

THE AMSTERDAM LECTURES

<ON>

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY1)

Part I. Pure Phenomenological Psychology:
Its Field of Experience, its Method, its Function.

α 1. The Two Senses of Phenomenology: As Psychological Phenomenology and as Transcendental Phenomenology.>

At the turn of the century as philosophy and psychology struggled for a rigorously scientific method, there arose what was at once a new science and a new method both of philosophical and psychological research. The new science was called phenomenology because it, or its new method, was developed through a certain radicalizing of an already existing phenomenological method which individual natural scientists and psychologists had previously demanded and practiced. The sense of this method in men like Mach and Hering lay in a reaction against the threatening groundlessness of theorizing in the exact natural sciences. It was a reaction against a mode of theorizing in mathematical speculations and concept-forming which is distant from intuition, a theorizing which accomplished neither clarity with insight, in any legitimate sense, nor the production of theories. Parallel to this we find in certain psychologists, and first in Brentano, a systematic effort to create a rigorously scientific psychology on the basis of pure internal experience and the rigorous description of its data (ÖPsychognosiaÓ).

It was the radicalizing of these methodic tendencies (which, by the way, were already quite often characterized as ÖphenomenologicalÓ) /303/ more particularly in the mental sphere and in the rational-theoretical sphere which was at that time in general interwoven with it, which led to a quite novel method of investigation of the purely mental and at the same time to a quite novel treatment of questions that concern specific principles of philosophy, out of which there began to surface, as we mentioned before, a quite new way of being scientific <eine neuartige Wissenschaftlichkeit>.

In the further course of its development it <the phenomenological> presents us with a double sense of its meaning: on the one hand, as psychological phenomenology, which is to serve as the radical science fundamental to psychology; on the other hand, as transcendental phenomenology, which for its part has in connection with philosophy the great function of First Philosophy; that is, of being the philosophical science of the sources from which philosophy springs.

In this first lecture, we want to leave out of play all our philosophical interests. We will be interested in the psychological in the same way as a physicist is interested in physics. With pure objectivity in the spirit of positive science, we will weigh the requirements for a scientific psychology and develop the necessary idea of a phenomenological psychology.

α 2. Pure Natural Science and Pure Psychology.

Modern psychology is the science of the real events <Vorkommnisse, what comes forward> arising in the concrete context of the objective and real world, events which we call ÖmentalÓ <psychische>. The most exemplary way in which the ÖmentalÓ <Psychischem> shows itself arises in the living self-awareness of what I designate as ÖIÓ <or ego> and of indeed everything that shows itself to be inseparable from an ÖIÓ <or ego> as a process lived by an ÖIÓ or as mental processes (like experiencing, thinking, feeling, willing), but also as ability and habit. Experience presents the mental as a dependent stratum of being to man and beast, who are at a more fundamental level physical realities. Thus psychology becomes a dependent branch of the more concrete sciences of anthropology or zoology, and thus encompasses both the

physical and psychophysical.

If we examine the world of experience in its totality, we find that its nature is to articulate itself into an open infinity of concrete single realities. According to its nature, /304/ to each single particular belongs a physical corporality, at least as a relatively concrete substratum for the extra-physical characteristics that are possibly layered on it, to which belong, for example, the determining factors through which a physical body becomes a work of art. We can abstract consistently from all extra-physical determinations, and that signifies that we regard every reality and the whole world purely as physical Nature. In this there lies a structural law of the world of experience. Not only does every concrete worldly or real thing have its nature, its physical body, but also all bodies in the world form a combined unity, a unity which in itself is linked together into infinity, a unity of the totality of Nature which possesses the unifying form of spatiotemporality. From the correlated standpoint of method this is expressed as follows: A consistently abstractive experience can be continuously and exclusively directed to the physical and on this basis of physical experience one can practice an equally self-contained theoretical science, the physical science of nature—physical in the widest sense, to which thus also belong chemistry, and also physical zoology and biology, abstracting away from it whatever pertains to the spirit <Geistigkeit>.

Now the question obviously arises as to how far it is possible within an interest one-sidedly directed to the mental in brute animals and in the world as such, which we grant never emerges autonomously, for there to be an experience and theoretical inquiry which consistently and continuously moves from mental to mental and thus never deals with the physical. This question leads, further, into another: to what extent is a consistent and pure psychology possible in parallel with a consistent and purely developed empirical natural science? This latter question is apparently to be answered in the negative: Psychology in its customary sense as an empirical science of matters of fact cannot, as the parallel would demand, be a pure science of matters of mental fact purified of everything physical in the way that empirical natural science is purified of everything mental.

However far continually pure mental experience may reach, and however far by means of it a <pure> theorizing may be effected, it is certain from the very outset that the purely mental to which it <pure mental experience> leads still has its spatiotemporal determinations in the real world, /305/ and that in its concrete factualness, like everything real as such, it is only determinable through local spatiotemporal determinants. Spatiotemporality as system of places <Stellensystem> is the form <Form> of all actual, factual being, of being within the world of matters of fact. And so it follows from this that all determination of concrete facts is founded on spatiotemporal determinations of place. Spatiotemporality, however, belongs primordially and immediately to nature as physical nature. Everything outside the physical, in particular everything mental, can belong to the spatiotemporal situation <Lage> only through a foundedness <Fundierung> in a physical corporality. Accordingly, it is easy to grasp that within empirical psychology a completely psychological inquiry can never be isolated theoretically from the psychophysical. In other words: Within psychology as an objective, matter-of-fact science, an empirical science of the mental cannot be established as a self-contained discipline. It can never let go of all thematic consideration of and connection to the physical or psychophysical.

On the other hand, it is clear that investigation into the purely mental is, nevertheless, in some measure possible, and has to play a role in any empirical psychology which strives for a rigorously scientific character. How otherwise is one to attain rigorously scientific concepts of the mental in terms of its own essence and without regard to all its concrete interwovenness with the physical? If we reflect on the fact that to these concepts there must also necessarily belong concepts which encompass the universal and necessary eidetic form of the mental in its ownmost essential character—which are concerned with all of that without which something like the mental would simply not be thinkable—then there opens up the prospect of a possible a priori science of essences belonging to the mental purely as such. We take this as our guiding idea. It would not be parallel to physics as an empirical science of nature but to a science of the a priori conceivable

Nature as such in its own pure essence. Although one does not <ordinarily> speak of a priori natural science, it is nevertheless very familiar in the form of certain important particular disciplines, such as the a priori doctrine of time, or as pure geometry and mechanics. /306/

<□ 3. The Method of Pure Psychology (Intuition and Reflection);

Intentionality as the Fundamental Characteristic of the Mental.>

Apriori truths are not so easy to arrive at as we thought in earlier times. They arise as authentic eidetic truths in apodictic insight only from out of their original sources in intuition. These sources, however, must be disclosed in the right way. They can only become fruitful <useful> by means of methodical formulation and through completely unfolding their horizons. Consequently, a real grounding is needed for our guiding idea of an a priori and pure psychology which goes back to the experiencing intuition, an intuition methodically dealt with and allsidedly disclosed, an intuition in which the mental is presented to us in its original concrete givenness, in which it becomes apparent, as we also said, in its ownmost essential selfhood. In this process, the thing placed individually before our eyes functions as an example. Our attention is directed from the very outset to what preserves itself within the free variation of the example and not to what is randomly changing.

The specific character of the method one must follow here will gradually disclose itself to us. First, because it is foundational <das Fundierende>, comes exemplary experience—real and possible examples. And purely mental experience especially requires a method <for its proper study>.

1. Every experiencing or other kind of directedness towards the mental takes place in the mode of reflection. To live as ego-subject is to Ölive throughÓ the mental in multiple ways. But this, our lived-through life, is, so to say, anonymous; it goes on, but we are not focussed on it; it is unexperienced, since to experience something amounts to grasping something in its selfhood. In waking life we are always busied with something, now this, now that, and at the lowest level with the nonmental: Perceiving something means we are occupied with the perceived windmill; we are focussed on it and only on it. In memory we are dealing with the something remembered; in thinking we are occupied with something thought; in our feeling-valuing life, we are occupied with what we are finding beautiful or whatever other value we attach to it; in volitional striving we have to do with ends and means. So straightforwardly occupied as we then are, we ÖknowÓ nothing of the life-process in play¹) at the time; we ÖknowÓ nothing of all /307/ the various peculiarities which essentially belong to this process so that we are able to have the specific types of being occupied that we have, so that somehow things can be given as bodily present or can arise in memory, again with the thoughts, values, goals, and so forth, again can stand in our thematic gaze, and we can in such and such a way be occupied with them. Only reflection, turning one's gaze away from the straightforwardly thematic, makes mental life itself—the highly diverse ways of Öbeing occupied with,Ó Öhaving as a theme,Ó Öbeing conscious of,Ó with all their peculiarities and possible backgrounds—the object of thematic gaze.

In such a reflective perceiving and experiencing, mental life as such, mental life is grasped and itself made a theme which one can work with in a variety of ways. Naturally this new experiencing and making something thematic in reflection is itself also latent but likewise also disclosable through still higher reflection.

2. Whatever becomes accessible to us through reflection has a noteworthy universal character: that of being consciousness of something, of having something as an object of consciousness, or correlatively, to be aware of it—we are speaking here of intentionality. This is the essential character of mental life in the full sense of the word, and is thus simply inseparable from it. It is, for example, inseparable from the perceiving that reflection reveals to us, that it is of this or that; just as the process of remembering is, in itself, remembering or recalling of this or that; just as thinking is thinking of this or that thought, fearing is of something, love is of something; and so on. We can also bring in here the language we use in speaking of appearing or having something appear. Wherever we speak of appearing we are led back to subjects to whom something appears; at the same

time, however, we are also led to moments of their mental life in which an appearance takes place as the appearing of something, of that which is appearing in it.

In a way, and perhaps stretching the point a little, one can say of every mental process that in it something is appearing to the particular *ÖIÖ* insofar as the *ÖIÖ* is somehow conscious of it. Accordingly, phenomenality, as a characteristic that specifically belongs to appearing and to the thing that appears, would, if understood in this broadened sense of the term, be the fundamental characteristic of the mental. And the pure psychology whose possibility we are now weighing would /308/ properly be designated as *ÖphenomenologyÖ* and indeed as a priori phenomenology. Naturally such a psychology would also have to deal with ego-subjects, singly and communally, purely as subjects of such a phenomenality and do this in the manner of an a priori discipline.

After this only terminological discussion we now turn back to the question of methodically establishing pure phenomenological experience and disclosing it. *ÖPhenomenological experienceÖ* this is of course nothing but that sort of reflection in which the mental becomes accessible to us in its own special essence. It is reflection carried through consistently and with a purely theoretical concern so that the living, specific, egoic life, the life of consciousness, is not just seen fleetingly but explicitly seen in its own proper eidetic components and, as we said above, in the all-sidedness of its horizons.

< 4. The Meaning of the Concept of Purity <Reinheit>.>

Here the first question is how this <phenomenological> experience is to be methodically employed so that as a pure experience it will actually lay bare that in the mental which is seen to belong to its own essence.

a. The purity of which we are speaking obviously means, first of all, being free of all that is psychophysical. In the psychological focus, mental experiences are taken as concrete moments of animal and first of all human realities; they are always taken as interwoven with the corporeal element in concrete, animal

experience. Whatever this physical or psychophysical experience gives as existent must

consequently remain out of account, it is not to be dealt with; <rather> we are to practice phenomenological experience exclusively and purely, and consider only what it presents, only what becomes explicit in it. Whatever in the mental places it in or links it with Nature is to be left outside the topic. Manifestly, the same goes for deliberations with regard to all conceivable psychological possibilities, for despite all their being detached from factually experienced actuality, they are still concrete mental possibilities, still <only> data of possible psychological experience.

Here further difficulties await us: to what extent can an actually consistent, pure phenomenological experience be actual and, /309/ above all, possible be practiced; and to what extent can one through such a practice of progressively proceeding from some self-given mental <thing> to another self-given mental <thing> eventually reach a unitary and pure field of experience which in infinitum never brings that which is outside the essence of the mental with it into the unity of its pure, intuitive context, that is, into the closed realm of possible purely phenomenological intuitions. b. On the other hand, pure <phenomenological> experience clearly implies abstention from all prejudgments stemming from scientific or other privileged spheres of experience which could render one blind to that which phenomenological reflection actually lays before us, actually makes available to us a progressive cognizance-taking that from the beginning proceeds by pure intuition, that is, one that from the beginning is an explication of examples in all their dimensions, of the purely mental moments implicit in them.

The combination of both these difficulties has been so effective that one can venture the following paradox: In all of modern psychology there has never been an intentional analysis which was fully carried through. And this despite the fact that for centuries psychology has wanted to be based on inner experience and sometimes to be a psychology descriptive of the data of pure consciousness. Here I cannot even exempt Franz Brentano and his school, although it was his epoch-making contribution to have introduced

intentionality as the basic descriptive characteristic of the mental. Further, he demanded the construction of an empirical psychology on the foundation of a systematic and from the beginning purely descriptive inquiry into consciousness. But the distinctive meaning and method needed for a pure analysis of consciousness remained hidden from him.

The persistent prejudices which make people unresponsive to what we propose to accomplish arise first of all from the way the natural sciences have served as models for our thinking. In fact, the prevailing naturalization of the mental that has lasted right up to our day, and the way an essential identity of methods in psychology and the natural sciences is assumed to be self-evident <both> arise from this. Historically, these prejudices make their appearance already in the great originators of modern psychology, Descartes and Hobbes, and, most sharply expressed, in Locke's tabula rasa interpretation /310/ of the life of consciousness and also in David Hume's concept of consciousness as a bundle of mental data. Brentano's discovery of the intentional character of consciousness broke through the general blindness to it, but it did not overcome the naturalism which overpowered, so to speak, the intentional processes and blocked the path leading to the true tasks of intentional inquiry. Nor was the period immediately following that any different. The zealous struggle against mental atomism did not mean any actual freedom from naturalism with regard to the mental, for the modish recourse to Gestalt-qualities and forms of the whole only characterized a new mode of naturalism. The foundations <das Prinzipielle> of a mental naturalism as such (and, included in this, a most broadly conceived sensualism of the inner and outer senses) only gets to be truly understood for what it is and emptied of its seductive power when a pure phenomenological experience is seriously carried through, in other words, an experience in which the proper essence of intentional life is thus disclosed in consistent all-sidedness and evidence and can accordingly be brought to a pure description.

Before my methodical instruction about this experience which is shortly to follow, I would like to note as a prior clarification that the deep source of all our errors lies in the equating of immanent temporality with objective, concrete temporality. An equation which initially seems to press itself on us as self-evident.

Objective time is the extensional form of objective realities, and indeed primarily and authentically of physical nature, which extends through the real world as its structural basis. Mental lived experiences or processes <die seelische Erlebnisse>, in and of themselves, do not, therefore, either singly or combined into wholes, possess any concretely real uniting form <reale Einheitsform> of coexistence and succession of the type one finds in concrete and real spatiotemporality. The form of flowing, or of being in flux in the unity of a stream of consciousness which is proper to their nature is not an actual parallel form to this spatiotemporality. The image of a stream plays a trick on us. Intentional analysis of immanent temporality actually destroys this image and at the same time places its legitimate sense before us. Precisely in so doing, however, every genuine material analogy between analysis of consciousness and analysis of nature, whether physical, chemical, or even biological, falls away, as does the whole analogy between /311/ the way of being of consciousness and the $\text{I}\ddot{\text{O}}$ of consciousness, <on the one hand,> and on the other hand, the way of being of nature. The concepts of physical thing and attributes, of whole and part, uniting and separating, cause and effect, and the like, which are logical when applied to Nature, are all of them rooted in the originally real, that is, in Nature, and therewith in its basic determination, *res extensa*. When they are taken over into the realm of the mental <zum Psychischen>, i.e., as psycho-logical, these concepts lose what is fundamentally essential to their meaning, and what remain are only the empty husks of formal-logical concepts of object, attribute, composition, and so on.

□ 5. The Purely Mental in Experience of the Self and of Community.
The All-Embracing Description of Intentional Processes.

And now we turn to the other material difficulties which hinder the

cultivation of a consistent and pure phenomenological experience, difficulties which arise due to its involvement with experience of the physical. We will refrain from any traditional prejudgments, even the most universally obvious ones of traditional logic, which already have perhaps taken from Nature unnoticed elements of meaning. We will hold ourselves resolutely to what phenomenological reflection presents to us

as consciousness and object of consciousness, and purely to what comes to actual, evident self-giveness. In other words, we will interrogate exclusively the phenomenological experience, clearly and quite concretely thinking into a reflective experience of consciousness, without interest in determining concretely occurring facts. Such <phenomenological> experience does not have the individual experience <in view>, but the Gestalt most immediate to all as Self-Experience. For only in it is consciousness and the ego of consciousness given in fully original selfhood, as when I perceptively reflect on my perceiving. I as phenomenologist thus uncover my own living (in the attitude of fantasy, directed toward concrete possibility), my concrete possible living in this or that concretely actual and concretely possible forms. One can easily see that it is there, on the basis of this immediacy of my self-experience, that all other experience of the mental (always understood as experiencing intuition) is founded, pure experience of what is strange or other <Fremderfahrung> as well as of the community. So it is quite natural that from the outset the method of taking pure self-experience is treated as the method appropriate to a consistently conceived /312/ phenomenological disclosure of oneself. How can we manage to refrain from accepting any components drawn in by experience of what is externally physical, through which then also everything pertaining to the mental life of someone else <das Fremdpsychische> would remain eo ipso excluded? The experience of something ÔexternalÓ (more clearly: of something ÔphysicalÓ) is itself a mental experience but related to the physical through our intentional experience. Naturally the experienced physical thing itself, which is presupposed as what is physically actual in the worldÑthe thingly real with all its real momentsÑof necessity does not belong to the inventory of essences proper to us in our experiencing life-process. The same holds for any and every consciousness in which the being of something real in the world is meant and accepted, as well as of every activity of consciousness in my natural and practical life.

<¶ 6. Phenomenological <Psychological> Reduction and Genuine Experience of Something Internal.>

Thus if I as a phenomenologist wish to deal with pure mental experience and only with it, if I wish to take the life of my consciousness <Bewußtseinsleben> in its own pure essentiality as my universal and consistent theme and to make it a field for purely phenomenological experiences, then I certainly must leave out of account the totality of the concrete world which was and is continuously accepted in its being by me in my natural, straightforward living; I must thematically exclude it as outside the being of the mental. That is to say: as phenomenologist I may not in my descriptive practice, in the practice or exercise of pure experience of something mental, I may not exercise in a natural way my believing in the world; rather in further consequence I must dispense with all the position-taking which plays its natural role in the natural, practical life of my consciousness.

On the other hand, it is clear and has already been emphasized, that it belongs to and is inseparable from perception as intentional mental experience that it is perception of what is perceived, and this goes for every kind of consciousness with regard to what it is conscious of. How could we describe a perception, or a memory, or anything else in regard to its own peculiar essence as this concrete mental experience without also saying that it is perception of this or that, and is precisely of this object? This is manifestly so, quite apart from the question of whether the perceived landscape actually exists, or if, as further experience may show, it proves to be illusory. /313/ Even in an illusion the illusory landscape still appears, but if we recognize it as illusory, as appearing in an altered mode of our believing, according to which, although it appears the same to us, it does not have the status of simple actuality but that of nullity, of a negated actuality.

Now let us link the conclusion just reached with the one we arrived at earlier. According to the earlier assertion, a mere reflection on consciousness does not yet yield the mental in purity and in its own essentiality. Rather, we must in addition abstain from that believing in being <Seins-Glaubens> by virtue of which we accept the world in the natural life of consciousness and our reflecting on it; as phenomenologists, we are not permitted to go along with this (and in further consequence, indeed, we must abstain from every position-taking of any kind toward the world na·vely accepted by us). As phenomenologists we must be as it were non-participating onlookers at the life of consciousness, which can only in this way become the pure theme of our experiencing. Instead of living in and through consciousness, instead of being interested in the world in it, we must merely look at it, as if it, in itself, is consciousness of this or that, and at <precisely> how it is interested in its objects. Otherwise, the extra-mental world and not pure consciousness of it would constantly be included in the theme of our description. Now on the other hand we have said that this act of abstention, this *Epoch_*, changes nothing about it, and that every consciousness has in and of itself its <own> objectivity as such, in which things are appearing and are known in such and such a way. Or better, we now say that precisely through this phenomenological epoch_ what appears stands out as an appearing thing, what is known in that particular consciousness stands out as such, as something which itself belongs to one's mental inventory. The externally experienced thing as such, the thing we are conscious of as in some way as meant, is accordingly not something that in this instance simply exists, or that is simply possible, probable or non-existent; rather, it is the specific intuitive or non-intuitive content that is meant as existent, supposed, or non-existent. This is the meaning of the customary talk in phenomenology about parenthesizing <or bracketing>. Placing something in parentheses <or brackets> mentally serves as the index of the epoch_. But inside the parentheses there is the parenthesized <thing>.

One matter that should be paid attention to: The faith we have in our experiencing, which is at work in whatever specific consciousness one is now having and is precisely there in an unthematized and concealed way, naturally belongs, along with all its further modes of position-taking, /314/ to the phenomenological content of that moment of mental process. But such belief is, as such, only disclosed and not *participated in* by me as phenomenologist; as a moment of mental experience, it becomes thematic for me through the fact that I take up the phenomenological focus, which means that I move out of the na·ve and natural practice of taking this or that position, to one of holding back from it and I become, as mere spectator, an observing ego.

This describes in substance the necessary and consciously practiced method of access to the realm of pure phenomena of consciousness, namely that peculiar change of focus which is called the phenomenological reduction. By means of it our gaze was directed toward a principal aspect of pure phenomena of consciousness, which is the noematic (and about which traditional psychology did not know what to say). Through the phenomenological reduction intentional objectivities as such were first laid open. They were laid open as an essential component of all intentional processes and as an infinitely fruitful theme for phenomenological description.

But I <must> immediately add that the universality of the phenomenological epoch_ as practiced by the phenomenologist from the very beginning—the universality in which he or she becomes the mere impartial observer of the totality of his conscious life-process—brings about not only a thematic purification of the individual processes of consciousness and thereby discloses its noematic components; it further directs its power on the ego of consciousness, which it frees of everything concretely human, everything animally real. If all of Nature is transformed into a mere noematic phenomenon in that its concrete reality is suspended, then the ego, which has now been reduced to pure mental being and life-process, is no longer the concrete, material, creaturely ego we normally speak of; that is, the human ego of the natural, objective, experiential focus. Rather, it has now itself become the intended real thing as intended only; it has become a noematic phenomenon.

Everything meant or intended as such, and this includes my being as a

human creature in the world and my process of living in the world, is, remember, something intended within an intending life-process; one which, thanks to the phenomenological focus on the purely mental, the life-process in ÖreducedÓ form, is /315/ inseparable from it as its intentional sense. Naturally this intending life-process is always and continuously <to be found> in the field of phenomenological reflection.

<¶7. The Ego-Pole as Center of Acts of the Ego.

The Synthetic Character of Consciousness.>

The consistent unfolding of the noema, of the intended thing as such in each separate case, can be redirected into an examination and analysis of the relatively hidden noesis in itÑthat is, of the particular process of holding something in consciousness. But still there is something it can call its own: that is the ego-center, the ego <ÏIÓ> in the cogito <ÏI thinkÓ>; I have in mind the ego that remains phenomenologically identical in all the multiple acts of the egoÑthe ego apprehended as the radiating center from which, as the identical ego-pole, the specific acts <of the ego> radiate forth. For example, when I look at a thing actively, in experiencing I explicate it, I comprehend and judge it, and so on.

The ego-pole is, however, not only the point from which my acts stream forth but also a point into which my emotions and feelings stream. In both respects the phenomenologically pure ego-center remains a great phenomenological theme which is ultimately interwoven with everything else. To me this is evidence that all consciousness is consciousness belonging to my ego. This also carries with it the idea that consciousness in all its forms, in all the modes of active and passive participation of the ego, carries out noematic functions and therewith ultimately is joined into the unity of a context of functions; in this, what is already expressed is the fact that all analysis of consciousness has to do with, at the same time and ultimately even if implicitly, the central ego.

Now among the specific themes in connection with studying the ego there are Vermögen <ability to do something> and Habitus <tendency to do something>, and really, in ways which cannot be gone into here, these are phenomenological themes. But for phenomenological research what is of necessity nearest and first (and indeed as continuous and explicating flow of experience) is the pure life-process itself of the egoÑthe variegated life of consciousness as the streaming forth of the acts of that ego in such activities as are designated ÒI perceive,Ó ÒI remember,ÓÑin short, ÒI experience,Ó ÒI make something present to myself in a non-intuitive way,Ó or also ÒI live in free fantasizing,Ó in the sense that ÒI am engagedÓ also in the modes in which my valuing, striving, and dealing consciousness occupies itself. The /316/ theme that runs through all of these is the essential <reciprocal> two-sidedness of consciousness <on one hand> and what one is conscious of, as such, the noetic and the noematic.

The fundamentally essential difference between the way of being of consciousness in its phenomenological purity in contrast to the way of being in which Nature is given in the natural focus can be seen above all in the ideality of the holding back or being in a suspended state which characterizes the noematic components of a specific consciousness. It is also seen, we can say, in the uniqueness of that synthesis by which every consciousness is unified in itself and again by which one consciousness is united with another into the unity of a <single, unitary> consciousness. The different kinds of synthesis ultimately all point back to identifying syntheses <Identitÿssynthesen>. Every lived experience <Erlebnis> in our consciousness is a consciousness of something. But this involves the fact that there are also given in and with every lived experience in consciousness many others (ideally speaking there are an infinite variety of other such experiences) which are marked out as real or possible, each of which is united with it, or would be united with a consciousness which was consciousness of that same something. When, for instance, I have as a mental experience, the perception of a house, there ÖresidesÓ within it (and is right there within it itself if we ÒinterrogateÓ it, as I would like to show) the fact that the same house (the same noema) can be intended in an appertaining multiplicity of other perceptions and in all sorts of other modes of consciousness as the same house. Precisely the same holds for every other kind of consciousness as consciousness of the objectivity of its noema. Through this, the intentional relation demonstrates even more firmly its fundamental nature. The

something to which it is related as that which it is and that of which the consciousness in question is conscious—Nor to which the ego is related in a way appropriate to consciousness—this is a noematic pole which serves as an index or reference-point for an open, infinite manifold of ever again other experiences in consciousness, for which it would be absolutely and identically the same thing. And so it belongs to the fundamental nature of consciousness that this object-pole, indeed that every noematic unity is an ideally identical <thing> in all the mental experiencing making up its synthetic multiplicity, and in everything is thus not contained really but ideally. I say it is contained ideally. In fact, the manifold consciousness is generally separated in the stream of consciousness and thus has no concrete individually identical moment in common <with it>. But yet it becomes apparent /317/ in a very evident way that in one and in the other instance we are conscious of the same thing; one and the same house intended perceptually or otherwise is still the same house, noematically understood as the same intended object, both inseparably belonging to each of the multiple appearances yet at the same time being nothing less than a real moment. In other words, we can say that it <the house as ideal object> is immanent <in consciousness> as sense. In fact, in whatever other way we may speak of sense, it has to do with an ideal something which can be the object of intention throughout an open infinity of possible and actual intentional experiences. This is probably the reason that every analysis of consciousness begins by explicating the concrete, individual lived experience and makes its demonstrations from it. Yet these analyses always and necessarily lead from the individual conscious experience into the corresponding synthetic cosmos <Universum> of lived experiences in consciousness. Indeed, without laying claim to this <cosmos>, that which lies noematically within consciousness, and at which they are aimed as an intentional objectivity, cannot be explained at all.

Accordingly, intentional analysis is totally different both in method and in what it accomplishes from an analysis of concrete data, of what is concretely given. For example, using the phenomenological approach to describe the perceived thing as such means first and foremost, taking as one possibility the previous example of the perceived house, to go into the various descriptive dimensions which, as we soon see, necessarily belong to every noema, although in various particularizations. The first <point> is the directedness of our gaze toward the ontic component of the noema. Looking at the house itself we focus on the various distinguishing features and of course we look exclusively at those which really show themselves in this perception itself. But when we express the matter in this way, we are taking it as self-evident that beyond the actual perceptual moments, the perceived house still possesses a multiplicity of other moments not yet grasped. So then the question about the basis for speaking in this way immediately leads to the fact that to the noema of the perceived house belongs a horizon consciousness; in other words, what is genuinely seen in itself refers us in its sense, to an open more of determinations which are unseen, partly known, partly undetermined and unknown. The analysis cannot stop at this point, however. The /318/ question immediately arises as to how come it is evident that this pointing-ahead belongs to the phenomenon-in-consciousness? How come this horizon-consciousness refers us in fact to further actually unexperienced traits of the same <phenomenon>? Certainly this is already an interpretation which goes beyond the moment of experiencing, which we have called the horizon-consciousness, which is, indeed, as is easily determined, completely non-intuitive and thus in and of itself empty. But we are immediately drawn into a disclosure or fulfillment <of sense> which <shows> itself as evident from the given perception precisely by means of a series of fantasy variations which offer a multiplicity of possible new perceptions projected as possible: <that is,> a synthetically annexed and joined set of fantasy variations in which it becomes evident to us that the empty horizon with which the sense of the perception is freighted, in fact carries within it an implicit perceptual sense; that, in fact, it is an anticipatory sketching out of new moments which belongs to the way of being of the perceived, <a sketching out which is> still undetermined but determinable, and so on.

The explication of the intentional sense thus leads, under the title of

horizon-explication (explication of anticipations), from the explication of a sense that is already intuitively verified to the construction of an eidetically appertaining synthetic manifold of possible perceptions of that same thing. Constructively we produce a chain of possible perceptions which show how the object would look and would have to look if we perceptually pursued it further and further. In this regard, however, it also becomes evident that the same house, continued, that we just spoke of, that is, the same ontic house (as an identical link in the chain of multiply possible noemas) separates itself and distinguishes itself from the "house" <that is given> in the "how" of intuitive realization; each of the individual perceptions of the same house brings the same thing forward within a subjective "how" <how it appears>, bringing with it namely a different set of actually seen determinations of it. This holds true in a similar way for the other descriptive dimensions of a noema of external experience; for example, those under the heading of a "perspective." Whatever in the perceived thing comes forward in the actual intuition does so in such a way that every genuinely intuitive moment has its mode of givenness; for instance, what is visually given will be in a certain perspective. And with this, the perspective again immediately points toward possible new /319/ perspectives of the same thing, and we are again drawn, only looking now in another direction, into the system of possible perceptions.

Another descriptive dimension has to do with the modes of appearance <Erscheinungsmodi>, which, through the possible differences in essence among perception, retention, recalling again, prior expectation, and so on, are all determined by the same thing. This, too, leads, as will be demonstrated, to a kind of intentional explication, one which by means of the specifically given lived experience leads constructively beyond it into methodical clarifications which consist of constructing appertaining synthetic multiplicities. Again, the same thing holds with regard to the descriptive dimension that is characterized by its separating sense material from the mode of <its> acceptance. All of these dimensions are determined in accordance with the horizon and require a disclosure of the horizon and of the levels and dimensions of sense that are made clear through this disclosure.

This should suffice to make it evident that the truly inexhaustible tasks of an intentional analysis within a phenomenological psychology have a totally different sense from the customary analyses in the objective, let us say, natural sphere. Intentional explication has the unique peculiarity belonging to its essential nature, that is as an interpretive exegesis <Auslegung> of noesis and noema. Interpreting <is taken of course> in a broader sense and not in the sense of merely analyzing an intuited concrete thing into its component traits.

One more corroborating <operation> should be carried out. Up to this point the analysis of properties was what we have had in mind. But "analysis" often and in the literal sense means breaking something down into its parts. <It is true that> lived experiences in consciousness do have, in their immanent temporality within the stream of consciousness taken concretely but purely, a kind of real partitioning and a correlative real connection <with each other>. But it would certainly be foolish to want to look at the connecting and partitioning in consciousness exclusively from the viewpoint of putting parts together and taking them apart. For example, a concrete perception is the unity of an immanent flowing along in which each of the component parts and phases allows of being distinguished from one another. Each such part, each such phase, is itself again a consciousness-of, is itself again perception-of, and as this, has its <own> perceptual sense. But not, let us say, in such a way that the individual senses can simply be put together into the unitary sense /320/ of the whole perception. In every component of a perception flowing along as a phase of a whole perception, the object is perceived whose unity of meaning extends through all the meanings (senses) of the phases and so to say, nourishes itself from them in the manner of gaining from them the fulfillment of more exact determination—but this is by no means a <mere> sticking things together, and it is anything but merely the type of combination into a whole which is to be found in sensible forms. For not

every synthesis in consciousness exists as this type of continuous synthesis (and the substratum for corresponding analyses of phases and parts). But in general it is valid to say that consciousness as consciousness permits no other manner of linking to another consciousness than such synthesis, such that every partitioning down into parts again produces meaning or sense, just as every combining generates a synthetically established sense. Synthesis of meaning or sense—synthesis of an ideally existent thing—stands generally under quite different categories from <those of> real synthesis, and real totality.

The life of consciousness constantly flows along as a life that in itself is sense-constituting sense and which also constitutes sense from sense. In ever new levels these objectivities are carried out within pure psychological subjectivity, a production and a transformation of "objectivities" appearing to the conscious ego determining itself as so and so, nearer or "other" and accepted by it as being so, but in the most varied modes of validity. A kind of ongoing synthesis which is especially close to the essential nature of a coherently interrelated life of consciousness, and in fact always necessarily belongs to it, is the synthesis of all experiences into the unity of one experience; and within this, the synthesis of concordant experience, interrupted to be sure by discords but always through correction restoring again the form of an all-bracing harmony. All the kinds and forms of reason in cognition <erkennender Vernunft> are forms of synthesis, of accomplishment of unity and truth by cognizing subjectivity.

To shed light on the intentional is a huge task for phenomenological-psychological research.

The descriptive phenomenology which we have been speaking of up to now as in itself first was egological phenomenology. In it we conceived of an ego disclosing its own pure mental being, its realm in the strictest sense as original experience of the mental. Only after an egological-phenomenological /321/ inquiry that has been pressed sufficiently far does it become possible to broaden the phenomenological method in such a way that experience of someone else and of the community is introduced into it. Then and only then does the insight disclose itself that an all-embracing phenomenology is to be carried through in consistent purity, and that only in this way is intentional psychology at all possible—that the unity of synthesis encompasses the individual subjects as a phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

Not only is the conscious life of an individual ego a field of experience that is enclosed in itself and needs to be gone through step-by-step in phenomenological experience; also, the all-embracing conscious life which, reaching beyond the individual ego, links each ego to every other in real and possible communication is like this. Instead of thematizing the psychophysical experience of humankind passing from man to man and to animals in one's activity and in this way regarding this experience as mediated by nature and realities connected with nature out there in the world, one can, rather, start from one's own immanent life-process and go through the intentionality contained within it in such a way that a purely phenomenological continuity in experiences from subject to another subject is produced and purely preserved. It is the intentionality in one's own ego which leads into the alien ego and is the so-called "empathy," and one can put it into play in such phenomenological purity that Nature remains constantly excluded from it.

□ 8. The Eidetic Reduction and Phenomenological Psychology as Eidetic Science.

What we have discussed so far has dealt with the method by which a pure psychological sphere of experience reveals itself as a field of purely mental data, a field that needs to be described, a field that is self-disclosing in continuous intentional explication. Generally we speak in this connection also of general and essentially fundamental peculiarities which are to be encountered in this field. Nevertheless, as long as we remain within mere experience, thus clinging to singular facts and to the empirical generalizations arising from them as these are formed naturally in the course of experience, as long as our description retains the character of a mere empirical description, we do not yet have a science.

/322/ We already know that a pure phenomenological psychology as a

science of real facts is not possible. For such a science the purely mental facts that are revealed through phenomenological method would require a methodology that goes after their *real* <external, concrete> meaning, that is to say takes account of their physical signification, and therewith enters into the realm of the psychophysical. This lies outside our theme. But as we predicted, now, by virtue of our having opened up the realm of pure intersubjectivity, as it is revealed with phenomenological consistency and through experience practices purely <as a unity>, and indeed as reality and possibility, an a priori science can be established: a self-contained, a priori, purely phenomenological psychology.

But how is a phenomenological a priori arrived at? One must not here think of an effusive mysticism of logic. Rather, the method of gaining a pure a priori is a completely sober, well-known method readily available in all sciences, however much a reflective clarification and final explication of the meaning of this method may be lacking. A clarification and explication which can only be brought about for all methods of cognition only through a pure phenomenology. It is the method of attaining to pure universals <Allgemeinheiten, generalizations> intuitively and apodictically, universals free of all co-positing of concrete fact, which are related to an infinite range of freely conceivable possibilities as purely possible facts. Indeed, <it is a method> which prescribes apodictically the norm of being conceivable as possible fact. Once brought to light these pure universals, even if they are not generated through strictly logical methods, are pure pieces of self-evident knowledge which can be tested at any time by asking whether it is conceivable that they be otherwise without there arising in insight a contradiction or absurdity. A parallel example in the sphere of nature is the insight that everything that is intuitively imaginable as pure possibility, or, as we say, everything conceivable possesses the fundamental spatiotemporal and causal properties of a *res extensa* <extended thing>: spatial and temporal dimensions, spatiotemporal location, and so on.

Now how is it that we come to know such things? Well, we start out from some exemplary thing or other, perhaps of factual experience, and then, leaving its factuality out of play as irrelevant, we practice free fantasy-variation with our specific example, producing a consciousness of free optionality <Beliebigkeit> and a horizon of optionally produceable variations.

This is, however, only a rough beginning, and a more thorough investigation shows that it is only suitable for regional universals when qualified by more exact corresponding explication. In this <explication> there will come to the fore in the constant overlapping or coincidence within the variants an all-encompassing essential form running through them, an invariant which preserves itself necessarily through all the variations. And not only does it preserve itself as something that is factually held in common in the concrete variations intuitively produced but also as an invariant in the optionality of ongoing variation *as such*. And every thing-factum in experience, insofar as it is the theme of such intuitively fulfilled free variations possesses an evidentially emerging, necessary, and simply indestructible formstyle <Formstil> which emerges in this very natural method of proceeding as the formstyle belonging to all things in the region of *thing* *as such*.

In exactly the same way, proceeding from examples of phenomenological experience or possibilities of experience, obviously we can practice free variations and, ascending to the pure and necessary *as such* <überhaupt capitalized: *In General*> delimit the purely and simply invariant style <Stil> of phenomenological subjectivity, as <the general forms of> a pure ego and a community of egos *as such*, a life-process of consciousness *as such*, with noesis and noema *as such*, and so on. And so in this way the phenomenologist continuously carries out not only the phenomenological reduction as method of disclosive experiencing but also <an> eidetic reduction. Phenomenology then becomes an all-encompassing science, related to the continuously unified field of phenomenological experiencing, but rigorously focussed on investigating its invariant formstyle, its infinitely rich a priori-structure, the a priori of a pure subjectivity, both as single subjectivity within an intersubjectivity as well as a single subjectivity in itself. No *I* <or ego> is conceivable without consciousness of being an *I* <Ichbewusstsein> and none is conceivable without

perception, recollection, expectation, thinking, valuing, acting, etc.; none without fantasizing in which all such consciousness is transformed into *Öas ifÖ*. No perception is conceivable that would not again have perception as its formstyle. And this holds <also> for the other categories of consciousness.

All concepts and propositions that arise in this way are a priori in the same sense as, for example, purely logical and mathematical truths. A genuine a priori presupposes here as well as everywhere else, that variation and transition to the unconditioned generality as such, to free optionality, as mode of consciousness, does not move into a vague /324/ thinking of ideational projections fabricated from words but rather into actual intuitions, in constructing intuitions which are actually examples that must be unveiled within operative experience exactly to the extent that they can be used for arriving at a pure universal. In regard to the phenomenological experience with its horizons of intentional implication, this means that access to the

genuine a priori is very difficult. Phenomenological experience as explicitly such is itself a matter of accomplishing difficult methodical functions. Practicing the

method of variation in the egological focus produces, first of all, the system of invariants in one's own ego, unrelated to the question of the intersubjective accessibility, and validity, of this a priori. If one brings into consideration the experience of others, then what becomes clear is that it belongs a priori to the objective sense of that experience (thus, <as it is> to the alter ego) that the other be analogous in its essence with my ego; that the other, then, necessarily has the same essence-style <Wesensstil> as I. In this way, egological phenomenology is valid for every ego whatever, not just valid for me and my fantasy-variants. After the reduction has been broadened to include phenomenologically pure intersubjectivity, then a universal a priori for communities of subjects becomes apparent in the reduction of them to their inner-phenomenological and pure unity.

□ 9. The Essential Function of Phenomenological Psychology for an Exact Empirical Psychology.

The a priori concepts generated by eidetic reduction are an expression of the necessary essence of the structure <Stilform> to which all conceivable, factual, egoic being and the life of consciousness is tied. All empirical-phenomenological concepts take their place among them <the a priori concepts just mentioned> as logical forms, in the same way as all empirical concepts in which natural science's factual assertions proceed participate at the same time in the a priori concepts governing Nature. Thus, the unconditional normative validity of the a priori truths grounded in a priori concepts for all their respective regions of being, in this case for purely mental *empeiria* <facts> to which these concepts pertain, is self-evident.

Here we add what quite naturally comes next: a discussion of the significance of a phenomenological psychology for the much more far-reaching subject of psychology in general. Phenomenological /325/ psychology is the unconditionally necessary foundation for the construction of a rigorously scientific psychology which would be the genuine and actual analogue of exact natural science. The exactness of the last mentioned <natural science> lies in its being grounded on its a priori, on this <a priori> in its own disciplines, even if this is not a completely projected system of forms of a conceivable Nature as such. Through this theoretical relating-back of the factual in experience to this a priori of form, the vague *empeiria* <items experienced> gain a share in essential necessity, and the natural scientific method as a whole gains a sense that it is undergirding with *ÖexactnessÖ* all the vague concepts and rules; that is, to mould the particulars, which can only be brought out and determined in the light of experienceable matters of fact, to the measure of a priori form; which as such prescribes to everything empirical, insofar as it is to be *ÖobjectiveÖ*, a necessity within the totality of Nature.1) The fact that the a priori is here quantitative, expressed in size and number, is simply due to the essence of Nature as Nature.

But exactness in the more general sense is demanded for every genuine factual science of facts, <and thus> also for psychology. It, too, has its all-governing fundamental concepts; or <what is> the same thing, even the experiential realm dealt with by psychology has its a priori set of structural types, and standing in first place, obviously, is the set of structural types of the mental in the specific sense—the a priori without which an ego (and a

community of egos) would simply be inconceivable to consciousness <as would also> objectivity in consciousness, an apriori prior to all the contingencies of factual phenomenological experience. Eidetic-psychological phenomenology uncovers this apriori according to all the sides and dimensions which belong to noesis and noema. Thus, it produces the fundamental rational concepts which extend through every conceivable psychology, so far as it is in fact psychology, that is to say it has to do with the mental, with ego and intentionality, and so on.

But obviously this a priori phenomenology we gave just described, even thought it is in itself the first fundamental science exactness, does not exhaust the whole of a priori psychology, in so far as psychology is still a science of the mental as it makes its appearance in the given world as real moment <of experience> and /326/ which as a psychophysical <emphasis added> datum fits itself into and is coordinated with Nature. As such a science, psychology finds itself co-founded on the apriori of Nature. It rests, therewith, on both the empirical and the a priori natural science and <is> grounded in its own apriori, which has to belong to the psychophysical as such, but which has never been worked out.1)

A pure phenomenological psychology, as we indicated earlier, only makes sense as an eidetic science. On the other hand, we now see that any genuine and, in the good sense, exact psychology—nor better any psychology which is to possess the form of a rational science of facts according to the type of rational (here, mathematical) natural science it is—is in a broader sense phenomenological psychology in so far as it does not deal with the real mental <das real Psychische> on the basis of vague factual experiences defined in vague empirical conceptualities but rather on the basis of an all-embracing phenomenological experience and a doctrine of eidetic phenomenological essences rooted in it—nor we could say, on the basis of an a priori logic of psychology that accords with its own essence.

In our presentation here, it could seem as if psychology were one exact, positive science among others and thus as an eidetic science one among others. But no matter how true it is that the mental arises as one among other real components of the world, it still has the amazing quality—precisely that which in phenomenology is investigated in its purity—that it relates, or lets itself be related, intentionally <emphasis added> to everything extra-mental as well as everything conceivable at all. Human beings are in the world along with other realities, but human beings also have consciousness of the world, themselves included; it is owing to this that a world is there for us at all, and that it is accepted as existent. Granted, it may appear to be distorted and lawless in the individual case, but in terms of the whole it proves to be lawful and consistent; it may appear theoretically good or bad; it may be determined by us in an insightful or an erroneous way. But the world is what it is for us on the basis of our own functions of consciousness <Bewußtseinsleistungen>. The sciences, particularly, are on every level formations <Gebilde> produced in intentionality, which produces their sense of being true from the operations of confirmation within the individual /327/ subjectivity and within the intersubjective. Scientifically valid theory is a system of intersubjective results which carry a self-constituting and enriching sense of objectivity within subjectivity itself. Theory of science as universal logic, as science of the a priori form <Form> of a science as such and of the apriori-prescribed types (regions) of scientific knowledge <Wissenschaftstypen>, keeps to the customary meaning of science, namely as theory, as a system of resultant truths.1) With this <version of science>, however, the whole subjective life-process that shapes both truth and science remains outside the topic. Obviously a full and comprehensive theory of science would demand that the function <Leistung> be explored as a formation in the functioning <leistenden> subjectivity. It would demand that all forms and patterns of scientific (and so also of any type of) rationality be included in the research. Clearly this research would be absolutely requisite to a universal pure phenomenology which comprehended within itself all theory of knowledge, theory of science, and theory of reason.

<Admittedly> this looks like a restoration of psychologism. What is said by it, though, is only that an all-embracing phenomenology—so far as it makes scientific theory understandable as the *noema* of *noeses* that, in accordance with their essences, necessarily belong to them—also at the same time includes within itself an all-embracing <universal> psychology of reason and its functions; alongside, of course, phenomenology of unreason and the whole category of the passive functions of consciousness which carries the label of *dissociation*. This phenomenological psychology of reason is, however, in its whole fundamental position unphilosophical. It no more becomes philosophical by starting out <relying> on the apriori than geometry becomes philosophical by starting out <relying> on the spatial apriori with respect to space. The theory of reason in positivity, the psychological theory of reason, still belongs to the positive sciences.

Nevertheless, in a certain way not only this psychological theory of knowledge but also the whole of phenomenological psychology stands quite near to philosophy. For, once it is firmly grounded and established in its full all-embracing universality, all that is required is the Copernican <180%> Turn <i.e., of the transcendental reduction> /328/ in order to give this whole phenomenology and theory of reason transcendental significance. The radical change of meaning arises through the fact that the constant presupposition upon which the totality of scientific positivity—even that of empirical and phenomenological psychology—rests is put out of play by an

epoch_ <bracketing>.: Bracketed is the presupposition of a pregiven world, of what, according to common experience, is the self-evidently existing world.

In other words: Instead of positing a world in advance, this pregiven world, and then only asking how this self-evidently existing world is to be determined truly, this world is instead treated as *noema*. Absolutely posited is subjectivity, purely as such, in which the world is constituted and which is now no longer meant as animate subjectivity in the world. In a word, the psychological-phenomenological reduction is transformed into the transcendental-phenomenological <reduction>, and therewith psychological phenomenology is transformed into absolute or transcendental phenomenology.

Part II: Phenomenological Psychology and the Transcendental Problem

The idea of a purely phenomenological psychology has not only the reformative function for empirical psychology which we have just set forth. It can also, for very deep-seated reasons, serve as a preliminary stage for laying out the idea of a transcendental base-science <Grundwissenschaft>, a transcendental phenomenology.

□ 10. Descartes' Transcendental Turn and Locke's Psychologism.

Even historically, phenomenological psychology did not develop from the requirements of psychology itself. Although the real breakthrough occurred only at the beginning of our century, the history of phenomenological psychology leads us back to Locke's noteworthy foundational work and very shortly thereafter to the significant working out of impulses from it by G. Berkeley and David Hume. In the Hume's Treatise <Concerning Human Understanding> already we find a first effort at a systematic phenomenology, a first attempt at a systematic exploration of the sphere of pure lived experience <Erlebnissphäre>, although admittedly not by means of eidetic method and furthermore involving a contradictory sensualistic /329/ set of connections in conscious life as such. Already in classical British philosophy <in Locke>, then, the intended limiting <of focus> to the purely subjective <sphere> was determined by interests external to psychology.

This inward-turned psychology stood in the service of the transcendental problem that had been awakened by Descartes, although this problem was not grasped in genuine form and properly formulated by Descartes

himself. Still, in the very first of the Cartesian Meditations the thought was there—tangible, underdeveloped, but there and ready to be developed—the thought one can designate as the fundamental impulse of modern philosophy,

that which essentially determines its particular style, namely: Every objectively real thing <alles Reale>, and ultimately the whole world as it exists for us in such and such a way, only exists as an actual or possible cogitatum of our own cogitatio, as a possible experiential content of our own experiences; and in dealing with the content of our own life of thought and knowing, the best case being in myself, one may assume our own (intersubjective) operations for testing and proving as the preeminent form of evidentially grounded truth. Thus, for us, true being is a name for products of actual and possible cognitive operations, an accomplishment of cognition <Erkenntnisleistung>.

Here lay the motivation for all the later transcendental problems, bogus as well as the genuine. Right away in Descartes the thought took a form which misled him and succeeding centuries. With seeming self-evidentness he proceeded in the following way: The experiencing and cognizing subjectivity is thrown upon its own resources. Cognition takes place within its own pure immanence. The evidentiality of the ego cogito, of pure subjective inner experience, necessarily precedes all other evidences, and in everything is already presupposed. How can I, the cognizing entity in this case, legitimately go beyond the component elements which are given with immediate evidentness to me alone? Obviously only through mediating inferences. What do these mediating inferences look like? What can give them that wonderful capacity to enter a world transcendent to consciousness?

The genuine transcendental problem is further obscured by the realism-problem, which misled centuries of thinkers with those absurd truisms <Selbstverständlichkeiten, self-evidentnesses> of a /330/ theory based on inferences. All the same, the transcendental problem was prepared for and anticipated; attention was focussed on the all-embracing <universale> subjectivity of consciousness and its possession of a world. Descartes' method of doubt can be designated as the first method of exhibiting transcendental subjectivity, at least that of the transcendental ego as a unified self centered in the ego and its cognitive life-process. One can say: it is the first transcendental theory and critique <in the Kantian sense> of universal experience of the world as the foundation for a transcendental theory and critique of objective science.

In unsuccessfully working out the transcendental problem, in the twisting involved in Descartes' wrong formulation of the transcendental problem, this ego becomes pure mens <mind> as substantia cogitans <cognitive substance>, that is, mens as concrete mind <Seele> or animus, existing for itself yet again something that exists for itself only through causal law and its link with corporeal substance.

Locke, without sensing the depths opened up by the first Meditations and the

fully new position attained there in relation to world and to mind, took the pure ego from the outset as pure mind-substance <reine Seele>, as the human mind, whose

systematic and concrete exploration on the basis of evident inner experience was to be the means of solving the questions of understanding and reason. However great his epoch-making contribution was, of having posed this question concretely and in the unity of a scientific-theoretical horizon and of having shown its relationship to the primal foundation in inner experience, still he missed its genuine transcendental meaning because he conceived of it as psychological inner experience.

So he became the founder of psychologism, a science of reason. Nor as we can also say it in a more general way: a transcendental philosophy on the foundation of a psychology of inner experience.

The destiny of scientific philosophy hinged, and still hinges, on establishing it as genuine transcendental philosophy, or what goes with this, on a radical overcoming of every form of psychologism; a radical overcoming—namely one that lays bare in one stroke what is sense, what is in principle nonsense, and yet what is its transcendentially significant kernel of truth. The source of psychologism's continuous and /331/ invincible power through the centuries comes, as will be shown, from drawing on an essential double meaning which the idea of subjectivity and therewith all concepts of the subjective take on, and which arises as soon as the genuine transcendental question is posed. The disclosure of this double sense which links psychological and transcendental subjectivity together, and

indeed not accidentally unites them, is brought about when the divorce is accomplished between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology—None as rational psychological foundational science and the other as rational foundational science of philosophy in its necessary form as transcendental philosophy. In connection with this, the idea also seems to be justified of phenomenological psychology being projected as an advance guard for and valued as a means of access to transcendental phenomenology.

We begin with clarification of the genuine transcendental problem, which in its initial instability has made us inclined to get sidetracked, and still does.

□ 11. The Transcendental Problem.

The transcendental problem designates an all-embracing <universales> problem which is related to the cosmos and all the sciences that deal with our world, but points to a fully new dimension of this in contrast with the Natural universal problem whose theoretical solution is branched out into the positive sciences.

The transcendental problem arises from a general turning around of the natural focus of consciousness, the focus in which the whole of daily life flows along; the positive sciences continue operating in this natural focus. In this focus the *“real”* world is pregiven to us, on the basis of ongoing experience, as the self-evidently existing, always present to be learned about world to be explored theoretically on the basis of the always onward movement of experience. Everything that exists for us, whatever is or was accepted as an existing thing, belongs to it; not only minds but also the unreal objectivities which are to become our own, like for example linguistic meanings, scientific theories, or even the ideal constructions of art. They still have their existence <Dasein> in the world as unreal determinations that exist precisely as /332/ meaning or significance of physical word-sounds, or of physical signs, of real marble, and the like.

The constantly present and accepted world before us with all its real and unreal determinations, serves as the universal theme of all our practical and theoretical interests, and, in the final analysis, it is also the theme of positive science. This remains the case, and historically speaking it remained all-pervasive until a motivation became operative which was suited to putting the natural focus (a focus which by reason of its very nature necessarily comes first in the individual and historically) out of play and, in the same move, to compel a new focus, which we call transcendental. Such a motivation arose when, under the aegis of philosophy, there developed a truly all-embracing <universale> theoretical interest, in which questions were posed about the universe as such, about the world as the cosmos comprising every existing thing whatever. It arose also through the fact that philosophical attention was directed toward the life of consciousness <Bewusstseinsleben>, and became aware that the world which for us is *“the”* world, is on-hand <vorhanden>, exists for us in this or that way, is in this consciousness—*“as something appearing, meant, legitimated, in that consciousness—”*that same consciousness. As soon as we become aware of this, we are in fact in a new cognitional situation <Erkenntnislage>. Every meaning that the world has for us, we now must say—both its undetermined general sense as well as its meaning determined according to concrete particulars—is *“intentional”* meaning that is enclosed in the innerness of our own experiencing, thinking, valuing life-process, and is a meaning that takes shape within our consciousness. Every acceptance of the validity of being <Seinsgeltung> of something is carried out within ourselves; every evidence within experience or theory which grounds that acceptance is living within ourselves and henceforth is habitually motivating us. This holds for the world in every determination, even in the most self-evident, where everything which belongs to the world is *“in and for itself”* as it is, whether or not I, or whoever, may be accidentally aware of it or not.

Once the world in its full universality has been related to the conscious subjectivity in whose conscious life it makes its appearance as precisely *“the”* world in its specific meaning at that time, then its mode of being acquires a dimension of unintelligibility and questionability. This *“making-an-appearance,”* this *“being-for-us”* of the world as something that can only subjectively be brought to acceptance and foundational evidentness, does require clarification. The first /333/

awareness of the radical relatedness of world to consciousness does not, in its empty generality, yield any understanding at all of how consciousness in its multiplicity, in its restless streaming and self-transformation, so contrives that, for example, in the structure of perception there emerges a persisting, real objectivity that belongs to a thing as bodily existing, and as something transcendent to consciousness, that can become known as existing in and for itself, indeed that can even be proved in an evidential way to be there. How can we account for the fact that a presently occurring experience in one's consciousness called "recollection" makes us conscious of a not-present event and indeed makes us aware of it as past? And how is it that in the "I remember" moment, that sense can be included in an evidential way with the sense: "I have earlier perceived"? How are we to understand the fact that a perceptual, that is to say, bodily characterized present can at the same time contain a co-presence with the sense of a perceivability that goes beyond the <immediate> perceivedness? How are we to understand the fact that the actual perceptual present as a totality does not close out the world but rather always carries within itself the sense of an infinite plus ultra <more beyond>? Yet our whole life in the world as conscious life in all its relationships, is not intelligible at all if, instead of engaging in naive praxis, we also direct our interests toward the "how" of the function <Leistung> of consciousness, in order to live along with it in theoretic practice.

When natural reflection directs its gaze on this "how" in the midst of the living functions of anonymous consciousness, it still does not make this functioning intelligible, which appears to lead back into unknown infinities of concealed contexts and connections.

Apparently this problem applies also to every kind of "ideal" world, including the worlds which many sciences have disclosed to us in abstractive separation from all relationship to the real world; such as, for example, the world of pure numbers in its peculiar "in itself," or the world of "truths in themselves."

Unintelligibility assails in an especially painful way the mode of being of our self. We, individually and in cognitive community, are supposed to be the ones in whose conscious life-processes the real and every ideal world should gain meaning and acceptance according to all that they are (as pregiven to us, at hand, and as existing in and for themselves). We ourselves, however, as human creatures, are supposed to belong only to the real world. In accordance with the worldliness of our meanings, we are /334/ again referred back to ourselves and the conscious life wherein this special meaning takes shape. Is another way of clarification conceivable than interrogating the life and processes of consciousness itself and the world that we become conscious of through it? Surely it is as something intended by us, and not from any other source, that the world has acquired and always acquires its meaning and its validity. On the other hand, however, how are we going to interrogate conscious life without falling into a circle with regard to its reality <Realität>? Indeed, before we go any further, here, let's take yet another important step, a step which raises the level of transcendental problem to that of basic principle. This step is to recognize that the demonstrated relativity of consciousness <to the subject> has to do not just with our world as factum but with every conceivable world whatsoever. For if in free fantasy we vary our factual world and transport ourselves into random conceivable worlds, we inevitably also vary ourselves, to whom, after all, they are the envolving worlds. We transform ourselves each time into a possible subjectivity that would have the particular fabricated world in question as its surrounding world, the world of its possible experiences, the world its possible theoretical evidentness, of its possible conscious life in every kind of transaction with the world. In this way the problem of the transcendental world is removed from <the sphere of> fact and becomes an eidetic problem to be solved in the sphere of eidetic (a priori) theories.

In another manner the same things holds for ideal worlds of the type of pure mathematics; for example, the world of numbers. Such worlds we cannot in fantasy think as freely transformed; every such effort leads to the cancellation of their possibility, which is equivalent to <cancellation of> their actuality. For invariance belongs to their mode of being <Seinsart>.

But at the same time it is quite evident that it <this mode of being> is not tied to us as factual <emphasis added> cognizing subjects. As cognizing subjects, we can vary ourselves in such a manner that we posit whatever randomly conceivable theoretical <conscious> subjects we might choose. Every one of these, who as theoretical subject is capable of the free production of theoretical objectivities, could in himself produce formations in consciousness in an evident way which would have as their cognitional result their respective idealities, and so likewise there would result all kinds of ideal worlds like the number series, etc. Thus, as it also relates to such irrealities, the transcendental problem also has from the beginning an eidetic <emphasis added> meaning and demands eidetic ways of solution.

□ 12. The Psychologistic Solution to the Transcendental Problem.

The working out of the idea of an a priori psychological phenomenology has demonstrated to us the possibility that one can, through a consistently carried out phenomenological reduction, disclose in eidetic generality the essence proper to mental subjectivity. This includes with it the set of essential types <Wesenstypik> for all the forms of evidentness, beginning with the set of essential types for experience which agrees or harmonizes with other experience <einstimmige Erfahrung> and, in further consequence, includes the whole structural system of human reason which establishes and preserves law. And in further consequence it would include the essential patterns for possible worlds of experience, or possible systems of harmonizing experiences and the scientific thought established on the basis of them, in whose immanence the subjectivity possible at that time and place constitutes for itself the meaning and legitimacy of a world existing in objective truth. Consequently, phenomenological psychology, systematically carried out, would seem to encompass within itself in radical generality the totality of research on correlations between objective being and consciousness. It gives the appearance of being the proper place for all transcendental clarifications.

But on the other hand we must not overlook the fact that psychology in all its disciplines belongs to the *ÖpositiveÖ* sciences. In other words: It is from beginning to end a science <carried out> in the natural focus, in which *ÖtheÖ* world is continuously pre-given as simply there at hand <schlechthin vorhandene> and functions as its general and universal thematic basis. What psychology especially wishes to explore are the minds and communities of minds which present themselves within this pre-given world. The phenomenological reduction serves as a psychological method of obtaining the mental element of animal realities in their own essentiality, penetrating into their ownmost essential connections and preserving these undamaged.

In eidetic phenomenological research, also, the mental retains the existential sense <Seinssinn> appropriate to what is at hand in the world—but now related to possible (conceivable) real worlds. Even as an eidetic phenomenologist, the psychologist is transcendently naïve. However much he or she may try to put everything psychophysical out of play in directing his/her interest toward the purely mental, these are still actual or possible *Öminds,Ö* minds thought of completely in the relative sense of this word /336/ as always the minds of bodies out there, that is to say, mind of concrete human beings in a spatial world.

But if we allow the transcendental interest instead of the natural-worldly interest to become our theoretical standard, then psychology as a whole, like every other positive science, is stamped as something transcendently problematic <questionable>. Psychology cannot make available any of its premises to transcendental philosophy. The subjectivity of consciousness, which is its topic, i. e., the mental <seelische>, cannot be that which is inquired back to transcendently.

At this decisive point everything hinges on whether one keeps in view with unerring seriousness the thematic meaning of the transcendental mode of inquiry.

We have been driven out, expelled, from the naïveté of natural living-along; we have become aware of a peculiar split or cleavage, so we may

call it, which runs through all our life-process; namely, that between the anonymously functioning subjectivity, which is continuously constructing objectivity for us, and the always, by virtue of the functioning of anonymous subjectivity, pregiven objectivity, the world. This world also includes within it human beings with their minds, with their human conscious life. When we consider the pervasive and unsuspendable relatedness of the pregiven and self-evidently existing world to our functioning subjectivity, humankind and we ourselves appear as intentionally produced formations whose sense of being objectively real and whose verification of being are both self-constituting in subjectivity. Also, the being of the objective, a being that appeared to the contingent consciousness as *over against* it and *in and of itself*, has now appeared as a meaning constituting itself within consciousness itself.

□ 13. The Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction
and the Transcendental Semblance of Doubling.

The task that now arises is how to make this correlation between constituting subjectivity and constituted objectivity intelligible, not just to prattle about it in empty generality but to clarify it in terms of all the categorical forms of worldliness *<Weltlichkeit>*, in accordance with the universal structures of the world itself. If we accept the premise that the constitutive functions of consciousness, /337/ both active and passive, are actually to be brought to light, functions which make evident to us the meaning and self-verifying being of a world we accept as there, then this task is manifestly a totally different one from that of all positive sciences—and, as compared with all of them, is completely new. For all of these sciences, the intelligible existence *<Dasein>* of a world is presupposed, and its fundamental knowability, also, to no less a degree. Both of these remain outside the topic *<of a transcendental phenomenology>*. The all-embracing question for these sciences is how this world, and a world as such, is to be determined in objective truth. The question which already leaps beyond every positivity, namely whether there is a world at all in objective truth, and the critical question of how this is to be established, may not be held before us at the outset, no matter how much the latter question already penetrates into what is primordially transcendental. Rather, the original and in itself chief question, as we mentioned, is directed to a clarifying disclosure of the consciousness that, as such, constitutes all objectivity. And correlatively it is directed to that which emerges in it (and in the whole objectivizing subjectivity) as a result, the world and a possible world as such as a meaning of being *<Seinsinn>* that originates in this way for us.

Like every meaningful question, the transcendental question presupposes a ground of unquestioned being, in which all the means for its resolution must be contained. When we pose this question to our factual world,¹⁾ we presupposes our being and our conscious life, understood as that through whose unknown productive function *<Leisten>* this world acquires a meaning for us, as well as all that is determined within the world of these objects of experience, etc. In eidetic inquiry we have to do with a conceivable world as such in a priori generality, and indeed as related to a freely conceivable modification of our subjectivity, again presupposed as constituting that world. Admittedly, as factual presences in the background we inseparably also play our role, in so far as we are the ones who have conceived the possible worlds of possible constituting subjectivities. It should be evident that this unquestioned and presupposed ontological ground *<Seinsboden>*, which is also the basis for the presupposed possibilities, is not to be confused with what the transcendental question in its generality takes to be in question.

The universal domain of transcendental questionability is the totality of transcendental *na·vet_* which is the whole of the self-evidently existing world as such. Accordingly, this world is put in parenthesis with regard to its simple acceptance; it is suspended without asking whether this is justified or not. We do not allow ourselves to make a statement straight-out about anything real *<Reales>*; we may not make use of anything in the realm of what is at hand, no matter how evident it may be. To do so would be absurd—and contrary to the meaning of transcendental inquiry. In accordance with it all positive sciences are subjected to an epoch called the *òtranscendental epoch_.*—Along

with this, then, it would be a transcendental circle, to base transcendental philosophy, that is, the science constructed according to the demands of the transcendental question, on psychology, which, to be sure, exists not only as an empirical science but also as an eidetic positive science. Or stated equivalently: The subjectivity which itself constitutes all (real and ideal) objectivity cannot be psychological subjectivity, not even that psychological subjectivity which eidetically and in phenomenological purity is the topic of psychological phenomenology.

But how do we overcome the paradox of our doubling <Verdoppelung> and that of all possible subjects? We are fated as human beings to be the psychophysical subjects of a mental life in the real world and, at the same time, transcendently to be subjects of a transcendental, world-constituting life-process. To clarify this paradox, consider the following: mental subjectivity, the concretely grasped ÖIÖ and ÖweÖ of everyday discourse, is grasped experientially in its own essentiality through the method of phenomenological-psychological reduction. Its eidetic variation (in focussing on what is a priori conceivable) creates the basis for pure phenomenological psychology. The subjects, which as ÖmindsÖ <Seelen> are the topic for psychology, are the human subjects we find every day when we are in the natural focus. They are out there before us, and we ourselves as human beings are bodily and mentally present to ourselves through objective external apperception and eventually through topical acts of external perception. We observe that every external perception of individual realities, and thus every moment that is not self-sufficient within us, has its being within a universal external apperception which runs through the whole course of our waking life; /339/ it is through this apperception, operating steadily and continuously, that one is aware of a total perceptual present with its horizon of an open past and future; and in the course of this flowing-along one is conscious of this as the changing modes of appearance of the one unceasing spatial

world existing from out of living temporality.

If in reflection we focus on this all-embracing apperception of what is external, and next on the total conscious life in which it is grounded, then this conscious life can be seen as that unitary subjective being and life-process existing in itself, in which being for us is the being there for me of ÖtheÖ world and all the specific existing realities that are there for me is made, so to speak. The world of which we are always speaking, which we can always project in fantasy or imagination along with everything that is intuitively or logically there for us is none other than the noematic correlate of this all-embracing subjectivity of consciousness, and the experiential world given through that all-embracing apperception of the external world. Now how do things stand in relation to this subjectivity? Is it <subjectivity> something that I or we as human beings experience? Is it something experienceable? Is it what is before us, available in the world of extension as belonging to the spatial world? We ourselves as human beings are out there, are present to ourselves, individually and collectively, within an all-embracing apperception and yet only present to ourselves by virtue of special external apperceptions. In perceptions of external things I myself am given to myself within the total perception of an open spatial world, a perception that extends still further into the all-embracing; thus, in external experience I also experience myself as a human being. It is not merely my outward bodily corporality which is externally perceived; the merely natural body is the object of an abstractive focus; but, as concrete person I am in space; I am given in the spatial world as every other person as such is given, and again as every cultural object, every artwork, etc., is given. In this focus on external experience (in the world of space) my subjectivity and every other mental subjectivity is a component of this concrete being as person and consequently it is the correlate of a certain external apperception within the all-embracing apperception of the world.

It is now evident that the apperceiving conscious life-process, wherein the world and human being in its particularity within it are constituted as existentially real, is not what is /340/ apperceived or constituted <in it>; it is not the mental which as human mental being or human mental life-process comprises the apperceptive make-up of the real world. Something <else yet> is necessary in order to make this distinction between transcendental and worldly, concrete

conscious life (between transcendental and real subjectivity, respectively), as fully secure as possible, and in order to make transcendental subjectivity evident as an absolutely autonomous field of real and possible experience (thus to be called transcendental), and as a further consequence to secure and make evident an absolute or transcendental science based on it <real and possible experience>. To this end we will treat the
Ötranscendental-phenomenological reeducationÓ a little more precisely, the method of access which leads systematically from the necessarily first given field of experience, that of external experiencing of the world, upward into all-embracing, constitutive absolute being, i.e.Ñinto transcendental subjectivity. In order to make our ascent easier we will not carry out the transcendental reduction directly; rather, we will proceed stepwise from the psychological <phenomenological> reduction, and treat the transcendental reduction as a further reduction which grows out of and fulfills the psychological reduction. Let us review the type of phenomenological reduction practiced by the psychologist. As a researcher in a positive science, the psychologist has as his object of study mental subjectivity as something real in the pregiven, constantly and naturally accepted world. As eidetic phenomenologist he explores the logos of the mental. His thematic ground is then a conceivable world as such, likewise still thought of as simply existing and pregiven.

The phenomenological-psychological reduction is for him a method of limiting the concretely mental <das real Seelische> and above all the intentional process, to its eidetic essence by putting out of play or leaving out of account the transcendent positings at work in this life-process. In order to gain the pure mental totality from the outset in the form of all-embracing and unitary phenomenological intuition, and from there to press on to an eidetic psychology of pure phenomenological subjectivity, that putting-out-of-account, that phenomenological epoch_, must be carried out beforehand in generality and in a habitual volition. In doing this, however, the psychologist still does not cease to be a positive-science researcher, in other words, /341/ to hold his apperception of the world in acceptance as valid. But as soon as he radically inhibits his apperception, a Copernican revolution takes place which attacks the whole of his life, including all of his work as a psychologist. He becomes a transcendental phenomenologist who now no longer has ÖtheÓ world (or even a possible world that he presupposes as existent), who no longer is investigating objects at hand, realities that belong to the world. For him the world and every possible world is mere phenomenon. Instead of having the world as pregiven existence, as he as normal human being previously did, he is now merely a transcendental spectator who observes and, in experience and analysis of experience, uncovers this having of world, <i.e.> the way that a world and this world ÖappearsÓ in consciousness in accordance with meaning and is accepted as real.

While the psychological inner experience conceived purely as phenomenological always yet remained a kind of external, worldly experience, after the radical epoch_ with regard to world-acceptance the psychological inner experience became a new kind of transcendental experience in which absolutely nothing from real, spatial-worldly being is straightforwardly posited. While the psychologist as psychologist was from first to last included in in the topic in apperceptive form as a person in the world, the phenomenologist as phenomenologist, on the other hand, is for himself no longer I, this particular person; rather, as person he or she is Öput in parentheses,Ó is himself/herself a phenomenon. For his transcendental ego, he or she is a phenomenon of egoic being, of egoic life-process <Ich-Seins and Ich-Lebens>, which in the radical epoch_ remains continuously demonstrable as precisely that ultimately functioning subjectivity whose previously hidden accomplishment is the all-embracing apperception of the world.

The transcendental epoch_, the radical putting out of consideration every practice whatsoever of accepting the Öexisting world,Ó is accomplished through an act of will in such a way that it is Öonce and for allÓ; from now on this habitually and constantly firm resolve of will makes the phenomenologist, from that point on, a transcendental phenomenologist and opens up to him or her the field of transcendental experience and the eidetics of the transcendental.

It is easy to see, now, that the total of mental content <seelische Gehalt> in its proper essence, a content which the psychological-phenomenological reduction brings to light and which psychological phenomenology describes, remains conserved as /342/ transcendental content through the higher-level and radicalized epoch_, except that whatever is of psychological-real significance within it is left behind in the phenomenon. This <transcendental> content is constantly broadened to encompass the apperceptive bestowing of meaning as human consciousness, the human mind <or soul>, and the like.

If the transcendentially attuned <or focussed> ego, that is, the ego living in the habituality of the radical epoch_, accomplishes its reflection on consciousness, ever and again repeating such reflection, then there is generated for it the pure transcendental, ever and again the transcendental; indeed, it comes in the manner of a quite new kind of experience which is *ÖinnerÖ* in the transcendental sense; or, better, is transcendental experience. And parallel with this, the following also holds true: If the reflection on consciousness is accomplished by someone in the phenomenological-psychological focus, and in iteration, reflection on this reflection, and so on, no matter how much the researcher may obtain thereby for the phenomenological, his or her reflection on consciousness will still only attain a psychological meaning.

The transcendental field of being <Seinsfeld> as well as the method of access to it, transcendental reduction, are in parallel with the phenomenological-psychological field, and the means of access to it, the psychological reduction. We can also say: the concretely grasped transcendental ego and transcendental community of egos, <that is> along with the concretely full transcendental life, is the transcendental parallel to the level of *ÖIÖ* as human being and we as human beings in their ordinary meaning, concretely grasped as purely mental subjects with their purely mental life. Parallel in this case means: a correspondence that is parallel in each and every particular and connection, it means a being different and a being separated that is different in a quite peculiar way and yet not with an outsidership from each other in any kind of natural-level sense of the world. This must be correctly understood. My transcendental ego is, as the ego of transcendental experience of self, clearly *ÖdifferentÖ* from my natural human ego, and yet it is anything but some kind of second something separate from it; it is anything but a doubleness in the natural sense of one being outside the another. Indeed, evidently it only requires an alteration of focus, mediated through the transcendental epoch_, to transform my purely psychological experience of self (the phenomenological, in a psychological sense) into transcendental experience of self. And corresponding to this, all the things I meet with in my mind acquire through it by the confirmation of their proper essences, a new, absolute transcendental meaning.

□ 14. On the Parallelism between Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.

This transition within transcendental reflection necessarily creates an identification. I, who am in my absolute and ultimate being wholly and completely nothing objective but rather the absolute subject-ego, find myself within my life-process, which is constituting all objective being for me, as an acceptance-correlate <Geltungskorrelat: that is, the correlative entity within the mental process of accepting things as this or that and as truly existent> in an apperceived form as human ego accepted as an object, that is to say, as the content of a self-objectivation (self-apperception) which, as something produced by me—that is, as a production <Leistung> in which I am imposing a concrete meaning on myself—belongs precisely to my absolute being. If this intermingling has become intelligible by means of an alteration of focus—an alteration which, of course, is already taking place within the transcendental focus—and with this the peculiar overlapping of spheres of experience right down to specific details, then the result is self-evident: a remarkable parallelism, indeed, to a certain extent an overlap of phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology—both understood as eidetic

disciplines. The one is implicitly concealed in the other, so to speak. If, while remaining captive to normal positivity we cultivate a consistent psychological phenomenology of all-embracing intersubjectivity, a universal eidetics based on purely mental intuition, then a single volitional step—the willing of a universal and radical epoch—will lead to a transcendental transvaluation of all the results of phenomenological psychology. Obviously this requires as motive for it

all the considerations that lead to transcendental inquiry. Turning this around: Standing on a firm transcendental foundation <Boden> and working out a transcendental science, we certainly can still put ourselves back into the natural focus and give everything that has been transcendentially determined regarding structural forms of a possible transcendental subjectivity the eidetic signification of phenomenological-psychological structures. In this instance, though, the knowledge remains as a lasting acquisition for transcendental research—a knowledge which remains foreign to the naively positive psychologist—that all positivity, and especially psychological positivity, is a noematic formation accomplished by transcendental operations.

I must still mention the fact that, as one can see, eidetic /344/ phenomenological psychology is anything but a mere eidetics of the individual ego; it is, rather, the eidetics of phenomenological intersubjectivity. With the introduction of the transcendental reduction this intersubjective psychological eidetics finds its transcendental parallel. Concrete, full transcendental subjectivity is the All <space, cosmos> that comes from within, pure, transcendentially harmonious and only in this way the concrete cosmos <All> of an open community of egos.

Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute and only self-sufficient ontological foundation <Seinsboden>. Out of it are created the meaning and validity of everything objective, the totality <All, cosmos> of objectively real existent entities, but also every ideal world as well. An objectively existent thing is from first to last an existent thing only in a peculiar, relative and incomplete sense. It is an existent thing, so to speak, only on the basis of a cover-up of its transcendental constitution that goes unnoticed in the natural focus <or attitude>. And on account of this cover-up, the fact simply does not become visible that the objective thing is a unity whose intentional unity and acceptance as valid is intentionally constituted, and it has its true being in and for itself only on the basis of a transcendental bestowal of meaning, thus gaining its continuing credibility and persuasiveness from ongoing processes of legitimation within the transcendental and through the habituality arising out of these <processes> in accordance with their essence.

□ 15. Pure Psychology as Propaedeutic for Transcendental Phenomenology.
<The Radical Overcoming of Psychologism.>

Through a clarification of the ambiguity of meaning in the nature of (phenomenologically pure) conscious subjectivity and the eidetic science relating to it, we can understand on deepest grounds the historical invincibility of psychologism. Its power lies in a transcendental semblance or illusion <Schein>, quite in accordance with its essence, which, so long as it remained unnoticed and undisclosed as an illusion, had to continue exercising its influence.

From Descartes's time into our own, the transcendental problem did not penetrate through to clarity and scientific definiteness with regard to its fundamental and necessary principles. Only radical reflection of an unlimited all-embracingness in which all conceivable existing things belong a priori to the intentional realm of our subjectivity and every subjectivity we could ever conceive of (and whose functions of consciousness produce every meaning of being and every truth), could lead to the genuine transcendental problem /345/ and to the radical question of the sense of being <Seinsinn> of this subjectivity and the method of grasping it. Only when the transcendental-phenomenological reduction was developed could our knowledge mature to fullness: that the transcendental subjectivity of consciousness (which was presupposed in the problem) is not an empty metaphysical postulate but something given within an experience of its own type, namely transcendental experience, but, to be sure, <this subjectivity is> an infinite

realm of manifold special types of experiences and therewith also of an infinite number of descriptions and analyses.

From that point it was a fundamentally important further step to recognize the significance of the transcendental-phenomenological experience: namely, that its sphere is not merely the philosopher's own transcendently purified ego but rather, it is what makes itself known in this ego through the manifold alter ego opened by transcendental empathizing and then from the transcendently open, endless egoic community which manifests itself transcendently in every ego in changing orientation.

Therewith, a transcendental philosophy as rigorous science¹⁾ resting on the absolute ontological foundation <Seinsboden>, which is to say the experiential foundation <Erfahrungsboden> of transcendental intersubjectivity, instead of our groundless speculation (namely, resting on no corresponding experience), which is always ready to envelope everything in mythical metaphysics.

The breakdown in conceptualizing transcendental subjectivity in a radical way, or what amounts to the same thing, the absence of the method of transcendental reduction, did not allow a separation to be made between this transcendental subjectivity and psychological subjectivity. One of these is, so to say, the above-the-world, as world-constituting, theme of transcendental philosophy, first and foremost of eidetic transcendental phenomenology; the other is internal to the world as the empirical topic <Thema> of psychology, as the eidetic theme of phenomenological psychology. So the psychology of cognition <Erkenntnis, knowledge> had to be transformed unnoticed into the transcendental theory of knowing <or epistemology>, and the psychology of the valuing and practical reason had to be transformed into the transcendental theory /346/ of these sorts of reason <Vernunftsarten>. Psychologism thus had to remain unclarified and in force—mean the fundamental <prinzipielle>, transcendental psychologism, which is lethal to the possibility of a scientific philosophy, and yet is totally unscathed by refutations of the psychologism in pure apophantic logic or of parallel psychologisms in formal axiology and theory of practice <Praktik>.

To be sure, there was no lack of argumentative antipsychologism in traditional transcendental philosophy, but nowhere were the objections deeply and firmly enough based, nor did those who explored the evidence see conceptually that a science of the transcendental must self-evidently go back to conscious experience <Bewusstseins-erfahrung> and on this ground <Boden> through actual descriptive, analytic and eidetic work, carry out a radical clarification of all of reason in its special forms. This path, had it been pursued with radical consistency, would have led to the development of a pure eidetic phenomenology. Even before the necessity for a fundamental separation between psychological and transcendental phenomenology (and, within this, a phenomenological theory of reason) had been recognized, such an eidetic phenomenology would have at least implicitly accomplished the main work, although the truly definitive solution could only come about after this separation. In contrast to this possibility, the foes of psychologism, because they were tricked by anxiety over the potential psychologism of systematic and universal research into consciousness and pushed it away to the psychologists, fell into pointless formalistic argumentation and distinguishing among concepts, which was contrary to the spirit of genuine science and could bear little fruit.

A definitive clarification of the real meaning of transcendental philosophy, as well as of transcendental psychologism and the definitive overcoming of it, only became possible through developing the idea of an eidetic phenomenology as something double, and through radical meditations appertaining to it of the sort we have presented above.

□ 16. The Building of a Transcendental Philosophy.

This makes understandable a certain independence from psychological phenomenology in the construction of a transcendental phenomenology, and vice versa, in spite of their being fundamentally intertwined and interimplicated with one another and therewith, conceived in their fulfillment with full self-understanding of their meaning, and their identicalness. 1) It is

already clear at the outset that without linking up with psychology at all (much less with any other science) one can at once take into consideration the relatedness of all objectivity to consciousness, formulate the transcendental problem, proceed to the transcendental reduction and through it to transcendental experience and eidetic research—and thus bring a transcendental phenomenology directly into being. In fact, this is the course I attempted to pursue in my Ideas. 2) On the other hand, one can, as our presentation in these lectures has shown, start out at first undisturbed by any transcendental-philosophical interests, from the question of the requirements for a rigorously scientific psychology as positive science: one can demonstrate the necessity for a methodically foundational and purely rational (eidetic) discipline focussed on what belongs to the very essence of the mental and on the all-embracingness of a purely mental context, and in this way systematically develop the idea of an eidetic phenomenological psychology, having it establish itself in the full all-embracingness of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Afterwards, the peculiar nature of the necessary phenomenological epoch—as “parenthesizing” the whole world, even though an acceptance of the natural world as existent certainly lies at its foundation, immediately offers an obvious motive for radicalizing this reduction, for awakening the transcendental problem in its purest form, and producing, like the Copernican revolution, a transcendental revolution in psychological phenomenology. This indirect path through the positivity of empirical and eidetic psychology has great propaedeutic advantages:

a. The transcendental focus which is set up through a radically consistent and conscious transcendental reduction, signifies nothing less than an /348/ altering of the whole form of life <Lebensform> previously practiced not only by the particular ÖIÖ and ÖweÖ but also historically by humanity as a whole: an absolute, all-embracing, and radical shift in the natural living-along of life and one’s natural living in a pregiven world; a change in the mode of experiencing, of thinking, and of every other kind of activity, and also in all the modes of reason. The radical undergirding of this sort of life and work and attunement of all of life on the foundation of transcendental experience must by virtue of its absolute alienness from everything to which we have been accustomed, be, like anything new, very hard to understand. And likewise with the meaning of a purely transcendental science.

b. On the other hand, certainly psychological phenomenology is certainly also a new thing historically in the method of intentional analysis, and especially in its disclosure of intentional implications, completely original. And since it moves within the natural focus, it still possesses the accessibility of all positive science. Once it is clear and distinct with regard to its idea and at least some basic steps have been taken for carrying it out, then it will only take a little deeper-level reflection in order to make the transcendental problematic palpable and clear by means of it and then to turn the phenomenological reduction around and thus accomplish the transformation of the essential content of phenomenological psychology into a pure transcendental <philosophy>.

One may distinguish two fundamental difficulties in pressing on into the new phenomenology and arrange them on the two levels mentioned above: first, the difficulty in understanding the genuine method of <attaining> a pure $\text{Öinner experience,Ö}$ which already belongs to making a psychological phenomenology and a psychology as rational science of facts possible; and secondly, the difficulty in understanding a transcendental questioning standpoint and method which goes beyond all positivity.1)

The transcendental interest, taken in itself, is certainly /349/ the highest and ultimate scientific interest; so much so, that transcendental phenomenology is not only a philosophical discipline in a specialized sense and a philosophical foundational science, but also the all-embracing absolute science which enables every possible sciences to be an ultimately scientific science. In its systematic development it leads to all eidetic sciences, through which then all factual sciences are rationalized, but at the same time, when transcendentially established, they are so broadened as to leave no more meaningful problems open—say, under the heading of philosophical problems that got left out. Accordingly, in a system of sciences, or better, in the construction of a universal science in which each individual science is not a

separated and isolated piece but rather a living branch of the universal <all-encompassing> science, the right way to go is first to formulate transcendental phenomenology independently in its transcendental theories, and next show what it is in itself by exhibiting the essential nature of the natural focus as over against the essential nature of the transcendental focus, and through this bring to light the possibility of making a conversion of the transcendental phenomenological doctrines into doctrines of psychological positivity.1)

1) Translation is from Husserliana, 9: 302-349. The beginning of a new page of the original German text is given in our text as follows: /303/ marks the beginning of p. 303.

1) Being busied <or occupied> with something is itself a latent flowing-along.

1) Here is underlined the necessary recourse to idealization and hypothesis of idealization!

1) Logically ideal imagined things are conceivable only in identity within the world and (in general) vice versa. The Apriori is not just lying around in the street and apodicticity must actually be constructed.

1) It is theory of theory.

1) Emphases in this paragraph added by translator.

1) Rigorous science—of course, this concept is transformed through the whole undertaking by phenomenology of the reduction. The will to ultimate responsibility, in which the universe of possible knowledge is to arise, leads to a recognition of the fundamental insufficiency of all "rigorous science" in the positivist sense, etc.

1) (Overview of the Planned Third Part:)

Part III. Transcendental Phenomenology:

Philosophy as Universal Science Established on an Absolute Ground

□ 17. Transcendental Phenomenology as Ontology.

□ 18. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Foundations in the Exact Sciences.

□ 19. The Phenomenological Grounding of the Factual Sciences and the Empirical Sciences.

□ 20. Complete Phenomenology and Universal Philosophy.

□ 21. The Highest and Ultimate Problems as Phenomenological.

□ 22. The Phenomenological Resolution of All Philosophical Anthitheses.