

THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE

THIRD DRAFT

SELECTIONS

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[INTRODUCTION:

The Idea of Phenomenology and the Step Back to Consciousness]¹

The world, the all-inclusive unity of entities in real actuality, is the field whence the various positive sciences draw their realms of research. Directed straight at the world, these sciences in their allied totality seem to aim at a complete knowledge of the world and thus to take charge of answering all questions that can be asked about entities. It seems there is no field left to philosophy for its own investigations. But does not Greek science, already in its first decisive beginnings, direct its unceasing efforts towards entities as such? Do not entities as such serve it as the subject matter of a fundamental science of being, a "first philosophy"? For Greek science, to directly determine entities -- both individuals and even the universal whole, and in whatever regard they be taken -- did not mean to understand entities as such. Entities as entities -- that is, with regard to their being -- are enigmatic.² For a long time the lines of inquiry and the answers remain tangled in obscurities.

Nonetheless, in the first steps of this "first philosophy"³ one may already see the source whence springs the questionability of entities as such. Parmenides seeks to clarify being⁴ via a reflection on one's thinking about entities. Plato's disclosure of the Ideas takes its bearings from the soul's

¹As Biemel notes (*Hu IX*, pp. 591 and 645), this introduction is a variation on the introduction that Heidegger drafted, with similarities of content and tone but without any indication that it was edited by Heidegger. The text is printed as "Addendum 29" in *Hu IX*, pp. 517-519.

²The italics in this and the previous sentence are added by the translator.

³Changed by Husserl to: "in the first steps of this philosophy": (*Hu IX*, p. 645). The quotation marks are added by the translator.

⁴Within the text Husserl glosses "being" with "entities as such." [B1, p. 1.18; *Hu IX*, p. 598]

soliloquy (logos) with itself. The Aristotelian categories arise with regard to reason's assertoric knowledge. The modern age of philosophy begins with Descartes' explicit founding of first philosophy on the ego cogito. Kant's transcendental problematic operates in the field of consciousness. The turning of the gaze away from entities and onto consciousness renders perceptible a fundamental relatedness of all entities to consciousness, a relatedness that somehow captures the ontological⁵ sense of those entities.

This relatedness must be thoroughly clarified, both in general and as regards all the particular formations and levels of entities, if the cognitional task [p. 518] assumed by the positive sciences as a whole is not to remain caught in naïve one-sidedness. At the start of modern times and in a less than pure form at first, the realization begins to dawn that First Philosophy requires a science of conscious subjectivity, specifically as that subjectivity in whose own conscious performances all entities are presented in their respective subjective forms and modes of validity. The new phenomenology is this science: here its idea is elaborated purely and fundamentally and carried out systematically. In its comprehensive elaboration it is the realization of the idea of a scientific philosophy. It arises from⁶ a fundamental clarification of the genuine sense that the return to conscious subjectivity must have, as well as from radical reflection on the paths and procedural rules of this return, and finally from a method (motivated by the foregoing) for clearly highlighting the field of intuition of "pure consciousness," a field that is presupposed in philosophical inquiry as unproblematic. The systematic exploration of this field is then the theoretical task of phenomenology as a science.

But is not psychology already competent to do the work assigned to phenomenology? Is not psychology the science of conscious subjectivity, including all the subjective forms whereby entities are presented in consciousness? Therefore, what more could be required for philosophy besides a "pure" psychology rigorously and consistently restricted to inner experience

⁵On the translation of "Seinssinn" by "ontological sense," see the relevant footnote to Draft B, section ii-a, *Hu IX*, p. 264.20.

⁶Changed by Husserl from "It is grounded in" (*Hu IX*, p. 645.)

alone?⁷

However, a more thoroughgoing reflection on the region and the requisite method of such a pure psychology soon leads one to the insight into the impossibility, on principle, of pure psychology providing foundations for First Philosophy. All the same,⁸ there remains an extraordinarily close relation between the psychological doctrines fashioned purely from inner intuition and phenomenology's specifically philosophical doctrines. The terms "consciousness" and the "science of consciousness" bear a double significance resting on essential grounds, and unless this double significance is clarified, a secure grounding of philosophy is impossible. In the interests of philosophy, but also in the interests of psychology as a positive science,⁹ what is required is the development of a thoroughly self-contained psychological discipline dealing with the essence of pure conscious subjectivity. Even though this discipline, like all positive sciences, is itself not philosophical, it can serve, under the title "psychological phenomenology"¹⁰ as a first step in the upward ascent to philosophical phenomenology.

The idea, method, and problematic [of pure psychology] are dealt with in Part I. In Part II the explanation and purification of the specifically philosophical problem, that of the "transcendental," leads to the method for solving that problem, and it does so by laying out what is presupposed in its very sense, namely, the "transcendentally pure consciousness" as [p. 519] the field of the genuine phenomenological science of consciousness. The ideas of a pure psychological science of consciousness and of a philosophical science of

⁷Husserl crossed out the word "perhaps" after "alone" (*Hu IX*, p. 645).

⁸It is with this sentence in particular that Husserl begins to change Heidegger's "Introduction" and, specifically, to add paragraphs that refer ahead to the issues of Parts II and III: the double significance of "consciousness" and their parallelism, the propaedeutic function of phenomenological psychology, the future full system of phenomenological philosophy, etc.

⁹Changed to: "In the interests not only of an unconfused philosophy but also of a final grounding of psychology as an exact positive science" (*Hu IX*, p. 645).

¹⁰Changed by Husserl to: "under the title 'pure or phenomenological psychology,'" *Hu IX*, p. 645.

consciousness -- which get clarified by being contrasted -- reveal the parallelism of the contents of their doctrines, a parallelism that makes it unnecessary for the two sciences to undergo separate systematic development. The necessity of a phenomenological grounding of all positive sciences proves that, in the future system of thoroughly grounded sciences, phenomenology must have the pre-eminent place and accordingly that within this system, and without requiring independent development, a psychology will make its appearance only as an application of phenomenology.

By clarifying the profound reasons for the crisis of foundations in modern positive sciences, as well as their essential need for fully adequate grounding, one shows that they all lead back to a priori phenomenology as the only science that is methodically self-sufficient and absolutely and intrinsically self-justifying. It encompasses the complete system of every possible a priori and thus also of every conceivable method, or, what amounts to the same thing, the complete system of every possible a priori science in its absolute grounding. In the transition from eidos to factum it finally becomes clear that the idea of the systematic totality of positive empirical sciences phenomenologically grounded on an ultimate foundation is equivalent to the idea of a universal empirical phenomenology as a science of factual transcendental subjectivity.¹¹

¹¹This last paragraph is taken from Husserl's shorthand appendix. *Hu IX*, p. 645.

FROM THE LATER PAGES¹²
OF THE THIRD DRAFT

[PART III]

[\$11 Transcendental Phenomenology as Ontology]¹³

<p. 31> Transcendental phenomenology is the science of all conceivable transcendental phenomena in the synthetic totality of forms in which alone those phenomena are concretely possible: the forms of transcendental subjects linked to communities of subjects. For that very reason this phenomenology is eo ipso the absolute, universal science of all entities insofar as they get their ontological sense from intentional constitution. That holds as well for the subjects themselves: their being is essentially being-for-themselves. Accordingly, transcendental phenomenology is not one particular science among others; rather, when systematically elaborated, it is the realization of the idea of an absolutely universal science, specifically as eidetic science. As such it must encompass all possible a priori sciences in systematic unity, specifically by thoroughly considering the a priori connections in absolute grounding.

We could even bring up the traditional expression and broaden it by saying: Transcendental phenomenology is the true and genuinely [p. 520] universal ontology that the eighteenth century already strove for but was unable to achieve. It is an ontology that is not stuck either in the naïve one-sidedness of natural positivity or, like the ontologies of Baumgarten and Wolff, in formal generalities and analytic explanations of concepts far removed from issues. Our ontology draws upon the original sources of a universal intuition that studies all essential connections, and it discloses the complete system of forms that pertains to every co-possible universum of possible being in general and, included therein, that belongs to every possible world of present <p. 32> realities.

¹² Hu IX, pp. 519.26--526.44, reproducing C3 pp. 31.1--43.17.

¹³ Hu IX, pp. 519.26--520.34 (= C3 p. 31.1--32.24). The material generally corresponds to that of Draft D III, §11, from which we take the title. We have added some of the paragraph breaks in the following pages.

Leibniz already had the fundamental insight that in every genuine theoretical knowledge and science the knowledge of possibilities must precede the knowledge of actualities. Accordingly, for every kind of real and ideal sphere of being he required the appurtenant a priori sciences as such of pure possibilities (for example, even a pure grammar, a pure doctrine of law, and so forth). Consequently he grasped the true meaning of the distinctive achievement of the exact natural sciences and their exemplar role for the methodic formation of all sciences of reality. Since Bacon modernity has been imbued with the striving for a universal world-knowledge in the form of a complete system of the sciences that deal with real things, which, if it is supposed to be truly scientific knowledge fashioned via a method of rational insight, could in fact be fulfilled only by systematically pursuing the a priori that belongs to the concretion of the whole world and by unfolding that a priori in a systematic assemblage of all a priori sciences of real things. Of course, Leibniz' grand design lost its effective power as a consequence of Kant's critique of the ontology of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school; not even the a priori of nature was developed in systematic completeness. Nonetheless, that part of the project that survived brought about the exact methodological form of the physical disciplines. However, this [methodological] superiority does not yet mean that these disciplines have a fundamentally complete methodological form.

**[§12 Phenomenology and the Crisis in the Foundations
of the Exact Sciences]¹⁴**

Closely connected with this is the fact that more and more the fundamental principle of the method of mathematics is being shown to be inadequate, and the much admired evidence of mathematics is being shown to need critique and methodological reform. The crisis of foundations, <p. 33> which today has gripped all the positive sciences, also and most noticeably concerns the pure mathematical sciences that are the foundations of the exact sciences of nature. The conflict over the "paradoxes" -- that is, over the

¹⁴ *Hu IX*, pp. 520.34--521.27 (= C3 pp. 32.24-- 34.9). The material generally corresponds to that of Draft D, III, § 12, from which we take the title.

legitimate or illusory evidence of the basic concepts of set theory, arithmetic, geometry and the pure theory of time, and also over the legitimacy of the empirical sciences of nature -- instead of taking charge of these sciences and transforming them in terms of their requirements, has revealed that, as regards their whole methodological character, these sciences still [p. 521] cannot be accepted as sciences in the full and genuine sense: as sciences thoroughly transparent in their method and thus ready and able to completely justify each methodical step.

Thus the realization of Leibniz' design of rationally grounding all positive sciences by developing all the corresponding a priori sciences does not yet mean that the empirical sciences have achieved an adequate rationality, especially when these a priori sciences themselves are developed only on the basis of the evidence of naïve positivity -- after the fashion of geometry, for example. The genuine basic concepts of all positive sciences, those from which all scientific concepts of the real must be built up, are necessarily the basic concepts of the corresponding a priori sciences as well. When a method based entirely on insight lacks the legitimate formation in which the knowledge of its genuine and necessary sense is founded, then that unclarity is transmitted to the entire a priori and then to the entire theoretical store of the empirical sciences.

Only by way of phenomenological reform can modern <p. 34> sciences be liberated from their intolerable situation. Of course, Leibniz' fundamental demand for the creation of all the a priori sciences remains correct. But that entails discovering the idea of a universal ontology, and this discovery must be essentially complemented by the knowledge that any ontology drawn from natural positivity essentially lacks self-sufficiency and methodological incompleteness belongs within the nexus of the only absolutely self-sufficient and absolutely universal phenomenology.

**[§13 The Phenomenological Grounding of Fa₁₅ctual Sciences,
and Empirical Phenomenology]**

¹⁵ Hu IX, pp. 521.27--525.40 (= C3 pp. 34.9--41.19). The material generally corresponds (at great length) to that of Draft D, III, §13, from which we derive this title.

As the ontological disciplines are being reshaped into concretely complete constitutive ontologies, likewise the whole radical method that positivity necessarily lacks is created with insight. Indeed, in its universality, transcendental phenomenology thematically comprises all conceivable performances that take place in subjectivity; it encompasses not just all habitual attitudes and all formations of unity constituted in them but also the natural attitude with its straightforwardly existent world of experience and the corresponding positive sciences, empirical as well as a priori, related to that world. But transcendental phenomenology is concerned with and deals with these and all formations of unity along with the constituting manifolds. Thus, within its systematic theories [and] its universal a priori of all possible contents of transcendental subjectivity, the entire a priori accessible to the natural attitude must be comprised, established not in some crude, straightforward fashion but rather always along with the a priori of its appurtenant transcendental constitution. And that means: along with the method for its production, whether that method be incomplete or, in the case of complete formation, <p. 35> endowed with rational insight.

Let us clarify this for ourselves in a few steps. The concrete thematic [p. 522] field of all positive empirical sciences is the world of real things. In accordance with the universal structures of these things, there is a division of sciences or groups of sciences, with their essentially different [focusses]. Such structures mark off, for example, nature and the spiritual realm of the psychical; and within nature they mark off, for example, space and time as either separated from or bound to the universal structures under consideration. Pure research into nature or pure research into psyches is abstractive to the degree that it stays exclusively within the universal structures of that one particular science and leaves untouched those structures in which the two intertwine. Rational science, as science based on principled -- that is, a priori -- insights into structures, demands knowledge of the concrete full a priori of the world, i.e., the exhibition of the world's essential total form, with the universal structures belonging to it, and finally, for each one of these structures, the exhibition of the partial

forms included within it. Thus, for example, one must work out [on the one hand] the whole a priori formal system that rules all possible formations of natural data insofar as they should and always can belong to the unity of a possible nature; or, on the other hand, the possible formations of the psychic that should belong to the unity of a possible psyche -- and, at a higher level, of a community of psyches -- and that should be able to be "co-possible" in it.

The method for attaining an a priori of any level of forms whatsoever is, as regards universality, always the same. The method for [attaining] the psychological a priori has already been indicated above. The facta that serve in any given case as <p. 36> the starting point of the experience become, as such, "irrelevant"; freely varied in imagination, they become the starting points of an open-ended series of imaginative transformations that are to be freely pursued with awareness of their openendedness (the "and so forth"). The comprehending gaze is now directed to the stable form that stands out in the course of these optional variations -- to this form as the essential structure that, in this optional, open-ended variation, stands out in the consciousness of its unbreakableness, its necessary apodictic invariance. In this way, within the factual experiential world or world-structure, or within individual factually experienced realities, one comes to recognize that [element] without which any conceivable world at all, any conceivable thing at all, etc., would be unthinkable.

Like any activity with a justified goal, this one too requires knowledge of essence if it is to be a rational activity. It requires critique of and therefore reflection on its method and then possibly a transformation of its method in the sense of an evidential justification of the goal and the path. A basic and pre-eminent element of method has to do with possible experience itself through which one gets those possibilities of objects of experience that function as variants. Imaginative variation, on which the knowledge of essence rests, should yield concrete, real possibilities -- for example, things that possibly exist. Therefore, that by means of which things become represented cannot be a mere imaginative variation of the current individual perceptual appearances. [p. 523] Every possible individual perception makes a

presumption regarding the being and the being-thus-and-so of the possibly perceived thing; it gives only one side of the thing, but imbued with the undetermined presumption of certain other sides that presumably are accessible in new possible experiences. How do one-sidedness and many-sidedness become all-sidedness? What form must the flow of possible experiences have in which the concretely full thing is to come to intuition as an existent entity without (and this is an open possibility) getting turned into an empty illusion? <p. 37>

Therefore, for knowledge of essence to be adjudged genuine and normatively formed, what is needed is a systematic study of the phenomenological constitution of possible realities -- and of the world itself that encompasses them all -- in the manifolds of possible experience. Or, as one might also put it: we need a theory of experiential "reason." And yet another thing: The a priori of a possible world is a theoretical, predictively formed a priori. Only in this way does it acquire the form of an objective truth, i.e., one that is intersubjectively utilizable, verifiable, documentable. In this regard new basic elements of method are required: a disclosure of the paths of "logical" reason as well as of experiential reason. On the one hand, the need arises for a higher-level a priori that relates to the ideal objectivities emerging under the rubrics of "judgment" and "truth." We need a doctrine of the forms of possible predicative formations (judgments) -- both individual ones and those to be connected synthetically and in mutual feelings -- in particular a doctrine of the forms of possible true judgments, and finally of those open-ended systems of truth that, synthetically related to a unified region, are called sciences (understood as unities of theory). [On the other hand,] correlative to this [we need] a formal doctrine of manifolds whose theme is the formal idea of a region as thought by means of, and formally to be determined by, mere forms of truth.

The formal logic just described, taken in the broadest sense of a mathesis universalis that includes all analytically mathematical disciplines of our time, is itself a positive science, only of a higher level. Nonetheless, because the new irreal objectivities -- judgments, truth, theories, manifolds <p. 38> -- are for their part subjectively constituted and

require a rational method (a method of evidential formation) in order to be comprehended, for that reason we come to new strata of phenomenological research that are requisite for a genuine scientific ontology. Phenomenology is itself a science, it too fashions predicative theories, and it becomes evident that logical generality governs all such theories whatever -- and in that way one side of the thoroughly self-referential nature of phenomenology is revealed. An apriori does arise already, one that is naively practiced prior to such universal reflections on what is required, one that stands out in subjective certitude (e.g., as a geometric a priori). But as a vaguely grasped a priori, it is subject to misunderstandings [p. 524] regarding to its actually necessary content and its import. Up to a certain point a science, like any other goal-oriented undertaking, can be successful even if it is not completely clear about basic principles of method. But the proper sense of science nonetheless entails the possibility of a radical justification of all its steps and not just a superficial reflection and critique. Its highest ideal has always been the complete justification of every one of its methodological steps from apodictic principles that, in turn, have to be justified for all times and all people. Finally, the development of a priori disciplines was itself to serve the method of scientific knowledge of the world, and all of this would have been true of a universal ontology, if one had been developed in fulfillment of Leibniz' desideratum. But as we see, every a priori itself requires in turn a radical methodological <p. 39> justification, specifically within a phenomenology that encompasses all a priori correlation.

Thus it is that the crises in the foundations of all the positive sciences that are striving to advance indicates, and makes understandable, the necessities of research into the methods of those sciences. Although these sciences still are not clear on it, they lack the method for the apodictic formation and justification of the methods whence they are supposed to derive their unassailable basic concepts and ultimate foundations with an evidence that leaves absolutely no room for obscurity about their legitimate sense and import. Such evidence cannot be acquired naively nor can it be one that merely is "felt" in naïve activity. Rather, it can be acquired only by means of a

phenomenological disclosure of certain structures of experiential and logical reason, structures that come into question for the respective basic concepts - that is, by means of very painstaking and thoroughly developed phenomenological research.

To be sure, this research could have first taken place as purely psychological research -- if, among the a priori sciences, a pure psychology had already been developed. But then one could not have just stopped at that point. For, as has become clear from our presentation, the consistent development of the idea of such a psychology carries with it a strong incentive for awakening the transcendental problem and thus for the awareness that an ultimately grounded cognition can only be a transcendental cognition.

At this point it becomes clear that the full elaboration of the problematic of the foundations of the positive sciences and of their inherent tendency to transform themselves into radically genuine sciences -- completely self-transparent and absolutely self-justifying in their cognitive achievements -- <p. 40> leads, first of all, to the projection (within a complete system of a priori disciplines) of the total a priori of the factual world as a world in general, and, in conjunction with that, the projection of the complete system of the possible disciplines of a mathesis universalis understood as the most broadly conceived formal logic; and then leads to the transformation of all these disciplines into [p. 525] phenomenologically grounded ones and therewith it lets them emerge in radically genuine form as branches of an absolute and absolutely universal ontology that is the same as fully developed transcendental phenomenology. This latter is itself the ultimate science, the one that, in justifying itself, is referred back to itself. From it we manage, with consistent progress, to achieve a necessary broadening of the idea of universal phenomenology into the idea of the absolutely universal science that unites in itself all cognitions, both eidetic and empirical.

The universal a priori includes all the possibilities of empeiria in general and thus all possible empirical sciences -- as ideal possibilities. Thus the sciences that treat the factum of this experiential world have their essential form entirely -- on both the noetic and the noematic-ontic sides --

pre-indicated by this universal ontology; and they are genuine sciences only in their being referred back to this form. By the transformation of positive ontology into transcendental ontology and with the grounding of positive empirical sciences on transcendental ontology, the positive empirical sciences are transformed into phenomenologically understood sciences, sciences of factually transcendental subjectivity, along with everything which that subjectivity accepts as "in being." So the end-result is also an empirical, factual-scientific phenomenology. Ideally developed, it is present <p. 41> in the system of all positive empirical sciences that are brought to the status of radical scientificity on the basis of eidetic phenomenology.

In this manner eidetic phenomenology is the necessarily first phenomenology that must be grounded and systematically carried through, whereas the rationalization of the factual sciences, the initial form of which is necessarily more or less naïve, is the second [task]. The complete system of these rationalized empirical sciences is itself empirical-scientific phenomenology. This means that eidetic phenomenology is the method whereby factual transcendental subjectivity comes to its universal self-knowledge, to a rational, completely transparent self-knowledge in which subjectivity perfectly understands both itself and whatever it accepts as in being. Universal and ultimate science is absolute science of the spirit. Like all culture, eidetic phenomenology as science resides in factual transcendental subjectivity, produced by that subjectivity and for it so that it may understand itself and thereby understand the world as constituted in it.

[\$15 The "Ultimate and Highest" Problems as Phenomenological]¹⁶

The universality of phenomenology manifestly encompasses all conceivable scientific problems; it is within subjectivity that all questions receive their sense, which is always the sense that they can have for subjectivity. In it is carried out the separation of rational from irrational questions and thus ultimately the separation of scientific from pseudo-scientific questions.

¹⁶ *Hu IX*, pp. 525.40--526.36 (= C3 pp. 41.20--43.8). The material generally corresponds to that of Draft D, III, §15, from which we take this title.

All groups of problems, however they be gathered under the particular title of philosophy, are included within phenomenology according to their genuine sense and method. Thus, of course, [p. 526] questions about the "sense" of history or <p. 42> the "theory of historical knowledge" are also included, that is, questions about the methods for "understanding" individual facts of the personal world -- methods that are to be formed from the corresponding a priori sources through apodictic insight. Likewise phenomenology takes in the totality of rational praxis and every categorial form of the practical environment that goes with such praxis. To know is not to value in one's heart and to shape according to values (so far as the goals of cognition are not themselves valued as goals and striven for), but every performance of a valuing and a willing intentionality can be turned into a cognitive one and produces objects¹⁷ for cognition and science. Thus all forms of the spiritualization of nature with some kind of ideal sense -- especially all forms of culture in correlation with culture-producing persons -- become themes for science, [and the same holds], in highest universality, for the whole of the life of striving and willing with its problematic of practical reason, the absolute ought, and so on. Here belongs the task of clarifying the striving for true and genuine humanity, a striving that belongs essentially to the personal being and life of humankind (in the transcendental sense of this word).

Only in universality do all such problems get their full significance and their evidential method. Any one-sidedness or isolation of philosophical problems -- which are always and without exception universal problems -- takes its revenge through unintelligibility. By being referred back to itself, phenomenology, taken in its fully developed idea, clarifies its own function. In phenomenology as absolutely universal science, there is achieved the universal self-reflection of humankind. Its results, growing in scope and perfection, its theories and disciplines, are ultimately <p. 43> called upon to regulate, with insight, a genuine life for humanity. As regards metaphysics, phenomenological philosophy is anti-metaphysical only in the sense that it rejects every metaphysics that draws on extra-scientific sources

¹⁷ "Themen."

and engages in high-flown hypothesizing. But the old metaphysical tradition and its genuine problems must be placed on the transcendental level where they find their pure formulation and the phenomenological methodology for their solution.

[§14 Complete Phenomenology as All-embracing Philosophy]¹⁸

The full development of the idea of a universal phenomenology leads precisely back to the old concept of philosophy as the universal and absolute -- i.e., completely justified -- science. Here the conviction that dominated Descartes' philosophy gets confirmed for essential reasons: his conviction that a genuinely grounded individual science is possible only as a branch of sapientia universalis, the one and only universal science, whose idea, developed in pure evidence, must guide all genuine cognitive endeavors.¹⁹

**[§16 The Phenomenological Resolution of
All Philosophical Antitheses²⁰]**

(End)

¹⁸ *Hu IX*, p. 526.36-44 (= C3 p. 43.8-17). This material corresponds to some of that of Draft D, §14, from which we take the title.

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²⁰ Husserl took the remainder of Draft C (pp. 43.18-45.18 into Draft D, where he made it §16. (*Hu IX*, p. 526, n. 1)