

How (Not) To Read Heidegger

by Thomas Sheehan

English translations of the phenomenon called *Zeitlichkeit* wildly miss the mark and throw *Being and Time* off course at the very center of the issue that defines Heidegger's work.

What is the problem here? How to remedy it? This essay represents an effort to answer those questions.¹

I. HEIDEGGER

1.

Discursiveness: Recall that Heidegger's central topic is not "being"—at least not in any of the usual meanings of that term—but rather what

¹ I cite the *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) by volume number and page, and other editions of Heidegger's works by the abbreviations that appear in William Richardson's *Heidegger* (1963), xxxi. When a reference is given as page + period + number (for example, GA 15, 310.12-15), it refers to the page and the line.

Aristotle: I use *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, revised Greek text, ed. W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 2 volumes, along with *Aristoteles' Metaphysik* (Greek-German), 2 vols., reworked (from the Bonitz edition) by Horst Seidl, 2nd ed., (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1982); and *Aristotle's Physics*, revised Greek text, ed. W.D. Ross, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936).

Aquinas: For the *Summa Theologiae* I use the text in the series *Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos*, 3rd ed., (Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1963). For other works I cite the *Opera Omnia*, Parma edition, reprinted, (New York: Musurgia, 1948-1949), while occasionally checking other editions, for example, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, ed. R. P. Mandonnet, new edition, (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929); and (especially for the Latina recens) *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, ed. M. R. Cathala, (Turin: Marietti, 1926).

Heidegger's problems with medieval philosophy are well known. Nonetheless, in the notes I occasionally cite texts from Aquinas that seem related to Heidegger's points. I am grateful to John Protevi and Daniel Price for valuable suggestions about this essay.

he calls the "clearing" of and for being, *die Lichtung*. This clearing is the *locus* of being, analogous (but only analogous) to Aristotle's description of the thinking soul as the place where the forms of things may appear (*topos eidōn*: *De Anima* III, 4, 429a 27-28). In German the clearing comes out as the *Da* of *Sein*, the place where the whatness, thatness, and howness of things—their being—can become actually manifest in human experience.²

Recall also that the essence of a human being is to be "already" (i.e., essentially/necessarily) that place where things show up as what, that, and how they are. The nature of the human being is to be the locus for the "as," where "as" is shorthand for "the possibility of things appearing as this or that," i.e., appearing *in* their being.

The "as" connotes discursiveness, not only as a human possibility but above all as a human necessity. We are "condemned" to (or "thrown" into) relating to things mediately and discursively, i.e., by way of an as-structure. Discursiveness entails combining different elements while keeping them distinct. In discursiveness the synthesizing "as" and the differentiating "as-not" are not disjunctive but mutually inclusive. Such synthesis-and-differentiation happens both in praxis (using something as a means to an end but as not the only means) and in theory (seeing Socrates as an Athenian but as not the only Athenian and as not only an Athenian). Heidegger calls the structure of such synthetic-differential activity by the Greek word *logos*, which for him means not "word" or "reason" or "language" but "discursiveness."

So, the human being is always already thrown into *logos*. *Logos* as the possibility of discursive meaningfulness is what Heidegger calls

² [a] Not the usual meanings of being: See GA 15, 310.12-15: Heidegger holds "daß alle Metaphysik sich zwar in der Differenz [von Sein und Seiendem] bewegt (stets wird das betont, besonders bei Thomas von Aquino), daß aber keine Metaphysik diese Differenz in der Dimension erkennt, wo sie sich als Differenz entfaltet"—that is, in the "clearing."

[b] "Clearing": passim; see SD 71ff., 78.23-24; GA 5, 40.1-2, 71.35; GA 68, 45.11. Martin Heidegger, "Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens (1968)," in *Japan und Heidegger*, ed. Hartmut Buchner, (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke, 1989), p. 230.9.

[c] "Clearing for being": GA 65 #171, 295.3. See GA 49, 60.25-27.

[d] "*topos eidōn*": Aristotle emphasizes that the thinking soul is the forms only "potentially" (*oute entelecheiai alla dynamei*, 429 a 29-30); and here we say analogously that the "Da" is where the being of entities can become actually manifest.

[e] "whatness, thatness, howness": This phrase seeks to emphasize the distinguishability, but to deny any true separability, of being (das Sein) from entities (das Seiende). See Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 1, 193b 4-5: *ou chōriston on all' ē kata ton logon*; and by analogy, III, 1, 200b 32-33: *ouk esti de kinēsis para ta pragmata*.

"world." To be condemned to this field of discursiveness means to have to clear the field and hold it open. This is what Heidegger initially called "being-in-the world."³

Clearing and holding open the field of discursiveness means being already positioned (indeed, condemned) to "take-as." To have to take X as Y, i.e., to need to use or know X *in terms of* something else, means that you must already be structured so that you can be in touch with Y. Your being is a "distention" (*Ausbreitung*). You are "ahead" of your actuality, "stretched" into your possibilities, such that you have both yourself and other things from out of (or in terms of) your possibilities. *Operari sequitur esse*: Your activities are discursive because your structure is distensive.⁴

2.

Distention: Having traced discursiveness back to distention, Heidegger interprets distention in terms of movement. Shaping the discussion is his re-reading of *kinēsis* in Aristotle. Heidegger treats movement here not in the sense of change of place, quality, quantity, or even generation

³ In order (a) to show that your "thrownness" into (i.e., your *a priori* relegation to) *logos* means that you can have no footing outside of *logos*—neither in the *aisthesis* typical of animals nor in the *nous* characteristic of angels; and (b) to capture the logical/ontological (not chronological) priority operative here; that is, (c) to emphasize that your nature as being-in-*logos* is something you assume rather than create—in the interest of all that, one might say: you *always already have, of necessity*, cleared and held open the field of discursiveness.

⁴ "To take something as something" — in a much adapted sense: *ti kata tinos legein*, whether the *legein* be that of constructing declarative sentences or of hammering nails—is what Heidegger means by *entwerfen etwas auf...* In English this usually gets skewed as "projecting something upon....," as if one were throwing books on the desk or horseshoes at a stake. The *Woraufhin* of a projection is not "that upon which" I throw something but, formally, "that in terms of which" I take something. The *Woraufhin* could be the category predicated of a subject, or the task defining a tool, or the condition I think makes a certain phenomenon possible. I take Napoleon as a husband or an emperor; I use this stone as a missile or a paperweight; I think of being as created by God or as manifested in the clearing.

[a] "Ausbreitung": GA 29/30, 528.25 has "Ausbreitbarkeit," whereas the Simon Moser Nachschrift, 701.2, has "Ausbreitung." The evocation of Augustine's "distentio animi" (*Confessiones* XI, 26) is intentional. See Heidegger, "Des hl. Augustinus Betrachtung über die Zeit. Confessiones lib. XI," conference at St. Martin's Abbey, Beuron, October 26, 1930, typescript, e.g., p. 10. In SZ "Ausbreitung" is represented by "Sicherstreichen."

[b] "Activities discursive because...": In a much adapted sense one might hear an echo of Thomas Aquinas' observation that the human intellect knows potency through potency: "aliter se habet intellectus divinus, atque aliter intellectus noster.... [qui] sicut actum cognoscit per actum, ita etiam potentiam per potentiam cognoscit." *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 71, [11], (Parma V, 51a).

and corruption of substance, but as a basic kind of being: ontological becoming. (See *GA* 22, 173.1-8.)

In general, an entity has its being as ontological becoming if it meets the criterion of "necessary anticipation," i.e., if, over and above its as-yet-unachieved individual possibilities, it has its own wholeness (i.e., the required actualization of its necessary possibilities) still ahead of itself and in need of anticipation. Becoming is an entity's necessary prolepsis of a not-yet-achieved wholeness that the entity needs in order to be at all.⁵

Such becoming is "teleological." It means (a) being oneself at any given moment only by anticipatorily enacting one's *telos*; or (b) being present by being absent in the direction of one's wholeness; or (c) having one's *telos* and wholeness proleptically and thus finitely present. Becoming means that this absence *qua* anticipated bestows finite presence. At least this is how Heidegger understands Aristotle's discussion of movement as *energeia atelēs* or *tou atelous energeia*.⁶

Just as to be human is to be condemned to *logos*, so too (and as the

⁵ [a] Anticipation: See *In III Physicorum*, lectio 2 (Parma XVIII, 295b): "...quod iam in actu existens habet ordinem in ulteriorem actum; quia si tolleretur ordo ad ulteriorem actum, ipse actus, quantumcumque imperfectus, esset terminus motus et non motus..."; *In VIII Physicorum*, lectio 10 (Parma XVIII, 500a): "...movetur aliquid, quod cum sit in potentia, tendit in actum"; and S.T. 1.2.30.2, c.: "Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, et secundum quod est absens: nam secundum quod est praesens, facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad seipsum moveri."

[b] Wholeness: Thomas Aquinas argues that all steps preceding the end are for the end: see S.T. 1.2.8.3, c.: "...cum finis sit secundum se volitus, id autem quod est ad finem, in quantum huiusmodi, non sit volitum nisi propter finem." Here he follows Aristotle's argument that this state of affairs holds in natural as in rational movement (See *Physics*, II, 8, 199a 8-20, especially 8-9.)

⁶ [a] Re: Anticipating absent finality: Commenting on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* IX, 8, 1050a 8 (*archē gar to hou heneka*) Aquinas says: "Dicit...quod omne quod fit vadens ad finem, vadit ad quoddam principium. Nam finis cuius causa fit aliquid, est quoddam principium. Est enim prius in intentione agentis, quia ejus causa fit generatio." (Parma, XX, 544a; Cathala edition, no. 1857, p. 539). See S.T. 1.2.1.1, ad 1: "...finis [qui est primus in intentione]...habet rationem causae."

[b] Re: Absent in the direction of wholeness: See *In IV Sententiarum*, 17, 1, 5, solutio 3, ad 1. [Parma VII/2, 781a]: "Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfecti, qui est exitus de potentia in actum; et talis oportet quod sit successivus, quia semper expectat aliquid in futurum ad perfectionem suae speciei"; and in discussing angels at *De Veritate* 8, 14, ad 12 [Parma IX, 139a]: "...illa operatio per se cadit sub tempore quae expectat aliquid in futurum, ad hoc quod eius species compleatur; sicut patet in motu, qui non habet speciem completam donec ad terminum perducatur."

[c] Re: Proleptic presence of finality: See S.T. 1.2.27.3, c., where Aquinas argues that likeness is a cause of love "secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad actum ipsum: nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus." Indeed

basis for that) it means being condemned to becoming. Heidegger expresses this by saying that your essence is "to have to ek-sist," i.e., to be already and necessarily positioned beyond your present actuality, not just in the direction of this or that possibility, but in the direction of your end.

The ultimate and inevitable end that your becoming anticipates is the possibility to end all possibilities. Human becoming is mortal becoming, and mortality is not some future moment up the road. Rather, you already "enact" it: It is how you "already" (i.e., essentially/necessarily) now are. Of its essence, human becoming is a disappearing act. You *are* by proleptically being-no-longer.⁷ To be is to enact dying: *epitēdeuesthai apothnēskein*.

This ontological movement of appearing by disappearing is intrinsically time-forming, but not in the usual sense of "chronology."⁸ Rather,

"unicuique existenti in potentia, in quantum huiusmodi [hence: unicuique *mobili*], inest appetitus sui actus: et in eius consecutione [{"anticipated} realization"] delectatur, si sit sentiens et cognoscens."

[d] Heidegger on Aristotle on time: The loci classici in Aristotle include *Physics* III, 1, 201a 10-11, 201a 27-29; 201 b 4-5; 2, 201 b 31-32 (*energeia ... atelēs*); *De Anima* III, 7, 431 a 8: *hē gar kinēsis tou atelous energeia* (see S.T. 1.2.31.2, ad 1: actus imperfecti; also *In IV Sententiarum*, 17, 1, 5, solutio 3, ad 1: "Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfecti... [N.B.: Alius motus est actus perfecti...": cf. *GA* 9, 284]). For Heidegger's comments on Aristotle: *GA* 9, 283-288; *GA* 22, 171-181; 201-204; 318-331; etc.

⁷ *SZ* 259.1-2, 25-26.

⁸ Re: movement as intrinsically time-forming: In discussing the temporality of delectatio at S.T. 1.2.31.2, c. Thomas Aquinas makes it clear that entities that have their being as becoming are intrinsically and materially temporal (in tempore secundum se) insofar as (a) time is the measure of successive states (numerus successivorum) and (b) succession is essential to these entities (de quorum ratione est successio). He contrasts such materially-intrinsically temporal entities with entities that are in time (a) *only formally*, insofar as the numerus is extrinsic to the successio (the intellect divides up and numbers successive states and then compares them to some standard or "primus motus" like the sun); and/or (b) *only accidentally*, as when an entity does not have succession as part of its ratio but nonetheless is "subject to changeable causes" (subiacet causis transmutabilibus).

It is interesting to note that, as examples of intrinsically temporal phenomena Thomas offers: "motus, quies, locutio [language!]," whereas the one example he gives of something that is in motion only "per aliud, et quasi per accidens"—is "esse hominem" since, he says, "to be human does not have succession of its essence, and thus is not movement but rather is the term of a movement or change, specifically that of its own generation" (de sui ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius).

The way Thomas puts this matter in his commentary on the *Sentences* (*In II Sententiarum*, 2, 1, 2, c. and ad 1 [Parma VI, 404b-405a]) is to note that (a) time is the mensura variationis; that (b) the mensura may be either intrinsic or extrinsic; and (c) in the one instance it is in the measured: "quaedam intrinseca,

your ontological movement entails (i) being present to yourself and to things-in-their-being (ii) by being the mortal becoming that you "already" are.

Heidegger calls this "temporality." It constitutes the distensive structure of human becoming, which in turn makes possible—and necessary—the discursive structure of human activity. Temporality clears and holds open the field for discursive meaning; in fact it is the clearing.⁹

3.

Disappearance and Dispensation: As with all movement, so too analogously with distention or temporality, its essence, what makes it be the finite becoming it is, is the dimension of its intrinsic (but relative) non-appearance or dis-appearance—metaphorically its "hiding"—which Heidegger calls "the mystery" (*das Geheimnis*).¹⁰

This intrinsic non-appearance, however, is not "just nothing"; as in all movement, the absence is positive and productive. As relatively absent, the non-appearance makes possible finite appearance, while remaining itself ever absent. Given its absence, we might cross out this non-appearance lest it get hypostasized:

it-gives being
it-dispenses being (compare *Geschick*, *Schickungen*)
it-makes-possible-the appearance of things as-this-or-that.

And it does so in various "epochal" forms that constitute the "history," i.e., the historical dispensations, of being. Distention, as disappearing, dispenses discursive appearance, namely, "being" taken as the many ways in which and as which things can appear in human experience.

By clearing and sustaining the field of discursiveness, distention

quae est in mensurato sicut accidens in subjecto."

⁹ See SZ 133.5, 351.5-6; GA 9, 325.20-21; GA 65, #143, 263.28-29. But see GA 49, 60.23-27.

¹⁰ [a] See GA 9, 195.23: "das vergessene Geheimnis des Daseins." GA 65, #168, 293.9: "Der Entzug aber ist des Da-seins."

[b] Re: hiding; Perhaps it is better to speak of an "intrinsically concealed" dimension rather than (the anthropomorphized) "self-concealing"/"self-concealed." In any case, the intrinsic concealment is only relative, not absolute and entire, for [a] if it were fully "self"-concealed, there would be no *Schickung*, and no anticipation by *Dasein*, only a black hole whence no light shines, hypostasized into a "negative entity"; and [b] if it were fully present, there would be no more movement, only a Hegelian *Aufhebung* and *Versöhnung*. Therefore, relative intrinsic concealment (i.e., un-concealedness) gives appearance.

makes possible "appearance-as." Distention, in turn, is made possible by its own disappearance. So: distention as disappearance makes possible discursiveness as appearance. Both are intrinsically finite, the one as inevitably disappearing, the other as ineluctably discursive.

To name this distention or temporality—the disappearing-dispensing act that clears the field for appearance-as—Heidegger employs the Greek words *alētheia* and *physis*, both of which he interprets as distention's "presence-by-absence" or "appearance-by-disappearance." This *alētheia* refers primarily to (1) the distention of *Dasein*, the very opening up or happening of the clearing in conjunction with one's finitude and mortality; which clearing, in turn, (2) makes possible the discursive appearance of entities-in-their-being. This is the difference between ontological and ontic "truth"/disclosure.

The heart of the matter—the topic of Heidegger's thought—is this dispensation-by-disappearance. This unique movement is of the human essence, neither reducible to nor caused by individual human beings nor able to occur without them. It is what one already is and yet needs to become.

4.

Dislocation: As intrinsically disappearing, the dispensing is readily overlooked and forgotten. Thus, one can easily go about the business of using and understanding things-in-their-being—in working, playing, doing philosophy—while forgetting the disappearing act that makes it all possible. Just as, in order to represent non-appearance, we used a cross-out (*it*), so likewise, in order to represent the overlooking or forgottenness of it, we may bracket (see *epechō*, *epochē*) the non-appearing dispensing that is responsible for the various "epochs" of the dispensations or "history" of being (*Seinsgeschicke*, *Seinsgeschichte*). Thus: [it dispenses] the epochal dispensations of being.

This bracketing/oblivion, which Heidegger sometimes calls "errance" (*Irre*), is hardly a forgetfulness of being; if anything, it insists on being and on its correlate, the subject. Rather, it is a forgetfulness of the disappearing-dispensing *clearing* of and for being. As such, it is a radical dis-location (see *atopon*),¹¹ the forgetting of the locus of being (one's essence) and the substitution of something else for it.

Today, according to Heidegger, the game is up, the whole world is out of joint—but not because being has been lost. Quite the contrary. Being has triumphed. The history that runs from classical Greece to

¹¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1178a 3. (Compare VII, 5, 1149a 15.)

today—from theology as the first technology to technology as the last theology—has reached its eschatological fulfillment in nihilism. Being (i.e., presence) has become everything. The absence that dispenses presence has become nothing.

5.

Dénouement: Yet, reappropriating that absence is always possible, because one always already *is* it. Whether easy or not, it is simply a matter of retracing and recovering the ontological movement that one “already” is.

This would entail an end to the bracketing/overlooking of what dispenses the epochs of discursiveness. With the brackets off, the dispensing does not change its nature and come into appearance but, rather, is recognized *as* intrinsically non-appearing.

from:

to:

[it dispenses]

it dispenses

the possibility of appearance-as the possibility of appearance-as

The result: one might then shift one’s focus from the dispensed to the dispensing, and might appropriate the latter. That is, one might begin to understand one’s own essence *not primarily* in terms of its relation to being—taken as the product of dispensation in the various historical-epocal forms (the “history of being”: metaphysics)—but, rather, in terms of one’s always-already-operative relation to the heretofore overlooked dispensing itself, now understood *as* disappearing and as the place of one’s own being.

II: ARISTOTLE

1.

Temporality: There is no doubt that it is difficult business translating Heidegger’s definition of *Zeitlichkeit* (“temporality”). The very compact phrase that defines this essential structure of Dasein’s being reads: “*gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft*” (SZ 326.21-22). I suggest that

this means:

gewesend: one’s “always-already-operative” (i.e., essential)...

Zukunft: finite, mortal becoming,

gegenwärtigend: which dispenses one’s presence (or present moment) as the possibility of having oneself and other entities present-in-being.

Or in the reverse, and with emphasis on authenticity:

The proper (i.e., befitting-one’s-essence) way to have oneself and other entities present-in-being, is to do so in terms of

one’s always-already-operative being-onto-one’s-*telos*.

Clearly, the major problem is how to translate *gewesend* or its cognates *das Gewesen* and *die Gewesenheit*. The received translations use variations on the present perfect participial form “having been.” The Macquarrie-Robinson version of SZ renders *gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft* as “a future which makes present in the process of having been” (BT 374.11-12), and Joan Stambaugh repeats the definition in her forthcoming retranslation (merely changing “which” to “that”). These readings are entirely misleading. Heidegger himself frequently warned against using any notion of the “past” (*Vergangenheit*—and that includes the present perfect) to translate *das Gewesen* or *die Gewesenheit* with regard to *Zeitlichkeit*. In the very paragraph where he introduces the word *Gewesen*, he explicitly interprets it in terms of Aristotle’s *ti ēn einai*, which has nothing to do with either past time or the present perfect tense. A clue to what *das Gewesen* means and how one might translate it can be found in Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, 6 and 8.

2.

Metaphysics IX, 6, 1048b 18-34:¹² Within the field of “doing” in the broadest sense, Aristotle distinguishes between (1) those doings that have their fulfillment within themselves (*enhyparchei to telos*, 1048b 22-23) and thus are *praxeis* in the proper sense of the term; and (2) those

¹²This section of the Greek is not present in the Latin version that Thomas Aquinas used, and so receives no comment in his *In Metaphysicam* IX, I. V. The Parma edition of the *Opera Omnia* provides a Latin translation at XX, 538b.

that do not have such a *telos* and so are not *praxeis* in the proper sense.¹³

The example that Aristotle puts forth—exercising in order to lose weight (1048b 18-22)—might at first seem (both intuitively and from the very look of the Greek word) to have the *telos* as intrinsic to the doing and thus to be an instance of *praxis/enactment*. Thinning down (*to ischnainein*) has thinness (*hē ischnasia*) as its purpose and goal. More or less the same body, virtually the same word: Isn't thinning down an "enactment" of thinness? Not so, says Aristotle. Consider the following paraphrase:

1048b 18-22

[Principle:]	Any doing that has a point where it must stop does not have its <i>telos</i> [within itself]	18
	but is for the sake of a <i>telos</i> [outside itself].	19
[Example:]	For example, [the <i>telos</i>] of thinning down is thinness [itself]. ¹⁴	
[Application:]	The body, ¹⁵ when it is in the process of thinning down, is in movement in such a way that it is not yet that for the sake of which the movement is taking place. ¹⁶	21
[Conclusions:]	This kind [of doing] is not a <i>praxis</i> at least not a complete-and-perfect one [<i>teleia</i>]	22
	because there is no <i>telos</i> [inherent in the doing].	

¹³I provisionally translate *praxis*, insofar as it is an *energeia*, as "enactment," not in the sense of "acting something out" (a dramatic representation or the like) but rather, "putting into act." An argument against this usage is that the "act" of "enactment" misses the sense of "appearance" that *ergon* has for Heidegger (see below). An argument in favor is that it seems Heidegger, in another context, is edging towards something like "enactment" with his "*Ins-Werk-setzen*." See GA 5, 22 and 70. N.B.: The *poiēsis* mentioned at GA 5, 70 n. "a" does not have its Aristotelian meaning (*poiēsis* in contrast to *praxis*) but rather the pre-Aristotelian and generalized sense of "Ins-Werk-Bringen, Hervor-bringen," etc.

¹⁴The divergence here of Ross (II, 253) from Bonitz is well known. Ross translates *hē ischnasia* here (dubiously, I think) as "fat-removal" and follows Bywater's emendation of the Greek to the effect: "...for example, thinning down or thinness [where there is no *telos*]." Jaeger, *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), sides with Bywater (and implicitly Ross), but brackets out both *hē ischnasia* and *auto* and notes: "oratio est admodum dura et obscura et in libris corrupta." In any case, I take *hē ischnasia*, "thinness," as a *hexis* here, not as a *kinēsis* ("thinning") as at 1048b 29. Like the Latina recens ("velut emaciandi ipse finis est emaciatio"), Apostle, and others, I follow Bonitz.

¹⁵Aristotle uses the plural (*auta*, "the parts of the body") for the entity both as going through the exercise program and as the goal of it. Hence the plurals at 21: *hyparchonta* and *hōn*.

¹⁶Or perhaps: "...is in movement in such a way that [the desired body] that is the goal and purpose of the movement is not [yet] present."

True, it is the same entity that begins the exercise program as an overweight body and finishes it as a thinner one. However, (1) during the regimen, the thinned-down body that is the desired goal and purpose of the movement is not actually present (*mē hyparchonta hōn heneka hē kinēsis*); and (2) the movement does not persist when the *telos* is attained; rather, once the thinned-down body is achieved, the movement stops.¹⁷ Therefore, says Aristotle, the movement of the body as it loses weight is not a *praxis*. It *aims* at thinness but does not *enact* it.¹⁸

By inverting this negative example, we can derive two positive criteria for a true *praxis*: (1) The *telos* must be present, and inhere (*enhyparchei*), in the process (1048b 22-23), such that (2) the movement, as always enacting the *telos*, does not have to cease with the attainment of the *telos* (1048b 26-27).

The principles are fine, but the examples that Aristotle gives, both positive and negative, seem counterintuitive. Consider the following:

1048b 22-27

[Principle no. 1:]	But that [doing] in which the end inheres is a <i>praxis/enactment</i> .	22
[Positive examples:]	For example, at one and the same time one is seeing and has seen, one is understanding and has understood, one is intuiting and has intuited.	23
[Negative examples:]	but not that [at one and the same time] one is learning and has learned, ¹⁹ one is getting well and has gotten well.	24
[Positive examples:]	At one and the same time	25

¹⁷See *edei an pote pauesthai* (1048b 26-27) and perhaps *hōn esti peras* at 18. The Latina recens renders the latter (dubiously, I believe) as "quarum est aliquod extremum" (Aquinas, *Omnia Opera*: Parma XX, 538b). I think it should be "quarum est aliquis terminus."

¹⁸It may seem that Aristotle hedges when he adds *ē ou teleia ge* at 1048b 21-22, but I do not think so. He means: it is, of course, a *praxis* in the broad sense of an "activity" or "doing" (see the generic *tōn praxeōn* at 1048b 18), but it is not a *praxis* properly speaking, namely "one that is fulfilled in the very doing [*teleia*]"—because there is no *telos* [present here]."

¹⁹The present perfect form *memathēka* means "I know [insofar as I have learned]." Hence, this sentence has the meaning of, "One is learning and already knows."

	one is living well and has lived well one is happy and has been happy.	
[Principle no. 2]	Otherwise, it would have been necessary [for the process] to stop at a certain point, as when one is thinning down.	26
[Proof of no. 2:]	But not so in these cases: we are living and have lived.	27

Aristotle's two principles may be plain enough, but do his examples work? Say you now understand how to use the Internet. Does that mean you understood it before? Or does the fact that you are now seeing Siena for the first time mean that you have already seen it at an earlier time? Does the fact that you finally found a job and are now living well, entail that you have already lived well before this? Clearly not; and clearly that is not Aristotle's meaning in this passage, as he shows in the very next lines, which interpret the above according to the distinction of *kinēsis* ("movement-towards" or "being-on-the-way-to") and *energeia* ("already being in/with the *telos*").

	1048b 28-34	
[Thesis:]	Of these, some must be called <i>kinēseis</i> , the others <i>energeiai</i> .	28
	A. <i>Kinēseis</i>	
[Principle:]	Every <i>kinēsis</i> is <i>ateleis</i> : [i.e., does not have its <i>telos</i> immanent to the doing:]	29
[Examples:]	thinning down learning something walking to a destination building a house.	
[Judgment:]	These are <i>kinēseis</i> , i.e., they are certainly <i>ateleis</i> .	30
[Proof:]	For it is not the case that at one and the same time one is walking to a destination and has walked there one is building a house and has built it one is becoming something and has become it one is being moved and has been moved.	31
	And the following cases are mutually exclusive: one is moving something; one has moved it.	32

B. *Energeiai*

[Presumed:]	[Every <i>energeia</i> is <i>teleia</i> , i.e., has the <i>telos</i> immanent to the doing].	
[Examples:]	But the following are the same at one and the same time: one has seen and is seeing one is intuiting and has intuited.	33
[Conclusion:]	I declare the latter to be <i>energeia</i> , the former to be <i>kinēsis</i> .	34

Aristotle's topic here is what constitutes a true and proper (i.e., "complete" or "perfect": 1048b 22) *praxis*/enactment and how it differs from both an imperfect *praxis* (b 21-22) and any kind of *poiēsis*. A "perfect" *praxis*:

1. is a doing whose *telos* inheres in the very doing rather than being a separate product produced by the doing.
2. Thus the doing is an end in itself.
3. Therefore, the doing need not cease when the *telos* is attained—because the *telos* is attained in and at each moment of the doing, however short or long the doing might be.

By contrast, an imperfect *praxis*—like doing the process called "thinning-down-to-140-pounds"—must cease (as that specific deed) once you have reached 140 pounds; and likewise your building of a house ceases once you produce the *telos*, the house you contracted to build.

By using the "present perfect" tense²⁰ in his examples, what Aristotle

²⁰The classical Greeks called past time *ho chronos parelthōn* (from *para* + *erchomai*, go by, pass by). By Hellenistic times Dionysius Thrax (ca. 170-90 B.C.) called the past tense in general *ho chronos parelēlythōs* (from the present perfect of the same verb), and specifically called the "present perfect" tense to *parakeimenon* or *ho chronos parakeimenos*, "the [past time] lying close by," the "recent [past] tense." See *Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica*, ed. Gustav Uhlig, in *Grammatici Graeci*, I, i, (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1883; reprinted, Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1965), 53. E.T. by Alan Kemp, "The TEKHNE GRAMMATIKĒ of Dionysius Thrax" in Daniel J. Taylor, ed., *The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period*, (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1987), 170-89, here, p. 181. It is only with the Byzantine grammarian Stephanus (before A.D. 700) that one can document that this "recent past tense" was called the "present perfect": *enestōs syntelikos*: *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam* (n. 20): *Scholia Vaticana* §13, in *Grammatici Graeci*, I, iii,

is affirming about a perfect *praxis*—and what he is denying of both imperfect *praxis* and all *poiēsis*—is the doing's condition of being *teleia*, i.e., its condition of enacting (realizing, fulfilling) the *telos* of the deed in the mere doing of the deed. Therefore, Aristotle's use of the present perfect tense (*heōrake*, *pephronēke*, *nenōēke*, etc.) is not indicative that something "is as having been" or "is as in the process of having been." Rather, it indicates that the doing enacts its *telos* and therefore has that *telos* immanent, such that there is an equivalence—expressed by the word *hama*, "at one and the same time"—between (1) doing and (2) being in the *telos* of the doing. Using time words (but using them only metaphorically; see below), we may express this as the condition of "always-already" having the fulfillment or wholeness present and operative within the doing.²¹

3.

Metaphysics IX, 8: Aristotle confirms and deepens his notion of the telic-ness of enactment at *Metaphysics* IX, 8, 1050a 23 - b 2. In the context of discussing how *energeia* is "prior" to *dynamis* not just in *logos* and *chronos* but especially in *ousia*, Aristotle returns to the distinction between *poiēsis* and *praxis*.²²

Both these kinds of doing are seen as "bringing something about"²³ in the sense of letting it come into appearance (*eidos*, 1050b 1). Aristotle reads this letting-come-about in terms of *energeia* and *entelecheia* (1050a 21-23). These terms, along with their roots *ergon* and *telos*, point not to "act" or "activity" but to the appearance of something as *what-and-how-it-is*, and to the bringing about of that. In Heidegger's telling, for the Greeks a thing *is* to the degree that it *appears*²⁴ (to which he would add: "even if—and in some cases, especially if—it appears as not appearing"). Thus, whatever appearance a thing has *is* the thing as *ergon* or

p. 251.4.

²¹ Gilbert Ryle misses the point of *Metaphysics* IX, 6, 1048b 23 (*horai hama kai heōrake*) when he writes: "Aristotle points out, quite correctly (*Met.* IX, vi. 7-10) that I can say 'I have seen it' as soon as I can say 'I see it.'" *Dilemmas: The Tonner Lectures, 1953* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1954), 102. His reference ("vi. 7-10") indicates he may not have been using his left Loeb; perhaps that is why he does not engage the issue of "Aristotelian aspect." For Heidegger's remark on the passage, see GA 9, 284.

²² See *Metaphysics* V, 11, for various sense of "prior" and "posterior," the last of which is *kata physin kai ousian*, 1019a 2-3.

²³ See *gignetai* and *ginomenon* at 1050a 25, 26, 30, etc. At GA 9, 303 Heidegger remarks on this under the rubric of "Vollbringen."

²⁴ See *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 2, 1173a 1-2, and GA 40, 108: "Sein heißt [den Griechen] Erscheinen."

telos; and the coming-into or being-in such *ergon/eidos/telos* is the thing's *energeia* or *entelecheia*.

The question is: For Aristotle, what kinds of letting-come-into-appearance are the doings that are called *poiēsis* and *praxis*? (See Appendix I for a paraphrase of the text.)

A. *Poiēsis*: *Poiēsis*/production is characterized by the fact that what it allows to emerge into appearance is not only its own doing (the *chrēsis* or "exercise" of its faculty: 1050a 24, 30) but a product as well (*heteron ti*, 1050a 30). Since the producing of the product is the essential moment of this doing, it follows that:

1. *poiēsis* has its *telos* outside itself: it exists to let a product come into appearance;
2. and since *poiēsis* is the *allowing* of something to come into appearance, the actual *coming-into-appearance* is in the thing being produced: *hē energeia en tōi poioumenōi estin* (1050a 31).

What could this second point mean? If nothing else, it shows why *energeia* cannot mean an "activity" such as nailing boards or laying brick. For surely it is the carpenter and the bricklayer who are building the house, and certainly their productive activities are *in them*. (When they don't show up for work, the house doesn't get built.)

The *energeia* (the coming-into-appearance) that defines the laborers' activity as a *poiēsis* (as a *letting-come-into* appearance), however, comes into its fulfillment not primarily in the laborers but in the coming-into-appearance of the house: *hē energeia en tōi poioumenōi estin*. (Aristotle makes the point in the *Physics* III, 3: see Appendix II.) The coming-into-the-appearance of the moved (the house) is the goal and purpose that gives the building-activity its meaning, its coming-into-appearance as a *letting-come-into-appearance*. Therefore:

3. *poiēsis*, as a *letting-come-into-appearance*, necessarily ceases once the product itself has come into appearance.

B. *Praxis*: *Praxis*/enactment, on the other hand, brings into appearance nothing other than itself. It is the exercise of its own "faculty"—for example, seeing as the exercise of sight. Therefore, the exercise itself is the *ergon* and *telos*, the fulfillment-that-appears: *eschaton hē chrēsis*, 1050a 24. This coming-into-appearance of itself—and of no product besides—is what defines a *praxis*. "As regards doings where there is no other *ergon* besides the *energeia*, the *energeia* [and hence the *telos*] is present in and inheres in the doings themselves." (1050a 34-35). As

examples Aristotle gives: The *telos* of seeing is in the one who is now seeing; the *telos* of seeing-the-unchanging is in the one who is now seeing-the-unchanging. And the *telos* of life is in Dasein (*hē zōē en tēi psychēi*, 1050a 36 - b 1), to which we might add that Dasein appropriates that life by personally enacting dying: *epitēdeuesthai apothnēiskein* (cf. *Phaedo* 64A).

Aristotle's conclusion: "Thus it is clear that the being—and so the appearance—of a thing consists in the thing's being-in-its-*telos*" (*hē ousia kai to eidos energeia estin*, 1050b 2-3).

This *telos* is the essence of the thing, *to ti ēn einai*, that which is *proteron tēi physei* ("prior in being"). It must always be presupposed as the necessary, as what an entity "needs" ("needs to turn to": Heidegger's idiosyncratic reading of *Notwendigkeit*, "necessity") in order to be. We could perhaps use temporal metaphors (while remembering they are metaphors) to describe this essential necessity: it is that which "always already has been operative," what "always was," what "always already is," "prior" to the individuals who instantiate it.

Heidegger mentions this apriority at SZ 85.17 when he says that "ein apriorisches Perfekt"—a present perfect tense with apriori aspect—characterizes the very being of Dasein. In a marginal note (GA 2, 114) he glosses the phrase with a concatenation of temporal metaphors: *vorgängig*; *a priori*; *proteron tēi physei* and *to ti ēn einai* rendered variously as *das jeweils schon voraus Wesende*, *das Gewesen*, *das Perfekt*, and *das jeweils Frühere*. Let all these phrases ride (provisionally and no doubt inadequately) under the rubric of the ontological "already"—not that which *has been* and still *is*, but that which at any given moment is always "prior" and essential, beyond our determination, always already operative and determining us.²⁵ The essentialist the "perfect" in the sense of the *per-factum* or *teleion*, namely, that which is "already" in its *telos* and which affects us from there as always already "at work" (*ins-Werk-gesetzt*). These are the meanings Heidegger tries to squeeze out of the various forms of *gewesen* that he uses with regard to *Zeitlichkeit*.

4.

How is one to employ what is laid out above in interpreting Heidegger's definition of "temporality"? One way would be to approach the issue through the phenomenon of the verb-aspect of ancient Greek. I have

²⁵ See "...*phya* meint jenes, was einer ursprünglich und eigentlich schon ist: das schon Ge-Wesende...": GA 40, 108.

tried to say a word about that elsewhere.²⁶ In that regard it is clear, I think, that in the important debate over verb types, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos' classic "Events, Processes, and States" has definitively advanced the discussion far beyond the earlier work of Zeno Vendler and Anthony Kenny, and that one of the essay's major threshold achievements is to have simply recognized the problem in terms of verbal aspect.²⁷ Nonetheless, Heidegger's problematic of the "ontological already," which only begins to peek through the texts analyzed above (and then only at the existentiell level), cannot, I think, be finally and entirely encompassed within the linguistic questions relating to aspect, not even within the terms of Mourelatos' "ontological" approach to "events."

Aristotle's analyses in *Metaphysics*, IX, 6 and 8 remain at the level of particular, specific, everyday acts—seeing, understanding, intuit-

²⁶ "Heidegger's New Aspect: On *In-Sein*, *Zeitlichkeit*, and *The Genesis of Being and Time*," forthcoming in *Research in Phenomenology*. The best work in English on aspect is Robert I. Binnick, *Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), far surpassing Bernard Comrie's (still useful) *Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). For aspect in ancient Greek see K. L. McKay, *Greek Grammar for Students: A Concise Grammar of Classical Attic with Special Reference to Aspect in the Verb* (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1974), 214-24; and Hardy Hansen and Gerald M. Quinn, *Greek, An Intensive Course: Preliminary Edition* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980), Unit 2.1, 3(b). For Heidegger's hints about aspect, see GA 2, 114, n. "a," and 462.6; also GA 15, 296.25-30.

²⁷ Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, "Events, Processes, and States," in *Linguistics and Philosophy* 2 (1978): 415-34, in response to Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 172 ff. (see 173, n. 2 for Kenny's correlation of his verb types with Aristotelian distinctions; also, the chart below), and Zeno Vendler, *Linguistics in Philosophy*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), esp. ch. 4 (with minor changes = his "Verbs and Times," *Philosophical Review*, 66 [1957], 143-60). Using the non-aspectual framework of Kenny (combined with Vendler) and embedding it within just the formal framework of Mourelatos, we can schematize the issues of *Metaphysics* IX, 6 and 8 as follows. [K = Kenny, M = Mourelatos, S = my own suggestions].

SITUATION

[as the broadest, most neutral term]

<i>hexis</i> : state	<i>energeia</i>
<i>energein</i> or <i>prattein</i> : broad sense [M: occurrence, S: doing]	
<i>praxis</i> : proper sense [K: activity, M: process, S: enactment]	<i>energeia</i>
<i>kinēsis</i> [K: performance; M: event; S: movement-toward]	<i>kinēsis</i>
[unnamed]: punctual achievement [starts/stops, etc.]	<i>kinēsis</i>
<i>poiēsis</i> : developing accomplishment [S: production]	<i>kinēsis</i>

In this aspect-neutral framework, what defines a *praxis* in the proper sense (K: activity, S: enactment) is its intrinsic completeness and its homogeneity: the fact that the action is realized as soon as it is begun as well as at any moment in the process.

ing—and their structure as *praxis*. This level is what Heidegger calls the existentiell—and, to be sure, it includes one of the most important *praxeis* of all: resolution (SZ 300.30). In defining the ontological structure of temporality, however, Heidegger, while drawing on these analyses, drops them down a register to what he calls the existential-ontological, the level of the essence of the human. There Heidegger uses Aristotle's work *kat' analogian*, that is, as an important analogy for clarifying and articulating his own quite different notion of "ontological aspect" (see *er-aüßen*: ID 24).

Sein und Zeit operates at two levels: (1) at the existential level of one's essence, *Gewesenheit* is ontological "alreadiness," one's "always-already-operative" mortal finitude, and temporality is the existential-ontological enactment of that finitude; (2) At the existentiell level, resolution means choosing to have oneself and other entities present-in-being in terms of this "always-already-operative" ontological enactment. In short, *das Gewesen* not only lies beyond ordinary time (and especially the present perfect tense) and not only comes from an experience beyond the issue of complete and incomplete activity and other aspectual features of verbs, but also forces a radical redefinition of "time" and "temporality."

That, however, is a matter for another venue. For now, we can conclude that the present perfect's "is as having been"—while it may have a role to play in Heidegger's treatment of historicity—is entirely misleading with regard to Heidegger's understanding of temporality and therefore should be dropped.

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Appendix I:

A paraphrase of *Metaphysics* IX 8, 1050a 23 - b 2

In some cases	23
the doing [<i>chrēsis</i> : exercise of the faculty] is what is ultimate:	
e.g., the <i>ergon</i> of sight is the seeing,	24
and nothing besides this is brought into appearance by sight.	25
In other cases	
something else is brought into being/appearance:	26
e.g., the art of building [<i>oikodomētikē technē</i>] brings into appearance	
not just the doing-of-building [<i>oikodomēsis</i>]	
but also a house.	
In both cases there is a <i>telos</i> :	27
In the first case	
the doing is its own <i>telos</i> .	
In the second case, even though the doing is not its own <i>telos</i> ,	
the doing-of-building [<i>oikodomēsis</i>] is more of a <i>telos</i> ,	28
than is the ability-to-build [= <i>oikodomētikē technē</i> .]	
And the doing-of-building [<i>oikodomēsis</i>] -- as an <i>energeia</i> --	
is in the thing being built [the <i>oikodomoumenon</i>];	
that is, the doing-of-building, at one and the same time,	
(a) comes into appearance itself and	
(b) and is in-and-with the house.	
The second set are doings where	
not only the doing-of-the-doing [<i>chrēsis</i>]	30
but something else besides	
comes into appearance.	
In them, the <i>energeia</i> is in the thing-being-produced:	31
for example: the <i>oikodomēsis</i> as an <i>energeia</i>	
is in the <i>oikodomoumenon</i> ,	
the weaving as an <i>energeia</i>	
is in the cloth being woven.	
Likewise with other instances:	
in general, movement is in the thing moved.	33
In the first set of doings	
no other <i>ergon</i> is brought-into-being	34
besides the state-of-being-in-being [<i>energeia</i>].	

In them, the *energeia* inheres in the doing; 35
 for example: the seeing is in the one doing the seeing, 36
 the contemplating is in the one doing the contemplating,
 life is in the *psychē*, and b 1
 happiness is in the *psychē* too,
 because happiness is a kind of life.

Thus it is clear that 2
 the being -- and so the appearance -- of a thing
 consists in the thing's being-in-its-*ergon/telos*.

Appendix II

A paraphrase of *Physics* III, 3, 202a 13-18

202a
 Movement is in the moved, 13
 because movement, 14
 whereas it is brought about a mover,
 is the coming-into-*telos* of the moved.
 15
 But the coming-into-appearance of the mover
 is not different [except in *logos*]
 [from the coming-into-appearance of the moved].
 16
 Rather, movement has to be
 the coming-into-*telos* of both.
 A mover is that which
 (a) is *able* to move something, 17
 (b) comes to its own fulfillment when *actually* moving something.
 But (b) consists in allowing the moved to come to *its* fulfillment.
 18
 Therefore, there is one *energeia* for both alike.

Heidegger and Aristotle's Treatise on Time

by Michael T. Ka

In his outline of *Being and Time*, Heidegger promises an analysis of Aristotle's essay on time "as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology."¹ This treatise would have been the Third Division of Part Two. *Being and Time*, incomplete, does not contain this division. It does refer to the Aristotelian conception of time at different points in the text, most notably §81, but this lacks the full dimension Heidegger intended to give to his reading of the fourth book of the *Physics*.

Heidegger does however offer an interpretation of Aristotle's treatise on time in his lecture course of 1927, which has been published as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. In this paper, we will examine Heidegger's reading of the *Physics*, Book 4.10-14 in relation to its importance to his problematic. The questions guiding our investigation will be: (i) Why does Heidegger find it necessary to set out the Aristotelian conception of time as a propaedeutic to his own examination of the phenomenon? (ii) What does Heidegger find in Aristotle's essay and how does he appropriate it? (iii) What bearing does Heidegger's exposition of Aristotle have upon the larger issue of fundamental ontology and the question of temporality?

These are of course large questions to which much study could be devoted. In order to make some approach towards answering them, let us propose here the modest task of following Heidegger through one section of the *Basic Problems* text. In §19, Heidegger offers his explicit interpretation of the Aristotelian treatise.² We will abstract from the questions

¹ "... als Diskriminierung der phänomenalen Basis und der Grenzen der antiken Ontologie." *Sein und Zeit*, Twelfth Edition, Max Niemeyer, 1972, S. 40. The translation used is: *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 64.

² For an alternate reading of this same passage, see Charles Scott, *The Question*