, *Vier Seminare*, trans. Curd Ochwad (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 69.5-8.

22. Cf. “Die Wahrheit des Seins und so dieses [Sein] selbst west nur, wo and wann Da-sein”: *GA* 65, § 261.22-23, which echoes “Allerdings nur solange Dasein *ist*, das heißt die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, ‘gibt es’ Sein”: *GA* 2, 281.1-2, and “Sein aber ‘*ist*’ nur im Verstehen des Seienden, zu dessen Sein so etwas wie Seinsverständnis gehört”: *ibid.*, 244.5-6.

23. “Denn diese [ontologische] Unterscheidung entspringt ja gerade einem Fragen nach dem Seienden als solchem (nach der Seiendheit)”: *GA* 65, §132, 250.21-23.

24. *Leitfrage, Grundfrage*: *GA* 65, §2, 6.29-30, §34, 75.26-27 and 76.8; §193, 313.23-24. Cf. “. . . meine Philosophie, die nicht nur, wie alle Philosophie bisher nach dem Sein des Seienden fragt (l’être de l’étant) sondern nach der Wahrheit des Seins (la vérité de l’être)”: Heidegger’s private letter to Jean Beaufret, November 23, 1945, cited in Martin Heidegger, *Lettre sur l’humanisme*, 2nd edition, ed. and trans. Roger Munier (Paris: Aubier, Éditions Mouton, 1964), 182.9-13. See “das Denken, das die Wahrheit des Seins zu denken versucht und nicht wie alle Ontologie die Wahrheit des Seienden”: *GA* 9, 380.23-25 = *Pathmarks*, 289.3-4.

25. “die Frage, inwiefern es Anwesenheit als solche geben kann”: *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 77.17-18 = *On Time and Being*, 70.9-10. Also “die vorgängige Ermöglichung der Offenbarkeit von Seiendem überhaupt”: *GA* 9, 114.26-27 = *Pathmarks*, 90.32; “Grund und Zulassung der Seiendheit,” *GA* 68, 51.5. [p. 268]

26. *Was heißt Denken?* 147.19-20 = *What Is Called Thinking?* 241.10.

27. On “the enabling power”/das Tauglichmachende as *JÎ • (“h` <*, see *GA* 9, 228.10-11 = *Pathmarks*, 175.6-7 (also Ermöglichen, Ermöglichung: *ibid.*, 228.8, 24 = *Pathmarks*, 175.4, 19). Compare “die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses.”: *GA* 24, 405.12-13 = *Pathmarks*, 286.9-10. Concerning *!BX6g4<*” *J-H @ÛF\“H* (*Republic VII*, 509 b 9) and the world as “das Umwillen” see: *GA* 26, 203-252 = *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, 159-195. On ontological difference: *GA* 65, §258, 423.27-424.23.

28. *Verhalten*: *GA* 9, 184.15-22 = *Pathmarks*, 141.22-28. In this passage Heidegger indicates the “intentional” or “revelatory” aspect of such comportment by the phrases “daß [das Verhalten]. . . je an ein Offenbares *als ein solches* sich hält,” “offenständig zum Seienden,” and “[das] offenständige Bezug.” I am grateful to Professor Charles B. Guignon for helpful discussions on this point.

29. In *Being and Time* the “preparatory fundamental” question (GA 2, 24.2) was answered in Part One, Division One (and extended into Division Two), while the “fundamental question” itself (die Fundamentalfrage: GA 2, 6.30; 37.8, etc.) was reserved for the unpublished Part One, Division Three, “Time and Being.”

30. “Es gilt, das Da-sein in dem Sinne zu erfahren, daß der Mensch das ‘Da’, d.h. die Offenheit des Seins für ihn, selbst *ist*, indem er es übernimmt, sie zu bewahren und bewahrend zu entfalten”: GA 15, 415.10-13 = *Vier Seminare*, 145.10-13. Cf. “être le là”: Martin Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare. Protokolle -- Gespräche -- Briefe*, ed. Medard Boss (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987) 157.7; hereinafter abbreviated as *Zollikon*. Also Heidegger’s private letter to Beaufret, in *Lettre sur l’humanisme*, 182.29–184.3; “Der Mensch west so, daß er das ‘Da’ . . . ist”: GA 9, 325.20-21 = *Pathmarks*, 248.11-12; and “[D]as Menschsein als solches [ist] dadurch ausgezeichnet, auf seine Weise diese Offenheit [= das Da] selbst zu sein”: *ibid.*, 157.31-32.

31. “das *Da* [ist] dort [in *Sein und Zeit*] bestimmt als das Offene”: *Zollikon*, 188.14-15. On “das Offene” see also GA 9, 184.11, 184.25, 185.29, 187.32, and 188.21 = *Pathmarks*, 141.18, 141.23, 142.26, 144.9, and 144.22; also *Zollikon*, 9.8, etc.

32. “das *Da*, die Lichtung”: GA 65, §193, 316.27. “Das *Da-sein* als die Wesung der Lichtung”: *ibid.*, §173, 297.25. “das ‘*Da*’, das heißt die Lichtung des Seins”: GA 9, 325.20-21 = *Pathmarks*, 248.11-12; “das *Da* als Lichtung des Seins”: GA 9, 327.14-15 = *Pathmarks*, 249.22-23; “Wie ist das *Da* dort [in *SZ*] bestimmt als das Offene? Diese Offenheit hat auch den Charakter des Raumes. Räumlichkeit gehört zur *Lichtung*, gehört zum Offenen. . . .”: *Zollikon*, 188.14-15.

33. “[D]er Mensch west so, daß er das ‘*Da*’, das heißt die Lichtung des Seins, ist. [. . .] die Lichtung des Seins, und nur sie, ist ‘*Welt*’” GA 9, 325.20-21 and 326.15-16 = *Pathmarks*, 248.11-12 and 248.36-37.

34. “‘*Da-sein*’ bedeutet für mich nicht so sehr ‘*me voilà!*’ sondern, wenn ich es in [p. 269] einem vielleicht unmöglichen Französisch sagen darf: être le-là. Und le-là ist gleich z! 8Zhg4”: Unverborgenheit -- Offenheit”: Heidegger’s letter to Beaufret, November 23, 1945, in *Lettre sur l’humanisme*, 182.29--184.3. Also: “•8Zhg4” -- Offenheit und Lichtung des Sichverbergenden”: GA 65, §209, 331.23 (title), and “Wahrheit west nur und immer schon als *Da-sein*”: §243, 390.20.

35. “Die Lichtung selber aber ist das Sein”: GA 9, 332.3-4 = *Pathmarks*, 253.1.

36. “das *Da*, die Lichtung als Wahrheit des Seins selbst”: GA 9, 336.27 = *Pathmarks*, 256.23-24.

37. “der Unterschied als Lichtung, als *Ereignis*.” *Zollikon*, 242.12-13. Cf. also the previous note.

38. Note the concatenation: “Sein, Wahrheit, Welt, *Sein*, Ereignis”: GA 9, 369, note “d” = *Pathmarks*, 280, note “d.” Cf. also the previous note.

39. “. . . die sinngemäße Betonung im Deutschen statt *Dasein*: *Da-sein*”: *Zollikon*, 157.7-8; and “*Da-sein* heißt in *Sein und Zeit*: *da-sein*”: *ibid.*, 188.13-14.

40. See GA 2, 56.12, with note “d.” As regards the change of *Zu-sein* to *Sein* at GA 2, 56.8, see Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1931)*, ed. Thomas Sheehan and Richard Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 298, n. 45.

41. Jean Beaufret, *Entretiens avec Frédéric de Towarnicki*, second edition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 17.26, 28.

42. Beaufret, *Entretiens*, 17.29--18.15; cf. GA 65, §193, 313.6-11.

43. $\partial F J g : 0 * z " \hat{U} J @ \emptyset$ [i.e., $\langle _ @ L] g \acute{E} < " 4 n b F 4 < : 0 * g : \backslash " < \bullet 8 8 z \hat{ } J " b J O < , \acute{O} J 4 * L < " J \langle (' 4 , 429 a 21-22)$, roughly: “. . . so that [in its capacity to receive] there is no nature of/for it [viz, $\langle @ \emptyset H]$ except this: that it is in possibility.” I am grateful to Professor Richard Polt for clarifications on this matter and for pointing out that the receptivity of $\langle @ \emptyset H$ does not contradict its nature as $_ \langle X D (g 4 " : cf. \acute{O} (\bullet D \langle @ \emptyset H _ \langle X D (g 4 " (Metaphysics, 7 6, 1072 a 6).$

44. $J \hat{I} (\bullet D " \# F h V \langle g F h " 4 B V F P g 4 < J 4 _ | F J \backslash \langle (B 11, 424 a 1)$ and $J \hat{I} \langle @ g \acute{A} \langle B V F P g 4 < J \backslash | F J 4 \langle (' 4, 429 b 24-25)$. The Latin is *pati quoddam*: Thomas Aquinas, *In Aristotelis librum de anima commentarium*, ed. Angelo M. Pirotta (Turin: Marietti, 1925), respectively: liber II, lectio XXIII, p. 182 (text) with p. 186 (no. 547), and liber III, lectio IX, p. 236 (no. 720). On the possibility that the $J 4$ is the *object* of $B V F P g 4 <$ rather than an adverbial modifier, see Aristotle, *De Anima*, edited and translated by Robert Drew Hicks, Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer Company, 1976, 1988 (reprinted from the original 1907 edition), p. 412f.

45. $J \hat{I} * g 6 J 4 6 \hat{I} \langle J \grave{a} \langle " \# F h O J \grave{a} \langle g \acute{A} * \grave{a} \langle (\# , 12, 424 a 18)$ and $\bullet B " h \# H - D " * g \acute{A} g \acute{E} < " 4 , * g 6 J 4 6 \hat{I} \langle * \# J @ \emptyset g \acute{C} * @ L H (' 4, 429 a 15)$. For *susceptivus*: Aquinas, *In de anima*, liber II, lectio XXIV, p. 187, text (susceptivus specierum sine materia) with p. 188 (no. 551); and liber III, lectio VII, p. 224, text (susceptivum speciei) with p. 226 (no. 676: susceptivam speciei intelligibilis).

46. For example, Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, (Turin: Marietti, 1942), qu. I, art. 1, responsio p. 3A. [p. 270]

47. Aristotle makes the point indirectly: $6 " \acute{A} g p * \neg @ \acute{E} 8 X (@ \langle J g H J \neg \langle R L P \neg \langle g \acute{E} < " 4 J \grave{ } B @ \langle g \acute{A} * \grave{a} \langle (ibid.)$.

48. All these constitute *das transcendens schlechthin* (GA 2, 51.9), which holds a place homologous (and only that) to the transcendental in Husserl. (1) Further examples: Sinn des Seins, Temporalität des Seins, Entwurfsbereich des Seins, Offenheit, Als, Erwesung der Wahrheit des Seins, lichtende Verbergung, Ortschaft ($J \grave{ } B @ H$), Sammlung ($8 \grave{ } @ H$), Sein-lassen ($B @ \backslash O F 4 H$), Brauch (PDZ), Unterschied / Unterscheidung ($* 4 " n @ D V$); cf. “verschiedene Namen für dasselbe”: GA 65, §209, 331.24, and “Die Vielnamigkeit aber verleugnet nicht die Einfachheit” §6, 21.33-34. (2) Re “Zeit” as a title for the Da/Lichtung: “Zeit als Vorname des Entwurfsbereichs der Wahrheit des Seins. ‘Zeit’ ist. . . Lichtung des Seins selbst”: *Schellings Abhandlung*, 229.4-6 = *Schelling’s Treatise*, 188.38-40; “die Er-eignung des Menschen in die Zugehörigkeit zum Sein und seiner Lichtung (‘Zeit’)”: GA 66, 145.24-25; “die Zeit als der Vorname für die Wahrheit des Seins”: GA 9, 376.11 = *Pathmarks*, 285.26-27. (3) Re Ermöglichung: “Die vorgängige Ermöglichung [= Ereignis / Seyn] der Offenbarkeit [= Sein / Seiendheit] des Seienden”: GA 9, 114.26-27 = *Pathmarks*, 90.32. (4) Re Unterscheidung: “Die ‘Unterscheidung’ als Charakter des Seins selbst; es west als unterscheidend, scheidend einigendes”: Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung*, 216.29 = *Schelling’s Treatise*, 178.21-22.

49. GA 65, §133, 251.24, §141, 262.8, §164, 286.31, and 226, 351.22; also “die Kehre, die eben das Wesen des Seins selbst als das in sich gegenswingende Ereignis”: *ibid.*, §140, 261.25-26. On reciprocity (reci-proci-tas) cf. die herüber und hinüber schwingende Er-eignung: *ibid.*, §242, 381.26-27.

50. “Sagen wir vom Bezug des Menschen zum Seyn und umgekehrt des Seyns zum Menschen, dann klingt dies leicht so, als wese das Seyn für den Menschen wie ein *Gegenüber* und Gegenstand”: GA 65, §136, 256.1-4.

51. Heidegger glosses “Sein ist im Entwurf verstanden” (SZ, 147.30-31) with “Heißt aber nicht: Sein ‘sei’ von Gnaden des Entwurfs”: GA 2, 196 note “c.” See also “Und demnach nicht ‘wir’ der Ausgang,

sondern 'wir': als ausgesetzt und versetzt": GA 65, §144, 265.19-20; and "Das Seyn nichts 'Menschliches' als sein Gemächte, und dennoch braucht die Wesung des Seyns das Da-sein. . . .": ibid. §144, 265.30-31.

52. See Heidegger's warning against the hypostasization of Sein/•8Zhg4": GA 9, 442.21-22 = *Pathmarks*, 334.21.

53. GA 65, §133, 251.24-25. For the same thing expressed in terms of Zuruf and Zugehörigkeit see ibid., §191, 311.26; §217, 342.21-26; §239, 372.14-15; §242, 380.16; §255, 407.30-31.

54. GA 65, §140, 261.25-26.

55. GA 65, §141, 262.1-3; ibid., §195, 318.22-23.

56. GA 65 §140, 261.29.

57. GA 65 §144, 265.26-27. [p. 271]

58. *Was heißt Denken?* 6.7 = *What Is Called Thinking?* 9.24. Also GA 65, §129, 246.17.

59. "Was sich uns entzieht, zieht uns dabei gerade mit": *Was heißt Denken?* 5.37 = *What Is Called Thinking?* 9.13-14.

60. *Was heißt Denken?* 5.27 = *What Is Called Thinking?* 9.23, where the sentence is mistranslated "Withdrawal is an event," as it also is in Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, revised and expanded edition (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 374.17.

61. "Was sich entzieht, versagt die Ankunft": *Was heißt Denken?* 5.25-26 = *What Is Called Thinking?* 9.1-2, with "das Sichverbergen ist das innerste Wesen" and "ist wesentlich": GA 15, 343.24 and 28 (= *Vier Seminare* 81.24 and 28).

62. "Das Seyn aber 'ist' über solches 'Nichts' hinaus nun nicht wieder 'Etwas'": GA 65, §164, 286.22-23.

63. *Was heißt Denken?* 70.26-28 = *What Is Called Thinking?* 73.31-33.

64. On JX8@H as "circle" and "full circle," see Richard Broxton Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 442ff.; also the comment at 443, n. 2, on Jg8gFn` D@H |<4" LJ` H (*Iliad*, XIX, 32f., with parallels): "The sense demanded by the various contexts is rather that of a complete year -- 'full circle.'"

65. This reading of Schuldigsein as unovercomeable lack-in-being is based on GA 2, 375.6 (mangelhaft), 376.18 (Nicht-Charakter), 376.33 and 34 (Mangelhaftigkeit, Nichtcharakter), 378.9 (Nichtcharakter, geworfene, nicht insofern selbst der Grund seines Seins), etc.

66. Cf. "Wesung soll nicht etwas nennen, was noch über das Seyn wieder hinaus liegt, sondern was sein Innerstes zum Wort bringt, das Er-eignis, jenen Gegenschwung von Seyn und Da-sein, in dem beide nicht vorhandene Pole sind, sondern die reine Erschwingung selbst": GA 65, §164, 286.29--287.2.

67. "Gegenwart im Sinne des Gegenwärtigen": GA 2, 431.31.

68. “Denn Ontologie ist ein Index der Endlichkeit. Gott hat sie nicht”: “Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger” in Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 4th, enlarged edition (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973), 252.30-31 = Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 4th, enlarged edition, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 175.35-36.
69. “Der Entzug aber ist des Da-seins. [. . .] der Entzug. . .als die Schenkung”: *GA* 65, §168, 293.9 and 16-17. Also “das Sichentziehende” as “höchste Schenkung”: §129, 246.17-19.
70. “Wir können das mit dem Namen ‘das Ereignis’ Gennante nicht mehr am Leitfaden der geläufigen Wortbedeutung vorstellen; denn sie versteht ‘Ereignis’ im Sinne von Vorkommnis und Geschehnis -- nicht aus dem Eignen als dem lichtend verwahrenden Reichen und Schicken”: *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 21.24-29 = *On Time and Being*, 20.29-33. [p. 272]
71. “Dieser [d.h., der Kehre] eignet keine besondere Art von Geschehen”: “Vorwort,” xxi.17-18.
72. “Das ‘Geschehen’ der Kehre, wonach Sie fragen, ‘ist’ das Seyn als solches”: “Vorwort,” xxi.16-17. The question that was put to Heidegger is recorded at *ibid.*, xvii.9-11.
73. On the equivalence of *Seyn* and *Ereignis* cf. “Das Seyn aber ist zugleich hier begriffen als *Er-ignis*. Beides gehört zusammen: die Rückgründung in das Da-sein und die Wahrheit des Seyns als Ereignis”: *GA* 65, §195, 318.21-23.
74. “Vorwort,” xxi.17.
75. Compare being-unto-death as “Die eigenste, unbezügliche und unüberholbare Möglichkeit”: *GA* 2, 333.32, with “Die Einzigkeit des Todes im Da-sein des Menschen gehört in die ursprünglichste Bestimmung des Da-seins, nämlich von Seyn selbst er-eignet zu werden. . .”: *GA* 65, §161, 283.10-12.
76. For $\text{BD} \rightarrow \text{B} \rightarrow \text{g}$: see Damascius, *De Principiis* in the edition *Traité des premiers principes*, ed. Leendert Gerrit Westerink, tr. Joseph Combès, 3 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1986-1991), III, 153.2; in the Ruelle edition: *Damascii Successoris, Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis, in Platonis Parmenidem*, ed. Carolus Aemelius Ruelle (Paris, 1889; reprinted, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1966), 2 vols., here I, 312.21
77. See “geworfener”/“er-eignet”: *GA* 65, §122, 239.5; “geworfen”/“er-eignet”: *ibid.*, §182, 304.8; and “geworfene”/“zugehörig der Er-eignung”: *ibid.*, §134, 252.24.
78. *GA* 2, 431.13 and *GA* 65, §204, 327.6-7.
79. *GA* 65, §198, 322.7-8. Cf. “Übernahme der Zugehörigkeit in die Wahrheit des Seins, Einsprung in das Da”: *ibid.*, §197, 320.16-17.
80. “die Er-eignung, das Geworfenwerden”: *GA* 65, §13, 34.9.
81. “Die im Ereignis wesende Kehre ist der verborgene Grund aller anderen. . .Kehren, Zirkel und Kreise”: *GA* 65, §255, 407.8-11. Cf. “Die gemeine Daseinsauslegung droht mit der Gefahr des Relativismus. Aber die Angst vor dem Relativismus ist die Angst vor dem Dasein.” Martin Heidegger, *The Concept of Time* [with German and English texts], trans. William McNeill (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992), 20.15-17 = 20E.14-16.
82. Pindar, Pythian Odes, II, 72, in *The Works of Pindar*, ed. Lewis Richard Farnell (London: Macmillan, 1932), III, *The Text*, 56; and *GA* 2, 194.3.

83. “Statt des boden- und endlosen Geredes über die ‘Kehre’ [the scare quotes show that this refers to ‘die Wendung im Denken’] wäre es ratsamer und fruchtbar, sich erst einmal auf den genannten Sachverhalt einzulassen”: “Vorwort,” xix.9-12. Such engagement is ultimately a matter of Entschlossenheit or resolution: “es gilt eine Verwandlung des Menschseins selbst,” *ibid.*, xxi.9-10, citing the 1937/38 course, “Grundfragen der Philosophie,” *GA* 45, 214.18 = Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,”* trans. [p. 273] Robert Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 181.7-8.

84. “Was der Spruch des Parmenides ausspricht, ist eine Bestimmung des Wesens des Menschen aus dem Wesen des Seins selbst”: *GA* 40, 152.30-32 (cf. also 149.15-16); “. . . weil das Überwältigende als ein solches, um waltend zu erscheinen, die Stätte der Offenheit für es *braucht*”: *ibid.*, 171.32-34; “Wenn jedoch zum Sein als *nbF4H* das Erscheinen gehört, muß der Mensch als Seiender diesem Erscheinen zugehören”: *ibid.*, 148.15-16 (cf. 148.8-10). See: “So gehört der Mensch notwendig zu-, und hat seinen Ort in der Offenheit (und gegenwärtig in der Vergessenheit) des Seins. Das Sein aber braucht, um sich zu öffnen, den Menschen als das Da seiner Offenbarkeit”: *GA* 15, 370.16-19 (= *Vier Seminare*, 108.16-19); re “gebraucht” as “utilisé,” *ibid.*, 370.11 (= 108.11).

85. Cf. Zu ihr [= *nbF4H*] *gehört* Vernehmung, ihr [d.h. der *nbF4H*] Walten ist Mitwalten von Vernehmung“: *GA* 40, 147.33-34.

86. “Das Sichverbergen ist das innerste Wesen der Bewegung des Erscheinens“: *GA* 15, 343.24-25 (= *Vier Seminare*, 81.24-25).

87. “Mit dem Ereignis wird nicht mehr griechisch gedacht“: *GA* 15, 366.31-32 (= *Vier Seminare*, 104.31-32).

88. Richardson, *Heidegger*, 247.11.

89. “Vorwort,” xvii.19.

90. “Aber diese Wendung erfolgt nicht auf grund einer Änderung des Standpunktes oder gar der Preisgabe der Fragestellung in ‘Sein und Zeit’”: “Vorwort,” xvii.26-28. See also “Dadurch wird jedoch die Fragestellung in ‘Sein und Zeit’ keineswegs preisgegeben”: *ibid.*, xix.28-29. In “Humanismusbrief” Heidegger had made the same claim not about *die Wendung* but about *die Kehre*: “Diese Kehre ist nicht eine Änderung des Standpunktes [footnote: d.h. der Seinsfrage] von ‘Sein und Zeit’ . . .”: *GA* 9, 328.7-8 = *Pathmarks*, 250.7-8.

91. Cf. er-gänzt, Ergänzen, Ergänzung: “Vorwort,” xix.34-36.

92. “Vorwort,” xvii.29-31. (“p. 39” refers to *SZ* 39.39 = *GA* 2, 53.22.) Cf.: “Damit wird nicht gesagt, ‘Sein und Zeit’ sei für mich selbst etwas Vergangenes geworden; ich bin auch heute noch nicht ‘weitergekommen’, dies schon deshalb, weil ich immer deutlicher weiß, daß ich nicht ‘weiter’ kommen darf; aber vielleicht bin ich dem in ‘Sein und Zeit’ Versuchten um einiges näher gekommen“: *Schellings Abhandlung* 229.13-18 = *Schelling’s Treatise*, 189.6-9.

93. “Der Entwurf. . . nur Antwort auf den Zuruf“: *GA* 65, §21, 56.12-13; “[der Entwurf als die] Einrückung in das Offene, dergestalt, daß der Werfer des Entwurfs als geworfener sich erfährt, d.h. er-ignet durch das Seyn“: *ibid.*, §122, 239.4-5; “die Entwurfung als *geworfene* und das will sagen zugehörig der Er-ignung durch das Seyn [p. 274] selbst“: *ibid.*, §134, 252.23-25; “Im Verstehen als geworfenem Entwurf liegt notwendig gemäß dem Ursprung des Daseins die Kehre; der Werfer des Entwurfs ist ein geworfener, aber erst im Wurf und durch ihn“: *ibid.*, §138, 259.30-32; “Ent-wurf. . . als geworfener“: *ibid.*, §172, 295.123; “Der Werfer selbst, das Da-sein, ist geworfen, er-ignet durch das

Seyn”: *ibid.*, §182, 304.7-9; cf. *ibid.*, §258, 422.29-31. Also “Ausgesetztheit als offene Stelle”: *GA* 2, 216, note “a”; and “Da-sein als geworfenem des (Wurfs)”: *ibid.*, 244, note “a.”

94. Richardson, *Heidegger*, xxvi.17.

95. *GA* 2, 51.9, and note “a,” which equates this with Ereignis.

96. “Die entscheidende Frage (Sein und Zeit, 1927) nach dem Sinn, d.h. (S.u.Z. S. 151) nach dem Entwurfbereich, d.h. nach der Offenheit, d.h. nach der Wahrheit des Seins”: *GA* 9, 210.31-32 = *Pathmarks*, 154.12-14. Cf. *GA* 65, §16, 43.25-26.

97. “Leistung der Subjektivität”: *GA* 9, 327.25-26 = *Pathmarks*, 249.31-32. Cf. *GA* 65, §180, 303.22.

98. Homelessness: *GA* 40, 160.10ff., 176.2-4, 178.19, etc. Neediness: *ibid.*, 171.32, 176.30, 177.13-14, 178.15, 178.31-32, 181. 23-25, 183.2, etc.

99. “Der fragliche Abschnitt wurde zurückgehalten, weil das Denken im zureichenden Sagen [gloss in note ”b“: Sichzeigenlassen] dieser Kehre versagte [etc.]”: *GA* 9, 328.1-3 = *Pathmarks*, 250.1-3.

End of endnotes.