No. 137, Original

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES POST-TRIAL HEARING PROCEEDINGS

STATE OF MONTANA

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF WYOMING

and

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. Special Master

Moot Courtroom, Room 80, Basement 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, California 94305 9:03 a.m., Thursday, May 1, 2014

Peter Torreano, California CSR No. 7623, CRR

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THURSDAY, MAY 1, 2014, 9:03 A.M.

SPECIAL MASTER: So, first of all, good morning to everybody. It's great to see all of you again. I think when I last saw most of you before this morning it was about zero degrees Fahrenheit outside. So it's a bit of a huge change in the temperature. And for those of you who have never been here to the Bay Area before, welcome and I hope you enjoy your visit here in addition to you all participating in the hearing.

So this is the post-trial hearing in Montana versus Wyoming and North Dakota, No. 137, Original, in the Supreme Court of the United States. And in terms of the proceedings this morning, the -- I think that what we will plan to do is go until about 12:15 today when we're going to take a break because I know the Attorneys General from both Montana and Wyoming will be speaking to the students. I want to make sure you get an opportunity to get your lunch.

And, also, as I think I mentioned before, Dean Magill would like to meet both of you at 12:30 and welcome you to Stanford Law School. And then I think that the lunch they are planning is lasting until about two o'clock. And so I propose that, assuming we're not finished this morning, and my guess is we probably will

1	not be, that we then come back at about 2:15 in the
2	afternoon and continue with the argument at that
3	particular point in time.
4	You can assume, as always, that I have
5	carefully read all of the various briefs, not only what
6	Montana and Wyoming have filed, but that also what
7	North Dakota, Anadarko and Northern Cheyenne Tribe have
8	filed. But you also shouldn't necessarily assume that
9	I'm as closely attuned as to exactly what details in
10	those papers are as important as you are aware. So
11	feel free to point specific items out to me.
12	So let me just start out with introduction of
13	counsel. So counsel for the State of Montana?
14	MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, good morning.
15	I'm John Draper for the State of Montana. We
16	have with us today Attorney General Tim Fox, Deputy
17	Attorney General Cory Swanson.
18	MR. SWANSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
19	SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning.
20	MR. DRAPER: My fellow special attorney
21	general, Jeffrey Wechsler.
22	SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning.
23	MR. DRAPER: We also have our expert engineer,
24	Mr. Book; general counsel for the Department of Natural
25	Resources Conservation, Anne Yates; my assistant Donna

1	Ormerod; Mr. Art Hayes you may remember from the trial;
2	his counsel for the Tongue River Water Users
3	Association, Brenda Linlief Hall; and then at the end
4	of the row, my partner, Matthew Draper.
5	SPECIAL MASTER: Hello, Mr. Draper.
6	MR. DRAPER: Oh. There is Kevin.
7	Kevin Peterson. I'm sorry. I was expecting
8	him up here. Kevin Peterson is also a lawyer with the
9	Department of Natural Resource Conservation with the
10	State of Montana.
11	SPECIAL MASTER: Again welcome to all of you.
12	So State of Wyoming?
13	MR. KASTE: Good morning, Your Honor.
14	I'm James Kaste, deputy attorney general, for
15	the State of Wyoming. With me is the Attorney General
16	for the State of Wyoming, Peter Michael, counsel of
17	record in this case. Andrew Kuhlmann, assistant
18	attorney general in our office. We let Mr. Sayer out
19	of his office for this. Matthias Sayer from our
20	office. He kept the home fires burning while we were
21	in Billings.
22	Of course, today we have the Wyoming State
23	Engineer, Pat Tyrrell, here with us. And, as always,
24	Chris Brown, senior assistant attorney general, as well
25	as myself

1	MR. BROWN: Good morning.
2	SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning. And again
3	welcome.
4	And so let me just go through. Is there
5	anyone here from the United States?
6	We do not have anyone from the United States.
7	So Northern Cheyenne?
8	MS. WHITEING: Yes, Your Honor.
9	Jeanne Whiteing representing the Northern
10	Cheyenne Tribe as amicus.
11	SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning, Ms. Whiteing.
12	And is there anyone here from Anadarko
13	Petroleum?
14	MR. WIGMORE: Yes, Your Honor.
15	Michael Wigmore, Vinson & Ellis for Anadarko
16	Petroleum Corporation. With me is Julia Jones, counsel
17	at Anadarko Petroleum.
18	SPECIAL MASTER: Great. So let me just sort
19	of quickly go through oh.
20	MS. VERLEGER: How could you forget me?
21	SPECIAL MASTER: This is truly and formally
22	embarrassing. From the State of North Dakota?
23	MS. VERLEGER: Jennifer Verleger, assistant
24	attorney general for North Dakota.
25	SPECIAL MASTER: And I should say, you know,

1	carried along. And it's just that during the trial you
2	didn't have much of a speaking role. So I'm sorry to
3	have forgotten the great State of North Dakota.
4	MS. VERLEGER: That's okay.
5	SPECIAL MASTER: So let me just quickly go
6	over things. So first of all, Mr. Draper, are you and
7	Attorney General Fox going to be splitting the argument
8	or how do you plan to proceed?
9	MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, we would like to
10	proceed in this fashion: To open with some remarks by
11	Attorney General Fox followed by Mr. Swanson addressing
12	the issues related to notice, then by myself addressing
13	issues relating to post-1950 water uses in Wyoming, and
14	then with Mr. Wechsler addressing water uses and
15	administration in Montana.
16	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you.
17	Mr. Kaste, how does Wyoming want to proceed?
18	MR. KASTE: I'll do it. I asked around.
19	Nobody else volunteered. So I will do the argument on
20	behalf of the State of Wyoming.
21	SPECIAL MASTER: I'm disappointed in Mr. Brown
22	that he didn't arm wrestle you for it.
23	MR. KASTE: I asked him specifically and he
24	said no.
25	MR. BROWN: And you know better than that.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Let me suggest the
following and see whether it would be okay with counsel
for both sides. Rather than having Montana present its
entire argument and then, you know, like two and a half
hours from now perhaps turning it over to Wyoming, what
I actually think would be more valuable would be to
split it up very much along the lines that Montana was
thinking about splitting its argument up amongst
counsel.
And so the thought would be that we would
start out with both sides being able to present any
type of overview presentation that they would like.
Then we would go on to the question of notice and then
have both Montana and Wyoming address questions of
notice. Then we would go to the pre-1950 uses in
Montana and then the question of post-1950 uses in
Wyoming plus causation and materiality. And that way I
would think at least for me that would be more
valuable because the arguments would be closer together
on each of those points.
And it sounds to me as if it probably will not
be a problem with Montana since they have divided their
arguments in that fashion.
Mr. Kaste, do you have any concerns on that?
MR. KASTE: Whatever would be most helpful to

1	you, that's fine.
2	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Great. Then why don't
3	we go ahead and proceed in that fashion.
4	But before, Attorney General Fox, you come up
5	let me just ask.
6	Does North Dakota plan at this point to make
7	any argument this morning?
8	MS. VERLEGER: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
9	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. But if, you know, at
10	any point you want to, then just let Ms. Carter know
11	and I'll make sure that you have some time to do that.
12	What about the Northern Cheyenne?
13	MS. WHITEING: We don't plan to argue, Your
14	Honor, unless an issue comes up where we would like to
15	comment in which case we would ask your permission to
16	do so.
17	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. And then finally
18	Anadarko?
19	MR. WIGMORE: I think the same position for
20	Anadarko, Your Honor. We will see how it goes and then
21	ask your permission.
22	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So excellent. At the
23	very end I will also ask you again just to make sure
24	that you have an opportunity to address any of the
25	issues that concern the various entities that you're

1	referencing.
2	Okay. With that, Attorney General Fox?
3	ATTORNEY GENERAL FOX: Good morning, again,
4	Your Honor. May it please the Court.
5	Thank you again for hosting this here in this
6	wonderful corner of the world and for letting us visit
7	the Stanford campus. It's been years since I've been
8	here. I used to about 35 pounds ago I ran track and
9	I spent some of that time here training and it's great
10	to be back. Things have changed a little bit for the
11	better.
12	I appreciate you allowing us to have to have
13	this final word on this matter after all the evidence
14	of the trial has been gathered and evaluated, but
15	before I yield the floor to my colleagues who will
16	spend the majority of our time arguing on the specifics
17	of the case I would like to direct the Court's
18	attention to some of the big picture issues for the
19	State of Montana that rest in your hands now, sir.
20	As I mentioned at my trial opening in October,
21	this case is important to Montana and we believe this
22	case is ripe for resolution, not only because of what
23	has happened in the past, but particularly to protect
24	Montana's rights going on into the future.

Because of the nature of the Tongue River

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Basin and the possibility of drought Montana will continue to rely on Wyoming's compliance with the Compact to protect our pre-1950 direct flow and storage water rights on a very regular basis.

This multi-million dollar question is then how will Wyoming respond to Montana's shortage. To answer that question we urge you to review what we have effectively proven at trial and to understand the story of Montana's water users. Now that the facts are in and you have heard from our witnesses and reviewed mountains of documents we believe this story is very clear.

For many years since at least 1981 Wyoming has been on notice that Montana's pre-1950 water rights on the Tongue River were not being satisfied on a regular basis. This fact is clear since the largest right on the river, the T&Y canal, is also the second oldest right and it calls the river fairly early in the irrigation season every year.

We have presented testimony by numerous

Montana officials and water users and we have presented

many documents demonstrating that Montana put Wyoming

on notice of our water shortage. Despite all this,

Wyoming continues to dispute notice and there is a

clear disagreement over the facts and the standards

necessary for a call. The states need yours and ultimately the United States Supreme Court's resolution of this and other issues.

Wyoming has never taken a single action to provide any water to Montana under the Compact, never. For many years Wyoming insisted there was no provision for a call and the Yellowstone River Compact did not protect Montana's pre-1950 rights. Now that Wyoming finally acquiesces in your ruling, Your Honor, that Wyoming has a duty under the Compact to protect Montana's pre-1950 water rights there is still no certainty that Wyoming will provide water to Montana.

You've heard from Pat Tyrrell and Sue Lowry
the responsible Wyoming officials, that they will honor
a call if they consider it valid. But you also heard
and Montana certainly heard the likelihood for more
delays or reasons why they would not honor a call.

In reviewing Mr. Tyrrell's testimony we see there are many lingering disputes over whether Wyoming would honor a call for Montana, what it would require, and how long it would take. Mr. Tyrrell testified he would evaluate whether the call was futile, whether the water was actually going to be delivered to a particular headgate in Montana, how the water was going to be used, how much water might be lost between, say,

Dayton, Wyoming and the T&Y Canal near Miles City and whether there was a genuine or legitimate need for the call.

Your Honor, that one example demonstrates that the two state need a resolution of the issue. Even though Mr. Tyrrell may be well intentioned, these unanswered questions could delay or foreclose a call being honored while Montana users suffer. If Mr. Tyrrell's successor does not act in good faith, these unanswered questions will give Wyoming an avenue to delay or fail to honor a Montana call.

Montana simply should not be held at the mercy of its upstream neighbor. What this reveals is not only the need for resolution, as I told you in October in Billings, it also illustrates the materiality of this dispute. Montana and Wyoming have been unable to reach agreement on these issues despite having a compact commission since 1952 and since arguing over these issues since at least 1981.

Both states have extended considerable sums of money and time to bring this dispute to a final resolution. Our presence here, Your Honor, as adverse parties with a clearly genuine dispute is further evidence of the materiality of this controversy.

This court is the only place we can get

relief. You have before you a genuine dispute between two sovereigns, a dispute over both facts and law which will affect their actions for all future time. It is important that the court resolve the dispute and provide a workable methodology for Compact compliance.

For that reason I urge you, Your Honor, to resist Wyoming's request to summarily dismiss the case, quote, "without further ado," end quote, as they have stated so cavalierly.

So let me close by saying it isn't just about water rights, interstate compacts and technical engineering and hydrology data. All of that is important. But it is important only because it leads us back to focus on the people who depend upon the water. They are the heart and soul of this case and they are the reason we stand before you today.

You know Art Hayes is here with us. He still runs the original Brown Cattle Company and is raising the next generation of stewards to take over for him. His leadership and dedication have kept the Tongue River Water Users Association thriving running a large reservoir in a responsible manner and supplying water to farms and ranches for 190 miles. His future and that of his sons depends on whether Wyoming will honor Montana's pre-Compact uses which are the lifeblood of

the Tongue River Valley in Montana.

You've heard from John Hamilton, a softspoken and sincere gentleman who is a true innovator in agriculture. His years of research on crop innovation have led him to grow alternative crops like melons and apples in a place that Montana never thought would be possible to grow those crops. He is also passing on his knowledge to the next generation, and they need to know whether Wyoming will protect their pre-Compact uses against post-Compact depletions upstream in Wyoming.

Les Hirsch is another smart businessman and innovative farmer who suffered through the dry years by traveling hundreds of miles to cut and bail hay, hauled it home and took an economic loss on his cattle, but somehow he kept fighting on. He relies almost entirely on stored water out of the Tongue River Reservoir. His daughter is working alongside her father and they need to know if the reservoir will receive its water from Wyoming.

And who can forget Jay Nance and Roger Muggli? They are the two bookends of this river with the two oldest water rights on the Montana side. One is a tall, gentle and mild mannered gentleman. The other is a short, intense and fully energized gentleman. Their

story is the story of the Tongue River and their 1 2 testimony is uncontested prove that Montana needs Wyoming to honor our senior water rights. 3 So I ask you, Your Honor, to remember those 4 Montana faces and stories. They have worked to 5 6 overcome hardship and to keep their community together. 7 They are not asking for special rules and they are just 8 asking for both sides of the border to play by the same The State of Montana looks to this court to 9 10 help us meet that request. And may I end, Your Honor, by saying how much 11 12 I appreciate Attorney General Michael from Wyoming and our neighbors all over Wyoming for being the friends 13 14 that they are. This dispute is very real. It will go 15 on without your help and we need, Your Honor, for you to fully and finally resolve these issues for us. 16 Thank you. 17 SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you very much. 18 19 Mr. Kaste, do you have an opening statement? 20 MR. KASTE: May it please the Court. I had prepared to respond basically to 21

everything all at once and so I haven't to prepare a general opening such as it were, but I know everybody is counting on me to start out by saying some inflammatory. And so I will as is my habit.

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I think it is important for you as you look through the post-trial briefing and you listen to the arguments like those just made by Attorney General Fox to listen to what they are saying. And you've heard it more than once during the course of this trial and you see it in the post-trial briefs: "Wyoming has never delivered a drop of water to Montana pursuant to this Compact." We've heard that over and over again and we've heard something akin to it just now.

And here's the inflammatory part: We probably never will because that's not how this Compact works. We need to bear in mind at all times how this Compact works. The Supreme Court has stated flatly that this Compact does not require the State of Wyoming to deliver a specific amount of water to Montana. This Compact and the obligations of the parties under it are governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation.

And that can mean when Montana makes a call on Wyoming and we curtail any post-1950 uses that they don't get a drop of water as a result. We all know that. The people who made this Compact know that, knew that at the time.

This case is a pretty simple case. I've said it before and I've said it over and over again. This is a simple breach of contract case and your job today

is to look at the elements of a breach of contract case and to determine whether or not Montana has proved each of those elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

We're fortunately now through with the trial and the burden of proof falls squarely on Montana at this stage. There is no more giving the non-moving party the benefit of the doubt. Now Montana must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it has proven each of five elements of its claim, which are consistent with every contract claim everywhere all the time.

I don't understand Montana's reluctance to treat it as a contract case. We see in their brief it's referenced here as in the Compact. Well, there's a contract in the statute, but they never explain how it makes any difference, how that changes the elements of the claim, how it changes the burden of proof, how it makes anything different for these contracting parties.

There's no difference. It's just a simple contract case. And that means because the duties of the party are outlined and are promises in the Compact that our promises to each other are to follow the doctrine of appropriation.

And Wyoming has done that. I think what the

trial proved to us, the evidence showed is that Wyoming has followed the doctrine of appropriation and Montana has not. What we learned in the course of the trial is that the party who needs to be protected in this situation is Wyoming.

Montana has allowed a tremendous amount of water to go past the gate of Tongue River Reservoir all winter long in each of the two years in issue and then has turned to us and asked for more, and that's not right. And the doctrine of appropriation doesn't protect Montana's ability to waste that water all winter long and ask us to make up the difference.

Now, with regard to the burden of proof, it's important -- excuse me, the elements of the contract claim, it's important to remember that Montana has to show that it was the pre-1950 uses connecting to the appropriations, we're short of water at a specific time, not just any time but at a specific time.

Because the doctrine of appropriation is a contemporaneous system to deal with shortages on the river. It doesn't happen in the abstract. It happens at a specific place on the river at a specific time, and that evidence is sorely lacking from Montana. When you look at the evidence with regard to shortages and uses and things like that, it's never tied to a

specific time, and yet it must be in order for them to prevail.

Next, Montana needs to show a specific shortage. It needs to show that it engaged in appropriate intrastate mechanisms to make sure that its post-1950 uses are curtailed so that water that may come across the state line to the State of Montana doesn't go to a post-1950 usage.

And I think -- in preparing for this hearing it got me thinking about the discretionary operations at Tongue River Reservoir, and whether you view the bypasses that occur over the course of the winter to keep the reservoir low as a discretionary operational review and look at it in terms of the first element under whether or not there's a real pre-1950 shortage, or you can view them as an appropriate intrastate regulatory mechanism.

Montana has the appropriate intrastate regulatory mechanism to prevent a shortage in the Tongue River Reservoir. All they have to do is hit the button on that thing and shut the gate on the reservoir. And if they don't do that they cannot proceed with their contract claim. And they didn't. They just didn't.

They are getting better. We all know they are

getting better. So they are storing more water.

They've been more judicious about their winter releases and consequently there's been lots more water. We've had better water years as well.

But nevertheless you can view Montana's obligation to decrease its bypasses as an appropriate intrastate regulatory mechanism that they must engage in before they call on Wyoming to satisfy any shortfall. And perhaps that's even a better way to review those bypasses rather than under the doctrine. Either way you get to the same result. If Montana dumps a whole bunch of water into Yellowstone, they can't come to us and ask us to make up the difference. They just cannot do that.

The next element, of course, is they have to provide us with notice. Notice isn't magic, but notice is serious. And, of course, we've asked you to reconsider your ruling and say that notice must be done in writing between two sovereign states that are going to have to engage the full assets of the state to deal with this call, we're going to have to get people to go up and down that basin and make sure that our post-1950 uses are compared.

This is very different than a call between two adjacent farmers that could be made orally between them

or to a hydrographer commissioner who is up and down a small portion of the river every day. This is different and the formality of the notice ought to be different. And I understand we have this period of time prior to today where really our obligation was to give Montana the benefit of every doubt, give them every opportunity to show that it provided notice to Wyoming.

We're past that point now and now we can make a decision for the future that reflects the formality of the call process. And it doesn't have to be anything major. We saw in the 2004 and 2006 call letters a couple-page letter saying "we are calling on the State of Wyoming to release post-'50 water for the benefit of Montana's community."

There's no magic words there. Montana referenced requiring some magic set of words. But we don't. We just ask you to demand your rights under the Compact. It's just that simple. The evidence, of course, shows that never happened before 2004 and that it was really easy to do in 2004 and 2006 and it will be easy to do in the future.

Once notice is made then at that point in time and only that point in time can Wyoming's liability arise. Only on the date of the call can Wyoming be

liable for uses after that date. Wyoming like every junior appropriator in the prior appropriation system has the right, which Montana completely ignores, that we have the right to use water until we are called off by a senior appropriator. That's just the way the system works.

Montana describes Wyoming's operations as a free for all, a free river. It's not that in the least, but prior to a call on the river people have a water right and they are entitled to divert it until a senior says I'm not getting my water rights fulfilled and I want it and I need it and I have to put it to beneficial use. You have to show up.

Until that happens what we do in Wyoming cannot be the source of liability. We cannot look back prior to the call and say that something Wyoming did before it was put on notice that there was a need in Montana can create liability. That's just not how prior appropriation works.

Then we have the final two elements of every contract claim, causation and damages. Wyoming's breach of its promise has to result in some harm to somebody in Montana. That seems like pretty simple stuff. Yet Montana doesn't acknowledge that it bears burden of proving those developments in this case, if

valid and if they exist.

Now, Attorney General Fox said they are looking for certainty, and we are as well and I think you heard that from the testimony of the state engineer during the course of this trial. And I think that it's pretty clear that with regards to direct call certainty is pretty easy. In Montana sends us a call and we have to respond saying that we have knowledge. We'll do that in the future.

With regards to the reservoirs, it's a slightly different calculation as Mr. Fox said. We need to figure out how that's going to work by the time they make their call in June or July of any given year the ship has sailed on the spring runoff. That's fair.

And so what needs to be done is we need to have a clear guidance from this Court and when a call is made with regard to the Tongue River Reservoir the first thing we do, as we do under any system under the doctrine of appropriations, we look back at the call right and see what's going on there.

And for a reservoir that means looking back at the beginning of the water year and finding did they exercise their water right when they had the chance, did they catch the water that was available to them.

And if they didn't, they cannot place the burden of

their failure on the upstream juniors. They just 1 2 If they had the water available and they didn't catch it, it's not the juniors' burden to make up that 3 4 difference. So what's important here is that your ruling 5 6 says when the call is made we look back to the 7 beginning of the water year and evaluate how reservoirs 8 operated during that period of time prior to the call. And if the change needs to be made in those operations 9 10 because Montana fully exercised its right, fine. 11 That's okay. That's the way the system ought to work. 12 But if not, if Montana let way more water out of the bottom of that reservoir than is necessary to fill it, 13 14 then Wyoming has no liability to Montana. 15 And then we need to know how big is Montana's call right, how big is the Tongue River Reservoir, what 16 is the nature of the call right that Wyoming is 17 responsible for in some way. We are not responsible 18 for filling it, as I say, but we have an obligation 19 20 under the Compact to protect our pre-1950 rights or post-'50 rights in Wyoming and we need to know what is 21 22 the nature of that right. And by telling us that one simple thing, what 23 is the nature of the call right under the Tongue River 24

Reservoir, 99 percent of the water dispute is over.

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Once we know where the goalpost is we can then take appropriate action to make sure we get through the goalpost. And unfortunately Wyoming's position has been the Compact explicitly explains that there are both V(A) and V(C) rights in existing reservoirs as of 1950 and that the nature of their V(A) right or what is expected under V(A) is limited and not to fill capacity.

The Court is bearing in mind that the only way Montana prevails in this case -- the only way is if the math works for us -- is that Wyoming is on the hook under V(A) for the entire enlarged capacity and Montana can bypass as much water as it wants. If there's a restriction on either of those things, there's no liability. The math just doesn't work for them. They had plenty of water in both 2004 and 2006.

So unless we come down and say Montana can do whatever it wants and Wyoming is responsible like an insurer or like a guarantor for Montana's behavior, Wyoming prevails in this litigation. But simply prevailing in this litigation is not good enough. For the future we need to know the nature of that right or then we will be back here.

I urge you to tell us and recommend to the Supreme Court that the major V(A) right is in the

Tongue River Reservoir. If we know that, we can make it work.

I suppose with that I'll leave the remainder of my comments to specific issues that we have to talk about, but we appreciate the time and ultimately at the end of the day we're going to recommend, of course, that this case be dismissed, but in so doing you give us the guidance that we need to avoid future disputes.

SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you. So I actually have a couple questions, which may not go actually to the ultimate merits of the case, but I just want to go back over a couple of things you said. You started out as you promised with --

MR. KASTE: An inflammatory statement.

SPECIAL MASTER: That would be inflammatory that this was a simple breach of contract case. Now, it might very well be and, in fact, I think the rulings so far have been consistent with the notion that, like all compacts, you look to the rules of contract law in order to resolve them.

But you can't think, meaning that this is just a regular contract case or certainly that it's a simple contract case. In terms of the regular, it might be a contract, but it is a contract between sovereign entities that can only be heard before the United

States Supreme Court.

I assume that means that, again, even if the rules are the same, which is I think what you meant, that this is a case that the Supreme Court needs to give very careful attention to because it deals ultimately not with the rights of single individuals but with the rights of the states themselves.

MR. KASTE: That's exactly what I meant. I don't think the rules change based on the venue of the action or how rich or how powerful the litigants are. The rules are the rules and whether you write the contract in a statute or you write it on a bar napkin, the rules are primarily the same.

And I suspect and expect the Supreme Court to treat us like any other litigant in a contract dispute. And obviously I hope they are going to do this carefully, but the rules are the same and that's why the elements are the same. And that's why when Montana says, well, this is a contract in the statute, it's not followed up with and that means we have to do something different than we would do in ordinary contract litigation between two private parties regardless of their stature. The rules are definitely the same.

SPECIAL MASTER: Although occasionally you've actually I think referred to the fact this is a dispute

between states and argued that in this particular case Wyoming should have some sort of rights it maybe wouldn't get under an ordinary contract.

So, for example, your argument that the actual notice needs to be in writing and, in fact, earlier you argued that to finish it be in writing between the governors of the two states because after all this involves states. This is a serious matter.

MR. KASTE: Right. Well, and that goes to the nature of the parties' duties, not the elements of their claim. The nature of our duties to each other can be any number of things, you know, what did you promise to each other and what would we expect in a contract to be a reasonable -- in other words, I think the rules for contract law are notice is what's reasonable under the circumstances. Right?

And these circumstances are between two states and we don't hang out over the fence post like two farmers who have adjoining fields. We have a border. Our capitals are very far apart. We have some formal relationship between each other that's between sovereigns and the writing between those two parties to give notice that Montana is short its pre-1950 rights is reasonable under the circumstances and to be effective.

The people who testified about how interstate calls have happened in the past -- and they are rare I grant you that -- they just happen to be in writing.

And wouldn't it be great if we didn't have to fight in the future about whether or not someone like, you know, Keith Kerbel's level of government made a call on some guy at Carmine LoGuidice's level of state government that nobody else in the state government knows about in future cases?

You said in your prior ruling other than ease of proof which doesn't seem to be a good reason for this to be in writing. Well, at this point they have failed under any test prior to 2004 from that, but for the future I think ease of proof is an important consideration so that it would be real easy for us to look through the documents and say that is the day Wyoming's liability arose. They are on the hook on that day. They need to take appropriate regulatory action on that day.

Now is the time to do it right. Having given them every opportunity to prove something less for the future let's do it right and let's say it's in writing. And it can be instantaneous. That's the cool thing about today. You can write an e-mail between the compact commissioners and the governors today and it's

done just like that as if they were standing across the fence post from each other in a field.

SPECIAL MASTER: So you would agree then that even thinking about this as a compact because again a compact is a form of contract, that interpreting the Compact you need to recognize that it's a contract between states and not just between ordinary individuals?

MR. KASTE: I think that helps tell us what is reasonable under the circumstances, yes.

SPECIAL MASTER: The second thing you said is is that Wyoming needs protection, not Montana. And I certainly understand your concern that the Court needs to resolve this case in a way which is faithful to the Compact and doesn't require Wyoming to do something that the Compact does not require Wyoming to do.

But at the same time I just want to make sure that you're not disputing what Attorney General Fox said, which is that Montana as the downstream state ultimately loses if no one does anything to enforce their obligations under the Compact.

In other words, I don't see any way if the court just were to decide to walk away from this case that Montana wouldn't be the only one who could possibly suffer from that.

MR. KASTE: Well, I agree that it's 1 2 conceivable that if the Court did nothing in the course of this case, in the future Montana could be injured by 3 4 the conduct of Wyoming. It hasn't happened yet. SPECIAL MASTER: I understand that's your 5 6 argument. Go ahead. 7 MR. KASTE: But I agree that there's a 8 balancing in enforcing the plain meaning of this Compact that protects both of us. And if you go too 9 10 far in either direction, one state or the other is 11 going to be harmed. So if you allow Montana unfettered 12 bypasses through its reservoir and then it's perfectly fine for them to ask us to make up the shortfall caused 13 14 by their own action, Wyoming is injured by the failure 15 to enforce the doctrine of appropriation as against Montana. 16 Similarly, if you allow Wyoming unfettered 17 post-1950 use to the detriment of Montana's pre-1950 18 rights, Montana could be injured by our conduct. 19 20 the Compact protects us both and the Court can and should fairly apply the doctrine of appropriation to 21 22 protect Montana from post-'50 use in Wyoming and 23 Wyoming from profligate bypasses from the Tongue River Reservoir. 24 25 And they should protect us from this idea that

maybe Montana tells us in December we had a bad year and so you owe us for that entire year. That proceeds retroactively. We need to be protected from that type of claim. That's not consistent with the doctrine of appropriation at all. It's not consistent with what we agreed to in 1950 and we need the Court to say no to that.

SPECIAL MASTER: So one other thing I'm not necessarily expecting you to address right now, but I think as we get into some of the issues I want to make sure that you're addressing them along the way.

And that is again given that Montana is the downstream state, that means that they ultimately have to either rely on Wyoming complying with the Compact or the United States Supreme Court in order to ensure that the rights that they do have under the Compact are recognized.

I know that when Mr. Tyrrell was on the stand one of the things that he emphasized and a number of Wyoming officials emphasized is that, as you pointed out, Wyoming would like certainty and Wyoming plans to comply with whatever ruling the United States Supreme Court gives.

One of the things that worries me, though, when I look at the way in which this case has emerged

is that, as you pointed out, just submitting a notice to Wyoming is not necessarily going to be the end of any particular dispute.

And so in this particular case there's issues over what exactly the reservoir rights are. There are issues over whether or not Montana has actually proven a case with respect to its pre-1950 direct diversion flows. There are issues over exactly what has happened in Wyoming in terms of who has used what water, what the impact of groundwater is.

And I realize these cases are always difficult, but one of the questions I had was whether or not every single time that there is a dispute it's going to end up in the United States Supreme Court with dozens of issues like this particular case did and whether or not there's a way of resolving this case so that the Supreme Court doesn't ultimately become not simply, you know, a court enforcing a compact but basically a water court having to police each individual issue as it arises.

MR. KASTE: Well, I think the answer is if we were on our worst behavior, that could be the case, but I don't think that's anybody's intent. You know, we are in a situation where the parties have to live with this compact for the future. It's not a one-off

compact where we have this fight and then we just move away from each other.

It's not a divorce. Whoever doesn't move can't pick up our half and go home because we are going to have to work with each other in the future. And that's why certainty and guidance about the nature of the parties' rights are so important in this case so that the parties, who I think are both trying to act in good faith in line with what the court has said the Compact means, so that we can proceed without further disputes.

Of course, this isn't the only forum. We do have a dispute resolution mechanism in the Compact Commission that no one has yet taken advantage of, but it's there and both parties I think recognize that once we know where the goalpost is with regard to calls, what are they going to look like and what kind of information is Montana going to show us so that, yes, that's our problem and we need to shut off.

And it doesn't have to be much. I think what you've heard from Mr. Tyrrell is we need some reasonable assurance that there's an actual shortage and not some arbitrary number on a gauge at the state line that tells us what's happening at a headgate 200 miles away. We need some reasonable assurance that

there is actually -- and need some reasonable assurance that the water commissioners have been empowered and are shutting off any post-'50 uses.

And I think we solve the evolution from the 2004 call letter and the 2006 call letter and the attachment of the water commissioner's affidavit from 2006 was a significant step in the right direction as to what a valid call letter is likely to look like.

You know, it's likely to see a letter from the compact commissioner or the governor saying, "now is the time. Here's what my water commissioner has to say about what's going on. He's talked with the irrigators. He's talked with Mr. Muggli. We need some water. Stores are inadequate. We've taken into account the appropriate things, such as current flows, tributaries inflows. We know what's going on in the reservations."

These kind of things happen in a properly functioning system where the water commissioner has actually a strong understanding of what is the difference between the reservoir water there and the natural flow that is going to be the basis of that call.

We're going to have to take that message from the water commissioner, that message from the Compact

commissioner. And you've heard Mr. Tyrrell. We're going to respond to that. We're going to go up and down places that aren't already in regulation and that means maintaining the Tongue and Bill Knapp and Pat Boyd are going to spin headgates for those people who are taking water under post-1950 appropriations. It's not that hard to do and we do it in Wyoming all the time.

What we need, though, is some sort of assurance that what we're doing in Wyoming is really for the benefit of the pre-1950 appropriation in Montana. We didn't do that in 2004 and 2006 and we acknowledge that and the consequences that flow from that failure.

We all agree it's Pat Tyrrell's fault.

If there are consequences that flow from that, we are willing to accept those because we didn't honor the call. We will have arguments later today about, yeah, we did not get in the call. You recall that we admit that we acknowledged in those two years when we actually got the notice and we acknowledge that there was some storage after the call in 2004. We acknowledge that we didn't do the things that we need to do in the future.

But I think you heard from Pat Tyrrell we're

going to do those things in response to a call in the future. It's not that complicated. We're not likely to be back there unless we don't get good guidance on that reservoir. Because that's where the rubber meets the road in this case as I told you in the opening. That is the most important thing.

That is the lifeblood of the farmers in Montana. And the reservoirs in Wyoming are the lifeblood of our farmers and we have to send water to Montana during the course of the summer inappropriately to make up a shortfall they created, then it's going to hurt farmers in Wyoming.

SPECIAL MASTER: Let me ask you just one other question and then I want to get to the notice issue, but you did bring up issues of burden of proof.

And I have a very sort of general question on burden of proof and figuring out who has what responsibilities. I assume that in thinking now of burden of proof that I should start out by looking at the Compact to see whether or not the Compact helps gravitate that issue. And my initial impression on that is that the Compact helps in the sense that it refers specifically to prior mitigation law.

But then, second, I would look to prior appropriation law to see who would have compacts on the

issues and then to the degree that's not relevant I look at contract law. You aren't shaking your head no.

MR. KASTE: I am. I want to talk about this because there seems to be a lot of confusion that this is a contract case. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proving all the essential elements of his contract claim. There is a difference and one that we need to be cognizant of. You need to be cognizant of the difference between the prior appropriation document that honors the duty, the substantive duty of the parties and Montana's breach of contract claim in this case, which is defined by contract law and for which they bear the burden of proof on every single element.

There is a difference in the prior appropriation doctrine in practice today. We go out and someone makes a call on the river and they tell the hydrographer commissioner. "Sure. I'm on my way." And the hydrographer commissioner walks up to the next guy who is junior and shuts off his headgate.

He doesn't care. There's no burden of proof or anything. He just shuts it off. If that guy doesn't like it, well, then he has to prove that it shouldn't have been shut off. That's the burden shifting that we talked about. That's the burden that you go, hey, maybe that applies. No. That's a

different scenario in this case.

What happens in the field and what happens in response to those contemporaneous regulatory activities and who has to prove what's there is very different than what has to be proven by the parties in this case.

This case has a claim for breach of contract and the burden in that case always falls on Montana. They are different and they cannot be treated the same and we cannot intermingle those things when we look to see whether or not Montana has proven its case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Now, the prior appropriation document definitely defined our duties to each other, but it doesn't define whether or not they prevail in this case when we look at each of the elements. Because cause of action and the nature of those duties that we promised to each other in the Compact are different in the same way that -- you know, contracts contain a lot of promises and unless they specifically say we're going to move the burden of proof in some way the burden of proof always falls on the plaintiff in the case.

SPECIAL MASTER: But why if the Compact, the contract in this particular case, incorporates the law of prior appropriation, why don't I look to the law of prior appropriation then to determine not only what the

substantive responsibilities are but also what is necessary in order to establish liability?

MR. KASTE: Well, we do in the sense of what did the parties do to each other, but for the purposes of describing the burden of proof for the claim made in this case you have to look elsewhere.

This is a different case than if we had, like I say, the junior appropriator who came into court and said the water commissioner, he inappropriately shut off my diversion in order to feed the senior down there. In that case he has to prove that the water commissioner's actions were wrongful.

That's not this case at all. This is a different case. We have a contractual relationship. At its core Wyoming and Montana, we're not regular appropriators stuck on a stream together with no contract between us. We entered into a contract to settle these disputes and the nature of that relationship agreement had meaning. It's important and it puts the burden of proof on the complaining party.

At its core this case is a contract dispute by two parties who entered into an agreement. And that's different than two appropriators intrastate having a fight amongst themselves and relying on the doctrine of appropriation and state statutes to settle their

dispute as between them. And that difference is 1 2 important and that's why I say we're got to make sure that we properly differentiate the two. 3 SPECIAL MASTER: So if that's true, then in 4 thinking about what type of notice is required in this 5 6 particular case, shouldn't I look to just general 7 contract law rather than to any prior appropriation 8 cases? MR. KASTE: Well, as I say, the duty -- the 9 10 promises made to each other were to abide by the 11 doctrine of appropriation and the notice is intrinsic 12 to the doctrine of appropriation. To that I think you're right. And so our promises to each other 13 14 include that promise to provide notice. Contract law tells us what kind of notice when it's not otherwise 15 specified is sufficient. It says whatever is 16 reasonable. Right? I think you put that in one of 17 your prior rulings. 18 It seems like an oral notice would be 19 reasonable under the circumstances. I think it would 20 be better if it was something else. Anyway Montana 21 22 didn't provide it. 23 But there is this series of promises that we made to each other when we agreed to abide by the 24 25 doctrine of appropriation interstate, but that's

1	different that's at a different level than the
2	contract obligation we undertook that defines our
3	relationship.
4	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Mr. Brown, did you
5	have something to say?
6	MR. BROWN: I apologize. I did.
7	I just wanted to mention Mr. Kaste, though
8	inflammatory, is not very loud and the people in the
9	back apparently can't hear. So is there any way we can
10	boost the audio a little bit?
11	SPECIAL MASTER: I think that is the first
12	time I've ever heard anyone accuse Mr. Kaste of being
13	softspoken.
14	MR. KASTE: Well, I don't want to yell.
15	You're only six feet away from me. I mean I'm saving
16	that for later.
17	I will do my best in the future arguments to
18	try and fill the room and maybe I'll get more wound up
19	and it will happen.
20	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So this is fine. So
21	that was so I think I understand your position much
22	better than before. So this has been very helpful.
23	So why don't we move on at this stage if
24	people are fine with that and unless, Attorney General
25	Fox, you wanted to say anything in rebuttal I was going

1	to turn things over to Mr. Draper to turn to the notice
2	issue and, of course, address the general question of
3	burden of proof among others.
4	ATTORNEY GENERAL FOX: I have nothing further,
5	Your Honor. I was tempted to rest our case just based
6	on your questions and counsel's answers, but I suspect
7	we ought to add a little more.
8	SPECIAL MASTER: I think I would advise that,
9	yes.
10	Mr. Draper?
11	MR. DRAPER: Mr. Swanson will address the
12	notice issue, Your Honor.
13	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
14	MR. DRAPER: Thank you.
15	SPECIAL MASTER: Good morning, Mr. Swanson.
16	MR. SWANSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
17	At the outset I just want to point your
18	attention to Plaintiff's A in our reply brief and
19	that's the outline addressing your specific questions
20	that you had instructed the parties to address and in
21	terms of the notice provision at page 70 and so on.
22	So in the course of my argument I'll attempt
23	to answer all those questions. If at any point I
24	haven't sufficiently answered, then I will redirect as
25	you will have me readdress issues.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. That would be great.

And I do have some questions, but why don't you start out and then I'll probably just jump in fairly quickly.

MR. SWANSON: All right, Your Honor.

And at the outset I think it's important to go back to just the framing of where we are in the context of this dispute that began we know in terms of notice no later than 1981 up through 2006 for the purpose of this litigation and to remember Wyoming's response through all of those years. And there were a couple of them.

The first was continued insistence on the position that there is no provision for a call under the Compact and that was their position through 2006, in fact, until late in this litigation.

And, second, that really the dispute wasn't about Article V(A) which said Montana's pre-1950 rights should be protected against post-1950 depletions of Wyoming. They continued to assert that the dispute was really over Article V(B) simply dividing up the other remaining waters, and Montana continued to insist that, no, we, in fact, had to administer Article V(A) because until we were assured that we had our pre-'50 rights satisfied there was no point in discussing leftover water because there, in fact, may not be leftover

1	water.
2	And those two positions continually adhered to
3	by Wyoming give us the context for all of the arguments
4	over notice and call in the years from 1981 through
5	2006. And specifically if you look at 2004 and 2006
6	letters, and I'll start there and go back to the
7	beginning, Wyoming said there, in fact, is no provision
8	for a call, although Mr. Kaste has acknowledged that
9	was a call and he says there was no call prior to 2004.
10	So if that's the standard, that there has to
11	be a formal letter citing the detailed portions of the
12	Compact, now let's go back and look at 1981. And in
13	1981 Montana not just provided notice, Montana called
14	for water under the Compact. And we have written
15	evidence produced by the handwriting of the State
16	Engineer of the State of Wyoming.
17	And Mr. Fritz, our responsible official,
18	called Mr. Christopulos, Wyoming's responsible
19	official this is Exhibit Montana 136 and asked
20	for water, identified that we were short of water,
21	asked that water that senior water rights in Wyoming
22	be curtailed in order to provide us water.
23	And Wyoming, in fact according to
24	Mr. Fassett, this is actually Christopulos's

handwriting. So it's stated here himself calculated

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that there were post-1950 water rights being enjoyed on the interstate ditch in Wyoming and added up to instead of 9 I believe it was 18 to 20 CFS, which he had identified specific places they could curtail and the location of that ditch as close to the border that water would have gone to Montana.

And so we have a crystal clear situation here where there was a Compact violation and yet Wyoming maintains that was not a valid call.

So what we have, Your Honor, is an elevation of the standard of what Montana's duties are for notice or for call under this Compact that, if we look through that prism, we realize we're back to the thing General Fox mentioned in his opening: Number one, that we believe the evidence proves we did provide adequate notice, but, number two, that we are concerned about what future calls will look like and what future notices will look like and how Wyoming will respond.

So with that framework I think it's clear in 1981 we provided adequate notice and Wyoming should be liable for that notice. In 1982 the Compact Commission discussed this issue and at that point Montana stated that it would provide notice of Wyoming when it was short. Wyoming did not commit to responding by curtailing any rights.

In 1983 Dan Ashenberg produced a memorandum that was a proposed methodology of how to protect Montana's rights under Article V(A). What you see here beginning even in those years Montana is working to creatively find a way to protect senior water rights and find a way to reach a yes with Wyoming.

In 1984 Montana's governor wrote a letter that said that Montana's pre-1950 water rights should be satisfied. Wyoming's governor disagreed.

In 1985 Montana expressed its frustration at the Yellowstone River Compact engineer meeting. We are trying to find a way to administer the Compact and we have now provided five years of discussion and requests that Montana's senior water rights be honored. Wyoming continues to resist.

1986. Gary Fritz and George Christopulos had a phone call that's part of the wire CC record that Mr. Fassett testified to on working on a process to administer the Compact and to seek a way to honor Montana's senior water rights and Christopulos in that conversation acknowledged the 1981 call when they were aware at that time that Montana's water rights were in jeopardy of not being honored.

SPECIAL MASTER: I'm sorry. I want to jump into the elements because I'm thinking that I have

several questions I want to ask and rather than sort of going through each of the years because, again, I've found that. I've looked at the evidence on these.

So I guess the first question -- this is going to be relevant to both you and also to Wyoming. So both sides have suggested I should reconsider some of my initial ruling with respect to whether notice is required and, if so, what the nature of that notice should be.

So Wyoming, you know, believes that, you know, I should make it very clear, it's in writing. Montana has suggested and cited two new cases, one from Wyoming and one from Montana that, in fact, I should reconsider whether or not notice is required at all.

In that regard what is the status of my prior rulings on this? You know, to what degree should I at this stage be willing to reopen what the actual notice should look like, whether or not notice is even required? Should I just view this as basically an open question again or at this particular stage should I feel myself as somewhat bound by what I said before?

What makes this a particularly interesting issue is, of course, ultimately it's the Supreme Court that decides these issues and what I will be doing in my special report is making recommendations to the

Supreme Court on how to rule on this particular issue.

So do you have any thoughts on that question?

MR. SWANSON: I do, Your Honor. I do. And
the reason I was going to go through the narrative of
the years is I wanted to address an issue of possible
exceptions to the notice requirement. And I think my
discussion on that will inform your question and, if it
doesn't answer it, I'll continue to reemphasize it.

But the idea that there are reasons why

Montana shouldn't be required to provide notice, you
indicated three possible exceptions. One, Montana -we argued that, number one, it would be futile. And
the reason I started with the discussion of all those
years is it became clear Wyoming had set its legal
position and was not going to change. It was the
upstream state and didn't have to until we forced them
somehow to do that.

So year after year even though we continued to provide information and provide ways, creative ways to administer the Compact and receive our rights and specifically our officials, if you remember the testimony of Mr. Stults, was they were very cautious about getting into a litigation position with Wyoming because of the financial resources and because of other reasons.

And so we were trying to provide a way for Montana's rights to be honored without taking it to the nuclear option. And yet through all those years Wyoming persisted to not change its position and continued to say there's no call, we're not required and under V(A) your rights are protected.

So I think in terms of the futility issue that further notice wasn't going to avail Montana of anything. The second --

SPECIAL MASTER: So if I can just ask on the futility side because I certainly got the sense from the variety of Montana's witnesses that they felt frustrated at the time. But given that in 1981 after there was, you know, what you consider to have been a notice to Montana there appears to have been a recognition on the record at a Yellowstone River Compact Commission meeting that, you know, this was an issue and that Montana would provide notice in the future.

Is there any statement after that in which Wyoming basically said, no, you know, don't even think about providing notice, we're not going to do anything at all? In other words, you know, once you have that statement in the Yellowstone River Compact Commission, that seems to be a recognition that maybe Wyoming will

do something if they get a notice. 1 2 And so can you argue that it was futile to provide a notice after that when Wyoming seemed to 3 4 recognize that maybe they would do something with notice? 5 MR. SWANSON: Well, Your Honor, first of all, 6 7 there wasn't a requirement that it was a written notice 8 in that sense. 9 SPECIAL MASTER: That's a separate issue. Put 10 it aside. Just address the futility question. 11 MR. SWANSON: Separate issue. 12 Wyoming never committed to act even in 1982 when we basically voluntarily said we're going to keep telling 13 14 you when we're short on water. If you look at all the 15 subsequent communications -- and I'm not specifically talking about the Compact Commission communications 16 because what we've had here are many Montana and 17 Wyoming state officials who in multiple or dual had it 18 that carried on those communications whether it was 19 20 inside the Compact Commission or outside the Compact Commission. 21 22 But one of the things that's interesting is this 1984 exchange of letters between the Montana and 23 the Wyoming governors and at that point the official 24

position of Wyoming was communicated to the highest

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1	level again saying we don't believe we have any
2	obligation to curtail, to honor your senior water
3	rights.
4	So that's an example where the boss of the
5	boss of our Compact Commissioner received word that
6	basically Wyoming is not going to respond. I don't
7	know. There may be something in this particular record
8	that we could go find, but in terms of the
9	communications that happened from officials from the
10	bottom level to the top level, Wyoming's position was
11	there's no point in asking because we're not going to
12	send you water.
13	And that goes all the way through all the
14	years in question, all the testimony of Rich Moy,
15	testimony of Jack Stults, Keith Kerbel, all the way
16	down.
17	Does that answer your question in terms of
18	what you're looking for?
19	SPECIAL MASTER: Yes. It's responsive to the
20	question. That was exactly what I'm asking.
21	MR. SWANSON: The second thing in terms of the
22	exception to the notice is the exception dealing with
23	Wyoming had other reasons to know, Wyoming already knew
24	even without our providing them affirmative notice that
25	our rights were short. And this one is pretty obvious.

They were experts on the hydrology. Our people were experts on the hydrology. You heard a lot of testimony about the hydrograph and how it drops off after the runoff. And you heard a lot of testimony about how water from the Tongue and Powder River Basin is all, with some very minor exceptions, runoff from the State of Wyoming.

So in each of those conversations -- let's take, for example, the conversations between Mr. Kerbel and the Wyoming officials. And you recall that he kept saying, "Hey, it's really dry up here." And they said, "Yeah, it's really dry down here and we're regulating back to 1881."

Well, all these water professionals knew the geography. They knew where the Montana water comes from. It comes from Wyoming. If Wyoming is regulating back to 1881, how in the world can Montana 1951 rights be receiving their water? They can't. And they all knew that.

Not only did they all know that from their own personal knowledge but from all of the communications that went back and forth beginning -- I mean, you know, probably no later than -- well, certainly the Compact Commission negotiations and certainly communications that happened in the 1950s, 1970s onwards which we

pointed out in our statement of facts.

So the water situation in Wyoming is so linked with the water situation in the Tongue River there wasn't a reason why Montana had to call Wyoming and say it was dry. They would be calling us and telling us it was dry before we knew it was dry.

SPECIAL MASTER: Could I just again -- this is probably a good inroad into another central issue I have with respect to this and it's the -- it's the question of whether or not the ultimate purpose of the notice or any section which exists under notice is to ask whether or not Wyoming knew that Montana needed water.

So it's a question of just, you know, was there knowledge that, in fact, Montana was short of water, or was there an additional requirement that was necessary, which is that not only did Montana -- or Wyoming have to know that Montana was short of water but that Montana needed to say please release some water pursuant to the Compact for our particular use.

And in my various rulings on the question of notice I suggested that it's not just a matter of whether or not Wyoming has suspicions that maybe Montana was short on water, but until there was an actual demand then Wyoming wasn't under any obligation.

1	And the reason why I included that in those
2	earlier rulings was because if you look at the various
3	cases there are not very many of them. There are
4	various cases that talk about a call the suggestion
5	is that the element of a call is it's a demand for
6	water. It's the junior appropriator saying to the
7	senior I'm sorry, the senior the senior
8	appropriator saying to the junior appropriator, you
9	know, we need your water.
10	And so, you know, if you go, for example, to,
11	you know, the major case that I relied upon in those
12	earlier rulings, which was the Worley case, then, you
13	know, what Worley specifically said was that the
14	requirement is that there be an actual demand for the
15	water.
16	And so I'm just interested in your thoughts as
17	to whether or not that should be a requirement and, if
18	not, why.
19	MR. SWANSON: Well, and I want to preface it
20	by saying we're not even though I'm arguing for the
21	exceptions, I'm arguing for clear exceptions as well as
22	Wyoming resisted efforts to
23	SPECIAL MASTER: And I want to get back to
24	that. It's just this question of whether or not it's
25	just, you know, understanding that Montana needs water

or a specific request where Montana says it needs the water is I think relevant to two things.

Number one is how I might apply that exception of what actually Wyoming knew. Because the exception may not make a lot of sense when I think back at it if, in fact, you know, what a call generally requires is an actual demand for the water.

And then, second of all, in a lot of the testimony of the various witnesses with respect to what happened at various points in time, I think that if you look at the testimony of a lot of the Montana witnesses a lot of them are saying, yeah, we told Wyoming we were short of water down here, but then when it gets to the question of, well, did you actually make a call on the water, then things become a little bit vaguer leaving the possibility that what was happening was you had Montana officials calling up people in Wyoming and saying, hey, we're short on water down here but never saying the words "and therefore please release the water."

And so I think this question of whether or not that demand element is essential could be determined on some of these things.

MR. SWANSON: Yes, Your Honor. And we're not trying to say that no notice because we didn't provide

notice. We think it's crystal clear we provided notice in all those years, '81, '87, '88, '89, 2000, 2001, 2002 and obviously 2004 and 2006. We believe we provided adequate notice to Wyoming in each of those years.

Secondly, we also, and without the formality that Wyoming would like, asked for water, certainly in 1981 because that one is evidenced by the documents.

And I'll talk about the other one in a moment.

So the question would be is there not a requirement for Montana to demand a certain amount of water. And looking at your previous notice requirements your notice requirement was that Montana did not believe it was receiving sufficient water under the Compact and Montana placed Wyoming on adequate notice that it wasn't receiving this water and then the duty was -- we didn't have to determine the reason for the insufficiency, but the fact that it would be on Wyoming to determine whether the insufficiency was the result of their post-'50 uses.

And this is your opinion from December 20th, 2011 on the notice requirements. We think that ruling should stand unless we feel that the exceptions are strong enough given Wyoming's continued intransigence on this issue.

Going to the second part, which is whether we had to actually demand water, that's why I began with this context of Wyoming's continued legal position that there is no such thing as a call on this Compact and that even if there were that it would only apply to Article V(B) allocations by percentage, not Article V(A) protection of our rights.

That context shades Montana -- the behavior of Montana officials. We knew we were up against the wall and in the words of Mr. Moy we could only push water uphill so long and eventually you give up. And because we knew we were up against an unyielding partner we ended up having the Jack Stults mentality which said, "I'm not going to demand. I'm going to come up with creative ways to try and get more water out of this basin because I don't want to have to spend the next ten years in litigation," which is ultimately what we've done.

And so what Mr. Stults did is he tried to come up with a way to say let's get more water out of this basin. He was not trying to rewrite the Compact or form a new compact as Wyoming claims. He said in his testimony he was trying to find a way more cooperatively to get more water out of the basin and, if that didn't work, he could always go back to just

1	saying, no, we're only going to go by the plain meaning
2	of the words.
3	And I asked him in his testimony, "Why did you
4	propose this more creative cooperative way to manage
5	it? Was it to get more water?"
6	He said, "That's the only reason I did it was
7	to try and get more water from Montana."
8	And I asked him, "Did you understand did
9	Wyoming officials do you believe Wyoming officials
10	understood that to be a call?"
11	And he said, "They are professional water
12	engineers. They would have had to be deluded not to
13	understand that as a call."
14	That was our last effort at cooperative ways
15	to get water without demands prior to 2004. So if you
16	look at those years with Mr. Stults, 2002, 2001, and
17	you look at Mr. Kerbel's testimony in the same years as
18	well as 2000, each time they asked for water.
19	Mr. Kerbel said in his own way, "Hey, can you
20	kick any water, any more water down here?"
21	And Mr. LoGuidice or whoever he spoke to said,
22	"Nope. We're all dried up," even though they weren't
23	regulated.
24	So I don't know that we have to number one,
25	I don't think there's any reason to revisit it. Number

two, I think the evidence is clear that we provided notice and we also requested water even though we didn't do it with the formality that Wyoming required.

But, number three, going back to the context of this basin it's clear for future remedy purposes. It's clear that Wyoming understands the basin, Montana understands the basin. The analysis by Mr. Book shows when water will be needed in Montana. Certainly for direct flow it's engaged and if the flow that he's established in his Exhibit M6 flows into the reservoir we will know on June 30th whether our reservoir is full.

And so rather than overcomplicate this by trying to go back and revisit it, we think the standard established is acceptable and we think that we have met that standard in each of the years at issue, but in addition to that Wyoming's continued opposition to cooperating with us and Wyoming's continued statements from 1981 onward saying we will not honor a call no matter how fancy you make it also should relieve us of the burden of some of those years when we can't, for example, 2000, tell you a specific date when we provided notice.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Let me just sort of go back and talk about the various findings on my plate.

So I'm assuming the best from your standpoint is that I conclude that, in fact, in the relevant years that based on the testimony of the Montana witnesses that, in fact, Montana issued calls, and they might not have been written calls, but they actually made it clear to Wyoming that not only was Montana short of water but they wanted Wyoming to produce water. Okay. That would be clearest for you.

The second possibility, though, is that looking at the record that with the exception of 2004 and 2006 what I conclude is that, well, certainly there were a lot of people in Montana that called people in Wyoming and said, "hey, we're short on water here" so that Wyoming should have known that Montana needed some additional water. But no one got to that sort of last phrase of saying "and we demand, we ask, we want you to provide Montana with some additional water."

Now, if I just look back at what my prior rulings have said, it would suggest that if I were to conclude that, then I would have to rule against Montana. And the reason is is that -- right now I'm just going to quote from page 14 of my September 28th, 2012 decision on Wyoming's motion for partial summary judgment. This is on page 14 and talking about what the notice would require.

I say, "In this case, such information would include notification that Montana is not getting sufficient water to meet its pre-1950 appropriative rights and a request that Wyoming reduce its post-1950 uses of water in order to allow more water to flow to Montana."

And the reason why I included both counts of that, both that, number one, Montana isn't getting enough water and, number two, Wyoming should release water to us is that if I look back at the Worley case, again one of the few cases out there that actually addresses what is required -- just as a total digression, I'm surprised at how many basic issues of prior appropriation law appear never to have been resolved by a court or addressed by one court. You would think there would be a lot of law on these issues.

But it says that an upstream junior generally cannot be held liable for downstream seniors', quote, "shortage of water" unless the senior has demanded has that water, to the extent of its needs and within the senior appropriation, be allowed to reach its diversion point. The absence of such a demand is decisive.

So there seemed to be that sort of critical element of the call that it was something more than

simply notice of we're not getting enough water. 1 2 saying "and release some." And I guess one of my -- so my first guestion 3 4 is I assume that Montana would claim that actually it would be fine even if there wasn't that demand and, if 5 that's the case, your view would be that that was an 6 7 adequate form of notice, what was the argument for 8 ignoring the demand portion of it and just saying the amount of water by itself is sufficient? 10 MR. SWANSON: Well, first of all, Your Honor, we wouldn't concede that we never asked. 11 12 SPECIAL MASTER: Oh, I understand. Ι I thought I'd just be going down and I 13 understand. 14 start out with the best scenario for Montana and then 15 just walking down to see depending on what I ultimately conclude the Supreme Court thought what the law should 16 be. 17 MR. SWANSON: And so in terms of if we were at 18 that point of we notified or didn't do the demand or, 19 20 as Jeff Fassett said, we didn't pound on the table or say the magic words, where we are is we are in the 21 22 context that I began from 1981 at minimum onward communicated by the state engineer, by the governor 23 that said we're not going to provide the water. 24 25 In fact, Wyoming in its post-trial brief says

1981 was not a call and the reason it wasn't a call is because the handwritten notes say that Mr. Fritz has said if we ask for curtailment what we would get. And Wyoming said, well, you'd get this much, but we won't give it to you.

And Wyoming said, well, you didn't ask for water. That was a hypothetical that what if we did ask for water. And that's our point, that from 1981 onward what we had was a position by Wyoming that says you can ask and it doesn't matter. We're not going to give it to you.

So we had two parallel tracks. You had a track with the chairman who wouldn't do anything and so he wouldn't take both. And so you had continued efforts year after year to try and administer the Compact that were continually met with lack of a second on a motion by Wyoming. And you had the track of the more informal communications between Montana and Wyoming regulators that are continuing to talk to each other.

And those can't be viewed in isolation. What those demonstrate is a continued request by Montana for water, but that that water can't be provided unless Wyoming agrees to do it under the Compact, and they continued to refuse year after year meeting after

meeting to even address the issue under the Compact.

And as you heard from the water commissioners from Wyoming, and each of them sat on the stand and were asked the question would you regulate the interstate gates for the main stem of the Tongue to provide water for Montana. And they said, well, we're not going to do it until the state engineer tells us to do it.

The state engineer was with the water commissioner -- or the Compact Commissioner who said we're not going to do it. So that's the reason why I began with that context, Your Honor, is that we knew not just because it was hypothetical, but because we had asked repeatedly for that water and were continually told no.

So at some point the Jack Stults we're going to try something more creative approach took over, which is even though he's asking for water he's asking to -- he's asking to more creatively do it in order to get the water, but he's still -- his testimony was saying he's asking for it, but really what he was doing is he recognized he was up against a brick wall and the demand was pointless if he did.

SPECIAL MASTER: Let me just -- so we've talked about what the notice might look like. We've

talked about the futility exception. So as you pointed out, another exception which I suggested in my original opinion was a potential exception for preventing Compact administration. The notion here was that, to the degree that Montana kept trying to set up a process for meeting its rights under the Compact and Wyoming just kept avoiding those, that maybe at some point Montana would not have any obligation to provide any form of notice.

And as you pointed out, I think there's a lot of testimony on the record that there were various efforts on Montana's part to come up with various approaches for managing the Compact and Wyoming certainly participated in those negotiations, in some cases rejected ideas.

If I had a situation where Montana had a proposal that basically said, look, we need a process so that when pre-1950 appropriators of Montana are not getting their water Wyoming is going to release water from post-1950 appropriators. And Wyoming said no, we're not going to come up with any process for dealing with that.

That would be the sort of thing I would see falling under the exception, but at the trial most of what I heard were situations where it was Montana

coming up with an approach to administering the Compact as a whole, not just protecting pre-1950s appropriators from post-1950 appropriations in Wyoming, but dealing with a whole variety of other questions such as how do you actually implement Article V(B) or how you might run the entire watershed on a more holistic basis in order to maximize the amount of water coming out.

And that's what I heard Wyoming on a number of occasions saying no, we actually aren't sold on that.

And that strikes me as a very different matter because it's really getting to other issues where maybe Montana wasn't actually just trying to exercise its rights under the compact but trying to come up with something more than what the Compact provided.

So with that as background my question is was there or are you aware of a situation where there was a proposal that just addressed the sort of narrow stuff, this narrow issue of bringing up post-1950 water or pre-1950 appropriations in Montana where Wyoming said no, we're not going to go along with that?

MR. SWANSON: Your Honor, I'm not aware of one in isolation because they all were part of this overall conversation with the Compact, but that specific issue was addressed in these conversations. If you recall, there were kind of three major issues that were of

controversy in the 1980s. There was the Middle Fork project which was the unbuilt reservoir in Wyoming, the question of Article V(A), the question of the Article V(B) apportionment.

But the Article V(A) issue not only lingered but was viewed by Montana as a threshold issue that had to be dealt with before that. If you look back at the conversation between Mr. Fritz and Mr. Christopulos in 1986, that phone call. In that conversation Mr. Fritz went back and said, look, I know we keep talking about these other issues, but we have to understand what our senior rights were before we can talk about what's left over.

That's one example. And the specific examples where there's a written proposal to specifically deal with that at the moment escape, Your Honor, but it was not something where we were acquiescing to all of this stuff needs to go together or we're going to create a substitute compact, but, rather, it was a way to get past no and to address the issue of first we have to understand not only what -- how to protect but certainly quantify the pre-1950 water rights in Wyoming and the pre-1950 water rights in Montana.

That was the point actually behind our 2002 commissioning of the HKM study. We knew Wyoming had

just studied all their senior water rights and so we hired HKM to do the same or to give us another look at that because we felt that we had to have a better source of information of what was their pre-'50 water rights and then compare that to all the new development, the expansion that was going on at that time.

Mr. Moy testified that he was very concerned about the Wyoming Water Development Commission that was expanding the use of reservoirs and expanding the use of irrigation to the expense of other things, but specifically what he was looking at with respect to his testimony on that, he was looking at the issue of understanding the pre-1950 water rights violation, the current use, and then what the change of demand would be because he knew that Montana's pre-1950 water rights were not ever going to be met unless there was some way to administer that language.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you.

So just one last question which is on the question of the 2004 and 2006 notices. So Wyoming is claiming that Montana should not be able to obtain damages for any of the shortages to pre-1950s appropriators prior to the dates of those two notices.

And as you pointed out, in one of my earlier

rulings I said, you know, if Montana acted with due diligence, then they shouldn't be put at any loss because of the fact they could not provide a notice instantaneously.

My original intent in doing that was with the notion that, you know, Montana realizes that it's short on water; it immediately needs to make sure, in fact, it is; that, in fact, it's insuring that all the water it has is actually being utilized; that it looks like maybe Wyoming has some water to issue the notice. And I assume that that would mean that they post-date the notice by maybe a week, two weeks, something of that nature.

That's a little bit different than saying we're going to go all the way back, go all the way to the beginning of the irrigation season. And so I guess my question there is is there anything on the record, to your knowledge, that suggests that there was a reason why Montana couldn't have issued notice a little bit earlier than it actually did? Because again that whole exception is based on the assumption of due diligence.

MR. SWANSON: But, Your Honor -- and do you want me to go specifically by year?

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.

MR. SWANSON: Because I think each of them 1 2 have specific instances to it. SPECIAL MASTER: Go ahead. 3 MR. SWANSON: 2006 was the year that the 4 notice was -- the call letter itself was later 5 6 summoned. And you recall the testimony from Chuck 7 Dalby. He was the hydrologist who issued a memorandum to Jack Stults in June that said flows are looking 8 9 pretty good. We might make it this year. And if you 10 look at Dale Book's report, table 5 from 10/5 you see that the mean flow in the month of June was 3.4 CFS. 11 12 So that being the mean the first half of it would probably be pretty good for water. 13 14 And Mr. Dalby issued that memo right in that 15 flush period. And then he testified that conditions changed rapidly and I think within one week later he 16 had -- there was an e-mail that's in evidence where he 17 said things aren't looking so good. And it was 30 18 19 days, about 30 days later when Montana submitted that 20 call letter to Wyoming. Now, in the letter, though, it also references 21 that Montana had contacted Wyoming and told them the 22 letter was coming prior to that. I think the reason 23 for the delay there is because we all recognized this 24 25 was, in fact, likely to be the straw that broke the

camel's back and sent us to litigation. And so I think

Montana was worried about just getting all its

information ready.

But the factor there in terms of the late call in that summer was the conditions changed. The conditions changed sometime in the middle to the second half of June and it went from good flows that drop off to very low flow. And that was a direct flow issue. There was a small amount, I think a 10 percent shortage in the reservoir.

But the reservoir fill season goes all the way to June 30th. So we were still within our reservoir fill season. And if the flows are strong in June, according to Kevin Smith, I believe he said they were looking good for the reservoir and then things dropped off. So in June -- or in 2006. I don't think it was a tardy issue or lack of diligence. The conditions changed and we responded to it.

In 2004 that was a call in the beginning of the irrigation season. That was in early May. And, in fact, Wyoming officials received notice at an advisory committee meeting before that call that we were worried about our direct flow and that it was highly likely the Tongue River Reservoir was likely not going to fill.

So again that was the front end of that

irrigation season and still well within the reservoir 1 2 fill season. So Montana was diligent on that issue. If you look at 2002 -- this is interesting, 3 4 Your Honor. 2002 Mr. Stults had a couple of letters that he was writing back and forth. He received some 5 letters from Art Hayes and a state legislator named 6 7 Norma Bixby and he responded with a couple of response e-mails and these exhibits are Montana 141 -- I'm 8 sorry, not e-mails. They were written letters. 9 10 Wyoming 67 and Montana 144. 11 On May 23rd Mr. Stults wrote a letter to 12 Representative Bixby and Mr. Hayes that said: "Thank you for talking to me about the concerns of the low 13 flows and we will -- based on the information that 14 15 you've given me and gathered we will communicate this to Wyoming at our next interaction." That was May 16 17 23rd. Exhibit Wyoming 67. May 29th, so six days 18 later Mr. Stults writes a letter to Mr. Hayes and says 19 20 we met with Wyoming to resolve these water supply issues and it didn't go well. 21 22 So we know not only did he respond rapidly to the concerns and met with Wyoming in that six-day 23 period, but he provided a call -- or a notice and a 24 25 request for water in that six-day period as well.

Again that's before the end of May. That's going to 1 2 be at the front end of the irrigation season and that's still within the fill period for the Tongue River 3 4 Reservoir. So we think he was diligent with that. We also know from his testimony and 5 6 Mr. Kerbel's testimony that they were part of a 7 advisory committee and they were monitoring snow pack 8 every winter. They were continually looking at this 9 and also responding to the changes of water conditions 10 because sometimes the snow pack isn't the best teller. You recall in 2003, the testimony in 2003 was 11 12 the snow pack was low. They were convinced they would have to fill and then they had heavy spring rains and 13 14 they didn't have to -- they were able to fill the 15 reservoir. So conditions changed and they did the best they could. 16 SPECIAL MASTER: That's actually -- this has 17 been helpful. I just wanted to get that sort of 18 general sense of how you're thinking about the issues. 19 So I'm a little bit concerned about time. 20 There's some other important issues also and I want to make sure we 21 22 don't get bogged down purely on notice, but this has been very helpful. 23 So what I would suggest, Mr. Kaste, is we take 24 25 about a ten-minute break now since we've been going for

an hour and forty minutes and we come back at 10:30. 1 2 Does that give people enough of a break? Ten minutes? Okay. Great. 3 (Recess taken.) 4 MR. SWANSON: Your Honor, I wasn't sure if you 5 6 were dismissing me at the end of that, but I did have one questions of yours that I haven't answered that I 7 8 was hoping for a moment. 9 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. That would be fine. 10 MR. SWANSON: And specifically in the question you posed to was and you just asked me a moment ago is 11 12 shouldn't Wyoming be liable for any periods prior to the notice or the call. 13 14 SPECIAL MASTER: Right. 15 MR. SWANSON: And specifically in terms of storage, any storage that they would have done for 16 post-'50 storage rights in the fill season even before 17 the call would still be out of priority. Particularly 18 if our reservoir doesn't fill they can release that and 19 20 send it down to our senior storage right just like they do within their own state. 21 So in terms of the liability prior to the 22 call, they haven't lost the ability to still -- prior 23 to the notice they haven't lost the ability to still 24 25 meet our shortage by sending that water down.

And the other thing that's interesting about this is this concept of free river that Wyoming has when in certain periods of runoff they are allowing everyone to take beyond their water right, what's their pre- or post-'50 water right. And if you look at the timing, a large amount of that water that may be for storage or direct flow use beyond anybody's water rights is waters that would be flowing down to fill the Tongue Reservoir in the spring.

And so Wyoming should be held liable for that water that was taken beyond anyone's water right under the concept of free river that would have flown down in the spring and filled up the Tongue River Reservoir.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So actually I do have a question with respect to that.

So back when we first started out one of Montana's claims was that if there was post-1950 water stored at an early part of the water year and at a later point in time pre-1950 appropriators in Montana needed that water that Wyoming would need to spill that water in order to meet the needs of the pre-1950 appropriators in Montana.

And Montana actually at the time of the original hearing on Montana's motion -- I'm sorry, Wyoming's motion to dismiss seemed to concede that if

there was water stored for post-1950 use at a time when the needs of pre-1950 appropriators were fully met that that would then be stored in priority and it would be Wyoming's water.

Is this different than that?

MR. SWANSON: This is different than that.

This is different from that, Your Honor. And I think the first question would be when you deposit storage early in a water year what do you mean by that. Do you mean right after October 1st or do you mean after January or at some point after January the runoff begins? Because Montana's -- and probably some of this is because of the further development of our factual -- of the factual record.

Montana's storage on the Tongue -- in the Tongue River Reservoir limited by our winter operational factors which Mr. Wechsler will address as needed, but we reach a point when we can't store more in the winter due to the concrete issues, due to the potential for flooding, et cetera.

If we're at a point where we can't store and Wyoming is storing post-'50 storage, that's a different issue than what I'm discussing. What I'm discussing -- and this is rooted in the testimony. The testimony despite earlier representations by Wyoming that all

their storage happens in the winter where it's frozen, and that's fine if that does because that still is going to be potentially water that is stored out of priority, that's going to be an issue of snow and runoff.

And I guess just briefly what I mean by that is the Tongue can be storing at a point when the Big Horns are still frozen and the reservoirs in Wyoming are storing water that should be passing through to be stored in the Tongue River Reservoir. Let's say it's in March, but the reservoirs at high altitude are still in effect.

But what I'm specifically speaking to is also the factual testimony by Wyoming officials including water users. Tom Koltiska spoke to this when he talked about the Kearny Reservoir. They store primarily in the spring runoff at the same time as the Tongue River Reservoir and they make no distinction between pre- and post-'50 water right. And that seemed to hold true for a number of the Wyoming reservoirs and it certainly holds true for the padlock reservoirs.

So what we are positing is this scenario where June 30th arrives. The Tongue River Reservoir is not filled -- is not full, and we say send us the rest of your -- send us maybe a certain amount of post-'50

storage or we typically notify them that, in fact, we're short. Then Wyoming would release water that was stored at the time when it would have been stored in Tongue River Reservoir and it was stored under the later water right.

That would certainly come to affect water stored prior to our notification for a call to Wyoming and then that would still be water that would have -- that would have injured -- Montana would have been injured by the storage of that water and, therefore, we should be entitled to it.

SPECIAL MASTER: And your argument is you're entitled to that because of the rule of priority?

MR. SWANSON: Well, what I'm going to characterize as the rule of priority, really what it is is water stored in a junior reservoir right that had it not been stored would have come and been stored by our senior right, and that's protected under Article V(A) of the Compact.

The same could be true as well about the high mountain reservoirs, but I don't know that the court needs to slice it that thinly because really what it amounts to is -- really what it amounts to is you know all those calculations that we talked about that would carry over storage from the Wyoming officials and

Montana officials and you're into a more difficult factual situation and probably one that actually would be better addressed under the topics raised by Mr. Draper.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. But just to ask this question again. So other than Wyoming's practice with respect to how they treat their own reservoirs in that situation, is there any other either legal or administrative rules that you would cite to support your proposition?

MR. SWANSON: Well, and I don't want to -- I don't want to leave out free river as well, the water stored under free river conditions that would have punched into the Tongue River Reservoir. And that is just plainly looking at the doctrine of prior appropriations in both states which says you can't put water for the benefits of users if you don't have a water right for it.

And so that's just a clear violation of the doctrine of prior appropriation if a senior downstream would use that water, not that really anybody would have a water right downstream or someone who's storing it or giving it that has no water right. But that wouldn't apply to post-'50 water on behalf of Montana. So I just want to focus on the pre-'50 satisfaction of

1	rights by curtailing free river with an expansion of
2	pre-'50 water rights.
3	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
4	MR. SWANSON: And then as far as the other
5	issue goes in terms of if water is stored by a junior
6	reservoir stream and then is released to a senior
7	reservoir, I would look at the testimony of Wyoming.
8	That's how Wyoming does it under their own rules.
9	That's how Montana does it, although we aren't faced
10	with the same stacking of reservoirs ordinarily that we
11	see in the Big Horn Mountains.
12	But if they are applying that standard to
13	their own reservoirs, they shouldn't object to applying
14	that standard to our enjoyment of our senior right
15	under the Compact.
16	SPECIAL MASTER: Is there any testimony in the
17	record as to what Montana's practice is on that
18	particular point? I mean, I know there was the
19	testimony with respect to the way in which Wyoming
20	handled its reservoirs, but I don't recall any
21	testimony on Montana's practice.
22	MR. SWANSON: Your Honor, I don't know that
23	it would have been Kevin Smith's testimony, if there
24	was any, and because he talked in general about
25	reservoir operations I don't know that that particular

issue came up because we aren't faced with that situation as much and we were faced with, you know, obviously there's only one main reservoir on the Tongue River.

So I don't know that I could -- I could do a quick scan while we're still here today, but nothing is coming to mind.

SPECIAL MASTER: What I would just say just generally is on questions of this nature if I could ask whether or not there's something in the record or any precedent that I should pay attention to. You know, rather than spending time today coming back up and saying here's what it is, I would say, you know, both sides are free to begin, say, next week to provide me with any information. Okay?

MR. SWANSON: Understood. And so I guess I'll conclude, Your Honor, with saying we still believe that a demand isn't required. Montana didn't voluntarily agree to a demand in 1982 at the Compact Commission meeting. If you look at the practices of the Wyoming and the Montana water commissioners, notification of shortage of water rights is sufficient. There isn't a demand that's required. In looking at the words of the Wyoming commissioners on several occasions they weren't requiring a demand and they certainly weren't requiring

1	a formal demand.
2	And our concern with requiring a demand is
3	this: We did require a demand multiple times. We did
4	it explicitly in writing in 2004 and 2006 and that
5	wasn't good enough. So the question would be a demand
6	is needed. Then a more perfect demand is needed. Then
7	a more perfect demand is needed. And then a lot of
8	post-demand inquiry is needed before we get the water.
9	At some point we reach the diminishing returns where
10	the irrigation season is only so long and the water is
11	not coming to Montana users.
12	And so that's our concern with imposing that
13	demand and that's why we believe we should remain with
14	your previous rulings.
15	SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you.
16	Okay. Mr. Kaste?
17	So while you're walking up here I can tell you
18	I have some questions. I could either start asking you
19	those or you could start out by doing whatever
20	responses you want to the questions by Mr. Swanson.
21	MR. KASTE: Well, I did want to answer the
22	questions that you posed because I want you to know the
23	answers. If you have additional questions for me,
24	that's great, too. I kind of wrote them down and had

about five or six that I thought I ought to address.

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The first one was: "Both parties asked me to review things I've done in the past. Can I and should I do that?" The answer, of course, is yes and for the most part no, but occasionally yes, if that makes sense. SPECIAL MASTER: Good lawyerly answer. MR. KASTE: I got it. Obviously I note from your dress you're the judge here today. You have the ability prior to completing your resolution of this case in the sense you have jurisdiction over it to fix, change, alter one of your legal rulings prior to the time you're divested of jurisdiction by recommending it to the Supreme Court. Should you do that often? No. Should you do that occasionally? Yes when the circumstances warrant it. So our view, of course, is that there's one thing in this case that for the future would benefit

So our view, of course, is that there's one thing in this case that for the future would benefit the parties greatly and that is requiring that the notice be in writing. That's why I asked you point blank to reconsider that ruling.

With regard to the remaining rulings, some of them we like, some of them we don't, but they are what they are and we probably are okay based on those rulings and in that vein probably ought not to revisit

them.

With regard to the exceptions to the notice requirement, I went back the other day and I went through your original ruling on that and Montana said, well, in light of the evidence at trial we should revisit it. Basically all the evidence that came in at trial was essentially the same as the evidence you have considered on summary judgment and there's no real reason to change any of those rulings with regard to the three exceptions.

I didn't find anything new that would lead you to a different -- a different conclusion than what you previously reached. So while you have the authority and the power certainly to revisit those rulings and come to different conclusions, I don't think the evidence warrants it.

I notice you're about to ask me a question.

SPECIAL MASTER: I am, sir. So one of the things that Montana raised in its post-trial reply brief, and it spans I think two pages, is whether or not there should be any type of notice requirement at all. And they cite two cases that I don't remember having been brought up before.

One is the Van Buskirk case and the other is the case of Tucker versus Missoula Light & Water

1	Company.
2	MR. KASTE: Oh, thank you, thank you, thank
3	you.
4	SPECIAL MASTER: And so I would very much
5	appreciate it if you could address those because you
6	could certainly reading them on the surface view those
7	as saying you don't have to meet any particular
8	requirement in order to pursue a remedy for somebody
9	who has not delivered water that you're entitled to.
10	MR. KASTE: That was a pretty surface reading
11	because I think these cases are very very easy. And I
12	read that in the brief and thought, "Oh, my God. I
13	haven't heard of this Van Buskirk case and we're in
14	trouble." And then I read it and now we're not.
15	Van Buskirk is a great case in which it
16	contains the world's greatest jury instructions I've
17	ever seen that says, "Here's the rule. Jury, you're
18	going to enter judgment in favor of the defendant." As
19	a defense lawyer I find jury instructions to enter
20	judgment in favor of the defendant as great.
21	But in that case the court's theme was not put
22	the onus on what the senior appropriator has to give to
23	the junior appropriator in order to vindicate its
24	rights. It is does he have to go through the water
25	commissioner in order to vindicate his rights. That

whole case is about is the water commission the exclusive entity. The Wyoming Supreme Court says no, you have a common law right to vindicate your right as a water user and you can do that by going to district court, as the litigant did.

It doesn't say a word about whether or not in order to prevail in district court you have to provide notice to the upstream junior in order to succeed. And so to say that that case stands for the proposition that you don't have to make a call in order to vindicate your rights as a senior misrepresents that case significantly.

And the same is true with regard to the Tucker case, which you have seen before. It's the one we continuously cited about the burden of proof. And in that case the Montana Supreme Court makes clear several times -- well, once -- that the senior appropriator several times called on the junior and demanded water and was told no multiple times.

And so the court was never faced with the question that you're faced with, is notice a necessary perquisite to liability because it happened, everybody acknowledged it happened, the other side said no way, and they proceeded to decide the case on another issue.

So to represent both of those cases as saying

the call is not a necessary perquisite to liability is to misrepresent both. That's not what either of them say.

SPECIAL MASTER: So your view is both of those cases are basically cases that stand for the proposition that we don't have to follow the rules with respect to the water commissioners, but say absolutely nothing about whether or not notice is required?

MR. KASTE: Absolutely. And, in fact, the Tucker case has a long exposition about, well, was there a water commissioner appointed on this river. So do you have to have a water commissioner appointed in order to vindicate your rights in court? Well, of course not. You just have to get at that time 10 percent of your neighbors to agree to apply to the district court to have a water commissioner appointed.

None of that's necessary to vindicate your rights as against a senior. You can go to the district court and do that without the exclusive means of the statutory regime set up in both states. It's simple. It's not applicable here, although the burden of proof discussion in Tucker is very applicable here and we've cited it a number of times. And it says the burden of proof is on the junior -- or excuse me, the senior call.

Now, Montana has said a couple of times, more
than a couple of times Wyoming has changed its position
with regard to the call. Wow, they are dirty no-goods.
But here's the thing: For years they've said there is
nothing in this Compact that says there's a call
requirement and now there they are saying you've got to
make a call.
And that's true. We did change our position,
and that's okay because the Supreme Court told us that
our position wasn't consistent with the law. Okay.
Fine. Now that we know what the law is what are we
supposed to do? We go look at the facts, we apply them
to the law as interpreted by the court and by yourself
and we say that leads to this conclusion.
We've done that and it leads to the conclusion
that Montana must provide us notice, and they didn't do
that prior to 2004. There's nothing wrong with the
litigant changing its position with regard to what the
law requires when the court mandates that they change
their position. I don't know what else we could do.
Be held in contempt, I suppose.
Now we have a question about
SPECIAL MASTER: Let me just stop you there.
I think what Montana is basically arguing is that given

Wyoming's view was that there was no responsibility on

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the part of Wyoming to provide post-1950 water for pre-1950s appropriators in Montana, why would we require it to provide any type of a notice? MR. KASTE: Because that's what we agreed to in the Compact, as we now know from the Supreme Court. That's what their Compact obligation is. They must provide notice. And I think you can't find a statement like what we just said in the course of this evidence. Wyoming's discussions with Montana -- and you heard the testimony of all these witnesses. On both sides their discussions were not the precise question that you articulated earlier and that the only precise statement is we have our pre-'50 rights, they're not being satisfied, we want you to turn those on. We want you to charge a post-'50 right. Those discussions didn't happen in that particular fight, didn't occur until '04. In fact, we can see that in the technical meeting in April of 2004

Those discussions didn't happen in that particular fight, didn't occur until '04. In fact, we can see that in the technical meeting in April of 2004 when Keith Kerbel says -- you can see it in the minutes of the technical meeting -- "Hey, what if we made a call? What you do think Wyoming would do?"

If this is something that we thought about for years and years and years Wyoming has been intransigent in its position there, why is Keith Kerbel asking us a month and a half before the first call was made, "What

would you guys do if we made a call"? 1 2 How can you square that with this idea that they knew our position and we were not under any 3 4 circumstances budging from that position on that 5 particular issue? That's a load. It really is. When these people were talking they were 6 7 talking about overall Compact administration focused on 8 how do we divvy up the water on V(B). Because Dan 9 Ashenberg got it right in 1983 when he said on page 1 his proposal about how we administer the Compact, those 10 11 taken right from Wyoming are minimal and who cares. 12 When we read this quote Dan Ashenberg is the smartest quy in the room and he says what is their to bother 13 14 about. 15 And then we get the HKM study in 2003 which says there's 221 acres of post-1950 right in Wyoming. 16 "Oh, my gosh. Whatever shall we do?" 241 acres. The 17 smart people in the room were focused on where the 18 water was and it was V(B). And that's what they were 19 20 fighting about and that's what Montana wanted to 21 administer. They wanted to find a way to take 22 advantage of the water that was really available and 23 it's under V(B). That's the end of the story. There was an interesting conversation between 24 25 two guys in 1981 followed up by Montana's implicit

admission that it needs to make a call, it needs to work on Wyoming, and then nothing about this issue until 2004. That's it.

This case has been about 2004 and 2006 from its inception and it shocks the conscience frankly how much time has been spent talking about years prior to 2004 when there is not a single piece of paper submitted in evidence in the last six years demonstrating that the call had been made prior to that period of time. There's no call. Nothing.

It is astonishing to believe that bureaucrats on both side of this state line wouldn't have made a memorandum of some sort saying, "I made a call," "I got a call." And we know that by looking at what happened in 2004 when a call was made. There's paper everywhere. There's meetings and phone calls and memos and e-mail. There are governors involved. It's a crisis. Oh, my gosh.

Nothing like that before 2004. You don't have to believe the ridiculous in the course of making your decision in this case and, in fact, Montana has to prove it's more likely than not that it made one of these calls and it falls woefully short prior to 2004.

And now you've got a more important question:

Is notice knowledge or is it a demand? And the answer

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is it has to be a demand because in the prior appropriation scheme we can know that our downstream senior neighbor isn't getting his water, but he may not need it. And if he doesn't need it and he doesn't tell me he needs it, I don't have to do anything in response. A call is by its very nature a demand for your rights on someone else and without that second piece you have no call. You have -- you have a discussion among neighbors standing out looking at the sky going yep, it's dry, yes, it is. Who cares? That doesn't do anything to initiate the process under the doctrine of appropriation. You have to not only note that it's dry, you have to say: "And I want you to do something about it. I demand my right under this Compact." Montana didn't do that until 2004. SPECIAL MASTER: So aren't there, you know -there are at least three different situations here.

SPECIAL MASTER: So aren't there, you know -there are at least three different situations here.

One is that, you know, Montana tells Wyoming, you know,
there's only X amount of water going across the border.

Under those circumstances then you can easily imagine
that Wyoming can think, well, that's nice. Maybe they
need more water, but, you know, we don't know. They
haven't asked for any water.

But then a second would be somebody calling up and saying, "You know, we're really short on water down here. We're not -- you know, our farmers are, you know, not getting the water that they need." And why if they had said that do you need that additional step of a demand? Because at that point you know that they need the water. I mean, they've said they need the water. It's just they haven't made that final statement of "and, therefore, you need to actually supply it to us."

MR. KASTE: Because you have to ask me to do something about your situation. That's the way it is. With me, obligations you have in this world you have to be apprised that they want you to do something about it. It's not enough just to know their situation. They have to actually ask you to do something about it.

And, you know, there isn't a lot of case law about that, but it really couldn't be more clear. It says this demand is decisive. It uses the word "demand." And that is so important in prior appropriation systems because the junior appropriators have rights. The junior appropriator can divert water under junior appropriations within his water rights for beneficial uses all day long until the senior calls him.

Regardless of what's happening at the senior headgate, he might not get a drop of water. It doesn't matter. Until he calls and then says, "I need the water. I have a right. I'm going to put it to beneficial use," this person over here has a right. And that's why it's so important to demand that they take action to fulfill your right and it means to us that you have it. Okay? And it's not that hard. It really isn't.

Bill Knapp says he gets out and he's out standing in somebody's driveway talking with them and he says, "I'm short of my water. Yeah, I'd really like my water." Bill Knapp that says that part, that second part, "I'd really like my water."

Good enough for him. Off he goes to spin a headgate, but that second part is essential, essential and it didn't happen before 2004. And we can tell how essential it is because communications that occurred prior to 2004 didn't excite anybody on Wyoming's side of the line. But when we got one in 2004 he said, "I talked to the governor and we are demanding our rights under the Compact," he got excited.

Because there's a difference, a meaningful difference between a communication that says, "hey, the prevailing conditions in Montana stink" and "hey, the

prevailing conditions stink and we want you to do something about it." That difference matters. And it's simple. It's so simple. Call up, demand your water. They did it in '04 and '06. We acknowledged they gave it, but before that there's not any evidence to support that.

Now, you asked about, well, what about applying damages retroactively prior to this, is there any reason or basis for me to do that. I think the answer is no, not really. Because this person has a right, this junior has a right until the senior exercises his right.

There's no basis to say to this person what you did before the call is somehow wrongful when they are acting in perfect compliance with their rights as a junior appropriator. And so to ask them to make up a shortfall for the senior who sat on his hands in the exercise of his right is inappropriate and not in conformity with the doctrine of appropriation which gives the junior appropriator rights.

Both sides in this equation are protected from the other. We all have to play by the rules, both the seniors and the juniors. So the idea of collecting damages pre-call is completely anathema to the doctrine of appropriation.

1	Now, without being a pest, reservoirs are
2	weird. Reservoirs are a problem in this case because
3	the best record would be give us a call. He spins the
4	headgate. When the water shows up it shows up.
5	Simple, very simple.
6	Reservoir is tougher because when the call
7	comes in, if you give me a call on October 2nd, it's
8	going to be hard for me to say, "I don't know if we can
9	fill or not. It's October 2nd. We don't know what the
10	snow pack is going to be." And so there is this
11	looking-back period where we look back at the call and
12	ask ourselves did the reservoir exercise its right, did
13	it catch the water that was available to it.
14	And if it did and it's still short of what
15	it's entitled to, then we're going to have to cut
16	people off. All the juniors on that stream have got to
17	go off. That's how it works.
18	And you asked about, well, is there some other
19	rule of law that allow us to get back retroactively
20	what we had on reservoirs. No. That's not how it
21	works. You make a call. Curtailment occurs from that
22	point forward. If you get filled, you get filled. If
23	you don't, you don't.
24	Sometimes reservoirs don't fill. I think
25	that's an odd part of this case Montana doesn't seem to

recognize is that sometimes reservoirs don't fill up. Sometimes it doesn't snow.

Now, when we look back and make a decision about whether or not the calling right exercise is fair, to see if it would be fair to the juniors at that time to curtail their diversions that's not the same as this priority system. Now, what we have in Wyoming, we don't have a statute. We don't have a regulation. We don't have case law that says something about priority. Nobody is able to refer to anything as a rule of priority. There's no such thing.

What we have is we have this series of reservoirs operated in common amongst a group of people who have consensually agreed to operate them in a certain manner. Now I don't know about that. That's completely fine so long as they don't hurt junior appropriators, but it's not the rule of law that's making them do this.

They probably have to operate differently if we followed the rule, what the rules are. But when they agree amongst themselves to shuttle water about their own reservoirs in common ownership that's perfectly fine as long as it doesn't hurt anybody else. And thus far I haven't seen any evidence of their shuttling water between themselves consensually that

hurt anybody in Montana.

Now to say that their individual agreement ought to be the law, no, it's not. One of the neat things about the doctrine of appropriation is sometimes appropriators can make agreements among themselves to do certain things so long as they don't hurt anybody else. It's okay. It's fine. It's equitable in that way.

It gives people the opportunity to make decisions about how they manage water in their little part of the world effectively so long as they don't hurt anybody else. There you go.

But there's no basis in law or in fact to allow the Tongue River Reservoir to call on Wyoming in July and say, "The storage you obtained in Park Reservoir in January was wrong. You have to let it go." And Montana knew that way back when when they said, "Well, it's stored in priority. We can't get it back." That's the long and short of it. That's it.

So with regard to notice, we admitted in 2004, 2006, we've always admitted this. This case is about 2004 and 2006. Everything before that has been -- I can't think of a nicer word than "ridiculous." Put it to bed.

SPECIAL MASTER: One final question.

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Specifically with respect to 2004, if you look at your initial pre -- or post-trial brief, on page 55 of that brief you've said pretty much what you've just stated, which is that there is no dispute that Montana did provide adequate notice to Wyoming on May 18th, 2004. But if you turn back to page 50, you'll see there is a discussion of the 2004 letter in the last paragraph on that page where one of the things that you note is that there was the language of it actually talked about pre-1950 uses in Wyoming. And at the very end you say: "Wyoming was not obligated to take either of these actions and it was not obligated to take a different action than Montana had not requested." MR. KASTE: Yes. SPECIAL MASTER: So my question is is -- are you conceding that the 2004 letter was adequate for purposes of this particular case or are you claiming that actually you had no obligations under the 2004 letter to do anything because Montana preferred pre-1950 rather than post-1950 uses? MR. KASTE: Both as usual. The letter in and of itself is sufficient to constitute notice of The substance of that notice was all wrong.

The 2006 notice is better and it's more in line with

how the court has interpreted the Compact.

So, yes, they did -- the letter itself constitutes notice. Do we have to do the things that they asked us to do? No. Should we be forced to do things they didn't ask us to do? I don't think so. I don't understand why I should be required to read someone else's mind and do things that they haven't asked me to do.

It's not hard. Shut down your pre-'50s or your post-'50s for the benefit of our pre-'50s. Had they asked us that, then that would be adequate notice. And that's it. It's not that complicated.

SPECIAL MASTER: So let me ask the question in a different way. Let's assume that I were to recommend to the Supreme Court that they find that Montana provided adequate notice in 2004 after the notice was provided, there were post-1950 storage and uses in Wyoming, and that that water could have gone down to Montana and, you know, go through all the various other things that you think are required.

Would you argue to the Supreme Court in response to that, no, actually we're not liable for anything in 2004 because they asked just for the wrong thing? I'm just trying to figure out what is your argument, whether or not 2004 is okay or whether or

not --

MR. KASTE: It would depend on how many other things I'd have to argue. If that was the only one, I think it is Wyoming's position and has been our position that while the form of notice was adequate, the substance of the notice was not and it did not obligate us to you take actions that were requested.

And so it's conceivable we could go to the Supreme Court and say that would -- that was an erroneous ruling on your part to hold us liable for actions that weren't requested of us. It is important that they demand their right properly and ask us to do the thing that we're actually obligated to do.

And like I say, it's not that hard. There's nothing dramatic about the 2006 letter that makes it all covered in fairy dust because it works. It's just using the right -- demanding the right things from us. So it is conceivable that if you are really going down that road, then that would be wrong.

SPECIAL MASTER: Let me ask it a different way then. In preparing my special report for the Supreme Court, should I in that say Wyoming -- Wyoming's argument is that they aren't liable for anything in 2004 because the notice was deficient? I just need to know that so I know whether or not to address that

1	particular point to the Supreme Court.
2	MR. KASTE: Yes. We had that discussion with
3	Mr. Stults at trial. We made the point in our brief.
4	It is our position that notice was substantively
5	inappropriate. And so to the extent you need to get to
6	that decision, and there are lot of ways you don't need
7	to get to that portion, then, yes, that's our position.
8	You should address it and you should make a decision
9	what the content of the notice ought to be. It's
10	pretty simple.
11	As a matter of fact you have stated it
12	earlier. If our pre-1950s are unsatisfied, we would
13	take appropriate interstate regulatory action. We shut
14	off our post-'50s for our benefit. That's it. It's
15	simple. And they did it in 2006 minus our way to do it
16	as an appropriate interstate remedy.
17	So if that helps. You're looking at me like
18	it's not helping.
19	SPECIAL MASTER: No, no, no. As I said, what
20	I want to make sure is that I'm addressing all the
21	issues for the Supreme Court I ultimately have to
22	address and it sounds like it is one. So I will
23	MR. KASTE: It is unless you can get rid of it
24	on other grounds and I think there's lots of other
25	grounds or ways to recommend dismissal of this case

1	without ever getting into the minutiae. And I frankly
2	think that this case ought to be decided in ways
3	without getting into the minutiae because it's governed
4	by a few very simple principles and when you apply
5	those very simple principles most of this stuff goes
6	away.
7	SPECIAL MASTER: The thing is I need to
8	address everything because I don't know exactly what it
9	is that the Supreme Court will ultimately decide. So I
10	will make my recommendation, but I will address more
11	issues than may be necessary to do that.
12	MR. KASTE: Well, then you better hit this
13	one.
14	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you.
15	MR. KASTE: Thanks.
16	SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Swanson?
17	MR. SWANSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be
18	brief.
19	I think it speaks volumes about this case that
20	at this late date we don't know what Wyoming's position
21	is on the 2004. Apparently we now do know.
22	SPECIAL MASTER: Understood.
23	MR. SWANSON: We now do that the 2004 letter
24	is a sufficient notice, is a sufficient demand. And
25	that goes to our entire point, Your Honor. The

requirement that you've previously established, and we 1 2 think is reasonable, is that notice is required. Wyoming would like us to reach ever higher 3 4 levels of perfection of demand and in that way they are saying that you felt the '04 call letter was 5 6 insufficient because the demand wasn't precise, wasn't 7 perfect. And that goes contrary to not only the 8 settled law here, but the prior appropriations 9 practices in both states. 10 And I'd direct you to testimony by Wyoming's Water Commissioner, Mr. Boyd, when discussing a call. 11 12 He said: "It might be as simple as the senior right calling and saying, 'Hey, I'm short of water.'" 13 14 This is on page 22 and 23 of the transcript. 15 Mr. Boyd then goes on to say in response to a question: "Question: And it's not necessary for a 16 water user to use any specific words, correct, 17 when telling you he's short of water?" 18 "Answer: No, it's not necessary." 19 20 Mr. Schroeder also testified that there's no magic word, that "hey, I need water" is sufficient. 21 22 And if that's a practice that the Wyoming commissioners use in the State of Montana, it's a practice that we've 23 shown in the state -- or in the State of Wyoming. 24 25 me correct that. Excuse me. And then in Montana we

see a practice where we often rely upon verbal calls. That's a practice in both states.

Then again we're back to ridiculous, to use Mr. Kaste's term, a ridiculous position by Wyoming that not only, first of all, is there no call provision under the Compact, now there is a call, but the call is more than just notice, which is what Montana proffered in 1981. The call must be a demand. Not just demand, a perfect demand. A completely technically correct demand. And not just a perfectly technically correct demand, a demand that's followed up by inquiry into all the details of how we intend to use the water, how we're regulating the water, how much water may be lost to Dayton and Miles City and all the way down the line.

What it is, Your Honor, is a continued practice of Wyoming delaying meeting its obligations under the Compact. And when you delay long enough in the Tongue River Basin then you've evaded your responsibility for that particular year.

Now, these cases, the Van Buskirk and the Tucker case that Mr. Kaste says don't apply, they actually -- the facts seem to fit. You're talking about a person who has trouble with the water commissioner and the court says you don't have to go through that formal process, the exclusive process of

the water commissioner. You have other ways in which to ask for water.

Well, in this case we have a Compact

Commission that's not working, that's not providing us
the administration. So we are going, as I talked about
earlier, a dual track. We are continuing under the

Compact Commission to ask for administration.

Meanwhile our officials are continually communicating
with Wyoming officials asking for our water.

The Tucker case. The Tucker case is about somebody who is called multiple times and refuses to curtail. That sounds like the State of Wyoming in this case. So again, Your Honor, we think the liability issues we pointed out in the brief are certainly supported by precedents in Montana law.

Now, I think it's interesting that we are back to this position that says prior to 2004 Wyoming had no notice, no idea, in fact, that Montana was short of water and would be asking for water, and he cites the Keith Kerbel conversation in April 2004. Well, how about the Pat Tyrrell e-mail to Jack Stults in 2004 when he says, "Well, Jack, these issues aren't going to be any different than the issues we discussed and dealt with at length in the 1980s when we were dealing with this before"? According to Mr. Tyrrell, this isn't the

1	first time he's seen this issue.
2	And if you look at the testimony from
3	Mr. Fassett, Mr. Fassett, in fact, admits that we were
4	making us aware that Montana demanded water. I direct
5	you to paragraphs 95 and 96 in our facts section in our
6	first brief.
7	Mr. Stults talks about how he felt we were
8	entitled to water and he made it "I honestly
9	believe I made it clear to my counterparts in Wyoming."
10	Next paragraph. Question to Mr. Fassett:
11	"And did you believe at any of the times when
12	Montana gave you this information that one of
13	the purposes was to see whether or not
14	anything could be done in Wyoming to help?"
15	Speaking of water shortages.
16	"Answer: "Oh, I think to some extent that's
17	correct."
18	I'm sure we're going to hear about the "to
19	some extent," quotation. But again, he says correct.
20	Mr. Fassett on paragraph 93 in the same
21	document, he describes routine communications where
22	Montana indicated, quote and this is a quote from
23	his testimony: "We're not getting all of our pre-1950
24	water rights," end quote.
25	Then Mg Lowry in her testimony this is

paragraph 83 of our same brief -- testified she knew
T&Y was not getting enough water to satisfy its
pre-Compact right, T&Y being the second oldest right in
Montana. That means if number 2 is not getting it,
number 3 through numbers 77 are also not getting their
water because they are at the bottom of the river and
they are calling the entire river.

Ms. Lowry went on to say --

SPECIAL MASTER: I'll just interrupt only because I'm just becoming concerned that, as in much of this case, the notice issue is going to end up taking more attention than all the rest of them. And I actually know those portions of the record. So I've actually gone through that. And so probably no reason to go into that right now.

MR. SWANSON: All right, Your Honor.

So I will just end with this idea. And again we've seen this before. This will be my final point, this claim that prior to 2004 there was no call. There would have been papers and memos and commissions and discussions from governors and there would have been all these cites.

Well, it didn't happen in 1981. In 1981 there were no printed memos. We had handwritten notes found late in discovery in some -- the wrong drawer in the

wrong office. And that was clearly a call and it was clearly a notification and request for water from Montana in 1981.

And then as I had began at the beginning of this testimony and it's laid out in much more detail in our brief, all through the 1980s there were a series of discussions, questions, letters between governors, et cetera, saying we, in fact, need to deal with this issue.

So this idea that this all came out of the blue in May of 2004 is not supported, Your Honor, by not only the compelling, truthful, sincere testimony of gentlemen like Gary Fritz and Jack Stults and Rich Moy, Rich Moy who said he was practically pounding on the table trying to make them send us water, but it's also belied by all the documents that do, in fact, show that there were continual communications about these issues.

And a very clear, crystal clear call in 1981 still evoked a response from Wyoming that was really a non-response, which I think basically demonstrates we'll still be doing this continual issue all the way through 2006. Wyoming is unyielding and will continue to be unyielding until it's provided better guidance by this court.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you very much.

1	So I'm again aware of the time. We have about
2	I would say three hours more probably of time for the
3	argument. And so what I'd like to do is divide about
4	an hour and a half for both the issue of the Montana
5	uses and the same on the Wyoming side.
6	And I have really a set of questions when we
7	come to these issues. So I'll probably jump in even
8	sooner in terms of my questions.
9	So, Mr. Draper, you're handling the next set
10	of issues?
11	MR. DRAPER: The way you ordered them, Your
12	Honor, I believe it's Mr. Wechsler treating the
13	Montana
14	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So you're Montana and
15	you're going to be doing the Wyoming ones. Okay.
16	MR. WECHSLER: I prefer to be Montana.
17	SPECIAL MASTER: Could I just jump in here?
18	MR. WECHSLER: Yes, please.
19	SPECIAL MASTER: So let me just start out with
20	the Compact because we ultimately have to go back to
21	that. I'm going to start out sort of talking about the
22	reservoir and we're going to go into direct flow right
23	after that. So on the reservoirs the first question is
24	what does in Montana's opinion, what does section
25	(V)(3) of the Compact mean? What is it referring to?

existing reservoirs.

MR. WECHSLER: It's referring to the additional storage in existing reservoirs at the time the Compact was entered into above and beyond the existing storage as of 1950. And so you can see what happens in Article V(C). What they are doing is they are trying to determine the post-Compact water, that percentage of water that was not already in use at the time of the Compact.

And so they have four things there. They have -- first they have the diversions above the point of measurement. Second, they have brand new reservoirs. I think that's (C)(1). Third, they have -- and this is the one we're focusing on, (C)(3) -- they have additional post-Compact storage in

And we all know a lot of times you have reservoirs just as we have here in the Tongue River Reservoir and it ends up being much less expensive to simply add on storage there. We've seen that happen in Montana. We've seen that happen in Wyoming on a number of reservoirs that have post-Compact storage in existing reservoirs.

And then finally you have the water passing the point of measurement and by doing that then the states are accounting for all of the post-Compact water

and then they are divvying up by percentages that post-Compact water.

But what is very clear from both your prior rulings, the court's rulings, the language of the Compact, what is protected is the amount of water that was already vested as of the time of the Compact. We heard from Dr. Littlefield who's an historian about the negotiations. We know from that that what Montana and Wyoming were concerned with is protecting those water rights that were vested and protected under each state's existing laws.

And we also know that the states were very aware of the Tongue River Reservoir. We see it in the engineering report which ends up being extremely important as they entered into the final Compact. And so -- and then you can actually see it in Article V(A) which protects the appropriative rights established existing under the doctrine of appropriation.

And so we look to what does "beneficial use" mean. Well, you and the court have held that it's essentially synonymous with the definition under the doctrine of appropriation and so in turn what we end up doing is we look to what in Montana and Wyoming is protected, when is a reservoir right vested.

And you heard -- there's a number of citations

in the brief. You heard the testimony of Mr. Smith, 1 2 Mr. Davis, amongst others, that a water right, a reservoir right in Montana is totally protected once 3 4 they have invested in it, built the reservoir, filled the reservoir and offered it for sale. In fact, the 5 6 Montana Constitution explicitly indicates that sale is 7 a beneficial use. And so then looking at the reservoir, well, 8 what was vested and protected as of the time of the 9 10 Compact? Well, the reservoir had filled to capacity, 11 been emptied, filled again prior to 1950. And, in 12 fact, we can see on multiple occasions they were releasing up to 50,000 acre feet of water prior to the 13 14 Compact. 15 So the amount that's protected is the full earned annual yield of that Compact under the -- I'm 16 sorry, of the water rights of the reservoir under the 17 Compact under regulations pursuant to Montana law. 18 SPECIAL MASTER: And so the additional 6,571 19 20 acre feet of capacity that has been added on here, how is that handled under (V)(C)(3)? 21 MR. WECHSLER: Well, I think that is a unique 22 additional capacity because I think when you're looking 23 at the reasons that the reservoir was rehabilitated in 24 25 that additional storage, what you're looking at is

Northern Cheyenne Tribe Compact which is directly 1 2 related to the rehabilitation. And so there are 20,000 acre feet now in the reservoir that are prior vested 3 4 winter rights, tribal water rights. But I will say that even if you were to accept 5 6 Wyoming's interpretation it's only -- you know, the 7 tribal rights are covered under Article V(B), in other 8 words, they are post-Compact rights, which has a number of problems which we've pointed out in the pleadings. 9 10 You don't actually get to that 6,700 additional acre 11 feet of water in this particular case because we know 12 that in the years at issue the reservoir always had the minimum pool required by the operating plans of at 13 14 least 10,000 acre feet. 15 So the amount of water that was stored and released in any given year was always less than there 16 was during the Compact. Does that answer your 17 question? 18 SPECIAL MASTER: Yes. It raises some other 19 20 questions I'll get back to later, but, yes, that answers -- well, I think I understand then what 21 22 Montana's argument is here. Another section we haven't talked about at all 23 that I was just curious when I was reading back over. 24 25 Do you have any idea what the purpose of section

1	V(E)(2) is?
2	MR. WECHSLER: Pardon me. Hopefully my
3	colleagues.
4	SPECIAL MASTER: I apologize.
5	ATTORNEY GENERAL FOX: I happen to have a copy
6	of the Compact. I just so happen to have one here.
7	SPECIAL MASTER: And I'll just read for
8	everyone else's purposes. This is $V(E)(2)$ and it says:
9	"There are hereby excluded from the provisions of this
10	Compact devices and facilities for the control and
11	regulation of surface waters."
12	MR. WECHSLER: You're taxing my memory. I
13	don't know off the top of my head. I do know that this
14	was addressed in some early briefing and I want to say
15	it was addressed as part of a motion to dismiss or in
16	the oral argument, but I will say at the moment I
17	don't I believe it's covered in
18	SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Draper looks like he's
19	anxious to
20	MR. DRAPER: Well, Your Honor, that reference
21	to surface water, it is curious, but it refers to sheet
22	water that has not reached water course which is
23	normally not subject to prior appropriation.
24	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Okay. Thank you.
25	Okay. Back on.

MR. WECHSLER: So in this litigation Wyoming at the -- in the middle or the end of trial and, in fact, carrying over until now has taken this novel interpretation that we're -- the only amount of water that was protected was 32,000 acre feet which is related to the contracts, but that's contrary to the language of the Compact, as I explained.

It's contrary to the doctrine of appropriation both in Montana and I should say in Wyoming as well where we heard the testimony from Mr. Tyrrell and Mr. Fassett that the way in which a reservoir right in Wyoming is protected also has to do with building and filling the reservoir and then it's the entire capacity that is protected.

It doesn't take into account the intent of the state in protecting the prior rights and, in fact, it makes no sense given that we know from the letters to Congress and the documents that were before Congress and they adopted this Compact that one of the issues that was important near and dear to both states and particularly for Montana was storage. And so for Montana to have given up a huge amount of storage really particularly with complete silence in the Compact is contrary to that.

I think it's also contrary to the -- it

illustrates that it is a -- that Wyoming has these continuously shifting positions in order to minimize their Compact obligations. And the reason I say that is the last time that Wyoming has taken a position on when reservoirs are perfected and what amount of water is protected under the Compact was during the 1980s in the Middle Fork project and there's testimony, in fact, some documents that Wyoming's position at that time was the amount of water that is protected under a storage right is the amount of water that was viable let alone built and perfected.

And the reason they were saying that is they had the Middle Fork project which was a large amount of storage in the Powder River. Montana objected to it taking largely the same position that we take today. And Wyoming's response to that was, well, because it was filed even though it's not filled, even though it's not filled and, therefore, protected, vested under the doctrine of appropriation that amount of the reservoir water is still protected under Article V(A).

The other thing I would note about that 32,000 what I'll call a novel argument is under the facts, for example, in 2004 it doesn't even come into play. And the reason that's true is we know today that the amount of water that is allowed for the Tongue River Water

Users Association is 40,000 acre feet. Of that 7,000 1 2 are tribal rights which only a small amount of that was used in that year. 3 We also note that in 2004 something like only 4 5 55 percent of those rights were allowed to be used and 6 that's because there were such great shortages. 7 you'll recall, there's a pro rata sharing of shortages. 8 And so that means that we're really only talking about something like 20,000, 25,000 acre feet of water was 9 actually used, released, enjoyed by Montana in terms of 10 11 its reservoir water in those years. 12 I want to -- unless you have questions about that, I want to turn to the issue of winter flows. 13 14 SPECIAL MASTER: Sure. Why don't we turn to 15 winter flows. MR. WECHSLER: Okay. And in your -- in 16 your -- the questions that you posed in the case 17 management order, you actually talked about them in 18 terms of winter releases, and I do want to quibble a 19 20 little bit about language because Montana does not administer that water right in terms of the amount of 21 22 water that has been stored and released. And the reason that's true is we're talking 23 here about an on channel reservoir and so the river 24 25 comes down and it comes through. It's only when water

is actually captured that that water is stored. And so what we're talking about instead is simply flow of the river through the reservoir during these times.

In the motion for summary judgment, Montana's motion for summary judgment, we pointed out that the Compact does not require any particular type of administration of water rights including we had specifically called out the reservoir in terms of those operations. And you, in fact, held in Montana's favor and held then that it was the burden on Wyoming in establishing that those operations were not consistent with the doctrine of appropriation or were simply wrong.

And the reason that that ends up being important is we have two experts who in this case have discussed reservoir operations. Both of those, Mr. Smith and Mr. Aycock, testified on behalf of Montana. Wyoming has offered no evidence whatsoever about the operations of the Tongue River Reservoir being inappropriate. And so that's a fatal mistake. They are simply unable to satisfy the burden that you set up for them.

Wyoming suggests that it's self-evident that somehow winter flows through a reservoir should be considered to be a waste or problematic. But again

that is directly contrary to cases we have pointed out in our brief and it's directly contrary to all of, not some of, all of the expert testimony, the experts who understand reservoirs who operate reservoirs in this case.

Yet even without any kind of testimony
Wyoming's position is essentially Montana should have
set the reservoir flows at the beginning of the winter
at 50 CFS and should have walked away. And we pointed
out that there are a number of reasons that these flows
through the reservoir are, in fact, necessary.

And one is that this would cause significant damage to the reservoir itself and endanger communities downstream. In the brief we have cited to cases which show that the doctrine of appropriation imposes an obligation to operate a reservoir reasonably and, if not done so, you're subject to liability.

As Wyoming's witness, Mr. Whitaker, for example, and others as well have acknowledged, Wyoming itself does not require a facility or a reservoir to be operated in a way that causes damage to communities or to the facility itself. And so this ends up being another example of Wyoming attempting to impose a stringent burden, obligation, standard on Montana that, in fact, it doesn't practice in its own state.

1	The winter flows are justified by I would say
2	six different things on which there is extensive
3	testimony from Mr. Smith, Mr. Aycock, Mr. Hayes who
4	again is with us here today and who acts as president
5	of the Tongue River Water User Association as the
6	operator of the reservoir. Those flows are justified
7	in order to prevent damage to the Tongue River
8	Reservoir. I mentioned that. You remember they have a
9	45,000
10	SPECIAL MASTER: I got that only because, you
11	know, this is stuff
12	MR. WECHSLER: Yes, please.
13	SPECIAL MASTER: that I'm actually pretty
14	familiar with that at this point.
15	Several questions. First of all, so a lot of
16	this again, you know, I think gets back to the question
17	of the one-fill rule. I understand Montana's arguments
18	that Wyoming doesn't really, you know, follow sort of a
19	strict one-fill rule.
20	So there's the Federal Land Bank versus Morris
21	case that Wyoming believes states that Montana follows
22	the one-fill rule. And as I mentioned before the trial
23	began, when we look at that case, you know, you can
24	you know, you can peruse and certainly have a potential
25	reading of that case that would say yes, it does. And

1	at the same time, though, it's quite clear to me from
2	all the testimony that that's not what Montana actually
3	does.
4	So I guess one question I have is, you know, I
5	might ultimately say to the Supreme Court, oh, you can
6	distinguish the Federal Land Bank versus Morris case
7	and it's actually all totally consistent with not
8	following the one-fill rule.
9	But another possibility is that I come to the
10	conclusion that, you know, it seems to say the one-fill
11	rule, but the practice ever since Morris has been
12	something totally different.
13	If that's the situation, what should I
14	recommend to the Supreme Court they should do? Should
15	I recommend to the Supreme Court that it ignore all the
16	years of practice? Do I tell them that they should
17	ignore the Morris case?
18	MR. WECHSLER: Well, what I would say is
19	and I'll call it the Federal Land Bank case. I would
20	first say there is no clearer case of dicta that I've
21	ever seen.
22	SPECIAL MASTER: I understand that.
23	MR. WECHSLER: I think the language leading up
24	to the paragraph in the discussion says something like
25	"we like this language" even though it's clearly

unnecessary to the decision to make -- to address any 1 2 of those issues and, in fact, the holding is not related to that language. 3 SPECIAL MASTER: Right. 4 MR. WECHSLER: So what do you do if -- my 5 6 understanding of your question is what do you do if you 7 find well, yes, I would agree that that is the rule as 8 stated by the Montana Supreme Court in this dicta. 9 Well, I would say --10 SPECIAL MASTER: Even if it's not dictum, it's an indication of what that Montana Supreme Court 11 12 thought at the time. So, you know, again, this is sort of a serious situation where you have a clear I think 13 14 administrative practice and you have at least dictum in 15 one case that is just going a different way. MR. WECHSLER: True. And I would suggest to 16 you that it's not the best indication of what the 17 current Montana Supreme Court says because, as we cited 18 19 in the brief, there are now claims examination rules 20 which are adopted by the Supreme Court and in those rules they allow for multiple fills of the reservoir. 21 And so had the Montana Supreme Court believed 22 that there was a one-fill rule, then that would not --23 they would not have adopted such a rule. So I would 24

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look to that rule first.

But setting that aside I understand your question more to be what if -- you know, leaving that regulation out of the equation, what I would say is the Supreme Court has always been extremely reluctant to tell states what their water rights are or what the laws for the doctrine of the prior appropriation are.

And, in fact, we see that in this case. There was a footnote in the 2011 court case which went through great pains I thought to say, "Look it, states. This is a state law issue. You know, we know that from the McCarran Act and some of the cases, prior cases. And so we're not going to tell you -- we, the Supreme Court, are not going to tell you what your state law prior appropriation doctrine is."

And so if for whatever reason you're inclined to adopt or are afraid that maybe that Morris case is the best indication of what the law is in Montana, my suggestion would be certify it to the Montana Supreme Court, allow the Montana Supreme Court to address its own law, something that, you know, the Supreme Court is clearly very reluctant to do.

But I think in order to get there you have to ignore a lot of -- all of the testimony I would say and you heard from essentially the state engineer of Montana saying there's no one-fill rule here. We heard

from, you know, everyone on down to claims examiners that that is true. We can see in the adjudications that the orders adopted by the Water Board allowed for multiple fills in all of the state water projects, which I think is something like 22 different projects throughout the State of Montana. And then, of course, there's the claims examination rules.

I would also say I don't think that simply saying, "Montana, you have a one-fill rule" is dispositive. And the reason that's true is we see -- and we've cited a number of authorities in the brief. I won't go into detail on that, but what I think they show is that simply saying you have a one-fill rule doesn't mean that the proposition that Wyoming is suggesting, which is a rigid, a most rigid application of that doctrine, which is to say starting October 1 all water that passes through the reservoir must be charged against the reservoir.

We see that that is not the way a one-fill doctrine works in Colorado. It's not the way it works in Idaho, which are really the only two other states I'm aware of that have that doctrine. And we even see that that's not the way that that works in Wyoming.

And the reason and the thing I would point to the most for that is you can see the notice to fill

which was a requirement that the rules have in the State of Wyoming that when they are going to start to tell a reservoir, okay, now it's time for you to start filling that they issue these notices to fill. We heard Mr. LoGuidice say that, in fact, that was the standard practice.

And so it's at that point when the reservoir must start filling. We know that in the Tongue River Basin there was never a notice of those issues. I know that, you know, Wyoming's argument is somehow Bill Knapp can testify that, oh, people just sort of knew that, but nevertheless there is not a -- there was never any notice to fill issue there.

And when we talked to Mr. LoGuidice who I'll remind you is the head of the Division II office there, what he said is, well, the regulators have a fair amount of discretion in how they are administering and managing these reservoirs and they can use that discretion, for example, to consider a number of factors including when it should fill, when it should be charged with water.

We also see that this situation of bypass flows being charged against the reservoir, the fact again is not the way that Wyoming actually administers its reservoirs. There is Kearny Reservoir which has

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bypass flows, all which are long and the reason they give is they don't want the cement to be damaged just as in the Tongue River Reservoir. Those are never charged against Kearny. Wyoming's comeback to that is, well, that's totally different because there's never a call made by the reservoir. So let's look at Park Reservoir. Reservoir we know that there's a bypass flow of probably 4 to 5 CFS throughout the year. I think the testimony of Mr. Knapp was that ends up being somewhere in the realm of 1,600 to 1,700 acre feet over the course of the winter and to offset that Wyoming has a 90 CFS right. So there's still something like 1,600 CFS that are unaccounted for. Well, in '01 and in '04 the reservoirs that are connected to Park Reservoir, Cross Creek and Big Horn -- well, in 2001 and 2004 Park Reservoir did not fill and it is connected to those two junior reservoirs, Cross Creek and Big Horn. And so under their rigid, you know, rule as they claim that should be imposed on Montana, you would expect Park Reservoir gets charged with all of that water that it bypassed, that 1,600 acre feet. Well, in fact, that's not what they did.

not what they've done. What they did is, as they

always do in administering their reservoirs, that they 1 2 allowed that water, the junior water that was stored in Cross Creek or Big Horn to be passed down to Park 3 4 Reservoir. And so again, you know, we're seeing Wyoming 5 6 attempting to impose what they are calling this 7 one-fill rule on Montana when, in fact, whether or not the dicta in that Federal Land Bank case is correct it 8 9 doesn't answer the question as to whether Montana's 10 practices were appropriate. Even if there were a 11 one-fill rule, which we obviously very vigorously 12 contest, it wouldn't necessarily follow that we had to store every drop of water beginning October 10. 13 14 And, of course, setting aside all the things I 15 was going to start talking about, which is the major damage it would cause to the reservoir, the operational 16 problems, the stock rights, the ice jams and all of 17 that. 18 SPECIAL MASTER: I understand all of that. 19 20 So let me ask a totally different question. MR. WECHSLER: Sure. 21 SPECIAL MASTER: If Montana just decided not 22 to begin filling the reservoir until June, you know, 23 and there's -- you know, for the moment let's assume 24

that there's no particular safety reasons for doing

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that or for downstream purposes. It's just one year

Montana decides not to fill up until June?

MR. WECHSLER: Totally arbitrary.

SPECIAL MASTER: That's right. I mean, it

just decides that, you know, year, you know, it looks there will be more than enough water. We'll just leave it in the lake. And then they start to fill it up and they turn to Wyoming and say we want our water now. Is there anything that would prevent Montana from doing that under Montana's approach?

MR. WECHSLER: I think that what would prevent that and really what the constraints on the reservoir is the historic pattern of use and we have explained that the historic use defines the water right. It is a component of the water right and, therefore, the Tongue River Reservoir is obligated then to fill during the runoff period when once these dangers and problems to the reservoir and downstream are abated. That is when it is obligated to start filling.

And in the example that you were positing I think they are no longer following their historic pattern of use. Now they are essentially at the end of the spring runoff period. I think they basically used the irrigation season and I think there are cases that say you can't change your historic pattern of use to

the detriment of juniors because that forms a component 1 2 of your water right as we have argued. SPECIAL MASTER: Let me actually go on to the 3 4 beginning sort of spending time on the direct flow rights. 5 6 MR. WECHSLER: Okay. 7 SPECIAL MASTER: So could you just in relatively succinct terms tell me what in Montana's 8 view Montana needs to show in order to prevail on the 9 10 direct flow rights. MR. WECHSLER: Yes. I think that Montana 11 12 needs to show that there were actions in Wyoming that caused shortages to the state water and, therefore, 13 14 that there was insufficient water to satisfy Montana's 15 pre-1950 rights. And I am in part going on the prior rulings of the court. 16 And so I think the difference is and what the 17 questions that end up arising are, well, first of all, 18 Wyoming's argument is you must identify an individual 19 20 water right in Wyoming that should have been shut off and then trace it down to the individual user in 21 22 Montana and have this sort of causal link as between 23 the two. I think that that is -- that's contrary to the 24

general notion of the Compact being as between two

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sovereigns. It's inconsistent with the first interim report and also the 2011 Supreme Court decision that are essentially talking about lots of water that are then apportioned to the two states.

And I also think it's inconsistent with the prior case law and for that I think I would point to the Colorado versus New Mexico case in which you see some of the similar things being raised by Colorado there. They were saying look, New Mexico was making inefficient use of water down in New Mexico. They wasted water. They had abandoned rights.

What the court held in its 1984 ruling was that New Mexico had met its burden of showing a real and substantial injury by showing that the diversions in the upstream senior state would cause less water to be available for the downstream state.

After that the burden shifted to the State of Colorado, in this case the State of Wyoming here, to show that New Mexico was receiving more water than it needed. And I think in part that answers some of the questions like waste and intrastate remedies that really ultimately that burden rests on Wyoming. I think they acknowledge that for the purposes of waste in their pretrial memorandum where they acknowledged, yeah, that's our burden.

And in your motion on summary judgment you had said, well, again, it's Wyoming's burden to show that the practices in Montana were insufficient. But setting all of that aside for a second, because here we're talking about very, you know, technical things and I understand that you are wanting to cover all the bases.

But I think it's important to keep in mind this is not a close case. Whether or not Montana had sufficient water to satisfy its pre-1950 uses or, as Mr. Draper will talk about, whether Wyoming caused that is really not subject to a reasonable question.

Montana presented what I would call three sets of evidence that it was not receiving sufficient water in those years to satisfy its pre-1950 right.

The first was -- and, as we know, what we have here is a pretty simple system. There are 77 pre-Compact rights in Montana. All have been adjudicated or in the process of adjudicating. At the top of the system you've got the reservoirs. We know when the reservoir fills when it fills.

At the bottom of the system you have the second oldest and largest right, which, by the way, ends up being the calling right in Montana, the T&Y Ditch. And the hydrograph starts way up here.

Everybody has got water and then immediately it crashes and nobody has got water.

The overwhelming evidence presented by Mr. Hirsch, Mr. Muggli, Mr. Hamilton, the water commissioners, Mr. Kepper and Mr. Fjell, Mr. Gephart, was the only water users in Montana that were receiving water in the years that we're talking about, receiving direct flow pre-1950 water, were the Nance right, the seniormost, the 1886 right, and part of the T&Y, not even the whole T&Y, just part of T&Y, again an 1886 right.

The rest of them including the T&Y was on stored water. And so clearly there's insufficient water there to satisfy Montana's pre-'50. And that was the situation throughout the years because you would see at the beginning of the year, reservoir didn't fill. Once they start releasing water from the reservoir then you know that they are not receiving sufficient water for direct flow and the remainder of the time that situation prevailed.

You can look to the state line data which there is information in Mr. Book's rebuttal testimony on the level, the flow levels on each day at the state line gauge which are -- sometimes they get as low I believe as 6 CFS.

And so the second piece of evidence I would point to is that the experience of the water users, people like Mr. Hayes, the water commissioners, the people who testified on behalf of Montana said in order to satisfy the two seniormost rights, meaning again Nance and T&Y, you had to have 200 CFS passing the state lines, and again you see that in almost none of the time frame that we're talking about.

The second -- the third level set of evidence that shows Montana's pre-1950 rights were short is Mr. Book's analysis of the demand. And so there you would see what I would actually call a conservative analysis, and we included in our brief why we consider that conservative.

He looked at return flows. He looked at the amount of acreage that has been used in various periods, various months, and he calculated how much water is necessary to satisfy Montana's pre-'50 rights, and then we can compare that to how much water was actually entering the state, which, again is not even close.

And so Wyoming wants to quibble about the details. I think you can probably -- you could assume Mr. Book's analysis was 50 percent overestimating and you still are not even close to the amount of water

that Wyoming was providing to the State of Montana. 1 2 SPECIAL MASTER: We need to break, but let me ask you and leave you with one question. 3 So, again, what I want to make sure I also 4 understand is exactly what Montana thinks is necessary 5 in order to show a violation of those direct flow 6 7 rights. 8 And if I understand you correctly, even though you think there was a lot of evidence showing them 9 10 back -- there are people out there that you didn't 11 really want to get the water. It sounds as if what 12 Montana is saying is you look to see what are the rights in existence, the rights that have been 13 14 recognized in Montana on the -- on the Tongue River and 15 you total those up. And if, in fact, you're not getting that much water, then you've established your 16 case. And so I'm curious as to whether or not that's 17 true. 18 And then it's just a hypothetical afterwards. 19 20 If, for example, the T&Y Canal, if they just went out of existence, all of the land was fallow -- never tell 21 22 Mr. Muggli I used this as a hypothetical -- but if this was the case, would Montana be able to continue to 23 claim water for that acreage or, you know, do you 24

actually have to show there, in fact, people utilizing

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1	that water?
2	MR. WECHSLER: I understand.
3	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Great. So let's take
4	a break and we'll come back if you won't mind, we'll
5	come back like 2:10 rather than 2:15. I want to
6	squeeze another five minutes at the end. We have about
7	ten minutes left and then I want to switch over to
8	Mr. Kaste.
9	(Lunch recess taken.)
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1	Stanford, California May 1, 2014
2	AFTERNOON SESSION
3	MR. WECHSLER: Good afternoon.
4	SPECIAL MASTER: I left you with a question
5	and a hypothetical.
6	MR. WECHSLER: That's true. And so I
7	understood the questions to be, first, what must
8	Montana show in order to show a violation and,
9	second I'm paraphrasing, but if the T&Y were to
10	abandon legally no longer a valid right is what
11	happens.
12	SPECIAL MASTER: Actually, let me just clarify
13	that and let's assume that, you know, they just stopped
14	using their water. They haven't necessarily abandoned
15	it yet.
16	MR. WECHSLER: Okay. I think that to answer
17	the question I'll start where Montana's original
18	position was and then concede that that has changed.
19	Montana's original position in this case was the
20	Compact locked in a certain amount of depletion and so
21	there was an obligation at the state line delivery that
22	at the state line associated with certain conditions
23	that a certain amount of water had to be delivered.
24	That position was rejected. Essentially the
25	court said that the amount changed based on prior

appropriation doctrine and so, for example, if there is a right which was diverting the same but consuming more pursuant to, you know, changing irrigation or other type of change to the right that Montana was no longer allowed to receive that amount of water.

So under the doctrine of appropriation what we say is the standards are clear, the law is clear that once you have an adjudication you're entitled to the amount of water to satisfy your water right. That's been established through that adjudication. That forms the prima facie amount of the water right and that's -- I'll give you a Montana statute cite of 85-2-227.

I think that's the also the Parshall versus

Cowper case. We will recognize that the amount that

Montana is entitled to, if that amount of water

ultimately isn't needed Montana wouldn't get all of

that water, which I think goes to your second question.

And that's why you see in the Book analysis there is some allowance that, in fact, if all of the acreage isn't being irrigated in particular months and we see that in, for example, June and September that we're not claiming that amount of water.

And so I think the answer to the T&Y questions, and I'll answer both of the hypothetical I guess I posed which was T&Y no longer a valid right,

totally abandoned, not transferred and completely not a valid right, Montana would not be entitled to that water.

If, however, it were simply idle or there's some acreage that were idle, I think as an initial matter Montana would be entitled to that water.

Wyoming, however, could establish, prove that that water wasn't necessary or needed as happened in the Parshall case and I think very very relevant to this case as happened in the Colorado versus New Mexico case.

As I said, the defense there from Colorado, the upstream state, was very much along the lines of what Wyoming is claiming here, that there was wasted water or abandoned rights, water that was not necessary in New Mexico. And once New Mexico established that those actions up in Colorado were causing harm to their rights, then the burden was placed onto Wyoming in the second phase of that case, the 1984 case, to show that, in fact, New Mexico didn't need that water. And so that I think is how that would play out.

I will say those are hypothetical situations.

Again, in this particular case I don't think we get

anywhere near any particular line because we're dealing

with very small amounts of water that were coming into

Montana, you know, at a time that in Wyoming they were using post-1950 uses, where there was a free river situation. And we weren't even close to receiving enough water to satisfy all of our rights.

So it's really not a close question. And as I said before, all of the evidence shows that -- you know, whether you want to look at Mr. Book's analysis or you want to look at the testimony of the water users, our water users simply were not receiving their water. They were short of water. They were all short of water and using storage.

And we also know that the storage right, it is uncontested that it didn't fill. They were being forced to cut back and there was a lot of details we talked about at the trial about the ways that that caused hardship to Montana users.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So that's really helpful. So just to rephrase, basically what Montana's position is is that the adjudicated water right is sort of prima facie evidence of what the entitlement is and that should be what Montana receives, although to the degree that Wyoming can prove that, in fact, their particular acreage which is not being used, then you can take that amount out.

MR. WECHSLER: That's correct, Your Honor.

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All right. So let me ask and SPECIAL MASTER: I'm not sure there's an easy answer to this question. It might just be the nature of compacts and the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but does this put the Supreme Court in a position that, to the degree that there are calls in the future by Montana against Wyoming and the claim is we're not getting all of the direct flow water that we're entitled to, that every time there's a dispute over whether or not particular partners are actually getting -- actually need the water, that that's going to end up, unless the parties can agree on it, before the United States Supreme Court? MR. WECHSLER: Well, I think there's a danger of that unless an appropriate remedy is put in place. We know that the court is very hesitant to have a water monitor, which they have done in rare occasions, but has been very clear that it's hesitant to do it and I think probably it would be fair to say unlikely to do it in the future. What I would say to that is all along Montana has argued that in the remedies phase -- and I don't think we're there yet. This phase of the case is to say was there a violation and, if so, in what amount,

how many acre feet or CFS.

I think the question for the next phase as we view it is okay, what do you do about that? We know that there's been this violation and Montana has argued all along that what ought to be done is that a methodology is put in place that will involve some technical analysis and a study and, you know, potentially could be resolved by you or if the parties are able to resolve it as they did, say, in Arkansas River it was helpful.

But the methodology would essentially say, okay, under certain circumstances a certain amount of water that's -- that certain indices, whether it's strictly meters, whether it's at the Miles City gate, the state line, places in Wyoming, that the parties have some certainty as to what they should be doing, what they -- you know, they know what to expect given those indices.

I think we heard Wyoming say that that kind of certainty would be helpful. It would very much be helpful for Montana. In fact, we have said all along that has been the primary objective for the State of Montana in this case is to get a workable methodology so that going forward we're able to know that we can expect to enjoy our pre-Compact rights every year.

And, you know, that methodology may involve

1	indices. It may involve some process for a call that
2	we know will be honored given certain circumstances.
3	So I think that's what we envision.
4	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So actually I want to
5	take you back just for a moment to the reservoir
6	storage issue because I realize there was one question
7	that I just wanted to clarify. And that is is it
8	Montana's position with respect to the storage right
9	that what Montana has a right to do is to fill the
10	reservoir once a year to its full capacity of about
11	79,000 acre feet?
12	MR. WECHSLER: Yes. That's our position.
13	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. And I know then the
14	preliminary decree, for example, there was reference to
15	134,000 acre feet. Montana is not claiming that they
16	have a right to that amount?
17	MR. WECHSLER: Not under the Compact.
18	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. And why is that?
19	MR. WECHSLER: Well, I think in the in the
20	course of the litigation you make certain choices about
21	what it is we want. We feel that is totally
22	defensible. I think right now the total fill capacity
23	of the Tongue River Reservoir given the adjudication is
24	a little bit of an undecided question in terms of how
25	many what capacity can it fill to.

1	We've decided that the more prudent approach
2	was to take something that was totally defensible, that
3	was, in fact, conservative, an amount of water that we
4	know you know, we know that the reservoir filled
5	prior to the Compact. We know that the tribal rights
6	were in existence and protected at that time. We know
7	that the rights of the reservoir are commingled. And,
8	therefore, for Montana to receive its full amount, it
9	needs to fill to that 79,000 recognizing that we feel,
10	like I said, that's a conservative position but one
11	that is very very defensible.
12	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thanks. I'm just
13	looking at them just looking at the time and I want
14	to make sure we're able to get through everything. If
15	there's some additional points you want to make on the
16	storage and direct flow rights at this forum, that's
17	fine, but what I'd most want is to return to Mr. Kaste
18	and we can come back for some follow-up.
19	MR. WECHSLER: That's good.
20	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Excellent. Thank you.
21	So have you been keeping track of my
22	questions?
23	MR. KASTE: Well, I tried. And so I suspect
24	we want to talk about the reservoirs first.
25	SPECIAL MASTER: Yes. Let's do that.

MR. KASTE: Well, the first thing I want to say is unrelated to one of your questions, but it's sort of endemic throughout the course of this litigation. You just heard Mr. Wechsler describe filling the reservoir in a way that I think is exceedingly telling about what's really at stake here.

And I have this conversation with my kids all the time, you know, when they say "it fell" and "it broke." "It" disclaims all personal responsibility for it falling and it breaking when you knocked it off and broke it. And when you say "it didn't fill" Montana disclaims responsibility for not filling their reservoir. They have the keys to that reservoir gate and they have the means available to them to fill it, and they should.

And I think that's a huge problem in this litigation and a huge disconnect between the parties with regard to reservoirs. We have this idea on this side that it just happened and on this side we know that they did it. That's a big problem that needs to be fixed in this litigation.

Now your first question was what does Article V(C)(3) mean. Well, it means exactly what it says. In existing reservoirs existing uses are counted under V(A) and any existing reservoirs new uses are counted

1 for V(B) purposes. There's no magic to it. 2 Mr. Wechsler tries to say that, well, you know, really that's for enlargement. If you built a 3 4 bigger reservoir, then that's what that's designed to deal with. Well, it doesn't say that. It doesn't say 5 6 new storage in existing reservoir is enlargements. 7 He's using the words that would lead us to believe that 8 they're talking about a different hole in the ground. It talks about uses and Montana says, well, that's 10 crazy, that's ludicrous, it doesn't make any sense at 11 all. Why would Montana do that? 12 Well, because the Compact was designed to protect existing uses. You said that in your first 13 14 interim report. I think you said in your first interim 15 report that it says that all over this Compact. designed to protect existing uses. 16 And so when Wyoming sat down to negotiate this 17 Compact in 1950 and it looked across the way they saw a 18 reservoir being operated and, as you heard during 19 20 trial, to satisfy 32,000 acre feet worth of contracts, and we know that they never even sold that. 21 22 What's interesting to me is we went back and we looked at the trial exhibits and there's this 23 wonderful report on activities of the water board that 24

Mr. Smith testified to. And you see in that report it

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says, well, by 1961 we only actually sold 11,000 acre feet of contract water.

That's what Wyoming saw when we looked across the way. We can live with that. That's fine. We can protect that. And that's what Article V(C)(3) does. We saw what was going on in Montana and Wyoming has been exceedingly generous in light of the fact that only 11,000 acre feet was actually sold and therefore actually put to beneficial use by virtue of the plain language of the 1937 compact.

Fine. Let's say it's 32,000 acre feet.

That's what you had the ability to sell in 1950.

That's what we anticipated would happen when we entered into this contract in 1950 was the Tongue River Water

Users Association would put 32,000 acre feet of water for beneficial use. And that is protected under V(A).

And there's been plenty of water in both years at issue to satisfy that right. And anything above or beyond that right is calculated under V(B) because one thing that the Compact makes clear and one thing the doctrine of appropriation makes clear, too, is that we don't count the same water twice. There's no way to double-count water under this Compact. It's either V(A) water or it's V(B), but it can't be both.

And so it means exactly what it says and it

necessarily means that any existing reservoirs, there's a V(A) pool and a V(B) pool. That's it.

SPECIAL MASTER: Let me ask you several questions about that. The first is let's assume that we don't have the issue of the amount of water which is flowing through the reservoir in the winter and instead what Montana does is it's simply on a particular date close the gate, fills it up so we get away from the one-fill rule which we can come back to in a moment.

So under those circumstances what is Wyoming's argument as to how much water Montana would have a right under the Compact under its V(A) rights to put in? Is it basically you can fill it up until it gets to the 32,000 level and then that's it?

MR. KASTE: Well, you can fill it all the way up if there's water available.

SPECIAL MASTER: Understood.

MR. KASTE: But Montana's ability to call on Wyoming at any given point in time and say, "hey, we are seeking to enforce our V(A) right, the limit of that right is 32,000 acre feet. It's defined as of 1950. That's it. It's 32,000 acre feet. And they can because they have the space store lots more water in there and that -- all that water is, it's related to at some given point in time calculated or part of the V(B)

calculation.

And that's the extent of their right. And if they call on us to provide more than 32,000 acre feet or they are calling us and saying we need to curtail your uses at this point in time and they have had access to more than 32,000 acre feet of water, then their call is invalid. They have the water. They can't call for more for this right.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So again just looking back at how much the reservoir actually filled to prior to the negotiation of the compact, it looks like it ranged from a low of about 36,000 acre feet to a high of somewhat over 75,000 acre feet. And Wyoming's position would be we, "Well, in those years Montana was lucky. There was plenty of water to fill it up to that level."

But, in fact, if they had been water-short years and the only way they could have filled it beyond 32,000 acre feet would have been to call Wyoming, they would have been out of water. They would never have been able to fill to any of those levels.

MR. KASTE: Yeah, that's right. And that concept adheres in this Compact because it's limited to beneficial use. The amount of water that Montana put to beneficial use from this reservoir prior to 1950 was

at most the 32,000 acre feet of contract water that it 1 2 had the authority to sell. And if they got more than that in a given year, great, but it cannot call on 3 4 Wyoming to supply water after it has received that amount in any given year. 5 6 SPECIAL MASTER: Let's ask exactly the same 7 question in just a slightly different way. Then it's 8 your view that, at least what they are fighting after, the Montana negotiators of this particular Compact 9 10 would have thought to themselves based on this particular question, well, you know, all those various 11 12 years and we could have billed it for more than 32,000 acre feet, that was just through the generosity of the 13 14 precipitation gods and, in fact, all we are getting 15 pursuant to this Compact is the right to fill it up to 32,000 acre feet, again assuming that there's not more 16 water available. 17 MR. KASTE: I happen to think that's what they 18 thought because that's what they wrote. 19 That's the 20 plain language of this Compact. SPECIAL MASTER: 21 Okay. MR. KASTE: And I understand there's a -- I 22 suspect you're going to ask me about, well, why is that 23

They said, well, that's not

somehow different than the direct flow which we took up

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to the Supreme Court.

limited to the amount that you should have assumed as 1 2 of 1950. Right? We know that's the case. And the answer, of course, is interesting. 3 4 Under the Compact they treated reservoirs differently, the call reservoirs, had explicitly treated them 5 6 differently than the other rights. Did it inure to Montana's benefit? Maybe not. But they must have 7 8 thought that was the way to go because that's what they agreed to do. 10 And reservoirs in this case are limited to the amount of water they put to beneficial use as of 1950 11 12 and if there's a new use in that reservoir, it's just five feet of water. 13 14 SPECIAL MASTER: So let's parse the language 15 of (V)(C)(3) in a little more detail because I'd love to get your guidance on this. So the first thing it 16 says is "the net change in storage in acre feet in 17 existing reservoirs." 18 19 So you could interpret that in theory in at 20 least two ways. You could read that to the net change 21 in the amount of water stored in acre feet or you could read it the net change in storage capacity in acre 22 feet. 23 MR. KASTE: I think it's pretty hard to read 24

the word "capacity" into this language.

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That would

1	be I think that's the kind of language you would
2	expect to see if that's what they intended to do. I
3	mean, how hard is it to say "enlarge" or "change in
4	capacity." It's not hard and the drafters of this
5	Compact were well schooled in crafting the language
6	related to a water agreement.
7	You'd have to do I think some heavy lifting to
8	add those kinds of words into this language. It
9	doesn't say "capacity." It doesn't say "enlarged
10	storage." And it would be an easy thing to do to add
11	that language had that been their intention.
12	SPECIAL MASTER: But if I were to think about,
13	for example, oh, a I'm going out to acquire some
14	storage space because I want to store some various
15	materials around my house and I've run out of storage
16	space in my house. I can easily imagine going in and
17	asking someone out in the world how much storage is
18	that.
19	I mean, they way at least I thought about it I
20	think that the way I use the term "storage" I'm
21	thinking about total amount that I can store, not the
22	amount I've actually stored.
23	MR. KASTE: We have to read the whole sentence
24	in this particular instance.
25	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.

MR. KASTE: And the beginning of this sentence
relates to the latter and it talks about used for
irrigation, municipal and industrial purposes developed
after January 1, 1950. So while we talk about storage
in general at the front end, we limit it to the smaller
pool at the back end of this clause. And necessarily
by creating this smaller pool which is limited to the
net change in storage for purposes, specific purposes
developed after 1950, we know we can't double-count
water necessarily means there's a V(A) pool which
isn't accounted for in $V(C)$ under Article $V(C)(3)$.
So your existing reservoirs have some other
pool not mentioned here that would count under $V(A)$.
SPECIAL MASTER: And so then the question
let me just turn to that for a moment.
So let's assume that we interpret this to
refer to the amount of water stored rather than the
storage capacity. As you point out, it's only that net
change in storage used for irrigation, municipal and
industrial purposes developed after January 1, 1950.
And you're going to have to help me on the facts here.
So you initially had to contract the 32,000
acre feet and that gets expanded to a contract for
40,000.
MR. KASTE: In 1969.

1	SPECIAL MASTER: In 1969. But isn't it for
2	the same land that the water is being used?
3	MR. KASTE: Well, the contracts can be applied
4	anywhere. If I understand them, you just buy a share
5	of the water and if you don't apply them to your land
6	it's not dependent upon your priority waiver of water
7	rights or anything like that.
8	SPECIAL MASTER: I guess my question is it
9	says "for irrigation, municipal and industrial purposes
10	developed after January 1, 1950." So is there any
11	evidence in this case that the additional water that is
12	being stored now is being used for any irrigation,
13	municipal and industrial purposes developed after
14	January 1, 1950?
15	MR. KASTE: Everything above I believe at
16	least 32,000 acre feet is being used for a purpose
17	after 1950. You're talking about location and that's a
18	different deal.
19	SPECIAL MASTER: Isn't it the same purpose?
20	MR. KASTE: I don't think so.
21	SPECIAL MASTER: Again, this means it sounds
22	as if okay, if you develop some new agricultural area,
23	you have a new purpose to develop after January 1,
24	1950. To the degree it's all going to the same area,
25	it's all nurnoses developed fully

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MR. KASTE: I see what you're saying. there's no evidence about that question including -neither side put in any evidence about where the additional contract water was used. I think we talked about with Mr. Hayes about how the contracts work and you can tell I think from the testimony that sometimes they come up for sale and they buy them from their neighbors on occasion. Then they put them on different lands. So there's no particular evidence that would tell you that this land is newly irrigated after 1950, this land was irrigated before 1950 with water from the reservoir. That level of detail is not in the evidence. SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. And again what's interesting here is if "developed" refers to purposes and given that there's not a common link problem, then it raises the question of whether the quickness developed after it kicked in. MR. KASTE: I think in this case -- and it's difficult because these were purpose here and these beneficial uses at other points and parts of the Compact that they say at the beginning of that that was used for that. And so I think we have to look at how

much water was used prior to 1950 that's protected

under V(A), how much water is used for any of these purposes that were developed after 1950.

So "use" is the key word here and not "purposes developed." I don't know that there's another way to figure it out if we don't look at the uses that was 1950 versus the uses after.

SPECIAL MASTER: Well, again to the degree it's being used in the same area of land and is being used for agricultural purposes just like it was prior to 1950, do we have a new purpose or a new use? We might have more water being applied, but it would still seem to be for the same uses and purposes.

MR. KASTE: I think it's a new use to add more water, you know, the way this thing is written. I think what the drafters must have been thinking when they put this thing together is we're taking a snapshot in 1950 and we're seeing what the State of Montana was doing and we're seeing what the State of Wyoming was doing regarding exports in 1950.

And what we're using the water for, what you've developed at this point in time, that's protected under V(A). We want to protect existing uses. And if you're going to start using more water, that's fine so long as you do it under the percentage allocation under V(B).

They really didn't just take a snapshot. 1 2 That's the line below the V(A), above V(B). And if you use more water, that's V(B) water. 3 SPECIAL MASTER: So if using more water on the 4 same land is considered a new use, then doesn't that 5 6 mean actually the Supreme Court was wrong in its 7 earlier decision because we agree that Wyoming appropriators are now actually consuming more? Isn't 8 that in use? 9 10 MR. KASTE: That's why I say they treated reservoirs differently in this Compact by putting in 11 12 this specific language here. They are treating reservoirs differently than they do the direct quoted 13 14 versions where they measure at the headgate and you're able now to consume, consume more of the water that you 15 have put to beneficial use as of 1950 because of better 16 irrigation techniques. 17 They are treated differently in the Compact 18 19 and so, no, the Supreme Court wasn't wrong before. 20 And, yes, it can do this, follow this interpretation of 21 the Compact at the same time without being inconsistent 22 Because the agreement of the parties is different as it relates to storage and direct flow rights. 23 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. This is -- on all of 24 25 this what I'm trying to do is to get a sense of how one

1 might interpret this language. 2 MR. KASTE: I agree that there's an inconsistent or a seeming inconsistency and that's why 3 4 I bring it up, but the inconsistency is the result of 5 the plain language of the agreement. And so we have to make that work. We're stuck with the plain language of 6 7 the agreement and here I think it's fairly clear. 8 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. 9 MR. KASTE: So what we were talking about 10 after --SPECIAL MASTER: We were still basically --11 12 we've addressed (V)(3)(C) so far and then also I just wanted to clarify exactly what Wyoming's position was 13 14 as to how much Montana can store in advance of that. 15 MR. KASTE: And our position is as we said at the trial in 2013, but I want you to keep in mind as 16 you go through this one other piece of evidence and 17 that is the beneficial use limitation in Montana's 18 water right itself. 19 20 We heard and we looked at the abstract and talked to Mr. Davis about the beneficial use 21 22 recommendation in Montana's water right and we know that they can only release 32,000 acre feet of water to 23 put to use as in the reservoir water right as of today 24 25 and, of course, it was 40,000 in 1969 and was 32,000

1 back in 1950.

And if the Compact itself doesn't limit

Montana's Article V(A) right in the way that Wyoming

sets, then the beneficial use limitation within

Montana's own water right certainly does. Montana

cannot ask us to supply more water that it can put to

a beneficial use and there's a beneficial use

limitation in its water right specifically. And it has

changed over time.

We think we're really only on the hook for that limitation as it existed in 1950 with regard to their V(A) right. It is not what the Compact drafters had in mind that they could have had these changes over time at 20,000 acre feet of storage for the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, add another 8,000 acre feet of contract water and say, well, that's the V(A) right.

But there is this other beneficial use limitation. I think we talked about it a little bit at the trial and certainly in our brief and, if not the Compact, then that right is limited in the same way by the beneficial use limitation. You can't ask me to provide water that you can't put to beneficial use. Beneficial use is a limiting factor in this Compact. It's specifically defined and it applies across the board.

another hypothetical then. So let's assume you have the original reservoir and it is following the position and you fill that up to 32,000 acre feet. And then let's assume that after the Compact is negotiated Montana develops another reservoir on the river and I think we would have to conclude that new reservoir is probably not covered under section V(A).

And it develops this new reservoir in order to have a place in which to store the Northern Cheyenne Tribe's water and also to store the additional 8,000 acre feet in the new Compact, and it basically fills up that reservoir. And then it starts exercising its right to draw down that first pre-1950 reservoir all the way to the top, fills it up to 32,000. Farther down fills it up to 32,000.

Would that be okay under the Compact? The new reservoir fills up in a year in which no one has any complaints. There's water there. It's filled it up.

MR. KASTE: They can fill it and drain it as many times as they want until they call me and ask me to make up the difference. And that's really the key here. The call, as I said earlier, is so important in this situation because Montana, if there is available water in the river, they can fill that reservoir to

1	their heart's content, they can dump it, whatever they
2	want.
3	But once they call on the junior to make up
4	some shortage, then their actions are subject to some
5	scrutiny and at that point in time you look at the
6	language and see what they are entitled to under their
7	V(A) right to get that 32,000 acre feet. And if the
8	answer to that question is yes, then their claim
9	against Wyoming must fail, their call must fail,
10	because we're only on the hook to curtail diversions if
11	they are not going to meet that V(A) right.
12	Now, they may have a remedy under V(B) for the
13	additional space that they would like to fill up, but
14	that's a different question. It's certainly one not at
15	issue in this case.
16	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So let me ask the
17	question just a little bit differently again. So again
18	you have the original storage reservoir, a new one is
19	filled, and in wet years that new reservoir is filled
20	up.
21	MR. KASTE: Are you asking do I have to use
22	the water in the other reservoir first?
23	SPECIAL MASTER: That's right.
24	MR. KASTE: No.
25	SPECIAL MASTER: So now they don't have enough

water in the old reservoir in particular here and so 1 2 they call on Wyoming and say, "Guess what? We haven't been able to get our 32,000 acre feet out -- into the 3 old reservoir." 4 MR. KASTE: No. Just like Montana can't make 5 us release water that was stored in priority in 6 7 Wyoming, we can't make them release water that is 8 stored in priority in Montana. If that water was stored in a second reservoir at the time when it was 9 available stored in priority, you have no right to tell 10 them to dump that until they are ready to to use it at 11 12 a place and time of their choosing. Does that make sense? 13 14 SPECIAL MASTER: Yes. Okay. Thank you. 15 MR. KASTE: That's not our contention though, although I do think it would be a really good idea if 16 we built another reservoir and used the water in it. 17 It would save a lot of problems. And honestly that's 18 what the drafters, of course, thought would happen on 19 20 the Tongue River Reservoir and it's still an option for 21 Montana. It's worth noting Montana is not precluded to 22 this day from building additional storage and having 23 built it use it. And that's a problem with what 24 25 Montana has done in the course of operating its

1	reservoir in the past is that, while it may still have
2	sort of gotten away with it, it made a voluntary choice
3	not to use it.
4	And it's hard for the upstream state to look
5	at the public water sitting in Montana and say, "Well,
6	we want more." Use what you have and when you're done
7	with that, then you call us. And that's what it comes
8	to. That doesn't seem quite right.
9	SPECIAL MASTER: So are you ready to go on
10	to
11	MR. KASTE: Direct flows.
12	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. What about the
13	one-fill rule?
14	MR. KASTE: Well, the one-fill rule is
15	interesting. Obviously I don't think this case was to
16	be certified to the Montana Supreme Court because we
17	can all read the decision of the Montana Supreme Court
18	in 1940. And it says this statute, which is still in
19	effect today, necessarily includes a one-fill
20	limitation.
21	It doesn't sound that difficult to me. It
22	says we've interpreted this statute from Montana and it
23	necessarily includes a one-fill limitation.
24	I think we get to the same result in this case
25	whether we look at the Compact or whether we apply a

one-fill rule because what Wyoming contends Montana is doing when it is releasing water available to it over the course of a year and calling on us to make up the difference is asking for a second fill. If they could have filled and didn't, well, then they are asking us to refill their reservoir in reality.

And, of course, you know Montana wants to describe this to you as Wyoming physically says you have to shut the gate and you have to operate the reservoir in an unsafe way, and you know that's not the case. Montana has unfettered discretion to operate the reservoir however it perceives to be safe and reasonable.

That's their reservoir. We don't purport to exercise control over it, but when we account for the water that flowed across the state line and through that reservoir, if it passes through their gate and it wasn't necessarily delivered to a downstream senior appropriator, then they could have stored it. And their decision not to store it, whether made for good reasons or not, remains their decision and they are accountable for that decision.

It's an accounting complaint on our part.

They cannot let this stuff go by and then charge us for that amount from an accounting standpoint, not from a

physically stored or not stored standpoint. I don't 1 care what Montana does with its water, whether it 2 chooses to leave its reservoirs lower or higher, 3 4 whether it chooses to bypass a lot or a little. What I care about is how they count and if how 5 they count does not include these bypasses on their 6 7 side of the ledger, then something is wrong. Wyoming is not Montana's insurers. We're not their 8 9 quarantor. We're not required to give them some specific amount of water. The water goes by and if 10 they fail to catch it, the burden of that decision 11 12 falls on them. They assume the risk of the operation of their dam, not Wyoming. 13 14 SPECIAL MASTER: So I understand kind of what 15 Wyoming is trying to do. So let me just ask again several questions. The first one is -- as far as I can 16 tell, it's not as if Montana just recently decided to 17 actually let water flow through its reservoirs because 18 this was also a practice they had back in 1950 at the 19 20 time that the Compact was negotiated. So was this another instance where the Montana 21 22 negotiators actually gave up something that they were 23 doing at the time? MR. KASTE: I don't think so. I think what we 24 25 learned from that interesting set of limitations study

is that when they created the Tongue River Reservoir their idea was we'll only fill it up about 45,000 acre feet total and leave the top seven feet for flood control. I remember reading that in the sedimentation study.

And so when the negotiators got together and agreed to the limitation in Article V(C)(3) they knew in their minds, well, we've got seven feet of reservoir space that we've got to use except to hold the water for a second until we can safely pass it out as part of our flood control operations. They weren't giving up anything.

And the idea that, well, we can bypass a lot of water for a long time, so that means we can continue to do it, is wholly at odds with the doctrine of appropriation. No one -- one of these wonderful cases says no one has a right to waste water by not using it. A pattern of not using water does not create a right for the continued ability to continue not using that water.

The doctrine of prior appropriation abhors waste and it encourages at every turn the beneficial use of water. And if you voluntarily let water go past your headgate, you have acquired no right to use it ever. And Montana has done that for a long time, but

that does not give them a right to continue to do that to our detriment.

They can keep doing it practically. It doesn't bother us until they call on us and say our actions have put us behind the eightball on this reservoir. We'd like you to make up the difference. They have no right to let that water go by and then say, well, we have right to the use of it by letting it go through our dam and which is put to no beneficial purpose between that dam and the Yellowstone River, none.

SPECIAL MASTER: So my understanding is not that Montana's claim is putting that water through a headgate for beneficial use but that instead it is that they are running the dam in a prudent fashion, and part of that prudence is not storing all of that water in a particular time of the year and all they want to do is continue that particular practice.

And I understand Wyoming's argument that, well, that's great, that might be good, but don't take that on us. But that sounds very different than wasting water.

MR. KASTE: Well, if you don't put it to a beneficial use and you could have, then it wastes water. It was there, it was available to you, and you

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wasted your chance. And it may be prudent in terms of your operations, but if you have access to water and you don't use it, that's waste, or you don't need it. And so what they are saying is when they come back later in the year and they say, "Well, we needed that water, but we let it go past and now we want you to send us some of yours to make up the difference." I do not see how that burden can fall on Wyoming. SPECIAL MASTER: So I would separate out two different arguments again. I understand what your argument is with respect to whether or not Wyoming should be responsible for the water that Montana decides in the exercise of operating the dam to let flow through, but that's a separate question from whether or not that would actually be waste under the prior appropriation system. Under your theory of waste isn't any type of

Under your theory of waste isn't any type of flood control dam that lets water out in order to store the water later on waste?

MR. KASTE: If you don't put the water to a beneficial use it is to the extent that they then want to use some additional water that they had in their possession to put to beneficial use.

And I see what you're saying. There's a dichotomy in there between the responsibility for those

decisions and saying it's a horrible waste. It has this terrible connotation. And you can decide it either way, but I think you reach the same conclusion, which is you have an obligation as a reservoir owner to store water when it's available and, if you don't, it's waste.

There's not a nice way to say it. If it was available, you didn't store it, it's wasted.

SPECIAL MASTER: Now go back to my initial question. What I'm understanding your answer to my question of you really can imagine that Montana negotiators agreed to this, my understanding of your answer is that, well, actually all they thought they were going to get was 32,000 acre feet. They knew they had a lot more capacity than that and, therefore, they weren't worried that they weren't going to get the 32,000 acre feet.

MR. KASTE: And their intention, as we see from the sedimentation survey, was not to store water in that top seven feet. 20,000 acre feet were for that reservoir. Their intention there was to keep it only there except for during a flood event. So, yeah, they looked out and thought we don't -- we're not going to protect in explicit terms in this Compact something more than the amount of water we're putting to use

1	today.
2	SPECIAL MASTER: But under the one-fill rule
3	don't they get just one chance to get 32,000 and
4	anything that gets that flows through gets counted
5	against the 32,000?
6	MR. KASTE: I think there's some
7	misunderstanding about the one-fill rule that once that
8	amount of water comes into the reservoir you have to
9	shut something off and no more can come in. And that's
10	not really true. If water is available, you can keep
11	filling it. You can fill it and fill it and fill it
12	and fill it right? if there's water available.
13	But if you attempt to make a call on somebody
14	junior to you, you look at the operations and say did
15	you have enough to fill to that amount in this case
16	that's protected by Article V(A) and in other cases did
17	you get your full capacity. And if the answer to that
18	question is yes, then anything over that is gravy.
19	And if there was more than what was necessary
20	to fill you up, then the harm not the harm, but the
21	burden of refilling that space doesn't fall on the
22	upstream junior, the upstream user.
23	So the one-fill rule is kind of a minimum.
24	It's not a maximum.
25	SPECIAL MASTER: I understand that. But let

me go back again and let's assume it's just a turn back to -- in retrospect it would be a really blind deal and Montana just like it had historically lets water flow through in the first couple of months of the year.

And then it gets around to April or May and they start filling up the reservoir and it doesn't even make it to 32,000 acre feet. What you're telling me is that the negotiators on Montana's part, no one understood that in that situation that, you know, they would only get 32,000 acre feet. They couldn't claim more against Wyoming and that furthermore all the water that they had let out in -- you know, earlier in January and February and March, that gets counted against that 32,000.

MR. KASTE: I think that the people who negotiated this Compact would very much expect water that they purposely dumped out of the bottom of their reservoir would count against them. I think they understood and I can't imagine they wouldn't understand that concept very clearly.

And, yes, I think that they would have understood that if it didn't get to 32,000 acre feet because I think the folks who negotiated this Compact for Montana understood that sometimes reservoirs don't fit and this river system is dynamic in the sense that

some years there's way more water than anybody knows what to do with and some years it's really dry.

And they assumed that there was a risk associated with creating the reservoir and that it might not fill. And Wyoming was not going to be responsible for anything more than the V(A) right in that reservoir. I don't think they'd be shocked by that at all. I think those men knew exactly what they were doing.

SPECIAL MASTER: I hate to prolong this, but I just have to ask one last question. So you're also -- when you're telling me that if one of the Montana negotiators had gone back to Mr. Hayes's father, who would have been around at that point in time?

MR. HAYES: My great uncle.

SPECIAL MASTER: Great uncle.

Gone to his great uncle and said, "Guess what? You know, I know we've been filling this reservoir to, you know, a certain average, 50,000 acre feet, and furthermore you've been running out it in a way that lets water flow through in the early part of the year. And we have a great deal and we're going to protect you. And as part of that protection you better really be careful about running that water flow through because in the future if you let it flow through it

1	could count against you. And in addition to that
2	actually you don't get to store 50,000, if in fact it's
3	a dry year. All we're going to guarantee you is
4	32,000."
5	And do you think that Mr. Hayes's great uncle
6	would have said great deal?
7	MR. KASTE: I think that the people that
8	negotiated this Compact would have gone to Mr. Hayes's
9	great uncle and said, "We've got a compact that
10	protects existing uses. What we're doing today is
11	going to be protected under V(A) of this Compact."
12	And that's exactly what Wyoming is continuing
13	to propose to you today.
14	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
15	MR. KASTE: And I guarantee you that's exactly
16	how they sold that to the Montana water users. "We are
17	protecting existing uses." And at that time, of
18	course, there was 11,000 acre feet that they had
19	contracts for. There wasn't very many folks. It was a
20	different time, but the contract is what it is.
21	SPECIAL MASTER: So another question. So I
22	understand your belief that the Federal Land Bank case
23	adopts a one-fill rule. Does it adopt both a one-fill
24	rule in the sense that you only get to fill your
25	reservoir once or does it adopt a one-fill rule that

says, "Hey, now you get to fill your reservoir once 1 2 and, by the way, you need to start as soon as October 1st"? 3 MR. KASTE: Well, the water use is fairly 4 5 common throughout. SPECIAL MASTER: Whatever is at the beginning 6 7 of the -- I don't know. Is it October 1st or December 8 1st or January 1st? But that there's a particular date 9 upon which you have to start filling the reservoir. 10 MR. KASTE: I think the one-fill rule says you get to store water when it's available and if that's 11 12 October 2nd, store it. If that's January, store it. 13 If it's May, store it. That's your responsibility as a 14 reservoir owner. If it's available, store it during 15 the course of the water year. Of course, this Compact resets every year and 16 you have nice little water year to work with, but your 17 responsibility as reservoir owner and the risk you 18 19 assume when you operate the gate that if water is 20 available I'm going to catch it and, if I don't, it's That's the problem with this case. 21 my problem. 22 SPECIAL MASTER: So let's focus a little bit more on Federal Land Bank and the one-fill rule. 23 first of all, going back to the question which I asked 24 25 Mr. Wechsler earlier. Let's assume that I conclude in

directing the Supreme Court that it looks like Federal Land Bank seems to be saying that the one-fill rule is a great idea.

It's also fairly clear that the practice in Montana has not been to follow the one-fill rule. So should I recommend to the Supreme Court that it tell Montana that the practice it's been following for the last, you know, series of decades is illegal under their state law?

MR. KASTE: I think you should recommend to the Supreme Court that it follow the law as articulated by the Supreme Court of Montana. I said this in my brief and I think it's hilarious, but my speeding doesn't make speed limits any less valid. Just because I do it all the time doesn't mean that the law has somehow changed. Just because Montana says that -- it seems kind of harsh, but it isn't that.

That doesn't mean that the law has changed.

The law is what it is and it's our job to enforce it and to follow it. And the fact that DNRC thumbed its nose at the fairly clear pronouncement of the Montana Supreme Court is of no moment. It has no consequence. They are scofflaws. That's fine. They could do what they want, but the fact of the matter is that's the law of Montana.

SPECIAL MASTER: So one of the things that Montana also points to is Rule 10B of the Montana Supreme Court followed by claims examinations.

MR. KASTE: Which is worse than dicta and they claim that this is dicta and when you point to something else where the court hasn't even really been squarely presented with the question outside of the judicial process and say, well, that must have changed the law.

You know what? If somebody wanted to change the law in Montana it should be the legislature that does that and it should either modify this statute that the Supreme Court interpreted and say it does not include that one-fill limitation or they should eliminate the statute.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So taking a look at the statute itself and my understanding from your brief and Montana's brief that the current version of it is 85-2-305. The statute says "appropriate water by means of a reservoir shall apply for a permit as prescribed in this chapter." Now, it must have been I keep looking at this statute and if, in fact, the Montana Supreme Court was interpreting that statute, I don't have any idea how they came out with a one-fill rule from that.

It is not clear that the statute MR. KASTE: 1 2 says that and that's what the court is for. Obviously what the Montana court was doing was they were looking 3 at a statute that said people have a right to store 4 We're going to let people store water. 5 water. 6 And we looked at it and said, well, what does 7 that really mean, what does that entail and what does 8 the decisions by the court entail. Well, that necessarily includes a one-fill limitation. 9 10 necessarily includes them. Otherwise your reservoir 11 becomes the bully on the river and it starts beating up 12 everybody upstream I get to refill as much as I want. What do you think of that? 13 14 Well, we don't like it. And the fact that 15 it's not an explicitly related element in the statute doesn't make the pronouncement of the Montana Supreme 16 Court any less viable. 17 SPECIAL MASTER: So why don't we move on. 18 I'm looking to make sure I'm not missing anything. 19 20 Why don't we go on into the direct flow right. And I really -- let me just tell you I have sort of one 21 22 main question here, which is could you explain what 23 Wyoming believes Montana should have shown in order to prevail on the direct flow rights. 24 25 MR. KASTE: Yes. And I think it goes back to

what Mr. Wechsler was just talking about. We need a methodology. Well, we have a methodology. We have the doctrine of appropriation and what you have to show is pretty simple.

It would have been easy enough had Montana had what we consider to be a functioning regulatory system and this -- like I say, they are on the verge. They are getting better over time as they have water commissioners appointed and appointed who know the system.

They need to show that there is an actual unmet contemporaneous demand somewhere on the river, not that the state line flow is some number, not that the paper rights of all of the water holders are some number. What we need to see is an actual contemporaneous demand that is not being met.

It's not that hard to show. The 77 pre-1950 water rights, it should be relatively easy for Montana to show that, but they didn't really do that in this case. They used Mr. Book's methodology which isn't designed to show you actual contemporaneous demand. When I gave you the state line flow, no, well, let's just figure when it hits 200 unless we have a reservoir across the way.

And that's great and all, but it doesn't tell

you what's happening at the headgate and it doesn't account for the things that are occurring in the 190 miles between the state line and the T&Y Canal. What we need are just the water commissioners to go out and give us a real demonstration of actual contemporaneous demand. We'll need Mr. Muggli to say, "I'm not getting the water that I'm entitled to and I want it."

And for them to say, "And then I went up the stream and I was able to differentiate between reservoir water and natural flow for real," not based on just the number at the state line because that number is changing constantly as we move down the stream. "I went up the stream. I shut everybody off that wasn't entitled to the water because they had the junior right with T&Y and now Wyoming needs to shut off here."

In the course of a water year that's actually going to happen in a relatively short period of time and it shouldn't be that difficult to do once the water commissioners start figuring out what is the real state of natural flow in that river. What they've done in the past is they've taken what is an expedient and efficient for them route, which is to say, oh, 200. We pretty much know that at that point everybody is on reservoir water.

And that's great that it works for them, but when they want to call on Wyoming they need to call on the prior appropriations system and there's some burden on them to ensure that their actions shutting off -- that there's an actual need of calling up and that they are actually shutting off juniors upstream such that we can be assured when we turn off our post-1950 rights it will inure to the benefit of the caller, not Montana.

Well, you know, it is it between sovereigns and it's about the state line. No, it's not. It might be that way in another compact, but this Compact incorporates the doctrine of appropriation and the doctrine of appropriation is all about individual water right holders, what are their rights as it relates to the other guy.

And that means because the states don't really have water rights in the system, we're not irrigating the fields, they actually have to look at the behaviors and needs and ability to put to beneficial use of individual irrigators in Montana and then look at the actions of people in Wyoming and, if it's time, curtail them.

SPECIAL MASTER: Let me again just take a step back then. If there's evidence in the record that is

showing that there are particular water users on the Tongue River in Montana who have been told that they can't take their direct flow rights because there isn't enough water and there's been a call, say, by the T&Y Canal and as a result of that they are now calling for storage water and they are actually calling Mr. Hayes with the telephone line up and saying, "Hey, I want some stored water," why is that not evidence on faith of contemporaneous demand on the theory that if they didn't need water they wouldn't ask for the storage water? You presumably would take your flow rights before you took the storage rights.

MR. KASTE: Sure. I think in a properly functioning system when we have an accounting record that we can be fairly certain is doing a good job of accounting that the request for reservoir delivery may be a good indication, but there's an unmet demand.

But our point in these cases is we don't have that with regard to the materials that Montana submitted for the time in question, for '04 and '06. What we have is disarray and what we have is sort of admitted "I don't really keep good track of the natural flow of reservoir water. We're doing our best, but we're not there yet."

If we had some confidence that when that

reservoir order was made that it really reflected the situation, the true situation on the river, there could be good evidence of that. But I don't think the evidence that you received during the course of this trial can give you much confidence in the true state of the river. And it's frankly why we would go there when we could just use a call, just have a call by appropriator that says "I'm not getting my water."

And if it's somebody prior to pre-1950 and the work is done in a post-1950 right, Montana is perfectly justified in calling Wyoming and saying, "We're at that point. We will need to curtail your diversions. We want our post-1950 V(A) rights."

The call is the better mechanism and it's part -- a large point largely about the water commissioners in this case. No party can really have much faith or confidence that what they are describing on the river is the true state of affairs because they weren't in a position to know at that time.

And you can tell by virtue of the water commissioner's manual and district training manual that they are going to get to a point where we will have a very firm grasp on the true state of the river until Montana. And it's going to be awfully hard for Wyoming to say anything other than okay when that call comes in

in the future. 1 2 SPECIAL MASTER: So does this then come down to a question of the adequacy of the job that the 3 4 commissioners were doing in keeping track of the Montana water in the Tonque River? 5 6 MR. KASTE: Well, it undermines our ability to 7 use the call for reservoir water as a surrogate for a 8 call for priority regulation, that's true. And when we 9 talk things that can undermine our confidence, people 10 making calls for reservoir water when the flow at the 11 state line is 700 CFS. There's no way anybody should 12 be making a call for reservoir water when there's 700 CFS right at the state line, and yet that's what we 13 14 saw. 15 I think what we see is a system that's evolving and getting better and more sophisticated 16 every year and we're probably to the point now where he 17 can have some confidence with a little bit more 18 19 information from Montana with regard to how they 20 actually account for natural flow. Because we can't have a situation where Mr. Muggli is standing at the 21 bottom of the river saying, "I never made a call" and 22 Mr. Hayes up at the reservoir going, "Get it on 23 reservoir rights. Get it on reservoir water." 24

Those things can't coexist when Mr. Muggli has

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never actually called for his reservoir rights, but he's being charged for them. How can you have confidence that that system is functioning in a way that we could be justified in Wyoming turning off our post-1950 rights in response to that? I don't think that situation can or will persist in the future. SPECIAL MASTER: You wouldn't necessarily have to have Mr. Hayes, Mr. Muggli, each individual water user come in and testify that we needed that water even though we didn't get it. MR. KASTE: I think that communication goes from Mr. Muggli to his water commissioner who relays it to probably Mr. Davis who calls Mr. Tyrrell and then he calls Mr. Knapp and the headgate is turned. There's a few calls in there, but that's the thing about state-to-state underregulation is that it's going to take the work of a number of individuals to do that. But we can't just look at the state line and assume that some state of affairs exists at any given headgate downstream. And that's what Montana is asking you to do and that's not consistent with the doctrine of appropriation. SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So this has been very If there's anything you're dying to tell me, feel free to.

MR. KASTE: I have a list, but I will withhold 1 2 it. Thank you, Your Honor. 3 SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you. 4 Mr. Wechsler? 5 6 MR. WECHSLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 try to be brief. At first when Mr. Kaste first came up here and 8 9 talked about the reservoir operations and the operations being problematic the State of Wyoming had 10 11 the opportunity to disclose a reservoir -- an expert in 12 reservoir operations. They chose not to. The only evidence that we have here that says 13 14 that this reservoir was operated reasonably, prudently 15 and consistent with the doctrine of appropriation and then consistent with its operating plan and operating 16 manual, which are also consistent with the doctrine of 17 appropriation in other reservoirs elsewhere, there is 18 no other evidence in the record. 19 20 Mr. Kaste talked about the protected amount of 21 the reservoirs and he talked about a snapshot, which is interesting because that's the exact same argument that 22 Montana was making to the exception that opened up new 23 In fact, I know that we used the language 24 25 "snapshot." That was rejected by the court.

I was happy to hear that he said that the amount that's protected is the amount that was in use. He ignores, however, that the beneficial use of the reservoirs as defined by the adjudication court is a sale, which is consistent with the Montana Constitution. And Wyoming has put no evidence on that that's not consistent with the doctrine of appropriation as is their burden.

Ultimately there was an adjudication in this

Court and it was found that, in fact, it was that full

amount that was put to beneficial use. And so that use

even under Mr. Kaste's rationale is the amount that was

protected, the full amount that was offered for sale

in -- prior to the Compact.

And we know how much was offered for sale.

Well, you can look at the Compact, the contract which would be the full amount of the firm annual yield.

That's what was protected. That was what the State of Montana was obligated to provide to the Tongue River Water Users Association.

Mr. Kaste talked about the one-fill rule. I think you asked him about the statute. I was very glad you did that because there's really nothing in the statute that indicates there is a one-fill rule in Montana. And, in fact, the Federal Land Bank case

itself is talking about a Colorado statute. So to the extent the statute plays in here, if Montana had chosen to adopt a one-fill rule it would have done so by the statute.

Next Mr. Kaste offered an awful lot of supposition about what the intent of the negotiators was, and there's no evidence in the record to support that. In fact, there is some evidence in the record about what the negotiators were thinking. That comes from the testimony of Dr. Littlefield. Again, it's uncontested. I believe Dr. Littlefield was not even cross-examined.

And what he said that the intent of the drafters was was to protect all fully vested and prospective water rights that were in existence at the time of the Compact, which would mean again the full amount if the reservoir had been filled and offered for sale.

Turning to direct flow, Wyoming makes a number of arguments that are really in a vacuum and I wonder sometimes listening to Mr. Kaste if I had been at the same trial. The evidence on which Montana is relying is not simply the analysis done by Mr. Book, although certainly we fully support that as it is correct, but as I indicated before, there was water user after water

user who came onto the stand to testify about the
shortages, about needing reservoir water, about the
only two rights that were receiving the full amount of
their water were the two 1886 rights, that is, Jay
Nance and Roger Muggli. There's no contrary evidence
in the record.
The water commissioners then came forward.
They said they visited every single point of diversion
at the beginning of the year. They were on the river
every day. They were taking daily records. They were
providing monthly reports to the court. They have
testified that they had called off rights when they
were taking direct flow that they weren't entitled to.
They testified that they accounted for stored water.
They accounted for direct flow water.
And so somehow the notion that this was a
system which was not properly accounted for or there
wasn't proper administration is entirely, completely
unsupported by the record. Again it was Wyoming's

Thank you.

evidence on that issue.

SPECIAL MASTER: I need to ask you two questions, first on that last one.

administration was improper. They offered really no

burden under your ruling to show that the

There was testimony in which -- it was all on cross-examination of the various commissioners and others that a lot of the members of the water commission didn't seem to add up. And so what should the Supreme Court do with that particular evidence?

MR. WECHSLER: I think we're talking about -as I recall, it was two or three water users who
Wyoming pointed out it looked like you had -- you were
actually allocated too much storage water or too little
storage water. I think in a system as large as the
Tongue River in Montana with the number of users
several years after the fact to be coming up and asking
about particular numbers, it's really trivial. And it
shows sort of that Wyoming is grasping at straws there.

If you look at the overall body of evidence, the body of evidence is that they were keeping excellent records. They were keeping track. They all testified they were keeping track of both storage and direct flow water.

And each one of the water users came forward and when they were asked did you feel like the water commissioners were doing an acceptable job, they all without exception said that they felt like it was an exemplary job. And so water administration is to some degree an imperfect science and so if there's one or

two errors or something that's unexplained at this point, I don't think that that has any bearing whatsoever on liability.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. So if you look at the evidence as a whole, you know, there were both gaps in the records and in addition to that there were errors that appeared to exist in the records.

And so I think one of the questions that the Supreme Court needs to address to the degree that it believes that it has to look at the adequacy of the Montana administration of its water is what would be the standard for determining whether or not the administration is adequate. Any thoughts on what would be the appropriate standard?

MR. WECHSLER: Reasonableness. Reasonably consistent with the doctrine of appropriation. If what we're looking at is, you know, several years after the fact in the volumes and volumes and volumes of documents that were produced there is one or two errors, that's a high standard indeed.

I think generally the standard would be was it -- was it reasonable, did it do a reasonably good job in assuring that the appropriate -- that the water users who were entitled to water got water. And I think all of the evidence shows that that was true.

SPECIAL MASTER: I mean, the other question I had was that you said with respect to the amount of water for which Montana had contracted to provide from the Tongue River Reservoir that the contract was actually for the entire firm annual yield.

MR. WECHSLER: Yes.

SPECIAL MASTER: But, of course, for a period of time the amount that was actually being delivered was less than the total storage capacity of the reservoir. And so if you think about the differences between the V(A) category of water and the supplemental water under V(B), doesn't amounts that you have contracted for but not been delivering fit better into the V(B) category than the V(A) category?

MR. WECHSLER: No, I don't think so because I don't think what you're looking at is the amount that was delivered to our reservoir. I'm unaware of any authority in terms of storage rights and reservoir rights where the amount of water that you are entitled to that is perfected is the amount that was delivered.

Instead it is the amount of water that was stored and, as I said, in Montana it's the amount that was stored and offered for sale. That was the full amount. The full amount was, in fact, contracted, the full firm annual yield. And so we don't consider the

1 32,000 or that 8,000 change once they had operated the 2 reservoir for some amount of time and recognized actually we might be able to eek out an additional 3 4 amount from that firm annual yield. We don't consider that to be a relevant 5 6 consideration when we're looking at the amount that was 7 perfected. And, in fact, one of the considerations 8 that you had identified was how are other reservoirs managed. And the other reservoirs in the State of 9 10 Montana, as Mr. Smith testified to, are administered in 11 exactly the same way. 12 There was some examples that Mr. Smith provided where they had originally contracted for a 13 14 smaller amount and when that reservoir after yet 15 several years of operations realized, well, we can get a few more acre feet out of this in terms of the firm 16 annual yield they contracted for that amount without 17 having to modify or change the existing water right 18 which still held the same priority date and the same 19 20 amount. SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Can you just remind 21 What is supplemental water under the Compact? 22 me. MR. WECHSLER: Excuse me. 23

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. It's one of those

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terms that's in there.

MR. WECHSLER: It would be -- I'm looking, 1 2 Your Honor, at Article V(B), clause 2. SPECIAL MASTER: Right. 3 MR. WECHSLER: It says: "Of the unused and 4 unappropriated waters of Interstate tributaries of the 5 6 Yellowstone River as of January 1, 1950, there is 7 allocated to each signatory State such quantity of that 8 water as shall be necessary to provide supplemental water supplies for the rights described in paragraph A 9 10 of this Article V." 11 SPECIAL MASTER: Right. 12 MR. WECHSLER: So what's that? So that's the for -- so if you had an existing ditch let's say and 13 you had -- at the time of the Compact you had 100 acres 14 15 that were being irrigated, but in normal times there's only sufficient water to satisfy, say, 50 acres of 16 that, then you could seek a supplemental supply which 17 would be we think in direct priority without regard to 18 the state line for that land. 19 20 SPECIAL MASTER: And so thinking about this now in terms of reservoir, you have a reservoir which 21 has a capacity which is bigger than the amount of water 22 which was being used in 1950 and now you have more 23 water which is being provided. Why is that not, you 24 25 know, identical to the supplemental water for the

ditch?

MR. WECHSLER: Because the supplemental supply is a new supply of water. When you're looking at Article V(A) you're talking about the appropriate rights to beneficial uses. Again beneficial uses is defined as a beneficial use under the doctrine of appropriation. And to the extent that those were fully used as of January 1, 1950, those are protected and the Tongue River Reservoir was fully used as of January 1, 1950.

Reservoir rights have always had sort of a unique place in prior appropriation documents and part of the reason is you want to protect the reasonable investment expectations of someone building a project like that. You would not get someone building a project if you said to them, "Go ahead and build your project, but we're not going to protect anything until -- you know, we're only going to protect it once it's actually used."

So throughout the West essentially what has developed, and different states use different languages, but, in essence, in Wyoming and in Montana a reservoir is fully protected, fully vested when it is built and filled and then after that you're entitled to be using that water anywhere within that project.

1	SPECIAL MASTER: So why don't we take a break
2	at this stage.
3	I have to say, though, in closing this section
4	here that most water law books including our water law
5	textbook historically had very little on storage
6	rights. And I'm both beginning to conclude one of the
7	reasons was that this is one of the more sort of
8	detailed intricate areas of the law now. Everyone
9	probably needs to spend a lot more time focused on this
10	in the various texts that are being issued.
11	Anyway, so I appreciate the guidance. They
12	were really very useful and then we'll come back in
13	about ten minutes.
14	(Recess taken.)
15	SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Draper, so we are going
16	to finish by 5:00. That's the one thing I know because
17	I also have a flight to catch. I have a flight at 7:30
18	that I have to catch. So we will be finished by 5:00.
19	And so what I would like to do is to divide
20	this to keep this within about an hour and then that
21	will give an opportunity. If either Anadarko or the
22	Northern Cheyenne want to make any arguments, we'll
23	have time for that.
24	So I'll try and keep everybody on track
25	including myself.

MR. DRAPER: Very good, Your Honor. I think 1 2 that's a very doable goal. SPECIAL MASTER: Because the other thing I'll 3 4 say is is that sort of looking at questions, this last portion strikes me as in many ways very fact specific. 5 And so there are probably fewer questions I'll have 6 7 here than I did in the other sections. MR. DRAPER: And I think a lot of the 8 9 questions have at least been touched on beforehand. 10 I did want to make one point with respect to the earlier discussion on the Worley case. You talked 11 12 about the demand issue and how they had used that term in that New Mexico Supreme Court case. 13 14 I want to draw your attention to the language 15 on page 651 of the Pacific Reporter in that case, just the third paragraph before the end of the opinion. 16 It says: "The downstream senior appropriator 17 is entitled to use water to the extent of his needs and 18 within his appropriation. If needed, and if the water 19 is not reaching its diversion point, he must make his 20 needs known." 21 Now, that's the Worley case and it is 22 consistent with the purpose for this reference to a 23 demand, namely, you have to have the information that 24

there is a need downstream. And I think it makes clear

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when you look first to the purpose of the demand, which is to provide the information that the water is needed downstream, and the specific concluding language of the court that it's the knowledge of the need that's important, not the particular formulation of do you combine that with some formulaic "pursuant to Article V of my priority" or whatever you are being instructed or requested to take from that.

So I think that really helps understand what the court was talking about in that case and not a specific formula, which I think was one of points he was trying to get to.

I just had one other introductory point that flows from your earlier discussion, if I may.

SPECIAL MASTER: Sure.

MR. DRAPER: You were asking Mr. Kaste about his reliance on contract law and pointing out that the Compact is both a contract and a federal statute. I'd like to direct your attention to the language in the Texas-New Mexico decision on the Pecos River where Justice White speaking for a unanimous court rejected New Mexico's position that it didn't know that it was in violation of the compact, that it acted in good faith and therefore shouldn't be held to have violated the compact.

In response to that position the court said that there is this contract aspect of a compact and when you make commitments you may find out that there were commitments you didn't need and that you have to pay for it today. And so I think that -- that goes to this -- some of these questions you had relating to notice.

I would point out that that compact in I think it's Article 9, the Pecos River Compact specifically requires use of the prior appropriation doctrine. So it's a case that was interpreting the compact that expressly refers to and relies on the doctrine of prior appropriation and rejected the notion that was suggested by the upstream state in that case that it didn't have notice, it wasn't aware, it was acting in good faith and therefore it shouldn't be held liable and that was rejected by the court.

I'm here to address particularly issues related to use of Wyoming post-1950 rights during periods when the pre-'50 rights in Montana were going unsatisfied. And so I'll address a few points there and then answer any questions that you may have from the briefs.

SPECIAL MASTER: Yes. I have several questions. So if you want to address a couple of

points first, that's fine. Again, I've read the briefs.

MR. DRAPER: Well, following up on some of your questions this morning and in the questions that you gave us as we went into the briefing I would point out that we -- in our final figures we refined those storage figures to just focus on fill periods, which is essentially the same for the reservoirs in the two states.

And that's in generally that spring fill period beginning about April 1st and going until late fill or they are called now by direct flow rights that are more senior which typically happens usually around the end of June, beginning of July.

And so we have refined our analysis to focus just on that fill period and that's all of our claim is the interference with our ability to fill that occurred because of the filling of post-Compact rights in the reservoirs in Wyoming. And when we did analyze the fill of the post-Compact space in the Colorado -- or I'm sorry, in the Wyoming reservoirs we utilized the general methodology which was agreed to by the Wyoming experts that when you're releasing water in the prior year it's considered to be released from the most senior priority so that that empty space that can be

filled with the most senior priority in that reservoir, if there's not a division of ownership that might complicate that.

And so that assumption of releasing the most senior water first when you get to -- when Wyoming comes down to the Tongue River Reservoir they won't apply that. They seem to think that there's two priorities in the Tongue River Reservoir, which, of course, we don't agree with. They seem to think there's two priorities and that we are releasing the junior water fills.

So they are applying a totally backwards approach when it comes to us as compared to how they are happy to have their reservoirs and I think do analyze their reservoir operations in Wyoming.

So I think with those -- those are the points that relate to -- especially to reservoir operations.

I mean, the briefs are comprehensive. So if you've got any questions that you want to discuss in that regard, this might be a good time to do that.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Let me go ahead and let's say I don't have many questions in this particular area, but I do have some. So the first goes to, well, Mr. Larson's testimony and the issue of groundwater modeling. And my first question is how

should I and ultimately the US Supreme Court go about actually evaluating the reliability of the model that Mr. Larson used?

And I know that Mr. Larson testified in his view it would be viable to use that particular model, but, of course, I have the testimony of Dr. Schreuder who says it wasn't a reliable model. So are there particular indicators or factors that should be looked at in deciding whether or not a groundwater model is sufficiently reliable for a court to rely upon it?

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, we have some experience to look at in that regard particularly the Arkansas River case between Kansas and Colorado. It was 270 days of trial there. Most of that was over a model, a so-called hydrological institutional model that had groundwater aspects and surface water aspects. And there was a lot of testimony from opposing experts in that case.

And you will find that really it boils down to -- first of all, the basis for those opinions and then the credibility and logic of the experts as they explain to you how they utilized that information and the basis that they started with to reach their conclusions. And they test each other by opposing testimony and ultimately it's up to the Supreme Court

and you in the first instance to determine whether what they say makes sense basically.

And we did that for 270 days in the Arkansas case and the court ultimately adopted the model there that was the result of that testimony.

Now, there's some similarities that I think are helpful and that is that here as there we started with a model that had been initially developed by or for the US Government and had been developed outside the context of the particular litigation. Oftentimes models will be developed for a particular case and those are perfectly fine as a category, but there's extra -- there's extra reliability and assurance of impartially when a party not -- one of the parties to the litigation has developed a model and done that prior to the litigation, not with an eye towards litigation.

And that's the kind of thing we had in the Arkansas case. We had a model that was developed initially by the USGS. It wasn't complete, but it was a start and the concepts in that model were applied.

More directly in the litigation over the Republic River between Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado we started there with a groundwater model that had been originally developed by the USGS in particular.

Ultimately that case settled, but the settlement was based on taking that model that had been previously developed by or for a federal agency in the area in question and adapting it to the particular purposes of the case.

And so when an expert like Mr. Larson paid to model like that he's already starting from a good strong basis of credibility. And we can see that that's what happened in this case. Mr. Larson took that model, focused on the part of the model that is relevant to our purposes here. Some time passed so that he was better able to calibrate it based on data that had become available since that time and applied it in this case.

So those are some of the factors that go into determining whether a groundwater model -- as you say, it's subject to -- always subject to a certain degree of uncertainty. It is a replication of the physical world and it can't be perfect, but where we need to solve disputes where we know that logically and based on certain facts that there is the possibility that there is a hydrologic connection, for instance, that that can then be tested and quantified as long as your assumptions going into the process are tested and reviewed for reliability.

So here that was taken. Certain adjustments 1 2 were made by Mr. Larson and it was applied and data was what he had reported. 3 4 Now, we have the criticisms, as you mentioned, from Dr. Schreuder. He is suggesting that -- among 5 6 other things that there should have been a so-called ET 7 salvage function in there which the Government 8 didn't -- the federal government didn't feel was necessary obviously, but he's saying that it should 9 10 have been in there and it was a mistake not to have that in there. 11 12 We disagree. It is not a given that these ET salvage functions are reliable. They have appeared in 13 14 certain models, but the evidence of the relationship 15 between groundwater level and whether a preatophyte, this non-beneficial type ET is diminished because you 16 reduce water level. There's not any assurance that we 17 18 showed on cross-examination of Dr. Schreuder and through Mr. Larson's testimony that there is a reliable 19 20 relationship there in terms of the different --21 difference in one meaning there's a difference in 22 another. SPECIAL MASTER: So let me ask along those 23 So in looking at the differences between 24

Mr. Larson and Dr. Schreuder there are several things

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that at least looking back over the record I'm not sure exactly how to resolve.

One of them is the -- the issue of ET. As you brought out I think on cross-examination it's not clear that one should rely upon Dr. Schreuder's estimates as to what the level of ET should be, but at the same time reading the various supporting papers that were going into evidence it's also not clear to me that the ET reduction would be zero. In fact, it's probably somewhere between zero and where Dr. Schreuder is.

Similarly on the amount of water going back into the river as a result of the storage operation, there are a variety of numbers out there and I'm not quite sure which of the numbers based on the examination I've done so far is the correct number, if any of those numbers is the correct number.

So how should the Supreme Court deal with those uncertainties regarding the model?

MR. DRAPER: Well, I would first point out a perhaps obvious difference here. Mr. Schreuder, Dr. Schreuder, did not do a model. He said there's only one model here. And in many cases you'll have models from both sides. That was true in the Arkansas case. And here he didn't do any analysis. He simply tried to poke holes in Mr. Larson's analysis.

The evidence I think on the ET salvage function is very mixed, in fact, even changing sides and some of that evidence you will see if you review it carefully. So there is very little confidence that that actually should be included in the model. If you are looking for a reliable model, it shouldn't be inserting something that -- that has questionable reliability itself. And that is true of the ET salvage function.

It's a theory. It hasn't been totally disproved, but it certainly hasn't been proved and you've got clear examples where in recent modeling efforts by the federal government and in the interstate suits that kind of function has not been proved at all.

So we believe that it was very appropriate to use the model in this case that was created for the federal Bureau of Land Management that it was constructed without it being such a function.

Your second point went to return flows and what do we do with those various numbers that are out there. Well, the strongest evidence on that is really Mr. Wheaton who was called by Colorado who had hands-on experience and has very good qualifications to do the kind of testing and investigation that he has done in the Powder River Basin of which geologically the Tongue

1	River is part.
2	And he has found through flocculation and so
3	on that these infiltration ponds are very poor
4	infiltrators and do not allow water to go back in any
5	discernable quantity to the regional groundwater
6	system.
7	So that was that was the testimony of him.
8	He was called by the State of Wyoming, but he verified
9	that this was what they wanted him to say was not
10	true. There is not large scale infiltration. In fact,
11	he said he hadn't seen any.
12	Now the other part of this is, well, if you
13	have little or no infiltration to the groundwater
14	system, what about direct discharges to the to the
15	rivers, to the Tongue River itself or tributaries like
16	the Prairie Dog Creek.
17	The message that Wyoming gave to us throughout
18	the years was they were not allowing discharges to
19	surface streams. They were not doing it. Period. No.
20	Now, Mr. Larson checked into that further, as
21	documented in his reported testimony, and was told that
22	there was there essentially was no surface water
23	discharge.
24	Now, we had some testimony we had some
25	and that was talking to the Wyoming or taking

material from the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality. That's where he went for his information was the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality reports and information and he found that there was very little there.

Now, we did have some evidence that was put on by one of the Wyoming witnesses that indicated there were some direct discharge I think to Prairie Dog Creek in very small amounts and within a few months -- the period didn't match up with our study period here for the most part, but there were a few months of cross-over there.

The problem with that evidence was that there was no indication that that water ever, if it did occur -- contrary to what they had been telling us over the years, if it did occur that it ever reached the state line.

We have testimony from Mr. Pilch among others that he took everything out of Prairie Dog Creek and so this claim of some discharge in excess of what Mr. Larson testified to does not seem to have any basis to us.

And recall that Mr. Larson did assume based on his investigation of the work of the federal government primarily but also of the Department of Environmental

1 Quality of Wyoming that there was less than 25 percent 2 return flow. And so he assumed 25 percent. very conservative about that. There are indications 3 4 that it went down to zero or almost zero, but he assumed 25 percent to be safe and to be conservative. 5 6 SPECIAL MASTER: I have a couple more 7 questions here. One is what in Montana's view is the 8 relevance of the fact that Montana wasn't regulating its CBM wells? 9 10 MR. DRAPER: Absolutely none, Your Honor. SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Why is that? 11 12 should we be arguing over what Wyoming is doing when at the same time you're permitting pumping on the Montana 13 14 side? 15 MR. DRAPER: Well, first of all, we're talking about does the Compact prohibit this if it occurs. 16 the terms of this Compact are not going to be subject 17 to whether this year or next year or last year one of 18 the states is or is not doing something. 19 20 We've seen arguments like that fail miserably in the Supreme Court before interstate cases where 21 22 Nebraska was arguing, well, we weren't even regulating 23 groundwater pumping at all in 1943 when the Republican River Compact was adopted. So how could the 24 25 negotiators and the states have intended to regulate

something that they weren't even regulating. And the 1 2 court rejected that very roundly. And it's the same thing here. You can't --3 4 it's just illogical to claim that the scope of the Compact depends on what an administrative agency is or 5 6 is not doing, you know, in a particular time period. 7 SPECIAL MASTER: I quess I would separate out 8 two questions. The first is what is its relevance to what the scope of the Compact is, and one could say 9 10 there that, in fact, the fact that Montana is not 11 regulating it says nothing about whether or not it's 12 regulated under the Compact. But the second question, though, becomes, to the degree that Montana is pumping 13 14 CBM groundwater that is connected with the Tongue 15 River, can Montana then complain that Wyoming is doing it to the injury of Montana's water users? 16 seems somehow that there should be the same standard 17 for both states. 18 MR. DRAPER: Well, on your second question 19 20 there, what about the impact of whatever pumping -let's say CBM being downstream Montana -- what about 21 22 that effect on the flows of the Tongue River. 23 SPECIAL MASTER: Uh-huh. MR. DRAPER: Well, I view that as pretty much 24 25 an internal matter. I mean, if Roger Muggli needs

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187.5 CFS and he's getting 50 and we have some CBM pumping that might be affecting it let's just assume for purpose of discussion a couple of CFS, that is more of an administrative issue within Montana. And it doesn't mean that you've got to resolve that question in order for Wyoming to be required to 7 give its normal water that it would do -- provide at the state line to provide for our pre-'50 rights, which, as we know, typically reduces all of a sudden to the T&Y right. SPECIAL MASTER: Let me make sure I understand this. So let's assume that pre-1950 appropriators in Montana are short 4,000 acre feet of water in a 14 particular year. And let's also assume that there's 15 actually a reliable groundwater modeling that shows that in Wyoming they are pumping groundwater that is depriving the river of 4,000 acre feet. There's also 17 evidence that Montana users are pumping groundwater and 18 depriving the river of 4,000 acre feet. Is it your argument in that setting that

Montana can say, well, we're not going to regulate our groundwater, but we're going to turn to Wyoming and require them to do it?

> MR. DRAPER: No. Absolutely not, Your Honor. Your example, if our pre-'50 rights are short

4,000 -- a 4,000 acre foot depletion being caused by 1 2 groundwater pumping in Montana, we've got all the water we're entitled to under the compact. 3 But I would submit that the best evidence of 4 that is Mr. Book's table that shows what's needed for 5 those pre-Compact rights. And as long as Wyoming is 6 7 providing that -- if some of that is taken by a 8 depleted process downstream, that doesn't matter. That 9 is not something that we would presume to come to 10 Wyoming about. We've gotten our water and it's up to us to use that. 11 12 But, again, let's say that -- let's say in your example that we're short let's say a hundred CFS, 13 14 if we do it in CFS units, and our groundwater use is 15 depleting five. It is no excuse, no valid excuse for Wyoming to say, "Oh, well. You have a five CFS right 16 there. We can tell that based on our reliable model. 17 We don't have to give you anything. We know you're a 18 hundred CFS short of Mr. Book's number at the state 19 20 line, but because you haven't gone out and regulated that we're off the hook." 21 22 No. Okay. Thank you. 23 SPECIAL MASTER: So that's actually all the questions that I 24

have of Montana at the moment. And so unless there's

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1	something more that you want to add, I would suggest
2	that we hear from Mr. Kaste and maybe you can come back
3	up for any reply.
4	MR. DRAPER: Very good.
5	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you very much.
6	MR. KASTE: Well, Mr. Draper took a little bit
7	of a digression back into some issues that were
8	previously covered. I figured I ought to complete the
9	process.
10	He read you paragraph 19 from the Worley
11	decision. I'll read from paragraph 20 which says: "We
12	are not required to decide whether the demand must be
13	made upon the state engineer, the water master, the
14	upstream junior appropriators or one or more of them.
15	Here it is undisputed that no demand of any kind was
16	made."
17	So the notion that Worley doesn't require
18	demand is false.
19	Now, with regard to the questions that you had
20	about post-1950 uses in Wyoming, your first question is
21	how do I evaluate the reliability of the model. Well,
22	I think you should definitely look at Mr. and Dr. and
23	decide with Dr. because that's an easy way to go.
24	SPECIAL MASTER: Doctor, doctor.
25	MR. KASTE: Yeah, doctor, doctor.

You face the question that every fact-finder in a case faces that is you have two well-qualified, seemingly well-qualified experts who both have reached diametrically opposed conclusions. "How am I supposed to pick between those?"

And it's not an easy task and credibility of the witnesses comes into play. And I think there are more -- there are pretty important things here that you can use as a guide for deciding that Mr. Larson's analysis isn't reliable for these purposes, one of which is, well, let's look at his model.

Was it designed for this purpose? No. Was it calibrated to this particular location? No. Did the guy who did the analysis make modifications to that model in a way that was well grounded in the facts?

No. We heard from the people what the facts are with regard to the practice of using unlined CBM impoundments, and they are not lying, for the express purpose of infiltrating water into the ground and evaporating it up into the sky.

Mr. Larson's modification of the model was totally out of line and that affects the amount of water that goes back into the ground.

Did you talk to other relevant experts and did you take advantage of their knowledge? No, I didn't do

that. Who should he have talked to? Well, Mr. Wheaton would be a great guy to talk to. Mr. Larson didn't talk to him. Mr. Wheaton came in and he told us lots of interesting things about CBM and Mr. Draper was very careful in what he said to him.

Mr. Wheaton said he never saw any water from CBM impoundments go back to the regional aquifer system. No, he never saw any water go 5,000 feet into the ground. He saw lots of water that went five feet into the ground and that's in the groundwater as well and that water can have an effect on the stream.

That water can offset the amount that you're pulling out of the bottom. It's reasonable stuff.

Lots of water makes its way back in. The fact that

Mr. Larson didn't attempt to modify the model in a way that doesn't account for that properly makes it unreliable.

I think with regard to ET salvage, does the analysis take into account all of the relevant factors? No, it doesn't. It doesn't take into account what used to be a fairly important factor in ET salvage. The exact amount of difference that makes in the model probably isn't that big of a deal because the amount calculated is so small any change that reduces the depletions calculated by Mr. Larson distinguished

them.

The amount of water at issue with regard to CBM is so small that any minor adjustment makes it all go away. And that's why, of course, Dr. Schreuder's conclusion is when we look at this and we understand the limitations of the model, the conclusion you have to reach is the amount depleted from the Tongue River is indistinguishable from zero. It's just -- we can't even figure out what that little amount is with the data that we have.

And I think that the Court would be well justified in following Dr. Schreuder's lead and finding that for this particular purpose the BLM model which was well crafted to do something else just doesn't look at it.

Now, your next question I find really interesting, which was what is the relevance of the Montana's CBM loss. They are really relevant because Montana has obligations under this Compact just like Wyoming and we've talked about pre-1950 uses that are subordinate -- post-1950 uses are subordinate to pre-1950 uses.

And that's true on both sides of the state line and we know before Montana can make a demand on Wyoming they are supposed to engage in appropriate

intrastate regulatory measures. If they are going to ask us to turn off our pumps, we are going to turn off their pumps. Those are just as post-'50 as ours and they have the same effect kind of effect on the stream as ours do, perhaps more because they're closer to the places where Montana has to use the water.

We see even using Mr. Larson's analysis that there is robust depletions and estimations from Montana pumping and Wyoming pumping. And they are fairly close to each other and merely offset. But it is astounding to me that Montana would say, "We can do whatever we want. We can call on you to make up the difference and you don't have any business looking at what we're doing here on our side of the line."

That's essentially what they're telling us.

"Don't worry about what we're doing on our side of the line with this water. Your job is to give us" -- and I think you just heard it again from Mr. Draper -- "a certain amount of water at the state line and then don't look any further. You have no right to look at how we do things in the state. Just give us a certain amount of water at the state line."

That is not how this Compact works. We got started today by saying that's not how this Compact works. The parties have mutual obligations to each

other and that in this case means before Montana can come to us and complain about CBM production in Wyoming they need to take some sort of action to deal with the effects of CBM production in Montana, but frankly neither of us thought to do anything with regard to CBM production in either state because the effects on the Tongue River are so small as to be de minimus and not worth our time.

And both states make allowances for de minimus groundwater pumping in various ways. Montana doesn't even permit its wells. They don't even get above the criteria necessary to obtain a water right. So they can't be regulated in priority by a water commissioner because Montana says the wells are too small. "We are not going to bother with those internally."

And Wyoming, although asking them to get a water right, requiring a water right from every one of our CBM wells, we haven't seen effects from those CBM wells that justify the state engineer's opinion regulating those wells as if they are from a single sort of supply with the surface water. We probably ought to listen to the folks in Montana and the folks in Wyoming who have to deal with this problem every day and determine ourselves that these wells' effect on the stream is too de minimus for the Compact to warrant

intervention at this time. 1 2 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Let me ask just several questions there. 3 The first is is that in Wyoming's brief one of 4 the things that you said is that both states had 5 6 determined that the connection between CBM groundwater 7 production and surface water is too tenuous to warrant 8 intrastate regulation. But I looked at the record. I can't find a 9 situation where either state has actually made that 10 positive determination. I certainly can find in the 11 record a lot of evidence that no one has raised the 12 issue in Wyoming and that therefore the state engineer 13 14 does not have any determination there. 15 In Montana it appears as if they basically just decided that because no one is going to be using 16 the water that is pumped out that they aren't even 17 regulated under the prior appropriation system. 18 But I don't see anything that leads me to a positive 19 20 determination. Am I missing something? 21 MR. KASTE: No. Nobody went out and did a cool study. Nobody else built a model for this 22

purpose. But I think the policy makers in each state,

at least none of our policy makers in the legislature

and in Montana, their policy makers, have made an

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implicit determination not to bother with that at this time.

Now, ultimately CBM production could be done in such a way that action needs to be taken, but at this point in time and as it specifically relates to 2004 and 2006 we always have to come back to this date. It's grounded in a specific space in time. There was not sufficient material effects on the stream for any of the policy makers in either state to do anything about this. Neither should we.

SPECIAL MASTER: Let me ask you then another question. So again it might be that the Supreme Court ultimately reaches the conclusion that the model Mr. Larson used was not sufficiently reliable to depend upon, but let's assume that the Supreme Court actually looks at the results of the model.

In determining whether or not there is a sufficiently material non-de minimus impact on the surface water from the CBM groundwater pumping, does the Supreme Court look at the amount of water that Wyoming returns to the river system itself? Let me sort of explain this in a different way.

One way of looking at this is, well -- and again it's all going to depend upon the facts, but if you believe that the percentage that is returned to the

river is very high, you can look at that and say, well, 1 2 when you actually look at it overall, we don't know whether it's having any impact at all, in fact, maybe 3 4 it's getting to the river faster than it was before and, therefore, there's not a material connection and, 5 6 therefore, this is actually not groundwater which is 7 even managed under the Compact. That's one 8 possibility. The second possibility is to say, well, if you 9 10 ignore for a moment the water that's being returned to the river, actually the pumping of the CBM groundwater 11 12 is having an impact on the river and what Wyoming has basically done is to develop what in Colorado might be 13 14 an augmentation plan saying, "Okay. We're pumping it 15 out rather than bringing it back, but don't worry. We're going to put it right back in anyway." 16 And maybe there's no difference between those 17 two --18 If I understood either of them, 19 MR. KASTE: 20 then I could tell you. SPECIAL MASTER: Yeah. 21 Under the second you could say, well, actually they are connected. 22 There's a material connection and, therefore, actually it does 23 full under the Compact, but there's no liability here. 24 25 Whereas in the first situation you would say we don't

1	even get to a stage of asking about liability because
2	it's not managed under this Compact. It's too
3	immaterial.
4	And if your answer is there's no difference
5	between those two, that's fine, too.
6	MR. KASTE: You already said it, but only if
7	you understood either option, but I think Anadarko has
8	already briefed that this water isn't covered by the
9	Compact.
10	SPECIAL MASTER: All right. I understand.
11	MR. KASTE: And I agree with that.
12	SPECIAL MASTER: So I'm assuming now that
13	right. I'm assuming now that, you know, the question
14	is is it sufficiently material to the Compact.
15	MR. KASTE: Right. And the materiality in
16	this circumstance is no. And what I think we're
17	talking about is there's a connection as the water is
18	pulled out of the ground with the stream from below and
19	there's a connection with the stream from above when we
20	put it back in. Fair?
21	And I think that what we're looking at is what
22	is the net effect of those two actions on the stream.
23	Does that make a difference that we should be cognizant
24	of as it relates to the relationship between the
25	states? And the answer is no.

What we've done is we've changed sort of the time when that water makes its way to this stream. We take some of it out and so forth. But none of it makes a difference to the stream that would create a really usable quantity of water for anybody downstream in a particular time.

When you look at how much difference it makes in a stream even using Mr. Larson's figures, which I think are deeply flawed, we look at that and try to pick it out for a date. Is there a usable quantity of water for a farmer in Montana? No, there's not. And if there's not a usable quantity of water for a farmer in Montana, the Compact really probably ought not to provide a remedy that imposes harm, much greater harm over here than any commensurate benefit on the north side belonging to Montana.

SPECIAL MASTER: So humor me on this because this might ultimately not make a difference, but it strikes me as an interesting potential distinction. And the reason again is that -- and again it might be that it's not even material if you ignore entirely water being returned to the river either directly or through storage.

But if you think about the factual situation as one in which basically there's water being pumped

out of the system through the CBM pumping and then what happens is you're taking that water and you're going to return it to the river, one way of thinking about this is that the question -- if the standard is materiality, then the question is does it have a material impact when you pump it out.

That's the question of whether or not Wyoming can or -- or Montana can say, "Hey, that might be our water. We need to worry about this." And then Wyoming's response is, well, but what we're returning it to the river, which, as I say, you know, if I'm thinking in terms of the way other states might think about this, it sounds a little bit like an augmentation or a mitigation type. "Don't worry we're pumping it out, but we're putting it right back again."

But again all hypothetical, you could see the burden being quite different in that if indeed this is more like an augmentation plan, then I would think that it very well might be Wyoming's obligation at that point to actually show that the augmentation plan is adequate rather than Montana's.

MR. KASTE: What I think is the materiality ought to be measured with regard to a place, a person, a thing. And so materiality has to be measured at the stream because those are the persons claiming to be

impacted by the pumping that's occurring 5,000 feet below the ground. And so materiality for the people of Montana is not -- I think we pumped 800,000 acre feet of water out of the ground in the common Powder River Basin in the course of several years.

It seems like a material amount of water, but it doesn't make a difference to them, to Montana. So the question that we have to answer goes to the purpose of this Compact and the answer is no. And so I don't think we're obligated to show that this pumping in Wyoming is not having some effect or we are augmenting the stream in some fashion. I think what we need to look at is what is the impact on the people in Montana. And if there's no discernable impact on them, why would you care? Why should we do anything about it?

SPECIAL MASTER: And I would say the only reason we could potentially -- and this is an issue that I'm still struggling with. So I don't want to suggest to you that I've already reached a decision as to whether or not any particular action has a material impact, but the difference would be we have a lot of disagreements over exactly how much water is getting returned to the Yellowstone River system.

And so it could make a difference as to whether or not it is Montana's burden as part of

showing that, in fact, pumping is having a material impact because I think that one of the things

Dr. Schreuder's testimony suggested is if you include both ET and you include also the returned water to the river, then it all looks as if it's all part of the noise and you can actually flip the numbers and you can get a positive figure rather than a negative figure.

But if, in fact, all Montana's burden is is to show that pumping out has an impact, then they might have made an initial prima facie case if you just look at the rest of the modeling -- again, I'm posing this as a hypothetical -- that, in fact, the pumping is having a material impact. And then it would be Wyoming's burden to actually show that the amount of water that is being returned makes up for that and that therefore there's no liability.

MR. KASTE: I do not believe that Montana fulfills its burden by demonstrating that they are simply pumping in Wyoming in a certain amount. Their burden is to prove that that pumping in Wyoming in a certain amount caused an effect to some thing or someone in Montana. In the absence of that causal connection Montana hasn't proven its case and, like I say, materiality has to be measured in relationship to somebody.

SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Let me then ask you just another couple of questions and if there's anything else you want to add, you should feel free to.

One is -- and again I'm going to pose this as a hypothetical. Let's assume that for a particular year, say 2004, 2006, conclude that there is a call on a particular date and that before that date that there's no liability, after that date there is liability.

One of the arguments I understand Wyoming is making is there's just not any evidence in the record to determine what water might have been used before a call date and what water might have been used after a call date with the exception of the two reservoirs Dome and Sawmill that apparently fill afterwards for a total of 688 acre feet.

Why shouldn't the court looking at the evidence as a whole say, well, we know that -- you know, let's assume that the court concludes that there's actually evidence that there was post-1950 water that was used during that period of time either directly taken out or evaporated or stored in one of the reservoirs that didn't have a direct measure.

Could the Court conclude that it is more reasonable than not, more likely than not that if you

1 just proportion that amount over the season as a whole 2 and take the percentage that occurred after the call date that that's a good measure of the -- of water that 3 4 Montana was deprived of after the call? MR. KASTE: No, absolutely not. 5 6 SPECIAL MASTER: Why not? 7 MR. KASTE: Nobody testified that the 8 evaporation on any one of these little reservoirs 9 occurs at a steady rate. Nobody testified that the 10 irrigation that occurred before and after these 11 particular call dates occurred at a steady rate. 12 you have to assume and speculate about is that the amount of water on any given day pre-call and post-call 13 14 used at that particular right or reservoir is the same. 15 Nobody testified to that. So the Court would have to speculate as to the amount pre and post. 16 mentioned more than once during the course of the trial 17 that these dates are really important and we need that 18 19 evidence from Montana's experts to differentiate pre 20 and post in order to do the right thing here. In order to directly fix liability on Wyoming 21 we have to know those particular numbers. 22 particularly without any evidence that this number is 23 the same as that number on any given day the Court 24 25 would have no basis for finding, "Well, I'll just say

it's that many days. You know, I'll do some math and 1 2 figure out every day it's a foot and there are 200 So that's 200 feet. There you go." 3 The Court is not in a position to do that 4 because it doesn't have sufficient evidence to let it 5 be comfortable with the notion that that rationale that 6 7 is credible, that reasoning is credible. That needed 8 to come from an expert witness. Mr. Book needed to testify the amount of 9 10 evaporation on May 1 is the same as amount of the 11 evaporation on August 1st. And without that testimony 12 the Court would have no basis for proportionally awarding the water to Montana in this case. 13 14 SPECIAL MASTER: So does that mean that if 15 Montana were to issue another call let's say next week -- it turns out to be early Friday -- and they 16 issue a call. Does everyone have to go out immediately 17 and start measuring what the evaporation is on every 18 reservoir that Wyoming has not directly measured the 19

MR. KASTE: Oh, I doubt that. I'd be willing to bet Mr. Book would tell you what the evaporation was

Is that the only way in which Wyoming --

Compact reservoir and it needs to travel up and down

the roads to see exactly who is utilizing water on

Montana would ever be able to prove its case?

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their land?

for any given period of time on any size reservoir and even go get the information without too much trouble.

He didn't do that in this case.

But you highlighted an important point. In this case the burden falls squarely on Montana to go find out information like that through the course of discovery and present it to you. He didn't do that. But it remains their burden. You can't eliminate their burden by noticing it might be a little hard.

They are Plaintiff in this case. They need to find out what water was used in Wyoming after the call date. They can do that during the course of discovery and we had ample discovery in this case and we had to assemble that information and present it to you in the court. And if they have to do that in the future, that may be their burden as well.

We're not likely to see a situation that we saw in the past because of the evolving nature of regulation in Montana and supervening changes in the law, at least in our view, when the court tells us that's not the how the Compact words. We're obviously going to respond differently than we did in '04 and '06. And so the odds of us even clarifying about the same things in the future are limited.

SPECIAL MASTER: Last question. The causation

1	issue.
2	So we talked earlier about the issue of
3	contemporaneous demand. So let's assume all the
4	various Montana is able to meet all of its various
5	other responsibilities. So it chose that you have
6	pre-1950 users in Montana that don't have water and
7	that there are post-1950 users in Wyoming that were
8	using water during that period of time.
9	What is the causation issue that you think
10	also needs to be addressed? Is it simply the question
11	of whether or not if water had gone into the river from
12	those 1950 users in Wyoming it would have made its way
13	all the way down to the pre-1950 users in Montana?
14	MR. KASTE: Yeah. It's that simple. What we
15	need is an expert to say, well, here's the call to
16	Wyoming. Here are all these post-'50 users. If we
17	shut them off, that water will go there. It's not
18	complicated. It's something Montana certainly could
19	have done if it felt like it had to, but it doesn't
20	view this case as a continuing causation element. Had
21	it wanted to, it could have put on sufficient proof of
22	causation, but it didn't. And it's too late now.
23	SPECIAL MASTER: So is this any different than
24	if people call?

MR. KASTE: I think I wrote in the brief that

25

1	causation is the flip side of futility and I think that
2	that's true. And when you're engaged in a contractual
3	relationship with somebody and you say they are not
4	living up to their promises, then it becomes your
5	burden to prove causation in any case. That's
6	Montana's burden.
7	Like I said, there's a difference between
8	doctrine of appropriation and the promises that were
9	made and our duty under the contract and the cause of
10	action and elements of that cause of action that
11	Montana must prove in this case. They are different.
12	And so causation is one of those elements that they
13	can't get out from under.
14	SPECIAL MASTER: And so this is one of those
15	areas where when I look at the law of most of the
16	western states it's that under prior appropriation
17	doctrine if a junior appropriator wants to resist
18	giving up water when people call is it its
19	responsibility to show that it would be futile.
20	But you're saying here we shouldn't worry
21	about who has the burden of the prior appropriation
22	law, it's a matter of contracts law?
23	MR. KASTE: Yes.
24	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Last question. I
25	promised that was going to be the last question, but I

have one more left.

If there was a contract law -- a contract that you and I entered into, and we agreed that we're going to abide, the purposes of this contract, to the contract law of Wyoming. And let's assume that the contract law of Wyoming has somewhat different burdens of proof than the contract law of California where we're actually sitting on the empty contract. Do I ignore the contract law of Wyoming?

MR. KASTE: Absolutely not. The parties can contract and do something different than the default law and they can impose duties including shifting the burden of proof in a case, choosing jurisdictions and things like that. That didn't happen here. And incorporation of the doctrine of appropriation in this Compact while it sets the parties' duties does not alleviate Montana's burden of proving causation in this case.

and it says that the appropriative rights shall continue to be enjoyed in accordance with the laws governing the acquisition and use of water under the doctrine of appropriation your view is that governs -- the responsibility of the parties has nothing to do with burden of proof?

1	MR. KASTE: Yes. Burden of proof in this case
2	is different. It's not burden of proof I have
3	failed to explain this well, I think, and I apologize
4	for that. I think we talked about it two times and I
5	screwed it up every time.
6	SPECIAL MASTER: I'm just pressing you to see
7	whether or not in fact
8	MR. KASTE: Yes. The burden of proof is not
9	dictated by the terms of Article $V(A)$. In fact, the
10	duties of the parties doesn't affect the burden of
11	proof in these proceedings. They are very different
12	matters.
13	SPECIAL MASTER: No. I understand your point
14	entirely.
15	MR. KASTE: All right. I get to sum up now
16	before the Plaintiff?
17	SPECIAL MASTER: Sure.
18	MR. KASTE: I'm going to do it in two
19	sentences.
20	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
21	MR. KASTE: Thank you very much for all the
22	time you've spent on this case. The parties very much
23	appreciate it. We very much look forward to receiving
24	the guidance that you give us because both parties, as
25	you've heard today and have heard over and over, are

1	interested in establishing some certainty with regard
2	to this Compact so that we can get along and move
3	forward on this river without coming to the Supreme
4	Court again.
5	And so with that I would request on behalf of
6	the State of Wyoming that in the course of making your
7	recommendation to the court that you recommend that
8	this case be dismissed.
9	Thank you.
10	SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you.
11	Mr. Draper?
12	MR. DRAPER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
13	You covered a number of topics with Mr. Kaste.
14	The first one had to do with the two experts related to
15	the CBM analysis and I just emphasize there was a big
16	difference in their qualifications.
17	Mr. Larson is a hydrologist. Dr. Schreuder is
18	not. He's got two Ph.D.s, but neither one is in
19	hydrology. They are in mathematics. So we're dealing
20	with a hydrologic question here which requires
21	hydrologic judgment and Mr. Larson with his experience
22	with the USGS and many applications has shown his
23	abilities as an analyst who does not overstate things.
24	SPECIAL MASTER: And, you know, I think you've
25	made that point quite well in your briefs. And really

what I've been looking to for both of you, and it's 1 2 been valuable, has been what independent indicia are there that the Court could look at in deciding whether 3 4 or not one or another expert is correct. MR. DRAPER: Yes. And we would submit that's 5 6 one factor for you to look at. 7 I just want to mention, also, that we do have 8 statutory and regulatory regulation of CBM to document its effects, as we've described in the brief. 9 10 were making certain assumptions in our earlier 11 discussion. I just want to be sure we haven't lost 12 that point. SPECIAL MASTER: I think that's -- I think 13 14 that's fair. My understanding of Montana law is that 15 there is a regulatory system with respect to CBM water as it is outside of the norm of the prior appropriation 16 system itself. 17 MR. DRAPER: Right. The model itself, 18 19 contrary to what Mr. Kaste was asserting, was made for 20 the type of purpose that we're using it for in this case, which was what are the effects on surface streams 21 22 including the Tongue River. Again the ET salvage function that 23 Dr. Schreuder has pulled out and said, well, the 24 25 government forgot to use this and, therefore, you

shouldn't rely on this model, the model we have adopted after litigation between states, most recently in this court, did not have that function.

And yet it had preatophytes. Like most rivers it had preatophytes. There's been litigation on the Arkansas River preatophytes to the Colorado Supreme Court. People want to take credit for eradicating them. If you're familiar with the Shelton Farms case regarding this. Those are preatophytes. Did they have a preatophyte salvage or an ET salvage function? No. It was adopted by the court.

So there's no basis for trying to assert that because it doesn't exist in this government model that it's somehow deficient.

This insistence that the downstream states have to match the upstream states with respect to what it regulates is a red herring. Water flows downhill and there are many things that affect that process in the upstream state and the upstream state is not affected by what goes on downstream as a result.

And so there is -- there's no rule that the downstream state of a compact has to be doing or even on this Compact has to be doing what the upstream state is. The Compact imposes certain obligations and those -- by their very nature since the upstream state

is in possession, as the General pointed out earlier, they've never let any water down under this Compact.

There's not a single drop they've ever let down.

That's proof positive they are in control of the resource and that they should -- nothing should change because of the way that CBM pumping is regulated downstream is -- is certainly a good example of a red herring. It's just part of the many complications that while we would like to throw away Montana getting into relief here they say, well, you turn the world upside down when you ruled that Article V(A) did have some meaning and did protect pre-Compact rights, but in effect they don't want to do anything different than they've been doing up to now.

SPECIAL MASTER: So again let me just ask on the CBM pumping that's occurring in Montana. I know that Montana disagreed with the portion of my first report that suggested that Montana might have an obligation to remedy shortages through an intrastate remedy before they turn to an interstate demand.

But assuming that's correct, if it was a situation where any shortage in Montana could be met by just reducing CBM pumping that's taking place within the Montana borders, that would seem to then I would think under that excuse Wyoming from having to reduce

its CBM pumping because basically it could resolve in either intrastate or intrastate and interstate. It's hard to see how you could call Wyoming if you're not addressing it yourself.

But I could imagine a slightly different situation where the shortage in Montana is so large that even if I'm to limit it, it would still have a problem.

MR. DRAPER: Yes. And that is the situation.

SPECIAL MASTER: So that's your argument here?

MR. DRAPER: It's so large that it pales in

insignificance to any possible effects of CBM pumping.

We're talking hundreds of CFS, 150 CFS shortages, and

you can see based on all that pumping that goes on in the CBM fields of Wyoming, it's just a few CFS. So it's a whole different order of magnitude, couple of orders of magnitude.

But to your first point if the shortage to our pre-1950 right could be caused by anything that's happening in Montana, that's not -- that's our responsibility, not Wyoming's. But if Wyoming is causing a shortage of what our rights need by whatever means, whether it's CBM or maybe they put a bucket in a river by helicopter and take it somewhere, whatever the depletion source is doesn't matter, but if -- if they

1 are not providing the water that our rights, our 2 pre-'50 rights need, then they do have a responsibility under dual interpretations of Article V(A). 3 SPECIAL MASTER: Although maybe this is only 4 to the issue that would be relevant for injunctive 5 6 relief, but it seemed to me that there was some kind of 7 unclean hands or estoppel argument that to the degree 8 Montana is doing something that's harming its users should they be able to complain about Wyoming doing 9 10 something exactly the same? MR. DRAPER: There is no such unclean hands 11 12 situation here, Your Honor. That doctrine has not been asserted here and it's not applicable. If there are 13 14 wells downstream in Montana that are depleting flows to 15 further downstream users in Montana, that's not causing any harm to Wyoming and it's not -- it's not a source 16 of any criticism or determination of unclean hands. 17 Not at all. 18 19 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. I'm looking at the 20 time and I just want to make sure I give you an opportunity to talk about any other issue that came up. 21 22 We have about ten minutes left. I think your suggestion about pro 23 MR. DRAPER: rata, if you decide only a portion of the season is --24 25 falls within a -- or constitutes a violation, I think

pro rata is probably a good way to go. That approach has been used.

There's always a need in these cases where you have many different possibilities of what the master of the court will rule. If there's an infinite number of possibilities, you can't put on an infinite set of evidence to address every possibility. So masters have sometimes asked for further evidence. Sometimes they have simply taken a pro rata or if it's clear enough to them made an adjustment.

So these questions come up with some regularity in interstate cases and so they they've been handled without declaring that because the evidence didn't happen to hit exactly where a special master decided lines should be that it was a complete failure of evidence.

SPECIAL MASTER: If -- and, again, as you know, I have sometimes asked either or both parties for information that turned out not to be relevant, but one of the things is that if you are aware of any case in which a court, particularly a special master, took an approach which is similar to proportionality, then I would consider it.

MR. DRAPER: Very good. And I think you said we have a week to provide you with anything that might

fall into that kind of category.

SPECIAL MASTER: So I would say on both sides if there is anything that occurs to you after the hearing that you think would be responsive to some of the questions or concerns that I've raised, you know, I would be remiss if I didn't ask you to reply on that.

At the same time, you know, realizing that the briefs have been very long, I would ask that those be quite short and simply be the provision of citations with certain brief references. This is not an opportunity for more argument but for more information that could be relevant.

MR. DRAPER: Very good. You also raised the issue of materiality with Mr. Kaste. I'm not aware of any interstate compact enforcement case where anything was denied because of materiality. And under the doctrine of prior appropriation you don't see that coming up.

Typically if you have an application for a well, a pump and its effect on other wells, you see typically that some flexibility is allowed with respect to groundwater levels. But when it comes to impacts on surface water there's no -- there's no leeway. You make up through augmentation plans, for instance, the exact amount that you affect the stream.

1	I think that's everything. Thank you, Your
2	Honor.
3	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you.
4	MR. WIGMORE: Five minutes is enough, Your
5	Honor.
6	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. My only question. So,
7	Ms. Whiteing, are you wanting to add anything?
8	MS. WHITEING: If I make any remarks, I will
9	be very short.
10	MR. WIGMORE: As will I.
11	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Well, I would ask that
12	it be like two minutes. And I know Mr. Draper and
13	Mr. Kaste would want to respond to anything that is
14	contrary to what they are contending, but I would like
15	you to keep it short.
16	MR. WIGMORE: Do you want to hear about CBMs
17	or reservoirs?
18	SPECIAL MASTER: Oh, why don't we start with
19	reservoirs first.
20	And while you're walking down here,
21	Ms. Whiteing, the one thing I will say is that I
22	understand the need to make recommendations to the
23	Supreme Court that do not in any way make little of the
24	rights of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe because you were
25	not parties in this particular action. And I'll

confess there are times when I've read various briefs 1 2 and I've began to worry as to whether or not that's actually possible. 3 4 But to the degree I conclude that, in fact, to resolve this you actually have to address the nature of 5 the rights of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, I think what 6 7 my recommendation to the Supreme Court would probably have to be is that to resolve that issue the Northern 8 Cheyenne and the United States would have to be parties 9 10 in the action. 11 So just to let you know I understand that. 12 MS. WHITEING: Thank you, Your Honor. You cut my remarks to maybe 30 seconds. 13 14 SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. 15 MS. WHITEING: Having said that I want to make this one point, which is it has become clear to me in 16 the course of this argument today that Wyoming is 17 apparently treating the Tribe's Tongue River Reservoir 18 allegation -- allocation as if it were a state 19 20 appropriative right. We don't agree with that. It is an allocation 21 in a reservoir. It does have a later priority date, 22 but it is a federal reserve water right. That's what 23 we agreed to in the Compact. That's what Congress 24

25

ratified.

So we would say that the 20,000 acre foot
allocation has to be treated as if it were a federal
reserve water right and not a state appropriative
right, which it comes within the three-tier system
under the Yellowstone Compact.
So we want to make that absolutely clear. The
Tribe essentially gave up a portion of its direct flow
right in exchange for a storage right, if that's how
you weigh the priority date, but it is still a federal
reserve water right. And I think that's something that
can't be impacted. That's what Article VI says.
So I'll just leave it at that. Thank you.
SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you very much.
MR. WIGMORE: I'll be very brief as well, your
Honor. May it please the Court.
I just want to I really just want to make
two points here. One is you asked the question about
the reliability of the Larson model and how that issue
gets resolved. And I think it gets resolved because
legally it doesn't matter whether that model is
reliable or not.
The reason it doesn't matter is because
Montana has provided no evidence at all with respect to
impact based on the Larson model in Montana. It's very

clear that Mr. Larson comes up with quantities only

within the entire Tongue River watershed above the Tongue River Reservoir and that's on -- in his report on pages 8 and 12.

And then what Mr. Book does is he simply assumes that all of those impacts occur at the state line. There's no basis for that assumption. There is no record -- there's no evidence in this case supporting that assumption.

He said at page 21 that CBM impacts are assumed to occur at the state line. In his rebuttal report that Montana relies upon he says CBM impacts the state line. No transit loss applied. So there's no evidence in this case that the quantities calculated by Mr. Larson, in fact, affect the State of Montana.

And not only is Mr. Book's assumption not based on any evidence in this case, it's demonstrably wrong and Montana knows it's wrong because he says there's no transit losses that apply. And as we argue on page 7 of our brief, in another context when Montana was -- or Wyoming argued for credit for CMB direct discharges. And when you talk with Mr. Draper up here when he was talking about Prairie Dog Creek, one of the arguments that Montana makes in its reply brief on page 62 and 63 is there's no evidence that it gets past any Wyoming diverters. Well, there's no evidence in

Mr. Book's assumption that any decreased flow in the Tongue River Basin above the Powder River Reservoir get by the pre-1950 Wyoming diverter.

Montana also in its post-trial brief on pages 154 and 156 when Wyoming was arguing for post-1950 Kearny Lake imports to request for that Montana argues that the report doesn't consider transit loss, it doesn't consider ditch loss, it doesn't consider evaporation, and as and for all the foregoing reasons this analysis is flawed and should be disregarded.

Mr. Book does not consider any of those factors either in making his assumption that these impacts occur at the state line and his -- at least with respect to CBM his report is also flawed and can be disregarded. So it doesn't matter what Mr. Larson's model says because there's no evidence tying the quantities in his model to Montana -- to losses in Montana.

The other point that I wanted to make relates to the intrastate remedy issue which you raised.

Mr. Larson's report is very clear that in both cases he was looking at the effects of CBM pumping in the Tongue River Basin upstream of the Tongue River Reservoir.

Mr. Draper was mistaken when he said it's simply an internal issue.

Mr. Larson's report is only looking at the effects in Wyoming and amongst the Tongue River Reservoir. And if you look at his table, figure 4 on page 12 of his report, he shows the effects of the Wyoming pumping on the Tongue River Basin and he shows the effects of Montana. This is not an internal issue and because Montana has an obligation to stick to its problems first it cannot call on Wyoming to fix its CBM pumping when their own expert with all the flaws that we believe is evident in Mr. Larson's report that his own expert concludes that pumping in Montana affects the flow and the surface streams above the Tongue River Reservoir.

And on the issue -- and so it's our point all along as a matter of law that it's clear this Compact does not cover CBM. Montana, as you said, regulates CBM, but they don't regulate it under the doctrine of appropriation as if it's connected surface streams. There's no evidence in this case and it's -- it's true that Montana has never tried to shut down CBM pumping in Montana and this Compact cannot be interpreted to allow that level of infringement on Wyoming's sovereignty. And Montana does not regulate CBM pumping and those actual appropriations are interconnected and does not shut down its own wells before calling on

1	Wyoming to do so.
2	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you.
3	MR. WIGMORE: Thank you.
4	SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Draper?
5	MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, I'll just be very
6	short.
7	We just heard a rehash of Mr. Wigmore's
8	statement to you at the summary judgment hearing and it
9	shows no relation to the evidence that's been presented
10	to you. It's almost bizarre in terms of its lack of
11	connection to what's actually been presented to you in
12	this case. I don't think there's any need to go into
13	the details at this point. It's in the record and we
14	would simply ask that you take that into account.
15	Thank you.
16	SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you.
17	Mr. Kaste?
18	MR. KASTE: It's five after 5:00 and we were
19	supposed to be done five minutes ago.
20	I agree with everything Mr. Wigmore said and
21	have no response to Mr. Draper's comments. I think
22	we've made our positions clear in our briefing.
23	Thank you again.
24	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. I think, you know,
25	once again I have to congratulate, you know, the

attorneys on both sides for doing excellent jobs on the briefing. It's one of the reasons why we're able to keep this hearing to just one day is that virtually everything that was important was covered there, but today -- you know, I will tell you it's not always clear to me that oral argument is valuable, but today was extremely valuable in helping me think through various issues in this particular case.

Now, originally my hope was that I would be able to get a draft of the special report to all of you and get your comments and then revise it and then get it to the Supreme Court by the very beginning of June so they might actually be able to consider it and set a schedule before they head off for the summer.

I will still try to do that, but my guess is it's 50/50 probability at this stage, you know, because of the delay that the transcript caused in the -- I still would love to do that so we don't lose the two months of the Supreme Court's summer, but I can't absolutely guarantee -- as I say I think it's probably an even probability at this point as to whether or not I will succeed in doing that.

But the process will be the same. So as soon as I can get the special report in draft form I will then circulate it, ask all of you for any comments that

1	you have as to the accuracy of factual citations and
2	the like and then finalize it for the Supreme Court.
3	So any questions on the process?
4	MR. KASTE: I have a question. We have not
5	received a bill for the trial.
6	SPECIAL MASTER: Because I haven't finalized
7	it, yeah, but it will be out within the next week.
8	MR. KASTE: Okay.
9	SPECIAL MASTER: I would say.
10	MR. KASTE: I do want to make sure Peggy and
11	Susan are taken care of.
12	SPECIAL MASTER: I can tell you that they have
13	been taken care of. So I have paid them and so I'm the
14	only person at this point who is floating that and
15	but the bills are going out within the next week.
16	There's a lot of things on the calendar.
17	Anyway and so
18	MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, did you want us to
19	submit I think we talked about at one point
20	submitting a set of the exhibits on a thumb drive that
21	have been admitted.
22	SPECIAL MASTER: I think there was I think
23	that there was an offer by somebody to come up with a
24	clean version of all the exhibits that would be on a
25	thumb drive. I think that would be really valuable for

1	the Supreme Court. I didn't actually order that that
2	be done. So I think it's a question of whether or not
3	one or both parties would be willing to put in the time
4	to do that.
5	MR. DRAPER: We'd be glad to work with the
6	State of Wyoming to make that happen.
7	SPECIAL MASTER: Yeah. I think it would be
8	very helpful to the Supreme Court so they have all of
9	the exhibits in their final version available on a
10	thumb drive. That would be excellent.
11	And again, you know, I would think at the
12	earliest that that would be useful would probably be in
13	June and, you know, assuming that things slip over, it
14	might not be until July that we actually have that
15	available.
16	MR. DRAPER: Very good. And thank you very
17	much.
18	SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Thank you, all.
19	And, again, I hope you enjoy the remainder of
20	your stay here and I'm just going to clean up here for
21	a second. So everybody is free at this stage to go
22	about the rest of your business.
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