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SEVEN

ON THE WAY TO *EREIGNIS*:
HEIDEGGER'S INTERPRETATION OF *PHYSIS*

THIS ESSAY SEEKS TO SHOW HOW Heidegger's interpretation of *physis* in Aristotle lays the foundation for his understanding of *Ereignis*. Specifically, I want to point out how Heidegger finds the meaning of *physis* to lie in movement, the meaning of movement to lie in *dynamis*, and the meaning of *dynamis* to be "retrieval" (*Wiederholung*) in the primary sense of that term. The structure of retrieval in the realm of *physis* underlies the structure of resolve (*Entschlossenheit*) in the realm of human existence. Resolve issues in authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) and is itself the entrance to *Ereignis*. The essay draws on Heidegger's lectures, published and unpublished, and particularly on his 1940 seminar, the protocol of which has been published as "Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Physis*: Aristoteles, *Physik B*, 1."¹

The first step toward understanding Heidegger's interpretation of *physis* is to clarify how he reads Aristotle phenomenologically (Section I). Heidegger maintains that the Greeks, especially Aristotle, read entities as *phainomena*, appearances that show up in a correlative *noein* or *legein*, which manifests their meaningful presentness-as or is-ness (*ousia*, *Seiendheit*, beingness). The question of first philosophy concerns the analogical unity of is-ness as such. Heidegger's phenomenological orientation toward Aristotle led him to transform the Aristotelian question about is-ness or being-

¹Originally published in *Il Pensiero*, Milano, 3 (1958), 131-156, 265-289, ed. G. Guzzoni; issued as a separate fascicule by the same press in 1960. Republished with slight orthographical changes in WEG (1967), 309-371. English translation by Thomas Sheehan, "On the Being and Conception of *Physis* in Aristotle's *Physics B*, 1," *Man and World*, 9 (1976), 219-270. In referring to Heidegger's works, this paper cites first the abbreviated title of the German work (following the list of abbreviations in William J. Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* [see n. 2, infra], p. xxxi) with the addition of "WEG" to abbreviate *Wegmarken*, 1967), then the German pagination and; after an "equals" sign, the pagination in existing English translations.

ness: he radically reinvestigates *logos* (in SZ: Dasein) and works out the analogical unity of its beingness. This he finds to be a modality of that which Aristotle called *energeia atelēs* or *dynamis*, that is, a modality of movement, or, if the term be correctly understood, of "temporality." This was the task of *Being and Time*, Part One, Divisions One and Two (the only sections of that book ever to be published), and the results provided Heidegger with the horizon for understanding the meaning of being (*das Sein*) in terms of *dynamis* or movement. The crowning section of *Being and Time*—the unpublished Part One, Division Three—was to have read the analogical meaning of being as movement in the proper sense, which Heidegger at that time called *die Temporalität des Seins*, the time-character of being. Section I of this essay only alludes to this program and then goes on to elaborate what I call here an Aristotelian "phenomenological lexicon" for understanding *Physics B*, 1. This lexicon is, in fact, the fruit of Heidegger's own rereading or retrieval of Aristotle from the earliest courses in the twenties up through his interpretation of Aristotle's *Physics* in 1940.

Section II of this essay turns to Heidegger's interpretation of *physis* in Aristotle and focuses on Heidegger's characterization of *physis* as a mode of *ousia*, or beingness. The clue here is Heidegger's reading of *kinēsis* (movement) as a mode of beingness. An investigation of movement in terms of *energeia atelēs* (incomplete appearance or beingness) shows that the fundamental meaning of *physis* is *Wiederholung*, or retrieval, in the original and proper sense: regrasping possibility by letting it remain the relatively hidden source for the appearance of a moving entity. It will be shown below that *physis*, understood as this kind of retrieval, is called *Eignung*, the "appropriation" of possibility (as the relatively hidden source) into the limited appearance of natural entities. Heidegger's interpretation of *physis* as retrieval and appropriation merely spells out his understanding of *physis* as *dynamis*.

On the basis of that reading of *physis*, Section III of this essay goes on to show how *physis*, read as *dynamis*, lays the foundation for Heidegger's understanding of *Ereignis* in his later works. A step in that direction can already be found in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger made use of the notion of *Wiederholung* for his understanding of the phenomenon of resolve. Section III shows that resolve, as the aware retrieval of existence's possibility as possibility, is the core of the published portions of *Being and Time*, and it points the way to Heidegger's later transformation of *Wiederholung* and *Eignung* into *Ereignis*.

As a whole the essay argues that the topic or *Sache* of Heidegger's thought—which he originally expressed as the problematic of "being and time" and which he later called *Ereignis*—is "movement," the movement of disclosure conjoined to and indeed initiating the disclosive movement that is man's nature. One way, and perhaps the most important way, that Heidegger worked out this topic was by way of a retrieval of the proper movement-character of *dynamis*. He found that *dynamis* as movement was itself a retrieval and hence that the answer to the question about the meaning of being was an ongoing retrieval of this primordial retrieval, that is, it consisted in letting possibility remain possibility, letting appearance appear by not directly appearing. This "answer" is a matter of simply "being-underway," *Unterwegssein*, where the only operative authority is the ineluctable movement of disclosure.

Before entering upon the subject matter of this essay, I wish to make some remarks on the sources for what follows.

It has long been known that Heidegger's reading of Aristotle was essential to his entire life's work. Richardson writes that "Aristotle has influenced him more profoundly than any other thinker," and Gadamer, Arendt, Szilasi, Tillich, Spiegelberg, Gründer, and Kaufmann report as much.² We know that his philosophical objectives were defined in terms of Greek philosophy in the context of Greek poetry and literature, and indeed that from the time he was eighteen years of age he spent an hour a day reading the Greek poets and historians.³ Moreover, it is common knowledge that the Aristotelian problem of the analogy of being, first awakened in him by his 1907 reading of Brentano's dissertation on Aristotle, remained

²William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. 309. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Martin Heidegger und die Marburger Theologie"; in *Heidegger: Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks*, ed., O. Pöggeler (Cologne: Kuperbeur and Witsch, 1969), esp. p. 171. Hannah Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," trans. Albert Hofstadter, *The New York Review*, 17 (Oct. 21, 1971) 50–54. Wilhelm Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie"; in *Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften*, ed. C. Astrada et al. (Bern: Francke, 1949), pp. 73–87. Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture*, ed. R. C. Kimball (New York: Oxford-Galaxy, 1964), p. 78. Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, Vol. 1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 271–357, and esp. pp. 292–297. Karlfried Gründer, "Heidegger's Critique of Science in its Historical Background," *Philosophy Today*, 7 (1963), 22. Walter Kaufmann, *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*, (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1969), p. 29.

³Re Greek philosophy: US 134f=39. Also Manuel de Diéquez, "Chez Heidegger à Freiburg," *Les Nouvelles Littéraires artistiques et scientifiques*, Paris, 31, no. 1295 (June 26, 1952), p. 5. Re Heidegger's reading of Greek literature: Jean-Michel Palmier and Frederick de Towarnicki, "Entretien avec Heidegger," *L'Express*, Paris, 954 (October 20–26, 1969), 78–85, esp. p. 80.

"the ceaseless impetus for the treatise *Being and Time* which appeared two decades later."⁴

This impetus gained momentum in his lectures and seminars from 1919 on, when he seems to have taken to heart Hegel's words, "If philosophy were done in earnest, nothing would be more worthy than to give lectures on Aristotle."⁵ It was in those early Freiburg and Marburg lectures that Heidegger tried out what he called "a transformed understanding of Aristotle," which was the basis for his eventual break with Husserl.⁶ In 1928 Gibson recorded Heidegger's position (which was reported through Iskar Becker and went back at least to the 1923–1924 lecture course *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*) that "Aristotle was really in *De Anima* phenomenological (without the explicit Reduction)."⁷

We know as well that Heidegger projected a book prior to *Being and Time*, one that was to summarize his interpretations of Aristotle, and that Paul Natorp got Heidegger hired at Marburg in 1923 on the basis of the introduction to that projected work.⁸ And Aristotle's influence continued to work even on the later Heidegger. In the fifties he told his students, "It is advisable, therefore, that you post-

⁴*Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), p. x. Translation by Hans Seigfried, "A Recollection (1957)" in *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 21f.

⁵Heidegger cites this sentence from Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (WW, XIV, 314), in "Hegel und die Griechen," WEG 266.

⁶SD 86=78. Note: not "a seminar," as in the English translation, but "the seminar." Husserl realized that the cause of the break went back to Heidegger's (Aristotelian) beginnings in philosophy: "Ich hatte leider seine philos. Ausbildung nicht bestimmt, offenbar war er schon in Eigenart, als er meine Schriften studierte," Edmund Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, ed. R. Ingarden (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), p. 41. Husserl's strongest remarks on Heidegger are found in his letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931 (Husserl Archives, R I Pfänder 6.I.31), soon to be published by Herbert Spiegelberg.

⁷W. R. B. Gibson, "From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary," ed., Herbert Spiegelberg, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 2 (1971), 73. The winter semester course referred to here, which the prospectus of the *Gesamtausgabe* lists as "Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie" and which the Marburg catalogue (see Richardson, p. 665) subtitled "(Descartes Interpretation)," was recorded by Heidegger's students under the title "Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung" and dealt at length in its opening lectures with Aristotle's *De Anima* B (November 2–22, 1923). Gibson (p. 72) went on to write, "Husserl is the Plato to Heidegger's Aristotle." Further information on Heidegger's relation to Husserl before SZ can be found in my article, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography," *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*, pp. 3–19.

⁸Gadamer, 170; Szilasi, 77; H. Knittermeyer, *Die Philosophie der Existenz* (Vienna: Humboldt, 1952), p. 212; Sheehan, *art. cit.*, p. 11f. Husserl wrote Ingarden on December 14, 1922: "In VII [the seventh volume of the *Jahrbuch*] erscheint eine grundlegende gr. Arbeit über Aristot. von Heidegger" (Ingarden, 25), but Prof. Mrs. Malvine Husserl wrote on February 25, 1924, "Der Beitrag von Prof. Heidegger hat sich durch seine Berufung nach Marburg verzögert. . . ." Szilasi says that the introduction was written in the spring of 1923, but Gadamer, on the basis of a 1922 letter

pone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years" (WD 70=73). And to judge by an interview that the present writer had with Heidegger in 1971, Heidegger himself continued living out that program into his final years.

But if the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger is undeniable, the manner and degree of it remain among Heidegger's best-kept secrets. Sufficient index of the secret is the infrequency with which Heideggerian scholars elaborate the Aristotelian bases of Heidegger's work;⁹ and this infrequency is not the fault of the commentators. Heidegger himself published only one essay devoted entirely to Aristotle ("Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Physis*"), and even there the theme is Aristotle and not his influence on Heidegger. Likewise, in *Being and Time*, where Aristotle's presence can be felt virtually everywhere, the nature of the influence is concealed behind the language of phenomenology.

The secret lies hidden in Heidegger's courses—chiefly those from 1919 through 1952—and, since it is not clear that his *Gesamtausgabe* will include the early Freiburg courses (1916–1923), the secret may be kept until Heidegger's *Nachlass* becomes available. But parts of it have leaked out. For example, the appearance of his 1925–1926 course *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* revealed the deep influence of Aristotle's *Peri Hermēneias* (specifically the question of *logos apophantikos*) and *Metaphysics* Theta 10 (*alētheia*) on *Being and Time*. Likewise the publication of *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* has clarified Heidegger's reading of the meaning of *energeia* in Aristotle and the transformation of that meaning in the medieval problematic of *essentia* and *existentia*.¹⁰

from Heidegger, is correct in locating its writing in the year previous. In a conversation with me on January 27, 1975, Gadamer recalled that the work was to cover *Nic. Ethics Z*, *Metaphysics A* and *Z*, *H*, *Theta*, *De Anima G*, and *Physics B*. Before his death in 1924, Natorp gave his copy of the manuscript—typewritten with copious handwritten marginalia by Heidegger—to Gadamer, but this copy, along with Heidegger's letters to Gadamer, was destroyed in the bombings of Leipzig during World War II. Heidegger kept a copy without the marginalia, but it is not announced for publication in the *Gesamtausgabe*. Presumably it is in the Marbach Archives.

⁹Werner Marx's *Heidegger and the Tradition*, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Green (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1971), is a notable exception.

¹⁰*Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, ed. Walter Biemel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976); English translation *Logic: The Question of Truth* by Thomas Sheehan, forthcoming from Indiana University Press. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975); English translation *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). Heidegger's 1931 course, *Aristoteles, Metaphysik Theta, 1–3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*, ed. Heinrich Hüni (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981), appeared after the present essay was completed.

Moreover, there exist secondary works that either grew out of the earliest courses or extend them or report their contents. Among these is Helene Weiss' *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles* (1940), which Heidegger recommended to his seminar students in 1951 as one of the few good works on the *Physics* and perhaps on Aristotle's thought as a whole. (This recommendation may have been influenced by the fact that Professor Weiss, a former student of Heidegger's, reports, often in close paraphrase, much of the content of Heidegger's lectures on Aristotle in the twenties.¹¹) Among the unpublished seminars and lecture courses that inform what follows, the seminar of 1928, summer semester, entitled "Phänomenologische Übungen: Interpretation von Aristoteles, *Physik* II," is important, as is the major lecture course on Aristotle that Heidegger gave at Freiburg in 1921-1922, winter semester, and 1922, summer semester. However, since Heidegger's explications of *dynamis*, *energeia*, and *physis* are generally (and I emphasize that word) constant from the early twenties up through the winter semester of 1951-1952 (Übungen im Lesen: Aristoteles, *Metaphysik*, IV und IX, 10") and differ only in minor and generally contextual ways from "Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Physis*," attention will be directed principally to that last text.

I. READING ARISTOTLE "PHENOMENOLOGICALLY"

Crucial to the argument that will be developed here is a proper understanding of the "method" according to which Heidegger reads Aristotle at all.¹² To call this method "phenomenological," as

¹¹Originally published in Basel, Prof. Weiss' book was reissued in 1967 by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Darmstadt). Pages 20-29 closely follow sections of Heidegger's 1922 course on *Physics* A. Cf. also pp. 6, 52 n., and 100 n. Other works that follow Heidegger's interpretations to some degree are Rudolf Boehm, *Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche: Zu Aristoteles' Abhandlungen über das Sein und das Seiende (Metaphysik Z)* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965); Walter Bröker, *Aristoteles* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1964), third expanded edition; Wilhelm Szilasi, *Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes* (Bern: Francke, 1946), esp. pp. 285-291, which Szilasi (p. 76) calls "Eine durch die viel späteren Bemühungen verdeckte Erinnerung" of Heidegger's early interpretation of *Peri Hermeneias*; Ernst Tugendhat, *TI KATA TINOS: Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung aristotelischer Grundbegriffe* (Freiburg: Alber, 1958); to some extent, Karl Ulmer, *Wahrheit, Kunst und Natur bei Aristoteles* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953); Wolfgang Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik* (Göttingen, 1962); see E. Tugendhat's review of it in *Gnomon* 35 (1963), 543-555, esp. p. 554; Fridolin Wipflinger, *Physis und Logos: Zum Körperphänomen in seiner Bedeutung für den Ursprung der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles* (Freiburg: Alber, 1971).

¹²"Method" is written in inverted commas to indicate Heidegger's self-distancing from the method of modern philosophy; see US 178=74, 197=91 and FD 79=102. Heidegger's "method" follows Aristotle's *methodos* (*Physics* G, 1, 200 b 13 and WEG

Heidegger indeed does, is not to drag Husserl's phenomenology back to an epoch where it does not and could not belong. Rather Heidegger claimed that his own phenomenological procedure is no more than the explicitation of Aristotle's own way of investigation and of the way of reading entities that was indigenous to Greek thought itself. This explicitation led to Heidegger's break with Husserl and the philosophical tradition and entailed as well a transformation of Aristotle's problematic.¹³ Before spelling out the concrete shape of the phenomenological correlation that Heidegger found in Aristotle's works I will sketch a preliminary idea of phenomenology in Aristotle according to Heidegger and indicate how Heidegger used that idea to transform the Aristotelian problematic.

A. PHENOMENOLOGY: PERSPECTIVE AND PROGRAM

According to Heidegger the Greeks were the first people to experience entities (*to on, ta onta*) as *phainomena*, as things that of themselves show themselves or appear. Professor John H. Finley, Jr., in an informative study *Four Stages of Greek Thought*, confirms from a classicist's point of view what Heidegger finds operative in Greek thought from Homer through Aristotle, namely, that the presence of entities in the world was experienced as the appearing or *phainesthai* of those entities, where *phainesthai* means that an entity brings itself to radiant self-manifestation (*sich zum Scheinen bringen*) and "is" precisely insofar as it shows itself in that self-manifestation.¹⁴

In appearing, an entity appears as something meaningful—as a shield that the warrior can use or as the ship that he can launch or as

341=246). For Heidegger's claim that his work remains "phenomenological" from beginning to end, see SZ 38=62f, SD 90=82, and his "Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage," *Phänomenologie—lebendig oder tot?*, ed. Helmut Gehrig (Karlsruhe: Badenia Verlag), p. 47; English translation by Thomas Sheehan and Frederick Ellison, "The Understanding of Time in Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the Being-Question," *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 10, 2 (Summer 1979), 201.

¹³Cf. SZ 28=51, 213=256 on *auto to pragma* (*Meta. A*, 3, 984 a 18f); also FD 62f=81f, US 134f=39f and WP 12=45. See Walter Biemel, "Heidegger and Metaphysics" in *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*, p. 164: "The word 'phenomenology' [in SZ] took on an interpretation that was tied into Aristotle more than Husserl." Cf. as well Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963), p. 132. On thinking "Greekier than the Greeks," see US 134f=39; also Heidegger's "Aus einer Erörterung der Wahrheitsfrage" (a selection from his course of winter 1937-1938, "Grundfragen der Philosophie: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: *aletheia* und *poiesis*"), in *Zehn Jahre Neske Verlag*, ed. Günter Neske (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962), p. 20.

¹⁴Re *phainomena*, see US 132=38 and SZ 28f=51, EM 46=50, 54=59, 77=85, 79=88, 138=151, and WEG 345f=249f. See John H. Finley, Jr., *Four Stages of Greek Thought* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 3, 5, 27, 29, and 53f.

the god that he can revere or challenge. This "as"-character be-speaks the arrival of meaning among entities, the irruption that occurs only with the arrival of man. If man can deal with entities only insofar as they appear as such and so, the philosopher is distinguished by the fact that he asks the question of their "appearing-as" as such, the question of their being.

To say that much is to indicate two things:

First, whenever the Greeks speak of *to on*, they always imply *to on hēi* . . . , an entity in terms of some modality of meaningful presence, even if the "as" (*hēi*) is not expressly articulated. This as-dimension of entities, which gets expressed in the "is" of apophantic discourse, articulates the being-dimension of entities. Hence, *to on* always means an-entity-in-a-modality-of-being, and so Heidegger correctly translates *to on* as *das seiend-Sein*.¹⁵ To express the togetherness of entities and their given modes of being, Aristotle often uses *ousia*, which, derived through the participle *ousa* from the infinitive *einai*, can refer either to the particular present entity or to its presence or being. When it refers to the *being* of an entity, Heidegger accurately renders it as *Seiendheit*, that is, "beingness" or "is-ness." Therefore, the question that defines first philosophy—"What is *to on*?"—must be fleshed out to say "What is *to on hēi on*?" The *hei on* indicates that the question points beyond the realm of the ontic (shields, ships, gods) and seeks an ontological answer: "entities as *in-being*." The question focuses on the is-ness of any given entity, and in fact Aristotle says that the question "What is *to on hēi on*?" comes down to the question "What is is-ness?" (*tis hē ousia*), and indeed not the is-ness of any delimited region of entities but of all entities in terms of the analogical unity of all possible modes of is-ness. Aristotle's aporetic question about *ousia* is his formulation of the question about the meaning of being (*Meta. G 1* and *Z 1*, 1028 b 2).

Secondly, to speak of entities as *phainomena* is at least to imply the locus of their meaningful appearance, the horizon within which that meaningfulness is experienced. Entities as *phainomena* are in some way correlative to modes of awareness (*Vernehmen*) in the broadest sense. They comport a *legein* or a *logos* (a bringing-to-appearance) that reveals them as what and how they are (without *logos*, no is-

¹⁵WP 31=97; cf. EM 24=25f. Also, "Vorwort" to Richardson, p. xi=x: "das Seiende . . . hinsichtlich seines Seins." On *to on* as always in-being, see WEG 330=238 and Gottfried Martin, *Introduction to General Metaphysics*, trans. E. Schaper and I. Leclerc (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 60.

ness).¹⁶ The uniqueness of man as "the living being that has *logos*" (*to zōion to logon echon*)¹⁷ is that his essence is the locus of meaning and he has access to entities only in terms of their appearance-as or being-as in *logos*. Aristotle thematizes the function of *logos* as *dēloun* (to make visible), as *apophainesthai* (to show forth) and most importantly as *alētheuein* (to uncover, bring out of hiddenness, bring into intelligibility).¹⁸ For man *to on* is always *to on legomenon*; an entity is always interpreted or "read," more or less articulated according to one or many of the multiple modes of meaningful presence that we can discover in the implicit "as" of practical activity or the explicit "is" of apophantic discourse.

To summarize these two points we may say: If *to on* always implies a being-dimension or meaningful presence that is indicated by the "as" (*hēi*), the only locus of this being-dimension is man's essence as *logos* or *alētheuein*, disclosure. *To on* and *logos* are apriori correlative; man's very nature is to be ontological (*legein ta onta*) and phenomenological (*legein ta phainomena*). If man raises the question of first philosophy ("What is *to on hēi on*?"), the resultant ontology must be implicitly or explicitly phenomenological.

Before moving on, let us ask whether this alleged explicitation of the implicit phenomenological bases of Aristotle's philosophy is not merely a reading back of contemporary (specifically Husserlian) ^{perspe} into Greek thought. We could, of course, raise the question as to whether or not any interpretation of Greek thought, whether carried out by Thomas Aquinas, Werner Jaeger, William David Ross, or whomever, can hope to be without presuppositions. But rather than opening up the important issue of the hermeneutical fore-structure, I will simply let Heidegger speak for himself, and I will leave open the question he poses. This paragraph is cited here at some length because it reveals the broad context within which Heidegger's reading of Greek philosophy moves.

The totality of entities is the field from which the positive sciences of nature, history, space always get their regions of objects.

¹⁶Cf. SZ 212=255: "Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist, das heisst die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, 'gibt es' Sein." This paper prescind from the question of *nous*.

¹⁷Cf. *Politics* A, 2, 1253 a 9-12, *Nic. Ethics* A 13, 1102 a 30 and Z 1, 1139 a 5.

¹⁸SZ 32f.=56f and the footnote thereto. Heidegger's reading is grounded in texts such as *De Interpretatione*, 4 and 5, esp. 17 a 15f (*apophantikos*=*delon*); cf. *Meta. G 2*, 1003 b 31f. (*dēloi*); *Nic. Ethics* Z 4, 1140 a 10f and 21f (*meta logou alēthous*), Z 5, 1140 b 6ff and 20ff (*alēthe meta logou*), Z 6, 1141 a 4 (*alētheuomen*), Z 7, 1141 a 17f (*alētheuein*).