

Edmund Husserl

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY  
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Translated by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer<sup>1</sup>

[164] As is well known, over the last decade some of the younger generation of German philosophers have been gravitating with ever increasing speed toward philosophical anthropology. Currently Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy of life, a new form of anthropology, exercises a great deal of influence. But even the so-called "phenomenological movement" has got caught up in this new trend, which alleges that the true foundation of philosophy lies in human being alone, and more specifically in a doctrine of the essence of human being's concrete worldly Dasein. Some view this as a necessary reform of the original constitutive phenomenology, one that for the very first time would supposedly permit phenomenology to attain the level of authentic philosophy.

All of this constitutes a complete reversal of phenomenology's fundamental standpoint. Original phenomenology, which has matured into transcendental phenomenology, denies to any science of human being, whatever its form, a share in laying the foundations for philosophy, and opposes all related attempts at foundation-laying as being anthropologism or psychologism. Nowadays, however, the exact opposite is supposed to hold. Phenomenological philosophy is supposedly now to be constructed entirely anew from out of human Dasein.

With this conflict there have returned, in modernized form, all the old oppositions that have kept *modern philosophy* as a whole in motion. From the beginning of modern times, the subjectivistic orientation that is peculiar to the age has had its effect in two opposite directions, the one anthropological (or psychological) [165] and the other transcendental. According to one side it goes without saying that the subjective grounding of philosophy, which is continuously felt to be a necessity, has to be carried out by psychology. On the other hand, however, there is the demand for a science of transcendental subjectivity, a completely new science on the basis of which all sciences, including psychology, are for the first time to receive their philosophical

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<sup>1</sup>Edmund Husserl, "Phänomenologie und Anthropologie," from Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937)*, *Gesammelte Werke*, XXVII, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989, pp. 164-181 (with text-critical notes at pp. 300-307); this edition supersedes the first German edition published in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2 (1941), 1-14. A translation by Richard G. Schmitt of the first edition appeared in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960, pp. 129-142, and was reprinted in Edmund Husserl, *Shorter Works*, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston, South Bend, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1981, pp. 315-323.

Husserl delivered the lecture in 1931 to meetings of the Kantgesellschaft in Frankfurt (June 1), Berlin (June 10), and Halle (June 16). The original manuscript is preserved in two drafts, both written in Husserl's Gabelsberg shorthand, in Group F of Husserl's papers; thus the catalogue signature of the two drafts is F II, 1 and 2 (in German, *Konvolut* F II, 1, 2). The second of the two drafts (F II, 2) is the one translated here. Eugen Fink's typed elaboration of the lecture is archived as M II, 1; that is, it is found with those lectures (*Vorträge*) of Husserl's that were typed out by his assistants before his death.

While each translator reviewed the work of the other, Thomas Sheehan is chiefly responsible for the first half of the present English text, up to "...the initial moment of the method, the phenomenological reduction" (p. 172.34 of the German edition), and Richard E. Palmer is responsible for the second half (from p. 172.35 on, in the German edition).

grounding.

Should we just accept it as inevitable that this conflict must be repeated throughout all future ages, changing only its historical garb? The answer is no. Surely the method that philosophy requires on principle for its own grounding must be prefigured in the very essence of philosophy, in the fundamental sense of its task. If it is essentially a subjective method, then the particular meaning of this subjective factor needs to be also determined *a priori*. In this way it must be possible to arrive at a fundamental decision between anthropologism and transcendentalism on a level that stands above all the forms that philosophy and anthropology/psychology have taken down through history.

But here everything depends on actually possessing the *insights* that this fundamental decision presupposes. The abiding lack of them is what has allowed the conflict to go on endlessly. Are we in a position today to utilize those insights? Has the fundamental essence of philosophy and of its method now achieved such a radical clarification and apodictic conceptual grasp that we can make use of *them* in order to reach a definitive decision?

I shall try to convince you that in fact we now are in such a position, precisely as a result of the development of constitutive phenomenology. Without going into the details of that development, I shall try to sketch out the transcendental philosophical *method* that has achieved its pure clarification in constitutive phenomenology, as well as the *transcendental philosophy* (at least as an idea) that, thanks to this method, has entered upon a systematic process of concretely executed work. Having gained that insight, we will be able to arrive at the principled and definitive resolution of the question that is our topic today: to what degree any philosophy, and hence a phenomenological philosophy, can find its methodological grounding in a "philosophical" anthropology.

Let us start by contrasting pre-Cartesian and post-Cartesian philosophy. The former is dominated by the old *objectivistic* idea of [166] philosophy going back to antiquity, whereas the post-Cartesian philosophy is oriented to a new *subjective-transcendental* idea.

Within the modern struggle for a true philosophy (and also in the methodological disputes indicated above) we find a concerted effort at genuinely overcoming the old idea of philosophy and science in the name of the new idea. In the present case, genuinely overcoming the old means at the same time preserving it by clarifying its true sense in the form of a transcendental-relative idea.

As we know, science in our European sense is, generally speaking, a creation of the Greek spirit. Its original name is philosophy, and the range of its knowledge is the totality of whatever has being at all. It branches out into specific disciplines, the main trunks of which we call sciences. But we give the name *philosophical* only to those sciences that generally deal with questions about everything that is and do so in similar ways. However, the old all-encompassing concept, whereby philosophy includes all the sciences in a concretion, remains forever indispensable.

Initially the teleological notion of philosophy (or of science) was obscurely conceived; but step-by-step over a long process of development it has taken definite shape and has been clarified and consolidated. Knowledge within the attitude of 'αυμ\_ζ\_IV, that of pure theoretical "interest," issues in an initial sense of science that soon proves inadequate. Mere empirical knowledge -- descriptive, classificatory, and inductive -- is not yet science in the full sense. It provides only relative and merely situational truths. Philosophy, as genuine science, strives for absolute and definitive truths that surpass all forms of relativity. In genuine sciences entities themselves, as they are in themselves, get determined. What manifests itself in the immediately intuited world, the world of our prescientific experience, is *self-evidently* (despite its relativity) a world that is actually in being, even if its intrinsically true qualities transcend straightforward experience. Philosophy as genuine science attains those qualities (even if only on the level of approximation) by having recourse to the *eidos*, the pure *a priori* that is accessible to everyone in apodictic insight.

Further development tends towards the following idea. Philosophical knowledge of the given world requires first of all a universal *a priori* knowledge of the world -- one might say: a universal ontology that is not just abstract and general but also concrete and regional. It allows us to grasp *the invariant essential form, the pure [167] ratio of the world*, including all of its regional spheres of being. To put the same thing another way: Prior to knowledge of the factual world there is universal knowledge of those essential possibilities without which no world whatever, and this includes the factual world as well, can be thought of as existing.

This *a priori* makes possible a rational method for knowing the factual world by way of a rational science of facts. Blind *empeiria* [knowledge of particulars] becomes rationalized and achieves a share in pure *ratio*. Under its guidance there arises knowledge grounded in principles, a rationally *clarificatory* knowledge of facts.

For example, with regard to corporeal nature: pure mathematics, as the *a priori* whereby nature can be thought at all, makes possible genuine philosophical natural science and even mathematical natural science. Yet this is more than just an example, since pure mathematics and mathematical natural science have allowed us to see, in an admittedly narrow sphere, *exactly what it was* that the original objectivistic idea of philosophy/science was striving for.

Let us now distinguish two things that have come to need such distinguishing only as a belated consequence of the modern turn, namely, the formal and the material elements within this conception. *Formaliter* what we are dealing with here is a universal and (in the sense I have indicated) rational knowledge of *whatever is*, in its totality. From the start, however, and throughout the entire tradition, the formal concept of "whatever is" (the concept of "*something at all*") has always had a binding material sense: it has always meant what-is as worldly, what-is as real, i.e., something that derives the meaning of its being from the world that is in being. Allegedly, then, philosophy is the science of the totality of real things. But, as we shall see in a moment, it is precisely this kind of science that begins to come unstuck in modern times.

Beginning with Descartes, the development of modern philosophy set itself off in sharp contrast to all previous development. A new motif came into play, one that did not attack the formal ideal of philosophy -- that of rational science -- but that nonetheless in the long run completely transformed philosophy's material sense, as well as the ideal itself. The *naïveté* with which one presupposes that the world is *self-evidently in being* -- given to us by experience as self-evidently already out there -- is lost: The self-evidentness turns into an *great enigma*. Descartes' regress from this pre-given world to the *subjectivity that experiences the world*, and thus to the subjectivity of consciousness itself, gives rise to [168] an entirely new dimension of scientific inquiry. By way of anticipation we may call this dimension the transcendental.

We may express this dimension as a *basic philosophical problem* in a number of ways: It is the problem of cognition or of consciousness. It is the problem of the possibility of objectively valid science. It is the problem of the possibility of a metaphysics -- and so on. Regardless of how we express it, the problem is far from being a precise one, laid out in originally derived scientific concepts. Instead, the problem always retains something of the obscure and ambiguous, and this lack of clarity leaves the door open to absurd formulations. This newly opened dimension of knowledge can only with difficulty be put into words and concepts; the old, traditional concepts, alien as they are to the essence of the new dimension, cannot grasp it; rather, they only misconstrue it.

Thus the modern epoch of philosophy represents a constant effort to penetrate into this new dimension and to arrive at the right concepts, the right ways of asking questions, and the right methods. The road to this goal is long, and it is understandable that modern philosophy, in spite of the intense scientific dedication, has not achieved the one and only philosophy that would measure up to the transcendental motivation. Instead, we get a plurality of systems, each contradicting the other. Has this situation changed

for the better in our own times?

Amidst the confusion of our modern philosophies, each one following upon the other, dare we hope there might now be one philosophy among them in which modernity's striving for the transcendental might have achieved complete clarity and provided a solidly formed, apodictically necessary idea of transcendental philosophy? Might it, in addition, lead us to a method for doing solid, rigorously scientific work, and even to a systematic inception of, and progress in, this work?

My answer was already anticipated in my introductory remarks. I cannot do otherwise than see transcendental (or constitutive) phenomenology as the purely elaborated transcendental philosophy that is already doing real scientific work. It is much discussed and much criticized but, properly speaking, is still unknown. Natural and traditional prejudices act as a veil that inhibits access to its real meaning. Far from helping and improving, such criticism has not yet even made contact with it.

My task now is to lay out for you the true meaning of transcendental phenomenology in an evidential way. Then [169] we will have the fundamental insights in the light of which the problem of the possibility of philosophical anthropology can be settled.

The easiest place to start is with Descartes' *Meditations*. Let us be guided by their form alone and by what breaks through in them: the will to practice the most extreme kind of scientific radicalism. We shall not pursue the contents of the *Meditations*, which, as we have frequently noted, is often falsified by biased judgments. Rather, we shall try to attain a level of scientific radicalism that can never be unsurpassed. All of modern philosophy springs from Descartes' *Meditations*. Let us transform this historical proposition into a substantive one: Every genuine beginning of philosophy springs from meditation, from the experience of solitary self-reflection. When it is rooted in its origins, an autonomous philosophy (and we live in the age when humanity has awakened to its autonomy) becomes the solitary and radical self-responsibility of the one who is philosophizing. Only in solitude and meditation does one become a philosopher; only in this way is philosophy born in us, emerging of necessity from within us. What others and the tradition accept as knowledge and scientific foundations is what I, as an autonomous ego,<sup>2</sup> must pursue to its ultimate grounding, and I must do so exclusively in terms of my own sense of its evidentness. This ultimate grounding must be immediately and apodictically evident. Only in this way can I be absolutely responsible; only thus can I justify matters absolutely. Therefore I must let no previous judgment, no matter how indisputable it may seem to be, go unquestioned and ungrounded.

If I seriously try to live up to this demand, I discover to my astonishment something that is self-evident and yet has never been noticed or expressed before, namely that a universal belief in being flows through and sustains my entire life. Quite unnoticed, this belief immediately infiltrates my view of *philosophy* as well. By philosophy I understand, of course, a universal science of the world and, at a more specific level, the distinct disciplines that pertain to particular regions of the world, off "the" world. The being of "the" world is what we constantly take for granted as entirely obvious; it is the ever unexpressed presupposition. Its source, to be sure, is universal experience, with its constant certitude about being.

What status does the evidence for this certitude have? The evidence of

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<sup>2</sup>Three terms that Husserl uses in this lecture -- "ich," "Ich," and "Ego" -- are translated respectively as: I, ego, and Ego. When "ich" appears in lower case (or when capitalized only because it begins a sentence), it is generally used in the normal sense of the first person singular. The other two terms, however, have specialized philosophical meanings. When capitalized, *Ich* (in our translation: ego) usually refers to the ego of psycho-physical experience as Husserl understands it, whereas *Ego* (in our translation: Ego) refers to the subject of transcendental experience. However, Husserl twice uses *Ich* and not *Ego* to refer to the subject of transcendental experience (see below).

our experience of *individual* realities frequently fails to hold up. On occasion the certitude that it offers about being turns out to be dubious and [170] is even invalidated as an empty illusion. Why is it that, by contrast, my experiential certitude about the world -- the latter taken as the *totality* of realities that are actuality in being for me -- nevertheless stands unshaken? In point of fact I can never doubt this certitude or even deny it. Is that sufficient for a radical grounding? In the end does not this certitude about being, which inhabits the continuity of our experience of the world, turn out to be a multiply founded certitude? Have I ever pursued and expounded it? Have I ever inquired responsibly into the sources of validity, and into the import, of experience? No. Thus, without being accounted for, this certitude has sustained all my scientific activity up to now. But it must no longer go unaccounted for. I must submit it to questioning. I cannot even seriously begin an autonomous science without having first justified it apodictically, giving it an ultimate grounding through the activity of raising and answering questions.

Now a further step: Once I put in question the certitude about being that operates in my experience of the world, this certitude can *no longer serve as the basis* for forming judgments. Consequently what is demanded of us -- or of me the meditating and philosophizing ego -- is a *universal epoché* regarding the being of the world, including all the individual realities that one's experience (even one's consistently harmonious experience) submits as actual. What then remains?

The world, we say, is the totality of entities. Hence, am I now standing *face to face with the nothing*? If so, can I even formulate a judgment at all? As regards a basis for making judgments, do I still have any experience at all in which entities are already present for me in ordinary intuition, prior to all judgment? Our answer is not unlike Descartes' (even if it is not in complete agreement with him): Even though the existence of the world, as what first needs radical grounding, has now become questionable for me and has fallen under the epoché, nonetheless *I* the questioner, the one practicing the epoché, am still here, along with the "I am" of which I am conscious and which I can ascertain immediately and apodictically. From out of myself as the one practicing this epoché I possess an experience that I can immediately and actively answer for. It is not an experience of the world -- the validity of my entire world-experience has been put aside -- and yet it is still experience. In this experience I grasp myself precisely as ego within the epoché of the world, and I grasp everything that is inseparable from me as this ego. Therefore, in contrast to the being of the world, I as *this* apodictic ego am that which in and of itself is prior, insofar as my being as this ego remains unaffected by whatever status the validity of the world's being, and the justification of that validity, may have. Clearly only as *this* ego [171] can I ultimately account for the being of the world and can I (if at all) achieve a radically responsible science.

Now, a new and important step: It is not for nothing that I have been emphasizing "this ego," since, when I get this far, I realize that a *true revolution* has taken place in my philosophizing ego. *At first*, when beginning my mediation, I was, for myself, this *individual* human being who like a *philosophizing hermit* had temporarily separated himself from his fellow human beings in order to keep a healthy distance from their judgments. But even in so doing, I still base myself upon my experience of the world as something self-evidently in being. But *now* that this world is and must remain in question, so also my being as a human being -- amidst other humans and other realities in the world -- has to remain in question as well, submitted to the epoché.

Owing to this epoché *human solitude* has become something radically different: it has become *transcendental solitude*, the solitude of the *Ego*. As *Ego* I am for myself not a human being within the world that is in being; rather, I

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<sup>3</sup>It is possible (but improbable) that the sentence means: "In point of fact I can never doubt these realities [*sie*] or even deny them."

am the ego<sup>4</sup> that places the world in question regarding its entire being, and hence too regarding its being in this way or that. Or: I am the ego that certainly continues to live its life within universally available experience but that brackets the validity of the being of that experience. The same holds for all non-experiential modes of consciousness in which the world retains its practical or theoretical validity. The world continues to appear the way it used to appear; life in the world is not interrupted. But the world is now a "bracketed" world, a mere phenomenon, specifically a phenomenon whose validity is that of the stream of experience, of consciousness at all, although this consciousness is now transcendently reduced. World, in the sense of this universal phenomenon of validity, is obviously inseparable from transcendental consciousness.

With the above we have described what transcendental phenomenology calls the phenomenological reduction. What this refers to is not some *temporary* suspension of belief with regard to the being of the world but one that continues on by an act of the will, a commitment that is binding on me the phenomenologist once and for all. As such, however, it is only the necessary means for the reflective activity of experience and of theoretical judgment, the activity in which a fundamentally new field of experience and knowledge opens up: the transcendental field. What now becomes my focus -- and this can happen only through the epoché -- is my transcendental Ego, its transcendental *cogitationes*, and thus the transcendently reduced lived experiences of consciousness in [172] all their typical forms, along with my current *cogitata qua cogitata* as well -- everything of which I am presently conscious, as well as the ways in which I am conscious of it, although always within the bounds of the epoché. All of these make up the region of the Ego's transcendental consciousness, both as it currently is and as it remains unified throughout change. Although this is only a beginning, it is a necessary beginning. When carried through, transcendental reflection soon also leads to the transcendental peculiarities of the "I can," to faculties that have to do with habits, and to much more, including the universal phenomenon of validity -- the world -- taken as a universal totality that persists over against the multiple ways in which one is conscious of it.

Against all expectations, what in fact opens up here -- but only through the phenomenological reduction -- is a vast field of research. It is first of all a field of immediate, apodictic experience, the constant source and solid ground of all transcendental judgments whether immediate or mediate. This is a field of which Descartes and his successors were oblivious and remained so. To be sure, it was an extraordinarily difficult task to clarify the pure meaning of the transcendental transformation and thereby to highlight the fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, the transcendental Ego (or the transcendental sphere) and, on the other, the human being's ego with its psychical sphere and its worldly sphere. Even after the distinction had been noted and the task of a transcendental science had achieved its pure meaning, as was the case with Fichte and his successors, it was still extraordinarily difficult to see and exploit the ground of transcendental experience in its infinite breadth. Because German Idealism failed on this point, it devolved into groundless speculations, the unscientific character of which is not a matter of debate and (contrary to the opinion of many today) is not to be commended. In general, it was extraordinarily hard to completely satisfy the demands of the new problem of philosophical method as a means for making philosophy a science based on ultimate accountability. But in the final analysis everything depends on the initial moment of the method, the phenomenological reduction.

The reduction is the entranceway to this new realm, so if one gets the meaning of the reduction wrong then everything else goes wrong, also. The temptation to misunderstandings here is simply overwhelming. For instance, it seems all too obvious to say to oneself: "I, this human being [*dieser Mensch*],

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<sup>4</sup>Here and in the next sentence Husserl uses *Ich* (capitalized) to refer to the transcendental ego instead of to the ego of psycho-physical experience, as before.

am the one who is practicing the method of a transcendental alteration of attitude whereby one [173] withdraws back into the pure Ego; so can this Ego be anything other than just a mere abstract stratum of this concrete human being, its purely mental [*geistiges*] being, abstracted from the body?" But clearly those who talk this way have fallen back into the naive natural attitude. Their thinking is grounded in the pregiven world rather than moving within the sphere of the epoché. For, to take oneself as a human being already presupposes an acceptance of validity of the world. What the epoché shows us clearly, however, is that the Ego is the one in whose life-process the apperception "human being," standing within the universal apperception "world," acquires and maintains its sense of being.

Indeed, even if one goes as far as we have now, and holds the new fields of transcendental experience and judgment in sharp separation from the field of the natural world, and even if one already sees that a broad area of possible investigations opens up here, one still does not easily see what it is that such investigations are supposed to accomplish, or that one is called upon to make a genuine philosophy able to stand on its own feet.

How are investigations that have consistently and without interruption maintained the epoché—that is, pure egological investigations—supposed to have any philosophical relevance at all? After all, it is as a human being standing in the world that I pose all my theoretical and practical questions, and also all questions about my fate. Can I give all these up? But must I not do so, if the being of the world is and *remains* subjected to an epoché? This being the case, it would seem that I shall never again return to the world and to all those questions about life for the very sake of which I have philosophized and have striven for scientific knowledge as a rational and radical reflection upon the world and human existence.

Nonetheless, let us consider whether the transcendental reduction's consistent renunciation of the world in the transcendental reduction is not, after all, the necessary path to a true and valid knowledge of the world, a knowledge which can be achieved only through this epoché. Let us not forget the context of meaning of my [*Cartesian*] *Meditations*, in which, for me, the epoché received its meaning and epistemological function. The renunciation of the world, the "bracketing of the world," did not mean that henceforth the world was no longer our focus at all, but that the world had to become our focus in a new way, at a whole level deeper. What we have renounced, then, is only *the naïveté* by which we allow the common experience of the world to be already given to us both as in being as such as as being thus or so according to the case. This naïveté is dissolved if we, as [174] autonomous subjects—and this was the impelling motive—responsibly interpret the way experiencing brings about this acceptance of validity and if we seek a form of rational insight in which we take responsibility for it and are able to determine its consequences.

Now, instead of just having the world naively and posing naive questions to that world, that is, questions about truth in the usual sense, we will pose new questions to it, questions directed to the world purely as world of experience and to the therewith associated consciousness of the world—that is to say, to a world which gains its meaning and acceptance purely in us, and first of all in myself and from myself. —In myself, be it noted [*nota bene*], as transcendental Ego.

But this is precisely what we have to bring into clear focus. The being of the world possesses self-evidentness for me only insofar as that self-evidentness is my own, is within my own experience, taking place in the life of my own consciousness. Therein lies the source of all possible meaning that objective worldly facts, whatever their kind, have for me. Through the transcendental epoché, however, I see that all worldly entities, and so too my existence as a human being, are there for me only as the content of a certain experience of apperception that has the modality of certitude-about-being. As transcendental Ego, I am the one performing and living through this apperception. The apperception is an event that happens in me—admittedly one hidden from reflection—in which world and human persons are first constituted as in being. Also, every evidentness which I am able to attach to something in the world, every process of verification, whether scientific or prescientific, resides primarily in myself, in the transcendental Ego. Certainly I am indebted to

others for quite a bit, perhaps for almost everything, but they are first of all *others for me*, others who get from me whatever meaning and validity they have for me. And only because I possess their meaning and validity from out of myself can they be of help to me as fellow subjects. Thus, as transcendental ego I am the absolute subject of, and the subject responsible for *all* of my validations of being. When, by virtue of the transcendental reduction, I become aware of myself as this kind of Ego, I assume a position above all worldly being [*weltliches Sein*], above my own human being and human living. This absolute position *above* everything that holds true for me and that can ever hold true for me, along with all its possible content—precisely and necessarily this is what must be the philosophical position. And this is the position that the phenomenological reduction provides me. I have lost nothing that was there for me in the state of naiveté, and in particular nothing that showed itself to me as existing reality. Rather: In the absolute attitude [*Einstellung*] [175] I now recognize the world itself, I recognize it for the very first time as what it continuously was for me and had to be for me according to its essential nature: *as a transcendental phenomenon*. Precisely in this way I have brought into play a new dimension of questions never asked before and precisely about this existent reality: Only through the answering of these questions can concrete, full being and the definitive, complete truth come to light *about this world*.

It is clear from the outset that the world—whose acceptance in the natural attitude was necessarily that of the whole of what simply exists—in fact has its truth only as a transcendentially relative truth, whereas being in its absolute form can pertain *only to transcendental subjectivity*. But let us be careful here. Certainly the world that is in being for me, the world about which I have always had ideas and spoken about meaningfully, has meaning and is accepted as valid by me because of my own apperceptive performances because of these experiences that run their course and are combined precisely in those performances—as well as other functions of consciousness, such as thinking. But is it not a piece of foolishness [*eine tolle Zumutung*] to suppose that world has being because of some performance of mine? Clearly, I must make my formulation more precise. In my ego there is formed, from out of the proper sources of transcendental passivity and activity, my "*representation of the world*," my "*picture of the world*," whereas *outside of me*, naturally enough, there is *the world itself*.

But is this really a good way of putting it? Does this talk about outer and inner, if it makes any sense at all, receive its meaning from anywhere else than from my formation and my preservation of meaning? Should I forget that the totality of everything that I can ever think of as in being resides within the universal realm of consciousness, within my realm, that of the Ego, and indeed within what is *for me* real or possible?

Although the answer is compelling, it is still unsatisfying. Recognition of the transcendental *relativity* of all being, and accordingly of the entire world that is in being, may be unavoidable, but when it is formally set forth in this way, it is completely unintelligible. And it will remain so if from the start we allow ourselves to use the kind of argumentation that has always been the curse of the so-called "theory of knowledge."

But have we not already concretely disclosed transcendental subjectivity [176] as a field of experience and a field of cognitions [*Erkenntnisse*] related to that as their ground? In doing this, have we not, in fact, actually opened up the way to solve the new transcendental puzzle of the world? This transcendental puzzle is quite different from all other puzzles about the world in the usual sense; it consists precisely in the unintelligibility with which transcendental relativity strikes us from the very start as well as when we discover the transcendental attitude and the transcendental Ego. The starting point is not at all an end point. In any case, it is clear now what we have to do to transform it into *something understandable*, and thus to arrive at a really concrete and radically grounded knowledge of the world. We must embark on a systematic study of concrete transcendental subjectivity, and specifically we must pose the question of how transcendental subjectivity in itself [*in sich*] brings about the sense and validity of the objective world. I, as Ego, must take as my scientific theme—and thereby make it an essential scientific theme for the very first time—my own self and my entire sphere of consciousness as regards both its own essential structure and the structural processes of producing and

maintaining sense and acceptance that are carried out and to be carried out in that sphere. As a philosopher, I certainly do not want to remain in the sphere of merely empirical inquiry. So as a first step I need to comprehend essential forms of my conscious lived experiences in terms of their immanent temporality, or in Cartesian terms, I need to comprehend the stream of my "cogitationes." These lived experiences are what they are as "intentional" lived experiences. Each individual *cogito*, and every synthesis of such *cogitos* as a synthesis into the unity of a new *cogito*, is a *cogito* with its own *cogitatum* [thing thought], and this latter—taken *qua cogitatum* [as the thing thought], precisely the way it emerges as *cogitatum*—is, in accordance with its own nature, inseparable from the *cogito*. But on the other side, of course, we have to pursue the essential connection between the *cogitationes* and their corresponding faculties. The "I can," the "I am doing," and finally the "I have an abiding faculty for" are occurrences within essence, as is every capacity for being active, including that ego-consciousness. Even the ego, which at first appears to be an empty center, is the name for a transcendental problem all its own, that of the various properties of faculties. [177] Indeed, the first issue is research into the correlation between consciousness as lived experience and what it is conscious of as such (the *cogitatum*). Here we must not overlook the decisive point. As Ego, I must direct my gaze toward a bewildering multiplicity of subjective modes of consciousness, which as such belong in each case to *one and the same* object that I am conscious of and intend *in* those modes of consciousness; and these modes of consciousness belong together thanks to the *synthesis of identity*, that necessarily enters into the process. One example is the multiplicity of modes of appearance that exist within the perceiving observation of a thing, by means of which it becomes immanent in consciousness as *this one thing*. This thing that is naively given to us as one thing, and possibly as something permanent and completely unaltered—becomes the *transcendental clue* that leads us to the systematic reflective study of manifolds in consciousness that essentially pertain to any one thing. This is the case for every entity, for every individual reality, and also for the world as a total phenomenon. The mere fact that there actually is an apodictic and essential set of laws governing correlation was already a completely new discovery of unprecedented importance. But these are only the beginning steps (although these call for the most comprehensive descriptive investigations) in a progression of ever new levels of transcendental investigation, investigations which produce their solid groundedness and their concrete and apodictic evidence on the basis of concrete experience and description.

The possibility of carrying out all these investigations depends on discovering the method of correlation-research, the method for questioning back behind intentional objectivity [*intentionale Gegenständlichkeit*]. Genuine analysis of consciousness is, so to say, the hermeneutic of conscious life, where the latter is taken as that which continuously intends entities (identities), and constitutes them within its own self in manifolds of consciousness that pertain to those entities in essential ways. One must put the thumbscrews not to nature (as Bacon argued), in order to force her to betray her secrets, but to consciousness, or the transcendental Ego. The fact that such a problematic and method could remain completely hidden, is due to an essential peculiarity of conscious life itself. Which is to say: While the ego in the natural, worldly attitude is always in one way or another directed to and involved with some object that is already given to it, as is always the case in the natural-worldly attitude, is continuously directed to some objectivity that is pre-given to it, and is in some way occupying itself with it, [178] the whole streaming on of life and the production of its unity that takes place within it remains, in accordance with its nature, anonymous and, so to speak, hidden. But that which is hidden can be uncovered, for in accordance with its nature, the ego can reflectively turn its thematic gaze around; it can intentionally bend its questioning back around and through systematic explanations make its own production of unity visible and understandable.

Given the above, we now also understand that the turning away from a naive investigation of the world to a self-exploration of the transcendental, epistemological realm of consciousness does not at all signify a turning away from the world or a transition into a theoretical area of speciality that is estranged

from the world and of no interest. On the contrary, it is this turn that makes possible a really radical investigation into the world; indeed, as we shall see later, it makes possible a radically scientific investigation into what absolutely and in the ultimate sense exists [*des absoluten, des im letzten Sinne Seienden*, of the absolute entity, of that which is in an ultimate sense]. Once we have recognized the deficiencies of the naive attitude, this becomes the only possible path to take in order to establish sciences based on genuine rationality. Concretely expressed, it is the path to the only possible philosophy that is radically grounded.

Of course, this great and overwhelming task requires an extraordinarily difficult method for abstractively stratifying the transcendental sphere and for the problematics corresponding to that. It is necessary to have a fixed working procedure [*in einer festen Arbeitsordnung*] if one is to ascend from one level of problems to the next level higher.

Above all, this entails that we abstract, at a first level of investigation, from the transcendental production of empathy. This is the only way to get at the essential presuppositions for understanding the production of empathy and thereby overcoming the most embarrassing of unintelligibilities—in a word, for dispelling the initially misleading illusion of a transcendental solipsism. Naturally this cannot be accomplished through empty arguments but through concrete explications of intentionality.

Here in the ego's transcendental realm of knowing, a fundamental and essential distinction shows up between what is personally one's own, so to speak, and what is other than oneself. It is from out of myself as the one constituting the meaning of being within the content of my own private ego that I attain the transcendental other as someone just like me; and in this way I attain the open and endless whole of *transcendental intersubjectivity*, [179] precisely as that which, within its communalized transcendental life, first constitutes the world as an *objective* world, as a *world that is identical for everyone*.

This, then, is the path offered by transcendental phenomenology, a path leading away from the naiveté of everyday natural life and away from philosophy in the old style, towards absolute transcendental knowledge of whatever exists at all.

What we must constantly keep in mind is that what this transcendental phenomenology does is nothing other than to interrogate *the one* world, exactly that which is always for us the real world (the world that holds true for us, shows itself to us, the only world that has meaning for us). Transcendental phenomenology uses intentionality to interrogate the sources of that world's meaning and validity for us, the sources that comprise the true meaning of its being. That is precisely the way and the only way, to gain access to all conceivable problems about the world, and beyond them, to the transcendently disclosed problems of being, not just the old problems raised to the level of their transcendental sense.

Once anyone has seriously understood what is aimed at here, what has been here opened up in concrete work and with the most compelling evidence as systematic theory, then, there can be no doubt that there is only *one* definitive philosophy, only *one* form of definitive science, which is the science elaborated by the ordinary method of transcendental phenomenology.

\* \* \*

This implicitly answers the question of whether any anthropology, regardless of the meaning its function may have, can ever by a philosophical anthropology, and in particular, the question of whether there can be any legitimacy to a philosophy whose grounding rests on the essence of human beings in any form whatever.

For it is immediately clear that any doctrine at all of human being, whether empirical or apriori, presupposes the existing world or a world that could be in being. A philosophy that takes its start from human existence falls back into that naiveté the overcoming of which has, in our opinion, been the whole meaning of modernity. Once this naiveté has finally been unmasked for what it is, once the genuine transcendental problem has been arrived at in its apodictic necessity, there can be no going back.

I cannot help seeing the decision for a transcendental phenomenology as definitive, and I cannot help branding all philosophies that call themselves

phenomenological as aberrations which cannot attain the level of authentic philosophy.

[180] The same holds for every *objectivism* of whatever kind, for every turning to the object instead of turning back to transcendental subjectivity. The same holds for every *ontological idealism*, which like Scheler's, claims that my *Logical Investigations*, with its renewed justification of *eidōs* and of apriori or ontological knowledge gives them licence to pursue a naive metaphysics instead of following the inner tendency of that book toward investigations directed to subjective constitution. The same goes for a return to any kind of metaphysics in the old style. Instead of being a step forward, this return to metaphysics represents a failure to confront the immense and inescapable task of the present age: at last to bring the meaning of modern philosophy to clarity and truth.

Unfortunately, I can only touch briefly on the already mentioned parallelism between the human being and the [transcendental] Ego, between psychology of consciousness and subjectivity, *interior psychology*, and *transcendental phenomenology*.

The former is a psychology of the subjectivity of consciousness, purely grasped (or a psychology of the personality, the latter taken in the unique and meaningful form it has in intentional psychology), and a psychology that uses the rational, that is eidetic, method.

The actual development of psychology in modern times did not come about as the unfolding of a specialized positive science. Rather, until well into the nineteenth century it had the intention of providing a transcendental grounding for philosophy in general. Even after it became an autonomous discipline, many continued to maintain this as its function. Such a constant interwovenness of psychology and philosophy during the age of transcendental motivation would not have been possible without there being some basis in the matter being dealt with. This point is also indicated in the fact that radical efforts to reform psychology—like the introduction of intentionality into so-called descriptive psychology (the form of interior psychology in the Lockean tradition), as well as the stimulus that the human-sciences orientation gave Dilthey to try to develop a psychology of the personality in its social-historical existence. These have created the preconditions needed for a new and deeper understanding of the transcendental problem and specifically for a transcendental method that is indigenous to psychology. Conversely, transcendental phenomenology's breakthrough to its own genuine method—and this within philosophy—had a retroactive effect in the direction of reforming psychology, and [moving toward] the true meaning of an interior psychology. Its basic guiding problem, that of the psychological-phenomenological constitution of the world as [181] a human "objectivation" ["*Vorstellung*," representation], now emerges for the first time, along with the method for explicating the horizon of consciousness, a method that follows clues coming from the *cogitatum*, from the intentional object. Yet all this remained *terra incognita* to Brentano and his school.

To be sure, this remarkable relation, this parallelism between an intentional psychology and a transcendental phenomenology naturally calls for clarification. We must come to understand, on ultimate transcendental grounds, why psychology—or anthropology, if you wish—is in fact not just a positive science along with the natural sciences, but rather has an *intrinsic affinity* with philosophy, with transcendental philosophy.

This clarification has also made possible and brought the following to light: When one has revealed intersubjectivity to interior psychology (which ultimately is anthropology in the pure, intellectual sense), as has now become possible, and when this has been developed as a *rational* science in unconditioned universality and breadth (as has happened from the beginning for the rational sciences of nature)—then a spontaneous tendency begins to impel psychologists to give up their naive orientedness to the world and to understand themselves as transcendental philosophers. We could even say: Once we take the idea of a positive rational knowledge of the world and think it through to the end, once we think our way through to the ultimate grounding of such a science, at that point any positive science of the world changes over into a transcendental science of the world. Positive science remains distinct from philosophy only so long as the knower remains stuck in finite matters. But these are large topics for a lecture.

End

The following are the suggestions I made to  
Richard Palmer for his half of the translation,  
many of which are incorporated above.

174.10 ff:

But this is precisely what we have to bring into clear focus. The being of the world possesses self-evidentness for me only insofar as that self-evidentness is my own, is within my own experience, and issues from my own life of consciousness. Therein lies the source of all possible meaning that objective worldly facts, whatever their kind, have for me.

174.16

...see that all worldly entities -- and so too my existence as a human being -- are there in being for me only as the content of a certain experience of apperception that has the modality of certitude-about-being.

174.19-20

As transcendental" (lower case) Ego (upper case), I am the one performing and living through this apperception. The apperception is an event that happens in me -- admittedly one hidden from reflection -- wherein world and human persons are first constituted for me as in being.

174.22 ff.

Likewise all the evidence I obtain for worldly things, all ways of pre-scientific as well as scientific verification, reside primarily in me, the transcendental Ego.

174.25 ff.

Certainly I am indebted to others for quite a bit, perhaps for almost everything, but first of all those others are \_\_others for me\_\_, others who get from me whatever meaning and validity they have for me. And only if I possess their meaning and validity from me can they be of help to me as fellow subjects. Thus as transcendental ego I am the absolute subject of, and the subject responsible for, \_\_all\_\_ of my validations of being.

174.31-32:

When, by way of the transcendental reduction I become aware of myself as this kind of Ego, I assume a position above all worldly above, above my own human being and human living. It is precisely this absolute position \_\_above\_\_ everything that holds true for me and that ever can hold true for me, along with all its possible content, that necessarily has to be the philosophical position. And this is the position that the phenomenological reduction provides me. I have lost nothing that used to be there for me in the state of naivete and in particular nothing that showed itself to me as existing reality.

175.2-3 and ff.

"...and had to be for me according to its essential nature: I recognize it \_\_as a transcendental phenomenon\_\_. Precisely in this way I have brought into play

NEXT PARAGRAPH

175.8 ff.

It is clear from the outset that the world -- whose validity in the natural attitude was necessarily that of the whole of what simply is -- in fact has its truth as only a transcendently relative truth, whereas being in its absolute form can pertain \_\_only to transcendental subjectivity\_\_. But let us be careful here. Certainly the world that is in being for me, the world that I have ideas about and speak of in meaningful ways, has meaning and validity for me from out of my own apperceptive performances -- from my experiences that run their course and are combined precisely in those performances -- as

well as from other performances of consciousness such as thinking. But isn't it foolish to suppose that the world itself has being because of some performance of mine? So I must improve my formulation: In my ego there is formed, from out of the proper sources of transcendental passivity and activity, my "representation of the world," my "image of the world," whereas outside of me there is, naturally enough, the world itself.

175.25

Should I forget that the totality of everything I can ever think of as in being...

175.29

Although the answer is compelling, it is still unsatisfying.

175.30-31

...and accordingly of the entire world that is in being

175.32 ff

...but when it is formally set forth in this way, it is completely unintelligible.

And it will remain so if from the start we allow ourselves to use the kind of argumentation that has always been the curse of the so-called "theory of knowledge."

+++++

In general it seems to me that Husserl usually follows this convention:

"ich" = first person singular in the ordinary sense

"Ich" [capitalized] = the ego of psycho-physical experience

"Ego" [capitalized] = the transcendental Ego.

I have been translating them, respectively, as:

"I"

"ego"

"Ego"

175.35 ff

But have we not already concretely disclosed transcendental subjectivity as a field of experience and a field of cognitions related to that as to their ground?

175.4 ff.

Quite different from all other puzzles about the world in the usual sense, this transcendental puzzle consists precisely in the unintelligibility with which transcendental relativity strikes us both from the very start as well as when we discover the transcendental attitude and the transcendental Ego.

176.9

[italicize "something understandable"]

176.9-10

"...and thus to arrive at a really concrete and radically grounded [ vs. "well grounded"] knowledge of the world."

176.12-13

"...transcendental subjectivity, and specifically [und zwar] we must 176.13

"...brings about the sense and validity of the objective world."

176.14 ff

As Ego I must take as my scientific theme -- and thereby make it an essential scientific theme for the very first time -- my own self and my entire sphere of consciousness as regards both its own essential structure and the structure of the performances of sense and validity that are enacted and are to be enacted in that sphere.

176.19 ff ["cogito" and "cogitatum" to be italicized throughout:]

So as a first step I need to comprehend the essential forms of my conscious lived experiences in terms of their immanent temporality, or in Cartesian words, I need to comprehend the stream of my cogitationes. These lived experiences are what they are as "intentional" lived experiences. Each individual cogito [omit translation "moment of 'I think'"], and every synthesis of such cogito's as a synthesis into the unity of a new cogito, is a cogito with its own cogitatum, and this latter -- taken qua cogitatum precisely the way it emerges as cogitatum -- is essentially inseparable from the cogito. But on the other hand, of course, we have to pursue the essential connection between the cogitationes and their corresponding faculties. The "I can," the "I am doing" and finally the "I have an abiding faculty for" are essential occurrences as are every capacity for being active, including that of the ego-consciousness. Even the ego, which at first appears to be an empty center, is the name of a transcendental problem all its own, that of the properties of faculties.

Bottom of p. 176. To be continued.

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177.1 ff.

Nonetheless, the first issue is research into the correlation between consciousness as lived experience and what it is conscious of as such (the cogitatum).

177.3 ff

As Ego I must direct my gaze toward a bewildering multiplicity of subjective modes of consciousness, which as such belong in each case to one and the same object that one is conscious of and intends in those modes of consciousness; and they belong together thanks to the synthesis of identity that necessarily enters into the process. One example is the multiplicity of modes of appearances in which consists the perceptual observation of some thing and by means of which this one thing becomes immanent in consciousness. That which is given to us naively as one thing -- and possibly [not "eventually"] as something completely unaltered and permanent -- becomes a transcendental clue for a systematically reflective study of the manifolds of consciousness that essentially pertain to the thing. This is the case for every entity, for every individual real thing, and also [no "thus"] for the world as a total phenomenon. The mere fact that there exists here an apodictic and essential set of laws governing correlation was itself a completely new discovery of unprecedented importance.

177.19

[No "already"]

177.20-21

[Perhaps "investations" rather than "research"]

177.21-22

...investigations that constantly effect their groundedness [Bodenstaendigkeit] and produce their concrete, apodictic evidence on the basis of concrete experience and description.

177.23

The possibility of carrying out all these investigations depends on discovering the method [singular, not plural] of correlation-research, the method for questioning back behind intentional objectivity in a concretely disclosive way. In a manner of speaking, genuine analysis of consciousness is a hermeneutic of conscious life, that latter taken as that which continuously intends entities (identities) and constitutes them within its own self in manifolds of consciousness that pertain to those entities in essential ways.

177.32

The fact that such a problematic and such a method could remain completely hidden is due to an [not "the"] essential peculiarity of conscious life itself, namely: Because the ego in the natural, worldly attitude is always in some way or other directed to and involved with some object that is already given to it, [178] it happens that the flow of life within which one carries out its enactments of unity, [<-- previous comma for reading sense] essentially remain, so to speak, anonymous and hidden. But the hidden is to be unconvered: by its essence the ego can reflectively turn its thematic gaze around, it can intentionally bend the question back and, via systematic explanations, make its enactment of unity become both visible and understandable.

Up to 178.6

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Up to 178.6

178.6 ff

Given the above, we also understand that this turning away from a naive investigation of the world and turning toward the self-investigation of the transcendental egological realm of consciousness does not at all mean turning away from the world and making one's way into a world-alien and disinterested theoretical speciality.

178.12

...it is this turn that ["that" rather than "which"] makes possible a really radical investigation of the world; in fact, as we shall see later, it makes possible a radically scientific investigation of the absolute entity, of that which is in an ultimate sense. Once we have recognized the deficiencies of the naive attitude, this is the only possible way for grounding sciences upon genuine rationality. To put it concretely: it is the path to the only possible philosophy that is radically grounded.

Of course this great and overwhelming task requires an extraordinarily difficult method for abstractively stratifying the transcendental sphere and for the problematics corresponding to that.

178.22-23

[perhaps]: "...from one level of problems to the next level up [or: next level higher]."

178.24 ff

Above all, this entails that we abstract, at a first level of investigation, from the transcendental production of empathy. This is the only way to get at the essential presuppositions for understanding the production of empathy and thereby for overcoming the most embarrassing of unintelligibilities -- in a word, for dispelling the initial and misleading illusion of transcendental solipsism. Naturally this is to be done not by empty argumentation but by a concrete explanation based on intentionality.

178,34

[Husserl often uses "fremd" to mean something like "other / the other." Hence, perhaps:] ...and what is other than oneself.

178.34 ff

It is from out of myself, as the one constituting the meaning of being, and within the content of my own private ego, that I attain the transcendental other as someone *kust* like me; and in this way I attain the open and endless whole of transcendental subjectivity [179] precisely as that which, within its communalized transcendental life, first constitutes the world as an objective world, as a world that is identical for everyone.

This, then, is the path of transcendental phenomenology, the path leading away from the naiveté of everyday natural life and from philosophy in the old style, towards absolute transcendental knowledge of whatever is at all.

What we must constantly keep in mind is that this transcendental philosophy does nothing other than interrogate the one world, which is precisely the world that is always for us the real world (the world that holds true for us, that shows itself to us, the only world that has meaning for us). Transcendental phenomenology uses intentionality to interrogate the sources of that world's meaning and validity, the sources that comprise the true meaning of its being. That is precisely the way, and the only way, to gain access to all conceivable problems about the world and, beyond them, to all the problems about being -- the latter, however, as transcendentially disclosed problems, not just the old problems raised to the level of their transcendental sense.

Once anyone has seriously understood what is aimed at here and what gets disclosed as a systematic theory via concrete work and compelling evidence, there can be no doubt that there is only one definitive philosophy, only one form of definitive science, which is science elaborated by the original method of transcendental phenomenology.

\*\*\*\*

This implicitly answers the question about whether any anthropology, regardless of the meaning its function may have, can ever be a philosophical anthropology, and in particular whether there can be any legitimacy to a philosophy whose grounding rests on the essence of human beings in any form whatever.

For it is immediately clear that any doctrine at all of human being, whether empirical or apriori, presupposes a world that either is or could be in being. Thus a philosophy that takes its start from human existence falls back into the very naïveté that the whole meaning of modernity, in our opinion, is set on overcoming. Once we finally unmask this naïveté and attain the genuine transcendental problem in its apodictic necessity, there is no going back.

I cannot help seeing this decision as definitive, and I cannot help branding as aberrations all those philosophies that call themselves phenomenological but are entirely unable to reach the level of authentic philosophy. [180]

The same holds for all forms of objectivism, all those attempts to return to the object instead of turning back to transcendental subjectivity. The same goes for all ontological idealism which, like Scheler's, claims my Logical Investigations, with its renewed justification of eidos and of apriori or ontological knowledge, gives them licence to pursue some naïve metaphysics rather than following the intrinsic orientation of the book's subjectively oriented constitutive investigations. The same goes for the return to a metaphysics in the old style. Far from being progress, this represents a failure to confront the immense and inescapable task of the present age: at last to bring the meaning of modern philosophy to its clarity and truth.

Unfortunately I can only touch on the parallelism that has already been mentioned between the human being and the [transcendental] Ego, between interior psychology and transcendental phenomenology. The former is a psychology of conscious subjectivity, purely understood (or a psychology of the personality, the latter taken in the unique and meaningful form that it has in intentional psychology). This is psychology according to a rational, i.e., an eidetic, methodology.

The actual development of psychology in modern times did not come about as the simple unfolding of a specialized positive science. Rather, until well into the nineteenth century it developed with the intention of providing a transcendental grounding for philosophy in general. Even after it became autonomous, in the eyes of many people psychology still kept this function. This persistent interweaving of psychology and philosophy in an age that is motivated by the transcendental does have some grounds in the issues themselves. We can also see these grounds in the efforts at radically reforming psychology -- for example, the introduction of intentionality into so-called "descriptive psychology" (i.e., interior psychology in the tradition of Locke); or the stimulus that Dilthey's orientation to the human sciences gave him for forming a psychology of the personality in its social and historical existence. These created the preconditions for a new and more profound understanding of the specifically transcendental problem and for discovering a solidly grounded transcendental method. But on the other hand transcendental phenomenology's breakthrough to its own genuine method -- and this within philosophy -- had an immediate effect on the reform of psychology and on the authentic meaning of any interior psychology. Phenomenology's fundamental guiding problem -- namely, the problem of the psychological-phenomenological constitution of the world as [181] a human "representation" -- now came to the fore for the first time, as did the method for explaining the horizons of consciousness, a method that follows clues coming from the cogitatum, the intentional object. Yet all this was terra incognita to Brentano and his school.

To be sure, this remarkable relation, this parallelism between an intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology stands in need of clarification. We must come to understand, on the basis of ultimate transcendental grounds, why psychology -- or anthropology, if you wish -- is in fact not just one more positive science along with other disciplines like the natural sciences, but instead has an \_\_intrinsic affinity\_\_ with philosophy -- with transcendental philosophy.

This clarification has also become possible, and it has revealed the following: When, as is now possible, interior psychology (which ultimately is anthropology in the pure intellectual sense) discovers intersubjectivity and develops itself as a \_\_rational\_\_ science of unlimited universality and breadth (as happened from the beginning for the rational science of nature), then a spontaneous tendency begins to impel psychologists to give up their naive world-orientation and to understand themselves as transcendental philosophers. We could even say: Once we take the idea of a positive rational knowledge of the world and think it through to the end, once we think our way through to the ultimate grounding of such a science, at that point any positive science of the world changes over into a transcendental science of the world. Positive science remains distinct from philosophy only as long as the knower remains stuck in finite matters. But these are large topics for a lecture.

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