


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## Choosing One's Fate: A Re-Reading of *Sein und Zeit* §74

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In this article we present (1) a close paraphrase—virtually a translation—of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, §74, "Die Grundverfassung der Geschichtlichkeit," pp. 382–87, together with an analytical outline found in the Appendix; and (2) a brief commentary on the text. What Heidegger says about his own translation of Aristotle's *Physics B 1* applies here as well: "The 'translation' is already the interpretation proper. Thereafter only an *explanation* of the 'translation' is called for."<sup>1</sup>

Our rendering of §74 is hardly uncontroversial and will not please everyone. It is offered, rather, in the interest of reawakening questions about this crucial section of *SZ*. We welcome any suggestions and criticisms that will improve or correct that effort.

The commentary in Part II presents a justification for some of the key terms used in the paraphrase. Our rendering of the following terms differs markedly from the existing English translations:

- *Dasein* as "openness" and *das Da* as the "open"
- *überliefern* as "to free up" (cf. *Der Satz vom Grund*, 171.7–10)
- *Zukunft/Auf-sich-zukommen*, as "becoming" (cf. *SZ*, 325.29–30 and 199.15)
- *Gewesen* as "already" and *Gewesenheit* as "alreadiness" (cf. *GA 2*: 114.26–36)
- *Schuldigsein* as "lack-in-being" (cf. *SZ*, 282.26, etc.)
- *sich entwerfen auf* as "to understand oneself in terms of" (cf. *SZ*, 306.7–8, etc.)
- *Geschichtlichkeit* as "historicalness" and *Geschehen* as "occurrence"
- *Seinkönnen* as "ability-to-be"
- *faktisch* as "specific" or "in its specificity"

*Part I*  
*A Close Paraphrase*

Being and Time

§74: *The Basic Structure of Historicalness*

INTRODUCTION

*The topic*

Openness, in its specificity, always has its "history," and *can* have it, because the very being of this entity is constituted by historicalness. This thesis needs to be justified, with the aim of explaining the *ontological* problem of history as an *existential* one.

We defined the being of openness as care, and care is grounded in temporality. So we must search within temporality for the occurrence that determines existence as historical. Ultimately, therefore, interpreting the historicalness of openness will simply mean spelling out temporality more concretely.

We first uncovered temporality with regard to that mode of authentic existing called "anticipatory resolution." To what extent does resolve entail an authentic occurrence of openness?

*Resolution (1) takes over mortality and (2) decides about the situation.*

We defined "resolution" as silently and dreadfully understanding oneself in terms of one's own lack-in-being.<sup>2</sup> The *authenticity* of resolution comes from its being *anticipatory*.<sup>3</sup> In resolution, openness understands itself in terms of its ability-to-be, to such a degree that it goes right into the teeth of death in order to take over wholly, in its thrownness, the entity that it itself is.

But resolutely taking over one's own specific "open" entails, at the same time, resolve with regard to one's situation. In principle, however, an existential analysis cannot discuss what openness decides *specifically* in any given case. The present investigation is unable to give even an existential sketch of the specific possibilities of existence. Nonetheless, we must ask about the source from which *in general* openness draws the possibilities through which it specifically understands itself.

*The source of specific authentic possibilities*

An anticipatory understanding of oneself in terms of the inevitable possibility of existence (death) only guarantees the wholeness and authenticity of resolution. But the specific disclosed possibilities of existence cannot be drawn from

death, especially since anticipating that possibility entails actually returning to one's specific "open" rather than merely speculating about death.

Could it be, then, that taking over the thrownness of the self into its world might disclose a horizon from which existence draws its specific possibilities? As we said before, openness can never get out of its thrownness.<sup>4</sup> But before deciding too quickly whether openness draws its authentic possibilities of existence from thrownness, we must first make sure that we have a full conception of this basic determinant of care.

*Thrownness provides the possibilities from which resolution chooses.*

As thrown, openness is delivered over to itself and to its ability-to-be—but as *being-in-a-world*. As thrown, openness is submitted to a "world" and exists, in its specificity, with others. Usually the self is lost in "everyone." It understands itself in terms of the possibilities of existence that circulate in the current "normal" and public interpretation of openness. Ambiguity has mostly rendered these possibilities unrecognizable, and yet they are quite familiar. An authentic existential understanding does not escape from this received interpretation; on the contrary, in the act of resolve, when it chooses a possibility, it always grasps that possibility *from* this received interpretation, and then *against* it, and then again *for* it.

#### 1.

#### RESOLUTION AND THROWNNESS:

#### FREEING UP INHERITED POSSIBILITIES

*Resolution frees up concrete possibilities inherited through thrownness.*

Resolution, whereby openness returns to itself, opens up one's current, specific possibilities for authentic existence *from out of the heritage* that resolution, as thrown, *takes over*. The resolute return to one's thrownness entails *freeing up for oneself* those inherited possibilities, although not necessarily *as* inherited. Granted that everything "good" is our heritage and that the nature of "the good" is to make authentic existence possible, the actual freeing up of a heritage takes place in resolution.

*Authentic historicalness is "choosing one's fate."*

The more authentically openness resolves—i.e., unambiguously anticipates death and thus understands itself through its most proper and distinctive possibility—the more clearly and deliberately will it discover and choose the possibility of its existence. Anticipating death is the only way to dispel all accidental and "provisional" possibilities. Only being free *for* death gives openness its goal outright, i.e., pushes existence into its finitude.

Once grasped, the finitude of existence snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of easily available possibilities—taking it easy, treating things lightly, shirking responsibility—and brings openness to the simplicity of “choosing its fate.” This is our term for the originary occurrence of openness, enacted in authentic resolution, whereby openness, *frees* itself for itself: (a) free *for* its own death (b) *in* a possibility that it has both inherited and chosen.

*Authentic historicalness lets one live authentically within history.*

Openness can be buffeted by the “blows of fate” only because, in the ground of its being, it *is* its fate in the sense described above. When openness as being-in-a-world exists by choosing its fate in self-freeing resolution, it is opened up to encountering both fortunate circumstances and terrible accidents. One’s fate does not first arise from the clash of events and circumstances. The unresolved are also knocked about by such things (even more than those who have chosen), and yet they are unable to “have” their fate.

*Resolution (the superior power of accepting mortality) takes over thrownness.*

By anticipating death, openness allows death to grow powerful within it. But in so doing, openness, as free for death, understands itself in terms of the “superior power” of its own finite freedom. This freedom “is” only in the act of making this choice, but it enables openness to take over the *powerlessness* of being abandoned to itself, and to get clear on the contingencies of the situation that is now opened up.

*Because openness is always co-openness, historicalness is always co-historicalness.*

But in choosing its fate, openness as being-in-a-world exists essentially as co-being with others. Thus its occurrence is always a co-occurrence, which we define as “co-choosing a fate.” This is how we designate the occurrence of a community or of a people. Such a co-chosen fate is not cobbled together out of individually chosen fates, any more than communal being can be conceived as a mere jumble of various subjects.<sup>5</sup> Rather, our individually chosen fates are already guided in advance by living communally in the same world and sharing decisions about specific possibilities. The power to co-choose a fate is first opened up only in communication and struggle. The full, authentic occurrence of openness consists in the personal choice of one’s own fate *together with* the communal choice of fate in and with one’s “generation.”<sup>6</sup>

*Authentic temporality is the basis of authentic historicalness.*

“Choosing one’s fate” is the powerless superior power (ever ready for adversity) of silently and dreadfully understanding oneself in terms of one’s own lack-in-being. And the ontological condition of its possibility is the ontolog-

ical structure of care, namely, temporality. Only an entity whose being co-originally comprises death, lack, conscience, freedom, and finitude—the way care does—can exist by “choosing its fate.” That is, only such an entity can be historical in the very ground of its existence.

### *Summary*

#### Temporality:

Openness is essentially (“always-already”) becoming.

#### Historicalness:

Therefore, openness can be authentically historical:

1. free for its death (“shattering against” it);
2. thrown back into its specific openness,
  - a. taking over its own thrownness and
  - b. freeing up an inherited possibility for itself;
3. and thus insightfully present for its times.

#### In short:

Authentic (i.e., finite) temporality makes possible authentic historicalness (i.e., “choosing one’s fate”).<sup>7</sup>

## 2.

### RESOLUTION AS RETRIEVAL:

#### EXPLICITLY FREEING UP INHERITED POSSIBILITIES

*Resolution, when carried out explicitly, is retrieval.*

Resolution need not *explicitly* know the origin of the possibilities in terms of which it understands itself. Nonetheless, the temporality of openness (and it alone) does have the possibility of *explicitly* extracting from the inherited understanding of openness the existentiell ability-to-be in terms of which openness understands itself. When carried out *explicitly*, resolution—the act of returning to and freeing up oneself—becomes the *retrieval* of an inherited possibility of existence.

*Retrieval is the act of explicitly freeing-up*, i.e., explicitly returning to the possibilities found in already-openness. Authentically retrieving an already-present possibility of existence (“choosing one’s heroes”) is made possible existentially by anticipatory resolution: this is where one first makes the liberating choice to struggle with the tradition that one follows and to be faithful to what can be retrieved from it.

*Retrieval does not reactualize the past but responds to the already-possible.*

Freeing up and retrieving an already-present possibility does indeed disclose an already-open openness, but *not* in order to reactualize it. Retrieving the

possible does not mean bringing back the past or binding the present to what is bygone. Retrieval arises from resolutely understanding oneself, and it refuses to let the past dominate the present in the sense of coming back as what was formerly actual.

Rather, retrieval *makes a response* to a given possibility of already-open existence. But the response to the possibility, made in an act of resolve and thus in a *moment of insight*, is also a *disavowal* of what is unfolding as the past-in-the-present. Retrieval neither abandons itself to what is past nor aims at some sort of progress. Neither of those things matters to authentic existence in its moment of insight.

*Becoming gives the is-as-having-been prominence within the historical.*

We define retrieval as that form of self-freeing resolution in which openness exists by explicitly choosing its fate. But since choosing one's fate constitutes the original historicalness of openness, history has its essential importance not in the past, nor in the present in its "connection" with the past, but in the authentic occurrence of existence, which arises from openness as *becoming*. History—as the way openness *is*—is rooted essentially in becoming, so much so that death, the distinctive possibility of openness, thrusts anticipatory existence back into its *specific* thrownness and thus first gives *what-is-as-having-been* its proper prominence within the historical.

*Authentic being-unto-death—the finitude of temporality—is the hidden basis of the historicalness of openness.* Openness does not first become historical through retrieval; rather, only because openness as temporal *is* historical, can it, via retrieval, take itself over in its history. For that, no historical science is needed.

#### CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION

##### *Résumé*

- "Choosing one's fate" is our term for anticipatorily freeing oneself, in resolution, for the "open" of a moment of insight.
- Choosing one's fate is the basis for "co-choosing a fate," which is our term for the occurrence of openness in being-with-others.
- Retrieval is able to explicitly disclose how a personally and communally chosen fate is bound up with a received heritage.
- Retrieval is what first reveals to openness its own history.
- The occurrence of openness, together with the disclosedness it entails and the appropriation of that disclosedness, are all existentially grounded in the fact that openness as temporal is ecstatically open.

##### *Outstanding questions about a complete lifespan*

What we have been calling "historicalness," in tandem with the "occurrence" that happens in anticipatory resolution, we now call the *authentic* historicalness

of openness. On the one hand, the phenomena of freeing-up and retrieving, which are rooted in becoming, make it clear why the occurrence that underlies authentic history has its import in alreadiness.

On the other hand, it remains puzzling how this occurrence, taken as the choice of one's fate, is supposed to constitute openness' entire lifespan from birth to death. How is our reexamination of resolution supposed to clarify matters? Is not an act of resolve merely a *single* "experience" in the course of the whole span of experience? Does the full span of one's authentic occurrence consist of a seamless sequence of resolves? Why do we have no adequate or satisfying answer to the question of how a lifespan is constituted? Does our investigation, in its haste, depend too much on the answer without having first tested the legitimacy of the *question*?

The course of our existential analysis thus far has made one thing perfectly clear: the ontology of openness constantly succumbs to the temptations of the ordinary understanding of being. The only way to confront this fact methodologically is to study the *origin* of the supposedly "obvious" question of how the lifespan of openness is constituted, and to determine what ontological horizon it operates in.

*Next topic: the inauthentic historicalness of a complete lifespan*

If historicalness is tied up with the very being of openness, then even inauthentic existing must be historical. But what if the *inauthentic* historicalness of openness were determining the direction of our inquiry into the "span of a life" and blocking access to authentic historicalness and *its* proper "span"? However that may be, we need to study the inauthentic historicalness of openness if we want a complete and adequate explanation of the ontological problem of history.

\* \* \*

## Part II

### An Explanation of the Text

#### 1. DASEIN AS "OPENNESS"

Rather than following the widespread practice of leaving the word *Dasein* in the German, we translate it as "openness," along with *das Da* as "the open." We avoid the usual English variations on the word "there" (being-there, there-being, being-the-there), because we are persuaded that with *Dasein*, as with Oakland, "there is no there there," at least not in any usual sense of that term.<sup>8</sup>

Heidegger insists that *Dasein*, understood as the essence of human being, means "being-the-*Da*"—where the *Da* is understood as "the open" (*das Offene*) in the sense of *Lichtung*, *Welt*, and 'Ἀλήθεια." *Dasein* means "being-the-open."<sup>9</sup>

For Heidegger the emphasis in the word *Dasein* falls on the second syllable: Da-sein.<sup>10</sup> This means "openness to the open" in the sense of *being thrown* into enacting the open and only thus holding-open (letting-be) the open in which entities show themselves. This is the meaning we intend by translating *Dasein* as "openness," i.e., the state or condition of "being opened to the open."<sup>11</sup>

The term "openness" captures important meanings that Heidegger himself retrieved from Aristotelian ψυχή for his own understanding of *Dasein*. In *De Anima* Aristotle argues that ψυχή is the very being of human beings; that this being has no other nature than possibility; and most important, that *as* this possibility, ψυχή is essentially *open to and receptive of* the being of entities other than itself.<sup>12</sup>

For Aristotle human ψυχή, whether as τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι or τὸ νοεῖν, is a πάσχειν τι, a transcendental openness-to.<sup>13</sup> Ψυχή is δεκτική (Latin, *susceptiva*): actively open to receive the forms—i.e., the being—of other entities.<sup>14</sup> Precisely as such receptive openness, ψυχή in its full noetic function is ontologically structured so as to reveal the being of everything that appears: ἡ ψυχή τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα (*De An.* 3. 8.431b21).

Thus for Heidegger, human, noetic ψυχή, once properly retrieved, is openness to the open within which the being of entities is revealed (ὁ τόπος εἰδῶν: *De An.* 3. 4.429a27–28).<sup>15</sup> Its very being is to *let-be-seen* the *being* of all entities: ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν (*De An.* 3. 7.432a2).

## 2. GEWESENHEIT AS "ALREADINESS," ZUKUNFT AS "BECOMING"

Interpreting the frequently misunderstood terms *Gewesenheit* and *Zukunft* requires a brief excursus on "essence." In what follows we use "essence" not in its narrow meaning of "whatness," but in its more general sense of "beingness," *Seiendheit*.

Formally and generally, "essence" indicates (1) that which is "always already" (= *apriori*)<sup>16</sup> the case with the being of an entity, specifically as regards (2) the entity's *defining limits as making possible* the degree of being that the entity has. That is, essence indicates the *apriori* ontological dimension of an entity's necessity and possibility.

This entails that an entity always-already lives "off of" or "from" its essence. As Hellenistic philosophers expressed this dependency, an entity is only insofar as it constantly "returns to" its essence by way of an ἐπιστροφή, an ontological reversion to—in fact, a retrieval or re-petition of—how it necessarily and possibly is.<sup>17</sup> In noetic entities, this return-to-essence takes the form of a "complete return" (*reditio completa ad essentiam*) as in Proclus' dictum, Πᾶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ γνωστικὸν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πάντῃ ἐπιστρεπτικόν ἐστίν: "Everything that is able to know itself is able to return to itself by way of a complete [return]."<sup>18</sup> But such a return to or retrieval of essence is the ontological structure of *all* enti-

ties, whether noetic or not. At every level in the analogical chain of being, "to be" means "to return" in some degree or other to how one always-already (i.e., essentially) is.

Moreover, in this framework, which very much informs Heidegger's view of temporality,<sup>19</sup> the degree of an entity's return-to-itself (*Auf-sich-zukommen* as *Auf-sich-zurückkommen*) is directly proportionate to the degree of fulfilledness of that entity's being. Here we move from a merely formal and general characterization of essence (viz., as the apriori condition of an entity's necessity and possibility) to the material and concrete question of the essence of some specific entity—in the present case, the essence of human being.

Consider three possibilities for describing entities in terms of their apriori ontological condition:

1. *Perfection already attained (God)*: To be perfect, in the sense of being entirely constituted and fulfilled (τέλειον), means to have "always-already returned" completely to oneself, i.e., to always have been there.<sup>20</sup>

2. *Currently imperfect, but on the way to a future perfection (e.g., a table under construction)*: To be imperfect-but-on-the-way-to-perfection means that an entity is "still returning" to itself (in fact, returning "forward" toward its "future self," the εἶδος προαιπετόν) while not yet being completely there.<sup>21</sup>

3. *Perfect in its imperfection (the human being)*: To be whole and complete in one's very incompleteness means to be "ever returning" to one's self-qua-lacking-in-being, but with no prospect of ever overcoming that lack.

Cases 2 and 3 are both instances of becoming (understood as "coming to what one is meant to be"),<sup>22</sup> but with this difference: Case 2 indicates a becoming that will cease becoming once it reaches its goal, whereas case 3 indicates a becoming that, no matter how finite it may be, is always an end in itself. That is, case 3 is about a movement that, in its very incompleteness, is characterized by "perfective aspect."<sup>23</sup> In that regard, at least, case 3 is the same as case 1. Whereas God is always whole and complete in his state of perfect rest,<sup>24</sup> openness is always whole and complete in its very becoming. Thus Heidegger can say that openness is *ineluctably* becoming: *apriori/essentially/always-already* becoming: *die gewesende Zukunft* (SZ, 326.19–21).

It is clear that *Gewesenheit*, "alreadiness," is not a "third" moment alongside *Zukunft* and *Gegenwart*; that is, it does not indicate a "past" as distinct from the future and present.<sup>25</sup> Rather, it is a way of characterizing both becoming and presence-to as *apriori-essential moments* of openness: *die gewesende Zukunft*, *die gewesende Gegenwart*. As Heidegger put it in 1926, this "alreadiness" is an ontological determination, not of the "past," but of *each* of the ecstatic moments of temporality: it expresses their ontological-apriori-ness.<sup>26</sup>

**ONE'S ALREADY-OPENNESS**

----- THE "STRETCH" OF BECOMING -----

----- THE "RANGE" OF PRESENCE-TO -----

How is *die Zukunft* a *gewesende Zukunft*? Of its very nature, openness is imperfect: it is its own lack-in-being (*Schuldigsein*) and can never overcome it.<sup>27</sup> Therefore its being *has* to be (= apriori/*gewesend*) ever open (= becoming), unable to outstrip the lack, complete the circle, and thus arrive at a final rest.<sup>28</sup> As such, however, *die gewesende Zukunft* is also *die gewesende Gegenwart*. Openness/becoming means *having* to be present-to; never self-coincident but always exposed; thus never purely ἀπαθής but always necessarily παθητικός, i.e., not only affectable but also *needing* to be affected.<sup>29</sup>

These two moments of becoming and presence-to are two faces of the same coin of already-openness. To be thrown into becoming (*Erstrecktheit*) means tautologically to be thrown into presence-to (*Gegenwärtigen* as *Begegnenlassen*).<sup>30</sup> One's becoming is the very opening up of one's specific "open," and it is coextensive with its range of presence-to and affectability-by.

And what we are apriori present-to and affectable-by is not just what we meet in the "now," but *everything* that we can encounter in the open, including what-is-as-having-been and what-is-to-come. *Gewesenheit*/alreadiness is the ontological-existential condition that makes possible living an existentiell history.

EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL ALREADINESS      =      EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL CONDITION

EXISTENTIEL-ONTIC TIME AND HISTORY      =      EXISTENTIEL-ONTIC CONDITIONED

what-is-as-having-been-inherited/what-is-to-come

Given the apriori concatenation of entailments within its essence (viz., lacking-in-being → becoming → stretched-open/open-to → apriori affectable),<sup>31</sup>

openness *can and must* encounter within its world what is other than itself. Alreadiness is an index of finitude: to be ontologically preceded by (and thus to have to presuppose) *anything* means that one is not complete in oneself but necessarily open to and in need of further possibilities.<sup>32</sup> Already-becoming means being open to and in need of not only future possibilities (SZ, 326.12–14) but also of inherited possibilities that are still available for retrieval: what-is-as-having-been (SZ, 383.32–33, 385.22–23). All such *existential* possibilities are available for choice only due to one's *existential* structure of alreadiness. Thus alreadiness and what-is-as-having-been are *not identical* to each other but are related, rather, as ontological condition to ontic conditioned. Thus, too, alreadiness in the form of thrown becoming gives what-is-as-inherited its prominent role within history (SZ, 386.20–21).

In short: Alreadiness—*apriori* ἔκστασις grounded in lack-in-being—makes possible our specific *existential* histories, both individual and social (SZ, 382.16–18; 384.29–38). Whether authentic or inauthentic, these *existential* histories are formally structured as

- choosing inherited possibilities, whether implicitly or explicitly;
- living into the future in terms of those possibilities;
- and thereby having one's current finite "is."

If one's choice of inherited possibilities is consonant with the resolute choice to *be* one's mortal becoming, one's *existential* history is "authentic." If not, it is "inauthentic."

### 3. RESOLUTION, HISTORICALNESS, AND "CHOOSING ONE'S FATE"

Heidegger argues that to take over, in resolve, one's mortal becoming is *tautologically* to take over the openness of one's specific situation. Such an act of resolve is bivalent: (1) choosing to accept one's mortality as what defines one's being, and (2) choosing from among inherited possibilities for living authentically in the situation. Resolve comprises the twofold decision of how to die and how to live; or: the choice to live mortally.

This double-barreled *existential* act, grounded in ἔκστασις as *apriori* thrownness into becoming and presence-to, constitutes originary, i.e. authentic, historicalness. Authentic "mortal living," which takes a different form in each of us, is what Heidegger means by "fate." But he insists that one's fate is not imposed but chosen. *Existential* historicalness consists in the *ability* to choose one's fate; *existential* resolve consists in *actually* choosing one's fate.

### 4. RESOLUTION AS SELF-UNDERSTANDING

In SZ §74 Heidegger repeats his definition of resolution as "*das . . . Sichertwerfen auf das eigene Schuldigsein*" (SZ, 383.29). We should avoid translating "*sich*

*entwerfen auf* . . .” by the uninformative and misleading “to project oneself upon [this or that].” Rather, the phrase names an authentic act of *self-understanding*, taking oneself *as* mortal, grasping oneself *in terms of* the ultimate possibility: effectively understanding oneself as finite and mortal. That is why Heidegger constantly glosses *Entschlossenheit* and *sich entschliessen* with forms of *sich verstehen*.<sup>35</sup> And that is why, in the present text, we render all instances of “*sich entwerfen auf*” as “to understand oneself in terms of.”

##### 5. ÜBERLIEFERN AS “FREEING UP”

Both the Macquarrie-Robinson and Stambaugh translations of *SZ* unfortunately favor “to hand down” as the translation of “*überliefern*.” On this reading, the “*sich ihm selbst überliefern*” of resolve comes out as “handing oneself down to oneself” (*SZ*, 384.12–14), “*die sich überliefernde Entschlossenheit*” is translated as “the resoluteness which hands itself down” (*SZ*, 384.17), and the “*Sichüberliefern überkommener Möglichkeiten*” (*SZ*, 383.34–35) becomes “handing down inherited possibilities to oneself”—or, in a momentous mistranslation, “handing oneself over to traditional possibilities.”<sup>34</sup>

These readings are not just awkward but also erroneous to the degree they miss Heidegger’s own interpretation of *Überlieferung*. As Heidegger correctly points out, the *liefern* at the heart of *überliefern* comes from the Latin *liberare*, to set free.<sup>35</sup>

*Überlieferung* is a freeing-up in the sense of *liberare*, setting free. As such a freeing-up, *Überlieferung* brings into the light the hidden treasures of the already.<sup>36</sup>

*Überliefern, délivrer*,<sup>37</sup> is a freeing-up, viz., unto the freedom of a conversation with the already.<sup>38</sup>

Heidegger emphasizes in the strongest terms that resolve and retrieval have nothing to do with binding the present to a tradition, bringing back the bygone, reactualizing the past, or allowing it to invade and dominate the present by returning as what was formerly actual (*SZ*, 385.32–386.9). Much less does *Überlieferung* have anything to do with “handing oneself over to traditional possibilities.” The language of “handing down” (*tradere, traditio*) easily falls back into those misunderstandings.

Heidegger’s own §74, taken with his later clarifications, clearly excludes the language of “handing down” and emphasizes instead the action of “freeing-up” inherited possibilities and choosing from among them in the light of one’s self-understanding as mortal becoming. Hence, without losing sight of thrownness-into-becoming—in fact, in order to emphasize its primacy—we translate “*sich ihm selbst überliefern*” as “to free oneself for oneself,” “*die sich überliefernde Entschlossenheit*” as “self-freeing resolution,” and “*Sichüberliefern überkommenen Möglichkeiten*” as “freeing up for oneself inherited possibilities.”

## CONCLUSION

The beauty of the SZ §74 lies in its simplicity. In the central sections of the text Heidegger argues two main theses, namely: (A) The ability to live *any* kind of history is grounded in temporality and finitude. (B) The ability to live an *authentic* history is grounded in resolution.

(A) The ability to live *any* kind of history is grounded in temporality and finitude.

- Human being is grounded in care, care in temporality, and temporality in finitude.
- Bereft of pure self-presence, finite human being is (1) necessarily "thrown"—extended and exposed, apriori needing and receptive of a prior givenness—and (2) always in a state of *becoming*.
- The defining factor of thrown becoming is its ultimate possibility, death. Human being is ineluctably and apriori (1) a *mortal becoming* that (2) constitutes an open area of *presence-to*.
- As thrown (i.e., already stretched open), mortal becoming is exposed to and affectable by everything that appears within its world, including future purposes and inherited possibilities.
- The ontological extension/exposure of thrown becoming lets one have a specific history, i.e., choose among inherited possibilities and live into a future.

(B) The ability to live an *authentic* history is grounded in resolution.

- Resolution means (1) accepting oneself as mortal becoming and (2) living authentically in one's specific situation.
- Whereas having *any* kind of history means choosing among inherited possibilities and living into the future in terms of them, having an *authentic* history means making those choices in the light of the mortal becoming that is embraced in resolution.
- Retrieval is an act of resolution that explicitly enacts and preserves an inherited possibility.

But the text raises more questions than it answers. The most tantalizing issue that Heidegger leaves undeveloped in §74 is what he calls the "co-choosing of fate" (*Geschick*). What exactly is this act of social resolve? And how might it be carried out?

\* \* \*

*Appendix**An Analytic Outline of Sein und Zeit §74*

## INTRODUCTION

[SZ, 382.16–383.30]

*The topic* [SZ, 382.16–27] ¶1]

Openness “has” its history because it is historical. But historicalness is rooted in temporality. How, then, does authentic historicalness arise from authentic temporality (resolution)?

*Resolve takes over mortality and decides about the situation.* [SZ, 382.28–383.6] ¶2]

Authentic resolution means (1) embracing one’s finite, mortal self, and (2) choosing authentic possibilities within one’s situation. Where do these specific possibilities come from?

*The source of specific authentic possibilities.* [SZ, 383.6–19]

They come not from death, but from thrownness. What, then, is thrownness?

*Thrownness provides the possibilities from which resolve chooses.* [SZ, 383.19–30] ¶3]

Thrownness means being-in-a-world-with-others and having one’s inherited possibilities dominated by “everyone.” Even resolve must choose from among such possibilities inherited through thrownness.

## I.

## RESOLUTION AND THROWNNESS:

## FREEING UP INHERITED POSSIBILITIES

[SZ, 383.31–385.18]

A. At the Individual Level [SZ, 383.31–384.28]

*Resolve frees up specific possibilities inherited through thrownness.* [SZ, 383.31–384.1] ¶4]

In resolve openness (1) chooses its finite, mortal self and (2) frees up inherited possibilities.

*Authentic historicalness is “choosing one’s fate.”* [SZ, 384.1–384.14]

Resolving on one’s finitude lets one avoid inauthentic possibilities and achieve authentic historicalness (i.e., “choose one’s fate”).

*Authentic historicalness lets one live authentically within history.* [SZ, 384.15–23] ¶5]

Having one’s existential fate lets one live existential history authentically, open to both fortunate and unfortunate circumstances.

*Resolve (the superior power of accepting mortality) takes over thrownness.*

[SZ, 384.24-28]

[¶6]

In resolution, openness heightens the *power* of mortality via the *superior* power of freedom-for-mortality, which in turn lets one embrace the *powerlessness* of thrownness.

B. At the Communal Level [SZ, 384.29-385.2]

*Because openness is always co-openness, historicalness is always co-historicalness.*

[SZ, 384.29-385.2]

Being-with-others means that historicalness is always "co-choosing a fate" (*Geschick*). The personal *and* the communal choice of fate, taken together, make up the authentic historical structure of openness.

C. At the Ground Level [SZ, 385.3-18]

*Authentic temporality is the basis of authentic historicalness.* [SZ, 385.3-10]

[¶7]

Choosing one's fate means understanding oneself as lacking-in-being. Such understanding (resolve) is made possible by temporality.

Summary [SZ, 385.11-10]

[¶8]

Temporality means that openness *is essentially* ("already") *becoming*.

Therefore, in resolution, openness can be authentically historical:

1. free for its death
2. thrown back into its specific openness:
  - a. taking over its own thrownness and
  - b. freeing up for itself an inherited possibility,
3. and thus insightfully present for its times.

In short: Authentic temporality makes possible authentic historicalness.

## 2.

### RESOLUTION AS RETRIEVAL:

#### EXPLICITLY FREEING UP INHERITED POSSIBILITIES

[SZ, 385.19-386.24]

*Resolution, when carried out explicitly, is retrieval.* [SZ, 385.19-31]

[¶9]

When resolve frees up possibilities *explicitly*, it is retrieval. Resolve and retrieval let one struggle with one's tradition and be faithful to the retrieved.

*Retrieval does not reactualize the past but responds to the already-possible.* [SZ, 385.32-386.9]

Retrieval does not bring back the past but makes a responsible rejoinder to an already-open possibility.

*Becoming gives the is-as-having-been its prominence within history.* [SZ, 386.11–386.24] ¶10

Already-becoming entails being open to inherited possibilities as well as to the present and future. Thus becoming gives what-is-as-having-been-inherited its prominence within the historical.

#### CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION

[SZ, 386.25–387.25]

*Résumé* [SZ, 386.25–35] ¶11

Summary of *Schicksal, Geschick, Wiederholung, Geschichte*, and their grounding in ecstatic temporality.

*Outstanding questions about a complete lifespan* [SZ, 386.35–387.18] ¶12

Authentic historicalness emphasizes the already-open. But how is resolution connected with a complete lifespan? Indeed, what constitutes a lifespan?

*Next topic: the inauthentic historicalness of a complete lifespan* [SZ, 387.19–25] ¶13

#### ABBREVIATIONS

We refer to Heidegger's texts by page and line. The line count does not include the "header" or any empty lines on the page but does include the section titles.

- GA* M. Heidegger. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976ff. Cited by volume number followed by page number.
- GA 9* M. Heidegger. *Wegmarken*. Vol. 9 of *Gesamtausgabe* (1976). Translated under the title *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill. Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Cited with German text first, then English text.
- SZ* M. Heidegger. *Sein und Zeit*. 11th ed. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967.
- Zollikon* M. Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare: Protokolle—Gespräche—Briefe*. Ed. Medard Boss. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987.

#### NOTES

- 1 *The translation is already the interpretation*: "Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις," in *GA 9*: 245. 14–15 = 188.1–2. Emphasis added.
2. §60, pp. 295ff. Heidegger's note.
3. §62, p. 305. Heidegger's note.
4. P. 284. Heidegger's note.
5. §26, pp. 117ff.

6. On the concept of "generation," cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, "Über das Studium der Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und dem Staat" (1875); in *Gesammelte Schriften* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht], vol. V (1924), pp. 36–41. Heidegger's note.
7. *SZ*, 385.11–18: The German paragraph weaves the definition of *temporality* in with the description of *authentic historicalness*, whereas our translation separates out the two. Roughly: *Zeitlichkeit* [*SZ*, 385.11, 13–14]:  
 "[Dasein is ein] Seiendes, das wesentlich in seinem Sein  
 1. *zukunftig* ist [und]  
 2. als zukünftig gleichursprünglich *gewesend* ist, so daß ...  
*Eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit* [*SZ*, 385.11–16]:  
 1. es frei für seinen Tod (an ihm zerschellend),  
 2. auf sein faktisches Da sich zurückwerfen lassen kann, d.h.  
 a. die eigene Geworfenheit übernehmen kann,  
 b. die ererbte Möglichkeit überliefernd,  
 3. und augenblicklich sein für "seine Zeit."
8. "She [Gertrude Atherton] took us to see her granddaughter who was teaching in the Dominican convent in San Raphael, we went across the bay on a ferry, that had not changed but Goat Island might just as well not have been there, anyway what was the use of my having come from Oakland it was not natural to have come from there yes write about it if I like or anything if I like but not there, there is no there there" (Gertrude Stein, *Everybody's Autobiography* [New York: Random House, 1937; Cambridge, MA: Exact Change, published by arrangement with Random House, 1993], p. 298). Page cited is to 1993 edition.
9. *Being the Da*: *GA* 9: 325.20–21 = 248.11–12: "Der Mensch west so, daß er das 'Da' ... ist." Private letter to Jean Beaufret, November 23, 1945: "'Da-sein' bedeutet für mich ... être le-là," cited in Martin Heidegger, *Lettre sur l'humanisme*, ed. and trans. Roger Munier, rev. ed. (Paris: Aubier, 1964), 182f. *Zollikon*, 157.7: "être le là." *Zollikon*, 157.31–32: "[D]as Menschsein als solches [ist] dadurch ausgezeichnet, auf seine Weise diese Offenheit selbst zu sein."  
*Das Da as "the open"*: *Zollikon*, 188.14–15: "das *Da* [ist] dort [in *SZ*] bestimmt als das Offene" (cf. *infra*). Also *GA* 9: 184.11 = 141.18; 184.25 = 141.23; 185.29 = 142.26; 187.32 = 144.9; 188.21 = 144.22; *Zollikon*, 9.8, etc. Cf. *GA* 9: 184 note a: "die Offenheit eines Ent-gegen."  
*Das Da as (1) Lichtung, (2) 'Ἀλήθεια, (3) Sein-selbst, (4) Wahrheit, (5) Welt, (6) Unterschied and Ereignis*: (1) *GA* 9: 325.20–21 = 248.11–12: "das 'Da', das heißt die Lichtung des Seins." *GA* 9: 327.14–15 = 249.22–23: "das *Da* als Lichtung des Seins." *Zollikon*, 188.14–15: "Wie ist das *Da* dort [in *SZ*] bestimmt als das Offene? Diese Offenheit hat auch den Charakter des Raumes. Räumlichkeit gehört zur *Lichtung*, gehört zum Offenen. ..." *Zollikon*, 242.21–22: "Da-sein als ... Lichtung seiner selbst." (2) Private letter to Beaufret (*supra*), p. 183: "Und le-là ist gleich 'Ἀλήθεια." (3) *GA* 9: 332.3–4 = 253.1: "Die Lichtung selber aber ist das Sein." (4) *GA* 9: 336.27 = 256.23–24: "das *Da*, die Lichtung als Wahrheit des Seins selbst." (5) *GA* 9: 15–16 = 248.36–37: "die Lichtung des Seins, und nur sie, ist 'Welt.'" (6) *Zollikon*, 242.12–13: "der Unterschied als Lichtung, als *Ereignis*." *GA* 9: 369 note d: "Sein, Wahrheit, Welt, ~~Sein~~, Ereignis."
10. *Da-sein*: *Zollikon*, 157.7–8: "die sinngemäße Betonung im Deutschen statt *Dasein*: *Da-sein*" and 188.13–14: "Da-sein heißt in *Sein und Zeit*: *da-sein*."
11. *Openness to the open/standing in the open*: *GA* 9: 185.3–4 with note a = 142.3, with note a: "Offenständigkeit ... in die Lichtung." *GA* 9: 184.21, note c = 141.27, note c: "inständig in der Offenheit" (which in turn allows openness to be intentionally "offenständig zum Seienden" [*ibid.*, text]). *Zollikon*, 189.11–12: "Sich-aufhaltende-in-der-Lichtung-sein"; 189.26–27: "Da-sein, d.h. sich im Offenen Aufhalten"; 221.26–27: "das Innestehen des Menschen ins *Da*, in die Lichtung, die Gelichtetheit des Seins, als welche der Mensch existiert"; and 223.16: "ekstatisch in die Lichtung Hinausstehender." Cf. *GA* 77: 143.30: "das Sichöffnen für das Offene."

The reference in this last text is to *Enschlossenheit*, and the revised version of the text (which was published first) has it as: "das *eigens* übernommene Sichöffnen des Daseins für das Offene. . . ." (*Gelassenheit*, 3rd ed. [Tübingen: Neske, 1959], 59.2-3).

*Holding open*: *Zollikon*, 4.2-5: "Vielmehr bedeutet das Existieren als *Da-sein* das Offenhalten eines Bereiches aus Vernehmen-können der Bedeutsamkeiten der Gegebenheiten, die sich ihm aus seiner Gelichtheit her zusprechen."

Re "-ness": On our use of "-ness" to mean "the state or condition of being [opened]," see *Fowler's Modern English Usage*, ed. H. W. Fowler [first edition] and R. W. Burchfield [third edition] (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), s.v. "-ion and -ness," pp. 413f. Also *The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology*, ed. Robert K. Barnhart (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1988), s.v. "-ness"; and *The World Book Dictionary*, ed. Clarence L. Barnhart and Robert K. Barnhart (Chicago and London: Scott Fetzer/World Book, 1993), 2: 1396, s.v. "-ness."

12. Ψυχή as *possibility*: ὥστε μηδ' αὐτοῦ [i.e., νόου] εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἄλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν (*De An.* 3.4.429a21-22), roughly: "so that there is no nature of/for it [viz, νοῦς] except this: that it is [ever] in possibility."
13. Πάσχειν τι: τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν (*De An.* 2.11.424a1) and τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστίν (*De An.* 3.4.429b24-25). The Latin is *pati quoddam*: Thomas Aquinas, *In Aristotelis librum de anima commentarium*, ed. Angelo M. Pirotta (Turin: Marietti, 1925), respectively: liber II, lectio XXIII, p. 182 (text) with p. 186 (no. 547), and liber III, lectio IX, p. 236 (no. 720). On the possibility that the τι is the *object* of πάσχειν rather than an adverbial modifier, see Aristotle, *De Anima*, ed. and trans. Robert Drew Hicks (1907; reprint, Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer Company, 1988), 412f.
14. Ψυχή as *δεκτική*: τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν (*De An.* 2.12.424a18) and ἀποθές ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἶδους (*De An.* 3.4.429a15). For *susceptivus*: Aquinas, *In de anima (supra)*, liber II, lectio XXIV, p. 187, text (*susceptivus specierum sine materia*) with p. 188 (no. 551); and liber III, lectio VII, p. 224 text (*susceptivum speciei*) with p. 226 (no. 676: *susceptivam speciei intelligibilis*).
15. Τόπος εἰδῶν: Aristotle makes the point indirectly: καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν (*ibid.*).
16. *Apriori*: Cf. *Zollikon*, 197.17: "ein a priori, eine im vorhinein gesetzte Bestimmung."
17. Ἐπιστροφή: See Proclus, *The Elements of Theology: A Revised Text*, ed. and trans. E. R. Dodd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), e.g., proposition 32 (p. 36.2, 3, 8); proposition 34 (p. 38.2); proposition 35 (p. 38.15), etc.
18. *Complete return*: Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, proposition 83 (p. 76.29-30). Dodd translates the sentence as: "is capable of every form of self-reversion," but the context of the proposition (cf. ἐν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ γινώσκον καὶ γινωσκόμενον [p. 76.32]) indicates that it should be translated "complete return." This is how it was correctly rendered in Latin: "Omni sciens scit essentiam suam, ergo est rediens ad essentiam suam completa," cited in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de Causis Expositio*, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Louvain: Éditions E. Nauwelaerts, 1954), 88, citing *Liber de Causis*, proposition 15.
19. *Heidegger and the "return to essence"*: Cf. *SZ*, 325.37-38, "wie es je schon war," as an interpretation of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, with "zurück-kommi" (*SZ*, 326.3). Also *SZ*, 326.2: "Dasein überhaupt ist als ich *bin-gewesen*," where the "bin-gewesen" indicates perfective aspect, as if to say: "In my very being, I am as I perfectly/essentially am."

*Aspect*: See Robert I. Binnick, *Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); also Thomas Sheehan, "Das Gewesen," in *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire*, ed. B. Babich (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), 161-71; "Heidegger's New Aspect," *Research in Phenomenology* 23 (1995): 217-20; "How (Not) to Read Heidegger," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69, no. 2 (1995): 282-90.

20. *God as "completely returned" to himself*: The classic presentation of the argument is in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, pars I, qu. 14, art. 2, ad primum: "Redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa. . . . In quantum vero in seipsa habet esse, in seipsam redit. . . . Per se autem subsistere maxime convenit Deo. Unde secundum hunc modum loquendi, ipse est maxime rediens ad essentiam suam," in *Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos*, 3rd ed. (Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1963), 1: 107.
21. *A table under construction*: Heidegger presents the example at GA 9: 285.12–286.2 = 217.38–218.20.
22. *"Auf-sich-zukommen" as "becoming"*: Compare SZ, 325.29–30, where Heidegger defines *die [eigentliche] Zukunft* of resolve as "die Künft, in der das Dasein in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen auf sich zukommt," with an earlier allusion to the same phenomenon at SZ, 199.15–16: "das Werden zu dem, was er [= der Mensch] in seinem Freisein für seine eigensten Möglichkeiten (dem Entwurf) sein kann."
23. *Aspect*: See note 19 *supra*.
24. *Perfect rest*: *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.14.1154b27, οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιος.
25. *Gewesenheit is not "the past"*: GA 2: 114.33: "Nicht ein ontisch Vergangenes, sondern das jeweils Frühere." Also Martin Heidegger *Lógica. Lecciones de M. Heidegger (semestre verano 1934) en el legado de Helene Weiss* (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1991), 72.19–23: "Gewesenheit und Zukunft sind nicht zwei Zeiträume hinter und vor uns, sondern das von früher her Wesende ist unser eigenes Sein [etc.]."
26. *Gewesenheit as the character of Zukunft and Gegenwart*: Martin Heidegger, *Logik* (lecture course, winter semester, 1925–26), Friday, February 26, 1926: "Dieses Schon ist eine temporale Bestimmung, die jedem Zeitcharakter des Daseins zukommt. Das Schon ist die Anzeige des Apriori der Faktizität." Cited from the unpublished Simon Moser Nachschrift, p. 819.18–19 (compare GA 21: 414.4–7). Thus Heidegger can affirm (SZ, 344.14–16; contrast 326.7–8) that "aus ihr [= Gewesenheit] erst Zukunft und Gegenwart sich zeitigen."
27. *Schuldigsein as "lack-in-being"*: Our translation follows the lines of SZ, 282.26; 283.26; 284.39ff., etc.
28. *Lack of simplicity*: As finitude (lack-in-being) openness is tautologically a lack in simplicity (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.14.1154b22: διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν) and hence must always work mediately, through pluralities (cf. διάνοια, λόγος, σύνθεσις/διαίρεσις) rather than immediately through simplicity as with perfect νοῦς, where τὰ αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν (*Meta.* 12.7.1072b21) and which μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται . . . ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος (*ibid.*, 1073a5–6).
29. *On ἀπαθής/παθητικός*: See note 14 *supra*.
30. *Erstrecktheit and Gegenwärtigen/Begegnenlassen*: Respectively SZ, 390.38 and 326.13–16.
31. *The concatenation*: Heidegger hints at such a list at SZ, 385.7–8: "Tod, Schuld, Gewissen, Freiheit und Endlichkeit . . . wie in der Sorge."
32. *Alreadiness, an index of finitude*: Compare Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, third edition, 1965), §5, *ad initium*, 31.29–32.11.
33. *"Sich entwerfen" as "understanding oneself"*: Cf. the following texts from SZ, chosen virtually at random: 287.33–36: "gleich einem Sichverstehen in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen, das heißt das Sichentwerfen auf das *eigenste* eigentliche Schuldigwerdenkönnen. Das verstehende Sichvorrufenlassen [etc.]." 295.31–32: "Gewissen-haben-wollen ist als Sich-verstehen im eigensten Seinkönnen eine Weise der *Erschlossenheit* des Daseins." 306.7–8: "Die Entschlossenheit entwirft sich auf seines Seinkönnen, das heißt versteht sich in ihm." 325.24–35: "Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit versteht das Dasein in seinem wesenhaften Schuldigsein." 382.30–31. "In ihr [= Entschlossenheit] versteht sich das Dasein hinsichtlich seines Seinkönnens." Compare "Das vorlaufende Sichentwerfen . . ." (383.6) with "Das eigentliche existenzielle Verstehen" (383.27); and "sich entschließt" (384.1) with "sich versteht" (384.3) and "verstehet sich" (384.25).
34. *Handing oneself over to traditional possibilities*: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time: A Translation of*

- "*Sein und Zeit*," trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY, 1996), 351.16, which misreads *sich* as the accusative rather than the dative, and *Möglichkeiten* as the dative plural rather than the genitive plural.
35. *Liefern/ liberare*: See Friedrich Kluge, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*, ed. Walther Mitzka, 18th ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960; first edition, 1883), 440, s.v. "liefern": "liefern Ztw. Lat. *liberare* 'befreien, ...'"
  36. *Überlieferung*: Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957; third edition, 1965), 171.7–10.
  37. *Délivrer*: This French word is itself derived from the Romanic or Vulgar (not the classical) Latin *deliberare*, "to set free, liberate": *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* (Glasgow and New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 1: 166, s.v. "deliver"; and Ernest Weekley, *An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English* (New York: Dover, 1967; 1st edition, London: John Murray, 1921), 1: 427, s.v. "deliver."
  38. *Überlieferung again*: Martin Heidegger, *Was ist das—die Philosophie?* 4th ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1966), 34.1–2. Cf. *ibid.*, 70.7–10: "Deshalb gelangen wir nur *so* in die Entsprechung, d.h. zur Antwort auf unsere Frage, daß wir im Gespräch mit dem [= dem Gewesenen] bleiben, wohin uns die Überlieferung der Philosophie ausliefert, d.h. befreit." Regarding "conversation with the already," compare SZ, 386.4–5: "a response to a given possibility of already-open existence."