

Introduction to the Amsterdam Lectures

by Richard E. Palmer

There are a number of reasons that the Amsterdam Lectures, although not Husserl's best-known work, hold a special interest for present-day readers of Husserl:

1. They attempt a comprehensive short introduction to phenomenology, although of course they are only one of several such efforts undertaken by Husserl. Nevertheless, since they were composed when he was at the height of his powers and directed to an international audience, they command the attention especially of English-speaking readers. In fact, as the first lectures after his formal retirement at Freiburg they manifestly represent an effort by Husserl to distill the essence of his phenomenology into the compass of a single short opus accessible to those new to the subject.

2. In conjunction with the Britannica article they represent the closing of a chapter in Husserl's association with Heidegger. The project Husserl had envisioned as a collaborative effort had ended with Husserl dropping even the few pages of Heidegger's draft. Husserl realized, too, that this breakdown was no mere passing clash in temperaments. Rather, it made manifest in an unmistakable way that his larger project of phenomenology as a universal, rigorous science established on absolute foundations would not and could not be continued by his trusted assistant and successor to his chair at Freiburg. In this context, the Lectures offered Husserl the opportunity to reply to Heidegger unhampered by the constraints of length that were involved in the Britannica article.

3. The Lectures are of interest also as a major formulation by Husserl of the relationship between phenomenology and psychology, a subject that had occupied him from his earliest writings. This involved clarifying the relation of a pure, eidetic phenomenological psychology to empirical psychology on the one hand and to transcendental philosophy on the other. These matters had been a major topic in the Britannica article, and now they are unfolded at much greater length.

4. Finally, the Lectures are of interest as a revision of the Britannica article. On the envelope containing the manuscript in the Husserl Archives (F II 1) Husserl has added in pencil immediately under the caption, "Phenomenological Psychology: Dutch Lectures," the note: "This reworking of the project in typescript for the Encyclopedia Britannica was completed in Goettingen between the 7th and the 17th of April, 1928." Clearly, then, the Amsterdam Lectures are yet another draft of the Britannica article--a "fifth draft" as Joseph Kockelmans has termed them in his study, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology* (Pittsburgh, 1969, p. 234), which by the way contains a lengthy paraphrase of the Lectures, in essence a forerunner of the present translation.

Yet when one compares the Britannica article and the Amsterdam Lectures in detail, one is struck by the extent of Husserl's reworking of the earlier text. The Lectures not only greatly expand the Britannica article, they revise it so extensively that one actually finds only two or three dozen sentences at most that are basically identical in both versions. What remains the same in both texts is the general sequence and overall thematic structure, not individual sentences. What we find is a shared theme and sequence of topics expressed in quite different form in the two versions. The relationship, therefore, between the two texts is more like that between text and commentary than between text and revised text. This constitutes a special kind of

"intertextuality" that bears on the interpretation of both documents. Thus, it is perhaps a little misleading to call this text a "fifth draft" of the Britannica article when in fact the earlier text is something like a thematic base for a more explanatory exposition in the later text. Yet precisely because of its unique relationship to the Britannica article, we have a text which can scarcely be studied in isolation from its precursor.

The four dimensions of the significance of the Amsterdam Lectures just mentioned provide the thematic framework for a few introductory remarks.

I

The Amsterdam Lectures were written out, according to Husserl's note on the envelope (F II 1/1a, (-48)> and verified by other sources, in Goettingen during a ten-day period just after his formal retirement at Freiburg and a few days before they were presented as two lectures in Amsterdam on April 22 and 29, 1928, along with a discussion session at some other time. Husserl at this time was truly at the height of his powers. His lectures at Freiburg both before and after his retirement drew such large numbers that students arriving last had to stand. Leo Shestov, who attended Husserl's first Amsterdam Lecture, commented that Husserl stood at the podium throughout the presentation, which lasted over two hours, "with an extraordinary lightness, and with the art and power of a man forty rather than seventy years old...." <Husserl-Chronik, p. 330, citing E.H., pp. 51-52> For Husserl, surely this invitation to speak to a learned audience in Holland must have seemed a heartening reassurance that his thinking was arousing interest beyond the borders of Germany and that a lifetime of philosophical labor was not going to be lost.

In the Lectures he chose to deal with two topics he had been centrally concerned with throughout his career: the nature of phenomenology and the nature of the relationship between phenomenology and psychology. It is not surprising, then, that Husserl should turn to that essay in which he had attempted to deal with precisely these two topics: the Britannica article. It was in this article that Husserl had undertaken in short compass a general survey of phenomenology and also a clarification of its relation to psychology.

In a letter to Roman Ingarden dated December 26, 1927, Husserl wrote, "The new encyclopedia <Britannica> article has also cost a lot of work. It will come out in expanded form in the next volume of the Jahrbuch. I would like to shape the article in such a way that it furnishes a somewhat usable guiding string <Leitfaden> for the chain of further publications, above all the pieces in Ideen II." <Ich moechte den Artikel so gestalten, dass er als einigermassen brauchbarer Leitfaden dient fuer die Kette weiterfolgender Publikationen, vor allem der Stuecke von Ideen II. >Husserl-Chronik, p. 326> Clearly, then, Husserl intended the Britannica article not just as a casual piece for use in an encyclopedia, but was to function as a programmatic outline for his future endeavors. It is, in essence, an outline of his phenomenology.

One is hardly surprised, then, that when Husserl turned to the task of preparing his Amsterdam lectures, he turned to this text over which he had labored at the end of his academic career and which he regarded as a programmatic outline. Of course, it can be argued that what one finds in the Amsterdam Lectures is found in more complete form in the larger works, and furthermore that these come to us in a text that Husserl himself did not prepare for publication during his lifetime; consequently we do not have an authorized text.

Nevertheless, we do have a text which, as a fifth draft, is one which has received Husserl's careful and repeated study and attention. Furthermore, we may infer from Husserl's intention to publish an expanded version of the Britannica article in the Jahrbuch that the Amsterdam Lectures were written

not just with oral delivery in mind but to serve as that expanded version intended for appearance in the Jahrbuch.

It would seem that Husserl wrote the Amsterdam Lectures with eventual publication in mind. Another indication of this is the fact that the manuscript is embroidered with hundreds of corrections in different colored pen and pencil, a correction of some word or phrase in virtually every sentence. This suggests that our text was probably also used subsequent to the Amsterdam Lectures in connection with the lecture-course he offered in Freiburg on the topic, "Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology," and possibly also in the seminar "Phenomenological-Psychological Exercises <Husserl-Chronik, 332>," both during the summer semester of 1928.

In dealing with the question of why Husserl did not prepare the Amsterdam Lectures for publication and leave us an authorized, final text, it could be that perhaps other matters of greater novelty and urgency occupied him, or perhaps that the Cartesian Meditations (based on the Paris Lectures) already provided an expanded statement of his position. But a more likely possibility would seem to be that since the Amsterdam Lectures projected an expanded third part, as contained in the Britannica article but not given in the Amsterdam Lectures, and this would have involved considerable time, Husserl, pressed by other matters, simply never got back to the task of finishing that expanded version of the Britannica article intended for the Jahrbuch. Yet the unfinished torso is not without interest, and furthermore the Amsterdam Lectures differ considerably from the Cartesian Meditations.

The Amsterdam Lectures are only about one third the length of the Meditations and are devoted centrally to clarifying the relationship of a phenomenological psychology to empirical psychology, on the one hand, and to transcendental phenomenology on the other. Thus, while it may be true that the Amsterdam Lectures do not have the status of the major later works of Husserl, such as the Formal and Transcendental Logic, the Crisis, or even the Cartesian Meditations, nevertheless they are of interest not just in connection with Husserl's divergence from Heidegger but as a locus wherein Husserl tried to formulate his whole program and to explain in brief compass his major ideas. They comprise a concise statement of his vision of phenomenology at the height of his career and deserve to be taken seriously.

II

The matter of the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger has been dealt with at length by A. Biemel in his introduction to Vol. 9 of the *Gesammelte Werke*, which contains the text <pp. 302-49> on which this translation is based, by Spiegelberg in his magnum opus on the phenomenological movement, and of course by Professor Sheehan in this volume.

Just recently, however, a significant retrospective letter written by Husserl to Alexander Pfaender dated 6 January 1931 has been published in the *Pfaender-Studien* <Phaenomenologica 84, pp. 345-49> which gives a first-hand account of Husserl's reaction to Heidegger's betrayal of the master. Since the letter runs some five printed pages, we shall merely summarize its contents briefly. Husserl opens by saying that Pfaender's letter left him too shaken to reply immediately, but he asks him to consider whether worse has not been done to him than had been done to Pfaender. (Pfaender had written of his wife's painful illness, and also wondered that he was not considered more seriously for the post given to Heidegger.) Husserl then launches into a lengthy retrospective meditation on his friendship with Heidegger. He urges Pfaender to bear in mind that Heidegger had come to him as an assistant at just the time when his own spirits and self-confidence were at a low ebb, putting himself forward as a disciple who would continue Husserl's project of a constitutive phenomenology. Husserl recalls how impressed he was by the powerful energy of thought and commitment to philosophy he found in Heidegger, and how the conviction grew on him that the weight of responsibility for the

"Copernican revolution" he hoped to bring about through the phenomenological reduction and the building up of a constitutive transcendental phenomenology should rest on Heidegger, whom he increasingly regarded as his "only real disciple," the only one who could be shown the unrecognized breadth of his investigations and who would then be prepared to go on to discoveries of his own. Husserl recalls that constantly in those days there was talk between them of their common work, and of Heidegger's future collaboration in the completion of the investigations Husserl had begun. If Husserl died, Heidegger was to sift through the manuscripts and edit the more worthy ones and in general carry forward his philosophy.

And after Heidegger went to Marburg, Husserl interpreted the great success of Heidegger as also his own success, so that their get-togethers on vacation times were happy events, and they relished these opportunities to share a joint sense of progress. Relying on the genius of Heidegger, Husserl enthusiastically began to see the future of phenomenology as assured through the promise of Heidegger's further work.

Then he began to notice disturbing differences between their ways of doing philosophy. At first, he attributed these departures from his phenomenology to Heidegger's "powerful energy of thought," but the suspicion began to grow on him that in Heidegger "not only the method of my phenomenological research but also its very character as scientific" had been given up. Husserl tried to blame himself rather than Heidegger at first, and noted that Heidegger always denied that he had given up Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, even after the appearance of *Being and Time*. And thus Husserl entrusted to him the editing of the lectures on internal time consciousness and even presented the draft of the *Brittanica* article to Heidegger for his criticisms and "sought in collaboration with him to reshape it (which promptly miscarried)." Husserl remarks bitterly that he had plenty of warning signs: He was well aware that "Heidegger's phenomenology was something totally different from mine; his academic lectures and his book instead of being further developments of my scientific work were rather directed in open or concealed ways at attacking it and essentially discrediting it. When I mentioned this to Heidegger in a friendly way he laughed and said, "Absurd!" And thus, says Husserl, led on and blinded by his own extravagant hopes for phenomenology, and feeling himself "so completely isolated as a leader called but without followers, or better without co-researchers in the radically new spirit of transcendental phenomenology," Husserl passed the mantle on to Heidegger.

But within two months after Heidegger had taken Husserl's chair at Freiburg it was all over between them, says Husserl. "He evaded in the most obvious way any possibility of scientific discussion, apparently for him an unnecessary, undesired, unpleasant matter.... I see him once every couple of months, more seldom than the rest of my colleagues...."

Husserl's bitter disappointment comes out more directly toward the close of the letter: "I make no judgment about his personality-- it has become fully unintelligible to me. He was for almost a decade my closest friend--naturally all that is over; unintelligibility excludes friendship--but this turnabout in scientific esteem and in relation to the person was one of the most terrible misfortunes in my life.... Do you see now why I do not write as often as I would like?" Beneath Husserl's signature is a cautionary afternote. "I beg you to treat what I have said in this letter discretely. How I stand on scientific matters <wissenschaftlich, scientifically>, I have clearly expressed at every opportunity. This is enough small talk <Gerede>; my personal disillusionment <Enttauschung> with Heidegger is nobody's business <geht niemand etwas an.>."

Apparently Pfaender was indeed discrete, and it was over half a century later, after the death of all three parties involved, that the enterprising Herbert Spiegelberg came across the letter in Pfaender's papers. Husserl's letter offers us not only a poignant expression of his true feelings about the rift between himself and Heidegger, it also pinpoints the breakdown in their

relationship as two months after Heidegger's arrival back in Freiburg, and shows that this breakdown coincides with the miscarried project of collaborating on the Britannica article.

In the published text there are even exclamation points in parentheses after "him" and "together" in the sentence about submitting the draft to him for criticism so they could reshape it together, apparently registering Husserl's retrospective astonishment at his naive trust in Heidegger and how vain was that hope of hammering out a common articulation of phenomenology.

Since Professor Sheehan has already dealt with the matter in relation to the interaction between Husserl and Heidegger in relation to the earlier drafts of the Britannica article, we will only make some remarks on what is involved in seeing the Amsterdam Lectures as the final chapter of the Britannica story. When one does this, one does tend to read them in relation to the issues that divide Husserl and Heidegger rather than simply on their own merits or in relation to other Husserlian conceptions. In other words, one tends to read the Amsterdam lectures as a reply to Heidegger.

Certainly it is possible to read them in this way--as indirectly responding to Heidegger by reaffirming, defending, and explaining his position on the key issues that divided them. But such an approach treats the Amsterdam Lectures as only the final phase of the Britannica article story. It focusses on the Lectures as the ultimate form taken by the Britannica article as Husserl revised it yet a fifth time, now definitively and painfully aware that his successor was not the faithful assistant and follower, was not a colleague on the same wave-length who would carry on the project of establishing philosophy as a science on absolute foundations.

If the purpose of Husserl in collaborating with Heidegger on the Britannica article was that they should both bend a little toward each other to articulate the common program of a phenomenological revolution, the shattering of that project must have pushed Husserl in the other direction, that of hardening and clarifying the distinctions between them. Thus, we see in this text, even more than in the Britannica article, that Husserl goes to great lengths to explain the transcendental reduction and its roots in the transcendental ego.

We also see Husserl continuing his project of a scientific philosophy with absolute grounding and his project of a grounding for psychology in pure eidetic structures. As Biemel points out in his introduction, Husserl's emphasis on "rigorous science" and his view of phenomenology as a foundational discipline on which all future investigations, whether in psychology or ontology, would depend, strongly distinguishes Husserl from Heidegger. The closing lines of the Britannica article with their reference to phenomenology as a joint effort clearly indicate that Husserl at the end of his career envisioned phenomenology as basic science which would be the place for colleagues to join together in a common endeavor in which each could have his part and his work could be carried on later by others in the customary manner of scientific progress.

In this regard, Husserl was carrying forward the essentially Cartesian vision of a foundation of apodictic knowledge on which the edifice of science in all its diversity could be built. For Husserl, as for Descartes, the foundation for such a universal science on absolute foundations lay in the apodictic insight by the ego as it turns on its own constitutive acts in what Husserl calls the transcendental reduction. For Heidegger, however, the foundation of the lifeworld did not lie in the transcendental ego but in the opaque realm of Dasein's comprehension of the lifeworld in which he had his factual existence (though Husserl must have read Heidegger's ontic-ontological distinction as making the transcendental turn). But with such a foundation there can be no question of a "scientific philosophy" with an "absolute grounding" in the "apodictic insights" of reflective consciousness in the transcendental reduction.

Nor could Heidegger embrace the project of providing a theoretical foundation for psychology through eidetic structures of consciousness, although the structures of Dasein's self-awareness and Heidegger's "hermeneutic" of Dasein's facticity might have some importance for psychology. These, however, were never intended as a "theoretical foundation" for a scientific psychology, nor as an apodictic foundation for further apodictic knowledge.

Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this introduction to sort out the issues that divide the two thinkers and then systematically undertake a reading of the Amsterdam Lectures as a reply to Heidegger.

A major dimension of such an endeavor, as we have noted, would be to see what things Husserl emphasized in the Amsterdam Lectures to a greater degree than in the Britannica article. It is notable, in this regard, that Husserl goes much more extensively in the Lectures into the Ego-pole as the center of the constitutive acts of the transcendental ego. He is clearly reaffirming his view that the transcendental ego is the ultimate basis for phenomenology.

III

Whatever the merits of the Amsterdam Lectures as an introduction to phenomenology or a programmatic outline of Husserlian phenomenology, and whatever interest they may hold for us in relation to the Husserl-Heidegger debate, they are without doubt one of Husserl's most important statements on the relationship of phenomenology to psychology.

This was a subject with which Husserl wrestled in various forms from his earliest writings to his last. In Husserl the subject has several dimensions: the problem of psychologism (against which Husserl struggled his whole life), the problem of how to relate phenomenology to the empirical discipline of psychology in some way other than merely a critique of naive positivity, and finally the problem of how to move from a "psychological phenomenology" (or "phenomenological psychology") to a transcendental phenomenology free of every vestige of psychologism and positivity. In these lectures Husserl makes it clearer than ever before: phenomenological psychology has a two-fold purpose: First, by creating a pure psychology that can parallel (insofar as this is possible) the apriori natural sciences of mechanics and pure geometry, it can have a reformative effect on empirical psychology. The eidetic insights into the essential structures of mental life give us a body of apriori knowledge that is not in any way a matter of empirical fact but of universal principles.

But a "pure psychology" can have another and totally different function: it can be the propaedeutic for transcendental phenomenology.

These two functions correspond roughly to the first two sections of the Britannica article and form the two main sections of the Amsterdam Lectures as we now have them. Husserl here makes very clear the intermediate position of phenomenological psychology: It in no way has the character of empirical psychology, which remains the victim of positivity and which lacks the eidetic component as well as the foundation of certainty afforded by apodictic insight into essential structures, nor on the other hand is it transcendental phenomenology. Empirical psychology will never have the character of the pure eidetic psychology Husserl is recommending, nor will this pure psychology ever have the character of transcendental phenomenology, for it has not made the transcendental turn.

More than ever before, Husserl has clarified to himself the reformative potential of a pure psychology and the possibilities of such a pure psychology as a preliminary step toward a transcendental phenomenology. He has also clarified a program by which this transcendental phenomenology can be approached within a psychological framework--that of a "pure psychology." At the same time, he makes it quite clear that the historical roots of transcendental phenomenology do not lie in psychology at all, and thus it would seem quite possible to develop a transcendental phenomenology through pure philosophical reflection without any recourse to the empirical dimensions of psychology.

Perhaps because of his audience in Amsterdam, and perhaps in order to bid for the attention of psychologists, Husserl specifically dwells on method in a pure psychology. It is clear more than ever that Husserl expects the reformative potential of phenomenology to be felt in psychology.

This is the central theme of the first section of the Britannica article and, we assume, the whole first Amsterdam lecture as delivered in 1928. Again we see in this concern to make phenomenology relevant to a specific scientific discipline a basic contrast between Husserl's conception of phenomenology and Heidegger's. It is never Heidegger's concern to provide apodictic foundations for the sciences, nor does he address himself to

psychologists as even a major target audience for *Being and Time*, although manifestly that work can have great significance for psychologists.

So, clearly, the more Husserl addresses these concerns and does so in this way, the more Heidegger is perceiving tendencies in Husserl that he does not share. Later in his career looking back several decades to that earlier period Heidegger remarks in his letter to Father Richardson which serves as a preface to the latter's major scholarly work on Heidegger, already he was feeling the insufficiencies of transcendental philosophy per se, the tradition of transcendental philosophy not just in Descartes and Kant but in the great idealists and then Husserl. But if philosophy is to be "rigorous science" (which is what Husserl takes it to be) and if it is to serve as a reformative apriori discipline, then (according to Husserl) it must affirm in the strongest possible way its character as a transcendental discipline.

It is this point that Husserl passionately insists on: philosophy must be transcendental if it is to be philosophy and if it is to address the crisis of the European sciences--which, for Husserl, it self-evidently must do. One might say that for Husserl philosophy can never be transcendental enough. But precisely this point marks a parting of the way with Heidegger, for the loss of facticity, the denial of the factual content of the ego, bothers Heidegger. Thus his significant marginal remark on the Britannica article that the worldly is included in the transcendental ego.

Whatever the contrast in perspective may be between Husserl and Heidegger, however, Husserl in the Amsterdam Lectures is addressing directly the issue of how his phenomenology can relate to the empirical science of psychology, and these lectures remain an important articulation of that relationship as he saw it after three decades of work with the topic.

IV

Finally, The Amsterdam Lectures are interesting precisely in their relationship to the Britannica article. The two texts are parallel documents, one purportedly a "reworking" <Ueberarbeitung> of the other, yet the reworking is so thorough that it is very difficult to locate parallel sentences in the two texts even when they are mounted side by side. When one does this, it soon becomes apparent how highly condensed a version of Husserl's thinking the Britannica article is.

But the availability of a text that is, on the average, between two and three times longer under each parallel section heading in the Amsterdam Lectures gives us what is in essence a commentary on the earlier text. Quite possibly Husserl himself had doubts that his standpoint could be persuasively and clearly presented in the compass of the length to which he had restricted himself in the preparation of the Britannica article. Certainly Husserl is known to have remarked on the tremendous difficulty of this project.

So the problem is not just that the collaboration with Heidegger had not gone well, but that the article itself clearly loses a good deal of intelligibility because of its extreme conciseness. In fact, one can raise the question of whether it is feasible in the first place to try to compress the work of a lifetime into 5,000 words, especially when these words are to be addressed to an audience totally unacquainted with one's previous work and now encountering it described in a second language.

Clearly, Husserl was facing some "hermeneutical" obstacles. There is the hermeneutical question of how much preunderstanding is required in order to make sense at all of Husserl's argument in the Britannica article. Are we perhaps talking about something in the category of "Operation Impossible"--undertaken with all good will by Husserl but intrinsically beyond possibility of accomplishment? Husserl not only undertakes to explain his overall project in that space, but in both texts he goes beyond that and tries also to clarify what it means to overcome psychologism, how the reductions work, and why the transcendental problem remained unsolved for three centuries.

Here Husserl is not just referring to matters already familiar to his readers; rather, he is facing several of the thorniest problems in the history of modern thought and attempting to present his solution for them. Phenomenology, he argues, holds the solution to problems still unsolved in the sciences, which cannot overcome the chains of positivity because they lack the method of an epoche that would place the world in parenthesis, because they lack the technique of eidetic variation as a way of finding the essential structures of consciousness, because, lost in the positivity of the natural focus, they cannot see the constitutive activities by which things in the world are given in consciousness.

But can such a project as Husserl is proposing possibly be made clear and persuasive in so short a space and without exemplary studies to demonstrate one's point? Heidegger had suggested that such studies would be necessary to make the potentialities of phenomenology clear. It would seem that Husserl himself was acutely aware of this problem, and in reworking the earlier essay he took pains to expand and explain what had sometimes been concealed within a single sentence in the earlier text.

In any case, it is clear that in the Amsterdam Lectures Husserl takes advantage of having more room to unfold what might have seemed enigmatic to readers of the Britannica article, even in its original German form, and even more enigmatic to readers of the further reduced version as cut by Salmon for publication in the Encyclopedia Britannica.

In this regard, of course, see Spiegelberg's discussion of the fortunes of the article in the hands of Salmon and also his article on Gibson's diary of 1928 ("From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary by W. R. Boyce Gibson," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 2(1971):58-83).

Furthermore, it is not without hermeneutical significance that the Amsterdam Lectures were composed originally for oral presentation. The compression appropriate for a Britannica article is obviously not necessary for a scholarly lecture in Amsterdam. Here Husserl is trying to put the ideas of the Britannica article into a form that could be understood by persons in a foreign land, who were listening to a lecture in a language not their own, and on a subject not easy even for native Germans to grasp.

Surely the pressure for clarity must have been as great in the preparation of the Amsterdam Lectures as it was in the case of the Britannica article, a pressure now to express his ideas in a form that could be followed orally. Husserl the pedagogue, a man with a lifetime of public lecturing behind him, surely must have been the lively, engaging lecturer Shestov depicts in his memoir cited earlier.

Thus we have in the Britannica article and the Amsterdam Lectures two very different texts but with special possibilities of mutual illumination. Both follow basically the same sequence of topics, although in the Amsterdam Lectures Husserl does find himself early drawn into explanation of method in relation to pure psychology.

The topics are parallel not just in possessing the same three major divisional headings but in the whole sequence of subheadings. The insertion of additional subheadings by the German editor which are not in the manuscript of Lectures may somewhat obscure the parallelism. This gives the impression that Husserl was choosing new headings, when in fact Husserl is merely wandering off the topic under headings he has taken over from the Britannica article as guides for his exposition.

If we compare the main and subordinate headings in the two texts, we find that both project the same three main parts:

- I. Pure Psychology: Its Field of Experience, Its Method, and Its Function;
- II. Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology; and
- III. Transcendental Phenomenology and Philosophy as Universal Science with Absolute Foundations.

The two Amsterdam Lectures, however, did not take up Part III, so we have this part only as presented in the Britannica article. To have the Lectures stand on their own as an organic whole representing his phenomenology, Husserl would have needed to complete an expanded version of the final section comparable to his expansion of Parts I and II.

This he did not do, and the Lectures remained unpublished in Husserl's lifetime.

It is beyond the scope of the present introduction to undertake a comparison of the Britannica article and the Amsterdam Lectures, but it may be of interest simply to list the sixteen sections of the Amsterdam Lectures with an indication of the number of lines falling under each heading in that text and under the same heading in the article in the Encyclopedia Britannica. Since the German edition contains both texts in the same volume and in the same size type and line length, it becomes feasible simply to count the number of lines in the parallel sections in the German edition. The headings added to the Amsterdam Lectures by the German editor have been indicated in brackets

and, of course, do not have a parallel in the Brittanica article.

1. The Two Senses of Phenomenology: As Psychological Phenomenology and as Transcendental Phenomenology.>
EB, no heading, 17 lines; AL, 43 lines.
2. Pure Natural Science and Pure Psychology.
EB, 29 lines; AL, 93 lines.
3. The Method of Pure Psychology (Intuition and Reflection); Intentionality as the Fundamental Characteristic of the Mental.
EB, no heading; AL, 90 lines.
4. The Meaning of the Concept of Purity.>
EB, missing; AL, 108 lines.
5. The Purely Mental in Experience of the Self and of Community. The Universal Description of Intentional Processes.
EB, 98 lines; AL, 50 lines.
6. Phenomenological Psychological> Reduction and Genuine Experience of Something Internal.
EB, 98 lines; AL, 106 lines.
7. The Ego-Pole as Center of Acts of the Ego. The Synthetic Character of Consciousness.>
EB, missing; AL, 252 lines.
8. Eidetic Reduction and Phenomenological Psychology as Eidetic Science.
EB, 34 lines; AL, 112 lines.
9. The Essential Function of Phenomenological Psychology for an Exact Empirical Psychology.
EB, 72 lines; AL, 142 lines.
10. Descartes' Transcendental Turn and Locke's Psychologism.
EB, 46; AL, 113.
11. The Transcendental Problem.
EB, 73 lines; AL, 134 lines.
12. The Psychologistic Solution to the Transcendental Problem.
EB, 75 lines; AL, 70 lines.
13. The Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction and the Transcendental Semblance of Doubling.
EB, 111 lines; AL 239 lines.
14. On the Parallelism between Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.>
EB, missing; AL, 58 lines.
15. Pure Psychology as Propaedeutic for Transcendental Phenomenology. <The Radical Overcoming of Psychologism.>
EB, 51 lines; AL, 85 lines.
16. Constructing Transcendental Philosophy.
EB, missing; AL, 98 lines.

Total EB (without Part III), 700 lines; AL, 1793 lines. Total EB, with Part III, 880 lines; AL, 1793 lines. The Brittanica article, of course, contains another six sections (numbered 11-16) with an additional 180 lines which comprise Part III, but even with this additional length added to the Brittanica article, the Amsterdam Lectures remain over twice as long as the

earlier text. A further analysis and comparison of the two texts remains beyond the scope of this introduction, so the translator leaves that task to other hands.

V

The translator wishes to acknowledge with thanks the impetus from Herbert Spiegelberg more than a dozen years ago to undertake a fresh translation of the famous Brittanica article working from the uncut original version available in volume 9 of the Gesammelte Schriften.

The new translation appeared in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology in 1971 together with an introduction by Spiegelberg explaining the circumstances of its original appearance and the need for a new translation. When more recently the translation was requested for inclusion in an anthology of the shorter works of Husserl edited by Fred Elliston and Peter McCormick, the translator took the opportunity to make many changes based on corrections by Karl Schumann forwarded to him (with permission) by Herbert Spiegelberg. These have also been incorporated into the present translation.

For the present volume Thomas Sheehan and I have accepted the suggestion of the Husserl Archives that the Amsterdam Lectures do belong with the Brittanica article, so I have added the Amsterdam Lectures and Tom has translated the earlier drafts of the Brittanica article.

In translating the Amsterdam Lectures I wish to thank my cotranslator Thomas Sheehan, and also Fred Kersten for encouragement and corrections of the first fourth of the Lectures. If the first four sections seem any better translated than the rest, this may also be due to the anonymous reader at the Husserl Archives whose many valuable suggestions over the first sections have also been largely adopted.

I also gratefully acknowledge the help of two colleagues in the German Department at MacMurray College, now emeritus, Gisela Hess (the Brittanica article) and Susanne Robbins (Amsterdam Lectures) who checked my translation for grammatical and other errors.

I also wish to thank MacMurray College for the use of their computer in editing the translation and preparing it for publication.

Finally, I am indebted to Cairns' Guide to Translating Husserl which I consulted regarding every major term, although I have in some instances devised alternative renderings.

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