

EDMUND HUSSERL
"PHENOMENOLOGY"
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE
DRAFT B
("ATTEMPT AT A SECOND DRAFT"¹)

Translated by Thomas Sheehan

¹"Encycl Brit Zum Versuch der zweiten Bearbeitung (während Heid. Anwesenheit) und Heid. 1-10": in Husserl's shorthand on a cover sheet preceding the text of B2. *Hu IX*, p. 597 (and in part, p. 590).

[Section i, <pp. 1-11>]

INTRODUCTION:

THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY,
AND
THE STEP BACK TO CONSCIOUSNESS

drafted by
Martin Heidegger

The universe of entities is the field from which the positive sciences of nature, history, space² acquire their respective areas of objects. Directed straight at entities, these sciences in their totality undertake the investigation of everything that is. So apparently there is no field of possible research left over for philosophy, which since antiquity has been considered the fundamental science.³ But does not Greek philosophy, right from its decisive origins, precisely make "entities" its object of inquiry? Certainly it does -- not, however, in order to determine this or that entity, but rather in order to understand entities as entities, that is to say, with regard to their being.⁴ Efforts at answering the question "What are entities as such?" remain shaky for a long time because the posing of the question is itself entangled in essential obscurities.

Nonetheless, already in the first steps of the science of the being of entities something striking comes to light.⁵ Philosophy seeks to clarify

²Husserl (B1, p. 1.4) glosses the words "history, space" with "spirit history."

³Husserl (B1, p. 1.7-8) puts square brackets around the phrase "which since antiquity has been considered the fundamental science."

⁴In B1 p. 1.13 this word is underlined by hand, probably by Heidegger.

⁵Husserl (B1, p. 1.13-18) brackets the last two sentences and in the left margin substitutes the following for them: "For a long time the posing of the question, and consequently the answers, remain entangled in obscurities. Nonetheless already in the origins something striking comes to light." This latter text is taken into *Hu* IX at p. 256.12-14.

being⁶ via a reflection on one's thinking about entities (Parmenides).⁷ Plato's disclosure of the Ideas takes its bearings from the soul's soliloquy (logos) with itself.⁸ The Aristotelian categories originate with regard to reason's assertoric knowledge. Descartes explicitly founds First Philosophy on the res cogitans. Kant's transcendent problematic operates in the field of consciousness. Is this turning of the gaze away from <p. 2> entities and onto consciousness something accidental, or is it demanded, in the final analysis, by the specific character of that which, under the title "being," has constantly been sought for as the problem-area of philosophy?⁹

The fundamental insight into¹⁰ the necessity of the return to consciousness; the radical and explicit determination of the path of, and the procedural rules for, this return; the principle-based determination and systematic exploration of the field that is to be disclosed¹¹ in this return - - this we designate as phenomenology.¹² It stands in the service of the guiding philosophical problematic, namely, the question about the being of

⁶Husserl (B1, p. 1.18) glosses "being" with "entities as such."

⁷Cf. Parmenides, Fragment 3: τ γ α τ νο υ στ υ τ α υ αι.

⁸See Plato, Sophist, 263e, where thought, δι νο ι α, is defined as μ υ ν υ τ ς ψ υ χ ς π ς α τ υ δι λο γ ο ς υ υ ο ν ς γ γ ν μ ν ο ς, that is, "the interior dialogue of the soul with itself, which happens without sound." See Heidegger's lecture course of 1924-1925 published as Platon: Sophistes, GA I, 19, edited by Ingeborg Schüßler, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992, pp. 607-608: "es ist ein λ γ ι υ der Seele zu sich selbst," p. 608.

⁹The implicit quotation here is from Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z 1, 1028 b 2ff.: α δ α τ π λ αι τ α υ υ α ζ η τ ο μ ν ο ν α π ο ο μ ν ο ν, τ υ υ; τ ο τ σ τ ι, τ ς ο σ α; -- a text that Heidegger cites in part in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, fourth, enlarged edition, 1973, p. 239, E.T., Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated by Richard Taft, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 168; and Was ist das -- die Philosophie?, fourth edition, Pfullingen: Neske, 1966, p. 15, E.T. What is Philosophy? translated by Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback, New Haven, Connecticut: College and University Press, 1958, p. 53.

¹⁰Husserl (B1, p. 2.3-4) changes "The fundamental insight into..." to "The fundamental clarification of...." See Hu IX, p. 256.26.

¹¹Husserl (B1, p. 2.7) changes "to be disclosed" to "is disclosed." See Hu IX, p. 256.30.

¹²Husserl (B1, p.2.8) changes "we designate as phenomenology" to "is called phenomenology." See Hu IX, p. 256.31.

entities in the articulated manifold of its kinds and levels.¹³

But for a long time now¹⁴ has not this task of returning to consciousness been taken over and adequately fulfilled by psychology, with the result that laying a radical foundation for philosophy coincides with producing a pure psychology?¹⁵ Nonetheless, fundamental reflection on the object and method of a pure psychology can let us see precisely¹⁶ that such a psychology is fundamentally unable to secure¹⁷ the foundations for philosophy as a science. For psychology itself, as a positive science, is the investigation of a determinate region of entities and thus, for its part, requires a foundation.¹⁸

Therefore, the return to consciousness, which every philosophy seeks with varying [degrees of] certitude and clarity, reaches back beyond the region of the pure psychic into the field of pure subjectivity. Because the being of everything that can be experienced by the subject in various ways -- the transcendent in the broadest sense -- is constituted in this pure subjectivity, pure subjectivity is called transcendental subjectivity. Pure psychology as a positive science of consciousness points <p. 3> back to the transcendental science of pure subjectivity. This latter is the realization of

¹³ Husserl (B1, p. 2.8-11) brackets this sentence and in the left margin substitutes the following for it: "The ultimate clarification of the philosophical problem of being, and its methodic reduction to scientifically executed philosophical work, overcome the vague generality and emptiness of traditional [p. 257] philosophizing. The mode of inquiry, the methodic research and solutions, follow the classification, according to principles, of what [the attitude of] positivity straightforwardly accepts as 'entities' in all their kinds and levels." See *Hu IX* 256.31 to 257.3.

¹⁴ Husserl (B1, p. 2.12, within the text) overwrites this phrase with "since Locke."

¹⁵ Husserl (B1, p. 2.11-14) amends this sentence to read: "But since Locke, has not this task been taken over by psychology? Does the radical grounding of philosophy demand anything other than simply a psychology of pure conscious subjectivity, methodically and consistently restricted to inner experience?" See *Hu IX*, p. 257.4-8.

¹⁶ Husserl (B1, p. 2.15) brackets out this word ["gerade"]. See *Hu IX*, p. 257.8.

¹⁷ Husserl (B1, p. 2.17) changes this from "secure" [sichern] to "provide" [beistellen] See *Hu IX*, p. 257.11.

¹⁸ Husserl (B1, p. 2.18-20) amends this sentence to read: "For psychology is itself a positive science, and in keeping with the way any positive science does its research, psychology leaves untouched the question that concerns all these sciences equally, namely, the question about the meaning of being in the regions of being of these sciences." See *Hu IX*, p. 257.12-15.

the idea of phenomenology as scientific philosophy. Conversely, only the transcendental science of consciousness provides full insight into the essence of pure psychology, its basic function, and the conditions of its possibility.¹⁹

¹⁹On the back of B1, p. 2 Husserl writes a long shorthand memo. It is difficult to ascertain to what passage of the typescript (if at all) it is intended to pertain. Biemel transcribes the text at *Hu IX*, p. 598-599. For a translation of the text, see below: Husserl, Appendix to Draft B1.

PART I
THE IDEA OF A PURE PSYCHOLOGY

All lived experiences in which we relate directly to objects -- experiencing, thinking, willing, valuing -- allow of a turn of the gaze whereby they themselves become objects. The various modes of lived experience are revealed to be that wherein everything to which we relate shows itself, that is to say,²⁰ "appears." For that reason the lived experiences are called phenomena. The turning of the gaze towards them, the experience and definition of the lived experiences²¹ as such is the phenomenological attitude. In [p. 258] this mode of expression, the word "phenomenological" is still being employed in a preliminary sense. With the turning of the gaze to the phenomena a universal task opens up, that of exploring systematically the multitudes of lived experiences, their typical forms, levels and interrelations of levels, and of understanding them as a self-contained whole. Directed towards the lived experiences, we make the "soul's" modes of comportment -- the pure psychic -- into our object. We call it "the pure psychic" because, in looking at the lived experiences as such, one prescind from all psychic functions in the sense of the organization of bodiliness, which is to say, one prescind from the psychophysical. <p. 4> The aforementioned phenomenological attitude provides the access to the pure psychic and makes possible the thematic investigation of it in the form of a pure psychology. Clarifying the understanding of the idea of a pure psychology requires answering three questions:

1. What counts as the object of pure psychology?
2. What mode of access and what kind of treatment does this object, given its own structure, demand?
3. What is the basic function of pure psychology?

²⁰In B1, p. 3.12 this phrase is crossed out in the typescript. See *Hu IX*, p. 33.

²¹Husserl (B1, p. 3.14) adds the word "purely" after "lived experiences." See *Hu IX*, p. 257.36.

1. The Object of Pure Psychology

How in general is one to characterize the entity that becomes the object through the phenomenological turn of gaze? In all of the psyche's pure lived experience (in the perceiving of something, in the remembering of something, in the imagining of something, in the passing of judgment about something, in the willing of something, in the enjoying of something,²² in the hoping for something, and so forth) there is an intrinsic directedness-toward.... Lived experiences are intentional. This relating-oneself-to... is not merely added on to the psychic subsequently and occasionally as some accidental relation, as if lived experiences could be what they are without the intentional relation. Rather, the intentionality of lived experiences shows itself to be the essential structure of the pure psychic. The whole of a complex of lived experience -- that is to say, a psychic life²³ -- exists at each moment as a self (an "I"), and as this self it lives factually in community with others. The purely psychic is therefore accessible both in experience of the self <p. 5> [p. 259] as well as in the intersubjective experience of other [fremden] psychic lives.

Each one of the lived experiences that manifest themselves in experience of the self has about it, in the first instance, its own essential form and the possible modes of change that belong to it. The perception of, for example, a cube has this one thing itself in the ordinary comprehending gaze: the one thing.²⁴ Nonetheless, as a lived experience, the perception itself²⁵ is not a simple empty having-present of the thing. Rather, the thing is presented in perception via multiple "modes of appearance." The interconnection of these

²²Biemel transposes this phrase from here to the position after "in the imaging of something." Compare B1, p. 4.16 and *Hu IX*, 258.26.

²³In B1 p. 4.23 the phrase "that is to say" [das heißt] is crossed out. In *Hu IX*, p. 258.34 the phrase is changed, without apparent manuscript evidence, to read: "Das Ganze eines Erlebniszusammenhangs, eines seelischen Lebens existiert..." ("The whole of a complex of lived experience, of a psychic life...").

²⁴In B1, p. 5.5-6 "the one thing" is crossed out, and the earlier word "one" is underlined. See *Hu IX*, p. 259.5-6.

²⁵Heidegger (B1, p. 5.6, calligraphy) crosses out this word in his original text and substitutes "for its part." See *Hu IX*, p. 259.6.

modes, which in fact²⁶ constitutes the perception as a whole, has its own set of typical forms and its own typical regulation of its flow.

In the recollection of that same object,²⁷ of that same thing, the modes of appearance are identical [to those of the perception] and yet are modified in a way that befits a recollection. What is more, there come to light distinctions and grades of clarity and of relative determinateness and indeterminateness in the comprehension -- such as those of time-perspectives, attention, and so on. Thus, for example, the judged [content] of a judgment is known sometimes as evident and other times as not evident. In turn, the non-evident judgment either can occur as something that merely happens to have struck you or it can be something explicated step by step. Correspondingly the lived experiences of willing and valuing are always unities of hidden founding "modes of appearance."

However,²⁸ that which is experienced in such lived experiences does not appear simply as identical and different, individual and general, as an entity or not an entity, a possible and probable entity, as useful, beautiful, or good; rather, it is confirmed as true or untrue, genuine or not genuine. But the essential forms of individual lived experiences are embedded in typical forms of possible syntheses and flows within <p. 6> a closed psychical nexus. The essential form of this²⁹ [nexus], as a totality, is that of the psychic life of an individual self as such. This self exists on the basis of its abiding convictions, decisions, habits, and character-traits. And this whole of the self's habituality manifests in turn the essential forms of its genesis and of its current possible activity, which for its part remains embedded in the associative matrices whose specific form of happening is one with that activity throughout typical relations of change.

Factically the self always lives in community with others. Social acts

²⁶Heidegger (B1, p. 5.9, calligraphy) writes in the word "**alone**." See *Hu IX*, p. 259.10.

²⁷The phrase "that same object" is crossed out in B1, p. 5.12 [cf. *Hu IX*, p. 259.12]. The reference is to the cube mentioned above.

²⁸Heidegger (B1, p. 5.21, calligraphy) changes this to "**Nonetheless**." See *Hu IX*, p. 259.22.

²⁹Heidegger (B1, 6.1, calligraphy) substitutes "Er" for "Dieser."

(such as appealing to other persons, making an agreement [p. 260] with them, dominating their will, and so on) not only have about them their own proper form as the lived experiences of groups, families, corporate bodies, and societies, but also have a typical form of the way they happen, of the way they effect things (power and powerlessness), of their development and progression.³⁰ Intrinsically and thoroughly structured as intentional, this totality of life of individuals in possible communities makes up the whole field of the pure psychic. By what means does one achieve secure access to this region, and what kind of disclosure is appropriate to it?

2. The Method of Pure Psychology

The essential components of the method are determined by the basic structure and kind of being of the object. If the pure psychic is essentially intentional and initially accessible in one's experience of one's individual self, the phenomenological turn of the gaze onto lived experiences must be carried out in such a way that these lived experiences are shown in their intentionality and become comprehensible in³¹ their formal types. Access to entities that are, by their basic structure, intentional is carried out <p. 7> by way of the phenomenological-psychological reduction. Remaining within the reductive attitude, one carries out the eidetic analysis of the pure psychic, that is to say, one lays out of the essential structures of particular kinds of lived experience, their forms of interrelation and occurrence. Inasmuch as the psychic becomes accessible both in experience of the self and in intersubjective experience, the reduction is correspondingly divided into the egological and the intersubjective reductions.

³⁰Heidegger (B1, p. 6.15; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 260.5 and p. 599) subsequently amends his own text here. He changes "Verlaufes" ("course" or "progression") to "Verfalls" ("decline") in calligraphy, and in the left margin writes ("Geschichte"), to be inserted after "Verfalls," thus making the amended text read:

"of how they develop and decline (history)."

³¹Heidegger (B1, p. 6.26, calligraphy) subsequently changes "in" to "with regard to." See *Hu IX*, p. 260.16.

a) The Phenomenological³² Reduction

The turning of the gaze away from the non-reflective perception of, for example, a thing in nature [Naturdinges] and onto this very act of perceiving has a special characteristic: in it the direction of the comprehending act, which was previously directed at the thing, is pulled back from the non-reflective perception in order to be directed at the act of perceiving as such. This leading-back (reduction) of the direction of the comprehending act from the perception, and the shifting of the comprehending [p. 261] onto the act of perceiving, changes almost nothing in the perception; indeed, the reduction actually renders the perception accessible as what it is, namely, as perception of the thing. Of course, the physical thing in nature, by reason of its very essence, is itself never a possible object of a psychological reflection. Nevertheless, it shows up in the reducing gaze that focuses on the act of perceiving, because this perceiving is essentially a perceiving of the thing. The thing belongs to the perceiving as its perceived. The perceiving's intentional relation is certainly not some free-floating relation directed into the void; rather, as intentio it has an intentum that belongs to it essentially. Whether or not what-is-perceived in the perception is itself in truth³³ present at hand, <p. 8> the perception's intentional act-of-meaning [Vermeinen], in keeping with its own tendency to grasp something, is nonetheless directed to the entity as bodily present. Any perceptual illusion makes this plain. Only because the perceiving³⁴ essentially has its intentum,

³²Heidegger (B1, p. 7.9, calligraphy) subsequently amends this by inserting "**psychological**" here, so as to read:

"The Phenomenological-psychological Reduction."

See *Hu IX*, p. 260.26-27. In 1925 Heidegger called this reduction "the first stage within the process of phenomenological reductions" [note the plural] and referred to it as "the so-called transcendental reduction." See his Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, GA II, 20, edited by Petra Jaeger, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979, p. 137; E.T. History of the Concept of Time, translated by Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 100.

³³Heidegger (B1, p. 7.26, calligraphy) subsequently substitutes "**truly**" (wahrhaft) for "in truth." See *Hu IX*, p. 261.12.

³⁴After "perceiving" Heidegger (B1, p. 7.4, calligraphy) inserts

"as intentional"

See *Hu IX*, p. 261.16-17.

can it be modified into a deception about something.

Through the performance of the reduction the full intentional make-up of a lived experience becomes visible for the first time. But because all pure lived experiences and their interrelations are structured intentionally, the reduction guarantees universal access to the pure psychic, that is to say, to the phenomena. For this reason the reduction is called "phenomenological." However, that which first of all becomes accessible in the performance of the phenomenological reduction is the pure psychic as a factual, unrepeatable set of experiences of one here-and-now self. But over and above the descriptive characterization of this momentary and unrepeatable stream of lived experience, is a genuine, scientific -- that is, objectively valid -- knowledge of the psychic possible?

b) The Eidetic Analysis³⁵

If intentionality makes up the basic structure of all pure lived experiences and varies according to individual kinds of such experience, then there arises the possible and necessary task of spelling out what pertains to, for example, a perception in general, a wish in general, in each instance according to the make-up of its full intentional structure. Therefore [p. 262] the attitude of reduction to the pure psychic that initially shows up as an individual factual set of experiences must prescind from all psychic facticity. This facticity serves only exemplarily as a basis for the free variation of possibilities.

Thus, for instance, the phenomenological analysis of the perception of <p. 9> spatial things is in no way a report on perceptions that occur factually or that are to be expected empirically. Rather, a phenomenological analysis means laying out the necessary structural system without which a synthesis of manifold perceptions, as perception of one and the same thing, could not be thought. Accordingly, the exhibiting of the psychic, carried out in the reductive attitude, aims at the invariant -- the necessary typical form

³⁵On May 29, 1925, in his course Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Heidegger referred to this as the eidetic reduction rather than eidetic analysis. See GA vol. 20, p. 137; History of the Concept of Time, p. 100.

(eidos) of the lived experience -- which comes out in the variations. The attitude of reduction to the psychic, therefore, functions in the manner of an eidetic analysis of phenomena. The scientific exploration of the pure psychic, pure psychology, can be realized only as reductive-eidetic -- that is,³⁶ as phenomenological -- psychology. Phenomenological psychology is descriptive, which means that the essential structures of the psychic are read off from the psychic directly.³⁷ All phenomenological concepts and propositions require direct demonstration upon the phenomena themselves.

Inasmuch as the reduction, as we have characterized it, mediates access only to the psychic life that is always one's own, it is called the egological reduction. Nevertheless, because every self stands in a nexus of empathy with others, and because this nexus is constituted in intersubjective lived experiences, the egological reduction requires a necessary expansion by means of the intersubjective reduction. The phenomenology of empathy that is to be treated within the framework of the intersubjective reduction leads -- by clarifying how the phenomena of empathy within my pure psychic nexus can unfold in mutually felt confirmation³⁸ -- to more than the description of this type of syntheses as syntheses of my own psyche. What is confirmed here, in a peculiar form of evidence, is the co-existence [Mitdasein] of a concrete subjectivity,³⁹ <p. 10> indicated consistently and with ever new determining content -- co-present with a bodiliness that is experienced originally and harmoniously in my own sphere of consciousness; and [yet], on the other hand, not present for me originaliter [p. 263] the way my own subjectivity is [present] in its original relation to my corporeality.⁴⁰ The carrying out of

³⁶Heidegger (B1, p. 9.12) crosses out this phrase.

³⁷Husserl (B1, p. 9.14) changes "directly" to "directly-and-intuitively via the method of variation." Cf. *Hu IX*, p. 262.21.

³⁸Husserl (B1, p. 9.24) notes: "intersubjective reduction."

³⁹Heidegger (B1, p. 9.28, calligraphy) changes "subjectivity" to "**other self**," so as to read:

"to a concrete other self."

See *Hu IX*, p. 262.37.

⁴⁰Heidegger (B1, p. 10.2-4, calligraphy; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 262.39 to 263.1) subsequently changed the clause after the semicolon to read:

the phenomenological reduction in my actual and possible acceptance of a "foreign" subjectivity in the evidential form of mutually felt empathy is the intersubjective reduction, in which, on the underlying basis of the reduction to my pure and concrete subjectivity, the foreign subjectivities that are originally confirmed in it,⁴¹ come to be accepted as pure, along with, in further sequence, their pure psychic connections.⁴²

3. The Basic Function of Pure Psychology

The reduction opens the way to the pure psychic as such. The eidetic analysis discloses the essential interrelations of what has become accessible in the reduction.⁴³ Consequently in the reductive eidetic investigation of the pure psychic there emerge the determinations that belong to the pure psychic as such, that is to say, the basic concepts of psychology, insofar as psychology, as an empirical science of the psychophysical whole of the concrete human being, has its central region in pure psychic life as such.

Pure psychology furnishes the necessary a priori foundation for empirical psychology with regard to the pure psychic. Just as the grounding of an "exact" empirical science of nature requires a systematic disclosure of the essential forms of nature in general, without which it is impossible to think

"But on the other hand this other [fremde] self is not present originaliter the way one's own [self] is in its original relation to its bodiliness."

⁴¹The reference of "it" (sie) seems to be "my pure and concrete subjectivity" at B1, p. 10.8-9, although it could refer back to "intersubjective reduction" at B1, p. 10.7-8.

⁴²Heidegger (B1, p. 10.8-11, calligraphy; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 263.5-8) subsequently changed this to read as follows (the last word, "it," seems to refer to "the intersubjective reduction"):

"The carrying out of the phenomenological reduction in my actual and possible acceptance of a 'foreign' psychic life in the evidential form of mutually felt sympathy is the intersubjective reduction. On the basis of the egological reduction the intersubjective reduction renders accessible the foreign psychic life originally confirmed in it."

⁴³Heidegger (B1, p. 10.15, calligraphy; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 263.11-13) adds:

"The former is the necessary component -- the latter along with the former is the sufficient component -- of the phenomenological method of pure psychology."

nature at all and, more specifically, to think spatial and temporal form, movement, change, physical substantiality and causality -- so too a scientifically <p. 11> "exact" psychology requires a disclosure of the a priori typical forms without which it is impossible to think the I (or the we), consciousness, the objects of consciousness,⁴⁴ and hence any psychic life at all, along with all the distinctions and essentially possible forms of syntheses that are inseparable from the idea of an individual and communal psychic whole. Although the psychophysical nexus as such has its own proper a priori that is not yet determined by the basic concepts of pure psychology, nonetheless this psychophysical a priori requires a fundamental orientation to the a priori of the pure psychic.⁴⁵

⁴⁴"Bewusstseinsgegenständlichkeit" -- perhaps "the objectivity of consciousness."

⁴⁵Husserl (B1, 11.9-10) adds: "and yet founded on what is intrinsically prior [an sich...früheren]."

PART II
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

drafted by
Edmund Husserl

[Section ii-a]⁴⁶

[The Historical Intertwining of Phenomenological and Transcendental Phenomenology,
and the Need to Distinguish the Two]

The idea of pure psychology did not grow out of psychology's own needs to fulfill the conditions essential to its systematic construction. Rather, the history of pure psychology takes us back to John Locke's famous and foundational work, and back to David Hume's noteworthy elaboration of the tendencies that stem from Locke. Hume's brilliant Treatise already has the form of a rigorous and systematic structural exploration of the sphere of pure lived experience. Thus in a certain sense it [is⁴⁷] the first attempt at a "phenomenology."

But here in the beginning, the restriction [of the investigation] to the realm of the pure subjective was determined by interests coming from outside psychology. Psychology was at the service of the problematic of "understanding" or "reason" that Descartes had reawakened⁴⁸ in a new form -- namely, the fact that entities in the true sense are known to be such only via these subjective faculties. In our current way of speaking, it was a matter of

⁴⁶In B2, pp. 12-14 = "pp. 1-3." (The original page numeration is always given in quotation marks.) This equals *Hu IX*, pp. 264.1-266.15. The material of Section ii-a, which is continued in Section ii-b, generally corresponds to the topics treated in Draft D, Part II, §6, from which we take the title that immediately follows. Husserl put no paragraph breaks in Section ii-a. I have added those that appear below.

⁴⁷The bracketed word is added by Biemel, *Hu IX*, 264.8.

⁴⁸Within the text of B1, p. 12.12 Husserl here adds in shorthand "and raised to a new level of consciousness" ["und auf eine neue Stufe des Bewusstseins erhobenen"]. The addition is taken over into Draft C (typed p. 3, hand-numbered p. 14, although the page is actually found in B1; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 610). However, the sentence was radically edited in Draft C to read: "Psychology stood in the service of the transcendental problem awakened by Descartes." In that form it entered the D draft at *Hu IX*, p. 287.13-14. These changes -- made in B1 but not in B2, included in some but not all the C drafts, and yet taken into the D draft -- show the fluidity that existed between drafts B, C, and D between mid-October and December 8, 1927.

"transcendental philosophy."⁴⁹ Descartes put in doubt the general possibility that any knowledge could legitimately transcend the knowing subject. That, in turn, rendered made it impossible to understand the genuine ontological sense⁵⁰ of any entity qua objective reality, insofar as its existence is intended and demonstrated only by way of subjective experiences. The "transcendent" world, which, from a naïve point of view, is given as existing becomes problematic from a "transcendental" point of view: it cannot serve as a basis for cognition the way it does in the positive sciences. According to Descartes, such a basis requires that we get a pure grasp of that which is presupposed in the transcendental inquiry and which is itself beyond question: the ego cogito. Descartes' Meditations already gained the insight that everything real -- ultimately this whole world -- has being for us only in terms <p. 13="p. 2"> of our experience and cognition, and that even the performances of reason, aimed at objective truth with the character of "evidence," unfold purely within subjectivity.⁵¹ For all its primitiveness, Descartes' methodical attempt at universal doubt is the first radical method of reduction to pure subjectivity.

It was Locke, however, who first saw in all of this a broad area of concrete [p. 265] tasks and began to work on it. Because rational cognition in general occurs only in cognitive subjectivity, the only way to get a transcendental clarification of the transcendental validity of cognition is by way of a systematic study of all levels of cognitive experiences, activities, and faculties exactly as these present themselves in pure "inner experience" -

⁴⁹Heidegger changes this (B1, p. 12.14-15, calligraphy) to:

<p>"The tendency was towards a 'transcendental philosophy.'"</p>

Husserl takes this change over into the C drafts but not into the D draft. Moreover, in B1 Heidegger recommends that Husserl insert here the sentence that appears three sentences below (B1, p. 12.26--13.3) and that runs from "Descartes' Meditations already [Heidegger recommends dropping "already"] attained the insight..." to "...unfold purely within subjectivity." Husserl followed the suggestion (along with making editorial changes in the sentence) in C (cf. *Hu* IX, p. 610.12-16) and carried the result over into D (p. 12 = *Hu* IX, p. 287.14-19). [This present note corrects *Hu* IX, p. 600.5, "bis ?": it should read: "bis 264.33."]

⁵⁰Phrases like "Seinssinn" or "Seinsgeltung" are translated as "ontological sense" or "ontological validity."

⁵¹Heidegger suggests (B1, p. 12.26) that this sentence (minus the "already") be located above. See footnote *

- a study that was guided, however, by the naïvely developed basic concepts of the experiential world and their logical elaboration. What is required, in short, is inner-directed descriptions and the exploration of pure psychological genesis.⁵²

But Locke did not know how to sustain this momentous idea at the high level of the principles that characterize Descartes' inquiry. With Locke the methodically reduced Cartesian ego -- the ego that would remain in being even if the experiential world did not -- once again becomes the ordinary ego, the human psyche in the world. Although Locke certainly wanted to solve the transcendental questions of cognition, they get transformed in his work into psychological questions about how human beings living in the world attain and justify knowledge of the world that exists outside the mind. In this way Locke fell into transcendental psychologism, which then got passed down through the centuries (although Hume knew how to avoid it). The contradiction consists in this: Locke pursues the transcendental exploration of cognition as a psychological (in the natural positive sense of that word) exploration of cognition, thereby constantly presupposing the ontological validity of the experiential <p. 14="p. 3"> world -- whereas that very world, along with all the positive cognition that can relate to it, is what is transcendently problematic in its ontological sense and validity. Locke confuses two things: (1) questions about natural legitimacy in the realm of positivity (that⁵³ of all the positive sciences), where the experiential world is the general and unquestioned presupposition, and (2) the question of transcendental legitimacy,⁵⁴ where what is put into question is the world itself --

⁵² Apparently Heidegger suggests (B1, p. 13.12-15, calligraphy) dropping this sentence and changing the preceding two sentences to read:

"...a transcendental clarification of cognition's transcendental validity can [proceed] only as a systematic study of all levels of cognitive experiences, activities, and faculties exactly as these present themselves in pure "inner experience" and announce their pure [Heidegger later erases 'pure'] psychic genesis. Naturally the most accessible clue for this study was provided by the naïvely developed basic concepts of the experiential world and by their logical elaboration."

Husserl takes over this suggestion in C (*Hu* IX, p. 610.36-37) but drops it in D (*ibid.*, p. 287).

⁵³ This word, "die," instead of referring to "positivity," could be in the plural ("those") and could refer to "questions of natural legitimacy" (natürlichen Rechtsfragen).

⁵⁴ Heidegger (B1, p. 14.7, calligraphy) suggests ending this sentence here and

everything that has the sense of "being-in-itself" over against cognition -- and where we ask in the most radical way not whether something is valid but rather what sense and import such validity can have. With that, all questions about cognition within the realm of positivity (that⁵⁵ of all the positive sciences) are burdened from the outset with the transcendental question about sense.

Nevertheless, the historical insurmountability of Locke's psychologism points back to a deeply rooted [p. 266] sense of truth that can be utilized in the transcendental project, a sense of truth that, despite the contradiction in [Locke's] transcendental claim, is necessarily a part of every carefully carried out part of a pure psychology of knowledge and reason. Moreover, as transcendental phenomenology (whose proper idea we are striving for) makes clear for the first time, the reverse is equally true: every correctly (hence, concretely) realized part of a genuine transcendental theory of knowledge contains a sense of truth that can be utilized in psychology. On the one hand, every genuine and pure psychology of knowledge (even though it is not itself a transcendental theory) can be "changed over" into a transcendental [theory of knowledge]. And on the other hand, every genuine transcendental theory of knowledge (even though it is not itself a psychology)⁵⁶ can be changed over into a pure psychology of knowledge. This holds on both sides, proposition for proposition.

changing the remainder of the sentence, and the next sentence, to:

"Here the world itself -- that is, every entity with the characteristic of 'in-itself-ness' with regard to cognition -- is put into question. We ask not whether something 'is valid' but rather what sense and, in keeping with this sense, what import such a validity can have. The transcendental question of sense weights upon the positive sciences."

Husserl does not take this into C.

⁵⁵This word, "die," could be in the plural ("those") and could refer to "questions about cognition" (Erkenntnisfrage).

⁵⁶Heidegger (B1, p. 14.27-28, calligraphy) suggests that the remainder of the sentence read:

"...allows of being changed over into a pure psychology of knowledge."

[The Historical Intertwining of Phenomenological and Transcendental Phenomenology,
and the Need to Distinguish the Two (concluded)]

<p. 15="p. 4"> In the beginning such insights were unavailable. People were not prepared to grasp the profound meaning of Descartes' radicalism in exhibiting the pure ego cogito, nor to draw out its consequences with strict consistency. One was unable to distinguish the attitudes of positive research from those of transcendental research and, as a result, one could not delimit the proper sense of positive science. And given the ardent efforts to create a scientific psychology that could compete in fruitfulness and rigor with the pace-setting natural sciences, people failed to radically think through the requirements of such a psychology.

In this situation, which entrapped later thinkers too, neither transcendental philosophy nor psychology was able to attain the "sure path of a science" -- a rigorous science fashioned originally from the sources of experience peculiar to it -- nor could the ambiguous interpenetration [of transcendental philosophy and psychology] be clarified. The psychologism of the empiricists had the advantage to the degree that it ignored the objections of the anti-psychologists and followed the evidence that any science which questions cognition in all its forms can get answers only by systematically studying these forms via direct "inner" intuition. The knowledge thus acquired about the essence of cognition could not go astray if only it questioned [p. 267] the ontological sense of the objective world, that is, if it followed Descartes' shift of focus and his reduction to the pure ego. The charge that this was psychologism had no real effect because the anti-psychologists, out of fear of succumbing to psychologism, avoided any systematically <p. 16="p. 5"> concrete study of cognition; and, as they reacted ever more vociferously against the increasing power of empiricism in the last century, they finally

⁵⁷In B1 and 2, pp. pp. 15-20 = "p. 4-9" = *Hu IX*, pp. 266.16 to 270.39. The material of Section ii-b, which continues that of Section ii-a, generally corresponds to the topics treated in Draft D, Part II, §6, from which we take the title below. There is only one paragraph break in Husserl's text of Section ii-b, at *Hu IX*, p. 270.7 ("Of course one very quickly recognized...."). I have added the others that appear below.

fell into an empty aporetics and dialectics that managed to get what meager sense it had only by secretly borrowing it from intuition.

Even though much valuable preparatory work towards a pure psychology can be found in Locke's Essay and in the related epistemological and psychological literature of the ensuing years, nevertheless pure psychology itself still attained no real foundation. For one thing, its essential meaning as what we might call "first psychology" -- the eidetic science of the logos (?)⁵⁸ of the psychic -- remained hidden, and thus the genuine guiding idea for systematic work [on it] was lacking. For another thing, the great efforts of individual psychological investigations, whether concerned with the transcendental or not, could bear no real fruit so long as naturalism, which dominated everything, remained blind to intentionality -- the essential characteristic of the psychic sphere -- and therefore blind to the infinite breadth of the pure psychological problematic and methodology that belong to intentionality.

Pure psychology, in the fundamental sense sketched out in Part I, arose from outside general psychology; specifically, it blossomed as the final fruit of a methodologically new development of transcendental philosophy, in which it became a rigorously systematic science constructed concretely from below. But of course pure psychology arose not as the goal of transcendental philosophy or as a discipline belonging to it but rather as a result of the fact that the relations between positivity and transcendentality were finally clarified. This clarification made possible for the first time a principled solution to the problem of psychologism; and following from that, <p. 17="p. 6"> the methodological reform of philosophy into rigorous science was concluded and philosophy was freed from the persistent hindrances of inherited confusion.

The prior event that make this development possible was Brentano's great discovery: his transformation of the scholastic concept [p. 268] of intentionality into an essential characteristic of "mental phenomena" as phenomena of "inner perception." In general, Brentano's psychology and philosophy have had an historical impact on the rise of phenomenology but no

⁵⁸This question mark appears typed in the B drafts at this point (B2, p. 16=5.11).

influence at all on its content. Brentano himself was still caught in the prevailing naturalistic misunderstanding of conscious life, and into that orbit he drew those "mental phenomena." He was unable to grasp the true sense of a descriptive and genetic disclosure of intentionality. His work lacked a conscious utilization of the method of "phenomenological reduction" and consequently a correct and steady consideration of the cogitata qua cogitata. The idea of a phenomenologically pure psychology in the sense just described remained foreign to him. Equally foreign to him was the true meaning of transcendental philosophy, indeed the necessity of a basic eidetic transcendental discipline related to transcendental subjectivity. Essentially determined by the British empiricists, Brentano in his philosophical orientation took up the demand for a grounding of all specifically psychological disciplines (including transcendental philosophy) on a psychology that would be [constructed] purely out of inner experience but that, in keeping with his discovery, would have to be a psychology of intentionalities. As with all empiricists, Brentano's psychology was, and ever remained, a positive and empirical science of human psychic being.

<p. 18="p. 7"> Brentano never understood the fundamental charge [laid against him] of psychologism, any more than he understood the profound sense of Descartes' first Meditations, where both the radical method of access to the transcendental sphere and the transcendental problem itself were already discovered in a first, if primitive, form. Brentano did not appropriate the insight (which emerged already in Descartes) into the antithesis between positive and transcendental science and into the necessity of an absolute transcendental grounding of positive science, without which it cannot be science in the highest sense.

There is another limitation to Brentano's research. It is true that, as with the old, moderate empiricism of a Locke, Brentano did stimulate various a priori disciplines, although without clarifying their deeper sense as inquiries into essence. However, grounded in the positivity that he never [p. 269] overcame, he did not recognize the universal necessity of a priori research in all ontological spheres if rigorous science is to be possible. For precisely that reason he also failed to recognize the fundamental necessity of

a systematic science of the essence of pure subjectivity.

The phenomenology that grew out of⁵⁹ Brentano was motivated not by psychological interests and not at all by positive-scientific ones, but purely by transcendental concerns. In our critique of Brentano we have indicated the motives which determined the development of his phenomenology. In that regard it is always to be remarked that he continued to be determined by a traditional motive of Lockean-Humean philosophy, namely, that regardless of its orientation, every theory of reason, cognitive or otherwise, had to be derived from inner experience of the corresponding phenomena.

Thus, the major points are: the disclosure of the genuine sense-content and method of intentionality; disclosure of the deepest motives and the horizon of Descartes' intuitions [Intuitionen], <p. 19="p. 8"> culminating in the method of "transcendental reduction," first of all as egological and then as intersubjective. By such means one lays out the transcendental field as the arena of such transcendental experience. I may also mention the separation between positivity and transcendentality, as well as the systematic unfolding of the fundamental content of positivity under the rubric of an universitas of rigorous positive sciences, merged with the complete science of the given world and related to the universitas of the underlying a priori disciplines, themselves merged with the unity of a universal positive ontology. Furthermore there is the comprehension of the concrete totality of transcendental questions posed by the positivity of all these sciences; the knowledge that transcendental philosophy in its primary sense is a science of essence related to the field of transcendental possible experience; further, the fact that on this ground a universal descriptive science and then a genetic science must be established purely from out of possible experience (in the eidetic sense), which is the source of all transcendental questions relative to the particular sciences and then to all forms of social culture as well. At the beginning of this development, [p. 270] stimuli from Leibniz' philosophy, mediated by Lotze and Bolzano, played a role with regard to the pure exhibition of a priori "ontologies." The first studies made were the intentional analyses connected

⁵⁹The literal meaning is "that is connected with" (anknüpfende); but it is clear that Husserl is referring here to his own phenomenology, which was connected with, but grew away from, Brentano's work.

with the production of a "formal ontology" (pure logic as mathesis universalis, along with pure logical grammar).⁶⁰

Of course one⁶¹ very quickly recognized the proper realm of a priori <p. 20="p. 9"> psychology and the necessity of positively developing it. Nevertheless that faded for a while in the interests of exploring the intentional structures of the transcendental field, and thus in general all the work remained purely philosophical work carried out within a rigorous transcendental reduction. Only very late did one⁶² come to see that in the return (which is possible at any time) from the transcendental attitude to the natural attitude, the whole of transcendental cognition within the transcendental field of intuition changes into pure psychological (eidetic) cognition within the field of psychic positivity, both individual and interpersonal. That very insight led to a pedagogical idea about how to introduce people to phenomenology given all the difficulties related to its unaccustomed transcendental attitude. Essentially every philosophy has to start with the attitude of positivity and only [subsequently], by motivations far removed from natural life, clarify the meaning and necessity of the transcendental attitude and research; therefore, the systematic development of pure psychology as a positive science can serve in the first instance as a pedagogical propraedeutic.

The new method of intentionality as such and the immense system of tasks that go with subjectivity as such offer extraordinary difficulties, which can be overcome at first without touching on the transcendental problem. But this totality of scientific doctrines grounded in positivity then acquires transcendental sense through the specific method of transcendental phenomenological reduction, which elevates the whole [realm of] positivity to the philosophical level. This was the very method we followed when we dealt

⁶⁰Husserl is referring to his *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900-01). The topic of pure logical grammar is treated there in vol. II, Investigation IV, pp. 286-321 (1984 ed., pp. 301-351), E.T. vol II, 491--529. The idea of pure logic as a formal ontology or mathesis universalis is sketched out in vol. I, pp. 228-257 (1975 ed., pp. 230-258), E.T. vol. I, pp. 225-247.

⁶¹Husserl is referring to himself.

⁶²Husserl is again referring to himself.

with phenomenology as pure psychology in Part I, thereby giving phenomenology a pedagogically lower, and not yet fully genuine, sense.

[Section iii]⁶³

[The Transcendental Problem]⁶⁴

[p. 271] <p. 21="p. 10">⁶⁵

The issue of all-inclusiveness belongs to the essential sense of the transcendental problem.⁶⁶ Each and every entity, the whole world that we talk about straightforwardly and that is the constant field (pre-given as self-evidently real) of all our theoretical and practical activities -- all of that suddenly becomes unintelligible.⁶⁷ Every sense it has for us, whether unconditionally universal or applicable case by case to individuals, is, as we then see, a meaning that occurs in the immanence⁶⁸ of our own perceiving, representing, thinking, evaluating (and so on) lives and that takes shape in

⁶³ In Draft B, pp. 21-28 = "pp. 10-17" = *Hu IX*, pp. 271.1-277.21. The material of Section iii generally corresponds to the topics treated in Draft D, Part II, §§7-10.

⁶⁴ *Hu IX*, p. 271.1-26. We supply this title from Draft D, II, §7, to which its contents correspond.

⁶⁵ At the top of p. 21 in B3 Husserl writes: "Duplicate. The new text [that was prepared] for Heidegger 21-28 with Heidegger's critical notes." These pages in B3 are the ones Heidegger took from Freiburg to Messkirch on Thursday, October 20, 1927, for the purposes of correcting and commenting upon them, and it is to these pages that Heidegger refers in his letter of October 22, 1927.

⁶⁶ The German word that we translate as "all-inclusiveness" is "Universalität." As the text below shows (*Hu IX*, p. 273.31; ms. p. 24=p.13), this "universality" refers to the all-encompassing breadth of the transcendental epoché.

⁶⁷ Following on Heidegger's criticisms (see below in this same paragraph), Husserl changes this sentence in B3 and B1 to read: "As soon as one's theoretical concern turns toward the life of consciousness in which each and every thing that is real for us is always "present," a cloud of unintelligibility spreads over the whole world, this world that we talk about straightforwardly and that is the constant field -- pre-given as self-evidently real -- of all our theoretical and practical activities." This latter reading is reproduced in *Hu IX*, p. 217.2-8.

⁶⁸ Heidegger's note (B3, p. 21.7; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 271, n. 1, where Biemel fails to underscore "Aufgabe"):

"It is the task of transcendental philosophy to show this, and that point as such must be made directly here."

Disposition of the note: (1) Husserl copied this note in shorthand into the corresponding margin of B1 and, in that text, changed the word "Immanenz," to which Heidegger's note is keyed, to "Innerlichkeit" (see *Hu IX*, p. 271.10-11).

(2) In *Hu IX*, p. 271, n. 1 Heidegger's marginal note given above is incorrectly keyed to the word "Variieren" at *Hu IX*, p. 271.19, whereas it should be keyed to *Hu IX*, p. 271.11. See the following footnote.

subjective genesis; every acceptance of being is carried out within ourselves, all experiential or theoretical evidence grounding that acceptance is active within us and habitually motivates us onward. This applies to the world in each of the determinations [we make about it], including the taken-for-granted determination that what belongs to the world is "in and for itself" just the way it is, regardless of whether or not I or anyone else happen to take cognizance of it. If we vary⁶⁹ the factual world into any world that can be thought, we also undeniably vary the world's relativity to conscious subjectivity. Thus the notion of a world existing in itself is unintelligible, due to that world's essential relativity to consciousness. An equal [degree of] unintelligibility -- and this too belongs to the transcendental question -- is offered by any ideal "world," such as, for example, the world of numbers, which, in its own way, does exist "in itself."⁷⁰

⁶⁹Heidegger (B3, p. 21.13) inserts a red "T" at the beginning of this sentence so as to call into question the discussion of "unintelligibility" that follows (as well as in the second sentence of this paragraph). This mark directs Husserl's attention to the Appendix II, first point: Heidegger's letter of October 22, 1927:

The first thing in the presentation of the transcendental problem is to clarify what the "unintelligibility" of entities means.

➤ **In what respect are entities unintelligible? i.e., what higher claim of intelligibility is possible and necessary.**

➤ **By a return to what is this intelligibility achieved?**

Disposition of the note:

(1) The fact that Husserl understood Heidegger's red mark to refer to the Appendices is indicated by Husserl's own marginal note -- "Beilage" ("Appendix") -- written in the left margins of both B3 and B1.

(2) Biemel wrongly states that this appendix has not been retained ["(nicht erhalten)": *Hu IX*, p. 603] and then wrongly relates Heidegger's red mark here to Heidegger's previous marginal note seven lines earlier ("It is the task of transcendental philosophy..."; cf. the previous footnote).

(3) The fact that Husserl understood that Heidegger was criticizing the notion of "unintelligibility" is shown by the fact that in B3 and B1 Husserl (a) crossed out the two sentences that begin "Thus the notion of a world existing in itself is unintelligible..." and "An equal [degree of] unintelligibility..." (*Hu IX*, p. 271.21-26), and (b) changed part of the related second sentence of the paragraph: "Each and every entity..." (B3, p. 21.2-5, corresponding to *Hu IX*, p. 271.2-8: see above).

(4) Biemel's editing here is paradoxical. (a) At *Hu IX*, p. 271.21-26, he retains the two sentences that Husserl crosses out, whereas (b) at *Hu IX*, p. 271.2-8 he substitutes the revised text of Husserl.

⁷⁰Husserl (B1 and B3, left margins) writes a second time: "Beilage" ("Appendix"), which Biemel again incorrectly says is "not retained" (*Hu IX*, p. 603). As mentioned above, the present sentence and the previous one are crossed out in B1 and B3.

[Psychologism as a False Solution]⁷¹

Our elaboration⁷² of the idea of a phenomenologically pure psychology has shown the possibility of disclosing, via a systematic phenomenological reduction, the proper essential character of psychic subjects in eidetic universality and in all their possible forms. The same goes for those forms of reason that ground and confirm legitimacy, and consequently for all the forms of worlds that appear in consciousness and show themselves as existing "in themselves." Although this phenomenological-eidetic psychology is not an empirical psychology of the factual human being, nonetheless it now seems called upon <p. 22="p. 11"> to clarify concretely, and down to the last detail, the ontological sense of world as such. [p. 272] However, if we closely analyze the phenomenological-psychological reduction and the pure psyches and communities of psyches that are its outcome,⁷³ clearly only the following is entailed in the procedure:⁷⁴ that for the purpose of exhibiting psychic subjectivity as a field of pure inner experience and judgment, the psychologist must "put out of play" for all psyches the world they accept as existing. In making phenomenological judgments, the psychologist must refrain from any belief regarding the world. For example, when I as a psychologist describe my own perception as a pure psychic event, I am not permitted to make direct judgments about the perceived thing the way a natural scientist does.

⁷¹ *Hu IX*, pp. 271.26--273.13. The contents of this section correspond generally to Draft D, II. §8, "The Solution by Psychologism as a Transcendental Circle."

⁷² (1) In editing Draft B, Husserl cut page 21 of B3 in half and placed the bottom half (lines 19 to 28 (= *Hu IX*, 271.24 [mitgehörig] to 271.36 [berufen] in B1 at this point. (2) In the transition from Draft B to C, this sentence and some of what follows carries over to C p. 19.18 ff. (3) In the transition from Draft C to D, p. 19 of C gets inserted into D and renumbered as p. 18. There the present sentence begins §8 (*Hu IX*, p. 290.11).

⁷³ Reading "sich ergebenden" instead of the manuscripts' "sie ergebenden" at B (all drafts) p. 22.2-3 and *Hu IX*, p. 272.2.

⁷⁴ Heidegger (B3, p. 22.4-16; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 603, re 272.4-16) marks off the rest of this sentence as well as the following three sentences -- i.e., from "that for the purpose" to "And so on in every case" -- and notes in the margin:

"These lines should be put [above] in section I-a to fill out my altogether too brief presentation of the reduction."

By "Ia" Heidegger is referring to section I.2.a of his own draft (B1, p. 7.9; = *Hu IX*, p. 260.27), the section originally entitled "The Phenomenological Reduction."

Rather, I am permitted to judge only about my "perceived as such" as that which is an inseparable moment of the lived experience of perceiving: namely, as an appearance with this given sense, known as the selfsame, believed in as existing, and the like, amidst whatever changes in its modes of appearance. And so on in every case.⁷⁵ Thus,⁷⁶ when I make a general and (as is required) a rigorously consistent reduction to my psyche, the world that has been rendered questionable in the transcendental inquiry is certainly no longer presupposed -- and the same for all psyches as regards their purity. Here in this context of statements about the purely psychic, the world that has straightforward validity for these minds themselves is not the focus of attention, but rather only the pure being and life of the very psyches in which the world appears and naturally, via the corresponding subjective modes of appearance and belief, acquires meaning and validity.

Nonetheless, it is still a question of "psyches" and connections between them, psyches belonging to bodies that are always presupposed and that are only temporarily excluded from theoretical consideration.⁷⁷ To put it

⁷⁵For the next two sentences I follow Husserl's original version in B2, p. 22.16-25 (the unmarked typescript).

⁷⁶Heidegger (B3, p. 22.16-23; see *Hu IX*, p. 604, re 274.17-23) edits this and the next sentence to read:

"When I make a general reduction to my pure psyche and that of all others, the world that has been rendered questionable in the transcendental inquiry is certainly no longer presupposed. Although the world still has straightforward validity for these psyches, it is not the focus of attention; rather, the focus is only the pure being and life of the very psyches in which the world, via the corresponding subjective modes of appearance and belief, acquires meaning and validity."

Husserl (B1, p. 22.16-25) changed these two sentences to read: "When I make a general and, as is required, a rigorously consistent reduction to the pure psyches of myself and others, I practice epoché with regard to the world that has been rendered questionable in the transcendental inquiry, that is, the world that these psyches accept, in a straightforward manner, as valid. The theme is to be simply the pure being and life of the very psyches in which the world appears and in which, via the corresponding subjective modes of appearance and belief, that world acquires meaning and validity for their ego-subjects." This changed text appears in *Hu IX*, p. 272.16-24.

⁷⁷Heidegger's note here (B3, p. 22.28, bottom margin, keyed to this passage; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 272, n. 1) is highlighted in red:

"What kind of 'excluding from consideration' is this? Is it the reduction? If so, then even here, in the pure psyche, I emphatically do not have the a priori of the psyche as such."

Husserl copied this note in shorthand into the corresponding bottom margin of B1.

concretely, [pure psychology] is concerned with⁷⁸ the animals and human beings that inhabit a presupposed <p. 23="p. 12"> spatial world;⁷⁹ and just as physical somatology explores such animals and human beings with a systematic methodical focus on only one side of them -- the animate organism aspect -- so pure psychology explores them with an equally systematic focus on only the other side -- the pure psychic aspect.⁸⁰ Even when doing pure psychology we still stand, as psychologists, on the ground of positivity; we are and remain explorers simply of the world or of a [particular] world, and thus all our research remains transcendently [p. 273] naïve. Despite their purity, all pure psychic phenomena have the ontological sense of worldly real facts,⁸¹ even when they are treated eidetically as possible facts of a world which is posited as general possibility but which, for that very reason, is also unintelligible from a transcendental point of view. For the psychologist, who as psychologist remains in positivity, the systematic psychological-phenomenological reduction, with its epoché regarding the existing world, is merely a means for reducing the human and animal psyche to its own pure and proper essence, all of this against the background of the world that, as far as the psychologist is concerned, remains continually in being and constantly valid. Precisely for that reason this phenomenological reduction, seen from the transcendental viewpoint, is characterized as inauthentic and transcendently non-genuine.

⁷⁸Heidegger (B3, p. 22.28; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 604, re 272.27-28) changes the first part of this sentence to:

"The object[s] of the investigation are...."

⁷⁹Husserl (B1, p. 22.28 and p. 23.1) changes this to read: "To put it concretely, [pure psychology] is concerned with presumptively [vorausgesetztermaßen] existent animals and human beings of an existent spatial world." See *Hu IX*, p. 272.27-29.

⁸⁰See Heidegger's "Appendix I," paragraph 4, below, where Heidegger argues that these "one-sided" treatments presuppose the concrete ontological totality of the human being.

⁸¹"weltlich reale Tatsachen" is underlined in pencil in B3, p. 23.9. (See *Hu IX*, p. 273.2). This apparently is the phrase Heidegger refers to in his Appendix I, third paragraph ("'weltlich reale Tatsache'"; Heidegger neglects to close the quotes in his ms.) when he remarks that the human being is "never a 'worldly real fact.'"

[Transcendental Reduction and the Semblance of Doubling]⁸²

If the transcendental problem is concerned with the ontological sense of any world at all as getting its meaning and validity only from functions of consciousness, then the transcendental philosopher must practice an effectively unconditioned epoché regarding the world and so must effectively posit and maintain in validity only conscious subjectivity, whence ontological sense and validity are produced. Thus, because the world is present for me only thanks to my life of experiencing, thinking, and so forth, it makes sense at the outset to go back precisely to my own self in its absolute⁸³ proper essentialness, to reduce back to my <p. 24="p. 13"> pure life and this alone, precisely as it can be experienced in absolute self-experience.

But is this really something different from reduction to my pure psyche? Here is the decisive point which differentiates the genuine transcendental-phenomenological reduction from the psychological reduction (the latter being necessary for the positive scientist but not transcendently genuine). According to the sense of the transcendental question I as a transcendental phenomenologist place the whole world entirely and absolutely within this question. With equally all-inclusiveness, therefore, I stop every positive question, every positive judgment, and the whole of natural experience qua pre-accepted valid basis for possible judgments. [On the one hand⁸⁴] my line of questioning requires that I avoid the transcendental circle, which consists in presupposing something as beyond

⁸² *Hu IX*, pp. 273.13--276.22. The contents of these pages corresponds in general to Draft D II. §9, "The Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction and the Semblance of Transcendental Doubling."

⁸³ Heidegger at this point (B3, p. 23.28; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 604, re 273.21) inserts a red "T" and in the left margin he writes:

"meaning?" [heißt?]

The note is circled in red and thus refers to the appendices to Heidegger's letter, presumably to Appendix I but also to Appendix II, the fourth paragraph: "Was heißt absolutes ego im Unterschied vom rein Seelischen?" ("What does the absolute ego mean as distinct from the pure psychic?") and perhaps the fifth paragraph. Two other marginal notes by Heidegger are erased in the margin here.

⁸⁴ Heidegger recommends (B3, p. 24.12; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 273.35) that Husserl add the phrase "On the one hand" here.

question when in fact it is encompassed by the all-inclusiveness of that very question. On the other hand [it requires⁸⁵] a reduction to the very basis of validity that this question as such presupposes: pure subjectivity as the source of sense and validity. Thus, as a transcendental [p. 274] phenomenologist, what I have now is not my ego as a psyche -- for the very meaning of the word "psyche" presupposes an actual or possible world. Rather, I have that transcendently pure ego within which even this psyche, with its transcendent sense, is endowed, from out of the hidden functions of consciousness, with the sense and validity it has for me.⁸⁶

When, as a psychologist, I take myself as a pure psychological theme, I certainly do discover, along with all the pure psychic, that [element] as well in which I come to have an "idea" of myself as the psyche of this worldly corporeality of mine; and I prove its validity, define it more closely, and so on. So too my psychological activity, all my scientific work -- in short, anything and everything that belongs to me as a pure subject -- all of it I can and <p. 25="p. 14"> must acquire in this way. But the very habituality of the psychological attitude, which we call its positivity, entails that at each step one is always effecting anew or keeping in effect (but always latently)

⁸⁵Heidegger (B3, p. 22.14) here inserts

"it requires" (verlangt sie)

Hu IX, p. 273.37, without textual evidence, substitutes "fordert" for "verlangt."

⁸⁶Heidegger's double note at this point (B3, p. 24.22 left margin running into the bottom margin; cf. Hu IX, p. 274, n. 1) is highlighted in red. Husserl copies it in shorthand into the corresponding left margin of B1:

"Does not a world-as-such belong to the essence of the pure ego?

Cf. our conversation in Todtnauberg [April, 1926] about 'being-in-the-world' (Sein und Zeit, I, §12, §69) and its essential difference from presence-at-hand 'within' such a world."

Regarding the disposition of this marginal note: Heidegger underlines Husserl's words "world" and "pure ego" and connects them with a line; he underlines "transcendent"; and in the left margin he writes the above note. The first sentence is bracketed in red.

Heidegger then draws a line separating the first sentence from the second one, which is not bracketed in red. The word "presence-at-hand" [Vorhandensein] is underlined in Heidegger's handwritten marginal note in B3, but not in Husserl's shorthand transcription of it in the corresponding margin in B1.

the apperception of the world,⁸⁷ within which everything that [eventually] becomes a specific theme is inserted as a worldly thing, Of course all these [acts] -- in general, all apperceptive performances and validations -- belong to the psychological realm, but always in such a way that the apperception of the world remains universally accepted as valid; and whenever something new emerges, it always becomes, within [that] apperception, a worldly thing. The disclosing of the mind is an infinite process, but so too is psychic self-apperception in the form of worldliness.

It is the transcendental reduction's fundamental and proper character that, from the very beginning and with one blow -- by means of an all-inclusive theoretical act of will -- it checks this transcendental naïveté that still remains as a residue⁸⁸ in pure psychology: it encompasses the whole of current and habitual life with this act of will:⁸⁹ This will demands that we practice no transcendent apperception and no transcendent validation, whatever its condition. It demands that we "put [all this] in brackets" and

⁸⁷Heidegger's note at this point (B3, p. 25.4, left margin; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 274, n. 2) is highlighted in red:

"1. [As] something present-at-hand! But human Dasein 'is' in such a way that, although it is an entity, it is never simply present-at-hand."

Disposition of the note:

This and three more marginal notes all appear in B3, on p. 25, and three of the four are numbered by Heidegger. The present note, which Heidegger designates with a "1," is bordered in red and topped off with a red circle. Husserl copied it in shorthand into the corresponding margin in B1.

⁸⁸Heidegger (B3, p. 25.15), using red, (1) underlines those words, (2) also underlines the word "whole" [*ganze*] towards the end of that line, and (3) puts an exclamation point in the left margin. Apparently the exclamation point indicates a contradiction between, on the one hand, saying that transcendental naïveté suffuses the whole of habitual life and, on the other hand, saying that such naïveté is there merely as a residue. In B1 Husserl copies the exclamation point into the corresponding margin and changes the phrase "remains as a residue" [*übrig bleibt*] to "dominates" [*herrscht*]. See *Hu IX*, p. 274.28.

⁸⁹Heidegger's note at this point (B3, p. 25.16-17, left margin; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 274, n. 3) is underlined in red:

"2. And [what about] this will itself!" ["Und dieser Wille selbst!]."

Heidegger may be indicating that, if the transcendental epoché is as universal as Husserl claims, it must paradoxically bracket out even this act of will itself. Or he may be alluding to the need to question this "will" in terms of what he calls "Entschlossenheit" [resoluteness].

Disposition of this second note on p. 25: (1) Husserl copies Heidegger's note, in shorthand, into B1, along with the exclamation point. (2) Unlike Husserl, Biemel (*Hu IX*, p. 274, n. 3) takes Heidegger's explanation point to be a question mark.

take it only as what it is in itself: a pure subjective act of perceiving, meaning, positing-as-valid, and so on. After I do this to [p. 275] myself, I am not a human ego⁹⁰ even though I lose nothing of the proper and essential content of my pure psyche (and thus, nothing of the pure psychological). What is bracketed is only the positing-as-valid that I had performed in the attitude of "I, this human being" and the attitude of "my psyche in the world"; what is not bracketed is that positing and that having-as-valid qua lived experience. This reduced ego is certainly [still] my "I" in the whole concretion of my life, but it is seen directly in transcendently reduced inner experience <p. 26="p. 15"> -- and now it really is the concrete ego, the absolute presupposition for all transcendence that is valid for "me." In fact

⁹⁰In B3 Heidegger provides two marginal notes on this phrase, both of which are highlighted in red, and both of which Husserl copies in shorthand into the corresponding margin in B1 (see *Hu IX*, p. 275, n. 1):
 Note [A]: At B3, p. 25.21, left margin and running down to the bottom margin:

"3b. Why not? Isn't this action a possibility of the human being, but one which, precisely because the human being is never present-at-hand, is a comportment [a way of 'having oneself'], i.e., a way of being which comes into its own entirely from out of itself and thus never belongs to the positivity of something present-at-hand." ["Warum nicht? Ist dieses Tun nicht eine Möglichkeit des Menschen, aber eben weil dieser nie vorhanden ist, ein Verhalten, d.h. eine Seinsart, die eben von Hause aus sich sich selbst verschafft, also nie zur Positivität des Vorhandenen gehört."] obtain

Note [B]: At B3, top margin:

"3a. Or maybe [one is] precisely that [namely, a human ego] in its ownmost 'wundersome' possibility-of-Existenz. Compare p. 27 below, where you speak of a 'kind of transformation of one's whole form of life.'" ["Oder vielleicht gerade solches, in seiner eigensten, 'wundersamen' Existenzmöglichkeit. Vg. S. 27 unten, wo Sie von einer 'Art Änderung der Lebensform' sprechen."]

Disposition of these notes:

Note [A]: In Husserl's text Heidegger underlines "I am" and "not" in the phrase "I am not a human ego" (B3, p. 25.21; *Hu IX*, p. 275.1) and, a few lines below, underlines the words "is certainly" in the phrase "is certainly my ego" (B3, p. 25.27; *Hu IX*, p. 275.7) and connects the two underlinings with a line, as if to point to an apparent contradiction. At that point, it would seem, Heidegger writes out the first note -- "[A]" (above) in the left margin and numbers it simply as "3" and blocks it in red, topping it off with a red circle. Husserl copies it into B1.

Note [B]: Apparently later, after reading ahead to B3, p. 27.26 (*Hu IX*, p. 276.34-35) where the phrase "a kind of transformation of one's whole form of life" appears, Heidegger returned to B3, p. 25 and wrote the second note -- "[B]" above -- in the top margin, keyed it to the phrase "I am not a human ego," numbered it as "3a," and then renumbered note "3" as "3b" -- so that they would be read in the reverse order in which they were written. Prof. Biemel provides these two marginal notes in the 3a--3b order at *Hu IX*, p. 275, n. 1.

In Note [B] Heidegger's phrase "p. 27" refers ahead to B3, p. 27.26 (*Hu IX*, p. 276.34-35), specifically to the German words "eine Art Änderung der ganzen Lebensform." In *Hu IX*, p. 275, n. 1, Prof. Biemel erroneously takes the reference to be to *Hu IX*, p. 276.36, where in fact a different and distinct note of Heidegger's appears.

it is evident that the ego in its [now transcendently] reduced peculiarity is the only one⁹¹ that is positable [setzbar]⁹² with all its intentional correlates, and that it therefore offers me the most fundamental and primordial experiential ground for transcendental exploration. The phenomena attained in this transcendental reduction are transcendental phenomena.⁹³

Every single pure psychic experience -- once we take the next step of submitting it to the transcendental reduction that purifies it of worldly sense -- produces a transcendental experience that is identical [to the pure psychic experience] as regards content but that is freed of its "psychic" (that is, worldly, real) sense. In precisely this way the psychic ego is transformed into the transcendental ego, which, in each of its self-disclosing reflections (transcendental reflections), always rediscovers itself in its own transcendental peculiarities, just as the psychological ego, in keeping with the change in reductive focus, always rediscovers itself in its own psychological peculiarities. In this way there comes to light this wondrous parallelism of the psychological and the transcendental, which extends to all

⁹¹"...ist...ausschliesslich setzbar...": literally "is...exclusively positable."

⁹²Heidegger underlines "setzbar" in red. His note in the left margin (B3, p. 26.4, left margin, blocked in red; cf. *Hu IX*, 604, re 275.12-13) is highlighted in red:

"[So it is a] positum! Something positive! Or else what kind of positing is this? In what sense [can one say] that this posited-something is -- if it is supposed to be not nothing [but] rather in a certain way everything?" ["positum! Positives! Oder was ist das für eine Setzung? In welchem Sinne ist dieses Gesetze, wenn es nicht nichts [underlined twice], vielmehr in gewisser Weise Alles sein soll?"]

Concerning the note: (1) Husserl copies the note, in shorthand, into the corresponding margin in B1. Also in B1 he crosses out "ausschliesslich setzbar" and substitutes for it "ein [in] sich abgeschlossenes Erfahrungsfeld" ["a self-enclosed field of experience"]. This latter is the text reproduced in *Hu IX*, p. 275.12-13. (2) Heidegger's marginal note is apparently related to [A] "Appendix I," paragraph 5: "That which does the constituting is not nothing; hence it is something and it is in being -- although not in the sense of something positive." and [B] "Appendix II," sixth paragraph: "What is the character of the positing in which the absolute ego is something-positated? To what extent is there no positivity (positedness) here?" (3) It may be that Heidegger, in his phrase "in gewisser Weise Alles," intends to echo Aristotle's $\psi\psi\chi\tau\ \nu\tau\alpha\ \pi\iota\zeta\ \sigma\tau\iota\ \pi\ \nu\tau\alpha$ (*De Anima* Γ , 8, 431 b 21): "The soul is in some way all things."

⁹³Husserl (B1, p. 26.6-8) brackets out this sentence in the original draft and substitutes for it the following: "Transcendental experience is nothing other than the transcendently reduced objective world, or, what amounts to the same thing, transcendently reduced pure psychological experience. In place of psychological 'phenomena' we now have transcendental 'phenomena.'" See *Hu IX*, p. 275.15-19.

descriptive and genetic determinations that can be worked out on either side in the respective systematically maintained attitude.

The⁹⁴ same holds if I as a psychologist practice the intersubjective reduction [p. 276] and, by prescinding from all psychophysical connections, thoroughly examine the pure psychic nexus of a possible personal community, and then carry out the transcendental purification. This purification prescinds not just from the positively valid physical, as above; rather, it is a fundamental "bracketing" of the whole world, and it accepts as valid only the world as phenomenon. In this case what is left over is not the psychical nexus, as in the former instance; rather, the result is the absolute <p. 27="p. 16"> nexus of absolute egos -- the transcendentially intersubjective nexus -- in which the world of positivity is "transcendentally constituted" with its categorial sense for entities that in themselves exist intersubjectively. However, one may (as in E. Husserl's Ideen I) follow transcendental rather than psychological interests and take up, from the very beginning, the transcendental reduction, both egological and intersubjective. In that case, what emerges is not at all pure psychology but immediately⁹⁵ transcendental phenomenology as a science (fashioned purely from transcendental experience) both of transcendental intersubjectivity -- indeed, thanks to the requisite eidetic method, an a priori possible transcendental intersubjectivity -- as well as of possible worlds (or environments⁹⁶) as transcendental correlates.⁹⁷

⁹⁴In B1, p. 26.20 to 27.7, Husserl changes this sentence and the next three sentences (that is, down to "...both egological and intersubjective.") to read as follows: "The same holds if I as a psychologist practice the intersubjective reduction and, by prescinding from all psychophysical connections, thereby discover the pure psychic nexus of a possible personal community, and then, as a second step, carry out the transcendental purification. This purification is quite unlike that of the psychologist, which remains within natural positivity and then, by prescinding from the bodies co-present with psyches, reveals the social bonds of pure psyches. Rather, it consists in the radical epoché of the intersubjectively present world and in the reduction to that [level of] intersubjectivity in whose inner intentionality this intersubjective presence occurs. This is what yields us all as transcendental subjects of a transcendental, intersubjectively connected life within which the intersubjective world of natural positivity has become a mere phenomenon. However, (and historically this is the road phenomenology took) one may take up, from the very beginning and with a single stroke, the transcendental reduction (both egological and intersubjective)." This amended text is the one that appears in *Hu IX*, p. 276.16.

⁹⁵Changed in B1, p. 27.7-8 to: "...pure psychology as a connecting link but, from the very start,...."

⁹⁶Reading "Umwelten" for the "Unwelten" that appears at B2, p. 27.12.

[Pure Psychology as a Propaedeutic to Transcendental Phenomenology]⁹⁸

Now one understands in depth the power of psychologism. Every pure psychological insight (such as, for example, all the psychological analyses -- even if imperfectly sketched -- that logicians, ethicists, and so on, make of judgmental cognition, ethical life, and the like) is, as regards its whole content, in fact able to be utilized transcendently so long as it receives its pure sense through the genuine transcendental reduction.

Likewise one now understands the pedagogical⁹⁹ significance of pure psychology as a means of ascent to transcendental philosophy,¹⁰⁰ which is completely independent of its significance for making possible an "exact" science of psychological facts. For essential and easily understood reasons, humankind as a whole, as well as each individual human being, has, in the first instance, always lived and continues to live lives entirely and exclusively in positivity. Thus, the transcendental reduction is a kind of transformation of one's whole way of life,¹⁰¹ one that completely transcends¹⁰²

⁹⁷ In B1, p. 279-12 Husserl changes the second half of this sentence to read: "...transcendental phenomenology as a science (fashioned purely from transcendental intuition) of transcendental intersubjectivity -- indeed, thanks to the requisite eidetic method, a transcendental intersubjectivity that is a priori possible and related to possible worlds as intentional correlates." This changed text is reproduced in *Hu IX*, p. 276.19-22.

⁹⁸ *Hu IX*, p. 276.22--277.21 (i.e., the end of Section iv). The content of these pages corresponds generally to Draft D, II, §10, "Pure Psychology as a Propaedeutic to Transcendental Phenomenology."

⁹⁹ Changed in B1, p. 27.19-20, to "propaedeutic."

¹⁰⁰ The following dependent clause is crossed out in B1, p. 27.21-23.

¹⁰¹ Heidegger (B3, p. 27.25-26, left margin) draws a red circle next to the line "eine Art Änderung der ganzen Lebensform..." The red circle refers Husserl back to Heidegger's note in the top margin of B3, p. 25 (Note "3a": "...Compare p. 27 below, where you speak of a 'kind of transformation of one's whole form of life.>"). That Husserl understood Heidegger's mark in this way is shown by his own note in the left margin of B1 at this point: "Cf. Heidegger p. 25" (B1, p. 27.26).

¹⁰² Heidegger underlines this word (*übersteigt*) in red. Keyed to this word, he writes a note in the left margin, running to the bottom margin; (B3, 27.27, cf. *Hu IX*, p. 276, n. 1):

all life experience heretofore and that, due to its absolute foreignness, is hard to understand both in its possibility and [p. 277] actuality. <p. 28="p. 17"> The same holds correspondingly for a transcendental science. Although phenomenological psychology is relatively new and, in its method of transcendental analysis, even novel, nonetheless it is as universally accessible as are all the positive sciences.¹⁰³ Once one has systematically disclosed, in [pure psychology], the realm of the pure psychic, one thereby already possesses, implicitly and even materially, the content of the parallel transcendental sphere, and all that is needed is the doctrine that is capable of merely reinterpreting [the pure psychological sphere] rather than supplementing it [by adding something on to it].^{104 105}

"An ascent (a climbing up) that nonetheless remains 'immanent,' that is, a human possibility in which, precisely, human beings come to themselves." ["Ascendenz (Hinaufstieg), die doch 'immanent' bleibt, d.h. eine menschliche Möglichkeit, in der der Mensch zu sich selbst {underlined twice} kommt."]

This note likewise refers back to B3, p. 25, both to Note 3b, where Heidegger spoke of the transcendental reduction as "eine Möglichkeit des Menschen" and to Note 3a, where he spoke of it as a "transformation" in which Dasein becomes "its ownmost 'wondersome' possibility-of-Existenz."

¹⁰³ This sentence and the previous are taken over virtually verbatim into Draft C, p. 29 and Draft D, p. 24.

¹⁰⁴ Husserl original text in B3, p. 28.7-8 is: "...und es bedarf nur der nicht ergänzenden sondern zur ihrer Umdeutung berufenen Lehren."

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger's note (B3, p. 28.8, left margin to bottom margin; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 277, n. 1):

"But on the contrary, isn't this 'reinterpretation' really only a 'supplementing' application [or: utilization] of the transcendental problematic that you find incompletely [worked out] in pure psychology, such that when the psychical comes on the scene as a self-transcending [entity], from that moment on, everything positive is rendered transcendently problematic -- everything: both the psychical itself and the entities (world) constituted in it."

["Aber ist diese 'Umdeutung' nicht doch nur die 'ergänzende' Anwendung der transzendental Problematik, die Sie unvollständig in der reinen Psychologie finden, sodaß mit dem Einrücken des Psychischen als eines Selbsttranszendenten nunmehr alles Positive transzendental problematisch wird -- alles -- das Psychische selbst und das in ihm konstituierende Seiende (Welt)."]

Concerning the note:

(1) Heidegger's note is preceded by "! X !" heavily marked in red in the left margin. Husserl reproduces these latter marks, along with Heidegger's note, in the corresponding margin of B1.

(2) In B1 Husserl changes the preceding sentence and this one to read: "...one has thereby -- implicitly and even materially -- the content of the parallel sphere. All that is needed is the doctrine of the transcendental reduction, which is capable of reinterpreting [the pure psychological sphere] into the transcendental [sphere]." See *Hu IX*, p. 277.6-9.

(3) Biemel transcribes Heidegger's handwritten phrase "eines selbst transzendenten" as "eines selbst Transzendenten." But it could equally be read as "eines Selbst-transzendenten" or "eines selbsttranszendenten"

To be sure, because the transcendental concern is the supreme and ultimate human concern, it would be better "in itself" if, both historically and factually, the theories of subjectivity, which for profound transcendental reasons are ambiguous, were developed within transcendental philosophy. Then, by a corresponding change in focus, the psychologist can "read" transcendental phenomenology for his own purposes "as" pure psychology. The transcendental reduction is not a blind change of focus; rather, as the methodological principle of all transcendental method, it is itself clarified reflectively and transcendentially. In this way, one may say, the enigma of the "Copernican Revolution" is completely solved.

End of Draft B

[Seienden]." In any case, the word "transcendent" in this context means "self-transcending" rather than "transcendent" in the sense of "present-at-hand in the physical world."

[p. 600] <p. 1>¹⁰⁶

HEIDEGGER'S LETTER AND APPENDICES¹⁰⁷*

Messkirch
October 22, 1927

Dear fatherly friend,

My thanks to you and Mrs. Husserl for the recent days in Freiburg. I truly had the feeling of being accepted as a son.

Only in actual work do the problems become clear. Therefore, mere holiday conversations, enjoyable as they are, yield nothing. But this time everything was under the pressure of an urgent and important task. And only in the last few days have I begun to see the extent to which your emphasis on pure psychology provides the basis for clarifying -- or unfolding for the first time with complete exactness -- the question of transcendental subjectivity and its relation to the pure psychic. My disadvantage, to be sure, is that I do not know your concrete investigations of the last few years.* Therefore, my objections appear simply as formalistic.¹⁰⁸

<p. 2>In the enclosed pages I attempt once more to fix the essential points. This also gives me an occasion to characterize the fundamental orientation of Being and Time within the transcendental problem.¹⁰⁹

Pages 21-28¹¹⁰ are written essentially more concisely than the first draft. The structure is transparent. After repeated examination, I have put the stylistic abbreviations and glosses directly into the text. The marginal notes in red concern questions about issues that I summarize briefly in Appendix I to this letter.

¹⁰⁶Page numbers in angled brackets indicate the eight pages of Heidegger's handwritten letter and appendices.

¹⁰⁷Asterisks in the text of Heidegger's letter and appendices refer to explanatory notes found below.

¹⁰⁸Presumably Heidegger is referring to his objections to Husserl's Draft A of the EB article.

¹⁰⁹Heidegger crosses out a redundant "des Problems" between "innerhalb" ("within") and "des transcendentalen Problems" ("of the transcendental Problem").

¹¹⁰That is, Section iii above.

Appendix II deals with questions about the arrangement of those same pages. The only thing that matters for the article is that the problematic of phenomenology be expressed in the form of a concise and very impersonal report. Granted that the clarity of the presentation presupposes an ultimate clarification of the issues, nonetheless your aim, or that of the article, must remain confined to a clear presentation of the essentials.

[p. 601] <p. 3>

For all intents and purposes the course of our conversations has shown that you should not delay any further with your longer publications. In the last few days you repeatedly remarked that a pure psychology does not yet really exist. Now -- the essential elements are there in the three sections of the manuscript typed by Landgrebe.¹¹¹

These investigations [relating to pure psychology] must be published first, and that for two reasons: (1) so that one may have the concrete investigations in front of him and not have to go searching in vain for them as some promised program, and (2) so that you yourself may have some breathing space for [preparing] a fundamental exposition of the transcendental problematic.

I would ask you to stick to the second draft for the "*Studien [zur Struktur des Bewußtseins]*" as a guide. I have now read it through once again, and I stand by the judgment I made in my previous letter. --¹¹²

Yesterday I received from my wife the letter from Richter (a copy of which is in Appendix III). I have written to Mahnke.*

Of course here I do not get down to my own work. That will be a fine mess, what with the lecture course and the two seminars* and the lectures <p. 4> in Cologne and Bonn,* and Kuki besides.*

However the requisite enthusiasm for the problem is alive; the rest will have to be done by force.

¹¹¹The "*Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins*," (Husserl Archives, M III 3, I to III). See *Briefwechsel IV*, p. 145, n. 70.

¹¹²Heidegger uses a dash, followed by a space, to separate this paragraph and the next (omitted at *Hu IX*, p. 601).

Next week I leave here to see Jaspers,¹¹³ whom I will ask for some tactical advice for myself.

I wish you a successful conclusion of the article, which will keep many problems astir in you as a starting point for further publications.

Again, you and Mrs. Husserl have my cordial thanks for those lovely days. I send you my greetings in true friendship and respect.

Yours,

Martin Heidegger

¹¹³That is, on Monday, October 23. See Heidegger/Blochmann, *Briefwechsel*, p. 22 (October 21, 1927), postscript.

APPENDIX I*

Difficulties With Issues

We are in agreement on the fact that entities in the sense of what you call "world"¹¹⁴ cannot be explained in their transcendental constitution by returning to an entity of the same mode of being.

But that does not mean that what makes up the place of the transcendental is not an entity at all; rather, precisely at this juncture there arises the problem:¹¹⁵ What is the mode of being of the entity in which "world" is constituted? That is Being and Time's central problem -- namely, a fundamental ontology of Dasein. It has to be shown that the mode of being of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities and that, as the mode of being that it is, it harbors right within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution.

Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the [p. 602] eksistence¹¹⁶ of the factual self. This factual self, the concrete human being, is as such -- as an entity -- never a "worldly real fact"¹¹⁷ because the human being is never merely present-at-hand but rather eksists. And what is "wondersome"* is the fact that the eksistence-structure of Dasein makes possible the transcendental constitution of everything positive.

Somatology's and pure psychology's "one-sided" treatments [of the psycho-physical]¹¹⁸ are possible only on the basis of the concrete wholeness of the human being, and this wholeness as such is what primarily determines the human being's mode of being.

¹¹⁴It would seem Heidegger has in mind Husserl's use of "world" at, for example, *Hu IX*, p. 274.16 (= <p. 24>). See Heidegger's note thereto.*

¹¹⁵Cf. the series of questions in *Sein und Zeit*, p. 351.34-37 (E.T., p. 402.37-41), which Husserl duly noted in his own copy of the work. Cf. below, "Husserl's Marginal Remarks in Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*."

¹¹⁶In German, "Existenz," Heidegger's word for Dasein's being (das Sein des Daseins) as a "standing out towards" ("ek-sistence") possibility; hence: eksistence.

¹¹⁷Heidegger seems to be referring to Husserl's phrase "weltlich reale Tatsachen" (*B3*, p. 23.9; *Hu IX*, p. 273.2). Cf. n. *** above.

¹¹⁸Cf. *Hu IX*, p. 272.27-33.

The [notion of the] "pure psychic" has arisen without the slightest regard for the ontology of the whole human being, that is to say, without any aim of [developing] a psychology -- rather, from the beginning, since the time of Descartes, it has come out of epistemological concerns.

That which constitutes is not nothing; hence it is something, and it is in being -- although not in the sense of something positive.¹¹⁹

The question about the mode of being of what does the constituting is not to be avoided.

Accordingly the problem of being is related -- all-inclusively -- to what constitutes and to what gets constituted.

¹¹⁹Cf. *Hu IX*, p. 275.ca 12

APPENDIX II*

Re: Arrangement of Pages 21ff.¹²⁰

The first thing in the presentation of the transcendental problem is to clarify what the "unintelligibility" of entities means.¹²¹

➤ In what respect are entities unintelligible? i.e., what higher claim of intelligibility is possible and necessary.

➤ By a return to what is this intelligibility achieved?

➤ What is the meaning of the absolute ego as distinct from the pure psychic?¹²²

➤ What is the mode of being of this absolute ego -- in what sense is it the same as the ever factual "I"; in what sense is it not the same?

➤ What is the character of the positing in which the absolute ego is something posited? To what extent is there no positivity (positedness) here?¹²³

➤ The all-inclusiveness of the transcendental problem.

¹²⁰That is, Section iii of Draft B: *Hu IX*, pp. 271.1-277.21.

¹²¹See *Hu IX*, p. 271.5 <p. 21="p. 10">: "a cloud of unintelligibility spreads over the whole world"; cf. *Hu IX*, p. 273.5 <p. 23="p.12"> "unverständlichen Welt," and p. 264.22 <p. 12="p. 1"> "unverständlich."

¹²²See above re *Hu IX*, p. 273.21 (B3 p. 23.28): "my own self in its absolute proper essentialness" and the note thereto.

¹²³See above re *Hu IX*, p. 275.12-13 (B3 p. 26.4): "...the ego...that is exclusively positable..." and Heidegger's note thereto.

APPENDIX III

"I have the pleasure of being able to inform you that the Minister has decided to assign you the chair as full professor of philosophy at the University [of Marburg].* On consideration of your present income your basic salary would be set at 6535 Reich Marks yearly, increasing as is customary every two years to the sum of 9360 Reich Marks.

"While inviting you to express your opinion on this settlement, I likewise have the honor of informing you that Privatdozent Dr. Mahnke from Greifswald has been called to the professorship that you have held up to now.

With best regards,

[Richter]"

[END OF HEIDEGGER'S APPENDICES]

EXPLANATORY NOTES ON HEIDEGGER'S LETTER AND APPENDICES

The handwritten letter and appendices: Heidegger's letter is written on a single sheet of paper, 28 x 22.5 cm, folded in half to make four pages of 14 x 22.5 cm. Heidegger's letter covers all four folio pages. Appendix I is on two pages, 14 x 22.4 cm., with writing on only one side of each page. Appendix II is written on a single side of paper, 14 x 22.5 cm. Appendix III is written on one side of a single paper, 14.5 x 14.5 cm.

"I do not know your concrete investigations of the last few years": On February 7, 1925, Husserl wrote to Heidegger: "Ever since I began in Freiburg, however, I have made such essential advances precisely in the questions of nature and spirit that I had to elaborate a completely new exposition with a content which was in part completely altered." This excerpt is from a letter that is not found in the *Briefwechsel*. Heidegger read the above lines to his students on June 12, 1925, prefacing the reading by saying: "I am not sufficiently conversant with the contents of the present stance of his investigations. But let me say that Husserl is aware of my objections from my lecture courses in Freiburg as well as here in Marburg and from personal conversations, and is essentially making allowances for that, so that my critique today no longer applies in its full trenchancy." Cited from Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Gesamtausgabe II/20, p. 167-8; E.T. *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 121. See also *Sein und Zeit*, p. 47, n. 1; *Being and Time*, p. 489, n. ii (H. 47): "Husserl has studied these problems [of the constitution of nature and spirit] still more deeply since this first treatment of them; essential portions of his work have been communicated in his Freiburg lectures."

"Yesterday I received...written to Mahnke": Heidegger is indicating that, on Friday, October 21, the day after he had arrived in Messkirch, he received the letter (forwarded by his wife in Todtnauberg) from the Minister of Education Richter, appointing him to the chair at Marburg. See also Heidegger/Blochmann, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 21-22 (letter of October 21, 1927): "The minister has decided to give me Natorp's job of full professor. I got the news yesterday, along

with word that they have decided that my successor is to be Privatdozent Mahnke, who had been proposed for the full professorship." On Wednesday October 19, the day before leaving Husserl's house, he wrote to Jaspers from Freiburg to say that he had news (presumably not yet in writing) that he had been named to the position: Heidegger/Jaspers, *Briefwechsel*, p. 82.

Dietrich Mahnke (1884-1939) studied mathematics and philosophy with Husserl at Göttingen (1902 to 1906) and took his doctorate under him in 1922 with a work entitled *Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik*, which Husserl published in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, VII (1925), pp. 305-612. He taught at Greifswald until 1927, when he succeeded to Heidegger's associate professorship at Marburg. See *Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung*, p. 434. Heidegger wrote to Mahnke from Messkirch on October 21, 1927, (Nachlass Mahnke, ms. 862, Universitätsbibliothek Marburg), among other things to congratulate him on his appointment and to discuss issues of teaching at Marburg.

"...the lecture course and the two seminars": In the winter semester of 1927-1928, Heidegger delivered a four-hour-per-week lecture course on the *Critique of Pure Reason*. See Heidegger/Jaspers, *Briefwechsel*, p. 81, letter of October 6, 1927. The text has been published under the same title as the course: *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, edited by Ingrid Görland, GA II, 25, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1977, second edition, 1987. As Heidegger wrote to Blochmann: "The work-weeks in my study [in Todtnauberg] were nonetheless very productive for me. I worked through Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in one stretch...": Heidegger and Blochmann, *Briefwechsel*, p. 21.

The two seminars ("Übungen," that is, "exercises") were: (1) for advanced students: "Schelling, *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*" (cf. Heidegger/Jaspers, *Briefwechsel*, p. 80: letter of September 27, 1927; and p. 62: letter of April 24, 1926); (2) for beginners: "Begriff und Begriffsbildung" ("[The] Concept and Concept-formation"), a topic that in *Sein und Zeit*, p. 349, n. 3 (omitted in later editions but included in *Being and Time*, p. 498) Heidegger said would be treated in the (unpublished) Part One,

Division Three of *Sein und Zeit*, specifically in Chapter Two.

"...the lectures in Cologne and Bonn": Theodore Kisiel (private communication, September 28, 1996) places the lectures between November 1-4, 1927, citing Heidegger's letter of November 11, 1927, to Georg Misch: "Last week I gave lectures in Cologne and Bonn, and in fact they required some preparation of me" ["Vorige Woche hatte ich Vortr ae in K oln und Bonn, die mich auch einige Vorbereitungen kosteten."] A month later he mentioned the lectures to Elisabeth Blochmann as well: "In Cologne and Bonn I met with some quite nice and genuine success" ["In C oln u. Bo[nn] hatte ich einen sch onen u. echten Erfolg"]. Heidegger/ Blochmann, *Briefwechsel*, p. 22 (December 19, 1927). The content of the lectures is not known, but Kisiel suggests they may have dealt with *Sein und Zeit*, which Scheler and Hartmann were elaborating in detail in their seminars at Cologne.

"Kuki: Heidegger had met Baron (not Count, as Heidegger incorrectly states in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*) Sh uz  Kuki (1888-1941) at Husserl's home on October 12, 1927. Kuki was largely responsible for introducing Heidegger's thought to Japan. He studied in Germany and France from 1922 to 1928 and first met Heidegger at Husserl's house in 1927. He attended Heidegger's course on *Critique of Pure Reason* (see above), beginning in November of 1927, as well as, up until May 30, 1928, most of "Logic (Leibniz)," since published as GA II, 26. He returned to Japan in April, 1929, and published (in Japanese) *The Structure of "Iki"* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1930), which at least in part is influenced by Heidegger. Cf. Heidegger's "Von einem Gespr ach von der Sprache," *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, third edition 1965, pp. 85ff., E.T., *On the Way to Language*, translated by Peter D. Hertz, New York: Harper and Row, 1959, pp. 1ff. Also, *Japan und Heidegger: Gedenkschrift der Stadt Me kirch zum hundertsten Geburtstag Martin Heideggers*, edited by Hartmut Buchner, Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke, 1989, esp. pp. 28-29, 127-138, 268, and photograph no. 7 between pp. 262-263; and *Edmund Husserl und die ph anomenologische Bewegung: Zeugnisse in Text und Bild*, edited by Hans Rainer Sepp, Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber, second edition, 1988, p.432, with a photograph, p. 287.

APPENDIX I: Husserl copied out Appendix I in shorthand, analytically dividing it into seven numbered sections. Husserl's shorthand transcriptions of Appendix I is catalogued in the Husserl Archives as M III 10 III 3 (B3), pp. 7a-7b. In the following translation of that transcription, (the emphasis is Husserl's rather than that in Heidegger's original text.

We are in agreement on the fact that

- 1) entities in the sense of what you call "world" cannot be explained in their transcendental constitution by returning to an entity of the same mode of being.
- 2) But that does not mean that what makes up the place of the transcendental is not an entity at all; rather, precisely at this juncture there arises the problem: What is the mode of being of the entity in which "world" is constituted?

That is Being and Time's central problem

-- namely, a fundamental ontology of "Dasein." [The quotation marks are Husserl's.]

- 3) It has to be shown that the mode of being of Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities and that, as the mode of being that it is, it harbors precisely within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution.
- 4) Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the eksistence of the factical self. This factical self, the concrete human being, is as such -- as an entity -- never a "worldly real fact" because the human being is never merely present-at-hand but rather exists. And what is "wondersome" is the fact the eksistence-structure of Dasein makes possible the transcendental constitution of everything positive.
- 5) Somatology's and pure psychology's "one-sided" treatments [of the psycho-physical] are possible only on the basis of the concrete wholeness of the human being, and that wholeness as such is what primary determines the human being's mode of being.

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- 5a) The [notion of the] "pure psychic" has arisen without the slightest regard for the ontology of the whole human being, that is to say, without any aim of [developing] a psychology -- rather, from the beginning, since the time of Descartes, it has come out of epistemological concerns.
- 6) That which constitutes is not nothing; hence it is something and it is in being -- although not in the sense of something positive.
The question about the mode of being of what does the constituting is not to be avoided.
- 7) Accordingly the problem of being is related -- all-inclusively -- to that which does the constituting and to what gets constituted.

"what is 'wondersome'": In the manuscript of his "Ideas III" Husserl wrote: "Das Wunder aller Wunder ist reines Ich und reines Bewußtsein...." ["The wonder of all wonders is pure Ego and pure consciousness...."] Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Book III: *Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, ed. Marly Biemel, *Husserliana V*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 19__ * [date] p. 75; E.T. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* Book III: *Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences*, translated by Ted E. Klein and

William E. Pohl, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980, p. 64. Cf. Heidegger, "Nachwort zu: 'Was ist Metaphysik?'" in *Wegmarken*, p. 307 (earlier edition, p. 103, Heidegger speaks of only human beings, called by the voice of being, experience "das Wunder aller Wunder: daß Seiende ist." "The human being alone of all entities, addressed by the voice of being, experiences the wonder of all wonders: that entities are." "Postscript" to "What is Metaphysics?" in Walter Kaufmann, editor, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, New York: Penguin/Meridian, 1975, p. 261 [translation amended].

Appendix II: Husserl rewrote Heidegger's Appendix II in shorthand and numbered the points as "1" through "7," beginning with the first sentence. The page is preserved in B3 (M III 10, III 3), numbered as p. 8.

"...the chair as full professor of philosophy...": The opening had been occasioned by the transference of Professor Nicolai Hartmann to Cologne in 1925. Heidegger accepted the position and on November 2, 1927, was officially named to the position, with retroactive appointment to October 1, 1927 (Akten Universität Marburg / Betreffend Die Professoren der philosophischen Fakultät" [1922-1940], Bestand 307d, Nr. 28, Document of November 9, 1927, Nr. 5980, archived November 12, 1927, Nr. 523.)

HUSSERL'S SHORTHAND NOTE FROM

B1, p. 2

On the back of B1, p. 2 Husserl writes the following text in shorthand. It is difficult to ascertain to what passage of the typescript (if to any at all) it is intended to pertain. Biemel transcribes the text at *Hu IX*, p. 598-599. The following is a translation of the text.

"Objective sense and object. Possible perception, possible perceptual appearance. Exemplary. Manifolds of perceptions -- of perceptual appearances of the same thing. The 'manifold.' The appearing, continuously flowing on -- at first in passivity. The activity in the change of appearing. Onesidedness and allsidedness. Allsidedness and the corresponding unity. Manifold of higher levels, whose individualities themselves are already unities of manifolds.

"The intuited thing, onesidedly perceived. Allsided perception of surfaces. Question: Which ways, which constituting 'methods' must I follow in order for the exemplary object, the object intuited in an exemplary starting-point intuition [Ausgangsanschauung] to "come to light," to "show itself" according to all its properties, or rather, according the directional tendencies of its properties [Eigenschaftsrichtungen]. Evidence --

"The perceived object as such -- as the 'X' of undisclosed horizons related to correlative directional tendencies of the 'I can' (or the 'we can'). The I -- the center of all possibilities of the 'I can,' of the ability-to-do, of the I-can-operate [des Mich-bewegen-können] -- the center of the 'surveyable' system of such possibilities of operating, center of the now and the I-am-operating temporally through the ordering-form of the past, [I] traverse my pasts and my futures -- in anticipation in the manner of empty, self-traversing thinking. I here -- I try to think my way into a progression of myself according to all directional tendencies. For every now and here that I correctly think, I can do the same, I can think the same as done, over and over again. A rule of a doing from out of every exemplary directional tendency -- if -- then, appearances as motivated being -- but also freely producible constructions: a system of actions of thought as constituting, always

performable again -- correlatively the products present at hand. Products bound to a unity -- finally the idea of a universal total-product ('manifold'), for which all products, both achieved and to be achieved, are installment payments, 'appearances.'

"An object -- meant -- experienced and yet itself still meant as an experienced object, with open horizon. Awakening of the horizon, awakening of my 'I-can-system' and of my apposite 'thus' will I find. 'Thus' will come to light. [Biemel places a question mark to indicate the unclarity of Husserl's text here.]

"The problem of completeness regarding the horizontal disclosures -- 'What is that,' how I disclose its complete sense -- its sense-form, which is the rule of all possible actually-present [aktuellen] disclosures. What perception will bring I do not know, and yet I know what perception can bring. The essence. [Das Wesen, die Essenz.] (1) What I can put forth as the essence for example of this thing, the universal that comprises all its being-possibilities. (2) the individual essence, the individual of the universal, the idea of individualizations, which is a thought but not the construable universal."