

Heidegger, Aristotle and Phenomenology

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It has long been known that Heidegger's reading of Aristotle is essential to his entire life's work. William J. Richardson writes that "Aristotle has influenced him more profoundly than any other thinker," and Gadamer, Szilasi, and Gründer report as much.¹ It is common knowledge that the Aristotelian problem of the analogy of Being, first awakened in him by his 1907 reading of Brentano's book on Aristotle, remained "the ceaseless impetus for the treatise *Sein und Zeit* which appeared two decades later."² This impetus gained momentum in his lectures and seminars from 1919 on, when he seems to have taken to heart Hegel's words, "If philosophy were done in earnest, nothing would be more worthy than to give lectures on Aristotle."³ It was in those early Freiburg and Marburg lectures that Heidegger tried out "a transformed understanding of Aristotle"⁴ that was the basis for his eventual break with Husserl. In 1928 W. R. Boyce Gibson could record Heidegger's position (reported through Oskar Becker and going back at least to the 1923-24 lecture, *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*⁵), that "Aristotle [was] in *De Anima* phenomenological (without the explicit Reduction)."⁶ Gibson's further evaluation: "Husserl is the Plato to Heidegger's Aristotle."⁷ We know as well that Heidegger projected a book prior to *Sein und Zeit* that was to have summarized his Aristotle interpretations, and that Paul Natorp had Hei-

degger hired at Marburg in 1923 on the basis of the introduction to that work.⁸ And the influence has continued to work even on the later Heidegger. In the Fifties he told his students, "It is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years."⁹ And to judge by a conversation that the present writer had with Heidegger in 1971, Heidegger himself continues to live out that program to this day.

But if the influence is undeniable, the "how" and "how far" of it remain generally unknown. Index enough of that fact is the infrequency with which Heideggerian scholarship elaborates the Aristotelian bases of Heidegger's work. And this is no fault of the commentators. Heidegger has published only one essay devoted entirely to Aristotle ("Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Physis*: Aristoteles *Physik*, B, 1"¹⁰), and even there the theme is not explicitly the influence of the Stagirite on Heidegger. Likewise, in *Sein und Zeit*, where Aristotle appears directly or indirectly on virtually every page, the nature of the influence is concealed behind the language of *Lebensphilosophie*.

The "secret" of the Aristotelian bases to Heidegger's thought lies hidden in Heidegger's courses from 1919 through 1952, and since it is not clear that his *Gesamtausgabe* (the publication of which begins reportedly this year) will include the early Freiburg courses (1916-1923), the secret may be

kept closed until his *Nachlasse* become available. But the appearance this year of his 1925-26 course, *Logik (Aristoteles)* will show the profound influence of the *Peri Hermeneias* (specifically regarding *logos apophantikos*) and of *Metaphysics Theta, 10* (regarding *alētheia*) on the writing of *Sein und Zeit*. Likewise the publication of *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (lecture course, 1927) will clarify Heidegger's reading of the meaning and transformation of Aristotle's *energeia* with respect to the medieval *essentia-existentia* and Heidegger's own ontological difference.

If one wanted to spell out the general lines of Aristotle's influence on Heidegger, one could do worse than to utilize existing secondary sources that report the contents of those early courses or that extend their themes. Among these is Professor Helene Weiss' *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles* (Basel, 1942), which Heidegger recommended to his seminar students in 1951 as one of the few good works on the *Physics* and perhaps on Aristotle's thought as a whole. This work reports, often in close paraphrase, much of the content of Heidegger's lectures on Aristotle in the Twenties.

But my purpose in the present essay is more limited. I wish to show how Heidegger reads Aristotle as a prototypical "phenomenologist" and how this reading lays the groundwork for a transformation of the Aristotelian problematic of Being into the problematic of *Sein und Zeit*. A review of students' transcripts of Heidegger's unpublished seminars and lectures on Aristotle from 1921 through 1952 shows that Heidegger's interpretations of Aristotle remain *generally* consistent from the early to the later period and that, whereas the courses expand on the topic, their content differs only in minor and generally contextual ways from

such published works as "Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Physis*" and *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Hence, for what follows I will draw largely on these latter texts.

The titles of Heidegger's early courses on Aristotle indicate that the "method" with which he reads Aristotle is "phenomenological." But Heidegger does not intend to drag Husserl's phenomenology back to an epoch where it does not and could not belong. Rather, he claims that his phenomenological procedure is no more than an explicitation of Aristotle's own way of investigation, indeed, of the *methodos* that was indigenous to Greek philosophical thought itself. It is precisely by sticking with *that* "phenomenological method" that Heidegger broke with Husserl and with the entire traditional appropriation of Greek philosophy. But this explicitation of Aristotle's procedure leads to a transformation of Aristotle's problematic. In what follows I will first spell out a preliminary idea of phenomenology in Aristotle and show how this lays the basis for a transformation of the Aristotelian problematic. Then I will elaborate the concrete structure of the "phenomenological correlation" as Heidegger sees this articulated in the key terms of the Aristotelian lexicon.

1. PHENOMENOLOGY: PERSPECTIVE AND PROGRAM

In Heidegger's telling, the Greeks were the first to fundamentally experience being (*to on*) as *phainomenon*, that which of itself shows itself, that which appears. Professor John H. Finley, Jr., in his informative *Four Stages of Greek Thought*,¹¹ confirms from a classicist's point of view what Heidegger finds operative in Greek thought from Homer to Aristotle, namely, that the presence of beings in the world is

experienced as their appearing, where *phainesthai* means that a being brings itself to radiant self-manifestation (*sich zum Scheinen bringen*) and "is" precisely insofar as it shows itself in that self-manifestation.¹²

In appearing, a being appears *as* something meaningful in the broadest sense: as a shield that the warrior can use or as the ship he can launch or as the god he can reverence or challenge. This "as"-character bespeaks the arrival of meaning amongst beings, the "irruption" that occurs only with the arrival of man. Indeed, men can deal with beings *only* insofar as they appear *as* such and so, and the philosopher is distinguished by the fact that he asks the question of their "appearing-as" as such. He asks the question of their "Being."

What we have said so far indicates two things. In the first place: Whenever the Greeks speak of beings (*to on*), they always imply beings *as* something or other (*to on hēi . . .*), that is, in terms of some modality of meaningful presence, even if the "as" (*hēi*) is not expressly stated. This "as"-dimension of beings, which is spoken forth in the "is" of apophantic discourse, articulates the Being-dimension of beings. Hence, *to on* always means "a-being-in-a-modality-of-Being," and Heidegger can correctly translate *to on* as *das seiend-Sein*.¹³ To express this unity, Aristotle often uses *ousia*, a noun which, derived through the participle *ousa* from *einai*, can adequately be translated by the neologism "is-ness" or "Beingness" (*Seiendheit*).¹⁴ Therefore, the question that defines first philosophy, "What is *to on*?", must be fleshed out to say, "What is *to on hēi on*?" — "What is a being (any being, all beings) precisely *as a being*, that is, in its Beingness?" The question clearly focuses on the "as"-dimension of beings. It does not seek an

ontic answer, but an ontological one insofar as it directs itself to the "as-ness" or "is-ness" as such. Therefore Aristotle spells out the above question more clearly when he says (*Meta.*, Z, 1, 1028 b 2ff.) that the question, "What is a being as a being?" comes down to the question, "What is is-ness?" (*tis hē ousia*;) . And this question seeks not the is-ness of any delimited region of beings, but of all beings in terms of the analogical unity governing all possible modes of is-ness.¹⁵ Aristotle's question about *ousia* is his formulation of the question of the meaning of Being.

A second thing needs to be said. To speak of beings as *phainomena* is at least to imply the locus of their meaningful appearance, the horizon wherein that meaningfulness is articulated. Beings as *phainomena* are correlative to modes of "awareness" (*Vernehmen*) in the broadest sense, that is, to a *legein* or *noein* that is revelatory of the *phainomenon* as what and how it *is*. Without *logos*, no is-ness.¹⁶ The uniqueness of man as "the living being who has *logos*" (*zōion logon echon*) consists in the fact that his essence is the locus of meaning and that he has access to beings only in terms of some modality of their "appearance-as . . ." in *logos*. Aristotle thematizes the function of *logos* as *dēloun* (to make visible), *apophainesthai* (to show forth), and most importantly as *alētheuein* (to uncover or bring out of hiddenness).¹⁷ For man, *to on* is always *on legomenon*, "read" beings, beings articulated according to the multiplicity of modes of meaningful presence that are expressed in the implicit "as" or the explicit "is" of apophantic discourse.

We may summarize these two points: A being always implies a Being-dimension that is expressed in the "as", and the only locus of this Being-dimen-

sion is man's essence as *logos* or *alētheuein*. To *on* and *legein* are "apriori correlative"; man's very nature is "phenomenological" (*legein ta phainomena*). And if one attempts the task proper to first philosophy, namely, *legein to on hēi on*, then the resultant ontology must be phenomenological. Indeed, only as phenomenology is ontology possible.

Before moving on, let us ask whether this "explicitation" of the bases of Aristotle's philosophical procedure is not an unjustifiable importation of contemporary (specifically Husserlian) perspectives into Greek thought. What is ultimately at stake here is the question whether *any* interpretation of Aristotle, be it performed by Thomas Aquinas, Werner Jaeger, or W. D. Ross, can ever hope to be without presuppositions. And Heidegger's justification of his own phenomenological reading of Aristotle is grounded in the ineluctability of the phenomenological nature of man himself: all knowing, including the knowing of an Aristotelian text, is performed in and through the interpretative "as"-structure of a *legein*. But rather than unfolding the important issue of the hermeneutical fore-structure, I will simply let Heidegger speak for himself on the question of phenomenology and the Greeks. The following paragraph is the opening lines of Heidegger's redaction of an introduction to Husserl's *Encyclopedia Britannica* article on phenomenology. I cite it at some length because it reveals the broad context within which his reading of Aristotle moves.

The totality of beings is the field from which the positive sciences always acquire their regions of objects. Directed straight at beings, these sciences in their totality undertake the investigation of everything that is. Thus there seems to be no field left over for philosophy, that science which from

antiquity has been considered the foundational science. But has not Greek philosophy, ever since its decisive origins, made "beings" the very object of its questioning? Yes, of course, but not in order to determine this or that being, but rather to understand beings as *being* [*als Seiendes*], that is, with regard to their Being [*Sein*]. For a long time the posing of the question, and hence the answers, remained entangled in obscurities. Nevertheless, already in the origins something remarkable appears. Philosophy seeks the elucidation of Being by way of reflecting on the *thinking* of beings (*Parmenides*). Plato's discovery of the Ideas takes its bearing from the *monologue* (*Logos*) of the soul with itself. The *Aristotelian* categories originate with regard to the predicative knowing of *reason*. . . . Is this turning of the gaze from beings to consciousness accidental? Or is it ultimately demanded by that which is constantly sought for under the name "Being" as the problem-area of philosophy?¹⁸

The last question of this text echoes Aristotle's *aei zētoumenon kai aei aporoumenon* (*Meta. Z*, 1, 1028 b 2f.; cf. the end of the Kant book), and it serves as Heidegger's starting point for a radicalization of the Aristotelian question about the analogical unity of all "is"-predication. Up to this point we have been dealing with *Greek* phenomenology (as Heidegger explicates it), but the point, he insists, is to think phenomenology in an even "Grecker" way than did the Greeks. We may now proceed to show how Heidegger's explicitation of phenomenological method in Aristotle entails the transformation of the Aristotelian problematic.

Man has access to beings only in terms of their meaning in the broadest sense, that is, only in terms of some form of "presentness-as" in *logos*. This presentness-as in terms of which beings

are articulated (*legetai*) has many modalities. Thus: *to on legetai pol-lachōs*,¹⁹ "beings are revealed in their presentness-as in many modes." Aristotle gives an unsystematized list of the four ways beings are revealed, namely, beings-in-their-Being (1) as "accidental", (2) as true or false, (3) as in *dy-namīs* or *energeia*, and (4) according to the schema of the categories.²⁰ But all such modes are related to an analogical common denominator (*pros hen*) insofar as each one is a modality of presentness-as in which beings are revealed as such and so. If there were a science that could reveal that analogical unity, it would be the science of all beings in terms of their is-ness as such — the science of *on hēi on*.²¹

In critically searching out the common meaning that analogically unifies the many meanings of beings, one either presumes or thematically reinvestigates the meaning of the very locus of any and all meaning: *logos* as the "faculty" of revealing. The insight into the need for a reformulation of the meaning of *logos* is the basis for Heidegger's transformation of Aristotle's problematic. If beings are present in *logos* in many ways, those "many ways" are themselves modifications of *logos*. Therefore, *logos* itself appears (has Being) in many ways. If *logos* in its *alētheuein*-function has Being in a multitude of ways, then the first and foundational step towards elucidating the meaning of Being (i.e., the unity of modes in which beings appear) becomes the task of questioning the unity of the many modes of the Being of *logos*. *Logos* must, as it were, turn on itself and carry out an *alētheuein* of the unity of its own *alētheia*-process. And since the modifications of *logos* are correlative to the modes of appearance of beings, the discovery of the unity of the Being of *logos* provides the philosopher with the

a priori horizon for working out the analogical unity of all modes of appearance of beings, that is, the meaning of Being itself.

In short: Every being is a "being as . . .", that is, a being in a mode of Being. Further, the ground of the "as" is *logos* as *alētheia*, which, in a variety of modes, is correlative to the appearance of beings. Since the task of first philosophy is to seek the very "as-ness" of beings, then in working out the unified Being of *logos*, philosophy has secured the ground of the unified meaning of Being as such.

We see here in an Aristotelian formulation the program announced in *Sein und Zeit*. And indirectly we may also see how this program is possible not on Aristotelian grounds but only on the condition of a transformation of Aristotle's problematic. First of all, we must reaffirm, against popular misunderstandings of Heidegger's claim about the forgottenness of Being, that Being indeed is questioned in Aristotle's formulation of the task of first philosophy: "What is is-ness?" What Heidegger is claiming is that Aristotle's question is misplaced insofar as it does not probe the Being of *logos* deeply enough. Given Aristotle's understanding of the *alētheuein*-function of *logos* as categorial-assertive "making present," that is, given that the basic Being of *logos* is the constant revelation of beings in their presentness, Aristotle will be compelled to read the analogical unity of the many modes of the presentness of beings as "pure presentness as such," pure *energeia* correlative to apophantic *logos*. If Heidegger hopes to justify his claim that Aristotle's formulation is not revelatory of the authentic meaning of Being, he will have to critically reformulate the fundamental meaning of *logos* at a level deeper than the categorial-assertive level of *synthesis-dihairesis* at

which Aristotle stopped. The 1925-26 course *Logik* (Aristoteles) attempts to do just that in terms of texts from *Peri Hermeneias*, and *Sein und Zeit* attempts the same by means of a hermeneutic of "factual life." Both show that the apophantic *logos* of Aristotle is a derived form of a more basic dynamic and temporal unity of *alētheuein*. Thus the way is opened to answering the question of the unified meaning of Being in a more radical way than was possible for Aristotle. To state matters in a non-Aristotelian way, if the unified meaning of the Being of *logos* were temporality, the meaning of Being as such would be read in terms of time.

I have stated these matters programmatically and in Aristotelian terms in accordance with the limited goal set at the beginning of this section, namely, to show how in general and with what programmatic consequences Heidegger reads Aristotle phenomenologically. We may now move to the second topic: the concrete shape of the "phenomenological correlation" as Heidegger sees this articulated in the key terms of the Aristotelian lexicon.

2. PHENOMENOLOGY:

AN ARISTOTELIAN LEXICON

All human knowing, as phenomenological, has a being always in a mode of its Being, and in Aristotle these modes can be expressed in terms of *eidōs*, the appearance of a being as what and how it is. It is not our concern here that Aristotle's thematization of the modes of Being as modes of visibility (*eidōs* is derived from *horaō*, "I see") carries over aspects of Plato's emphasis on seeing. Rather, what is important is Aristotle's ontological transformation of Plato's *eidōs*. So differently does Aristotle experience beings from the way Plato does, that he radically changes the correlativity of *eidōs*

and *logos* and in so doing achieves a more adequate ontological formulation.²² Aristotle's *eidōs*, as the Being of a being, cannot be some "thing" existing off by itself apart from *logos* (*ou chōriston on*), but rather is *eidōs* only in *logos* (*all ē kata ton logon* — *Physics* B, 1, 193 b 5).²³ Both the Platonic and the Aristotelian *eidōs* are formulations of Being, and both are correlative to some kind of *logos*. But in Aristotle's unique formulation of that correlativity, Heidegger finds a more "adequate" phenomenology that is at the same time a more "adequate" ontology. Insofar as Plato's *eidōs* (at least as Aristotle reads it) can stand off on its own, it tends towards *ontical* characterization (as a being), whereas insofar as Aristotle's *eidōs* appears only in the apophantic declaration about a being (i.e., in the *legein* of an *on*), it is a properly *onto-logical* characterization, it names Being. We see how ontology is controlled by phenomenology and how the understanding of *logos* is crucial to both.

Let us now spell out the key words of Aristotle's "phenomenological" lexicon. If the phenomenological correlation can be articulated in terms of *eidōs* and *logos*, the *eidōs*, as the presentness of a being in *logos*, has a crucial element of stability about it. In *Physics* B, 1, 192 b 13 and 193 a 36, Aristotle speaks of beings as *synhestōta* and *synhistamena*, participial forms derived from the verb *histēmi*, "I stand." With this clue, Heidegger claims that the Greeks experienced beings as "the constant" with the twofold meaning of (1) that which stands of itself, and (2) that which is constant, enduring, lasting.²⁴ Equally expressive of such stability are *hypokeimenon*, "that which lies present" and *hypostasis*, "that which stands of itself." Both the "lying" and the "standing" indicate the common Greek viewpoint on beings as "that which is

constantly present of itself."²⁵ The Greek *ousia* likewise bespeaks such stability. In popular usage before it was taken up as a philosophical term, *ousia* meant one's present possessions. Heidegger's translation of *ousia* as *das Anwesen* ("present holdings") captures the sense of stable presentness that for the Greeks characterized the Being of a being.²⁶

These registrations of Being as stability can now be read in terms of *energeia* and *entelecheia*.²⁷ A being that stands there, lies there, or is held in presence (*synhestōta*, *hypokeimenon*, *ousia*) and that shows itself as what it is (*eidos*) has "gathered itself up" into stability. The words *telos* and *ergon*, which are contained in *entelecheia* and *energeia*, express this stable in-gathering. *Telos* primarily means "completion" or "fulfillment" (not "aim" or "purpose"), and *ergon* primarily means that which has been placed into the self-manifestation of its own *eidos* (not "work" as the end-product of technical making). As such, these words say much the same as *peras*, which designates a being's "act" of holding itself together (self-delimitation) so that it stands of itself and can be. The word *entelecheia*, expresses the Being of a being. As standing or lying present in its self-delimitation, as shining forth in what and how it is, a being "has itself in its fulfillment", *en telei echei*, *entelecheia*, or is gathered into the self-manifestation of its own *eidos*: *energeia*. All these terms express a being-in-its-Being, and as such are correlative with *logos*.

One final lexical entry: *morphē*. Heidegger reads *morphē* (which is usually translated as "form") as saying the same as *eidos*, with the added nuance of a being's "placing itself into the appearance" (*die Gestellung in das Aus-*

*sehen*²⁸). What this nuance achieves is a delineation of the difference of Aristotle's *eidos* from Plato's. Plato grasped the *eidos* as something present for itself, something common to individual beings which, in comparison with the *eidos*, tended to be displaced into the subordinate role of non-being. Aristotle, however, grasps the individual as a real being, something that is insofar as it places itself into its own *eidos* which appears only in *logos*. The nuance that attaches to *morphē* is a being's emergence into *eidos* for *logos*. The controlling factor again is *logos*: *morphē* is to be understood from *eidos* and *eidos* is to be understood from *logos*.²⁹

3. CONCLUSION

We have attempted only the limited task of showing the general lines of the idea of phenomenology that Heidegger finds in Aristotle, and of pointing out how *Sein und Zeit* is grounded on a radicalization of the Aristotelian problematic. We have bracketed the question of whether or not Heidegger's phenomenological reading of Aristotle "works," and have instead simply tried to understand its general and formal structure.

In brief: Man's uniqueness among living beings is that with him there arrives meaning, indeed that he has access to beings only in terms of their articulated presence in *logos*. Man's very Being is *logos*, and the *alētheia*-function of *logos* is that whereby and wherein the is-ness of beings becomes manifest. This is-ness can be expressed equally as *eidos*, *morphē*, *ousia*, *energeia* and *entelecheia*. Furthermore, the primary philosophical task is the determination of is-ness as such, the analogical unity that governs all possible modes of presentness of beings. The question about the unified meaning of Being rests on

a prior (thematic or unthematic) understanding of the analogical unity of the Being of *logos* itself. Heidegger's radically different thematization of the Being of *logos* is the basis of his claim

that the authentic meaning of Being remains forgotten in Aristotle. It is likewise the starting point for his own question about the meaning of Being in terms of time.

REFERENCES

N.B.: In referring to Heidegger's works, I cite first the abbreviated title (following Richardson's list, with the addition of "WEG" to abbreviate *Wegmarken*), then the German pagination followed in parentheses by the pages in existing English translations.

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2. *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. x. Translation by Hans Seigfried, "Martin Heidegger: A Recollection": *Man and World*, 3 (1970), 4.
3. Heidegger cites this sentence from Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (WW XIV, 314) in "Hegel und die Griechen," WEG 266.
4. SD 86 (78).
5. The Marburg catalogue lists this course as "Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie (Descartes Interpretation)," but Heidegger's students recorded it by the title given above. In its opening lectures, the course deals at length with *De Anima* B, 7.
6. W. R. B. Gibson, "From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary," ed., H. Spiegelberg, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 2 (1971), 73.
7. *Ibid.*, 72.
8. Gadamer, art. cit., 170. Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie" in *Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften*, ed. C. Astrada et al., Bern.: Francke, 1949 pp. 77. H. Knittermeyer, *Die Philosophie der Existenz*, Vienna: Humboldt, 1952, p. 212. Cf. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, ed. R. Ingarden, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968, pp. 25, 27.
9. WD 70 (73).
10. WEG, 309-371.
11. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966. Cf. pp. 3, 5, 27, 29, 53f.
12. US 132 (38). Cf. EM 46 (50), 54 (59); WEG 345f.
13. WP 31 (97); cf. EM 24 (25f.).
14. WEG 329f.
15. *Meta.*, G, 1, 1003 a 21.
16. Cf. SZ 212 (255): "Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist, das heisst die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, 'gibt es' Sein."
17. SZ 32f. (56f.) and footnote thereto.
18. Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie (Husserliana, IX)*, ed. Walter Biemel, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968, p. 256, my translation.
19. *Meta.*, G, 2, 1003 a 33; E, 2, 1026 a 33ff, Z, 1, 1028 a 10.
20. *Meta.*, E, 2, 1026 a 33ff.
21. *Meta.*, G, 1, 1003 a 21.
22. Cf. N II, 228, 409 (9f.).
23. WEG 351f.
24. WEG 316.
25. WEG 331.
26. WEG 330. EM 47 (50), 148 (162).
27. Heidegger's interpretations of *telos*, *ergon*, *energeia* and *entelecheia* are scattered throughout his works. Cf. WEG, 321, 339, 348f., 352-356. N I, 77; N II, 404f. EM 46 (50).
28. WEG 351 and passim.
29. WEG 345f.

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