

Radical Phenomenology

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

edited by

John Sallis



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**GETTING TO THE TOPIC:
THE NEW EDITION OF WEGMARKEN**

Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, second expanded edition with marginal notes, edited, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (*Gesamtausgabe, I. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte Schriften 1914-1970, Band 9*). Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1976. 487 pages.

Apart from the editor's epilogue this volume has three main features which distinguish it from the first edition of *Wegmarken* (1967).¹ First and of greatest interest, it bears some 180 (lettered) footnotes gleaned from the margins of Heidegger's personal copies of the essays. Whereas the actual selection of these marginalia was left to the editor, Heidegger himself laid down the rules, namely, that those glosses were not to be printed which either have meaning only for Heidegger or are not understandable by his readers. Secondly, the volume duly notes the changes which Heidegger quietly and controversially made in the 1949 edition of his 1943 "*Nachwort zu 'Was ist Metaphysik?'*" and which he publically acknowledged

¹Apparatus: (1) All abbreviations of Heidegger's works follow the standard "List of Symbols" in Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. xxxi. (2) Numbers in parentheses indicate pages in the two editions of *Wegmarken*. For example, (485) or (124, 159) refer to pages in the new edition; (316=148.3) means that on page 316 of the new edition there is a footnote which glosses page 148 line 3 of the old edition. (3) In the Appendix, e.g., "114=12.4: vor das Seiende → vor Sein des Seienden" means that on page 114 of the new edition there is a note which glosses page 12, line 4 of the old, specifically, "vor das Seiende" is annotated by "vor Sein des Seienden."

only in the 1975 edition. The later changes remain embodied in the text, but the original phrases are recorded in nine (numbered) footnotes. Thirdly, this new edition contains three additional essays which have appeared elsewhere: the "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers 'Psychologie der Weltanschauungen'" (1919/21) published in 1975 and the two theology essays from 1927 and 1964 published in 1970 as *Phänomenologie und Theologie*. There are other, minor changes in this volume. The list of sources has some new but insignificant information; the essays are arranged in chronological order (exception: theology-1964 appears as an appendix to theology-1927); and the pagination of the first edition is given in the margins for easy cross-reference. A warm dedication to the late Rembrandt scholar, Kurt Bauch, Heidegger's colleague at Freiburg since 1933, graces the volume.

There is another kind of change which scholars may find troubling. In his epilogue the editor writes: "Several small textual changes which serve only for clarification were taken over from [Heidegger's] personal copies, but on the author's instructions were not to be expressly noted" (485). Without combing the text, I have no way of reporting which these are.² But I found another change, hardly of any significance, but an unstated change nonetheless. Note "b" on p. 134 refers to § 22 of *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* for discussion of the ontological difference. However, in Heidegger's autograph of that course, which he personally showed me on 12 May 1971, that section is numbered § 16. The discrepancy is due to the fact that in Heidegger's autograph the numbered sections begin only *after* the Introduction, whereas in von Herrmann's published edition of that course the Introduction itself gets divided into six more sections so that § 16 of the autograph becomes § 22 of the published text. This is trivial, but what might the other changes be?

This is a difficult book to review. For one thing, most of the essays have been available for some time, all but two—the Jaspers piece and "*Hegel und die Griechen*"—in English translation.³ To discuss

²I have since found two: (1) The word "wesenhaft" is added before "weiter" (331=162.4); (2) to the phrase "Das Wesen der Wahrheit" is added "als Richtigkeit der Aussage verstanden" (186=81.20).

³An excellent new anthology, Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York, Harper and Row, 1977) contains new translations of WM, WW, and

the Jaspers essay would require a whole article, and David Krell's excellent commentary on it ("Towards *Sein und Zeit*" JBSP, VI, 1975) is readily available. That leaves the footnotes, 180 of them, unindexed, most of them not complete sentences, many as suggestively enigmatic as the oracles of Delphic Apollo, who "neither shows nor hides but gives a sign" (Heraclitus, Fr. 93). Nor are these marginalia accurately datable (cf. 486 f.). Supposedly any mention of *Ereignis* places a marginal note later than 1936, but I will show below that the word begins to emerge as early as 1928 (cf. also US 260 n.). One could offer statistics on the marginalia. Four essays have none at all (the Jaspers essay, theology-1927, the lecture on Leibnitz from the 1928 course of that name, and the 1939 essay on *physis* in Aristotle). Three essays have a minimum of glosses, none important ("Zur *Seinsfrage*" has one, "Hegel und die Griechen" has two, theology-1964 has one). The Plato and the Kant essays have nine and eleven notes respectively, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" has fourteen. The five most heavily noted are "Vom Wesen des Grundes," "Was ist Metaphysik?" as well as the *Nachwort* and *Einleitung*, and the "Humanismusbrief," all with about thirty notes apiece. The glosses concerning the alterations in the *Nachwort* clarify very little for this reader.

I shall reserve an appendix at the end for a listing of selected marginalia. Within this essay I shall attempt to place some of the important glosses into a reading of Heidegger's overall project, and I shall concentrate particularly on how and whence Heidegger derives the word and concept "*Ereignis*." First, then, what Heidegger's topic is *not*, secondly, what it *is*, and finally, why it is called *Ereignis*.

I shall risk saying that there is almost nothing in these marginalia which cannot be found more substantially and clearly in the published writings. (And after reading transcripts of Heidegger's courses from 1920 through 1952, I predict the same for a good deal of the *Gesam-*

HB: *The Piety of Thinking*, ed. and trans. James Hart and John Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1976) brings the two theology essays into English. I have translated the Aristotle essay: "On the Being and Conception of *Physis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, 1" in *Man and World* IX (1976) 219-270, and I have completed a new translation of the Plato essay which I am happy to supply to interested scholars in ditto-graphed form.

tausgabe.) But if the glosses in this volume will satisfy no treasure hunter searching for the "secret" of Heidegger's thought, they will help scholars to test their hypotheses about that scandal of all scandals: Just what was Heidegger talking about? For the longest time it has been customary to say that Heidegger's topic is the Being or Being-question left forgotten by the tradition. But for one thing, neo-Thomists regularly publish articles proving irrefutably that Being (*esse*) is not forgotten in Aquinas (just as Protestants maintain it is not forgotten in Luther⁴), and for another, Heidegger himself said in 1966 that he no longer liked to use the word *das Sein* (*Heraklit*, p. 18). He even took to crossing it out (*Sein*: 369 f.) or substituting the older form *Seyn* (124, 159, 169, 237 etc.), and in this volume he even crosses *Seyn* out (306)! If to name Heidegger's subject matter we fall back on "Ereignis" ("seit 1936 das Leitwort meines Denkens," 316=148.3; cf. US 260 n.), we only explain *ignotum per ignotius*. What then can we do? I suggest the employment of a heuristic device to designate what Heidegger was after. Let us call it simply "the topic" (as in the phrase "Get to the topic!"—"Zur Sache selbst!"), and only later shall I enlist words like *Ereignis*, *physis* or *alētheia* to explicate it.

At the outset it is worth saying the obvious: that the topic, *die Sache*, is not *das Sein* in the traditional sense of the Being of beings. For that, Heidegger generally uses the word *Seiendheit*, beingness (132, 134, 306)—hardly something forgotten by metaphysics, which thematized it under such titles as *idea*, *energeia*, *ipsum esse*, absolute spirit, will to power, and so on. These historical transformations of the beingness of beings may or may not exhibit development among themselves. The point of a "history of Being" is not necessarily to demonstrate some kind of evolution, for if anything, linear progression is swallowed up in a grand circularity whereby these modes of beingness revolve around, and in the process hide, that which renders them possible. Insofar as they "bracket out" (*epechein*) the central topic, each of them constitutes an "epoch" (*epochē*) in the "history of Being."⁵ The end of this history would

⁴Cf. the anecdote in Helmut Franz, "Das Denken Heideggers und die Theologie," p. 262 f. in Gerhard Noller, ed., *Heidegger und die Theologie* (München: Kaiser, 1967).

⁵Note that the *Seinsgeschichte* may have two meanings. "Negatively" it is a history of various epochs of beingness, each forgetful of the central topic so that "Diese

consist in removing the brackets and “seeing” what has lain hidden: “*Sein, Wahrheit, Welt, Sein, Ereignis*” (369=199.16). But what do these titles mean? The disconcerting habit that some Heideggerians have of answering the question by blindly repeating the master’s language with its rustic imagery of “forest paths” and “re-gioning”—as if they too walked the woods above Todtnauberg instead of fighting traffic in Paris and New York—is a sign of the deplorable state of the hermeneutical art.

Such a charge obliges its author to put up or shut up, and at some risk I shall put up, i.e., try to say what Heidegger’s topic is. For openers I invoke Aron Gurwitsch’s insistence that the *only* topic for philosophy is sense (*Sinn*).⁶ I wish to carry on a discussion of Heidegger’s so-called “Being-as-such” in terms of “sense-as-such” and his “Being of beings” in terms of the “meaningfulness of beings,” and further, I want to discuss sense and meaningfulness in the language of “givenness” (or as Heidegger prefers, “presence”). This procedure constitutes, *salva reverentia*, a “phenomenological reduction” from beings to their meaningful givenness and finally to sense-as-such as the horizon for all modes of beingness. It likewise entails a “phenomenological construction” of that realm of sense-as-such in terms of interrelating types of givenness (presence and relative absence). Such a translation of Heidegger’s richly suggestive, and therefore potentially misleading, lexicon may open the way to understanding how the term “*Ereignis*” emerged from a “phenomenological destruction” of Aristotle’s *kinēsis* to become the guiding term in Heidegger’s thought.⁸

Epoche [=die Metaphysik] ist die ganze Geschichte des Seins” (377=206.11). “Positively” the central “topic” may be seen as contracting itself into these modes of beingness so that the whole process is the “Geschichte des Seyns selbst” (134=30.38) or even “Geschichte als Ereignis” (190=85.35).

⁶*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, VII (1946), 652.

⁷Cf. M. Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1975) pp. 29-31.

⁸Nor is this talk of “sense-as-such” a lapse into consciousness or some sphere of cognition abandoned by Heidegger from the beginning. For Heidegger, Being is accessible only as sense (SZ 152), and all the language of presence and absence in Heidegger refers to givenness in meaning, not to the mere presentness-in-existence of the Scholastic *esse*. If talk of “sense” risks falling into epistemology, talk of “Being itself” runs the far greater risk of collapsing into the naive realism that still haunts Heideggerian scholarship. (Cf. SZ 208 on “idealism.”) In the Jaspers-essay in this

To begin then: beings are the given, their beingness is their givenness, and all this presupposes a prior horizon within which such givenness can happen at all. Equally, beings may have meaning, in which case their beingness is their meaningfulness, all of this presupposing a prior horizon of sense-as-such. The tradition has been clear enough on the first two moments of this schema (the given and its givenness, the meaningful and its meaningfulness—the metaphysical difference) and has given various titles to the experienced givenness of beings, some of which I listed above. But the horizon or “place” (I will use the Greek word *topos*) of the whole scenario has gone unheeded, even though it was originally named by the Pre-Socratics and mentioned in passing by the later Greeks (e.g., *alētheia* in *Metaphysics* IX, 10). We may now see the significance of Heidegger’s double claim that essential thinking took a momentous step forward when Parmenides located the topic worthy of thought in the “well-rounded” open place in which *noein* and *einai* come together (131, referring to Fr. I, 28 ff. & Fr. 3)⁹ and that since Aristotle the only advance in awareness of the topic occurred when Kant turned the philosophical gaze away from things, even away from their givenness/beingness and for a moment directed it upon the projection of the *topos* within which the given and its objective-categorial givenness show up. To be sure, Kant did not go far enough, and from the beginning Heidegger abjured any location of the *topos* within transcendental subjectivity, whether Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception, Hegel’s absolute spirit, or Husserl’s constitutive transcendental ego.¹⁰ From his earliest lectures after World War I Heidegger read the *topos*, the horizon within which givenness occurs, as generated in

volume Heidegger is quite clear that talk of “Existenz” is talk of “Existenzsinn” (“‘ist’-Sinn,” “‘ich’ ‘bin’-Sinn” p. 29) and talk of “Sein” is talk of “Seinssinn” (30). Cf. also 366=196.5: “‘das Sein-Selbst’ ist das Sein in seiner Wahrheit, welche Wahrheit zum Sein gehört, d.h. in welche Wahrheit ‘Sein’ entschwindet.”

⁹Cf. Heidegger’s text in Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (*Husserliana*, IX), ed. W. Biemel, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968, p. 256.

¹⁰But cf. Prof. Hans Seigfried’s wondrous transformation of Heidegger into a neo-Kantian who, armed with “a method modeled on that of the sciences,” busies himself with “construction” of phenomena in the interests of a “*Grundlegung der Wissenschaften*”! H. Seigfried, “Descriptive Phenomenology and Constructivism,” *PPR* 37 (1976), 248-261.

“the factual life-experience” (*das faktische Lebenserfahrung, die Faktizität*) or “existence” (*Dasein*) or simply in *Leben* as the *Grundbewegtheit* whose meaning is *Sorge* (1921-22 course on Aristotle). There are other ways of expressing it with various degrees of accuracy, many of them found in these marginalia. In the language of the early Husserl the topos is the empty projection which may be filled in by the presence of beings (SZ 151, 343).¹¹ In the language of givenness, the topos is the very “giving” of an area within which occurs the meaningfulness of beings—expressed by Heidegger as the *Es gibt* vs. the *Gegebenheit des Gegebenen* and in the present notes by various forms of *gewähren* (114; 188; 306; 372; 479=306.31). Again, the topos may be called *physis* or *Lichtung*, the emergence or “clearing” of the finite area of sense-as-such within which various modes of the meaningfulness of beings are played out and become comprehensible. In the traditional light-metaphor, the topos is *alētheia*, the “outbreak” (*Aus-schlag, ἐκβολή* 249=319.29) of light/sense-as-such which renders possible all modes of luminosity/meaningfulness of this or that. Now, whereas the tradition has been quite clear about the metaphysical difference between beingness and beings, it has ignored the difference between beingness and the topos which possibilizes it (e.g., 131). Because the tradition has reserved the word “Being” (*einai, ousia, esse, das Sein*) for what Heidegger would prefer to call “beingness” (the meaningful givenness, *Seiendheit*, of beings, their *Washeit*, 306), Heidegger will designate his topic, the emerging topos, as the *sense* of being(ness) or as the *clearing* for the presentness of beings (“*Lichtung . . . von Anwesenheit des Anwesenden*,” 184), or as *Seyn* in the sense of *das Einfache von Seiendem und Sein/Seiendheit* (159). To stress the emergent-dynamic character of the topos Heidegger resorts to such striking phrases as “*Entwurf der Wesung der Wahrheit des Seyns*” (132) and “*das Seyende des Seyns*” (134, cf. 127) and, stressing the *-heit* of *Wahrheit*: “*das Heitere (das Heiternde), das Lichtende*” (179=74.31).

Very little of Heidegger can be understood if we confuse this distinction between the possibilizing topos (*Seyn* or *Sein*, i.e., *Sein* in

¹¹The new volume has one note on Husserl at 457=285.16 in the Kant-essay: “Dagegen Husserls ‘kategoriale Anschauung’ *Logische Untersuchungen* VI; aber was heisst für Husserl ‘Kategorie’?”

Heidegger's sense) and the various modes of givenness/presentness of beings (*Seiendheit*, i.e., *Sein* in the tradition's sense). The confusion becomes well nigh inevitable when Heidegger himself shortens the title of his project from *die Frage nach dem Sinn* (= *Seyn*) *des Seins* (= *Sein des Seienden*) to simply *die Seinsfrage*, as he does in the dedication to this volume. In hopes of avoiding such confusion, I have spoken simply of "the topic," and now we may say: the topic is the topos (*die Sache selbst ist die Lichtung*) and Heidegger's project is a "topology" (447=275.17), a showing of the topos.

Up to now this description of the topos in mostly static, spatial, and horizontal-transcendental terms has neglected two essential factors: (a) the question of man and (b) the question of what possibilizes the possibilizing topos.

(a) The primordial event of the topos—if you will, the event or out-break of the topos—happens only in, with, and "as" essential and proper human existence (*Da-sein*). To discuss the topic without reference to man would be to say too little, in fact nothing at all (SF 407=235.23, cf. WD 74). For Heidegger man is nothing but possibility, not empty pure possibility, but the ability to live into a future and to retain meaning from the past, thereby opening up the sphere of sense-as-such. It is worth pausing over this word "past." Instead of the usual "*Vergangenheit*," which suggests something by-gone. Heidegger coins "*Gewesenheit*" from the past participle of *sein*, "to be." This has come into English as "having-been-ness"; however, I prefer "alreadiness" in order to stress that the human "past" lies not behind but *in front of man* (SZ 20) precisely by operating in and determining the structure of man's present and future. For example, one's Graeco-Roman, Judeo-Christian, secular-scientific "past"—or for that matter one's Oedipal complex—hardly flows away behind one into the distance. These are already out ahead, setting up the possibilities one might choose. That is why Heidegger speaks of the alreadiness of human existence in terms of thrownness or projectedness (*Geworfenheit*) into already determined possibilities, indeed into the most human of all determining possibilities, one's death. On the other hand living into the future does not mean forging possibilities *ex nihilo* but re-opening already operative possibilities, rejecting some, modifying others, in an effort to become what one most properly is. Temporally described, human possibility has a dimension of alreadiness (*Gewesenheit*) and a dimension of retriev-

ing one's proper alreadiness (*Zukünftigheit*); and to live authentically in and as possibility means, in the words of Pindar which Heidegger likes to quote, to "become what you already [properly] are."¹²

Below I show how this "circular" structure is modeled on and yet transforms the fundamental structure of Aristotelian *kinēsis*. But now it is important to discuss human existence not in the language of the early Heidegger but in the later language of *Ereignis*. All through the marginalia we find variations on this word, but one particular note highlights the relation between this term and the earlier language of thrownness and project. Heidegger glosses a sentence from "Einleitung zu 'Was ist Metaphysik?'" viz., "[Das Verstehen] ist der ekstatische, d.h. im Bereich des Offenen innestehende geworfene Entwurf" with the following: "Geworfenheit und Ereignis. Werfen, Zu-werfen, Schicken; Ent-Wurf: dem Wurf entsprechen" (377=206.23). Here he translates the earlier language of projected project into the later one of being-appropriated and resonating. In SZ existence was projected into sense; later, existence is seen as being appropriated unto sense by having sense "sent to" it. Before the turn, understanding meant that existence, as projected forward and opening the horizon, reveals a realm of meaning-fraught relations and references; after the turn understanding is a resonance with the realm of sense which is given to man, or equally, into which man is appropriated. The new volume is suffused with footnotes on the "appropriation" (*Ereignis*) and "employment" (*Brauch*) of man for sense. The interesting texts are those in which both words combine: *Sein* is the *Ereignis-des Brauchs* (312=107.25); the unthought is the *brauchendes Eignen* (459=287.11); man's existential essence is *ereignet-gebrauchte* (375=204.11); when *ereignen* is used transitively, it is called *Brauch* (311=106.16; 369=198.28; 370 c). Compare as well *die Vereignung-des Brauchs* (309=105.10). Clearly in both periods the same topic is under discussion: the event in which the topos is opened in conjunction with the opening of essential and proper human existence. In the early period this happens by man's self-appropriation in acts of resolve whereby he becomes what he properly (*eigentlich*) is: the emergent and mortal disclosure of the world of sense. In the later period man's most proper self is had in

¹²SZ 145; EM 77.

acceding to being “appropriated” or “employed” for the event of sense. (Thus the later Heidegger returns in a more profound way to the early Husserl’s concern for the autonomy of sense over against the concrete acts in which it is performed.)

(b) But what possibilizes the possibilizing topos? In *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* Heidegger glosses: “*Wesen: 1. quidditas—das Was-kouón; 2. Ermöglichung—Bedingung der Möglichkeit; 3. Grund der Ermöglichung*” (178=73.1). In the first set we recognize all modes of traditional beingness, including Aquinas’ *ipsum esse*, for these all tell what the state or condition of beings is. In the second we recognize the modern search for the transcendental horizon which possibilizes beingness, and we may assume this includes the language but not the intention of Heidegger’s early discussion of existence as “transcendence” and of Being as “*das transcendens schlechthin*” (SZ38). In the third set we again find the transcendental pattern but in its moment of searching out the “whence” of the transcendental projection. For Kant this would be the transcendental unity of apperception (or in the “A” deduction, the transcendental imagination); for Husserl it would be the constitutive transcendental ego. But for Heidegger what is it? In *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, Heidegger annotates the phrase “*nichts ist ohne Grund*” with “*...Gründung überall wo Seyn. Welchen Wesens ist Seyn, dass zu ihm Gründung gehört...? Wo liegt die Notwendigkeit für Gründung? Im Ab- und Un-Grund. Und wo dieses? Im Da-sein*” (127=24.9). In this distinction between *Gründung* and *Ab-Grund* or equally between *Seyn* and *Sein* (306 note “g”) we come upon the issue of the so called “*lēthē*”—dimension of the topos. The clearest text in that regard is found in the “*Einleitung zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’*” where Heidegger says: “Whenever unhiddenness emerges, that which essentially become present in this unhiddenness, viz., hiddenness itself, remains absent precisely so that the unhidden thing can appear as a being” (370=199.22 f.) In this text we can distinguish four moments which then reduce to two: (1) the thing which appears as meaningful, *das Unverborgene*; (2) the meaningfulness of that meaningful thing, *die Unverborgenheit des Unverborgenen*; (3) the emergence-dimension of the realm of sense-as-such, *das Aufgehen der Unverborgenheit*; and (4) the submergence-dimension of that same realm, *das Ausbleiben der Verborgenheit in dieser Unverborgenheit*. Now by combining the first two and the last two, the fourfold structure collapses into two: first, there is that-

which appears in its state of meaningfulness, and secondly, there is the possibilizing topos with the two dimensions of submergence and emergence, *lēthē* and *alētheia*, *Enteignis* and *Ereignis* (328=159.25; 370). What is this? Having defined the topos as *alētheia*, we now seem to meet something behind or deeper than *alētheia*, viz., "*das Wesende in dieser [Unverborgenheit], nämlich die Verborgenheit;*" which Heidegger glosses as "*Ἀλήθεια als Verbergung.*" Were we mistaken in identifying the topic with *Sein* and *alētheia*? Deeper than these, is the topic ~~Sein~~ and *lēthē*? And what would that possibly mean?

These questions can not be answered without considering why Heidegger calls his topic *Ereignis* and specifically, whence he derives that word. For now we may retain this much: (1) that the topic seems to be the emergent topos which possibilizes all modes of beingness; (2) that the topos happens only in and "as" essential, proper human existence, whether seen in terms of resolve's self-appropriation of what one properly is or as being-appropriated and employed for the emergence of sense-as-such; and (3) that somehow the topos has a bi-dimensionality of presence and absence whereby *both* these moments must be given, although in different ways, insofar as both constitute the topos which itself is sense.

Having shown what Heidegger's topic is not and provisionally what it is, we may now ask why it is called *Ereignis*. In order to show the Aristotelian "basis" of the term I shall draw upon the 1939 text "*Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις. Aristoteles Physik B, 1*" and the unpublished 1928 seminar "*Phänomenologische Übungen: Interpretation von Aristoteles, Physik II.*"¹³ I will show briefly (1) the phenomenological implications of understanding *kinēsis* as *energeia atelēs*; (2) that in formal terms the pattern operative in *kinēsis* is that of retrieve; and (3) that the pattern of the movement of retrieve is the pattern which finds expression in the word *Ereignis*.

Because for Aristotle experience in the broadest sense is always experience of beingness, it is therefore always of the presentness of beings in their stable *telos* or *ergon* (cf. *en-tel-echeia*, *en-erg-eia*). Movement, however, is the very lack of stable presentness and ful-

¹³Although this is the title in Richardson, *op. cit.*, 666, the seminar actually dealt with *Physics III*.

fillment, and for that reason would seem to be excluded from beingness (cf. *Physics*, III, 2, 201b 20f.: *mē on*). But the genius of Aristotle, as Heidegger likes to repeat,¹⁴ is precisely that he grasped movement as a kind of beingness (*energeia tis*, 201b 30f.), the condition of a being which at once stands in its *telos* (*en-tel-echeia*) without having fully arrived there (*tou dynatou hēi dynaton*, 201 b 5), the state of a being which is present in partial appearance, yet absent in relative non-appearance (*energeia atelēs*, 201 b 32).

“Relative non-appearance”—that is, non-appearance *for the sake of* appearance—is what Heidegger takes Aristotle to mean by *dynamis*; indeed, this *dynamis* is the possibilizing condition for a moving being’s partial and negated appearance. Precisely this “atelic” quality of a moving being is what allows it to remain in movement, for were the *dynamis* brought forward into the *telos*, the being would be achieved and the movement would cease. This atelic presentness constitutes a unique interplay of presence and absence, for along with its limited presence, a moving being’s non-presence or possibilizing absence *also becomes present* in a special way. For example, the *absence* of Pierre from the café and of my stolen bicycle from the rack are indeed present and given, even when the absent *beings* are not. Likewise in a growing natural being, the relative non-appearance of the source of growth indirectly becomes present in allowing the flower to appear.¹⁵ To spell out *dynamis* in terms of presence and relative absence is to lay out the geneologically most primitive form of “retrieve” (*Wiederholung*). Indeed if it may be said that Heidegger’s topic is the emergent topos (*physis*) and if, as Heidegger argues, *physis* is *kinēsis* or *energeia atelēs*, and if this atelic presence has the fundamental structure of drawing *dynamis* finitely into *energeia* while ever allowing *dynamis* its non-appearance, then we may begin to see anew the unity and simplicity in Heidegger’s thought precisely by discovering its Aristotelian roots.

A natural moving being, for example a plant, must maintain and not abolish its absence, preserve and not fully actualize its *dynamis*,

¹⁴“On the Being and Conception of *Physis*,” *Man and World* IX (1976), 225, In *Interpretationen aus der antiken Philosophie*, SS 1931, Heidegger dealt in the third lecture (May 5, 1931) with the “introduction” of non-being into being in Plato and Aristotle.

¹⁵“On the Being and Conception of *Physis*,” p. 266.

if it is to remain what it is. While using *dynamis* as power for presence (*entelecheia* . . .), a moving being conserves it *as possibility* (. . . *tou dynatou hēi dynaton*). There are various ways of expressing this. We may say that the plant constantly “goes back into” its *dynamis* (*Insichzurückgehen*)¹⁶ as it comes forth into appearance. Or we may say that the plant again and again seeks (re-peats) and draws upon (re-trieves) its *dynamis* in order to appear. In order to name this process of drawing upon *dynamis* for the sake of *energeia* while allowing *dynamis* to remain relatively absent, Heidegger comes up with “*Eignung*,” “appropriation.” *This is Heidegger’s proper title for movement, and it is the basic model of the concept of Ereignis.* But there is a lot of mileage between Aristotelian *kinēsis* and the unique “movement” that is the emergent *topos*. Three examples will illustrate how this *Eignung* respectively (a) operates externally in the movement of constructing an artifact, (b) takes on the *formal* pattern of “retrieve” in natural movement, and (c) is radically transformed into the pattern of retrieve *stricte dicta* in resolve, temporality and historicity.¹⁷

(a) While underway and unfinished, the process of constructing a table is the on-going appropriation (*Eignung*) of the appropriate wood (*das Geeignete, to dynamēi on*) unto the incompletely attained *eidos* “table.” Note that in the generation of artifacts the appropriation-process is external to the product and does not provide its own appropriate material. The *eidos prohaireton* “table,” which is the guiding force of the movement of construction, does not provide any wood but sends the carpenter to the lumberyard to buy it. (b) By contrast the movement of natural beings introduces a new element into the appropriation-process. In the growth of a plant the very process of generation is a “self”-provision of the appropriate material. The plant “orders up” (*bestellt*) its own seed which develops naturally into a flower which in turn “orders up” a new seed. This process of “ordering up” is the most primitive form of “retrieve.” The becoming of a plant is the plant’s appropriation of its own *dynamis* unto its own *energeia*. In so doing, the plant takes over what it properly is (*to ti ēn einai, Wesen, Gewesenheit*), i.e., it appropriates what it *already* is in *dynamis* by *becoming* it in incom-

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 268.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 254-263.

plete *energeia*. *Kinēsis* (and therefore *physis*) is already a primordial structure of retrieve, namely, becoming what one already is. (c) The appropriation-process is radically transformed when the movement that is *physis* becomes the movement that is *logos* in the human existence. In his 1922 course on Aristotle Heidegger first pointed out how for the Greeks *logos* is a form of *kinēsis*, but a unique one, as he indicates four years later: "The movedness [*Bewegtheit*] of existence is not the motion [*Bewegung*] of something present-at-hand" (SZ 374 f.). Human existence is that unique form of movement which, by stretching ahead of itself towards its death, opens the realm of sense-as-such. In its ordinary condition, however, existence hides this movement from itself and falls back on various forms of stability, such as accepting handed down meanings rather than waking up to the generation of sense-as-such. The act of resolve is the self-appropriating insight or self-disclosive retrieval whereby existence accepts and understandingly becomes the most proper possibility it already is, its dying. This constitutes a "retrieve of itself" (*Wiederholung ihrer selbst*, SZ 308), a "coming back to what one already properly is" (*Zurückkommen auf das eigenste Gewesen*, SZ 326), a "return to the possibilities one already is" (*Rückgang in Möglichkeiten des dagewesenen Daseins*, SZ 385). In that dimension of retrieve called historicity Heidegger speaks of a "*Sichüberliefern der Möglichkeiten*" (SZ 383 f.), which is not the "handing down" of possibilities as the existing English translation has it, but a "freeing up" of possibilities for oneself, a destruction-retrieve *formally* homologous with the classical therapeutic process delineated by Freud and with the process of reactualization of archetypes in primitive cultures. To draw upon proper possibility in the act of resolve or in historical retrieve is not to pull *dynamis* into full present appearance (cf. "... nicht, um es abermals zu verwicklichen" SZ 385), but rather to bring it indirectly into presense precisely by leaving it possible, i.e., in absence. In resolve one lets the possibilizing absence be present when one chooses the dying, hence finitely present, self that one is. Anticipation thus constitutes the "reverting" of the "repeatable possibilities of existence" (SZ 391).

A marginal note in the *Humanismusbrief* gets right to the topic. At 330=161.21 Heidegger glosses the phrase "*die eigentliche Würde des Menschen*" with: "*Die ihm eigene, d.h. zu-geeignete, er-eignete Würde. Eignung und Ereignis.*" In the early period the "value pro-

per to man," his openness whereby sense-as-such is generated, was concretely taken over when man appropriated his being-ahead-of-himself-onto-death (*die Übernahme der Geworfenheit*, SZ 325). The later position in the gloss states that this same value of aheadness and openness, while remaining proper to man, is not appropriated by him so much as apportioned to him as his possibility. Most important of all, this apportionment happens in the pattern called *Eignung und Ereignis*. To state it baldly these two name the same thing: the *energeia atelēs* that is movement; indeed at one point in his 1928 seminar on the *Physics* Heidegger combines both words into *Ereignung*. In that seminar he defines movement as "Sich-ereignen" in the sense of *die Anwesenheit des Geeigneten in seiner Eignung*, the presentness which something appropriated has precisely in its state of being appropriated—a perfect translation of Aristotle's *entelecheia tou dynatou hēi dynaton*. But that definition states only what movement is in Aristotle. The unique atelic presence which is *Ereignis* in Heidegger's thought is the happening of the event of sense, not the mere "thereness" (*Vorhandenheit*) of Aristotelian movement; it is the on-going retrieval of power for the meaningful givenness of beings amidst unsense, non-sense, and no-longer-sense; it is the continual actualization of the finite realm of sense-as-such from out of its own potentiality for appearance. This fundamental movement is *Sinn* as *Wegrichtung* (377=206.27) which happens only in man's essential proper existence. Projected ahead of himself (*geworfen* in SZ) or drawn beyond himself (*angezogen* in WD), man experiences the "wonder of all wonders," the partially open, partially closed emergence of the *topos* within which beings have meaningful presence. Heidegger's topic is the event of sense, the movement of *alētheia* where the *lēthē*-dimension functions as the withdrawn but present power for the meaningful appearance of things.

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APPENDIX: SELECTED MARGINALIA

(I) *Improvements of the Text.* 114=12.4: vor das Seiende → vor Sein des Seienden, vor den Unterschied. 223=129.25: Wahrheit → im Sinne des Wahren. 373=202.26: Stelle → die sterblich bewohnte Ortschaft, die sterbliche Gegend der Ortschaft. 378=206.32: möglichen → ermöglichenden. 331=162.14: weiter → Weite; aber nicht die des Umgreifens, sondern der ereignenden Ortschaft; als die Weite der Lichtung. (N.B.: the new text adds "wesenhaft" before "weiter.") 334=164.33: Räumliche → Raum weder neben Zeit, noch in Zeit aufgelöst, noch aus Zeit deduziert. 342=172.29: des Seins → besser: im Sein qua Ereignis. 327=159.10: Bezug zur Lichtung → ekstatisches Innestehen in der Lichtung. 190=85.34 f.: geschichtlich → unzureichend; Wesen der Geschichte aus Geschichte als Ereignis. 164=59.31: Menschen → Umgekehrt: Das Dasein besteht das Walten, besser das Wesen der Wahrheit und gründet so die Möglichkeit des Menschseins als Menschsein *im* Dasein!

(II) *Explanations of the Text.* 114=12.1: Ermöglichung → d.h. Sein. 179=74.32: macht → machen—her-stellen—hervorgehen lassen in die Lichtung. 188=83.21f.: Sein-lassen → 1. nicht negativ, sondern gewähren—Wahrnis; 2. nicht als ontisch gerichtetes Wirken. Achten, er-achten das Sein als Seyn. 237=143.20: Unverborgenheit → Die *Alētheia* ist ein Name für *esse*, nicht für *veritas*. 326=158.11: Hin-aus-gehen → hin in das Aus des Auseinander des Unterschieds (das Da), nicht "hinaus" aus einem Innen. 332=163.14: Verhältnis → Verhältnis aus Verhaltenheit (Vor-enthalt) der Verweigerung (des Entzugs). 332=163.31: Eigentlichkeit → aus dem Eignen des Er-eignens zu denken. 331=162.4: Geschick → Ge-schick: Versammlung der Epochen des brauchenden Anwesenlassens. 333=164.7: Nähe → im Sinne der Wahrnis: lichtend bereithalten, halten als hüten. 338=169.19: Nähe zum Sein → Als diese Nähe verwahrt und birgt sich das Sein selbst. 359=189.35: seiender → insofern Sein Seiendes "sein" lässt. 237=143.21: Grundzug des Seienden → d.h. als das Seyn. 450=277.29 & 31: allgemeinen & höchste → *koinon* – *koinotaton*; *koinon* – *katholou* (*theion*). 188=83.32: Sicheinlassen auf das Seiende → dem Anwesenden sein Anwesen lassen und nichts anderes dazu und dazwischen bringen. 328=159.15: das Ganze → in Was und Wie des Denkwürdigen und des Denkens. 328=159.17: Sagen → Sichzeigenlassen. 328=159.22: Standpunktes → d.h. der Seinsfrage. 328=159.25: Seinsvergessenheit → Vergessenheit—Lēthē—Verbergung—Entzug—Enteignis: Ereignis. 328=160.1 f.: Unterscheidung → Diese Unterscheidung ist aber nicht identisch mit der ontologischen Differenz. Innerhalb dieser gehört jene Unterscheidung auf die 'Seite' des Seins.

(III) *Some notes from "Vom Wesen des Grundes"*: 126=24 title: Das Problem des Grundes → Der Ansatz der Wahrheit des Seyns ist hier noch ganz im Rahmen der überlieferten Metaphysik vollzogen und in einfacher und wiederholender Entsprechung zur Wahrheit des Seienden und Unverborgenheit des Seienden und Enthülltheit der Seiendheit. Seiendheit als *idea* selbst Enthülltheit. *Ein* Weg zur Ueberwindung der "Ontologie" als solcher ist hier eingeschlagen (vgl. III), aber die Ueberwindung ist nicht ursprünglich aus dem Erreichten her vollzogen und aufgebaut. 131=28.24f.: *ontologische Wahrheit* → Unklar! Ontologische Wahrheit ist

Enthüllen der Seiendheit—durch die Kategorien—aber Seiendheit als solche bereits eine bestimmte Wahrheit des Seyns, Lichtung seiner Wesung. Diese Unterscheidung "ontisch-ontologische Wahrheit" ist nur eine Verdoppelung der Unverborgenheit und bleibt zunächst im Platonischen Ansatz stecken. Damit nur aus dem Bisherigen her die Richtung der Ueberwindung gewiesen, aber nicht eine Ueberwindung aus ihrem eigenen Grunde vollzogen und gegründet. 163=59 title: Vom Wesen des Grundes → Entsprechend dem Wesen des Grundes herausstellen das ursprüngliche *Ergründen*. Ergründung vor aller Begründung. Ergründung in Philosophie und Kunst, nicht aber in der Religion.—In III. der Ansatz zur Destruktion von I., d.h. der ontologischen Differenz; ontisch-ontologische Wahrheit. In III. der Schritt in einen Bereich, der die Zerstörung des Bisherigen erzwingt und eine völlige Umkipfung [= Kehre; note from von Herrmann] notwendig macht. In III. das Wesen des Willens als Da-sein, Aufhebung und Ueberwindung aller Vermögen. 175 = 70.31: Seinsverfassung → Der Sprung in den Ursprung! (Da-sein) Ursprung—Freiheit—Zeitlichkeit; Endlichkeit des Daseins nicht identisch mit der Endlichkeit des Menschen, anders zu fassen: Ursprungscharakter!

(IV) *Some Notes from the altered "Nachwort zu: Was ist Metaphysik?"* The text and footnotes here are very complicated. The 1943 version of the most controversial text reads: "dass das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende, dass niemals aber ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein." The 1949 emendation reads: "dass das Sein nie west ohne das Seiende, dass niemals ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein" (306=102.13f.). First of all Heidegger's 1943 copy glosses "wohl" with: "In der Wahrheit des Seins west das Seyn qua Wesen der Differenz; dieses Seyn qua ~~Seyn~~ ist vor der Differenz das Ereignis und deshalb ohne Seiendes." The same 1943 copy glosses "das Sein" with: "im Sinne von Seyn." Heidegger's 1949 copy glosses "west" with: "Wesen von Sein: Seyn, Unterschied; 'Wesen' von Sein mehrdeutig: 1. Ereignis, nicht durch Seiendes bewirkt, Ereignis—Gewährende; 2. Seiendheit—Washeit: während, dauernd, *aei*." Finally the 1949 copy glosses "wohl" again: "Vordeutung aus Seyn qua Ereignis, aber dort (in der 4. Auflage [1943]) nicht verständlich." Good luck!

(V) *Some Others*: 181=77.2: Schöpfungsordnung → Kein doppeltes Uebereinkommen, sondern eines, aber mehrfach gefügte: Weil Uebereinkunft mit dem Schöpfer, deshalb (als Geschaffenes in gewisser Weise Göttliches) *unter sich*; die "Entsprechung" in einem wesentlicheren Sinne, als ihn die grobe, ungedachte, von Aristoteles übernommene *analogia entis* der Scholastik meint. 193=88.31: Verborgenheit → Zwischen 5. und 6. der Sprung in die (im Ereignis wesende) Kehre. 313=145 title: Brief ueber den "Humanismus" → Das hier Gesagte ist nicht erst zur Zeit der Niederschrift ausgedacht, sondern beruht auf dem Gang eines Weges, der 1936 begonnen wurde, im "Augenblick" eines Versuches, die Wahrheit des Seins einfach zu sagen.—Der Brief spricht immer noch in der Sprache der Metaphysik, und zwar wissentlich. Die andere Sprache bleibt im Hintergrund.

(VI) *New and Different Information in the "Nachweise."* On p. 481 Heidegger cites at length from the preface (1925, 3rd ed.) of Jaspers' *Psychologie der Welt-*

anschauung, which he takes as Jaspers' response to Heidegger's 1919/21 essay, although Heidegger is not explicitly named. There is a strange shift of information concerning PLW. In the 1947 edition which combined PLW and HB, Heidegger said that the text of PLW was "written" (*geschrieben*) in 1940 for an address to a small circle, then published in 1942. He says there that it was first delivered in his course of WS 1930/31 (a mistake: it actually was delivered in WS 1931/32, but Heidegger is notoriously inaccurate when referring to his own courses; cf. *Heraklit*, p. 100, US 91f., 128) and 1933/34. The 1967 edition of *Wegmarken* dropped the word "*geschrieben*," repeated the error about 1930/31 and dropped the reference to 1933/34. The 1976 edition of *Wegmarken* substitutes "*zusammengestellt*" for "*geschrieben*," repeats the error about 1930/31 (but corrects it in the Table of Contents) and likewise drops reference to 1933/34.

(VII) *Some Errata*. P. 127 note "b": close parentheses after *physis*. P. 370 note "a": Read "*Lēthē*" instead of "*Dēthē*." P. 378: Shift "207" to left margin. The greatest erratum in this volume is the lack of an index to the marginalia.