

The Cambridge Companion to
HEIDEGGER

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2 Reading a life: Heidegger and hard times

THE END OF A CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHER

It was just before Christmas Eve – Monday, December 23, 1918 – when the young Mrs. Heidegger, eight months pregnant, decided to brave Freiburg's bitterly cold weather, travel across town, and break the bad news to Father Krebs. Engelbert Krebs, a Catholic priest and professor of theology at Freiburg University, was a close friend of her husband, the philosophy lecturer Martin Heidegger. In fact, Krebs had officiated at the Heideggers' Catholic wedding in Freiburg Cathedral on March 21, 1917.

At the time of that wedding Father Krebs had already been skeptical. It was a confessionally "mixed" marriage – Elfride Petri was a Lutheran, Martin Heidegger a Catholic – and even though the bride had solemnly declared her intention to convert to Catholicism and raise her children in the Roman faith, Father Krebs had had his doubts. Therefore, he was not entirely surprised when, a year and a half later, the 24-year-old mother-to-be sat across from him in his office and poured out her feelings:

My husband has lost his church faith, and I have not found mine. At the time of our marriage, his faith was already undermined by doubts. But I insisted on the Catholic wedding, hoping that with his help I would find faith. We have read, spoken, thought, and prayed a great deal together, and the result is that both of us now think only as Protestants – that is: we believe in a personal God and pray to Him, but without any dogmatic ties and apart from Protestant or Catholic orthodoxy. Under these circumstances, we would consider it dishonest to let our child be baptized in the Catholic church. But I felt it was my duty to tell you this beforehand.¹

Two weeks later, on January 9, 1919, Martin Heidegger himself decided to write to Father Krebs and explain the personal and philosophical transformation he had undergone in the past two years.

What had caused these changes in Heidegger? Was it the cataclysmic Great War, which had ended a few weeks earlier at a cost of 16 million lives? Or his own disastrous four months on the Western Front, which ended, as if symbolically, with his promotion to lance corporal on the day the German generals petitioned for an armistice? Or the role he played as a weatherman in preparing poison gas attacks on U.S. soldiers during their final push from Verdun to Sedan in early October?² Edmund Husserl would think so. "The war and ensuing difficulties drive men into mysticism," he said a dozen years later (August 13, 1931), after his bitter falling out with Heidegger.³

But in his 1919 letter to Father Krebs, Martin Heidegger did not refer at all to the world-shattering events that had transpired over the past two years – the war, for example, or the Bolshevik Revolution, or the end of the Hohenzollern dynasty and the proclamation of a socialist republic in Germany, or the outbreak in January 1919 of a virtual civil war between the left-wing Spartacus League and the reactionary Free Corps with their shadowy death squads, the Feme.

Yes, these were hard times for Germany, but in his letter Heidegger mentioned none of that. After all he was a philosopher, even something of a theologian – in any case, a deeply religious man – and in writing to Father Krebs he addressed what was presumably most important to him. Since 1916 Heidegger had been teaching Catholic philosophy at Freiburg University, occasionally in tandem with Krebs, and had built something of a reputation as a Catholic philosopher of the future. But now he had to tell Krebs that he had abandoned dogmatic Catholicism both in philosophy and in his personal life:

Freiburg

January 9, 1919

esteemed Professor,

Over the last two years I have set aside all scientific work of a specialized nature and have struggled instead for a basic clarification of my philosophical position. This has led me to results that I could not be free to hold and teach if I were tied to positions that come from outside of philosophy.

Epistemological insights that pass over into the theory of historical

knowledge have made the *system* of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me – but not Christianity and metaphysics, although I take the latter in a new sense.

I believe that I – perhaps more than those who work on the subject officially – have perceived the values that the Catholic Middle Ages bears within itself, values that we are still far from really exploiting. My investigations into the phenomenology of religion, which will draw heavily on the Middle Ages, should prove beyond dispute that in transforming my basic standpoint I have not let myself be dragged into abandoning my objective, high judgment of and esteem for the Catholic life-world, in favor of the empty polemics of an embittered apostate.

Therefore, it is especially important to me – and I wish to extend you my heartfelt thanks for this – that I not lose the benefit of your invaluable friendship. My wife, who first told you about this, and I too would like to preserve the very special confidence we share with you. It is hard to live as a philosopher – inner truthfulness toward oneself and those one is supposed to teach, demands sacrifice, renunciation and struggles that remain forever foreign to the academic “tradesman.”

I believe that I have an inner call to philosophy and, by fulfilling it in research and teaching, a call to the eternal vocation of the inner man – *and for that alone* do I feel called to achieve what is in my powers and thus to justify, before God, my very existence and activity.

With cordial thanks,

Yours,

Martin Heidegger

P.S. My wife sends her warmest greetings.⁴

We note that Heidegger does not say he has lost his religious faith or broken with the Catholic worldview and the values he perceives in it. Nor does he say he has abandoned the Catholic church, taken as a community of people with shared traditions and rituals. (Later in life he would tell a confidant that he had never left the Catholic church: “Ich bin niemals aus der Kirche getreten.”)

Rather, Heidegger is announcing his break with the *system of dogmatic Catholicism* and in particular with its way of policing its members’ freedom to research and teach as they see fit. Once liberated from ecclesiastical restrictions, Heidegger intends to continue working to retrieve the meaning he has found latent in Christianity and traditional metaphysics, although he says he now understands metaphysics in a different sense than before. And he proposes to present the positive results of his research in a study devoted to the phenomenology of religion.

This letter is a watershed in the philosophical and religious development of the 29-year-old Martin Heidegger. Firmly and decisively it marks the end of his budding career as the up-and-coming "Catholic philosopher," a reputation he had been carefully cultivating around Freiburg University ever since he took his doctorate in philosophy there in 1913.⁵

Martin Heidegger was born on September 26, 1889, in Messkirch, southwest Germany, the first child of a relatively poor Catholic couple, simple village people who had lived through the hard times of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*. After grammar school, he spent seven and a half years of his academic curriculum studying for the Roman Catholic priesthood: six years as a high school seminarian (1903-9), two weeks in a Jesuit novitiate (September 30 to October 13, 1909; he was dismissed for reasons of health), followed by a year and a half of theology studies at Freiburg University.

However, in February 1911 a deteriorating heart condition forced Heidegger to leave the seminary and abandon all plans to become a priest. In October 1911 he took up studies in mathematics and, under the strong influence of Professor Heinrich Rickert, in philosophy. On July 26, 1913, Heidegger received the doctorate in philosophy with a dissertation entitled "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism."

A few weeks later members of the Philosophy Faculty, particularly philosophy professor Arthur Schneider and history professor Heinrich Finke, began grooming the promising young scholar, then 23 years of age, to take over Freiburg University's Chair of Catholic Philosophy. A grant from the Catholic church was arranged to tide Heidegger over for two years while he wrote the requisite "qualifying dissertation" (*Habilitationsschrift*) that would win him a license to teach at the university as a *Privatdozent*, or unsalaried lecturer. The terms of the grant stipulated that in order to receive the stipend of 3,000 marks per year Heidegger had to promise to follow the church's line and "remain true to the spirit of Thomistic philosophy."

Moreover, Heidegger's mentors suggested that if he wanted the chair in Catholic philosophy, he should change the topic of his qualifying dissertation from his chosen subject, titled "The Logical Essence of the Concept of Number" (which reflected his interest in the philosophy of mathematics, inspired by reading Edmund Husserl and Heinrich Rickert), to a topic in medieval philosophy. Heidegger decided to write on Duns Scotus's doctrine of categories and mean-

ing, basing himself on the *Tractatus de modis significandi*, which was later found to have been written not by Scotus (1266–1308) but by his follower, Thomas of Erfurt, around the year 1379.

These were hard times for Catholic intellectuals. For the better part of the preceding century the traditional Catholic worldview – especially but not exclusively its fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible – had been on the ropes, severely buffeted by the revolution in religious and philosophical thinking that the Vatican, tarring with a very broad brush, denounced as “Modernism.” Launching his counterattack in the summer and fall of 1907, Pope Pius X lashed out against alleged Modernist tendencies in Catholic university circles, and in the process plunged the church into one of its darkest, most repressive periods. Among other things, the Vatican demanded (September 1910) that certain Catholic professors swear an anti-Modernist oath of fidelity to traditional formulations of doctrine on such things as miracles, the founding of the church, and the nature of faith.

Even Heidegger, when he was 20 years old and still a seminary student, had thrown in his lot with the Vatican on this one. He publicly condemned Modernism and defended the church’s teaching authority both in a speech he gave in Hausen im Tal, near Messkirch, on September 6, 1909 (three weeks before entering the Jesuits), and in an article he published in the conservative Catholic weekly *Der Akademiker* in May 1910.⁶

Four years later, however, while in the throes of writing his qualifying dissertation, Heidegger apparently began to feel the pinch of the church’s anti-Modernist crusade and changed his mind. In a letter to his friend Father Krebs (July 19, 1914, just two weeks before the Great War broke out) he remarked ironically how the Vatican might guarantee conformity among Catholic intellectuals: “Philosophical demand could be met by setting up vending machines in the train station (free of charge for the poor)” and “all who succumb to having independent thoughts could have their brains taken out and replaced with spaghetti.”⁷

Nonetheless, Heidegger, in hot pursuit of the chair of Catholic philosophy, continued to assure the administrative offices of Freiburg’s Catholic archdiocese, in writing and presumably with conviction, that his academic work would be devoted to “researching and teaching Christian-Scholastic philosophy” (September 20, 1914),

that he saw himself as standing "in the service of Christian-Scholastic philosophy and the Catholic worldview" (November 23, 1914), and that his philosophical career would be dedicated to "making the intellectual riches stored up in Scholasticism available and usable for the spiritual battle of the future over the Christian-Catholic ideal of life" (December 13, 1915). Moreover, in a handwritten curriculum vitae that he presented to the philosophy department on July 2, 1915, he declared that his "basic philosophical convictions [remain] those of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy" and that his lifework would be taken up with (here we find a slight twist away from neo-Scholasticism and toward Husserl) "a comprehensive presentation of medieval logic and psychology in the light of modern phenomenology."⁸

Therefore, a year after he had successfully completed his dissertation on medieval philosophy, and after being told for three years that he was the inside favorite for Freiburg University's chair of Catholic philosophy, it came as a great shock and a bitter disappointment when in June 1916 Martin Heidegger saw the philosophy department give the chair to Josef Geysler, a second-rate neo-Scholastic professor from the University of Münster.

It seems that between June 1916 and March 1917 Heidegger underwent the personal and philosophical conversion that culminated in his abandonment of dogmatic Catholicism. Several factors, including a personal crisis of faith, contributed to this Protestantizing turn.

For one thing (and probably bound up with his disappointment at being passed over for the Catholic chair) there was the increasing tension that Heidegger felt between, on the one hand, the conformity to ecclesiastical authority that the Vatican's anti-Modernist campaign demanded and, on the other, the "inner truthfulness towards oneself and those one is supposed to teach" (as he would later put it to Father Krebs) that was demanded by his vocation to philosophy. It is significant that Privatdozent Heidegger, after a year of giving courses in Catholic philosophy, spent the summer of 1917 reading the Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and would soon be studying Martin Luther.

Another factor was Heidegger's encounter with Edmund Husserl, who had come to Freiburg University in April 1916 to take over the chair of non-Catholic philosophy. Heidegger's first personal meetings with Husserl, from late July 1916 through the fall of 1917, were

disappointing. To be sure, Husserl was happy to help the young man get some part-time teaching at the university. However, he gave Heidegger's qualifying dissertation only a desultory reading and, in October 1917, sent to Professor Natorp of Marburg University an at best lackluster evaluation of Heidegger's promise as a scholar.⁹

Again, one of the major issues was religion. Husserl, who called himself a "free Christian" and a "non-dogmatic Protestant" and who once denounced what he termed the "Catholic International," vigorously opposed ecclesiastical interference with philosophical research. "Scientific work would be deprived of its freedom," he said on January 16, 1920, with explicit reference to the Vatican, "if one had to fear being censured by some learned commission." The point is that up through October 1917 Husserl, being unfamiliar with the religious transformation Heidegger was undergoing, thought that the young lecturer was still passing himself off around Freiburg as a Catholic philosopher.¹⁰

Only in November–December 1917 did Husserl learn from his student, Heinrich Ochsner, who was a close personal friend of Heidegger, how radically Heidegger's views on Catholicism had changed. That was the turning point. Husserl now began to open up to Heidegger both personally and professionally. However, after only a few weeks, their direct personal contacts were broken off when Heidegger was called up, on January 17, 1918, for active military duty and eventually, at the end of August, 1918, was sent to the Western Front.¹¹

In any case, Husserl was clearly pleased when he could finally announce to Professor Natorp that by 1917 the young Dr. Heidegger had "freed himself from dogmatic Catholicism" and had "cut himself off – clearly, energetically, and yet tactfully – from the sure and easy career of a 'philosopher of the Catholic worldview.'" But the change had not come easily. In a letter to Professor Rudolf Otto, also of Marburg University, Husserl would recall – as if describing the conversion of a modern St. Augustine – the hard times Heidegger had gone through and the "difficult inner struggles" that had led him to "radical changes in [his] basic religious convictions." But the outcome, Husserl wrote, had been happy: Heidegger had "migrated over to the ground of Protestantism."¹²

No doubt aiding the troubled young scholar to chart his course through the crisis was his romantic encounter during the summer of

1916 with his Protestant student Thea Elfride Petri. An economics major, she had been following his philosophy courses since the fall of 1915. By the late summer of 1916 they were vacationing together at Reichenau; by Christmas they were engaged; and three months later – both of them in deep religious crisis – they were married.

THE RADICAL PHENOMENOLOGIST

On February 7, 1919, amid the social and political chaos of Germany's collapse and regeneration, Heidegger began his first lecture course after the war, and he hit the ground running. "Today we are not ready for *real* reform of the university," he announced to his students. "And just getting mature enough for the task will take a *whole generation*" (GA 56/57, 4).¹³

These were hard times for Germany, both economically and politically. Right-wing death squads had just murdered Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and the bodies of other leftist victims were turning up by the scores. The reichsmark was falling in value and by November 1923 would exchange at 4.4 trillion to the dollar. The Versailles Peace Conference was busily paring away 10 percent of Germany's population, 13 percent of its national territory, and 100 percent of its colonies, as well as imposing (over and above Germany's war debt, which had set the national wealth back by 25 percent) a war reparations bill that was worth, in today's exchange rates, \$220 billion.¹⁴

Renewing the nation in general and the university in particular, said Privatdozent Heidegger on the first day of class, would require a "return to the authentic origins of the spirit," and that meant not flights of rarified theory but a concrete immersion in the practical experiences of real life in order to get to the core of what it means to be authentically human. "Man, become essential!" he exclaimed, citing the German mystic Angelus Silesius (1624–77). And quoting a somewhat better known figure: "He who can grasp it, let him grasp it!" (5).

What was going on? Certainly the passionate intensity of Heidegger's lecture style announced that there was a new force to be reckoned with at Freiburg University. But something else was afoot. Just two weeks before, fresh from his "letter of resignation" to Father Krebs, Heidegger had been appointed Edmund Husserl's new teach-

ing assistant, taking the place vacated by Edith Stein. And yet virtually everything the young lecturer had to say in his first course, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview," seemed to undercut, or at least to reinterpret radically, Husserl's own positions on phenomenology.

Heidegger's main attack was on the primacy that Husserl attributed to theory over lived experience and to the pure transcendental ego over what Heidegger at this point called the "historical ego" and the "ego of the situation" (205–6) and that he would later term "Dasein." "We find ourselves at a methodological crossroads," he said on March 14, "where it will be decided whether philosophy shall live or die" (63). And everything depends on first getting clear what philosophy's true issue is. "What is messing up the real problematic is not just naturalism as some people think," he said with explicit reference to Husserl, "but the overall dominance and primacy of the *theoretical*" (87).

For Heidegger the theoretical orientation of the pure ego of Husserlian phenomenology sucks the blood out of the richly textured *Umwelt*, the firsthand world of lived experience (*Erleben*) in which one primarily exists and carries out practical tasks. In this firsthand world, things are not just "there," and they do not primarily have "value." They are not even just "things." They are "*the meaningful* – that's what's primary. . . . When you live in the firsthand world, everything comes at you loaded with meaning, all over the place and all the time, everything is enworlded, 'world happens.' " (73). Here we do not know ourselves as egos who observe the entities lying around us. Rather (this was Heidegger's rereading of intentionality), we are the act of experientially "*living out unto something*," which has "absolutely nothing to do with an ego" (68–9). And this primary level of experience is intensely personal: "Only in the resonances of one's own individual 'I' does a firsthand thing get experienced, only there does 'world happen,' and wherever and whenever world does happen for me, I am somehow entirely there" (73; for Heidegger's discussion of sociality, see 210).

But this richly textured firsthand world gets drained of all life, meaning, and history when it becomes infected by theory (89; *entlebt*, *ent-deutet*, *ent-geschichtlicht*, and *Infizierung*). The dynamic, personal, and historical "happening" of world (*Er-eignis*), which is intimately bound up with the living and appropriating of one's own

life, gets flattened out to a "process" (*Vor-gang*) of objective knowledge. Ultimately the human being is reduced to a level of experience that is "absolutely without world, world-alien, a sphere where the breath is knocked out of you and you cannot live" (75, 78, 112; cf. 205). "In theoretical acts I leave my lived experience behind. To be sure, something of the experiential still comes along with me – but no one knows what to do with it, so they invent the convenient label of the 'irrational' for it" (117).

To preserve the firsthand world of lived experience, including the world of religious experience (207, 211), from the ravages of theorizing, Heidegger radically reinterpreted the "principle of all principles" that Husserl had laid down for phenomenology in Section 24 of his *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913). If, according to the Master, firsthand intuition is the starting point of phenomenology, that intuition ("even though Husserl doesn't say this in so many words") is not some theoretical comportment but an "understanding intuition, a *hermeneutic intuition*," from which theory is but a precipitate (117). This hermeneutic intuition, which already understands the world prior to any theorizing and which is the basis of all the rigor that phenomenology claims for itself, is

the aboriginal intention of authentic living, the aboriginal comportment of lived experience and of life as such, the absolute *sympathy with life* that is identical with lived experience. Prior to anything else – that is, if we take this path away from theory and more and more free ourselves from theory – we *see* this basic comportment all the time, we have an orientation *to* it. This basic comportment is absolute, but only if we live in it directly. And no conceptual system, no matter how elaborately constructed, can reach it. Only phenomenological living, as it continually intensifies itself, can get to it. (110)

But this *Urhabitus*, or basic way-of-being, that Heidegger calls phenomenological living "cannot be acquired from one day to the next, like putting on a uniform." It is not a method and has nothing to do with adopting "standpoints" (that, he says, would be the "mortal sin" that ruins everything). Rather, phenomenology, like lived experience, "can authenticate and prove itself only through itself," that is, only in the *living* of it (110).

This was pretty gutsy stuff, but it did not promise a faithful adher-

ence to traditional Husserlian phenomenology. In any case, Heidegger not only continued the attack during the following semester in his course "Phenomenology and the Transcendental Philosophy of Value" (May 9 to July 25, 1919), but even let Husserl in on what he was saying. In the middle of June in one of the Saturday morning discussions that Husserl used to hold at his Freiburg home with his close associates, Heidegger told Husserl publicly that the much vaunted pure ego of Husserlian phenomenology was "derived" from the historical ego by the "repression" of historicity and concretion, and that the pure ego was limited to the role of being the "subject" only of "theoretical acts."¹⁵

A dozen years later Husserl would say that in those early years he thought Heidegger actually did agree with him (Husserl used to tell Heidegger, "You and I are phenomenology") and that the only problem was that he did not understand Heidegger's language.¹⁶ But clearly the game was up from the beginning, even though it took Husserl ten more years (until the summer of 1929) to realize how much Heidegger had gone off on his own.

Which way had Heidegger taken? From his doctoral studies onward, Heidegger had been captivated not by Husserl's *Ideas* with its neo-Kantian turn toward transcendental subjectivity, and even less so by his Cartesian turn in the twenties, but rather by the Master's earlier, ground-breaking work, *Logical Investigations* (1900-1). There Husserl had advanced Franz Brentano's notion of intentionality – the idea that all mental acts are characterized by directedness to a meant object – and solidified it into the fundamental problematic of the *phenomenological correlation* between intentional acts and the mental objects they reveal. And Husserl did so specifically with reference to acts of logical-theoretical intentionality and their logical-theoretical correlates. Heidegger, however, took at least seven important steps both behind and beneath Husserl's early work and its theoretical interests.

First, Heidegger went back to the ancient Greeks and came to see the intentional relatedness-to-the-meant of Husserlian phenomenology as only an imperfect carry-over of what Aristotle had already worked out in terms of human acts of "disclosing" entities (Greek: *aletheuein*). Thus, "What phenomenological investigations had recently discovered to be the underlying posture of thinking turns out

to be the basic trait of Greek thinking, indeed of philosophy as such" (SD 87; TB 79).

Moreover, whereas Husserl's interests in intentionality remained focused primarily on theoretical comportment, Heidegger began probing the *pratheoretical* intentional acts operative in such everyday lived experience as work, talk, self-concern, and faith. He argued that we first encounter things within historical contexts of meaningfulness that first of all are bound up with our pretheoretical concerns and practical interests. And there a more primordial "hermeneutic" *logos* is at work: we know the present objects of practical concern by reaching "beyond" them to antecedently grasped purposes and goals. Heidegger claimed to find clues for this firsthand "hermeneutic" understanding in Aristotle's discussions of self-referential acting (*praxis-phronesis*) and creative making (*poiesis-techne*) in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.¹⁷

Second, Husserl had already argued in *Logical Investigations* VI, 6, that intentionality or disclosive comportment reveals not just entities but also and primarily the *essence* of entities, their "being." Following Husserl, Heidegger interpreted this "being" (*Sein* or *Seiendheit*) no longer objectivistically as the whatness and thatness of entities, the way much of traditional metaphysics had done. Rather, he read it phenomenologically, that is, in correlation with acts of disclosive intentionality, as referring to the howness (*das Wie*) or hadness (*die Habe*) of entities: the way in which, at any given moment, they are disclosed to and "had" in the human acts that co-perform that disclosure. But since practical activity entails prior anticipation of a goal or purpose, the primary modes of the being of an entity are not the presential modes of "being there" before a static subject but rather the future-oriented modes of "being for" the purposes posited by self-exceeding human existence.

Third, Heidegger's intense rereading of Greek philosophy in general and of *Metaphysics* IX 10 in particular led him to the major if implicit tenet of Greek thinking, namely, that entities, to the degree that they are "natural" (*physei on*), are intrinsically self-presentative, that is, accessible and intelligible – *on hos alethes* – even if that accessibility and intelligibility is always shot through with finitude.

Fourth, Heidegger conjugated this "aletheiological" insight of the Greeks with the phenomenological insights he had learned from

Husserl and Aristotle: entities are self-disclosive (*alethes*) only insofar as they are in *correlation* with the various modes of the human co-performance of disclosure (*aletheuein*), primarily the practical ones. Thus, the phenomenological correlation became the "aletheiological" correlation, and Heidegger found it already named in Heraclitus as *logos* (Frag. 50) and *physis* (Frag. 123), and in Parmenides as the "togetherness" (*to auto*) of thinking and being (Frag. 3). This "event" of intelligibility in its facticity became, for Heidegger, the "thing itself" that philosophy had to interrogate. It was, he thought, the ultimate *a priori*, the "first" of everything about the human world, and thus (for those with the sensitivity for it) the most obvious fact of all.¹⁸ Yet it is generally overlooked, not primarily because of some human defect but above all because it "prefers to hide" (Heraclitus, Frag. 53) in the sense of being ultimately unfathomable. In any case, the "happening" of this correlation – the always-already operative empowering of the essential togetherness of disclosive human comportment and of entities *qua* accessible – is what Heidegger, both tentatively in his early courses and boldly in his final writings, called *Ereignis*.

Fifth, insofar as intentionality reveals the being of entities, phenomenology became for Heidegger only a method for probing more deeply metaphysics' unresolved question about the essence or meaning of being, that is, about the analogical unity underlying all the various modes of the being of entities. However, given his phenomenologizing reading of the tradition, Heidegger now reshaped the question about the meaning of being into the question about the essence of the phenomenological correlation, that is, about the analogical unity underlying all possible ways in which entities can present themselves and thus be humanly appropriated. If the human "world" is at bottom a matter of the disclosive correlation, or *aletheia*, then how come *aletheia*? What is the essence, provenance, and "cause" of the disclosure of entities that happens in and with human nature?

Sixth, in working out the essence of this phenomenological-aletheiological correlation from the side of human nature and its pretheoretical "hermeneutic" understanding of things (as he mainly did in the twenties), Heidegger burrowed beneath the Husserlian structures of pure intentional consciousness with its alleged immanence, self-transparency, and apodictic self-giveness and spelled out the more primordial elements of fallenness and finitude, mortal-

ity and temporality, which he saw as the *a priori* or "fated" essence of human existence and its hermeneutic understandings.

Seventh, in working out the question about the essence of the disclosive correlation with emphasis on how it happens at all (the question of *Ereignis*, which he took up explicitly in the thirties), Heidegger came to see that the *a priori*, factual, and inexplicable *givenness* of the correlation – its "fatedness," back behind which one cannot go – was itself bound up with the *a priori*, factual, and inexplicable finitude that is the essence of human existence. This state of affairs – the unfathomable fatedness of the phenomenological correlation in conjunction with the inexplicable fatedness of human finitude – he called the *lethe* at the heart of *aletheia*.

Heidegger gestated these issues for a period of seven years, first at Freiburg, where he continued as a *Privatdozent* and as Husserl's assistant from 1919 until 1923, and thereafter at Marburg, where he was appointed associate professor in the fall of 1923 and taught until the summer of 1928. Between 1916 and 1927 Heidegger published absolutely nothing, and in the eyes of some colleagues this stood in the way of his being appointed to the chair of philosophy that Nicolai Hartmann was about to vacate at Marburg University in the fall of 1925.

But Edmund Husserl came to Heidegger's defense. In a letter to Professor Jaensch of Marburg's Philosophy Faculty (June 30, 1925), he said that "in the new generation [Heidegger] is the only philosophical personality of such creative, resourceful originality." "In my eyes," Husserl wrote, "Heidegger is without a doubt the most significant of those on their way up" and is "predestined to be a philosopher of great style. . . . He has kept silent for years so as to be able to publish only what is completely mature and definitively compelling. His publications that are soon coming out will show just how much he has to say and how original it is."¹⁹

Despite Husserl's rousing recommendation, Heidegger failed to get the appointment. Nonetheless, his reputation as a radical phenomenologist continued to grow. In late April 1927 Heidegger's question about the essence of the phenomenological–aletheiological correlation came to birth – a bit prematurely, as he himself later admitted – in his most famous work, *Being and Time*. The fame of that book won him the appointment first to Hartmann's chair at Marburg in the fall of 1927 and then, in the fall of 1928, to the

position he most coveted: Husserl's successor in the chair of philosophy at Freiburg University.

It would take two years before Husserl got around to reading *Being and Time*, and only then would he realize how much Heidegger's path had split off from his own. But even before that, personal tensions were building up between these two very different phenomenologists, now bottled up in the same provincial town of Freiburg, the one in retirement, the other at the height of his career. Husserl began to suspect his protégé; Heidegger began to avoid his old master; and, to make matters worse, their wives no longer seemed to get along.

But they kept up appearances. April 8, 1929, marked Husserl's seventieth birthday, and Heidegger, in the name of Husserl's closest collaborators, publicly presented him with a *Festschrift*, a collection of essays in his honor. But the brief speech Heidegger gave on this festive occasion was fraught with ambiguity and gave strong hints that Heidegger thought he was leaving the Master in the dust. He said in part:

The works we are presenting to you are only a testimony that we *want* to follow your guidance, not a proof that we have succeeded in doing so. For is it not the case that your research has, in the first instance, created an entirely new space for philosophical inquiry, one with new demands, transformed assessments, a fresh regard for the hidden powers of the great tradition of Western philosophy? Yes, precisely that!²⁰

Heidegger's message was clear, and Husserl finally got it. Two months later, having at long last read through *Being and Time* while on vacation at Lago Como (July–August 1929), Husserl took a pencil and scrawled on the title page, no doubt sadly, "Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas": "Plato is my friend, but truth a greater friend."²¹

THE POLITICAL ACTIVIST

Four years later Germany was in revolution, and not for the better. On January 30, 1933, President Paul von Hindenburg had appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor of the German Republic. A month later, following the burning of the Reichstag building on February 27, 1933, Hitler got the Parliament to suspend the German Constitution and replace it with a permanent state of emergency, under which fundamental civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly

and privacy of the mails were canceled. Within a week of that (March 7) Hitler arrested all eighty-one of the Communist deputies who had been duly elected to the Reichstag the day before and confined them to the newly opened concentration camps. On March 23, the Reichstag passed the Enabling Act, giving Hitler plenipotentiary lawmaking powers, and with that the Nazi dictatorship was born. This was followed on April 5 by the Nazi "cleansing laws" aimed at excluding Jews and Marxists from the civil service.

Then on Monday, May 1 – one day before Hitler would arrest hundreds of labor leaders and throw them into concentration camps – Martin Heidegger, the newly elected rector of Freiburg University, very ostentatiously joined the National Socialist German Workers Party.

That same day, Professor Emeritus Edmund Husserl and his wife Malvine, who were vacationing near Locarno, received a letter from Mrs. Elfride Heidegger, dated April 28. These were hard times for Jews. Because of the "cleansing laws," Husserl, who was born a Jew and converted to Protestantism in his youth, had been forced to resign from Freiburg University two weeks earlier. In these difficult times, Mrs. Heidegger wrote, she and her husband wanted to assure the Husserls of their continuing gratitude for all the help in the past.

Husserl was close to rage. On May 4 he wrote his old friend Professor Dietrick Mahnke of Marburg University to tell him what he felt. Many of his students and colleagues over the years had been a consolation to him, he wrote, but

with others I have had to suffer the worst experiences – the final case (and it hit me the hardest) being Heidegger: hardest, because I had come to place a trust (which I can no longer understand) not just in his talent but in his character as well. The loveliest conclusion to this supposed bosom friendship between philosophers was his publicly enacted entrance into the Nazi party (very theatrical, indeed) on May 1. Before that there was his self-initiated break in relations with me (in fact, soon after his appointment [at Freiburg]) and, over the last few years, his anti-Semitism, which he came to express with increasing vigor – even against the coterie of his most enthusiastic students, as well as around the department. That was a hard thing to get over.²²

Heidegger had been supporting the Nazi party at the ballot box at least since the spring of 1932, and in 1936 he told his former student Karl Löwith that the basis for his political engagement with the

Nazis was his very central philosophical concept of "historicity" (*Geschichtlichkeit*).²³ Although it seems he did not accept the party ideology in its entirety, Heidegger strongly supported its anticommunism. He saw Nazism as a force for crushing Marxism and as a vehicle for realizing the ultraconservative vision of one of his favorite political theorists, Friedrich Naumann (1860–1919), that of a strong nationalism combined with a militantly anticommunist "socialism" under the guidance of a charismatic leader. The goal was to fashion a middle European empire that preserved the spirit and traditions of Wilhelmian Germany against what Heidegger saw as the onslaught of global technology.²⁴

From April 1933 through April 1934, Heidegger served as the heavy-handed and controversial rector of Freiburg University, and in the early months of his tenure he not only lent his name and efforts to the Nazi revolution but also became an outspoken propagandist for Hitler's foreign and domestic policies. During this period he rushed to establish the *Führer* principle at the university (October 1, 1933), thereby making himself the virtual dictator of the campus. He applied the Nazi "cleansing laws" to the Freiburg University student body (November 3) and thus ended financial aid for "Jewish or Marxist students" or anyone who fit the description of a "non-Aryan" in Nazi law. On the same day he told the assembled students that "the *Führer* himself and he alone *is* German reality and its law, today and for the future," and a week later (November 10) he took to the radio to urge ratification of Hitler's withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations.²⁵

In private he engaged in the more despicable work of a Nazi informer. On September 29, 1933, he secretly denounced a colleague, Professor Hermann Staudinger, for having been a pacifist during the Great War, and when the Gestapo confirmed his tip, Heidegger quietly urged the government to fire the man without a pension (February 10, 1934). He also wrote a secret and damning letter to the head of a Nazi organization against a former friend and colleague, Professor Eduard Baumgarten (who, he said, had "very actively frequented the Jew Fränkel"), and thereby helped get the man suspended from a teaching job (December 16, 1933). As late as 1938 he prevented the young Max Müller from getting an academic position by informing the administration of Freiburg University that Müller was "unfavorably disposed" to the Nazi regime.²⁶

And always just under the surface, there was the odor of anti-Semitism. On October 2, 1929, some three years before Hitler came to power, he wrote a letter to the Society for the Support of German Science recommending his assistant, the same Eduard Baumgarten (when they still were friends), and he offered his reasons why the Society should give financial aid to this young scholar who was not a Jew:

I would like to say more clearly in this letter what I could only hint at indirectly in my report: It is nothing less than the urgent consideration that we are faced with a choice, either to provide our *German* intellectual life once more with real talents and educators rooted in our own soil or to hand over that intellectual life once and for all to the growing influence of the Jews [*Verjudung*] in the broad and narrow sense. We will find our way back only if we are able, without baiting and without useless arguments, to assist budding talents in their development.

Regarding this important objective I would be especially grateful if Mr. Baumgarten, whom I have selected to be my assistant, could be helped with a grant.²⁷

And on July 1, 1933, in what would seem to be a typical expression of his mind, Heidegger announced his belief that "there is a dangerous international alliance of Jews" – this to Karl Jaspers, whose wife was Jewish.²⁸ Moreover, from 1934 on, Heidegger declined to direct the doctoral dissertations of Jewish students. Fifty years later Heidegger's close friend Heinrich Petzet wrote (as if no further explanation were needed) that Heidegger felt ill at ease with big-city life, and this was especially true of that mundane spirit of Jewish circles, which is at home in the metropolitan centers of the West. But this attitude of his should not be misunderstood as anti-Semitism, although it has often been interpreted that way.²⁹

After Heidegger resigned the rectorate in April 1934, he continued to support the Nazi regime, though more quietly and perhaps more critically. In the spring and summer of 1936 he still thought that Hitler and National Socialism were the right path for Germany (although he did criticize some forms of Nazi bureaucracy), and he spoke positively of the achievements of both Mussolini and Hitler in the battle against nihilism (GA 42 40-1). And to judge from his public lectures, he apparently supported Hitler's war aims at least until the inevitability of an Allied victory became obvious.³⁰

The "worker" is the unconditional *menial* who has been expanded into the limitless *master*, i.e., the modern "free" enactor of *techne*, the latter taken as the planning, cultivating, calculating and finally the securing of entities as a whole (including human beings) within its own power to fabricate – a complete actualization of what lies at hand, but an actualization of its essence. The "worker" and the limitless subjectivity of such complete anthropomorphism consists in this: Being happens as power-to-make.³⁴

It was this power to dominate everything that Heidegger, in his role as political philosopher, saw as infecting all modern political forms without differentiation. "Today everything stands within this reality, whether it is called communism or fascism or world democracy."³⁵

To put it minimally, Heidegger was never a very strong supporter of democracy, whether before or after the war. He excoriated the "democratized decay" of Germany's postwar institutions and declared himself unconvinced that democracy was the best political system for the modern age.³⁶ He used to like to cite Homer (*Iliad* II 204): "The rule of the many is not good, let there be one ruler, one king," and at least for a while, whether he was finally happy with it or not, he apparently got his wish.

WHAT WILL HEIDEGGER HAVE BEEN?

The period after the war saw the spread of Heidegger's writings throughout the intellectual world in an explosion of interest that crossed lines of language, culture, and academic disciplines. By the time of his death on May 26, 1976, at the age of 86, his books and essays had been translated into all Western languages, as well as into Chinese, Japanese, and Arabic, and the voluminous *Collected Edition* of his works was already under way.

Yet throughout all those works Heidegger claimed to be the thinker of "one thought only," which took many forms of expression: What is the provenance of disclosure? What is the essence of "world"? What is the "cause" of the correlation that lets human beings have meaningful access to entities? In a word, How come *aletheia*?

Over the half-century of his philosophical career Heidegger largely succeeded in establishing the structures of human existence that are essential to this event-of-intelligibility, and he worked out as well the

general lines of its historical forms and epochs. However, he insisted that the question about the originating source of this disclosive correlation – the “how-and-why-it-comes-about” – was finally unanswerable. We cannot say why, whence, or to what end there is disclosure (i.e., why *es gibt Sein*) without already presuming the fact of disclosure and thereby moving in a circle. Thus, the essence of *aletheia* is *lethe*; the provenance of disclosure is unfathomable.

Unfathomable, yes, but something can be said about this correlation insofar as it always affects human existence and remains its chief, if largely unheeded, concern. First, Heidegger calls the “origin” of disclosure *das Er-eignis*, which we can translate as “em-propriation”: the event that brings disclosive comportment and disclosive entities together into their asymptotic “own” (*proprius*, *eigen*), that is, into the openness of disclosure.

Second, he speaks of the “origin” of disclosure as *difference* (Greek *diaphora*, German *Unterschied*), that is, that which is responsible for the fact that human existence and the human world are always nonimmediate and not self-coincident – right down to the non-self-coincidence that is dramatically registered in human mortality and that condemns us to ineluctably finite meanings derived from endless mediation.

Third, regarding the “origin” of disclosure, Heidegger insists on the simple fact that *es gibt Sein*, “disclosure just happens to happen.” In this context there seems to be no real room for history in the usual sense. Instead, Heidegger calls the *a priori* happening of the correlation *das Geschick des Seins*, disclosure’s inherent “fatedness” or givenness to human nature, on the basis of which alone entities are accessible. And when he considered this *a priori* givenness in its various epochal forms, he called it *die Geschichte des Seins*, the “dispensations” of disclosure.³⁷

Fourth, the facticity of human existence is its condition of being ineluctably bound up with this *a priori* givenness of disclosure. Facticity is the human fate of being “thrown” into the endless, finite mediation necessitated by difference, without being able to know why this endless mediation is necessary.

And fifth, because disclosure is always-already operative everywhere in the human world, all entities are, in principle, open to human appropriation. That is, everything is endlessly accessible, except the *fact that* everything is endlessly accessible. This now

achieved state of affairs, which is the gift of the intrinsic unfathomability of the aletheiological correlation, Heidegger termed "nihilism," and he suggested that human beings be not less nihilistic but more.³⁸

Heidegger thought that the archaic Greek poets and thinkers implicitly understood the fact of this endless but finite accessibility of things, and he set it against all theological traditions that would root the comprehensibility of entities in the *full* comprehensibility of God. Yes, "the belonging-together of subject and object [arises] from something that first imports their nature to both . . . and hence is prior to the realm of their reciprocity." But no, this "wellspring" of the aletheiological reciprocity "does not want . . . to be called by the name Zeus" (Heraclitus, Frag. 32); that is,

it does *not* properly admit of being named Zeus, and of being thereby degraded to the level of existing as one entity present among others – even if the "among" has the character of "above all other present entities."³⁹

Heidegger thought that the "hiddenness" or "oblivion" of the disclosive correlation led to its being increasingly overlooked throughout Western history, to the point that in our own day it has become completely forgotten and counts for nothing. He took it as his mission to reawaken a new sense of the unfathomable mystery that, whether attended to or not, yawns like an abyss under the tidy little world of bourgeois certitude – all of this in the interests of helping to bring about a revolutionary transformation of human nature.

And somehow, he said, he came to see Hitler's National Socialism as a movement that might help with that reawakening, at least in Germany.

The degree to which Heidegger's political convictions and actions were a faithful reflection of his philosophy – and vice versa – is a matter of much debate today. Many of his most devoted followers believe that his intellectual work is in no way significantly related to, much less contaminated by, his support for Nazism, even though Heidegger himself rooted that support in his own very central notion of historicity. Other Heideggerians claim that "metaphysics made him do it"; that is, they explain his political "error" as the result of his being victimized by the intrinsic hiddenness of disclosure, which, in the form of "errancy" (*Irre*), inevitably tends to lead people

astray, almost like a secularized form of Original Sin. Still others claim that Heidegger got trapped for a period of time in the nightmare of metaphysical "humanism" from which he was struggling to awake – with the corollaries, first, that Heidegger's political blunder is in fact very concrete proof of everything he had to say about the dark side of the forgottenness of disclosure and, second, that the alleged "overcoming" of metaphysics in his later thought is a guarantee that such an error would not happen again.

Others, however, argue that the reasons for Heidegger's support of Hitler and the Nazis were much more simple – and much more base – than these rather high-flown explanations would have it, and that in order to understand his political motives and despicable actions during the Third Reich one must start by investigating the hard times he lived through and specifically the concrete economic and social factors that conditioned his decisions.

If Heidegger himself insisted that his engagement with Nazism came from the very essence of his philosophy, perhaps his followers should believe him on this point. If Heidegger himself felt free, even for a while, to put not just his person but also the major categories of his philosophical thought at the service of Nazi foreign and domestic policy, then one would do well to ask whether those categories are really as free of economic, social, and political interests as most Heideggerians contend.⁴⁰

The point is not to condemn a man for his past but to learn something about oneself in the present, not to dismiss Heidegger's philosophical work out of hand but likewise not to join the Perpetual Adoration Societies that currently thrive among the Heideggerian faithful in Europe and America. The task, for those who care to take something from Heidegger, is to learn how to read him critically, both his life and his works, not to swallow his philosophy whole but to sift it for what is still of value and what not.

That would entail asking whether Heidegger's dogged pursuit of the *essence* of disclosure did not blind him to crucial problems bound up with *specific modes* of disclosure, particularly in the economic, social, and political orders. It would entail asking whether one risks perpetuating that same blindness to the very degree that one remains faithful to Heidegger's metaontological line of questioning. Maybe it is not wise – whether the times are hard or easy – to be the thinker of "one thought only."

After the war the State Committee for Political Purification declared Heidegger a Nazi "fellow traveler" and prohibited him from teaching. But Freiburg University came to his defense, and in 1951 he was granted emeritus status and was allowed to teach and lecture again at the university.

In posthumously published texts – some prepared in 1946 for the denazification committee, one for eventual publication in *Der Spiegel*³¹ – Heidegger tried to explain what he called his political "error." Otherwise he maintained a hermetic silence about the motives, responsibility, and particular forms of his involvement with National Socialism. But in 1953 he published the text of a 1935 lecture course in which he had attempted briefly to distinguish between, on the one hand, vulgar Nazism and, on the other, the "inner truth and greatness" of the Nazi movement, namely, its alleged effort to mediate between human beings and global technology. However, the paragraph was so shot through with ambiguity and even subterfuge that Heidegger himself tried, unsuccessfully, to get Yale University Press to drop it from the eventual English translation, *Introduction to Metaphysics*.³²

In general, Heidegger put the blame (if we can call it that) for the tragedy of World War II and the Holocaust not on any individuals or political movement but on an impersonal planetary force, the Will to Power, which he thought lay beyond anyone's responsibility or control. This force had brought about a new and unfortunate form of human nature: the "worker" taken as technology-oriented, world-dominating subjectivity. Heidegger frequently affirmed that in the thirties and forties Ernst Jünger's book *Der Arbeiter* (The worker, 1932) had opened his eyes to a suprametaphysical vision of the true meaning of the modern social, political, and economic order: "From the standpoint of the reality of the Will to Power I saw even then [in 1939–40] what is," Heidegger wrote.³³ And he tried to capture that vision in a handwritten text, dating from the late thirties, which has recently been found among his papers at the Marbach Archives:

The "form of the worker" is not *any one man* – not even primarily a type of man. Rather, as a type, it is only a form of *subjectivity*, whose essence consists in the *certitude* of calculation. As the Will to Power it is one form, the *last form*, of the "truth" of *beings as a whole*. Therefore, in essence it is *techne*, but a deeper essence than Jünger sees: he keeps turning around in a superficial circle but does not sense the whirlwind.

As Derrida puts it, the task of critically rereading Heidegger requires "showing – without limit, if possible – the profound attachment of Heidegger's texts (both writings and deeds) to the possibility and actuality of all nazisms,"⁴¹ even, one might suggest, those that pass themselves off in the guise of furthering "Western democracy," preserving the "American way of life," or instituting various kinds of "World Order," whether old or new.

Heidegger has been dead for some years now, and it is still not entirely clear who he was or what he meant to say. His works lie there, some seventy-odd volumes of them, and it is not entirely clear what they mean either. The hermeneutic principle that Heidegger himself suggested for reading texts, be they books or lives, was: "Possibility is higher than actuality." The way we read his life and his works in our own hard times can help determine, in some far-distant future, who and what Heidegger will have been.

NOTES

- 1 Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1988), p. 108.
- 2 *Ibid.*, pp. 104–5. For anecdotal accounts of the effects of these gas attacks on U.S. soldiers see Elaine George Collins, ed., *If Not for War* (Redwood City, Calif.: Collins, 1989), pp. 86–7, 123–4.
- 3 Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), p. 9.
- 4 Ott, *Martin Heidegger*, 106–7.
- 5 On Heidegger's education and career up to July 1915 see Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's *Lehrjahre*," in *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years*, ed. John Sallis, Giuseppina Moneta, and Jacques Taminiaux (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1988): 77–137.
- 6 Victor Farias, *Heidegger et le nazisme*, trans. Myriam Benarroch and Jean-Baptiste Grasset (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1987), pp. 51–2. Also see Ott, *Martin Heidegger*, pp. 63–4.
- 7 The entire letter is translated in Sheehan, "Heidegger's *Lehrjahre*," p. 113.
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 137 n. 178, and 80–1.
- 9 See Thomas Sheehan, ed., *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker* (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), pp. 7–8.
- 10 For the quotations in this paragraph see Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,' 1920–1921," *Personalist* 60 (July 1979): 312–24, p. 314, and Ott, *Martin Heidegger*, pp. 113, 110.

- 11 According to written statements he made in 1915 and 1928, Heidegger had already been in the army three times before, once as a volunteer (August 2–10, 1914) and twice as a draftee (October 2–10, 1914, and August 18 to October 16, 1915), and each time had been dismissed for reasons of health. See the documentation in Sheehan, "Heidegger's *Lehrjahre*," pp. 119, n. 2, 121 n. 13.
- 12 See Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,'" pp. 313–14.
- 13 Unless otherwise noted, in this section all page references within parentheses are to GA 56/57.
- 14 V. R. Berghahn, *Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 72.
- 15 See Gerda Walther's letter to Alexander Pfänder, June 20, 1919, Husserl Archives, Leuven, cited in "Introductory Note" to Martin Heidegger, "The Understanding of Time in Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the Being-Question," *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 10 (Summer 1979): 199–200, p. 199.
- 16 Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, pp. 9, 106.
- 17 Heidegger treated the issue at length in the first half of his course "Interpretation platonischer Dialoge (Sophistes, Philebus)," winter semester, 1924–5, and summarized it in his lecture "Dasein und Wahrsein nach Aristoteles: Interpretationen von Buch VI der Nikomachischen Ethik" delivered at Cologne University on December 2, 1924, at the invitation of Max Scheler.
- 18 See *Physics B I 193 b 3–6*, and *Metaphysics 1006 a 5–11*. See also the quote from GA 56/57 110, cited above on page 79, where Heidegger says that "we see this basic compartment all the time. . . ."
- 19 Husserl's handwritten letter from Freiburg, dated Tuesday, June 30, 1925, in response to Jaensch's letter of June 24, was intended to answer the question Professor Wedekind had raised at the Marburg Philosophy Faculty meeting of June 24 about how little Heidegger had published. Husserl's letter and other documentation relating to Heidegger's application for Hartmann's chair are found in the Staatsarchiv Marburg, "Akten der Philipps-Universität Marburg: Philosophie und Pädagogik, 1922–1943" (Bestand 307d: Acc. 1966/10, No. 28) and "Akten Universität Marburg betreffend die Professoren der philosophischen Fakultät. . ." (305a: Acc. 1950/9, No. 646). See Thomas Sheehan, "Time and Being, 1925–1927," in *Thinking about Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought*, ed. Robert W. Shahan and J. N. Mohanty (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), pp. 180–3, and Theodore Kisiel, "Why the First Draft

- of *Being and Time* Was Never Published," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 20 (January 1989): 3-22, p. 31.
- 20 Martin Heidegger, "Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag," *Akademische Mitteilung: Organ für die gesamten Interessen der Studentschaft an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg/Br.*, 4. Folge, 9. Semester, No. 4 (May 14, 1929): 46-7, p. 46.
- 21 Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, A 6 1096 a 14-17.
- 22 The German text appears in Bernd Martin, ed., *Martin Heidegger und das "Dritte Reich": Ein Kompendium* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), p. 149.
- 23 Karl Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 57.
- 24 See Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger and the Nazis," *New York Review of Books*, June 16, 1988, p. 44.
- 25 These texts are printed in Guido Schneeberger, *Nachlese zur Heidegger: Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken* (Bern: Suhr, 1962), pp. 136-7, 144-6.
- 26 Bernd Martin and Gottfried Schramm, "Ein Gespräch mit Max Müller," *Freiburger Universitätsblätter*, 92 (June 1986): 13-31, pp. 27-9.
- 27 The German text appears in Ulrich Sieg, "Die Verjudung des deutschen Geistes," *Die Zeit*, "Feuilleton," December 22, 1989, p. 50. The term "Verjudung" became a Nazi term of contempt ("Jewification") in the thirties.
- 28 Karl Jaspers, *Philosophische Biographie*, expanded ed. (Munich: Piper, 1977), p. 101; also his *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger*, ed. Hans Saner (Munich: Piper, 1978), pp. 15, 257, 284.
- 29 Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, *Auf einen Stern zugehen* (Frankfurt: Societät, 1983), p. 40.
- 30 Heidegger's criticism of the Nazi bureaucracy is mentioned in Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland*, p. 57. Heidegger's positive statement about Hitler and Mussolini was intentionally omitted from the first German edition of his 1936 course *Schellings Abhandlung "Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit" (1809)* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971), and therefore is absent from the English translation by Joan Stambaugh, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985). It has been restored in the *Gesamtausgabe* edition of the work, GA 42 40-1.
- 31 The *Der Spiegel* interview appears in English translation by William J. Richardson: "Only a God Can Save Us," in Sheehan, ed., *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*, pp. 45-67.
- 32 The disputed text appears in Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die*

- Metaphysik* (originally published in 1953), republished in 1983 as GA 40 208; English translation by Ralph Manheim, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 199; it is discussed in Sheehan, "Heidegger and the Nazis," pp. 42–3. Regarding the Yale incident see Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 443.
- 33 Martin Heidegger, "The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts," trans. Karsten Harries, *Review of Metaphysics*, 38 (March 1985): 481–502, p. 485.
- 34 The transcribed text, with a photograph of the original, appears in Heimo Schwilk, ed., *Ernst Jünger: Leben und Werk in Bildern und Texten* (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1988), p. 131.
- 35 Heidegger, "The Rectorate," p. 485.
- 36 Petzet, *Auf einen Stern zugehen*, p. 82; cf. p. 232.
- 37 The German verb *schicken*, as transitive, means to send or dispatch and, as reflexive, to happen. From the transitive sense comes the noun *das Geschick*: destiny, fate, fortune. From the reflexive sense comes the noun *die Geschichte*: event or happening; history; story. The Latin deponent verb *fari* means to say or speak something to someone. The past participle *fatum*, taken as a substantive, means that which is "spoken" (destined, fated) to someone.
- 38 See Thomas Sheehan, "Nihilism, Facticity, and the Economized *Lethe*," in *Heidegger: A Centenary Appraisal*, ed. Edward S. Casey, Samuel IJsseling, Thomas Sheehan, and Jacques Taminiaux (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University, Simon Silverman Center, 1990), pp. 28–61.
- 39 Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Krell and Frank Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1984): finite comprehensibility, pp. 107–8; "belonging-together," p. 103; "wellspring," p. 102; Zeus, p. 74.
- 40 See, e.g., the text from November 11, 1933, in Schneeberger, *Nachlese*, pp. 148–50.
- 41 Jacques Derrida, "Heidegger, l'enfer des philosophes," *Nouvel Observateur*, November 6–12, 1987, p. 173.