

HEIDEGGER

THE MAN AND THE THINKER

Edited by

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Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography

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Martin Heidegger, perhaps the most influential philosopher of this century, is in many ways "a man without a biography."¹ He once opened a lecture on Aristotle with the information: "He was born, he worked, he died." Much the same could be said of Heidegger. Born in southwest Germany in 1889, he worked there all his life except for five years at Marburg, and died there on May 26, 1976. Yet within the span of those 86 years his thought shook the world of philosophy.

In Heidegger the biography and the course of thinking are virtually coterminous. From beginning to end he lived in his thought. The only biography worth writing, therefore, is a philosophical one which charts the sources and development of his thinking. What follows is not that, but only a collection of fragments to fill in some gaps in the period leading up to the 1927 publication of his major work, *Sein und Zeit* (hereafter: SZ).

FROM MESSKIRCH TO FREIBURG: 1889-1909

Martin Heidegger was born on Thursday, September 26, 1889, in Messkirch, Baden-Württemberg, of Friedrich Heidegger (1851-1924) and Johanna Kempf Heidegger (1858-1927). Both parents were Roman Catholics, his father the sexton of St. Martin's Church in Messkirch. His mother's family traces its origins in the region back in an unbroken line to 1510, and his father's family name kept the resonances of the region: *die Heide*, heath, moorland. He had a sister, Mariele, and a brother, Fritz, who survives him in Messkirch. Everything about his family and youth bespeaks the simplicity of a

farming town on the eastern edge of the Black Forest, which Heidegger himself celebrated in his essay "The Pathway." His earliest formal education (until 1903, age thirteen) took place at the local public schools in Messkirch. Just after his fourteenth birthday a promising future as a priest sent young Martin to the Jesuit secondary school at Konstanz, some thirty miles south of his native town, where he spent three years (1903-1906) followed by three more at the Jesuit Bertholds-Gymnasium in Freiburg (1906-1909).

Those six years of secondary school were momentous in the formation of the young thinker. They were the time, he tells us, when "I acquired everything that was to be of lasting value."² This was the period of his training in Greek and Latin (he continued to read Greek authors every day of his life except for the war years³), his discovery of Adalbert Stifter (1905) and Friedrich Hölderlin (1908), and perhaps most important of all, the first encounter with his abiding question about the meaning of Being. In the summer of 1907, when the seventeen-year-old scholar was home on vacation from the Bertholds-Gymnasium, his "fatherly friend and fellow Swabian," Father Conrad Gröber, then pastor of Trinity Church in Konstanz, later bishop of Meissen (Saxony) and archbishop of Freiburg,⁴ gave him Franz Brentano's *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*.⁵ This straightforward 220-page treatise examined the meaning of the Greek participle *on* (which has the verbal sense of "to-be-in-Being" as well as the substantive sense of "that-which-is-in-Being") and found it to be a homonym whose analogous meanings Aristotle ordered according to a fourfold distinction: Being as "accidental," being as true, being as potential and actual, and being according to the schema of the categories. Heidegger repeatedly characterized the work as "my first guide through Greek philosophy in my secondary school days," as "the 'rod and staff' of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy," and as "the first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again and again from 1907 on."⁶ More important than the book was the question it awoke in him but could not answer: if that-which-is-in-Being (*das Seiende*) has several meanings, what does "Being itself" (*das Sein*) mean in its unity? From this question, rooted in Aristotle (and not in Husserl!), the line leads, with some wavering, to the publication of SZ.

FREIBURG: FROM STUDENT TO LECTURER: 1909-1916

In 1909, the end of his secondary education, the twenty-year-old Heidegger entered the novitiate of the German Province of the Jesuits at Feldkirch, Austria, near the border with Lichtenstein, but he was dismissed after only a few weeks for reasons of health. Thereupon he entered the archdiocesan seminary at Freiburg, where the spiritual directors were also Jesuits, and simultaneously matriculated at the Albert Ludwig University in Freiburg.⁷ From the fall of 1909 through the summer of 1911, he studied theology and

some philosophy until he abandoned entirely the idea of becoming a priest and left the seminary. But he continued his studies at the university with a concentration on philosophy until the summer of 1913 when at the age of 23 he completed his doctoral dissertation, *The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism*, under the directorship of Arthur Schneider.⁸

From his first semester at the university Heidegger began reading, with little enough success, Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. The reason, he recalls, is that "I expected a decisive aid in the questions stimulated by Brentano's dissertation,"⁹ and Husserl, he knew, had been a student of Brentano's in Vienna. But the "realist" Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901) had already begun to give way to the "transcendental" Husserl who would write the *Ideas* (1913),¹⁰ and from early on, the young Heidegger seems to have understood that whereas phenomenological *method* might help him to "articulate the whole region of 'Being' in its various modes of reality,"¹¹ Husserl's turn toward *transcendental subjectivity* could only bar the way. For in 1910 we find Heidegger reading Husserl's programmatic essay "Philosophy as Strict Science" and at the end, next to the sentence "Not from philosophies but from issues [*Sachen*] and problems must the impulse to research proceed," writing the following marginal note: "*Wir nehmen Husserl beim Wort*"—"We take Husserl at his word." He had already begun to see that not consciousness, as in Husserl, but rather *alētheia*, as in the Greeks, was the central issue for philosophy. In that regard, he has said, the appearance of Werner Jaeger's *The History of the Genesis of Aristotle's Metaphysics* (1912) awakened his keen interest in the problematic of truth or disclosure (*alētheia*) in *Metaphysics* IX, 10.

Catholic thinkers also exerted great influence on Heidegger during his first two years at the university. Maurice Blondel's *L'Action*, which Heidegger told Henry Duméry he read "secretly" while with the Jesuits, continued to earn his praise until late in his life. And in the spring of 1950 Heidegger told Duméry that he thought a personalist theodicy was conceivable on the basis of Heidegger's own work so long as one rigorously and critically avoided anthropomorphisms.¹² The French spiritualist Ravaisson also worked an abiding influence on him.¹³ But during those first two years at the university the influence of Carl Braig, Catholic theologian of the Tübingen school, seems to have been most pronounced, especially through his treatise *On Being: An Outline of Ontology*.¹⁴ Besides offering Heidegger an extensive access to the philosophical texts of the tradition and an introduction to the concept of the onto-theological structure of metaphysics, the work seems to have started him on the path of searching out the etymology of fundamental concepts. For example, Braig traces the word *Zeit* (time) back to the Greek *tanumi*, "I stretch myself" (*ich strecke mich*), and here we may well see the roots of the discussion of temporality and historicity at SZ, p. 373, as a "stretching" (*Erstreckung*).¹⁵ It was Braig who, on walks with the young seminarian, spoke of the internal restrictions of

scholasticism and the possibilities inherent in German Idealism. Here was Heidegger's introduction to Schelling and Hegel. And another topic that would be fruitful in his teaching and writing after World War One dawned on him during this period.

The term "hermeneutic" was familiar to me from my theological studies. At that time, I was particularly agitated over the question of the relation between the Word of Sacred Scripture and theological-speculative thinking. It was, if you will, the same relation, viz., between language and Being, only veiled and inaccessible to me, so that along many detours and wrong paths I sought in vain for a guiding thread.¹⁶

It was also during these university years that he discovered Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dilthey, Dostoevsky, Rilke, and Trakl, and no doubt countless others. He speaks fondly of the lectures of the art historian, Wilhelm Vöge.

When Heidegger left the seminary in 1911 to devote himself to philosophy, his first wish was to go to Göttingen to study under Husserl, but financial problems kept him at Freiburg. (Within five years the situation would work out to his advantage with Husserl's transfer to Freiburg.) There he enrolled in lectures and seminars given by Heinrich Rickert, the neo-Kantian philosopher of values. Rickert's distinction between history and nature on the basis of individualizing vs. generalizing thought was, for all its primitiveness, basic to the young thinker at that time, and some forty years later he remarked that in those pre-war years when experimental psychology was attempting to become the one and only philosophy, "the value-philosophy school was an essential and decisive support for what was known as philosophy in the great tradition."¹⁷ Through Rickert Heidegger was introduced to the writings of Emil Lask, who mediated between Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and Rickert's neo-Kantian theory of value.

In August, 1914, with the outbreak of the war, Heidegger enlisted in the military but was dismissed on October 9, 1914, for ill health. From 1915 through 1917 he worked in Freiburg with the Control Board of the Post Office, a position that apparently entailed field service. Fairly quickly during this period he finished his work, *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*, which he presented in the summer of 1915 as his *Habilitationsschrift*, the book which, coupled with his lecture on "The Concept of Time in the Science of History" (July 27, 1915), gave him the right to lecture within the German university system. Significantly enough, his first course that fall was on Parmenides, and in the next two semesters he gave lectures on Kant, Fichte, and nineteenth century philosophy, and a seminar on Aristotle. On February 9, 1916, Edmund Husserl, then at Göttingen, received an appointment at Freiburg effective April 1. Apparently the contact between Husserl and Heidegger was immediate, for in September of that year, when Heidegger finished the preface to his Duns Scotus book, we find him thanking Prof. Husserl for his help in

getting the work published. The Husserl Archives in Louvain today have the original copy that Heidegger gave Husserl with the inscription "Presented to Professor E. Husserl with most grateful respect."¹⁸ Thus begins a relationship that was to launch Heidegger into the public eye as Husserl's "favorite student"¹⁹ and colleague. In the 'twenties Husserl would often say to Heidegger, "You and I are phenomenology."²⁰

THE PATH TO MARBURG: 1917-1923

One year after Husserl's arrival Heidegger was drafted for service on the Western Front with the *Ersatz-Bataillon Infanterie-Regiment 113*, and in 1918 he was at Verdun with the meteorological service (*Frontwetterwarte 414*). During this period, on October 7, 1917, Edmund Husserl received in Freiburg a letter from his friend and colleague Prof. Paul Natorp of the Philipps University at Marburg, inquiring whether the 28-year old Heidegger would be a fitting candidate for the position of professor *Extraordinarius* left vacant by the removal of Georg Misch to a full professorship in Göttingen. Natorp was interested in making this a position in medieval philosophy, and he notes that Heidegger had recently published a work on Duns Scotus. But Natorp wondered whether Heidegger's commitment to Catholicism would affect the matter.²¹ On October 8 Husserl replied:

I hasten to respond to your inquiry. Because Dr. Heidegger is very busy in the war service, I have not had sufficient opportunity up to this point to become closely acquainted with him and to form for myself a reliable judgment about his personality and character. In any case I have nothing bad to say of him.

It is certain that he has confessional ties [*konfessionell gebunden ist*], because he stands, so to speak, under the protection of our "Catholic historian," Colleague Finke. Accordingly last year he was proposed in committee meetings as a nominee for the chair of Catholic philosophy in our Philosophy Department—a chair which we too would have liked to form into a scientific teaching position for the history of medieval philosophy. He was taken into consideration along with others, at which point Finke suggested him as an appropriate candidate in terms of his religious affiliation [*in konfessioneller Hinsicht*].²²

Husserl goes on to note that a few months ago Heidegger had married a Protestant woman (Elfride Petri), who, he says, "as far as I know, has up until this point not converted [to Catholicism]." He finds him too young and not ripe enough for the position of *Extraordinarius*, and his Duns Scotus book is only a beginner's work (*Erstlingsbuch*). Moreover, "Dr. Heidegger has not yet had the opportunity to prove himself extensively as a teacher because, as I mentioned, some years back he was drafted into the Field Service of the Post Office [*Postfelddienst*]." Concerning Heidegger's teaching, "I have heard some very

favorable judgments and also some critical ones—which in any case is connected with the fact that, in order to make headway in the systematic area, he does not give historical lecture courses but systematic ones,” and he does manage to attain “a secure position on fundamental questions and methods.” Moreover, Heidegger is no longer satisfied with Rickert, and “he now seeks to come to grips with phenomenological philosophy from within. It seems that he is doing this seriously and with thoroughness. This is all I can say at this time.”

A week later (October 15, 1917) Natorp responded that, because of his youth and limited area of work, Heidegger was only third on the list after Kuntze and M. Wundt, but that in any case he seemed to show promise.²³ The job went to Wundt, who held it until 1920, when Heidegger was to have another chance at the position.

When he returned from the war and took up teaching again, Heidegger's interests ranged over a wide area that included St. Paul, St. Augustine, and above all Aristotle—all of these studied from within phenomenological method. But Heidegger's method was an adaptation of Husserl's. For one thing, its focus was set on the area of “everyday life” and not on the strictly theoretical areas that Husserl had probed in *Logical Investigations*, vol. II and in *Ideas*. For another, little enough was said about the reductions that Husserl saw as the necessary entry into philosophical work, although a reduction is certainly at work in Heidegger insofar as he approaches all beings from the question of their presence (Being) in the open domain of sense that is man's essence.²⁴ And there was nothing at all about the transcendental ego, that final goal of phenomenological archeology. Husserl would later attribute Heidegger's divergence from his own work to Heidegger's theological prejudices and to the disorienting experience of the war and its “ensuing difficulties [which] drive men into mysticism,”²⁵ and he would lament, “Unfortunately I did not determine his philosophical formation; he was obviously already into his own thing when he studied my writings.”²⁶

Indeed. And that meant Aristotle and the question about the unified meaning of Being which determines all modes of the Being of beings. Phenomenology was a means to, a method for, ontology. To be sure, it put the science of Being on a whole new footing insofar as it no longer asked about Being apart from man but rather focused on the *presence* of beings in and to man's essence and designated this *relatedness* as the problem-area that the tradition inadequately searched for under the title “Being.” But if phenomenological givenness and correlativity were now the domain for ontology, the question that began to put distance between the master and his young disciple was: What is this area of presence and relatedness? “It is consciousness and its objectivity, or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealing?”²⁷ Yes, the one and only issue (*die Sache selbst*) for phenomenology was the self-showing of whatever immediately appears. But Heidegger had a hunch:

“What occurs for [Husserl's] phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought even more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as *alētheia*, the unconcealedness of what-is-present, its un-hiding, its showing of itself.”²⁸

This happy marriage of the Aristotelian problematic of Being and an adapted phenomenological method led Heidegger further away from his master. Husserl's insistence on seeing for oneself “demanded that one give up introducing the authority of the great thinkers into the conversation. However, the clearer it became to me that the increasing familiarity with phenomenological seeing was fruitful for the interpretation of Aristotle's writings, the less I could separate myself from Aristotle and the other Greek thinkers.”²⁹

There were other components to the revolutionary doctrine being formed by Husserl's apprentice. There was the discovery of what he called “kairological time” in the writings of St. Paul, especially in the fifth chapter of I Thessalonians.³⁰ The eschatological thrust of early Christianity, the expectation of the Parousia, opens up an absolutely unique understanding of time wherein all questions of “when” are transposed from chronology (*chronos*) into “the moment of insight” (*kairos*, *Augenblick*). The question of when the Parousia will occur is not answered by reference to objective time but is referred back to factual lived experience and becomes a matter of the way a man leads his life. The “time” of the Parousia and the task of self-understanding are bound together in such a way that to relate authentically to the coming of the Lord means to be awake and vigilant (*wachsam sein*) rather than to look forward to a future event. The question of the “when” of the Parousia reduces back to the question of the “how” of authentic living. Rather than crying out “Peace! Security!” (I Thess., 5:3), the person who is truly awake in his factual experience lives a life of constant, essential, and necessary uncertainty in a *Vollzugszusammenhang mit Gott*, an enactment of that uncertainty before the divine. Out of such an experience, Heidegger asserts, authentic temporality is generated. Clearly at this point he was at some distance from Husserl. Heidegger was captured by the insight that the finitude and temporality of human existence are what open up the primordial realm within which can happen the self-manifestation of phenomena: dis-closure or *a-lētheia*. This was the original and unifying meaning of what the tradition called “Being,” and Heidegger was out to “destroy” (i.e., de-construct) that tradition in order to find what it had left unsaid, viz., that man opens up the world of meaningfulness by living into his future and thereby reappropriating his ownmost and already operative state of dying. Here, he thought, was born sense as such and the world of presence.

Sometime between 1919 and June of 1921 Heidegger drew these themes together in a document that only recently has been published: “Remarks on

Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*.³¹ The whole essay has received an excellent commentary by David Krell, so here I need only highlight some topics that point towards SZ. Heidegger focuses on existence (*Existenz*), which is not grasped theoretically but only in the experience of living out one's own Being in a concerned having-of-oneself in historical contexts.³² This basic experience of self-having is constituted by an "authentic historical stretch into my past — not a past which is some baggage I drag along behind me, but a past which I experience historically in such a way that I thereby possess myself as a self within the horizon of expectations which I have already projected ahead of myself."³³ This concerned, historically enacted self-having is the "how" (*Wie*) of man's Being, and: "The phenomenological explication of the 'how' of this enactment of experience according to its fundamental *historical* sense is the decisive task in this whole complex of problems involving the phenomenon of existence."³⁴ Within that phenomenology, facticity — the lived experience of one's own "here and now" — is crucial. Facticity is a phenomenon enacted only historically, where "the historical" means not "the chronological" but the very content and "how" of the self-concern wherein I experience my specific past, present, and future. In this regard Heidegger speaks of "conscience" as the "renewal of concern" (*Bekümmernerneuerung*) by the enactment of self-appropriation (*Selbstaneignung*), and he emphasizes that the meaning of the factual "I am" includes in an original way historical living within the problematic of the "how" of concerned appropriation of oneself.³⁵ Clearly, the kernel of SZ is already present in this essay.

On February 11, 1920, when Heidegger was in the middle of a course that investigated the "hermeneutics of facticity" and the structure of the *Umwelt*, Husserl was at last impressed enough with the thirty-year-old lecturer to write to Natorp recommending that Heidegger fill the position that Wundt was vacating to go to Jena.³⁶ Natorp responded on March 21 that Heidegger was again third on the list, this time after Nicolai Hartmann and Leser, but now "proposed with more emphasis."³⁷ No matter. Hartmann got the job.

The third and finally successful chance came in 1922. Paul Natorp, 68 years old and about to retire, would be succeeded in the fall of 1923 by Hartmann with the result that the *Extraordinarius* position would again be open. On February 1, 1922, when Heidegger was between lectures on Aristotle which in fact were a *tour de force* on "falling" and *Reluzenz* (material that would enter SZ at page 21), Husserl wrote Natorp about the "original personality" (*originelle Persönlichkeit*) of this *Privatdozent*, about his command of a range of material from Aristotle through the neo-Platonists to Augustine, and about how "he illustrates fundamental problems through *concrete* exegesis [and] develops, for example, thoughts about the hermeneutical categories, about the sense and the genuine method for history" and so on. He also notes that Heidegger has studied Luther (in fact he had opened his Aristotle course on November 2,

1921, by citing Luther's condemnation of the *Metaphysics*, *De Anima*, and *Ethics* of the "pagan master Aristotle!") and that his knowledge of Catholicity would be important at Marburg for linking up philosophy with Protestant theology, which Heidegger also knows well.³⁸

In several letters Natorp made positive moves to invite Heidegger to Marburg. On September 22, 1922 he wrote Husserl: Whereas Richard Kroner, also of Freiburg, would certainly qualify because of his book *From Kant to Hegel*, it would be more desirable to widen the range of the philosophical offerings at Marburg by bringing in some new blood. Thus we come again to Heidegger, not only because of Husserl's high recommendations of his assistant, but also because of what the Marburg faculty has heard of his new developments in applying phenomenological method to the history of philosophy, especially to Aristotle and the Middle Ages. In fact, Marburg needs both a professor to teach phenomenology and a professor familiar with the history of medieval philosophy — and Martin Heidegger would be two in one. But there is one hitch (it will occur again in 1925-26): Heidegger has published so little — in fact nothing since his book on Duns Scotus. Therefore the Marburg faculty is thrown back on Husserl's judgment of the man. But doesn't Heidegger have something in the works, a manuscript far enough along to be printed or that could be read? Could he send it to Natorp? And in any case Natorp would be thankful to Husserl for any reports available about Heidegger's lecture courses and seminars.³⁹

That letter is the beginning of the famous and much discussed "Natorp essay."⁴⁰ Sometime between September 22 and October 30, 1922, Heidegger had his brother Fritz type up two copies of a forty page manuscript which pulled together the major themes and directions of his teaching over the past three years. The manuscript was represented as part of a major work on Aristotle that would be published in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*. (On December 14 of that same year Husserl told Ingarden: "In the seventh [volume of the *Jahrbuch*] there will appear a fundamental and long work on Aristotle by Heidegger."⁴¹) The full manuscript was to deal with texts Heidegger had been discussing in his Aristotle courses: *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, *Metaphysics* I and VII-IX, *De Anima* III, and *Physics* II; and the "Natorp essay" was an introduction to this work. The scope of the essay was enormous: besides Aristotle he spoke of Augustine, the young Luther, Gabriel Biel, St. Paul, Peter Lombard, and the Old Testament. "At that time," Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, "Heidegger would surely have called it a working out of the hermeneutical situation: it tried to make the reader aware of the questions and the intellectual resistance [*Gegenwollen*] with which we might confront Aristotle, the master of the tradition."⁴² Heidegger kept one copy for himself (the only one to survive) and covered the margins of the other with handwritten additions, clarifications, and amendments before sending it

off to Natorp. (This copy, which Natorp later gave to Gadamer, was destroyed in the bombings of Leipzig.) "The remarkable phenomenological power of intuition Heidegger brought to his interpretation liberated the original Aristotelian text so profoundly and strikingly from the sedimentations of the scholastic tradition and from the lamentably distorted image of Aristotle contained in the criticism of the time (Cohen loved to say, 'Aristotle was an apothecary') that it began to speak in an unexpected way."⁴³

The response of Natorp was immediate and enthusiastic: On October 30, 1922, he wrote that he and Nicholai Hartmann had read the document ("*Heideggers Auszug*") with the greatest interest and had found therein what Husserl's reports had prepared them for: an extraordinary originality, depth and rigor that happily wipes off the map so much of the at best second-quality material that even some full professors of medieval thought at Marburg have written and use to defend their professorships. But apparently Heidegger was negotiating at this time for another position, at Göttingen, and Natorp assures Husserl that Heidegger will have a warm reception at Marburg and that, while they could get by with Kroner or Heimsoeth, neither of them could provide, as well as Heidegger can, such a strong expansion of Marburg's philosophical offerings.⁴⁴

A week later Natorp again wrote to say what strong interest the essay had awakened among his colleagues for its originality of procedure and execution. He himself has read it once more and has an even more intense impression of its worth. He is amazed at Heidegger's view of Greek thought and its decisive influence on the whole of Western "culture," at his position both on and against German thought, and at how, in the case of Luther and Kant, he places himself against the past and seems to agree with and to corroborate Natorp's own views from many new perspectives. He asks whether there is any more that they might see of Heidegger's essay.⁴⁵

The die was cast. Heidegger accepted the call.⁴⁶ When he had finished his last course as *Privatdozent* at Freiburg, he gathered some friends, colleagues, and students for a going-away celebration at Todtnauberg in the Black Forest. Gadamer remembers sitting at night around an immense bonfire and listening to a moving talk by Heidegger about the Greeks and about vigilance (*wach sein*).⁴⁷ Here, says Gadamer, the romanticism of the Youth Movement of the times and the power of Greek philosophy, the present and the past, met in the decisiveness of a thinker who saw both as one. That unifying vision also explains why the Aristotle essay never appeared. In a very real sense it became SZ.

THE GENESIS OF "BEING AND TIME": 1923-1926

The question: When was SZ conceived and written? can only have a complex answer, only part of which can be given here. As early as 1913 Heidegger

stated his goal of "articulating the whole region of 'Being' in its various modes of reality."⁴⁸ Soon after the war his lecture course "Basic Questions in Phenomenology" (winter semester, 1919-1920) presented in incipient form the analysis of environment within a hermeneutics of facticity. The following winter his "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion" opened up, by a reading of St. Paul, what was to become his doctrine of resolve and existential temporality. His Jaspers essay probed the meaning of *Existenz*, and his two Aristotle courses at Freiburg (winter, 1921-1922, and summer, 1922), which shaped much of the Natorp essay, elaborated the environment analysis through a reading of Aristotelian texts.

During the summer of 1923 his last course at Freiburg began to pull together the analytic of existence (*Dasein*) which was to become SZ. Announced in the catalogue as "Ontology," the course was better known by the subtitle which Heidegger gave it on May 2, the first day of class: "Hermeneutics of Facticity."⁴⁹ Facticity: this meant not human Being as the object of some intuition but the Being of man insofar as he lives in his time being and his current "there" (*Da*). Hermeneutics: this meant neither exegesis and commentary as in Hellenism and Christianity nor the theory and art of interpretation as in Schleiermacher and Dilthey, but rather the very event of disclosing one's heretofore undisclosed facticity, a moment already operative within facticity insofar as man is *zōion logon echon*, the living being who has himself and his world in speech. The true self that is facticity is not derived from the ego—rather the ego is derived from it. (Heidegger would seem to be the first philosopher to have ontologically deduced the ego.) And so too this hermeneutics is no mere description (*Abschilderung*) at the service of a theory of rational man, but rather a matter of awakening existence to and for itself. After discussing (May 30 through July 4) "historical consciousness" and "philosophy" as two modes of the current self-interpretation of existence, Heidegger proceeded to spell out what he had earlier called *der Bewegtheitszusammenhang des Lebens*, the world of movement (*kinēsis*) that is existence. To that end he called for a return to the Greeks, especially to Aristotle, and at the same time for a destruction of the tradition (July 11). In the two remaining lectures many of the technical terms of SZ began to make their appearance: *gewesen sein*, *Neugier*, *Vorhabe*, *In-der-Welt-sein*, *Alltäglichkeit*, *Bedeut-samkeit*, the *Als*, *Erschlossenheit*, *Vorhandenheit*, and even the threefold articulation of SZ Part One, Division One (= SZ I.1): *Welt*, *In*, and *Wer*. However, the course broke off on July 25 before these themes could be fully developed. Although it would be premature to call this course a "proto-SZ," there could be no question of Heidegger's direction.

The actual writing of SZ belongs to the Marburg period. In December of 1923 Heidegger discussed with Ernst Cassirer "the demand for an existential analytic," and during that winter in Todtnauberg he began the first drafts of

SZ.⁵⁰ A few months later, on Friday, July 25, 1924, the “original form” of SZ emerged as a 6000-word speech delivered before the Theologians’ Society of Marburg under the title, “The Concept of Time.”⁵¹ After introducing his topic by a brief discussion of time in Christian theology, Einstein, Aristotle, and Augustine, Heidegger poses the question of time within the arena of human existence: Could it be that I myself am the “now” and that my existence itself is time? The rest of the lecture (1) provides a very brief eight-point summary of some of what is in SZ Part One, Division One (= SZ I.1): *In-der-Welt-sein als Besorgen, Mitsein, Sprache, Jemeinigkeit, das Man, Worumwillen, Reluzenz, and Alltäglichkeit*, and then (2) lays out the essentials of SZ I.2 on death, resolve, authentic temporality, and within-time-ness. It ends with a stirring list of questions which reduce from: What is time? to: Who is time? to: Am I my time? With the last question, he says, existence becomes questionable.

A year later, in the summer of 1925, we can at last begin to speak of a “proto-SZ” and it takes the form of the lecture course, “The History of the Concept of Time.”⁵² Like so many of Heidegger’s courses, its title scarcely betrays its contents. After a lengthy discussion (May 4–June 15) of intentionality, categorial intuition, and the *a priori* in Husserl, Heidegger launches into the following ambitious outline:

Part One: Analysis of the Phenomenon of Time

- a. The preparatory description of the field in which the phenomenon of time becomes visible: The elaboration of the Being-question in the sense of a first explication of existence;
- b. The laying free [*Freilegung*] of time itself;
- c. The conceptual interpretation [of time].

Part Two: History of the Concept of Time from the Present Backwards

- a. Henri Bergson’s theory of time;
- b. The Concept of Time in Kant and Newton;
- c. The Genesis of the Concept of Time in Aristotle.

Part Three: The Exposition of the Question about Being in General and about the Being of History and Nature in Particular

Let two remarks suffice for our purposes. First: the proposed outline. The three Parts here projected scramble the outline of SZ; they correspond roughly to: (1) SZ Part I, Divs. 1-2; (2) SZ Part II, Divs. 1-3, without Descartes but with Bergson and Newton; and (3) SZ Part I, Div. 3. The “Destruction of the History of Ontology,” here called “Part Two: History of the Concept of Time . . .,” is to come *between* what we now have as the *published* parts of SZ and the famous *unpublished* division entitled “Time and Being.” (With Heidegger’s 1927 course, “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology” we will get yet a third outline: first, the “historical-destructive” part, but focused on the question of

Being, not time; secondly, roughly SZ II.3 on Aristotle, followed by SZ I.1-2; and thirdly, a glimpse into SZ I.3⁵³) Second remark: what the course actually covered. The lectures got no further than the first division entitled “The Preparatory Description . . .” or “A first explication of existence.” Within those twenty-four lectures we have an occasionally close, occasionally divergent, elaboration of the Table of Contents of SZ up to the chapter on death.

It is well known that a few months after this lecture course broke off, Heidegger was nominated to the Marburg chair vacated by Nicolai Hartmann’s removal to Cologne, but on condition that he publish something immediately. The order of events thereafter seems to be the following. During the spring vacation, January 29 through April 30, 1926, Heidegger retired to Todtnauberg and in the house of Johann Brender, a hundred meters below his own cabin,⁵⁴ pulled together the lecture notes of “The History of the Concept of Time” into the first 240 pages of SZ, had them printed with Husserl’s help, and sent two copies of the page proofs to the appropriate ministry in Berlin. Husserl joined him for vacation in Todtnauberg, and there they discussed the notion of Being-in-the-world as this would be elaborated in SZ sections 12 through 69. On Thursday, April 8, 1926, Husserl’s sixty-seventh birthday, Heidegger presented him the dedicatory first page of SZ, covered with flowers and hand-inscribed: “To Edmund Husserl in grateful admiration and friendship.”⁵⁵ The old man could hardly have surmised that three years later, when reading the book during his vacation at Lago Como, he would scrawl in pencil on the title page: “*amicus Plato, magis amica veritas.*” But at this point his jubilation carried over into helping Heidegger correct the page proofs, and by mid-April they were into sections 12 and 13 on “Being-in-the-world in general.”

The jubilation was squelched some months later when the minister in Berlin denied Heidegger the appointment and adjudged the 240 pages “inadequate.” But the publication of the full text—as much of it as would ever appear—in February of 1927 brought Heidegger immediate fame. Two months later, on April 30, 1927, he began lecturing on “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” an illuminating restructuring of SZ and a sneak preview of how he intended to complete that work. In October of the same year, while he was helping an already dubious Husserl to write the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article on phenomenology, the ministry in Berlin reversed its decision and gave Heidegger the position. He stayed on only a year longer, until the retirement of his master brought a call back to the university where he had begun and would end his philosophical career. On November 5, 1928, as he entered Hörsaal 6 of the University of Freiburg to begin his first lecture as Husserl’s successor, he was greeted by the applause of an overflow crowd of 280 students. He was thirty-nine years old, at the height of his powers, and the brightest star of German phenomenology.

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1. Cf. Paul Hühnerfeld, *In Sachen Heidegger*, Hamburg: Hoffman and Campe, 1950, p. 9. Besides the usual sources, I am indebted for information in this essay to conversations with Martin Heidegger, spring, 1971; H.-G. Gadamer, E. Tugendhat, and W. Biemel, January and May, 1975; M. Müller, K. Rahner, and F.-W. von Herrmann, fall, 1976; to the Husserl Archives and Prof. Karl Schuhmann's *Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977, and to information supplied by Heidegger himself to *Das Deutsche Führerlexikon*, Berlin: Otto Stollberg, 1934/35, p. 180, reprinted in G. Schneeberger, ed., *Nachlese zu Heidegger*, Bern, 1962, p. 237.
2. M. Heidegger, "A Recollection . . .," trans. H. Seigfried, *infra*.
3. Jean-Michel Palmier and Frédéric de Towarnicki, "Entretien avec Heidegger," *L'Express* 954 (Oct. 20-26, 1969), p. 80.
4. On Gröber's relations to the Nazis as archbishop of Freiburg, cf. Gordon Zahn, *German Catholics and Hitler's Wars*, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962, pp. 119-142.
5. Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, Freiburg: Herder, 1862; reprinted, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960. In English: *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans., Rolf George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
6. Respectively: *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, p. 92f. = *On the Way to Language*, trans. P. Hertz, New York: Harper and Row, 1971, p. 7 (hereafter: US). *Zur Sache des Denkens*, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969, p. 81 = *On 'Time and Being'* trans. J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 74 (hereafter: SD). "Preface" to William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963, p. x.
7. J. A. MacDowell, *A Gênese da Ontologia Fundamental de Martin Heidegger: Ensaio de caracterização do modo de pensar de "Sein und Zeit,"* São Paulo: Herder, 1970, p. 155, n. 116. MacDowell opines: "Nestas circunstâncias, Heidegger deverá ter praticado mais de uma vez os 'Exercícios Espirituais' (*loc. cit.*).
8. *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik*, Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1914. Also in M. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften* (hereafter: FS), Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1972, pp. 1-129 with omission of the "Lebenslauf" (p. 111 of the original). H. Rickert was co-director.
9. SD 82 = (Eng. trans.) 75
10. On Husserl as a realist, cf. Roman Ingarden, *On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Arnór Hannibalsson, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975.
11. *Die Lehre vom Urteil . . .*, original, p. 108; FS, 128.
12. On Heidegger and Blondel: Henry Duméry, "Blondel et la philosophie contemporaine (Etude critique)," *Etudes blondéliennes* (Paris), 1952, fascicule 2, p. 92, n. 1. Also Jean Beaufret's contribution to *Dem Andenken Martin Heideggers. Zum 26. Mai 1976*, Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1977, p. 19. Also Jean Guittou, "Visite à Heidegger," *La Table Ronde* 123 (March, 1958), p. 155: Heidegger also read Blondel's *Pensée*.
13. On Heidegger and Ravaisson: Jean Guittou, *loc. cit.* and "Cette paix qui émane d'un long repos de l'être," *Le Monde* (Paris), May 28, 1976, p. 8
14. Carl Braig, *Vom Sein. Abriss der Ontologie*, Freiburg: Herder, 1896. This book, vol. IV of a projected ten volume series called *Grundzüge der Philosophie*, all by Braig, was divided into an introduction (Being in general and the science thereof) and three unequal divisions: Vom Wesen des Seienden (Wirklichkeit, Wesenheit), Vom Wirken des Seienden, and Vom Zwecke des Seienden. The work opened with a long citation from Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, V, 3, 4, which said in part: "Mira est caecitas intellectus, qui non considerat illud [esse], quod prius videt et sine quo nihil potest cognoscere."
15. Braig, p. 88f. Cf. etymologies and explanations of other Greek terms: *energeia* and *entelecheia* on p. 27; *to ti ên einai*, *hypokeimenon* and *hypostasis*, p. 49; *topos* (traced back to the Sanskrit!), p. 65; *ratio*, *logos*, *archê*, and *aitia*, p. 105; *telos*, p. 140.
16. US 96 = (Eng. trans.) 9f., here slightly revised.
17. Heidegger made these remarks during a discussion in the pro-seminar of Prof. Spoerri in Zürich, Nov. 6, 1951.
18. "Herrn Professor E. Husserl in dankbarster Verehrung überreicht vom Verfasser," Husserl Archives, Louvain, B P 75.
19. R I Albrecht 12. III. 26. My special thanks to Professor Samuel IJsseling, Director of the Husserl Archives, for permission to quote from selected letters of Husserl.
20. Husserl's conversation of 13. VIII. 31 cited in Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, ed. by the Husserl Archives, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976, p. 9.
21. R II Natorp 7.X.17.
22. For this and the following: R I Natorp 8.X.17
23. R II Natorp 15.X.17
24. For Heidegger's use of the term "phenomenological reduction," cf. his *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1975, p. 29. For Husserl's claim that "Heidegger has not grasped the whole meaning of the phenomenological reduction," cf. E. Husserl *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, ed. R. Ingarden, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968, p. 42f.
25. Cairns, *loc. cit.* (same date and conversation).
26. Husserl, *Briefe*, p. 41 (Nov. 19, 1927).
27. SD 87 = (Eng. trans.) 79.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, 86 = (Eng. trans.) 78.
30. See my article "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,' 1920-1921," *The Personalist*, LX, 3 (July 1979), 312-324.
31. M. Heidegger, "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*," in *Karl Jaspers in der Diskussion*, ed., Hans Saner, Munich: Piper, 1973, pp. 70-100. Also in M. Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, 2d. ed., Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1976, pp. 1-44. Cf. David Farrell Krell, "Toward *Sein und Zeit*," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 6 (1975), 147-156.
32. "Anmerkungen," p. 89f. (= *Wegmarken*, p. 29f.): gehabt im Vollzug des 'bin'; Michselbst-haben; *historischen* Zusammenhängen; Grunderfahrung des *bekümmerten* Habens seiner selbst.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 91 (= p. 31). This is more a close paraphrase than a translation.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 91 (= p. 31f.)
35. *Ibid.*, p. 92f. (= pp. 33-35).
36. R I Natorp 11.II.20
37. R II Natorp 21.III.20
38. R I Natorp 1.II.22
39. R II Natorp 22.IX.22
40. To the best of my knowledge Heidegger refers to this essay only once and then to say he will not publish it: Juan Llambías de Azevedo, "Un diálogo con Heidegger," *Marcha* (Argentina) 17 (Dec. 30, 1955). Other mentions of it are: H.-G. Gadamer,

Philosophische Lehrjahre. Eine Rückschau, Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1977, pp. 24, 212f.; *idem*, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans., David E. Linge, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, p. 200f.; Wilhelm Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," in *Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften*, ed. C. Astrada et al., Bern: Francke, 1949, p. 77; (Szilasi erroneously dates the essay from 1923); Hinrich Knittermeyer, *Die Philosophie der Existenz*, Vienna: Humboldt, 1952, p. 212. (Knittermeyer calls it "eine nur handschriftlich vorliegende Interpretation der aristotelischen Metaphysik."). I am grateful to Professor Gadamer for further information on this essay in a conversation held on January 27, 1975.

41. Husserl, *Briefe*, p. 40.
42. Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. 200; translation slightly revised.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
44. R II Natorp 30.X.22.
45. R II Natorp 9.XI.22.
46. Did Heidegger go to Marburg as an *Ordinarius* (roughly, full professor) or as an *Extraordinarius* (roughly, associate professor)? Walter Biemel (*Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study*, trans. J. L. Mehta, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976, p. 181) and David Farrell Krell ("General Introduction" to Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, trans., D. Krell et al., New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 14) have him an *Extraordinarius* at Marburg, and indeed Heidegger's own "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Lehrstuhls seit 1866," in *Die Philipps-Universität zu Marburg 1527-1927*, Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1927, p. 687, indicates that Misch, Wundt, and Hartmann (up to 1922) occupied an *Extraordinariat*. But Heidegger himself (*Das Deutsche Führerlexikon*, p. 180 [cf. n. 1, *supra*]) and Husserl (*Briefe*, p. 26, 31. VIII.23) say that he went as an *Ordinarius*. Knittermeyer, *op. cit.*, p. 212, says: "1923 wird Heidegger Ordinarius in Marburg, in der Nachfolge Paul Natorps, neben Nicolai Hartmann."
47. Gadamer, *Philosophische Lehrjahre*, p. 213f. and 33. Heidegger delivered a lecture on "Dasein und Wahrsein" in 1923 at the Kant Society in Cologne, on invitation of Max Scheler.
48. Cf. note 11 *supra*.
49. Oskar Becker, who heard the course, defines its subtitle: "Damit ist gemeint die *Auslegung* (interpretierende Explikation) des tatsächlichen geschichtlichen Lebens als eines faktischen, historisch da seienden, auf die Weise seines *Da-seins* hin." "Mathematische Existenz. Untersuchungen zur Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 8 (1927), 621.
50. On the discussion with Cassirer, cf. SZ, 51, n. 1. On the drafts of SZ, US 95 = 9 says that Heidegger began the first drafts in the summer of 1923, but information from F.-W. von Herrmann confirms that he began in the winter of 1923-24.
51. See my article "The 'Original Form' of *Sein und Zeit*: Heidegger's *Der Begriff der Zeit* (1924)," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, X, 2 (May 1979), 78-83. Also Oskar Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 444.
52. Martin Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1979.
53. See my article, "Time and Being, 1925-27" forthcoming in *Heidegger Studies* (tentative title), ed. Robert W. Shahan and J. N. Mohanty, Norman, Okla.: Oklahoma University Press.
54. Cf. W. Biemel, "Erinnerungen an Heidegger," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 2 (1977), p. 13.
55. The Husserl Archives at Louvain preserve Husserl's own copy of SZ (B P 78) and, glued inside it, the handwritten dedication of April 8, 1926: "Edmund Husserl/in

dankbarer Verehrung und Freundschaft/ Todtnauberg i. Schwarzwald, zum 8. April 1926." In the final printed draft the dedication reads: "Edmund Husserl in Verehrung und Freundschaft zugeeignet" and adds "Bad." before "Schwarzwald." The citation from the *Sophist* also appears in Greek and German above the dedication, with a slightly different translation ("... denn offenbar versteht ihr doch schon lange..." for SZ's "Denn offenbar seid ihr doch schon lange mit dem vertraut..."). Was the manuscript completed at the time? Frau Husserl writes (*Briefe*, p. 37, 16.IV.26): "Heidegger... brachte eine mit Blumen geschmückte Rolle, die die Widmung 'Edmund Husserl in dankbarer Verehrung und Freundschaft' seines eben vollendeten Werkes enthielt." Husserl (R I Albert 28.IV.26) speaks of "die Widmung seines eben in Druck befindlichen Buches." Heidegger himself, many years later, wrote of showing Husserl on this occasion "Das nahezu fertige [well-nigh finished] Manuskript" of SZ. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917)* ed. Rudolf Boehm, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966, p. xxiv.