No. 137, Original

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, No. 137, ORIG. VS. STATE OF WYOMING and STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Defendants.

> TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS July 27, 2016

Reported by: PAMELA J. HANSEN, RPR, RMR, CRR

1	The above-entitled matter came on for
2	hearing before HON. BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., Special
3	Master, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California
4	94305-8610, on July 27, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., at Byron
5	White Federal Courthouse, Division 2, 1823 Stout
6	Street, Denver, Colorado.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: This is a
3	hearing in the U.S. Supreme Court case of the State
4	of Montana versus the State of Wyoming and the State
5	of North Dakota, No. 137 Original, again before the
6	United States Supreme Court.
7	And this morning the hearing is on two
8	separate motions in connection with remedies. The
9	first is the State of Wyoming's motion basically to
10	conclude the case at this point, and then second of
11	all will be Montana's motion for summary judgment on
12	the Tongue River Reservoir. And so we should
13	probably start, as we always do, with an invitation
14	of counsel for the various parties. So we'll start
15	with the State of Montana.
16	MR. DRAPER: Good morning, Your Honor.
17	I'm John Draper, counsel of record for the State of
18	Montana. I have with me at counsel table Jeffrey
19	Wechsler, who is my co-counsel, outside counsel.
20	Then at the end of the table is our Attorney General
21	Tim Fox. General Fox would like to address the
22	Special Master at your convenience when you consider
23	it appropriate. Next to him is Mr. Alan Joscelyn,
24	the Chief Deputy Attorney General of Montana.
25	I would also note that we have with us

Mr. Tim Davis, who is the administrator of the 1 Division of Water Resources of the Department of 2 Natural Resources and Conservation of the State of 3 Montana, and with him is Kevin Smith, who is the chief of the state Water Projects Bureau in that same division. 6 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank you 7 very much, Mr. Draper, and I'll welcome again Attorney General Fox, and it's nice to see all the 9 10 various counsel again. 11 Mr. Joscelyn, I don't remember you 12 participating before. MR. JOSCELYN: That is the fact. I had 13 not had the pleasure of appearing personally before. 14 I've sat in on many of the conference calls in the 15 last year and a half. So it's a pleasure to be here. 16 17 Thank you. SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: You're welcome. 18 And so next is the State of Wyoming. 19 MR. KASTE: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm 20 James Kaste on behalf of the State of Wyoming. With 21 me as always, my life partner Chris Brown and 22 Attorney General Peter Michael. In addition, we have 23 with us today the state engineer for the State of 24 Wyoming, Mr. Patrick Tyrrell. 25

1	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Again, welcome,
2	Mr. Kaste, Attorney General Michael. It's great as
3	always to see you, as well as the various other
4	counsel and administrators for the State of Wyoming.
5	So next, State of North Dakota.
6	MS. VERLEGER: Good morning, Your Honor.
7	I'm Jennifer Verleger for the State of North Dakota,
8	and as always on behalf of all of my co-counsel.
9	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So welcome,
10	Ms. Verleger. And it should probably be noted for
11	the record that Ms. Verleger, as always, is actually
12	representing North Dakota all by herself.
13	So are there amicus in the courtroom
14	today?
15	MR. DUBOIS: Your Honor, James Dubois for
16	the United States. I will not be speaking on any
L7	motion. I'm just here to observe today.
L8	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank
L9	you, Mr. Dubois. And if at any point, though, you do
20	want to say anything on behalf of the United States,
21	you're obviously welcome to do so.
22	So as I oh, I'm sorry.
23	MS. WHITEING: Your Honor, I'm Jeanne
24	Whiteing, representing amicus the Northern Cheyenne
25	Tribe And I will not be speaking today either I

just will be monitoring the hearing. Thank you.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. And sorry

that I hadn't noticed you sitting there in front of

the railing, Ms. Whiteing, but again, it's great to

see you. And again, if at any point you do want to

say anything on behalf of the Northern Cheyenne

Nation, feel free to do so.

Okay. So I had suggested in the e-mail that I sent out yesterday that we actually start with Wyoming's motion right off the bat, then turn to Montana's motion. My hope is that we'll be out of here by about noon. We will certainly be out of here by 1:00 because I have a plane to catch, as I guess probably a variety of other people also do. I do not have any set times for the presentations. I don't think that's probably necessary this morning.

I should note that, as always, I've gone through all of the various briefs. I have gone back and looked I think at all the major cases that have been cited in the briefs. I have reviewed portions of the record which I think are relevant. So I'm pretty on top of the arguments on both of the two sides. However, having said that, I would love to have both Montana and Wyoming counsel to begin with whatever summary or presentation of their argument

Τ	they would like to start with, but as always, I will
2	probably jump into the argument fairly quickly with
3	questions.
4	So since I'm going to start with Wyoming's
5	motion, what I would suggest is that we begin with
6	your argument. I assume Mr. Kaste will be making
7	that argument. So begin with that, and then we'll
8	switch over to Montana. That will probably be an
9	excellent point, Attorney General Fox, if you wanted
10	to say whatever you would like to for the record at
11	that particular point, and then if there are other
12	members of your staff or your counsel who will be
13	making arguments, you can certainly do that. Okay?
14	Does that sound good from a process standpoint?
15	MR. KASTE: Yes, Your Honor.
16	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: We'll probably
17	take a break about an hour and a half through this so
18	that people have an opportunity to visit the
19	restrooms or whatever else they would like to do. If
20	people need a break before then, just let me know.
21	Mr. Kaste.
22	MR. KASTE: Thank you, Your Honor. I
23	think one of the things to add with regard to the
24	order of things today, it's probably apparent from
25	the nature of the motions pending before you, and

1	that is that part of the State of Wyoming's motion is
2	essentially the opposite side of the coin from
3	Montana's motion, and so it's very likely that I'll
4	say most of what I have to say in response to
5	Montana's motion for summary judgment and, of course,
6	presenting our own. But I'll sort of play it by ear,
7	and if there's things that I haven't addressed that
8	you want me to talk about at a later time, that's
9	fine and I'll be happy to do that. But I don't want
10	there to be a surprise that I seem to be addressing a
11	motion that they have not yet had an opportunity to
12	bring out on their own.
13	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: I understand
14	that there is significant overlap between the two
15	motions, and probably inevitable you will bring in
16	Montana's motion with respect to your particular
17	motion, but I will come back at the end and let both
18	parties also talk about Montana's motion.
19	MR. KASTE: Okay. Well, thank you for
20	coming out. And I think you should have held this
21	hearing in Cheyenne. You could have gone to Cheyenne
22	Frontier Days, which is this week. You're missing
23	the world's largest outdoor rodeo. And if you stay
24	until Friday you can go see Kiss with Mr. Brown.
25	With regard to the case, we've asked, the

1	State of Wyoming has asked at a couple different
2	points in these proceedings for you to do something
3	unusual. At the summary judgment stage we talked
4	about this case having de minimis value and,
5	therefore, making it fairly good sense to end it at
6	that point in time without going through trial. You
7	didn't agree with that. Probably a good decision.
8	We asked at the conclusion of the trial
9	that as part of your representation you recommend to
10	the Court that we not proceed with the remedies case.
11	We asked the Court to make a decision on this case
12	utilizing equitable power without proceeding to the
13	remedies phase, and the Court declined to do that.
14	Also probably a good decision, and an unusual request
15	on our part, and we made that, those two requests, in
16	light of the very unusual circumstance we found
17	ourselves in in the course of this case. We're
18	looking at an interstate dispute where the amount of
19	water at issue is very small, particularly in light
20	of the amount of water that generally flows through
21	this river.
22	Today we're in front of you asking for
23	essentially the same thing, but we're in a very
24	different procedural posture, and it makes our
25	request not unusual but routine. Our request now is

1	for you to determine that there are no genuine issues
2	of material fact that preclude the entry of judgment,
3	counter-intuitively, against my client and in favor
4	of Montana.

I believe since we're in this familiar procedural posture, this issue is now ripe for your determination and ripe for your recommendation to the Court. We're in a position where we're on a merry go round and we can't seem to get off, and neither party can get off it. We need you, we need your help, and we believe this is the right time for you to get us off this merry go round.

We need a tool or this case will go through a very long, I think, protracted remedies phase, and in proportion to the amount at stake, any amount of time is a protracted amount proportionately. So we need you to come in, to rule on this case before we go through proceedings. And I think it's important, it's very important to understand that no amount of discovery, no amount of additional proceedings are going to change the outcome of this case, and that's what makes it ripe for determination now.

The damages are what they are, the relief that you order is going to be what it's going to be,

and there are no additional facts that we can find that are going to change that result.

I think we have in place a lot of clarity as a result of these proceedings and as a result of this lengthy process that we've undertaken. We have an initial opinion by the Court based on the first interim report that clarified significant disputed issues between the parties. We have a substantial second interim report that clarify those further, along with a host of rulings on pretrial motions that govern the parties' conduct going forward, and we've used those rulings in the course of the last two years to modify our conduct and to follow the Compact in a way that Wyoming wasn't prior to these rulings, and it has been by all accounts extremely successful.

We have for the first time in history two calls made on the State of Wyoming, both of which were honored, and two calls withdrawn by the State of Montana at an appropriate time when the circumstances warranted it.

By all accounts, the rulings in this case have led to a fairly successful change in the relationship between the parties. And that's not to say that at some future point in time there won't be a dispute. I can't guarantee that and no one can.

1	But	the	disp	pute	that	was	brought	befor	re	you	is	over,
2	and	we	just	need	an	order	putting	r it t	0.0	bed.		

Now, I know you've read everything, and I think the briefing in this case is clear. I think the issues in front of you at this point are relatively simple. Not water law centric, by any means, but I'll go through each of the various issues in a little bit of detail and use that probably as a jumping off point for the questions that I know you have.

I think the first issue I have to address is Montana's assertion that, Well, we haven't had an opportunity to conduct discovery in the remedies phase of this case. That's true, but you're only entitled to discovery if it's going to make a difference, and the burden on Montana at this point in time in response to a summary judgment motion, if it doesn't have the facts necessary to establish that a genuine question of material fact precludes the entry of judgment, you have to come forward with an affidavit or a declaration explaining that those facts are out there or we believe them to be out there, and if we were able to discover them it would make a difference in the outcome of this case.

Neither of those two things are true, and

1	Montana has made no attempt to show that either of
2	those two things are true. It's important to
3	remember that this is summary judgment proceedings,
4	and albeit early in these proceedings, you still have
5	the same obligation to come forward with evidence in
6	response to the motion. You cannot stand silent.
7	You cannot just say, I need discovery, and not put
8	forward, give the affidavits demonstrating that
9	there's discovery out there that you should get and
10	you're precluded from it or the questions of fact do
11	in fact exist. There's a burden at this stage of the
12	litigation. Montana has failed to meet it.
13	I think it's also important to recognize
14	in this regard that the evidence that Montana
15	couldn't marshal on this issue is evidence within its
16	custody or within its control. We're talking about
17	damages. This is the plaintiff's case. This is
18	their obligation and their opportunity to go to their
19	water users and say, What are your damages? Or to
20	look at its own records, look at its own reservoir
21	and say, What are our damages? They haven't been
22	precluded from obtaining any of that information
23	because we haven't had formal discovery in this case.
24	The parties have an obligation even before
25	they file suit to do an adequate investigation into

- their case and marshal facts in support of it on all
- the elements of their claim, including damages.
- 3 There's -- there's no showing that that was done
- 4 here. Frankly, no showing that it needs to be done
- 5 here.
- So I think that there's no excuse for the
- 7 failure to provide affidavits or to claim under Rule
- 8 56(d) that I need more time, I need more time to
- 9 marshall evidence and here's what it would be. We
- haven't had any proof that that needs to take place.
- So I think it's important to bear in mind
- as we look at particularly damages, which is -- which
- is the area in which most discovery would take place.
- The injunctive and declaratory relief, and so forth,
- is not a discovery intensive remedy in most
- instances, but damages are.
- You know, if this was a different case,
- very different case, we might very well be in a
- position where we'd want to talk to farmers in
- Montana, go back into their records, look at what
- they grew, didn't grow, the -- what damages they may
- have claimed under their insurance showing crop
- losses, and look at consumptive use, and spend, I
- don't know, a couple years and a few million dollars
- looking at what happened during both of these years

1	on that side of the line, but it doesn't make sense
2	to do that here because of the nature of damages that
3	we're limited to by virtue of the very unique
4	circumstance of having the Tongue River Reservoir and
5	a separate pool of water available to purchase as it
6	was in 2004 and 2006.
7	We're in an extremely unusual situation,
8	you're not likely to see again in other original
9	action cases, where we have this established pool of
10	water that was available to replace the losses that
11	Montana had. Montana failed to avail themselves of
12	that available substitution.
13	And the very basic rules of contract law
14	say if you don't do that, then your damages are
15	limited across the board to the amount of available
16	replacement. Whatever that cost, that's what you
17	get. And if you had damages that you suffered
18	because you failed to take advantage of an
19	opportunity to cover your loss, that burden falls on
20	you and not on the person that breached. Elementary
21	principle of contract law, you have a duty to
22	mitigate.
23	Didn't happen here, consequently damage is
24	limited.
25	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: This is probably

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON:

This is probably

1 a good place to jump in. 2 MR. KASTE: Sure. SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: As you already 3 identified from the expression on my face. 4 So -- I'm sorry. Is it not -- you can't 5 6 hear very well? MS. VERLEGER: We still can't hear 7 Mr. Kaste any better. 8 Is that any SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: 9 10 better? Okay. MR. KASTE: I think she said she can't 11 12 hear me. SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: We'll both try 13 14 to do a better job. Okay. So let me just start out by asking 15 three pertinent questions. So the first one is just, 16 I have not been able to figure out why the parties 17 have not been able to settle on the damages question. 1.8 I can totally understand why Montana and Wyoming may 19 not have been able to settle on questions of 20 declaratory relief that's necessary, injunctive 21 relief, something that should be included in the 22 remedies at this particular stage, how the costs 23

should be allocated or if they should be allocated.

All of that I can understand why Montana and Wyoming

24

1 can't agree. But I would have thought by now, given, 2 as you point out, the amount of water that is at 3 stake here, that the two sides would have been able to agree on the amount of damages or the form of 5 damages. 6 And without revealing any type of 7 confidential discussions that have taken place as part of settlement discussions, can you provide any 9 type of insight into why it is that this damages 10 issue hasn't been settled yet? 11 MR. KASTE: You asked me the only question 12 I can't answer. That is not fair. 13 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Another way of 14 saying this, are there some specific questions with 15 respect to damages which is preventing the two sides 16 from coming to an agreement? 17 MR. KASTE: I don't believe so. 18 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okav. 19 MR. KASTE: Here's what I can tell you. 20 We're talking about water in the West, and compromise 21 with regard to water in the West is near impossible. 22 And that's why I began with telling you we're on a 23 merry go round, both parties want to get off but we 124 can't, and we're going to need somebody to tell us to 25

get off or it ain't going to happen.

1	And I apologize to you, I apologize to the
2	Court. I took very seriously, and I think we all
3	did, the Court's admonition that we think very
4	seriously about whether we continue to involve the
5	jurisdiction of the Court. We all got the message.
6	But like I say, this is water in the West, and it
7	is it is too controversial and too important to
8	the people in both states for decision makers to
9	compromise.
10	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay.
11	MR. KASTE: It's just it's just that
12	hard because of the nature of the subject matter.
13	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. That's
14	fair.
15	MR. KASTE: That's the best
16	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: I've worked in
17	this field for a long enough period of time to
18	understand that this is a difficult area of
19	compromise, and having said that, I still do not
20	understand and Mr. Draper, I will ask you exactly
21	the same question, Attorney General Fox, too, as to
22	why the parties haven't been able to resolve the
23	damages question.
24	So let me turn to the second question,
25	which I just want to make sure I understand Wyoming's

1	position as to what Wyoming finds acceptable for me
2	to do. So as I understand it, what Wyoming says,
3	it's perfectly fine for the Supreme Court to take the
4	maximum dollar per acre amount, that according to the
5	record water was available from the Northern Cheyenne
6	Tribe during the 2000s, which is \$15 an acre-foot,
7	and multiply that times the total amount of water
8	that the Supreme Court has found that Wyoming used in
9	contravention of the Compact. So that's step one.
10	And then to also include prejudgment
11	interest at either, depending on what the Supreme
12	Court ultimately decides, at either the Wyoming rate
13	of interest or the rate of interest under Section
14	1961, in other words, the federal rate of interest.
15	And third of all, to calculate that
16	interest from the dates upon which Montana initially
17	notified Wyoming that they were not getting
18	sufficient water and therefore a call was made. Is
19	that a correct summary of what Wyoming would consider
20	to be an acceptable award of damages?
21	MR. KASTE: Yes.
22	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank
23	you.
24	Then my third question is, in order for
25	the Supreme Court to conclude that that is an

1	appropriate award of damages, I think there are
2	probably four things that the Supreme Court would
3	need to be able to find. No. 1, that in this
4	particular case that the appropriate damages are an
5	award of monetary damages rather than water. So
6	No. 1, that in this case there should be monetary
7	damages rather than water. Second of all, that the
8	doctrine of mitigation actually required of Montana
9	ranchers and farmers to acquire water that they did
10	not otherwise receive from the Northern Cheyenne
11	Tribe. Third, that we have enough information to be
12	able to determine what the cost of that would have
13	been. And then fourth of all, disgorgement of any
14	benefits that Wyoming received from that water is
15	inapposite for this particular case, inappropriate
16	for this particular case.
17	MR. KASTE: I think that's correct, and
18	you also need to find that water was available.
19	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Yes. I think
20	that's part of the mitigation requirement. I would
21	include in that second requirement that the Court
22	would have to find that in fact under the law of
23	mitigation, that there was water available and
24	farmers and ranchers should have bought that water.
25	Okay.

1	So I want to put aside for a moment, I'm
2	going to come back to it in a minute, as to whether
3	or not specific relief in the form of water is
4	appropriate. I want to put that aside for the moment
5	and just deal with the other three issues.
6	So I thought I understood your concept of
7	mitigation until I read the Special Master's report
8	in Kansas versus Colorado. So this was Arthur
9	Littleworth's order regarding mitigation, and it's in
10	the third report of the Special Master in Kansas
11	versus Colorado. And the first parts of what he
12	wrote in there is what I thought I understood, which
13	is that basically the defendant, which is in this
14	case you, bear the burden of proving that the
15	plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate
16	its damages. Second of all, that the duty to
17	mitigate damages did not arise until the injured
18	party has a reason to know the breach has occurred.
19	Both of those are relatively straightforward.
20	But then there's a paragraph, which I must
21	admit I had not really focused on when I studied
22	remedies in law school, and it specifically says,
23	moreover, Colorado, which in that particular case was
24	the defendant, was certainly in a position to be
25	aware of any Compact violations as early in time as

- 1 Kansas, the plaintiff in that particular case, was aware of it. Okay? So that in other words, the 2 defendant, that would be you in this particular case, 3 was aware as soon as the plaintiff, which would be Montana in this particular case, was in violation. 5 Whenever that may have occurred, Colorado also could 6 7 have reduced potential damage in Kansas by Compact compliance, but damage award will not be reduced on account of damages which the defendant could have 9 10 avoided as easily as the plaintiff. 11 That's nonsense. MR. KASTE: 12 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So let me just 13 go on. So I go to the cases that Art Littleworth 14 actually cited in support of it. One was a case called Shea, this is a really complex one, it's 15 16 Shea-S&M Ball, B-A-L-L, versus Massman, 17 M-A-S-S-M-A-N, hyphen Kiewit, K-I-E-W-I-T, hyphen Early, E-A-R-L-Y, and also Buras, B-U-R-A-S, versus 18 Shell Oil Company. And both of them say much the 19 20 same thing, that if in fact the way in which the 21 plaintiff could have mitigated damages is also 22 something the defendant could have done, that the 23 plaintiff isn't under any obligation to mitigate the 24 damages. So --
- MR. KASTE: They may --

1 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Help me 2 understand. MR. KASTE: All three of them are then 4 nonsense, because in a contract case, which this is, 5 when one party breaches and the duty to mitigate 6 arises on the other party, in almost every instance 7 the breaching party is -- says, I'm done, I'm not 8 going to pay your damages. I -- I'm not in breach in 9 I haven't done anything wrong. You're on your 10 own. 11 And that's, of course, what happened here. 12 We said, We're not in breach. We had an argument 13 about that. It turns out we were. But in all of 14 these cases, the plaintiff -- the breaching party 15 breaches the contract, damages arise -- or the 16 opportunity for damages arise, and that triggers the 17 defendant's obligation to mitigate his damages. 18 is -- it is invariably the case that the plaintiff 19 could have paid for those or could have acquired 20 substitute goods in the same way the defendant could, 21 but that's nonsense. That's not how the world works. 22 In almost every contract case the plaintiff doesn't 23 march right in and pay for substitute goods. 24 doesn't happen.

So I -- I quess I'm not familiar with

1	where that kind of ludicrous stuff came up, but
2	that's not how it works in the real world, and it's
3	not how it ought to work either because the defendant
4	in a breach of contract case excuse me the
5	plaintiff in a breach of contract case is the master
6	of their own destiny with regard to their damages.
7	That's what the doctrine of mitigation does, is it
8	looks to the plaintiff and says, You could have done
9	something to help yourself, and because you didn't,
10	we're not going to put that burden on the defendant.
11	And to say to the defendant, you're not
12	entitled to a defense of failure to mitigate because
13	you didn't march right in and do what the plaintiff
14	should have done of their own accord, that's
15	that's not the law as I know it. I don't think
16	that's what the restatement says. And and I don't
17	believe those cases ought to be applied in this
18	circumstance.
19	In every contract case, every one, the
20	plaintiff has an obligation when they know there's a
21	breach, which occurred when the call was made in 2004
22	and 2006 and Wyoming said, we're not doing that. At
23	that point in time that person, that contracting
24	party also has a burden, and they failed to meet

25

that, hopefully in a very small measure at the end of

1 the day, but that failure makes a difference in what 2 they're entitled to at the end of the day. 3 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: That's -- I must admit that what you just said was what I always 5 thought was the rule with respect to mitigation, but 6 I'm now puzzled by these set of cases and what 7 Special Master Littleworth said in the case of Kansas versus Colorado. MR. KASTE: If you read enough cases, you 10 can find two that say the exact opposite thing. In 11 this case, one is right and supported by the 12 restatement of the law, which I think is pretty darn 13 good authority, and I think that's what we ought to 14 follow and what the Court is likely to follow. Their 15 track record demonstrates that they turn to the 16 restatement of contracts when they're looking at 17 contract issues that are presented to them in the 18 first instance to see what the rules are and what 19 rules they ought to apply. The restatement is 20 awfully fair. I think we agree on that. 21 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So let me go on 22 the other side -- aspect of that, which is not what 23 the legal requirement is but whether or not in fact the evidence shows, the evidence that was presented 24

during the liability phase, that in fact there was an

obligation to mitigate in this particular case. And
I know that Montana's argument is in part they should
be able to get more discovery, but I also understand
that Montana's argument is that in fact if you look
at that evidence, it doesn't meet the burden of proof
that Wyoming would have on summary judgment.

So there are a couple of questions I have. The first is, when you look back at the record, I'm looking specifically at pages or some of the pages that you cited, so in Volume 7, on Page 1499, Art Hayes testified that in fact the tribe was selling water in 2004 and 2006, but that in 2004, which was the only year he was explicitly asked about it, he didn't have enough money to go and buy the amount of water. So that he couldn't mitigate in that particular situation because he simply didn't have the money to go out and buy water that, of course, he would otherwise have been receiving if there had not been a breach.

Similarly, John Hamilton, this is in

Volume 16, Page 3669, Mr. Hamilton says that one of
the reasons why he did not buy the Northern Cheyenne
water, again, was because it was too expensive. He
had basically run out of cash at that particular
point to go out and buy more water.

1	So given that particular testimony by two
2	of the farmers and ranchers in this particular case,
3	can the Supreme Court find that in fact it had an
4	obligation, presumably it has to go out and pay,
5	cobble money in order to go and buy the money to
6	mitigate the issue.
7	MR. KASTE: Well, the rule is whether you
8	can mitigate without let me see if I'm getting
9	this right undue risk, burden or humiliation.
10	I think there are a couple of important
11	points to remember here. One is, Montana made a
12	claim for its water and Montana has money. Montana
13	could have done something to help the farmers. And
14	if we're talking about Montana's pool of water in the
15	reservoir, it has an obligation to do that. Well,
16	we're going to write the check to Montana. We're not
17	going to write a check to John Hamilton. We're not
18	going to write a check to Art Hayes.
19	We're dealing with sovereigns here, their
20	sovereign rights as between each other, and so the
21	lack of funds is not an appropriate answer for
22	Montana and the claims that it's making in this case
23	on behalf of itself,
24	And I understand that we are all working
25	to get this water in the right places for farmers and

- 1 for our citizens, but the claims in this case are 2 brought by Montana, not Art Hayes. What's important 3 about his testimony is he said flat out, water in 4 both those years, it was available. It was available to Montana, just as it was available to Mr. Hayes, 6 Mr. Hamilton, and every other water user there. 7 If - if this was as important as it 8 appears to be, although when you stretch out that 9 1356 acre-feet over two years amongst a whole bunch 10 of water users, what amount of money would have made 11 Mr. Hayes whole out of that. What's his proportion 12 of that 1300. Did he say that he couldn't afford 13 that? I don't think so. I don't think he knew he 14 was entitled to 1356 acre-feet or more likely some 15 small percentage of that. Could he afford that? 16 That evidence isn't in the record. Montana hasn't 17 put it forward. 18 What we have is him making an amorphous, 19 it was a tough year and I didn't spend money to 20 change my operations, not knowing that I may be 21 entitled to what might be 150, I don't know, 22 acre-feet in 2004 and 2006. It might have been less 23 than a foot from Mr. Hayes individually or 24 Mr. Hamilton individually.
- It doesn't seem to me that we're in a

1	position to take that excuse and say, Well, I guess
2	we can't have summary judgment because they couldn't
3	afford it. We don't know the answer to that
4	question, and we don't need to know. That's the
5	important follow-up, is we don't need to know whether
6	or not they could or couldn't afford it because
7	Montana hasn't brought that to your attention in
8	response to the summary judgment motion. They didn't
9	walk in here with an affidavit from Mr. Hayes saying,
10	I was entitled to 100 of that 1300 acre-feet of water
11	and that would have cost me \$150, or is it \$1,050.
12	You know I can't do math, although I did try to do
13	the prejudgment interest calculation. I think I did
14	it right. \$1,500, he didn't come in here and say
15	that to you in an affidavit in response to this
16	summary judgment motion, and you need to have that
17	before you can make your finding that a genuine
18	question of material fact is based on that formula.
19	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So I hear you
20	saying two things, and one is a factual decision and
21	the other I'm a bit puzzled about. So the first,
22	which is a factual determination, is I think what I
23	heard you say at the very outset was that in your
24	view, it was Montana's obligation, when they sent the
25	notice to Wyoming and they got back basically a

1	letter that said, No, we don't believe we have an
2	obligation to provide additional water to Montana,
3	that at that point in time Montana should have sent a
4	letter to all the water users on the Tongue River
5	saying, You probably have an obligation to mitigate
6	right now. We know some of you might not have enough
7	money, and if you don't have enough money, please let
8	us know right away because we will go out and we will
9	buy however much water you think we should buy and
10	we'll make you whole and provide you with that water.
11	Is that correct? Is that what you're
12	arguing?
13	MR. KASTE: They should do something.
14	They have the ability to do something. What they do
15	in response to Wyoming's breach I'm not in control
16	of. How they choose to handle that I don't really
17	care, but I know that they could have, even with
18	their own money or asked the farmers on their own
19	behalf, gone to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and
20	bought 1356 acre-feet of water, and they did not.
21	How they do it is up to them.
22	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So then the
23	second point which I hear you making, which I'm
24	actually a little bit more puzzled by, is that on
25	this particular question. Montana had an obligation

- to provide various affidavits; for example, Mr. Hayes and Mr. Hamilton didn't have enough money to buy the water.
- But the reason why I'm puzzled by that is

 if I go to the very sections of the liability phase

 record that Wyoming is relying upon to show them that

 water was available from the Northern Cheyenne Tribe,

 and it could have bought it for no more than \$15 an

 acre-foot, is that very record in which Mr. Hayes and

 Mr. Hamilton explicitly said, Well, we couldn't buy

 water because we didn't have the money.

- MR. KASTE: Yeah, I hear you. What the distinction is, is they're not talking about what they know to be their proportionate share. They didn't even know what their proportionate share was when they made their statements. They made this out-of-context statement that I don't have any money to buy water, but they had no idea what amount of water they were on the hook to buy. How can they -- how can they legitimately create a genuine question of fact about their ability to purchase or replace the water if they don't know how much they're supposed to buy.
- SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So couldn't that same argument have been your argument that this

really should have been Montana that's going out 1 2 there and buying water to make up for the water that the farmers did not have. Doesn't your argument just 3 now also suggest that at an individual level, 5 Mr. Hayes and Mr. Hamilton couldn't have actually mitigated their damages because they didn't know 6 7 exactly how much water they weren't getting. 8 MR. KASTE: Well, I think they could. I think all the farmers in Montana could have looked at 10 what they were growing that year, decided they didn't have enough water, and bought some from the tribe. 11 12 They didn't, and I think they ought to be stuck with the consequences of that decision. You can't 13 complain, whether you're the farmer or you're 14 15 Montana, that, Hey, I got shorted water and it hurt 16 But there was water available, and you could have bought it, I think you ought to buy it. 17 18 And that's the whole point here. was water available. I don't care who paid money. 19 don't care who wrote the check. Whatever damages 20 resulted could have been addressed by releasing 1300 21 22 and 56 acre-feet in the two respective years. I 23 think the burden is on Montana to do that if they're 24 the one complaining about, I got shorted, I got 25 shorted 1300 acre-fee of water that I'm entitled to

1	under this Compact.
2	Hey, buy it. I think that's how it ought
3	to work. For you to complain about your damages, you
4	have an obligation to fix them before they get out of
5	hand, and they didn't.
6	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So let me ask
7	another factual question, which is, again I was
8	looking at the specific portions of the record that
9	Wyoming had pointed me to. And one was Volume 8,
10	Page 1653. And looking at that particular page,
11	there was a reference to the fact that there was 180
12	days of notice requirement to the Montana Department
13	of Natural Resources and Conservation, the State of
14	Montana department, and it suggested this was some
15	type of Compact requirement, I assume the Compact
16	between the Northern Cheyenne and Montana.
17	And unless my memory is not good enough to
18	remember that, then what was the nature of that
19	Compact requirement, do you recall?
20	MR. KASTE: Under the Northern Cheyenne
21	Compact, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe is supposed to
22	talk to the State of Montana in advance of each
23	individual year and let them know whether or not
24	they're going to market their Compact water, and
25	they're supposed to give advance notice. I think we

1	gave you an Exhibit M-387, which is on that same
2	page, the notice from 2004 or the document
3	identifying that that was in place in 2004.
4	Our other exhibit, Exhibit M-399, is not
5	the same notice. I think we had trouble locating
6	that same document in the case, specifically notice
7	that was given in 2006. Instead we have like
8	Mr. Hayes saying they were marketing their water in
9	2006, and Mr. Whiteman, whom we also cited, who said,
10	yes, we were marketing water in those years.
11	And we give you that second exhibit that
12	has a spreadsheet indicating quantities of water that
13	were purchased by various individuals in 2006, and
14	it's evident from that spreadsheet that that's
15	Compact water and not 7500 acre-feet of contract
16	water that the tribe also has. Otherwise it should
17	be, on that spreadsheet as using part of their 7500
18	acre-feet of contract water.
19	So I think you take the pieces of
20	available evidence, and granted the documentation
21	that we had on this particular issue, what we were
22	able to cobble together during the course of
23	discovery is incomplete, but what we do have
24	demonstrates that it was available for sale in 2006.
25	And so from that I think we should infer, and we're

1	allowed to make reasonable inferences in summary
2	judgment, saying that there was requisite notice in
3	2006. What you don't see is information indicating
4	that they did not, either by affidavit or declaration
5	or some other document submitted in response to our
6	summary judgment motion.
7	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thanks.
8	That's very helpful.
9	So now we go to the last of the questions,
10	which is the disgorgement issue. And so here I would
11	again appreciate whatever help you can provide me on
12	this.
13	So as I understand how the Supreme Court
14	has most recently ruled on this particular question,
15	is that in order to find that disgorgement is
16	appropriate, that the Supreme Court does not have to
17	find that Wyoming has deliberately reached the
18	Compact, but that instead that they acted in, I'm
19	going to use the language of the Supreme Court,
20	reckless disregard of another more vulnerable state's
21	rights.
22	And so two questions. Number one, is that
23	the standard that I should be using in determining
24	whether or not disgorgement is appropriate? And if
25	so, didn't Wyoming in this particular case by, in

1 response to Montana's call, saying, No, we're not going to provide you with water, we don't think we 2 have an obligation here, is that in reckless 3 disregard of Montana, the downstream state's rights 4 under the Compact? 5 MR. KASTE: The first question, reckless 6 7 disregard was the standard, but I think if you look at the majority opinion of Justice Kagan in that case, that the standard is probably more 9 10 appropriately knowingly. 11 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Knowingly failed 12 to comply. MR. KASTE: Well, it just says knowingly. 13 I -- I would prefer if it was reckless, but I think 14 the important thing is under either test, lenient 15 knowingly, and more stringent reckless, Wyoming did 16 not breach the Compact in the same kind of knowingly 17 or reckless disregard to the rights of Montana. 18 I think there's a very good contrast to be 19 made by the actions of Nebraska in Kansas versus 20 Nebraska and the actions of Wyoming in this case. 21 Nebraska engaged in what is just a very traditional, 22 efficient breach analysis. It's better for me to 23 breach the Compact than it is to comply, and I know 24 I'm doing it and I don't care because it's better, 25

1	works out in my favor. That's knowingly, clearly.
2	It's not what happened in this case. The
3	State of Wyoming was presented in 2004 with a letter
4	that asked it to do a number of things that, one,
5	were nutty like draining Lake DeSmet. Two, had never
6	been asked for before. Three, were completely
7	inconsistent with our historic understanding of the
8	Compact and the way it works. And in good faith
9	reliance on our interpretation, without trying to
10	damage or hurt anybody knowingly, we made a decision
11	that that call shouldn't be honored.
12	And in 2006 we're faced with the same
13	dilemma again, with no resolution from either the
14	Compact commission and the Court, and made the same
15	decision. Our interpretation of the Compact mandated
16	this action. That's very different than saying I

decision. Our interpretation of the Compact mandated this action. That's very different than saying, I know that I owe you this and I don't care. I'm going to act in a way that's inconsistent with the Compact

regardless.

People can have a dispute about the meaning of a document as poorly written as the Yellowstone River Compact, and we've had one for a decade, and we've had to have you and the Court over the course of that decade explain to us what it means. That's okay. That's not the kind of conduct

1	that implicates disgorgement as a remedy.
2	Disgorgement as a remedy is purposeful. I
3	purposely am going to take advantage of you. I'm
4	knowingly going to take advantage of you.
5	An honest dispute between two parties
6	about the interpretation of a Compact that result in
7	damages is every Compact case or every contract case.
8	You and I could have a contract to exchange money for
9	goods, and I say, That's not what the Compact or
10	contract provides in this circumstance. I'm not
11	going to pay you. You're damaged.
12	I can't get disgorgement as a remedy
13	there. We had an honest dispute about the meaning of
14	the contract.
15	That's this. Disgorgement is not an
16	appropriate remedy in this case by any stretch of the
17	imagination. If it was, then it's the appropriate
18	remedy in every case where two parties disagree about
19	very difficult Compact language.
20	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So let me just
21	separate out several different possibilities. All
22	right? So there's the possibility there the parties
23	agreed on the actual meaning of the Compact, but one
24	state just accidentally violates it. All right?
25	They don't attack some of the people who maybe are

1	losing water in their state but they should have.
2	That strikes me as a situation where there's not a
3	knowing breach.
4	But doesn't the argument that you make
5	mean that any time an upstream state wants to hold
6	onto more water than the Compact really requires them
7	to do, all they have to do is to say, you know, My
8	interpretation of the Compact is that we don't have
9	to provide you with water. And then they litigate
10	that particular issue, and again, they don't have the
11	disgorgement.
12	Isn't there also a requirement that
13	states, you look at a Compact and come up with a
14	at least a reasonable interpretation of it. In this
15	case, is my question ultimately here, or one the
16	Supreme Court has to read, is the question whether or
17	not Montana's interpretation was a reasonable
18	interpretation at the time.
19	MR. KASTE: Wyoming's.
20	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: I'm sorry,
21	Wyoming.

MR. KASTE: I think both the alternatives are wrong. What you're getting at, I think, is the difference in motive. Is there evidence of a motive here beyond a good faith dispute of the meaning of

1	difficult language. You're implying by your by
2	the nature of your question that we we want the
3	water to the exclusion of our good faith
4	interpretation of the Compact, and we're using that
5	interpretation as the means to hide and get at the
6	water that we want. And disgorgement is a remedy
7	that flows from motive knowingly, recklessly. It
8	just isn't mine. Right?
9	There's no evidence of this in this case,
10	that there was a Wyoming official anywhere along the
11	way that had that state of mind. I'm going to use
12	this Compact as a means to keep this water away from
13	the other side, and this is like a subterfuge, this
14	is my ruse. We don't have any evidence of that, and
15	we're not going to find any either through more
16	discovery.
17	Mr. Tyrrell got on the stand.
18	Mr. Tyrrell was deposed. Mr. Tyrrell made a
19	decision. Mr. Whitaker told you point blank it was
20	his fault. Remember, he said that. The
21	decision-maker was sitting in the back of the room,
22	and everybody in this case had an opportunity to ask
23	him, Why did you do that? What were you thinking?
24	What made you say no to this Compact?
25	He told us, fairly, Well, that was our

25

1	interpretation. This is how we read the Compact.
2	It's describing our rights and responsibilities, and
3	we believed that we did not have a responsibility to
4	take the actions that were requested of us by
5	Montana. In particular, the ones in 2004 that seemed
6	really outlandish, but even the ones in 2006 that
7	were that were much more rational, and ultimately
8	turned out to be in complete conformity with the
9	Court's interpretation of the document. There's no
10	evidence of motive here that will give you any
11	grounds to recommend disgorgement as a remedy.
12	And you can ask Mr. Tyrrell again, but
13	you're going to get the same answer. We don't need
14	to go through discovery to get at the information
15	that we already have.
16	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So then
17	let me get back to the very first question that was
18	stated in this case, and that is, you can't just
19	avoid the various factual issues that we just
20	discussed, as well as the question of whether or not
21	mitigation was required in this particular case by
22	awarding water rather than awarding monetary damages.
23	MR. KASTE: Awarding water creates a
24	different set of problems, and mind you, a worse set
25	of problems, because specific performance is usually

a last resort, and specific performance in this case makes very little sense. Who am I supposed to give that water to? Who am I supposed to take it from? The people that have water available this year from whom I might steal from to give to somebody else who steals it, force them to provide it to Montana under my obligation, am I taking it from the right people, from the wrongdoers back in 2004, 2006? Am I giving it to the right people? The people who need it this year may not be the same people who needed it in '04 and '06. It may not go into the reservoir. logistic problems with it are substantial.

And when am I supposed to give it to them? The reservoir is filled this year. Get your 1356 out of that. A whole bunch of water went over the reservoir in this year and in '04 and maybe there will be some next year. When am I supposed to make this payment to them? When it's convenient to them? I don't know of any provision of law that allows specific performance maybe five years in the future, when they actually need it, as opposed to at the end of the case.

It's impossible for me to figure out a way to do this that's fair to the people on both sides of the lines. Actual remedy, the problems that existed

- in 2004 and 2006, monetary damages are the only
- 2 remedy that really makes sense here. As inadequate
- as they may be to whatever happened in 2004 and 2006,
- 4 that's all we can really do in a fair way. Because
- if I give Art Hayes water today, I may not be
- 6 actually remedying the injury that happened in 2004,
- 7 and I don't know how to figure that out.
- I don't think we need to because we
- 9 shouldn't turn to specific performance as a remedy
- when there's an adequate remedy at law. And it's a
- few dollars, and it's easy, it's sensible, and to the
- extent we get to vote on it, we vote for money. I
- just don't see how we can do this in a sensible way.
- SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank
- you. So that's all quite useful on the question of
- damages.
- MR. KASTE: Okay.
- SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So before we run
- out of time entirely, we should probably talk about
- the various other issues.
- MR. KASTE: I can run through them quickly
- or I can just respond to your questions.
- SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Why don't I go
- ahead and just go ahead and ask my questions.
- MR. KASTE: All right.

1	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And then you can
2	come back and say whatever else you want to. Does
3	that make sense?
4	MR. KASTE: Sure.
5	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So on the
6	question of declaratory relief, so I have several
7	questions here also. And I'm going to for the moment
8	put aside your question of the Tongue River
9	Reservoir, because that's in Montana's motion, as you
LO	pointed out, this might inevitably come up.
L1	So the first just a little bit of
L2	premise on this. The first is, is that as Montana
L3	points out, if you look at prior original
L4	jurisdiction cases, in virtually every case that I
L5	found the Court has indeed set out in its decree some
L6	specific holdings with respect to the way in which
L 7	the river should be managed.
L 8	In this particular case there's obviously
L 9	a lot of of material in both the first report that
20	I filed with the Supreme Court and the second report
21	that I filed with the Supreme Court, but none of that
22	is embodied specifically in the decree except to the
23	degree that it's implicit in what the Supreme Court
24	ultimately found.

25

So at a minimum, I think this is one of

1 the things that Montana suggests, at a minimum, 2 shouldn't I provide for a decree that includes the 3 specific elements of the interim reports that have been guiding the parties apparently in their 5 management of the Tongue River? 6 MR. KASTE: You know, honestly I -- it 7 didn't become apparent to me that you hadn't done that in this last order until fairly recently. anticipated the order that flowed from the Court in 10 response to the parties' exceptions to say, We adopt 11 the contents of the second interim report and, 12 therefore, it sort of makes itself or merges into the 13 order and becomes part of the decree. 14 That didn't happen in the order that you 15 presented to the Court, and it should. I think that 16 your next order, recommendation, should say the Court 17 adopts the content of the first and second interim 18 reports. And we understand our obligation is to 19 follow the various rules that you lay down in both of 20 those reports. Fine. 21 And I think a lot of the disconnect 22 between the parties' position on this is more a 23 discussion of term -- or a dispute over terms than it 24 is about substance. We're entitled to a decree. 25

Montana says, Well, you're entitled to a judgment.

L	One	is	just	а	different	term	for	the	other.
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I don't care what you call the final order in this case, whether you call it a decree or whether you call it a judgment. It needs to include the adoption of these reports so future generations understand, We're bound by those rulings. It's the Court's ultimate outcome, and it needs to contain a money judgment in favor of Montana in light of first finding that Wyoming is liable for two years for a certain amount of water.

Does it need to do more than that seems to be the sticky wicket. And the answer I think is no, it does not need to require and should not because Montana hasn't established that it is entitled to some other specific declaration or some other specific injunction. There is a test for injunctive relief. They don't meet it. There are considerations weighing in favor and against declaratory relief in certain instances. There are none that suggest we need additional declaratory relief in this case.

And I think there's a very big distinction between some other additional declaratory relief that exists outside the second interim report and a revisiting of a holding of that report, which is the

1 essence of Montana's motion for summary judgment, 2 which is, I don't like the answer you gave me in the 3 first instance. I'd like a different one. That's an appeal. That's a motion for reconsideration. 5 not the same as saying at the conclusion of the case, here's the declaratory relief that then flows from 7 your findings on liability. You're not being presented with that. 9 You're being presented with a motion to reconsider, 10 which I think, one, I'm not sure you have the ability 11 to reconsider in light of the fact that the parties' 12 exceptions were rejected. I take that to mean that 13 Montana's request for additional discussion or 14 elucidation of what the Tonque River Reservoir right 15 is has been denied by the Court, and they have 16 accepted your decision that it makes good sense in 17 this case to stop at a point that you don't have to 18 go any further. Stop at this discussion to resolve 19 this case and go no further. 20 I think that there were reasons that you 21 stopped. You articulated them very well in the 22 course of your report. I understand and respect 23 those reasons. I understand that I previously asked

you to do something different, and I'm used to you

disagreeing with me in light of my requests, so it

24

25

1	doesn't bother me. But I understand that you came to
2	a conclusion that this was the right thing to do in
3	response to the case in front of you.

And now, in light of that changed circumstance where we have this guidance and no more, Wyoming is willing to accept that ruling in order to move on and to get this case resolved, which is in everyone's best interest. To do more than that, as you very -- very carefully pointed out in your report, requires us to get into questions that we're probably not prepared to answer, and they relate to parties that aren't before the Court. And as much as I wanted you to do something else, you didn't, and I -- I think we should live with that. And having seen your reasoning, rationale, it's probably the prudent thing to do.

So we're -- we're at a place now where the question is, what -- what kinds of additional remedies should flow from the determination of liability? And Wyoming's position is those remedies ought to be limited to the money judgment and nothing else.

And the idea that Montana should be entitled to some injunctive relief, which is not really articulated, and most of the declaratory

relief they seem to be asking for isn't articulated either, and I think that's inherent in this merry-go-round concept that we can't get off of. We can't get off, we know we have to keep arguing, but we can't even tell you what we want because we've reached a point of diminishing returns here. And if you can't even tell us what you want, what you think you ought to get, and in order to get you have to show certain things, and Montana has failed to do that, particularly with regard to injunctive relief.

I understand the concept of, Well, the upper state needs to be put in its place. It sounds like punishment, the Court saying, You need to be punished so you won't do this again. Well, that's as much soaring rhetoric as anything else. The Court actually looked at the rules for the imposition of an injunction, and the limitations that they have placed on themselves about what is or is not the right time and right reasons to grant an injunction and intend to follow them.

If you have a remedy at law, you don't need an injunction. If you have no good evidence that there's a serious breach imminent in the future, you don't get an injunction. And I think that if you fairly apply the test for injunctive relief, the

- situation we're in and the evidence that was before
 you in the liability phase, that you should find that
 no injunctive relief is necessary or warranted in
 this case.
- And it's hard for me to do because I don't 5 even know what relief they want other than an 6 injunction to comply with the Compact, which is an 7 obligation we already have. And you've heard from multiple individuals from the State of Wyoming who 9 have done all they can do, which is tell you, I see 10 the Court's ruling, I understand it, I respect it, I 11 will follow it. You look at the course of conduct of 12 these parties over the last two years and that's 13 what's happened. We've seen the ruling, we respect 14 15 it, we follow it.

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It's probably important to note this is a case between sovereigns, not people. The State of Wyoming doesn't have ill will. The State of Wyoming, it's this ambiguous thing. It's bigger than any of us. The State of Montana doesn't have ill will. It's bigger than any of us. And I think it's fair to presume that these sovereigns are just trying to follow the law as they understand it. Our conduct bears that out. And I think that that's going to be the case in the future.

1 At some point in the future we're going to 2 fight. We've got a baby. We've a married couple 3 The baby is not going anywhere, and with a baby. 4 sometimes, under some circumstances in the future we 5 may have an additional dispute, but if we're lucky it 6 will be 50 years from now, like it was 50 years after 7 the first Compact was generated. 8 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So hopefully the headline in the Wyoming newspapers tomorrow is not to 10 label that the state of Wyoming is an ambiguous 11 thing. 12 MR. KASTE: I don't know what it is. 13 struggle with the concept of sovereignty. It's an 14 entity but it's made up of a whole bunch of people, 15 and my experience with people on both sides of this 16 line, there are people of good faith trying to do the 17 right thing. 18 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So I want to 19 follow up on what we've just been talking about and 20 settle some issues. The first is, is there a need 21 for the Supreme Court in its final decree to actually 22 adopt some of the specific findings that were in 23

25 parties.

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my -- particularly in my second interim report, with

respect to the various rights and obligations of the

You suggested that maybe all the Supreme

Court needs to do is to simply say they adopt what

was ever in my first and second interim report. I

think the problem with that is, is, of course, there

were a lot of other things in the first and second

interim report in terms of the logic the Supreme

Court might not agree with.

So my inclination, and I appreciate your thoughts on this and Mr. Draper's thoughts on this, is to go back, pull out some of the specific findings regarding the rights and obligations, and put those into a decree so that they are specifically set out. The three values of that is, one, the Supreme Court is only agreeing to the actual findings rather than any of the logic that might be in there, and it's clear what those are.

Second of all, it's a good way of ferreting out whether or nothin fact the parties are not sure what some of those specific findings actually mean. Because one of the things I would plan to do is to give both sides -- or actually, I should say all three sides an opportunity to take a look at that decree and see whether or not they think that actually accurately sets out what they believed was embodied in the first and second interim reports.

1	And then third of all, provide some
2	guidance for both sides to actually adopt them. So
3	that's my inclination at a minimum.
4	Then there's a second issue, which I would
5	appreciate Montana addressing well, actually
6	there's a second issue, which was Montana's motion,
7	which is whatever that decree is, it should go
8	further than the second interim report with respect
9	to Montana's rights in the Tongue River Reservoir.
10	We'll talk about that during Montana's portion.
11	There is a third question, though, and
12	that's what I will appreciate Montana's thoughts on
13	first, which is, is there anything else that needs to
14	be in that decree? Because I agree with you,
15	Mr. Kaste, in moving forward we need to know exactly
16	what people think should be part of the relief, and
17	at this point for so long generality as to what's
18	necessary. Then that's sort of Part A.
19	MR. KASTE: Can we stop at Part A?
20	Because that's a lot.
21	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Yes, let's stop
22	right there on Part A. So this one I'm not asking
23	you to address Montana's motion or whether there
24	should be anything else, but I would appreciate your
25	thoughts on any problems with my basically pulling

- out what I think are the key findings and putting
 that into a decree that I would recommend to the
 Supreme Court.
- MR. KASTE: Well, other than you're asking
 for a fight, which you are. To the extent that you

 pull something out that I like and they don't, we

 fight over the thing you pull out. To the extent you

 don't pull something out that I want in there and

 they don't, we fight. And we are just prolonging

 these proceedings I think needlessly.

I understand that there are -- that your opinion builds from the beginning to the end, and yet every opinion from every point does that. So there's dicta in every opinion. There's some facts in there that didn't matter that people thought were interesting and threw in. And then there's the heart of the matter and the holdings.

And I really don't want to fight about that but we will, I guarantee you we will, and we'll fight hard and we'll fight longer than we should for the reasons I previously mentioned, and we won't get a better deal than what we currently have. I don't see there being a significant advantage to saying, well, this is -- after putting together what is a comprehensive piece of work here, which has been very

1 helpful, to say, Now I'm going to cut that up and you 2 can ignore a bunch of stuff in there, I'm not going 3 to like that. I like a lot of the stuff. Montana is 4 not going to like it. There's stuff they like that 5 we don't. 6 I think that the best course of action is 7 to adopt the second interim report in whole. It's 8 efficient. Neither party took exception to all of 9 that stuff. We liked it in some measure, enough that 10 we were willing to not fight about its contents in 11 front of the Court, with the exception of the two 12 things we brought up, which are pretty small in the 13 grand scheme of things. We got that agreement 14 already. I don't think you ought to mess that up. 15 More than pragmatically, I really think 16 you can't be inclusive enough in whatever it is that 17 you would plan to write to capture the essence and 18 the important parts. There's a lot of good for both 19 parties in minutia in here that will get left off, 20 and won't I don't think do the future generations a 21 whole lot of favors to distill it down in ways that 22 are unfair. 23 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So I certainly 24 do not want to unravel what has occurred already, but 25 at the same time, it's safe, Mr. Kaste, but you're

beginning to convince me that we need some kind of 1 declaratory relief here because in fact the parties 2 don't agree on what portions of the second interim 3 report they're going to abide by, which portions 4 they're not going to abide by, and what they need --5 MR. KASTE: I didn't say that. 6 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Well, if that's 7 not a problem, then I don't see why it's going to take very long to come up with a decree that includes 9 everything that the parties are going to accept, 10 because if in fact, as you point out, there's 11 something that I might not include and you're going 12 to say, Hey, we need to include that, Montana is 13 going to say, Fine, go ahead and include it, because 14 15 apparently both of you are in agreement with 16 everything in there. MR. KASTE: We don't think that's going to 17 18 happen, and I don't -- I don't want to get into a position where we bet how awful this is going to be 19 or how great it is going to be. I believe that we're 20 going to have -- we're going to create disputes that 21 22 we didn't need to create and we're going to create a fight that we don't need to create because we're 23 generally happy with where we are. And once you 24 start parsing things out, we will be generally 25

- unhappy with where we are. As a whole, it seems to
 work pretty well. You start picking it apart and
 we're going to have problems.
- I didn't say that anybody is not going to 5 abide by it. I don't think that we're in a position 6 now where we can -- we have any disagreements about 7 what it means or our rights and responsibilities. If 8 we start taking it apart, then we're probably going to fight. And we can resolve that. It will take 10 some time. We'll be back and forth saying, Why, what 11 value do we obtain by going through that process when 12 we already have a comprehensive piece of work that we 13 all agree on and are living under peacefully. 14 don't think we benefit ourselves or future 15 generations by tearing the sucker apart.
 - SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So why is it that you would end up fighting with each other if it is put in the decree but you're not going to end up fighting about this in two or three years when the issues actually come up?

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MR. KASTE: Because you're giving us the opportunity, and it's water in the West. And we can't compromise, we won't compromise, and we'll demand everything that we like out of there, and so will they, but not what you want.

1	We're in a position now where we are
2	content. When you put us in a position where we have
3	to go back and forth with each other, we will
4	invariably retreat to our camps and attempt to get
5	the best deal out of that decree. Why? What good
6	does it do? Nothing.
7	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So let's
8	move on from there.
9	So the other issue I was going to say is
10	the question of whether or not there should be
11	injunctive relief. And on that, I think that
12	Wyoming's position is quite clear. I probably will
13	have some questions, but I think it makes more sense
14	for Montana to address some of my questions on
15	injunction first.
16	Similarly, on the cost issue, at the
17	moment I don't have any questions, but again, I might
18	have some questions after Montana addresses your
19	motion.
20	So for the moment I don't have any more
21	questions for you. Is there anything else you would
22	like to say to me at this point?
23	MR. KASTE: I don't think so, other than
24	I'd appreciate it if you grant our motion for summary
25	judgment and kick us off this merry go round. I

- think we'd all appreciate it if you would do that for
- us before we have to engage in some form of future
- proceedings, to the detriment of both states, because
- we're going to have to pay for it.
- 5 Thank you.
- 6 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank
- you, Mr. Kaste.
- What I would actually propose, since
- 9 probably a lot of people have had some coffee before
- coming to the hearing. We've been going for an hour
- and 15 minutes right now. Why don't we take like --
- I would not propose a long break. I would propose
- 13 10 minutes, does that sound good? A 10-minute break
- right now, and then we will come back. And so we're
- recessed for about 10 minutes. Thank you.
- 16 (Recess taken.)
- 17 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Let's go back on
- the record.
- 19 So Attorney General Fox.
- MR. FOX: Good morning, Your Honor. Thank
- you for the opportunity to address the Court, and I
- want to acknowledge my colleague and now long time
- friend, General Michael, who has been a pleasure to
- work with not only in this matter but many other
- 25 matters as well.

1	It's no secret that in fact Wyoming and
2	Montana do share a lot of common interests, and for
3	the most part I would say probably historically we
4	work together on things that are of note to the West.
5	For instance, the federal-state relationship and many
6	other things.
7	But I think Mr. Kaste is right, this is
8	water in the West, and to quote a long-standing maxim
9	of jurisdiction, whiskey is for drinking and water is
10	for fighting. And I know a little bit about both of
11	those, which brings me to where I am today as
12	Attorney General because as you know, Your Honor,
13	this is where I grew up. I know these people and the
14	work and businesses that they do.
15	And this is obviously very important to
16	both states, but it's important to me because I grew
17	up in this area. I worked in places like Lame Deer
18	on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. As Your Honor
19	is aware, we have a home just minutes from the Tongue
20	River Reservoir and the state line. And this is very
21	important to me for a lot of reasons.
22	And Your Honor is certainly you've
23	heard the testimony of people like Mr. Hayes and
24	Mr. Hamilton, and so you, too, understand the
25	importance of these things to people who work for a

1 living and live off the land. 2 So I think it's important to look at the 3 context of what Montana is asking for historically. Certainly the events that led up to the water Compact 5 itself were important negotiations and important actions that were taken, hopefully to avoid the kinds 6 7 of circumstances that we've seen ever since then, and we're now looking at 60 plus years of disputes with the State of Wyoming. And as the Court is aware, 10 it's not just the years of 2004 and 2006 where the 11 violations have been found that are important, but 12 we're looking at a pattern and course of conduct 13 really for more than 60 years that really exemplifies 14 Montana's request for remedies, not just for past 15 actions but for the future, for this generation and 16 generations to come, to finally settle these issues. 17 not just so we don't have disputes, but so Wyoming 18 and Montana can work together in the future for the 19 best interests of all their constituents. 20 So my remarks will be somewhat brief, but 21 I think it's important, Your Honor, in the dialogue 22 that you had with Mr. Kaste and talking about 23 declaratory relief in particular, and the Court's 24 suggestion that perhaps gleaning some of the

directives or guidance, if you will, that have come

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out of the first and second interim reports, and then 1 to put that down on paper to direct the parties in 2 the future so that they avoid these disputes, so they know where they stand, they know what they can and 4 5 can't do. Just as a few examples, you know, first 6 and foremost, what -- we now know, because the Court 7 has told us, that Montana can make a call under the Compact. That's an important step but it's just the 9 first step. But what does Montana need to do before 10 making that call? That's an issue perhaps can be 11 gleaned from the reports, put it into a decree. 12 What -- how must Montana make the call for 13 it to be valid? We know more about that. It needs 14 to be in writing, it needs to go to particular 15 parties. And certainly, how long does Wyoming have 16 to respond to a call? And what must they do in 17 responding to the call? Can they withhold water 18 while they determine, as their engineer has 19 mentioned, whether they think a call is valid or not? 20 These are the kinds of issues that have 21 got us stuck in the past and have caused this kind of 22 problem and grief and consternation, and this is not 23 just a hypothetical. This involves and impacts the 24

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lives of individuals on both sides of the state line.

1 And it really, I think, Your Honor, when we look at affirmative relief in addition to the issue of damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief are not only the norm in these kinds of cases, as Your 5 Honor has mentioned, but it really, really is something that needs to happen in this case in order 7 for the parties to go forward and know and understand what they need to do. 9 And the time is ripe. While there is 10 some, I guess, opposition to not having this case 11 settle now, when we look in the big scheme of things, 12 when we're talking about 60 plus years or perhaps 13 even more when we look at the events leading up to 14 the Yellowstone Water Compact, another seven months, 15 for instance, as was suggested in the parties' joint 16 suggestion, where we go from here in terms of 17 discovery and what have you, seven months is not a 18 long time to settle this in frankly what could be in 19 perpetuity for many generations to come. 20 So Montana would submit, Your Honor, that 21 the time has come to certainly wrap this up. 22 has more incentive to finish this than Montana. 23 believe that there could be and we're open to 24 negotiations to try to settle certain issues. We can 25 still do that. But I think we've come to the

1 realization that politically it's easier for the parties to be told what to do than to try to sell a 2 settlement to their constituents and say, This is 3 4 what we agreed to do, when those constituents may not be happy. And that politically is one of the 5 barriers that makes it difficult to settle a case 6 like this, because, again, as Mr. Kaste said, this is 7 water in the West. So I believe that Your Honor and the Court 9 10 has an opportunity here to create a long-lasting legacy that will serve the people of Wyoming and 11 Montana for many, many years to come, but we won't be 12 able to do it if we leave it here, as Wyoming has 13 14 suggested, and if we don't finish this remedies phase and make sure that we have declaratory relief and 15 16 injunctive relief in a manner, shape and form that's meaningful and fair and really spells out where we go 17 18 from here. So, Your Honor, those are more conceptual 19 20 and 30,000 foot level comments that I would like to I think it under -- where we've gone in just 21 this hearing today underscores the fact that there 22 23 isn't very much agreement and there will be future disputes. And as Mr. Kaste has said, he knows and 24 acknowledges that there will be disputes, and we know 25

1	that there will be shortages of water.
2	With that in mind, the time has come to
3	have very specific parameters set forth, which
4	some of which can be gleaned from the record I
5	believe, but some of which needs to come from further
6	discovery.
7	Mr. Draper will be discussing two points
8	that Wyoming has brought up in their motion, damages
9	and declaratory relief. And Mr. Wechsler will do
10	will talk about injunctive relief and cost. And if
11	Your Honor has any questions of me, I'd be happy to
12	answer those now and or try to answer those now,
13	recognizing that counsel of record knows much more
14	about this case than I do.
15	But again, we appreciate, Your Honor, your
16	attentiveness to this and your commitment. We really
17	do believe that there's an opportunity here for the
18	Court to set the stage to make sure that Montana and
19	Wyoming not only get along but do the right thing for
20	the right reasons.
21	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So let me
22	actually ask two questions. The first one is, as I
23	understand what Mr. Kaste is suggesting, I'm going to
24	paraphrase and probably add in some things that

Mr. Kaste did not say, but my understanding of what

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Mr. Kaste was saying was, you know, you've already 1 said a lot in the two interim reports. The Supreme 2 Court has sided with you on both of those occasions. 3 And if you just leave Montana and Wyoming to actually 4 implement what's in there, we would be able to do 5 that, but if you force us to actually confront some 6 of these issues again in the public staying of a 7 Supreme Court case, we're just going to end up 8 fighting over exactly what -- because right now we're 9 10 all three satisfied. And so I think my question is, I think 11 what you're saying is, Actually, no, we're going to 12 fight unless the Supreme Court basically tells us in 13 a decree exactly the way in which the system should 14 be operated in connection with the issues that are 15 16 before us. 17 MR. FOX: Well, Your Honor, I think there's a difference that needs to be made. 18 know, whether or not we're fighting with the Court, 19 for instance, or fighting with each other, I think 20 it's safe to say, given the history and, for 21 instance, the water under the bridge, if you will, 22 23 that's occurred over the last 60 plus years that there is a pretty good chance, if not a substantial 24 chance, under the current circumstances, without more 25

1	specific guidance in the form of declaratory and
2	injunctive relief from this Court, that there will be
3	disputes, and very likely we will be back before this
4	Court. It may not be these parties or these
5	individuals or it may not be Your Honor, but
6	certainly it will be someone.
7	We would like to avoid that. We think
8	that is avoidable. We believe that this Court can
9	help us fashion the kind of guidance, if you will.
10	Just, for instance, dispute resolution. Under the
11	Compact, as I understand it now, the provisions, we
12	have to have the United States to vote if there's
13	going to be any resolution of a difference between
14	Montana and Wyoming, but they don't historically
15	vote. Can the Court require that they vote? I think
16	you can. And as I mentioned, what does Wyoming do in
17	the interim when we make a call?
18	Now, in the last year or two they've been
19	relatively good to work with, and I think with the
20	Court breathing over our necks, that could be so, but
21	this case does have to come to a conclusion at some
22	point.
23	We don't relish the idea of having further
24	disputes with the State of Wyoming. They're our
25	friends and our neighbor. But we can't settle this

1	without your help, and we think that it's possible to
2	do it. Your idea, Your Honor, of presenting
3	something for us to comment would be acceptable to
4	Montana.
5	Another option that I'm familiar with in
6	my private litigation experience is, as the
7	prevailing party here, Montana could submit to you a
8	proposed consent decree, Wyoming with
9	justification in the form of brief or affidavits or
LO	whatever, with Wyoming having the ability within a
11	certain amount of time to comment on that and Montana
L2	to reply. That would could perhaps save some
L3	work. It might be more expeditious, Your Honor,
L4	although we have every confidence in your ability to
L5	set forth whatever guidance you feel is necessary.
16	But those are options that, again, come from my
L7	experience in civil litigation and that may be
18	helpful to the Court, and Montana is certainly
L9	amenable to doing that.
20	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank
21	you. And second question, which I'm going to ask you
22	the same question that I started out asking Mr. Kaste
23	with respect to the damages issue.
24	MR. FOX: Sure.

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SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And feel free to

1 defer this to Mr. Draper if you want. 2 And that is, again, I can understand why the parties haven't settled yet, but I don't 4 understand why the parties have not been able to resolve the question of damages. MR. FOX: Sure. 7 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And if there's anything you can help me out with on that. 9 MR. FOX: Well, Your Honor, I may have 10 maybe a little more latitude than Mr. Kaste did 11 because I wasn't directly involved in the -- in the 12 negotiations. I was informed, actually, within the 13 last few days that we were unable to come to a 14 settlement. 15 And I think, again, Mr. Kaste was correct 16 in the sense that water is a very important issue. 17 We're talking about farmers and ranchers and 18 municipalities, individuals who have financial stakes 19 in these things on both sides of the -- of the 20 border. It was my understanding that we were charged 21 with the responsibility of having some sort of a 22 global settlement, so at least from my perspective, 23 we were looking at tying things together. And as 24 Your Honor is aware, you can give a little in one 25 area to take a little in another area, so that may

1 have entered into this situation.

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But I think ultimately politically it's 2 difficult in some cases to tell your constituents 3 that you have agreed to something that may or may not compromise what they've had before, which in some 5 cases could have been very, very advantageous to 6 I think the Court -- Your Honor used the word 7 vulnerability. Montana is vulnerable. We are the downstream state. We don't hold cotton, and that kind of imbalance in position and strength has been 10 the problem for 60 plus years. And the only way to 11 fix that, I believe, is for the Court to intervene 12 and give us the kind of prospective relief that 13 14 allows the parties to work together. 15

On the issue of money, I think you're right, it's possible to settle those things. There may -- you know, you've mentioned disgorgement and some of the other things that really are not developed in the record. In the big scheme of things, it's always been Montana's position that the prospective relief is the most important thing here to govern the parties going forward.

You know, given another opportunity, we'd love to sit down and try to settle that. And perhaps one -- I'm thinking off the top of my head, Your

1	Honor, and hopefully my co-counsel in the back won't
2	contradict me, but perhaps one option is for the
3	parties for Montana to work on a draft consent
4	decree while working with Wyoming on settling the
5	damage issue in particular, given the directive
6	perhaps from the from the Court that we actually
7	are going to do it that way, that there will be a
8	consent decree with prospective relief in the form of
9	declaratory and injunctive relief. Montana will
10	suggest what they would like to do. Wyoming would
11	comment. The Court would determine ultimately what
12	further information the Court may need. And in the
13	meantime we try to work out the damages issue in good
14	faith.
15	And correct me if I'm wrong, Your Honor.
16	That really doesn't include the issue of cost,
17	correct?
18	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: That's correct.
19	MR. FOX: So we would need some guidance
20	from the Court on whether or not Montana is entitled
21	to costs, and if so, to what degree and how much, and
22	that might be just as easy as submitting a bill of
23	costs to the Court, with a brief explaining why we
24	think we're entitled to those amounts. Wyoming can
25	again respond. The Court could then determine what

1 parameters it wishes to use to determine what costs Montana might be entitled to. 2 Those are all things that could continue 3 to go on that would streamline and expedite the 4 process and give the Court the information it needs 5 to make a determination. 6 Okay. 7 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Attorney General. 9 MR. FOX: Thank you. SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Mr. Draper. 10 11 MR. DRAPER: Thank you, Your Honor. SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So you've heard 12 my questions with respect to both the injunctive --13 14 I'm sorry -- both the question of damages and also with respect to declaratory relief. And so you're 15 welcome to either start with what you were planning 16 17 on saying or go directly to those questions. MR. DRAPER: Thank you, Your Honor. I 18 will -- with your permission, I'll just make five 19 initial points very briefly, and then go to your 20 21 questions. What Wyoming is asking for in its motion 22 23 for summary judgment is for you to do what the Court refused to do. They didn't -- they did not even want 24 this phase to take place. They didn't believe that 25

1 there was anything necessary other than a summary 2 disposition on damages that it had calculated in 3 dollars. 4 And now it is before you, and we're simply 5 asking for the same relief in terms of summary 6 judgment, asking you to rule as a matter of law that 7 we're not entitled to submit evidence on any of the aspects of remedies that they have mentioned in 9 their -- in their motion. Nothing should be 10 submitted on damages. We should -- are supposed to 11 just take their word for it. Nothing on the form, 12 whether it should be money or water. Nothing on 13 whether disgorgement is appropriate. They don't --14 they don't believe that there is any declaratory 15 relief to which we're entitled, although that was our 16 first request in our initial filing in this case. 17 Our request for the case to be accepted by the Court 18 was accepted, and that is our primary motivation as 19 we expressed right there out of the box. They want 20 to deny that. 21 They say yes, well, there's been some -- a 22

They say yes, well, there's been some -- a couple years where we satisfied the call criteria, and we should leave it at that and deny the primary relief that Montana requested in its initial filing, which was approved as a filing by the Court.

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1	But I'd also like to make the second point
2	that this case was bifurcated by your order. Case
3	Management Plan No. 1, Paragraph 2, reserved the
4	matters relating to remedies to the later remedies
5	phase. So even this evidence that they point to with
6	respect to 7 to 9 or 7 to 15 dollars per acre-foot,
7	some random remarks that came into the record,
8	that that was not within the scope of evidence
9	that we were allowed to discover or present to you.
LO	It's not subject to cross-examination. It's not
L1	subject to countervailing evidence. It's frankly,
L2	as a matter of fact, it's wildly out of sync with
L3	what we've seen in our interstate cases in the past
L4	where the Supreme Court has approved damage relief.
L5	There was we just had the Kansas versus
L6	Nebraska case, where 3.7 million was approved for
L7	around 7,000 acre-feet. That's more like \$52 per
L 8	acre-foot. And these are - obviously these are
L 9	factual matters. They want you to avoid all that,
20	turn a blind eye to it, and accept the random
21	evidence that happened to come in in a phase of this
22	case that was not intended to cover that subject.
23	We feel that that is turning on its head
24	the normal procedure that this Court follows. As you
25	know, the Court is anxious to have a full record in

these cases. We've seen that explicitly set out in
cases like United States versus Texas. We see it in
every reference to a special master. Your reference
directs you to take evidence, such evidence as the
parties may offer and such other evidence as you may
call for. They want a full record here, and if the
parties don't happen to provide it, the master is in
a position to request it, evidence that he believes
needs to be part of the record.

So this -- this approach to original jurisdiction cases, and we've seen it in interstate water cases, is totally contrary to the summary disposition that they're asking you to enter right now. And I would suggest that the Court would be quite surprised if you did accept their motion and it came right back to them.

They were -- they were asked by Wyoming to avoid this whole phase as being unnecessary. And to grant their motion would essentially be to accept their exception to the Court, and return it to them based on much less than a full record.

I would point out that in that regard, the Court -- and Your Honor is probably very familiar with these in recent cases we have been very thorough in entering decrees, or the Court has been very

1	thorough. For instance, I have in my hand the two
2	volumes from the fifth and final report of Special
3	Master Littleworth in the Kansas v. Colorado case.
4	These are the volumes that set out the rules by which
5	compliance will be achieved by Colorado, and it's
6	it's a help to Colorado. It knows exactly what it
7	needs to do and what it doesn't need to do.
8	I would submit that that would be true
9	here, too. Not only not only Montana, but Wyoming
10	also needs to know what it needs to do in the future
11	in order to be in compliance with the Compact.
12	You have set out general principles in
13	analyzing past actions, past hydrologic conditions.
14	As Your Honor was suggesting, those need to be
15	transformed and supplemented so that they in future
16	action can avoid and I would say the merry go
17	round here that we're looking at is if this does not
18	happen, we will be back here on a merry go round
19	every time that as Mr. Kaste has suggested, every
20	time that the hydrologic conditions change we need to
21	come back here. Otherwise it's an advisory opinion,
22	and it's absolutely contrary to the jurisprudence in
23	this area over the years, starting with the Pecos
24	case, which is really our first case where we see an
2.5	attempt to enforce an interstate water Compact And

the Court has been very careful about the remedy

1

2 phase. 3 You'll notice in that 1987 decision in the 4 Texas v. New Mexico, that is talking completely about == well, almost completely about remedies, but 6 there -- it can be in money. The Special Master, 7 Charlie Meyers, assumed that it had to be in water. The Court said, No, it could be in money. But you 9 have to look at that. You have to look at the 10 equities. You have to look at whether payment in 11 water would be the most just and equitable remedy 12 under the facts of that case, the facts of that case. 13 Wyoming doesn't want you to look at these 14 They say it's unnecessary. Just take our --15 take our money, enter a judgment against us. Yes, we 16 violated, this is how much, let's be done with it, 17 and we don't want any more direction as to how to 18 avoid these problems coming up next year, when the 19 hydrologic conditions admittedly will be different. 20 They're different every year. 21 We've also seen in the more recent case, 22 the Kansas versus Nebraska case, treatment of 23 remedies in that case. So the decision that came out 24 in February 2015, after you submitted your second 25 interim report in this case, dealt essentially almost

completely with remedies. The parties were agreed,
yes, there's been a major violation. There were a

few adjustments as to what the amount was, but the
rest of that whole consideration is remedies. And
they want you to skip that in this case.

The remedies that they were considering in that Kansas v. Nebraska case are contained primarily in a couple of volumes. Again, these are on the Supreme Court Web site. The first volume of the final settlement stipulation that gives those rules for how the model is to be used, and then a model documentation volume that actually has the model in the back on a disc, the model code input, output, grass, all this kind of thing, and it provides that if there's any dispute as to what the narrative describing the rules is, that that would be settled by what's in the -- what's in the model that's in the pocket part.

Back in the early days, before computers became as useful as they are today, in the Pecos River case, you can see there, the 1988 amended decree that we've cited, the reliance on a particular exhibit, which I'm holding in my hand here. This is the Texas exhibit that's mentioned in the decree, and it's the — it's the Pecos River Master's Manual, and

it has equations.

2 Well, we all know that equations, it's 3 like computer models, they're set up so that you can 4 handle different hydrologic conditions. It doesn't have to be exactly as it was in the years that the 5 6 Court looked at based on data of inflows and outflows 7 in that case. These are formulas by which you go forward, by which the parties can tell if they're in 9 compliance, and in that way avoid coming to this 10 Court more than absolutely necessary to resolve their 11 disputes. If their dispute is over, such as in this 12 case, when can a call be entered? When is it 13 appropriate? What are the attributes of a valid call 14 here? 15 If we don't know those going in, you can 16 see that next year we're going to be back. And the 17 Court is going to be very disappointed to see us. 18 The Court wants us, I believe, to follow 19 its precedence here. Of course, the facts in each 20 case differ. We're not going to be adopting, I don't 21 believe, a big computer model, and so on, but there 22 are certain rules. When can a call be made? 23 can a call be challenged? What do you have to do if 24 you as Wyoming receive a call? What's the time 25 for -- for you to respond to that? How do you

- respond to it? How do you document it? What kind of monitoring is required?
- Those are -- those are ultimately simple
 things, but if you don't -- if you don't have clear
 rules, it is -- we know these days, just like Texas
 and New Mexico, where the Court says, these states
 have a propensity to disagree if there's room to do
 so.

As you can see, we took extra time while the case was pending before the justices to see if we couldn't, with their strong encouragement that we had in their order, to settle this, at least part of it.

And as Your Honor has pointed out, we couldn't settle any part, including the damages. And that's the situation today.

We tried, but as I think Mr. Kaste had a good phrase, this is western water law. Officials having to justify why they gave in voluntarily, without being required by the Supreme Court Special Master, the Supreme Court itself, as arguably giving away water that they would otherwise be enjoying. And frankly, the -- we've seen a couple of settlements of these interstate cases, but that's very unusual. Normally you cannot settle these things. They have to be litigated for those reasons

- that Mr. Kaste pointed out.
- And so it was a surprise really to me that
- in a couple of cases, where there were strong
- 4 personalities in Nebraska that wanted to go forward
- and reach an agreed solution, that you could do that.
- We also had that situation on the Republic River. We
- 7 had been litigating the Arkansas River for 13 years
- of trial, and we were not anxious, if we didn't have
- ⁹ to, to go through another experience like that. And
- so we -- we did enter into a settlement, but as Your
- Honor may have noticed, the Court has countermanded
- part of that settlement and changed it. So that one
- part of it, without any -- any other adjustment in
- the balance that we achieved in that settlement, has
- found that one part had to be changed, and did so.
- So that can also have a bit of a dampening
- effect on the parties' ability to settle these
- matters.
- So that's -- that's the background that
- we're cleaning up, including this most recent case
- where the Court has taken special pains to emphasize
- its commitment, its authority to do whatever --
- whatever is necessary to protect downstream states,
- which has this inherent geographical vulnerability,
- as the General has mentioned. They point that out

- 1 directly, and they say it is this Court's duty to protect those downstream states and to remind them, 2 those downstream states, of their -- of their duty to 3 4 comply with these compacts. And that's where you get into the 5 remedies. What is necessary to adequately remind 6 downstream states sufficiently of the need to comply 7 with the Compact. And that's where you get into the equitable mix of remedies. You can see even 9 disgorgement was -- was ordered in that case the very 10 first time as part of that what the Court felt was 11 necessary to adequately remind the downstream state 12 13 of its -- of its duties. And it did not -- it did go through what 14 the situation was there, but it did not specifically 15 tie it to any principle of contract law or any state 16 of knowledge, if you could attribute state of 17 knowledge to a state, which we have to do in effect. 18 One thing I would point out here in that 19 context is that they firmly rejected, the Court 20 firmly rejected the notion that Wyoming is pressing 21 here, that contract law alone governs what the Court 22
- go to this replacement number that they've come up

23

can do here. That's their position. You have got to

1 These cases teach differently. The Court has said it's at the apex of its powers to order an appropriate remedy when it is enforcing an interstate Compact, which is both by nature a contract and a 5 federal statute. It's a little bit like light. Sometimes it's like a wave, sometimes it's like a 7 particle. And the Court has to use its judgment, guided by reports of its Special Masters, to 9 determine just how to do that in each case. And to 10 submit that it is a pure contract question, which is 11 the dissenting -- position of the dissenters in the 12 Kansas v. Nebraska case, has been rejected. 13 So those are general points --14 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Mr. Draper --15 MR. DRAPER: Yes. 16 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: -- if I may 17 interrupt you. I'm looking at the clock, so I want 18 to try to be as efficient as possible. 19 MR. DRAPER: Very good. 20 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So the first 21 thing -- and I appreciate your thoughts on 22 Mr. Kaste's thoughts, which is that the Supreme 23 Court's order, basically, when it came back to me, 24 really does not provide me with much information at 25 all with respect to how I should resolve these two

motions. What it does say is that the Supreme Court
has gone out to resolve all the remedies it chooses,
but that doesn't mean that I couldn't decide in this
particular form and fact. Without interim hearings,
I couldn't go ahead and issue, or at least that's not
saying that I'm going to. It's saying I don't think
we know because the Supreme Court basically was
silent on that particular exception.

In the same way, of course, as on the other side, the fact that they sent it back to me without a specific order saying that I have to look at whether or not Montana has a right to fill the reservoir beyond the 32,000 acre-feet means that I shouldn't address that particular issue at this particular stage. As far as I know, the Court was basically silent. They just didn't want to resolve those questions on their own.

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, I understood their order simply to be, number one, rejecting the notion that it not go back for a remedies phase.

That's clear. But otherwise, they are simply entrusting the case now in the remedies phase to your judgment, and they want to have you in the first instance to recommend to them how it should be done.

For instance, on the Tongue River

1 Reservoir, there wasn't any need for you to go beyond 2 the 32,000 acre-foot fill holding that you did for 3 purposes of resolving liability. That's all we were 4 talking about there. So it was -- it was quite 5 understandable and acceptable that you didn't. 6 However, going forward, the situation is 7 different. As we have pointed out in our affidavits, if you compare how much is needed to fill the full 9 capacity, you need -- you go above 32,000 in 10 93 percent of the years, looking at the -- applying 11 that to the historical record. 12 You can also see that when you just look 13 at how many years did -- was more than 32,000 14 acre-feet stored, new water stored in the reservoir. 15 85 percent of the years. That is far more than every 16 other year. It means that next year, the likelihood 17 is very high that more than 32,000 needs to be 18 stored. 19 But right now the 32,000 limit is there. 20 So when we start filling on October 1 and we get to 21 the 32,000, at that point, under the ruling as it 22 stands now, we have -- we do not have a Compact-23 protected right to continue to fill. And in 24 85 percent of the years we would need to do that. We 25 will need to fill beyond the 32,000 acre-foot level.

So today, yes, it's fine that we didn't 1 2 go -- you didn't go beyond the 32,000, but going 3 forward, we can see that not only will it come up sometime, it will come up almost every time. And so 5 you couple that with the admission in the affidavit 6 that was filed by Mr. Tyrrell that, yes, we will in 7 dry years, I can't deny that we might have disputes. And it just goes to point, when there's water 8 everywhere, we don't need a Compact. Who cares? It's when the water supplies get short, and when the 10 water supplies get short, we saw that in 2004 and 11 12 2006, there was a dispute. We were told, You don't 13 have such a right under the Compact. Letters that purport to be calls are ineffective. We will not 14 15 honor them. You don't have that right. There's no 16 violation of this Compact. 17 All those questions can be answered simply for the future going forward. We know that, yes, in 18 those years there was a violation. The order has 19 been entered by the Court based on your 20 21 recommendation, but under the other hydrologic conditions, which are going to be different this year 22 23 and next year and the year after, from 2004, 2006, they know those are going to be different, and under 24 25 Wyoming's proposal we stay on the merry go round of

- 1 coming back to the Court on each new set of 2 hydrologic conditions. 3 This is an impossible way to proceed really, looking at judicial economy, looking at the 5 Court's role in resolving disputes between states. 6 It can only resolve the disputes between states 7 during the time? Is that -- is that fulfilling its 8 responsibilities as the Court itself has stated? 9 don't think so. 10 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. I want to 11 move on to both damages and declaratory relief. 12 let me actually try and ask some very specific 13 questions here, because I asked questions of 14 Mr. Kaste, both with respect to law and facts. 15 think I can -- I think I have a pretty good 16 understanding of the cases there and what they stand 17 for. 18 I have two specific questions, answer 19 specifically if you want and more generally if you 20 can't. The first one is, what would be Montana's 21 view with respect to the possibility of providing 22 water rather than monetary damages? The advantages I
- in connection with monetary damages. And to be

23

24

see are, number one, again we don't have to deal with

a lot of the evidentiary issues I think would come up

honest, I just can't imagine that it would be worth
the discovery and the trial proceedings to figure out
exactly what the damages would be, either in terms of
loss to Montana or benefits to Wyoming, given the
total amount of water that we're talking about here.
So one thing is to avoid those various issues.

- Second of all, it would serve the purpose of disgorgement, because to the degree the water is more valuable to Wyoming than Montana, they lose that water in the future, but it would also make Montana whole because you would get the water that you were shorted before.
- So I see a variety of potential advantages to water. And as I think you said in your briefs, prior to 1987 that was all the Supreme Court talked about, was relief in terms of water, that it was not until the Texas versus New Mexico decision in 1987 that we were talking about monetary damages. So thoughts on water versus monetary damages.
- MR. DRAPER: Well, I think they both have their difficulties. The 1987 discussion in Justice White's opinion on the Pecos River for the -- for the Court was unanimous, I believe. He spent a lot of time addressing that because Special Master Meyers had assumed that he had to order repayment in water.

1	And the Court went into the balancing of equities,
2	that water looks a lot like specific performance, and
3	that requires a balancing of benefits and detriments
4	on both sides of the state line.
5	You know, there's issues in practicality.
6	You know, is it is it possible to obtain water
7	easily in Wyoming that would be sent down? Is it
8	possible to buy water from the Northern Cheyenne
9	Tribe that's already in storage, make it available to
10	Montana?
11	These are all questions that have some
12	some complications. Depending on where the water
13	comes from, you may have to worry about transit
14	losses. There's also the question of timing. If
15	you're going to repay in water, water that you took
16	when the chips were down and everything was dry,
17	everybody needed extra water, and you held onto it
18	upstream, and that's what happened in 2004 and 2006,
19	is it fine just to buy some water and say, Hey, it's
20	available in a year when nobody is is short of
21	water.
22	So you do have some complications there.
23	And we we went into that, there was substantial
24	discovery at trial on the question of money versus
25	water in the Arkansas River case before Special

Master Littleworth. And he made a determination that 1 Kansas's request that it be in money would be favored 2 over Colorado's request that repayment be made in 4 water. So following the recommendations of the --5 or at least the discussion of the principles 6 applicable in the 1987 Texas v. New Mexico decision, 7 the Special Master there ruled that it would be in money, and that was not challenged before the Court. 9 10 If you go to the money option, there are complications there. How do you convert water into 11 That -- there was -- there was a lot of 12 testimony, a lot of discovery, expert analysis that 13 14 went into that very question in Kansas v. Colorado. And this is true in large part in the Kansas v. 15 Nebraska case. But, you know, there were -- there 16 were many -- more than a handful of agricultural 17 economists working on that case at one time. 18 were all sorts of specialists that had to be called 19 in to make that conversion from lost water, shortfall 20 21 deliveries, to cash. And it was disputed on many levels, but 22 the Court ruled and the Master dealt with all the 23 multitude of issues that came up in the context of 24 25 it, trying to figure out how much is an acre-foot of

1 water worth in dollars and cents, and what are the --2 what is the prejudgment interest rate? Should it be 3 the interest rate at which states borrow money? 4 Should it be at the interest rates that farmers are subject to? You know, all these questions had to be 5 6 looked at. 7 And so it was -- it was an analysis that included, and I think this is important, that there 9 were ripple effects of these actions, an extreme 10 state, a disgorged state of water, what effect did 11 that have throughout the lower state's economy. 12 And that analysis of secondary impacts was 13 accepted by the Special Master, as it was in a 14 slightly different form in the Kansas v. Nebraska 15 case, as being part of damages that would be ordered 16 to be paid in that case. 17 So there -- there are lots of potential 18 complications. Wyoming would have you believe, No, 19 it's just pure contract law, and we have a couple of 20 random statements here that we think you should rely 21 Don't accept any cross-examination or 22 countervailing evidence, even though this looks 23 pretty low compared to what -- the cases we've got on 24 record. They state the numbers right there in the 25 Kansas v. Nebraska case. Just accept that and we're

-	7
1	done.
	donc.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So let me ask a second question. So I understand Montana's arguments that at this point the record is not adequate to award monetary damages, to determine what those monetary damages would be. It doesn't mean that I agree with Montana's arguments. That's something I have to decide after this particular hearing, but I certainly understand Montana's arguments.

On the other side of the equation, the parties haven't been able to settle this damages issue, but it cannot, as I say, cannot imagine it would justify all the attorney time, expert witness time, the time of all of the various water users to actually figure out what the monetary damages might be in this particular case.

So I guess the other question I have is that if I decide that in fact Wyoming is not entitled to summary judgment at this particular point in time, is there any way of truncating the damages portion of the case so that we don't end up with six or seven months of discovery and then even a several day trial on this particular question, or am I basically confronted between a choice at this stage of either ruling for Wyoming and suggesting that the Court

1	award the damages calculation Wyoming suggested, or
2	putting all the parties through a very long
3	proceeding figuring out what that number actually is,
4	or whether or not I should award water as the
5	damages.
6	MR. DRAPER: Well, I am truly sorry, I
7	truly regret that we were not able to settle that
8	issue. The fact is it takes two to tango, and it
9	just hasn't been possible at this state.
10	I would I would say, based primarily on
11	the experience in the Arkansas River litigation
12	between Kansas and Colorado, that certain elements
13	can be settled along the way, particularly if the
14	Special Master makes certain rulings about what is
15	appropriate. And
16	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So just to
17	interrupt you there. For example, I could decide
18	that disgorgement was not appropriate. If I decided
19	disgorgement was not appropriate, then you wouldn't
20	have to worry presumably about the about the gains
21	that Wyoming might have had as a result of holding on
22	to that particular water.
23	MR. DRAPER: That's a potential, Your
24	Honor.
25	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And it's just an

- example. I imagine there are probably ones that cut
 the other way also.

 MR. DRAPER: Yes, but there -- really,
- there were a number of instances in that Kansas

 versus Colorado litigation where, although the

 parties were at odds as a general matter, when the

 Master made a ruling on something, then there was an

 opening where we could settle something based on

that, and we did so.

And I -- I think that -- I think that

model is something that could work here. We haven't

been able to settle all of the damages, but if -- if

there's some intermediate direction by the Special

Master as to what he sees as the applicable

principles, for instance, then there may be a window

there to go ahead and settle. And it might just be

part, or ideally it would be something that would

save the parties a lot of time and expense.

question on the damages side. So one of the questions I asked Mr. Kaste was, if you look at the record, the record has these statements from, for example, Art Hayes in which he says, you know, The reason I didn't go out and buy water from the Indians in this particular case was that I simply didn't have

T	the money to pay the Northern Cheyenne for the water
2	rights that it holds.
3	And Mr. Kaste's response to me I think
4	was, in part, the alternative was Montana could have
5	gone out and purchased water from the Northern
6	Cheyenne and provided that to the farmers and,
7	therefore, there was still a failure to mitigate.
8	Any response to Mr. Kaste's suggestion?
9	MR. DRAPER: It's a very novel one, Your
10	Honor, unprecedented in any context that I've
11	experienced.
12	As Your Honor noted, the parties did not
13	know that there was a Compact violation going on that
14	needed to be compensated for, that Montana claims
15	that it didn't know that it was violating the
16	Compact. Certainly we didn't know. We were getting
17	these protestations that we had no rights under the
18	Compact. And under those circumstances where a party
19	says, No, you you're entitled to nothing, there's
20	no violation to mitigate, to then say, once the Court
21	has ruled, Yes, there was a violation, that that
22	the damages, which is an element of that reminder to
23	the downstream state from the upstate stream of its
24	obligations under an interstate Compact to comply,
25	that that should be diminished.

1	Mr. Hayes didn't have the money. The
2	damages in Kansas v. Colorado, and also in Kansas v.
3	Nebraska, were based on individual circumstances.
4	The farmers' losses are what were summed up and
5	accumulated to be the state's losses or the major
6	part of the state's losses. And so in choosing an
7	interest rate, for instance, for the prejudgment
8	interest, the Court adopted a rate that was
9	applicable to individuals, not to the state.
10	So the suggestion that the state should
11	have had the responsibility and suffer diminution of
12	remedies that would otherwise be available to it does
13	not comport with the kind of just and applicable
14	remedy as the Court has said it wants to enter in
15	these cases.
16	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So let me turn
17	to the declaratory relief issue and just ask you a
18	couple of questions there. So first of all, as I
19	understand what Attorney General Fox has suggested
20	and what you've suggested, you believe that the
21	declaratory that any form of decree embodying
22	rules with respect to the operation of the Tongue
23	River should include not only matters that were
24	resolved in the first and second interim report, but
25	second of all, follow your motion on the question of

1	whether or not the State of Montana has a right to
2	fill the Tongue River Reservoir beyond 32,000
3	acre-feet each year.
4	And my understanding is that you also
5	think it should include other forms of of
6	declarations that have not been set out so far? For
7	example, you mentioned, you know, what happens when
8	Montana calls the river? Does Wyoming have a set
9	period of time to to respond to that call? Can
10	you just reject the call and say, Sorry, we don't
11	think you've provided enough information about how
12	you've been operating the Tongue River Reservoir and,
13	therefore, we reject it?
14	So could you help me on that last, as to
15	what type of information you will be needs to be
16	in the decree report. And I'm not asking for
17	specifics. I'm just asking for sort of general
18	categories.
19	MR. DRAPER: Well, I would mention first,
20	we will need to know the extent of the Tongue River
21	Reservoir rate that is protected by the Compact,
22	obviously, but beyond that, we need to know the
23	procedures applicable to calls. When can a call be
24	placed? And under prior appropriation law, any time
25	your water right is entitled to take water and is not

- receiving the water, not receiving the water because
 juniors upstream are taking it, a call is
 appropriate, and that situation arises literally on
- 4 October 1st typically every year.
- If a call were to be put on on October 1st
- and 32,000 acre-feet is stored, is it appropriate
- then for Wyoming to say, Well, you've got your
- 8 32,000. That's all the Court said you were entitled
- 9 to, and the rest of the water is ours, you know.
- 10 So...
- SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So we've got one
- category, which is sort of the Tongue River Reservoir
- rights.
- MR. DRAPER: Right, and when generally
- calls can be put on.
- 16 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay.
- MR. DRAPER: When must they be lifted.
- Some -- some of this stuff should be able to be
- answered very succinctly, I would think, but as long
- as we have that rule -- now, if we -- if we leave
- this case and we don't have a clear definition that,
- ves, you can put -- if you choose, you can put a call
- on on October 1st if you haven't filled to your
- winter fill capacity, which is presently 45,000
- acre-feet, we may get -- we may get a lot of

1 pushback. 2 In fact, Mr. Kaste has suggested that if 3 we try to delineate these things, we're going to have 4 a fight. That's just telling you straight out, we've 5 got issues that need to be resolved, and the whole 6 purpose of this proceeding is to resolve the dispute 7 between the two states. And it will not be resolved 8 if their approach is accepted. And we don't know when we can put one on, when it has to come off, 10 what -- what we can expect that Wyoming has to do. 11 Let's say, two days they've got to shut off all their 12 rights. What are those rights? It would be easy to 13 list those, just attach them to the decree, these are 14 the rights that have to be shut off. 15 Here, you might want to list the --16 another listing the pre-Compact rights of Montana. 17 Those are the rights being protected. Easy to do 18 based on the -- as you say, it is pulling stuff from 19 your first two reports and from the record, and 20 putting them in a decree and saying, These are the 21 principles that will apply going forward. 22 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okav. So let me 23 ask two more questions. The first is with respect to 24 some prior Supreme Court decrees. So if I recall

correctly, you were involved in the Kansas versus

25

1	Colorado case
2	MR. DRAPER: Yes.
3	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: before
4	Special Master Littleworth.
5	MR. DRAPER: Yes.
6	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And I noticed in
7	going through his decree that there was a dispute
8	resolution provision in it that provided first for
9	negotiation between the parties and then actually
10	binding and nonbinding arbitration. And my question
11	is, was that something that the parties had agreed to
12	or was that something that the Special Master decided
13	to do?
14	MR. DRAPER: That is something the parties
15	agreed to. You'll see something you'll see that,
16	and you'll also see a similar provision in
17	Article VII of the final settlement stipulation in
18	the Kansas v. Nebraska case. In that final
19	settlement stipulation it set out a dispute
20	resolution procedure, and that also is by agreement.
21	And my understanding of the Court's
22	thoughts on this is that they don't believe that it's
23	appropriate or even that they have the authority to
24	impose something that's not required in the Compact.
25	They will enforce the Compact according to its terms,

1	but no further. And if the Compact has provided no
2	mandatory dispute resolution process, it is not going
3	to add that requirement to the Compact. As we saw ir
4	the 1983 Texas v. New Mexico decision, it was not
5	willing to change or supplement the terms of the
6	Pecos River Compact.
7	So that's why I think here it would be
8	ideal if the parties could as a part of a decree come
9	to you and say, Well, on that part we've agreed to
10	the following procedure and we ask that you insert
11	that in the decree that you ask the Court to approve.
12	And I think it can work that way, but I don't think
13	that the Court believes that it should be adding one
14	unless it's agreed to.
15	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. And I
16	don't think were you involved in Texas versus New
17	Mexico?
18	MR. DRAPER: Yes, in some form.
19	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So I
20	noticed also in the decree there it was ordered that
21	the parties try to resolve matters with the
22	Interstate Commission to the degree they could. Do
23	you have I know there was all the argument with
24	respect to whether or not the Interstate Commission
25	needed to be sort of a regent figure but also whether

1	or not there should be a river master. There also
2	was an order in there that the parties try to get the
3	Interstate Commission to resolve it. And I was
4	curious whether or not that came about.
5	MR. DRAPER: That was the that's more
6	the area of suggestion from the Court. You know,
7	there typically the upstream state will be saying,
8	Don't worry about it, the commission, it's set up by
9	the Compact to deal with it.
10	Well, it's typically it's not you can't
11	get a resolution out of out of those commissions
12	because there's typically a as a practical matter,
13	a veto vote, but they but there were all these
14	efforts to make I think the Court specifically
15	said if the parties can settle these matters, there's
16	no need for us to revisit that those those
17	agreements. And so they my understanding is they
18	put that in there, but it wasn't - you know, you do
19	what you can, but there weren't any consequences.
20	And, of course, the parties' position was
21	they always tried to settle things through an
22	Interstate Commission.
23	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And so along
24	those lines, so I agree with you that some of the
25	Supreme Court's decisions seem strongly to suggest

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that what the Court does not want to do is create new

2	procedures that are not in the Compact itself.	So
3	under those circumstances, to the degree that M	l ontana
4	is interested, as you suggested, in more inform	nation
5	about, for example, does Wyoming have a set per	riod of
6	time to resolve I'm sorry, excuse me to r	respond
7	to a call? What happens if the parties disagre	ee as
8	to whether or not the call is legitimate?	
9	How does the Court determine how far	it
10	can go in providing those sort of details, and	where
11	it's basically coming up with new procedures th	at it
12	should not add to these compacts?	
13	MR. DRAPER: I see your point. And	I
14	think it the dividing line is what is necess	ary to
15	implement the decision they have made as to wha	t the
16	rights and responsibilities are in the Compact	that
17	it is interpreting and enforcing. So there's b	een a
18	ruling that, although it's not specifically set	out
19	in the Yellowstone River Compact that a call is	
20	necessary in order for Montana to enjoy its rig	hts
21	under the Compact, to protect its pre-Compact r	ights.
22	And so that is a requirement that obviously is	not in
23	expressed terms, but it's set out in the Compac	t.
24	And I think it is the it is natural and cons	istent
25	with these previous decisions to say how that's	going

to be implemented.

Here, we're talking about calls, whether they have been justified, whether they can be refused or have to be honored, this kind of thing. In those other cases that we referred to, it's arguably much more complicated, and the complications are dealt with by -- by computer models. And over the objections of some of the parties, computer models have been adopted.

Take a look at the Kansas/ Colorado case in particular. It was settled as to whether or not to use it in the Republic River case, but in the Arkansas River case between Kansas and Colorado, that was disputed, and in fact most of our trial time I would say was over the model, and that was several days of trial time, and so it was a hotly contested issue.

But here you are adopting procedures to implement the finding of the Court that that Compact applies in that case to groundwater. It found that there was a certain amount of pre-Compact plumbing that was grandfathered into the Compact, but beyond that, all depletions had to be accounted for, and if -- there were disputes between the states as to how that would be implemented.

1	And you can see in computer situations,
2	you get into all those technical hydrologic and
3	modeling terms to get to the point where you have a
4	model that is satisfactory to the Court, sets the
5	rules for going forward as to how its decision is
6	going to be implemented.
7	Here, it looks a lot simpler, and I think
8	it is a lot simpler. We've got to set out some rules
9	for how how Montana satisfies the river call
10	requirement, and how Wyoming satisfies its
11	obligations when there is a call. I would say so
12	there is those procedures, and some of the ones you
13	just suggested. There's documentation issues.
14	Documentation is part of this, so that if a dispute
15	does arise, that things can be accounted for.
16	Typically it will allow the parties to work things
17	out themselves if they're adhering to the rules. And
18	then reporting about conditions that are relevant to
19	the Compact requirements.
20	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So one
21	last question along these particular lines.
22	So going to the notice requirement, the
23	reason why I didn't put it in my second interim
24	report that notice was required was because of the
25	language of the Compact providing that the Compact

1	protected pre-1950 rights under the law of prior
2	appropriation, and I concluded that part of the law
3	of prior appropriation was wishful thought in the
4	law.
5	Does that then suggest that in determining
6	what is appropriate to put into a decree and what's
7	not appropriate to put in a decree, that I need to
8	ground all of the provisions of the decree ultimately
9	in the provisions of the Compact? So a call is
10	necessary, that's part of the law of prior
11	appropriation. As I said, I didn't think the call
12	had to take any particular form because prior
13	appropriation is not dictating a particular form.
1.4	Each state has a different approach to that. So do I
15	need to ground things in the language and meaning of
16	the Compact itself?
17	MR. DRAPER: Ultimately, everything needs
18	to be based on the Compact. Now, as you point out,
19	the reference to the prior appropriation doctrine in
20	Article V(A) pulls in aspects of that doctrine that
21	are appropriate to the compact. And the Court has
22	held that damages can only be awarded on the basis of
23	a violation, if there is a violation, only if a
24	proper call is made and you have decided in two years
25	it was but in other years the requirements were not

1	satisfied.
2	So to set out the general principles that
3	you were just mentioning about not required to take
4	any form, that simply needs to be put in an
5	appropriate provision of a decree, and I would hope
6	that it would set out exactly what is allowable. If
7	there are choices, it could be by letter, it could be
8	by an e-mail. Are each of these permissible, and
9	what kind of confirmation of receipt might be
10	necessary, those kinds of things. I think those are
11	details of how you implement the Court's decision on
12	this on the general principle, and gives the guidance
13	that's necessary for us to follow those principles in
14	the future.
15	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank
16	you.
17	So I notice Mr. Wechsler has been over at
18	the table anxious to get to the questions on
19	injunctions and cost, and I want to make sure we have
20	some time to address that, and also address your
21	motion, which is which is equally important.
22	MR. DRAPER: So with that, Your Honor,
23	I'll give the podium to Mr. Wechsler.
24	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank you

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very much.

1	MR. DRAPER: Thank you.
2	MR. WECHSLER: Good morning, Your Honor.
3	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Good morning,
4	Mr. Wechsler. I'm sorry I've used up a lot of times
5	on those first two questions, but I had more issues
6	with respect I can't speak this morning I had
7	more issues with respect to those first two
8	questions.
9	MR. WECHSLER: I'm not disappointed at
10	all, Your Honor.
11	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Thank you.
12	MR. WECHSLER: Rather than address
13	anything that I prepared, I understand you have
14	questions and I want to address the issues that are
15	important to you. So perhaps it's best that we go
16	directly to your questions.
17	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So I'm
18	going to say that on the injunctive relief question,
19	what I need the most help on is what you see as the
20	standard for whether or not the Court should simply
21	issue a decree that might vary with Mr. Kaste's view
22	that it simply sort of adopts everything that was in
23	the first and second interim reports, to Montana's
24	view that it should be a more detailed decree, but it
25	simply sets out the emphasis on what Montana has to

1	do to call the river, you know, this is the way in
2	which the Tongue River Reservoir rights operate, but
3	it's basically just setting out the rights and
4	responsibilities, versus one that says, you know,
5	Wyoming is enjoined and ordered to comply with the
6	Compact in all its terms.
7	MR. WECHSLER: Your question, Your Honor,
8	is the standard, and I think in Wyoming's exception,
9	they identified the four elements for an injunction,
10	and we don't disagree that that is what applies. I
11	think the only disagreement between the parties is
12	whether the Connecticut versus Massachusetts case
13	applies, which would be, say, a clear and convincing
14	standard, whereas Montana thinks that it's a
15	preponderance of the evidence.
16	And I think as we outlined in the papers,
17	the reason we think that is this is not an
18	equitable apportionment case where that standard
19	applies, it is a Compact enforcement case, all the
20	parties agree that the proper standard for that is
21	the preponderance of the evidence standard.
22	And I would note when we're talking about
23	that particular dispute, Kansas versus Nebraska does
24	talk and provide some guidance on the injunction
25	question, and they did not notably cite the

1	Connecticut versus Massachusetts case.
2	Does that answer your question?
3	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Yes. So
4	that's that's very helpful.
5	And so on the question, then so taking
6	the Kansas versus Nebraska decision, the most recent
7	decision we have from the Supreme Court, they talk
8	about whether or not there's a cognizable danger of a
9	recurrent violation. And so do we then, back on
10	that, need to show that?
11	MR. WECHSLER: Yes, Your Honor, although
12	for the purposes of this summary judgment motion, the
13	burden is obviously on Montana I'm sorry on
1.4	Wyoming to show that not only that they are entitled
15	to judgment as a matter of law, but on that
16	particular question, the cognizable danger question,
17	that there's sufficient facts in the record and that
18	there is no dispute over the the material facts.
19	And one problem that we have here, of
20	course, is there never was any evidence presented on
21	the cognizable danger piece. I'm not exactly sure
22	what Wyoming relies on because when it came to
23	drafting their summary judgment motion, although you
24	had asked them to actually take the time to do that,
2.5	thoy didn!t got out the material facts on which they

So Montana was really at a loss to determine 1 2 exactly which facts for any one of those element. 3 So yes, to answer your question directly, yes, we do agree that the cognizable danger piece 5 applies. I can say a little bit more about what 6 facts we think there are that show that there's at the very least a dispute, but even more strongly we 7 believe shows there is a cognizable danger. And so unless you tell me that you're not interested in 10 hearing that --11 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So let me 12 just then construct a draft section of an opinion and 13 then respond to that, which will get you to exactly 14 the same place. It is that the standard is whether or not there's a cognizable danger of a recurrent 15 violation; that both on the record as well as in 16 17 other proceedings before the Special Master, Wyoming 18 officials have said they will comply with all of the 19 provisions that have been set out in the Supreme 20 Court opinions and the record -- I'm sorry -- and the reports of the Special Master; that there have been 21 22 two disputes since the -- since 2008 -- or I 23 shouldn't say disputes -- there have been two calls 24 on the river since 2008, and in both of those cases

Montana called the river, Wyoming responded,

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1	according to the letters of Mr. Tyrrell; and we have
2	data by determining how much water was at that point
3	stored in the pre-1950 reservoir, as well as making
4	sure that no pre-1950 appropriators got water out of
5	the river, and that ultimately the calls were were
6	ended without any disputes over what the Supreme
7	Court has said and what has been in the reports of
8	the Special Master. And, therefore, no injunction,
9	no injunctive relief is necessary, and furthermore,
10	that, you know, it's fully supported by the Kansas
11	versus Nebraska case, in which the Court said there's
12	no reason for an injunction.
13	MR. WECHSLER: Yes, Your Honor, I think
14	that does get me to the exact same place.
15	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Fair enough.
16	MR. WECHSLER: Let me first address the
17	cognizable danger. Wyoming has discussed this as if
18	this is some very high hurdle, that this is going to
19	be a difficult thing for the Compact to approve.
20	I think the case law bears that that's
21	quite the opposite. In fact, the Court has called it
22	a relatively modest hurdle. Other courts have
23	described it only as recognizable evidence that this

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So -- and in evaluating the cognizable

1	danger, the courts have said you have to look at all
2	of the circumstances. So what circumstances are
3	there here that show that there is a cognizable
4	danger, which serves two purposes. One, we think
5	show that there is a cognizable danger; and two,
6	clearly show that there are disputes over the facts
7	on this particular issue.
8	I think the first thing is you have to
9	look in a historical context. For years Wyoming
10	resisted every single effort to administer and work
11	on this. The states have been constantly at odds.
12	And it was only as a last resort when Montana sought
13	the recourse of a lawsuit in this case that that
14	actually happened, that there actually has been some
15	impact. So you have to consider the historical
16	context.
17	Next you have to consider that every
18	single year Montana is short of water. So a call is
19	necessary on both the reservoir and direct flow
20	rights every single year. And there I'll pause and
21	I'll say, Well, if you look at what the Special
22	Master in the Kansas versus Colorado case and
23	you've referenced the third report, I think, I think
24	this the part I'm referring to is in the fifth
25	report, what the what the Special Master there

1	found persuasive was that Colorado had caused that
2	violation by groundwater pumping, and Colorado was
3	not proposing to stop groundwater pumping, that in
4	fact that taking of water, that exact type of action
5	was going to continue going forward.
6	The same type of rationale applies here.
7	Wyoming is not proposing to stop taking water from
8	reservoirs or direct flow rights, nor is it proposing
9	to stop all post-1950 water uses. And so you have
_0	the exact same dynamics in play there, which as I
_1	said the Special Master in Kansas versus Colorado
_2	found very persuasive.
.3	Next, Wyoming has taken the position in
L 4	testimony in this case, I believe it was on the
L5 _	third-to-last day, the state engineer, Pat Tyrrell,
L6	took the position that it had the right to
L7	unilaterally validate or approve of a call; that is,
L8	without reference to Montana, it's going to make a
L9	determination as to whether or not it's a valid call.
20	That is certainly something that Montana
21	is almost certain to dispute. So if and when that
22	happens, as they have told you it will happen, there
23	again we can see that this is only going to recur.
24	And then I think you referenced the
25	2015 or the past prior two years. But I think

1	if you go back and you look at our exception in
2	our response to Wyoming's exception rather and the
3	appendix to that, it wasn't so smooth in 2015, and in
4	fact Wyoming raised several issues, which Montana
5	thought were entirely inconsistent with the second
6	interim report, even though we were sitting at that
7	time before the Supreme Court on this very case.
8	Once you remove, of course, the very strong eyes of
9	the Supreme Court, now you're now you're in a
10	place where Montana is particularly vulnerable.
11	And then I would also point out, in terms
12	of cognizable danger, that Wyoming, unlike in some of
13	these other cases, most notably Kansas versus
14	Nebraska, and I'll address that case in a moment, has
15	not adopted any new rules and no new statutes which
16	would ensure compliance with the Compact. It asks
17	you to simply rely on the rules it already had in
18	place, but, of course, those rules were in place
19	before and we had the violation.
20	The next thing I would say, and I think I
21	have three more points on this particular question,
22	but the next thing that I would say is essentially
23	what Wyoming is asking you is to believe that their
24	sort of good faith representations, that is, the way
25	the law looks at this, that their voluntary cessation

1	of	the	conduct	is	enough	so	that	there	should	not	be
2	an	inju	unction.								

But courts have been very, very reluctant to believe those types of things. We outline that in the papers. I'll mention a couple here. In fact, the Supreme Court directed courts to beware -- this is a quote, Beware the efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repentance and reform.

They have said that they -- the parties making such protestations such as Wyoming bear a heavy burden of persuading the Court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again. That particular quote is from the Friends of the Earth versus Laidlaw case.

And the Court has also said in the

Concentrated Phosphate case that a statement, meaning
a statement that, Oh, don't worry, we're going to

believe -- we're going to do this in the future, and
this is a quote, "standing alone, cannot suffice to
satisfy that heavy burden."

So, in other words, on the record that we have before you right now, there are significant disputes over fact, and all we have is a statement from Wyoming, which the Court has held in other contexts is not enough to satisfy that burden. So as

- a matter of law, it's insufficient to -- for summary
- judgment.
- I'll also point out that in the Kansas
- 4 versus Colorado case, Colorado argued, quote -- and
- 5 this comes from the fifth report at 105 -- "The Court
- 6 can be satisfied that Colorado has no intention of
- 7 deliberately violating the Compact in the future."
- 8 That was Colorado's argument.
- 9 The Master goes on to agree, Yes, I
- don't -- I believe that they are trying to comply in
- 11 good faith. However, because of the reason I gave
- before, he still found that it was necessary to grant
- the injunction because you still have the same
- 14 dynamics in play.
- 15 You asked about the Kansas versus Nebraska
- 16 case. I think there's some important things to
- 17 understand in the Kansas versus Nebraska case that
- distinguish that. The first is the opinion that Your
- 19 Honor has read goes to great pains to explain that it
- is providing equitable relief, and the purpose of
- 21 that equitable relief is to remind the upstream state
- of its duties and ensure that there's no future
- violation.
- That is what we are seeking with the
- injunction. The declaratory relief we believe is the

most important part of that, and if there were some
robust form of other equitable relief, be it as it
was in that case disgorgement or something else that
the Special Master determines is correct, and all of
that goes to ensuring that this doesn't happen again,
that would satisfy Montana.

The second point that I think is very important in that Kansas versus Nebraska case is Nebraska had put in place, in fact, they had multiple efforts, but by the end they had gone through very significant pains to change the entire statutory scheme in that particular area. And the reason they changed the statutory scheme was all aimed at Compact compliance. So, for example, they put in an entire scheme which allowed for natural resource districts, which gave them certain authority, which was not in place.

And in light of all of that evidence, because again that was at the end of the trial, which included remedies, the Court I think essentially concluded that, Well, it's more than just a statement; it is in fact an entire statutory scheme that is out there so we can see their commitment.

And then finally, you mentioned the two disputes from the past two years. I will say that

1	that came at significant effort and compromise by t	.h∈
2	State of Montana. I do not agree that it was a ver	У
3	smooth process by any means. And from Montana's	
4	perspective, if it showed anything, it was that	
5	disputes are inevitable, and not that they were	
6	that this is going to obviously work going forward.	
7	And in fact, we think what the Court and	l
8	what your role here is is to ensure that there is	
9	relief in place to make sure that we don't ever hav	e
10	to be here again, which as the General mentioned is	
11	something that is behooves both states.	
12	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Thank you. So)
13	that actually answers that questions that I have wi	th
14	respect to Montana's positions on the injunctive	
15	side, and on the cost side, I actually don't have a	ny
16	questions. I've read through all the materials. I	
17	think it's all straightforward, and ultimately it's	а
18	question I have to resolve, but I certainly	
19	understand the arguments of both sides, so unless y	ou
20	have something you want to add.	
21	MR. WECHSLER: I have nothing to add.	
22	Thank you very much.	
23	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Thank you very	

So, Mr. Kaste, I'm sure there's lots of

much, Mr. Wechsler.

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things you want to say. I urge you at this point to 1 only say the things that I've heard on. MR. KASTE: Well, I only want to make a few points, the first of which is I wish we would have had that fight, because I'm pretty sure I'm 5 going to win that. And I think you heard exactly the reason why we're going to fight is, even from 7 Attorney General Fox when he got up to talk, Mr. Draper mentioned the word supplement. Well, we 9 10 need some declarations to supplement what you did in the second interim report. 11 I guarantee you we are going to fight 12 13 about supplementing things that are not in your report. And I don't believe it's appropriate for you 14 to issue declaratory relief that adds onto those 15 things that you've already done. 16 I also heard, from my point of view what I 17 heard was, let's relitigate things that are in the 18 supplemental report and squeeze more out of them. Ι 19 remember very, I think, adamantly asking you to 20 just -- just tell them that when they make a call, 21 22 that it be in writing. I'm pretty sure you heard that from them today. We've come on this merry go 23 round 180 degrees from where we've been in the past, 24

and you said no. And you said -- Mr. Brown made me a

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1	list of things you said in your second interim
2	report, which is he does that, he never talks,
3	he's like my moot life partner, he refuses to talk
4	but you've already talked about those things that
5	they were just telling you about, just as a matter of
6	convenience we pick up on. You said the notice
7	requirements should be applied flexibly, with an eye
8	to its purposes rather than as an exercise in
9	formalism. You see that on Page 49 of your report.
10	You said, Well, the commission could presumably
11	establish a specific procedure specifying or for
12	enforcing Article V(A) that does or does not require
L3	notice. That's on Page 49.
L 4	You said I have a list, and I don't
L5	want to bore you with it because you wrote it, but
16	I've got it looks to me like 10 different things you
L 7	said about the notice requirement in your second
L 8	interim report to drive our conduct. I don't want to
L 9	relitigate that. And like I said, if you start
20	tearing this apart, we're going to fight because
21	we're going to be relitigating things that you've
2.2	already decided.
23	And I'm not going to lie to you, the
2.4	decision is not perfect. There are pieces of it that
25	I would like you to have said more, and I really

1	don't want to fight about it now, and I don't think
2	it does the parties any good to go back and
3	essentially relitigate all of the particulars related
4	to the findings that you made during the liability

phase of this case.

You made decisions and you issued rulings that resolved the questions that were before you. To go farther than that would be a mistake, and it would be inconsistent with the Court's position that they don't render advisory opinions. And when you asked Mr. Draper very specifically, How am I supposed to pick, two days to respond to a call or three days, that's not in the Compact. You're issuing an advisory opinion. You don't have the facts in front of you, you don't have the law behind you, you don't have a Compact that dictates one result over the other.

What you're faced with is a Compact that sets up a mechanism for dealing with these issues. There's a Compact commission. They're supposed to administer this Compact. And when they can't, and only when they can't, we come to you and we come to the Court. And at this point we don't have anything, anything else where we're saying we can't figure this out, we can't work through this problem.

1 Frankly, we haven't given the commission 2 the opportunity to do anything subsequent to the 3 issuance of the second interim report to determine 4 whether or not it's adequate to meet our needs going 5 forward. I think it is. I hope it is. It may not be. And years in the future we may have a dispute that the Compact commission can't resolve, but we 7 don't have one now, and I don't think we should 9 create one under the guise of declaratory relief. 10 Let me say something about a remedy 11 related to water. I brought that up. I'm inherently 12 twitchy about the idea of making a payment in water 13 because it's scary to me that we would have to work 14 through the logistical issues associated with that 15 kind of remedy. The state engineer is a smarter quy 16 than I am, and if that was the Court's order that we 17 make this payment in water, we could figure out how 18 to make that work. 19 The problem, and Mr. Draper identified it 20 in the same way I have, is timing. When do we make 21 that payment? Because, like I said, I could count 22 1359 acre-feet of water that went over the reservoir 23 this year, go ta-da, but that's not fair. That doesn't repay them in the sense that it was supposed 24 25 to repay them for our -- our violation.

1	So if that is the Court's order, we will
2	find a way to make it work. If you find that that is
3	a more sensible and convenient, efficient way to
4	order the relief in this case, we will make it work.
5	And so I don't want to leave you with the impression
6	that Wyoming is completely intractable in its
7	position that money is the easier, more efficient
8	remedy. If you think that that's not true, we'll
9	figure it out. So we leave that to your discretion.
10	And I don't know if you have any questions
11	for me with regard to the injunction. I want to just
12	say just a couple of things. I think, you know, the
13	idea that, one, we don't know what what's supposed
14	to happen in any given set of circumstances, and so
15	on, I think that's not entirely true. For example,
16	how do we know what's a valid call?
17	Well, your report, if you look at Footnote
18	20 of your report, you say, Well, Wyoming would need
19	significant evidence or Montana needs significant
20	evidence to determine the reservoir might not fill.
21	Again, that's their decision to make a call. If that
22	doesn't exist, Wyoming, like every junior
23	appropriator, ought to have the right to say, I'm not
24	honoring your call. I'm looking at the same forecast
25	as you. That's not going to fill.

1	That's part and parcel of our
2	relationship, and that's one of the reasons why this
3	idea that we're going to have a big, fat computer
4	model or there might be some magic mathematical
5	formula that dictates our relationship in any given
6	year doesn't make any sense for us. We have a very
7	unique Compact. Not entirely. I guess there are a
8	couple others out there that adopt the doctrine of
9	appropriation, but they're not these ones. And we
10	have a system with about a million moving parts in it
11	and a hydrologic condition in any given year that is
12	what it is, and that hydrologic condition and the
13	free will decisions made by individual irrigators
14	about whether or not they want to use water now or
15	not makes a huge difference in whether or not we're
16	supposed to respond to a call favorably or not.
17	Not this is not amenable to a
18	mathematical solution because it is, as you know, and
19	we argued often about this being a decision that's
20	made in the specific time, in response to specific
21	conditions, specific actions, and specific
22	requirements that these senior irrigators have when
23	they say, I need my water and I intend to put it to
24	beneficial use if I get it. Then we make the
25	determination and we look to see what's available and

1	who	can	we	turn	off.	. That	may	or	may	not	be	the	same
2	focu	s in	ı ar	ıy giv	ven y	year.							

This isn't that kind of case. And so

we've got the outline of -- of rules and

requirements, responsibilities, that we can use to

make these decisions going forward, but they are

inherently flexible, dependent upon circumstances

that we cannot possibly identify no matter how big

your model is.

And so I think we have more than enough to get us through to complete this case right now without saying more, and that's in large measure I'd like to stick to what we currently have rather than fighting about new things.

I'd say with regard to the -- the request for injunctive relief, I'd point again to the standard, there's no irreparable injury in this case. We can repair it. There's a remedy. They have to earn an injunction. And I understand that it's often been given in these original action cases, but I believe, because I just want to, that the Court looked at the standard when it did that, followed it, and found that the prevailing party earned the injunction that it received because it didn't have an adequate remedy in law, it was susceptible to

irreparable injury, and there was some evidence that
there was a cognizable recurrence. The word escaped
me, about a possibility of occurrence. I presume the
Court followed its own rules and found that to be the
case in every one of those circumstances.

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This isn't those circumstances. And I think that the most efficient, the most beneficial resolution of this case is to end it now. I think we've put you in a position procedurally where you can do that and feel confident that the parties were treated fairly and had a fair opportunity once in here during the course of presentation. But in particular Mr. Draper as it relate, to damages says, Hey, I have evidence that the price is more. I have testimony, I have a document, I have anything to demonstrate that it makes good sense, and that we're forced by virtue of the summary judgment standards to proceed. I didn't hear any of that. I didn't hear, I have evidence that mandates that we have additional fact finding in this case.

We don't need additional fact finding. It wouldn't do us any good. We'd be right where we are here today. As a result, we've requested you grant our motion for summary judgment, enter a judgment or decree or whatever you want to call it, and -- and

1	put an end to these proceedings without without
2	forcing the parties to do more and undertake
3	additional costs and expenses.
4	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank
5	you, Mr. Kaste.
6	MR. KASTE: Thank you.
7	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. So I know
8	it's noon right now, but we're going to finish before
9	1:00 because I've assured some people that we are
10	going to, and knowing the questions I have on
11	Montana's motion, it will not actually take a long
12	time in terms of argument. Would people like a
13	5-minute break? Yes, okay. We'll take a 5-minute
14	break, but no longer than 5 minutes.
15	(Recess taken.)
16	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Why don't
17	we go back on the record at this point, and we are
18	now going to be discussing Montana's motion for
19	summary judgment on the Tongue River Reservoir. And
20	to try to make this maybe a little bit more
21	efficient, Mr. Draper, let me start out by telling
22	you, obviously, the two issues that I'm most have
23	most interest in.
24	MR. DRAPER: Great.
25	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: The first

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1	question is, what type of a standard should I be
2	using in deciding whether or not I have to address
3	Montana's rights in the Tongue River Reservoir to
4	fill it beyond 32,000 acre-feet. And then the second
5	question is whether that standard is what the facts
6	show in the record at the moment.
7	And let me just give you some additional
8	thoughts on those. So first of all, with respect to
9	the standard, one possible reading of the various
10	Supreme Court opinions that have been cited to me is
11	that, in addition to deciding that in fact there's an
12	overall case or controversy, and there clearly is
13	here or else we wouldn't have gotten this far in this
14	particular case, that I also need to determine that
15	any particular issue that I'm going to address has to
16	be more than hypothetical or abstract, and that,
17	using the language in the Los Angeles versus Lyons
18	case, 1983, there has to be some suggestion that this
19	is the real posture that the parties are confronting.
20	In the City of Los Angeles versus Lyons
21	case, as you recall, the big question there was did
22	the plaintiff in that particular case have standing
23	to seek injunctive relief even though the Court
24	concluded that in fact there was a case or
25	controversy there, they conclude there was a separate

1	question as to whether or not the plaintiff had
2	standing to seek injunctive relief.
3	And analogizing here, the argument would
4	be that I just can't address any question the parties
5	raise with respect to the Compact. I have to
6	actually conclude that there was some reasonable
7	prospect, as I say, I just use the term real and
8	immediate but seeking guidance on what the actual
9	standard is, that there is some reasonable prospect
10	that this is going to be something that the parties
11	are going to confront. So that's a question on the
12	standard.
13	The second question then goes to the to
14	the facts in this particular case. And there I think
15	reading the facts in as favorable of a light for
16	Montana, that they are basically that, you know
17	I'm just going to call out some particular facts
18	because I realize that there was a lot in your favor,
19	but the ones that strike me as most convincing is
20	that if you look at five of the nine years in which
21	we have data since the reservoir was expanded in
22	1999, in five of those nine years Montana actually
23	did store more than 32,000 acre-feet in the
24	reservoir. It wasn't a matter that they could have,
25	they actually did store more than 32,000 acre-feet of

1	water in the reservoir.
2	And that even in 2006, a year in which I
3	concluded that we didn't have to address the question
4	beyond 32,000 acre-feet in order to find that Montana
5	was damaged, I was able to reach that conclusion only
6	by a small hair because in fact Montana in that year
7	stored 31,414 acre-feet.
₿	And so just sort of looking at the record,
9	those are the two things that I found on Montana's
10	premise were most convincing that, yes, this is
11	probably an issue that the parties will confront in
12	the near future.
13	So anything you want to add to those
14	thoughts would be appreciated.
15	MR. DRAPER: Okay. To look at those in
16	order, the real and immediate controversy or
17	question, point, I think we have taken pains to show
18	in several ways that this that we have an
19	immediate controversy right now, today, because we
20	are looking at the probability that we will need to
21	store more than 32,000 acre-feet in the future.
22	And it's almost overwhelming because the
23	chances, given the statistics that you cited and the
24	rest of the information in those affidavits, which is
25	totally based on the record in this case, it's not

it's not just 10 years down the road we would have a 1 dispute, which I think in itself would be sufficient. 2 We don't want the state coming back every 10 years to 3 get things resolved. The Court has got a lot of 5 other important things to do. So here we have, it's very likely that 7 next year we will have to come back and the following year and the following year. It's -- it's overwhelming that we have -- we will have a dispute 9 here, and not later but sooner. 10 So I think the -- we satisfy that 11 question, is there an actual controversy as to this 12 part of the case. And I think it comes under that 13 holding in the Oklahoma versus New Mexico case, where 14 the opinion by Justice White of the Court is that 15 when a case is before it, it has a duty it feels to 16 resolve every issue before it. And this is not only 17 18 an issue, it's an issue that will inevitably come up and it's imminent. So I think it satisfies the real 19 and immediate question very soundly. 20 And the facts that you point to are quite 21 convincing in that regard. Five of the nine years 22 since -- since the expansion of the reservoir is over 23 50 percent of the time just in that short a period. 24

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And as you point out, in 2006 it missed it by a few

1	acre-feet, a few hundred acre-feet in needing to know
2	whether more than 32,000 acre-feet is something that
3	we can call for.
4	And typically you call if your if your
5	water right is not satisfied, you're entitled to
6	call. And until the reservoir is up to its limits of
7	storage, we should be able to call, but if we can
8	only call to the extent of 32,000 acre-feet, partway
9	through the year you're likely to hear from Wyoming,
10	You've filled to 32,000, we've been watching, so
11	don't don't think about continuing to call. We
12	don't recognize it after this point, relating to
13	post-'50s stored and diverted. The Court only held
L4	you have 32,000, that's the least, they didn't go
15	beyond that, and you have no leg to stand on for more
16	than 32,000.
17	And yet I believe that the undisputed
18	facts show that we do have the right under the prior
19	appropriation doctrine, which was incorporated in
20	'85, to fill to the pre-Compact capacity of the
21	reservoir, which you held was 72,500 acre-feet.
22	Now, the actual reservoir is larger than
23	that by about 6700 feet at the moment because of that
24	enlargement. But in a sense, the reservoir rarely
25	goes down to a level less than 6700 acre-feet. That

1	72,500 foot limit doesn't prove to be limiting in all
2	but very unusual circumstances that we haven't seen,
3	but I think it's an appropriate limit. That's what
4	our capacity was pre-Compact, and if the reservoir
5	were drawn down for whatever reason all the way, for
6	instance, at that point we wouldn't be able to fill.
7	If you had if you had no carryover at all for
8	whatever reason, if you need to drain it for repairs,
9	how much can you put in that first year starting from
LO	zero? The answer in our view is only 72,500. We
L1	can't go all the way under those circumstances. And
L2	yet those are very unusual circumstances.
L3	In essence, it is correct to say that
L4	we're asserting the right here. We think the record
15	is clear and complete on it that we have the right
L6	under the prior appropriation doctrine and the
L7	pre-Compact priority that we'll be protected by the
18	Compact up to the right to fill 72,500 acre-feet in a
19	single year.
20	We always add the phrase less carryover
21	storage, but that's kind of a redundant phrase. If
22	there is if there's already water in the
23	reservoir, which is very typical, we don't actually
24	go up to that right, but that is the right. The
25	prior appropriation doctrine recognizes, and it's

Τ	appropriate to have it entered as a matter of summary
2	judgment at this time.
3	And I would point out there's quite a
4	difference between asking for summary judgment on
5	something which was within the issues litigated in
6	the liability phase of this case, and the water
7	rights associated with the Tongue River Reservoir was
8	central to that, as Your Honor has pointed out in
9	respect to the Court, and you have devoted many pages
10	of your report to setting out those facts, analyzing
11	them, up to what you determined was necessary in
12	order to resolve liability issues.
13	Now, as I mentioned before, we need to
14	fully resolve that dispute between the states because
15	Wyoming is not willing to recognize a right beyond
16	32,000 acre-feet.
17	Now, let me encourage you to ask other
18	questions. I had just a small handful of points to
19	make but I don't want to intercede in this.
20	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: No. I was going
21	to say, I read the motions, so if there are any
22	points that are new, feel free to add them at this
23	time.
24	MR. DRAPER: In fact, I've covered several
25	of those already. I would point out that Wyoming

itself, under -- its witnesses under oath have stated 1 that it is necessary to resolve this question of the 2 full extent of the reservoir right. They're now 3 taking a different position, but they have put in that testimony, and we believe that that is 5 absolutely true. I'll just close by saying, because I think 7 we did cover all the points I had in mind, that 8 9 resolving the issue in this way on summary judgment is a judicially efficient way to resolve the issue. 10 It's possible it could be left open for further 11 proceedings, but I don't believe it's necessary. 12 parties were invited to present the evidence that 13 they had on this issue. They did. A record was 14 made. You have analyzed that record. I think it is 15 ripe for resolution by summary judgment. 16 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So on that last 17 point I'll just mention, in thinking about various 18 possibilities to this particular motion, I thought 19 about the question if this could be one to leave 20 jurisdiction open. The problem is, all of the cases 21 I've seen in the past, I think the Supreme Court has 22 23 wisely decided only to leave the jurisdiction open if you know that within like a year or year and a half 24 or something of that nature it can resolve the 25

1	question. And here this is an issue that presumably
2	could come up a year from now, it could come up four
3	or five years from now. So I don't think as a moral
4	situation the Court leaves these issues open.
5	MR. DRAPER: I would agree, Your Honor. I
6	think, based on the prior cases, that the Court would
7	want to resolve this issue. It has the law and facts
8	available to it, and it will create a difference in
9	actually achieving its overall goal of resolving the
10	controversy existing today between the states.
11	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Thank you.
12	MR. DRAPER: Thank you.
13	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Mr. Kaste, as
14	you're walking up here, basically I'll say a few
15	questions. What do I need to decide in determining
16	whether or not to resolve this particular issue? And
17	do you have any thoughts on what the record currently
18	shows regarding the prospect of this issue coming up?
19	MR. KASTE: Well, I don't know if this
20	issue will arise in the future, and neither does
21	Montana. What I heard from Mr. Draper was
22	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: You might want
23	to talk a little louder.
24	MR. KASTE: What I heard from Mr. Draper
25	was a hypothetical. Maybe in the future we'll fight.

1	Maybe the reservoir will be drained, and maybe we
2	won't know how to figure it out, and maybe we'll be
3	back in front of the Court.
4	You're not here to decide maybes. You
5	made a decision, a very specific decision in the
6	second interim report that said, I don't need to
7	decide this issue in order to resolve the claims
8	before me. And not one thing has changed from the
9	moment you made that decision.
10	There was a case and a controversy brought
11	to the Court's attention. It related to 2004 and
12	2006 ultimately. You decided what needed to be
13	decided in order to resolve that case or controversy,
14	and there exists no further case or controversy.
15	There exists speculation that there is a potential
16	for a future case, but you can't decide a future
17	case. The Court can't decide a future case. The
18	Court recognizes that it doesn't issue advisory
19	opinions and it doesn't decide hypothetical
20	questions, and that's where we are with this issue.
21	We've we've done all that needed to be
22	done, and we're now we're exactly in the on a
23	merry go round where Mr. Draper and I have switched
24	positions, and I'm telling you I don't want you to
2.5	decide this in spite of the fact that I previously

1	asked you to decide that. See how weird this has
2	gotten? Each of us at one point or another has taken
3	the exact opposite position based on the changed
4	circumstances. You've made a ruling. Both parties
5	have adjusted. And our adjustment is to say, the
6	best interests of this case is to stop.
7	You cannot decide an issue merely because
8	two parties might agree that it would be great if you
9	did. That doesn't establish a case or controversy,
10	because the parties think it would be beneficial to
11	them to have this question decided before a case or
12	controversy arises. That's sort of the essence of a
13	declaratory you know, the limitations on
14	declaratory judgment, is you can't have two people
15	walk in and go, We'd like you to answer this
16	question, Court. The Court will come back and say,
17	whether it's the Supreme Court or another federal
18	court, it doesn't confer jurisdiction upon me under
19	Article III, the fact that we think it would be nice
20	to know the answer in advance of a case or
21	controversy.
22	We're bound here by the Constitution,
23	and Mr. Brown keeps pounding with his finger
24	saying, Nothing has changed. And he's right about
25	that. Not a darm thing has changed since the second

interim report that would make it necessary to decide this question now.

2.4

should ask this question but I think I have to. Do the parties even agree at this point as to what the second interim report actually said with respect to the Tongue River Reservoir? And I ask that because in your opposition to Montana's motion, in trying to demonstrate that in fact it was a hypothetical issue, you said given the current winter storage operations on the Tongue River Reservoir, Tongue River Reservoir will have 50,000 acre-feet of water in it and, therefore, it's not really going to be an issue as to whether or not Montana can store more than 32,000 acre-feet at that particular point.

Montana in its reply said, No, that's not the way in which we actually do this. Instead you start out with what the carryover is as of October 1st, and then Montana can store another 32,000 acre-feet beyond that.

One of the things I find quite interesting about that is the way that Wyoming at least sort of set out the hypothetical in its motion, it was a way of looking at the facts that benefited Montana, but then Montana's interpretation of what I said

1 basically was one within it that Wyoming may be 2 demonstrating once again a merry go round complex. 3 MR. KASTE: It's an apt metaphor today, isn't it? SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: 5 Yes. 6 MR. KASTE: Well, there are distinctions 7 to be made here between -- and I think you've heard 8 this come through Attorney General Fox and myself at 9 various points in the day. The positions that the 10 parties take in the course of this litigation is one 11 thing, and the way in which Mr. Tyrrell and Mr. Davis 12 comport themselves are different at times. And we 13 have behaved in a way that has been pragmatic. 14 that's what I think Wyoming is trying to point out in 15 its articulation about how it has worked over the 16 past couple of years. 17 Montana and Wyoming have collectively, 18 without regard to what the number is in your second 19 interim report, have behaved in a way that 20 pragmatically led to the reservoir filling. We were 21 fortunate in these years that there was enough water 22 that that could happen without getting really wound 23 up about it. Wyoming responded to Montana's calls 24 and took what we believe to be and I think by all 25 accounts were appropriate actions with regard to

1	their reservoirs and rights. Montana took what we
2	believed to be very reasonable reservoir operation
3	actions over the course of not just the spring but
4	during winter as well, and that included deviating
5	from their operations guidelines for the reservoir to
6	reach this somewhat higher level, which as you know
7	is is still in its exploratory phase for the
8	reservoir operator.

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But pragmatically we got to a point through both of our actions where we were able to handle the call and fill the reservoir. And at the end of the day both parties are best served by physically filling Montana's reservoir.

so is it -- is it a big deal to know what the number is? I don't know that it matters. What matters is filling the reservoir and then putting that water on Art Hayes' crop. And the people responsible with implementing your decision have done that and done that well over the course of the last two years. And I'll grant you that we haven't had the worst possible two years that we could have, but the positions we take here and the actions of our -- of our administrators on the ground are different. I tend to think what they do is way more important.

1	possibility always that Wyoming could recede and say,
2	Under these circumstances you're you're done,
3	32,000 acre-feet. Montana could say, No, no, our
4	right is larger. And we could find ourselves in
5	front of a Court again in the future at some point in
6	time based on a set of facts that don't currently
7	exist.
8	Our point is not that that is an
9	impossibility, but that that case hasn't yet come
10	before you. And if it hasn't come before you, you
11	can't go out on a limb and start making rulings in
12	the abstract. And maybe that means that we're here
13	next year. I don't know. That's the way the
14	Constitution works, though. I didn't write it, but I
15	think that's where we are.
16	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: The problem
17	here, at least in part, and I don't expect you to
18	provide me with an easy answer, what I have to do is
19	I think, based on all the evidence, how best to
20	resolve this and what recommendations to make to the
21	Supreme Court.
22	But both sides are saying, Help us off the
23	merry go round, but I think Montana thinks the merry
24	go round is the lawsuit, and that we just you
25	guys, as long as this case remains alive, you're just

- qoing to continue to litigate everything. Well,
- that's true, but I think Montana wants to get off the
- litigation merry go round and assumes everything will
- 4 be fine after that.
- 5 MR. KASTE: Wyoming.
- 6 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And Mr. Tyrrell
- 7 has affidavits that are basically saying, Hey, we can
- 8 resolve these things, just in the litigation so that
- 9 we can sit down and resolve them, whereas Montana I
- think is saying, It's not just the litigation. It's
- our relationships generally over the Tonque River is
- the merry go round, and we're never going to be able
- to resolve all these various things until the Supreme
- 14 Court helps us by actually enunciating some basic
- rules, and that's how we get off of the merry go
- round, and those two requests are inconsistent.
- 17 And I have Mr. Tyrrell saying, Everything
- is great once we get out of Court, and I have
- 19 Mr. Davis saying, Well, it's not all that great and
- 20 we have all these various issues that we still need
- 21 to resolve.
- MR. KASTE: Well, let me answer it this
- way. One of those things is within your power to do
- and one of them isn't. And you're limited by Article
- 25 III and the Court is limited by Article III dealing

1	with the litigation, and to get us off that merry go
2	round. You don't have the power to sit us down like
3	a parent and two children and say, You're not leaving
4	here until you shake on it, or or whatever the
5	resolution might be.
6	Your role here, unfortunately, and the
7	Court's role is necessarily limited, and you can help
8	us on one side of this equation but not the other,
9	and to step outside of that role would be a mistake.
10	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Two comments on
11	that. The first is, is that ultimately what I need
12	to do is to issue a report to the Court on what the
13	law is and how that law then applies to the facts
14	that are set forth. And as I've already set out, you
15	know, I think both of the two sides have done a good
16	job helping enunciate what the law is here and what
17	the facts are.
18	The second thing is, you know, that it
19	will be nice to have a sense that what the Court is
20	doing is actually being helpful in this particular
21	context. And I guess in that connection, you know, I
22	think one of the things I hear from Wyoming is, don't
23	do anything more, and Montana is saying, do a lot
24	more.

25

I obviously at this stage will do only

1	what the law provides, but I guess I also would urge
2	both parties that if there is anything else that this
3	Court can do to help on these issues, hopefully you
4	can come to an agreement on those and suggest them.
5	I don't think there is. Hence, here I am right now,
6	but I would urge the parties to do that.
7	MR. KASTE: I guess I would reiterate what
8	I said before. There are there are
9	people of good faith on both sides of this issue, and
10	both of them are telling you, You're going to have to
11	make us do this, not because we're the kind of folks
12	that can't get along but because that's the reality
13	of the situation. And the best thing the Court can
14	do for both parties is to resolve the issues and
15	write us an order that puts this thing to rest in the
16	most efficient and fair way.
17	It's not it's not like we haven't tried
18	to sit down and talk through these things. There are
19	fundamental institutional problems that we're both
20	incapable of resolving, to all of our I think the
21	people in this room, we're not thrilled that that's
22	what we have to report to you, to report to the
23	Court. That's not consistent with what we generally
24	do as lawyers. We try to solve problems. And yet
25	the only solve the only resolution to this problem

Τ	has to dome to us from the Court. So we need we
2	need decisive action, and our view is that the sooner
3	the better.
4	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And again, I'll
5	just I'll repeat this, which is that the issues
6	that are before me, those need to be resolved on the
7	law. There are a variety of issues that are not
8	before the Court and I think both sides agree that
9	the Court cannot sua sponte take on itself. So, for
10	example, the Supreme Court cannot decide, because
11	there's a dispute resolution approach, to what
12	happens if Montana and Wyoming disagree on an issue
13	which is not before the Court here.
14	But in prior cases the parties have been
15	able to come together and say, Well, in addition to
16	what the Court is deciding, there are some things
17	that you can help us do in the future, and it would
18	be great to embody those in a decree.
19	And one of the things that I'm suggesting
20	is, is that in addition to just the general
21	negotiations, it might be useful for both sides to
22	think about whether or not it would be something both
23	sides can agree on that would be a way of avoiding
24	this ever coming back to the U.S. Supreme Court
25	again, which I think is everybody's fervent wish,

including the Supreme Court's. 1 MR. KASTE: Well, I think I can speak for 2 Montana as well, we'll make every effort, recognizing 3 our limitations. 4 SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Understood 5 entirely. So thank you, Mr. Kaste. 6 7 Mr. Draper. MR. DRAPER: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a couple of points. We have heard today reiterated 9 that Wyoming believes that it can determine whether a 10 call is valid, and we have seen in the context of 11 this motion to enter summary judgment on the Tonque 12 River Reservoir that there is a glaring need to 13 determine whether a call is valid once 32,000 14 acre-feet have been stored. We believe the record is 15 clear that, yes, to the extent of the original 16 pre-Compact size of the reservoir, 72,500, there is. 17 Wyoming does not agree with that. It made that very 18 clear in their papers. And they want to keep it that 19 20 way. We do not believe that the Court has 21 addressed this particular issue that you adopted in 22 the second interim report, and we believe that you 23 need to go ahead and address that issue now. 24

25

As to the actions in the last two years,

1	obviously the parties, they're walking on egg shells
2	while this is before the Supreme Court, and you can't
3	use that as a guide as to whether there's a dispute
4	or not. We we can see black and white that there
5	is a dispute here today, and it will arise very
6	shortly. It's not necessary that it arise in the
7	next year or two, but this one will. And so it's an
8	urgent need that we have here. And we as plaintiff
9	want to see this case come to the proper conclusion
10	just as soon as possible. That that's a typical
11	desire of a plaintiff. We don't want it dragged out.
12	We don't want it stalled. We would like the relief
13	that we're entitled to entered as soon as possible.
14	So we're we're very motivated to do
15	this quickly, efficiently, and part of that is to
16	achieve an order of the Court that will minimize as
17	much as possible the chances that we'll be back here
18	in a short time.
19	So with that, I think unless you have
20	further questions
21	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: I guess the only
22	question I have is I actually want to ask Mr. Kaste.
23	Other than what's on the record in terms of the two
24	of you, is there any understanding as to whether or
25	not the parties agree on actually how you calculate

1	the 32,000 acre-feet storage that the second interim
2	report provided that Montana was entitled to?
3	MR. DRAPER: Well, as we pointed out in
4	our brief, they seem to misunderstand what you ruled.
5	You were very clear about it, and the 31,414
6	acre-feet that you mentioned earlier, that's
7	that's the amount that came in in that year starting
8	October 1. They seem to think, Oh, we had 50,000, as
9	an example. It was an improper example, but just if
_0	you had 50,000 in the reservoir, it doesn't mean you
1	get to put 32,000 in.
_2	Both states under the prior appropriation
13	doctrine count the storage right from the beginning
_4	of the fill season, which is typically at the end of
_5	the prior irrigation season, here it's the beginning
L6	of the Compact year or water year set out under the
L7	compact, October 1. And in Wyoming they issue
18	notices if in discovery they showed notices that
9	they issued to reservoir reservoirs that, Now
20	you've got to start filling, and we're going to count
21	everything that you don't fill against your right.
22	They there's no disagreement about that
23	principle. They just seem to misunderstand it, and
24	this is the kind of misunderstanding, us pointing it
2.5	out was you can say well it doesn't amount to our

1	benefit to point that out. What amounts to our
2	benefit is to be clear. Ambiguity is going to work
3	against the downstream state every time. If there is
4	a propensity, if there is an ability to disagree, and
5	when you leave things uncited like this or confused,
6	that's where the propensity of these states to
7	disagree will come up again.
8	As we've seen over the last 60 years,
9	there have been problems, and they have none of
10	them have been resolved until now. And the Court had
11	made through your efforts primarily, has made
12	tremendous progress, but there's a part of the job
13	that still needs to be done.
14	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. Thank
15	you.
16	MR. DRAPER: Thank you.
17	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So let me make
18	some final comments, and then I want to actually
19	phrase another set of issues that have arisen for me
20	with my actually Stanford faculty have.
21	So first of all, I do think there are a
22	few things that the parties appear to agree on today.
23	One is that water in the West is different; that
24	water in the West, it is a resource unlike any others
25	and obviously leads to significant and frequent

1	disagreement. The second is that both sides want to
2	get off of the merry go round, and hopefully whatever
3	the Supreme Court does on this particular case will
4	help you on that particular front, because otherwise
5	both sides are in strong disagreement on exactly how
6	the Court can best help you on that particular issue.
7	And again, my view is that the Court's principal role
8	here is to resolve the matters that are before it.
9	I will probably at this point, I'm hoping
10	to get a draft opinion back out by September 1. I

to get a draft opinion back out by September 1. I don't think it's going to be any sooner than that based on my calendar. I would really strongly encourage both sides, as I've always done, to continue to negotiate during that period of time, in particular to see whether or not there's any way that you can resolve the damages issue. I understand it. I strongly understand Attorney General Fox's issue that frequently it is easier to resolve one issue when it is being resolved along with a variety of other issues.

And the more specific you get on what you are trying to settle, sometimes it becomes more difficult. But at the same time, that struck me as an issue from the very outset the parties should be able to settle. So I would ask the parties to confer

again with respect to that particular issue and see

whether there's any way of resolving it, and if there

is prior to September 1, please let me know.

I also would encourage both sides to begin

to think about whether or not, in addition to what

is -- what the Supreme Court will decide to enter in

a decree as part of this original jurisdiction matter

based on the law of the Supreme Court and the law of

the case, whether there are any other types of

provisions that you can mutually agree upon to

include in that decree that would help you moving

forward.

I am very pleased to see that the last two calls that Montana issued were resolved as well as they were, and I realize, as Wyoming -- I'm sorry -- as Montana points out, that it wasn't necessarily smooth, that there were issues that came up. But nonetheless, I'm pleased to see that, but I also recognize that once the Supreme Court actually resolves this case, that there might be various issues, such as ways to resolve various disputes and particular processes, that it would be useful for both sides to have in the group, that the Court would not order on its own, but that again both sides would see as beneficial, and I would encourage the parties

to be thinking about that.

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You do not need to resolve that at the 2 I would think that would be an issue to 3 resolve in terms of what the final decree would look like, and I do not plan to make a determination of 5 that as part of this opinion. I will resolve 7 Wyoming's motion, but I will not actually come up with a decree as part of this. I will probably submit I think a decree that has more detail is 10 appropriate. I will probably set out a process for 11 doing that. And I appreciate, Mr. Fox, your 12 suggestion that that might be something that the 13 parties initially take on rather than having me try to turn my hand to that issue. So -- but it is 14 something that I think it would be valuable for the 15 16 parties to be thinking about and discussing in the 17 meantime.

So again, I will plan to have an opinion hopefully the beginning of September on the two motions that are before me, but I would, number one, ask the parties if you would confer once again on settlement, seeing in particular whether you're able to settle the damages issue; and second of all, that they begin to think about whether or not there might be conditions that would be valuable to put into and

1	include in an award, future disputes ending up at the
2	Supreme Court rather being resolved in an economical
3	and efficient manner.
4	So that's thoughts of moving forward on
5	the two motions that are before me right now. Any
6	questions or thoughts on that?
7	Okay. Then let me bring up the issue that
8	I have as a faculty member at Stanford, and this is
9	something that I would appreciate the parties
10	discussing and acting on as soon as they can.
11	So Stanford has something in September
12	which they call Sophomore Option. It is part of
13	sophomore college, and basically for three weeks,
14	there's two or three faculty members who work
15	intensively with a group of sophomores on a really
16	interesting issue. And one of the great things, it's
17	the only course they take in September and so
18	frequently we will do field trips.
19	I did a great trip like this five years
20	ago when I taught Western Water Policy while rafting
21	the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon.
22	Probably the best course I've ever taught, and we
23 =	stopped every day and we hiked down and talked about
24	western water issues, and then we'd raft on some
2.5	more

1	This year I am co-teaching a sophomore
2	college on natural resource issues on Native American
3	lands. And as part of this course, we're going to
4	have a field trip, and we're going to start out going
5	up to visit some of the Coastal tribes in Washington
6	and talk about some fishery issues.
7	Then we're going to take a train to
8	Glacier in Montana. And we're going to meet with
9	representatives of the Blackfeet Reservation,
10	Flathead, and we're going to come down and meet with
11	the Crow.
12	So here come the two issues that I would
13	appreciate your comments on. The first is that, I
14	think it would be really valuable for me also just to
15	talk to them about how they deal with their resource
16	issues. We're going to be down there, we're going to
17	be visiting with the Crow, and so I think that would
18	be very useful.
19	If we do that, I will not take the lead in
20	contacting anyone on the Northern Cheyenne
21	Reservation. We will not talk about any issues that
22	have any relevance to this particular case. But
23	given that the Northern Cheyenne are Amicus in this
24	particular case, I just want to make sure that no one
25	has an objection to us meeting with the Northern

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1	Cheyenne, and Ms. Whiteing in particular, I want to
2	make sure you do not have any objection to that.
3	Again, we will not talk about the issues in this
4	particular case. It would just be a discussion about
5	how the Northern Cheyenne are dealing with the
6	various resources and land issues on the reservation.
7	Then the second issue, which is that so
8	as I said, I'm going to be down with the Crow on the
9	reservation, and I was talking to a colleague of mine
.0	who's another trustee for the Nature Conservancy, and
.1	she said, Oh, she had a property in northern Wyoming,
.2	and there's a bunkhouse there that we would be more
.3	than welcome to utilize. And I said, Sounds
4	absolutely great. We started talking about it, and I
.5	don't know whether any of you can guess, but it was
-6	the Padlock Ranch.
.7	And so the question then becomes, do you
- 8	have any objection to the students and the two
9	faculty members staying at the Padlock Ranch? I'm
20	happy to pay my own way, but again, that's something
21	that I don't expect an answer right now.
22	MR. KASTE: I can give you one because we
23	knew that this was happening. We got a copy of your
24	agenda. I guess from my point of view, rather than
2.5	being concerned with the Padlock Ranch, we noticed on

1	the agenda a stop in Helena to talk to state
2	officials, but we have no objection. In fact, we
3	have complete comfort that your discussions, whether
4	they be at the Padlock Ranch or in Helena, will not
5	veer into the context of this case whatsoever. It
6	looks like a great opportunity for your students.
7	And I don't anticipate that it will make any
8	difference in the outcome of any of your rulings.
9	So
10	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So that's
11	actually the third point. As Mr. Kaste just pointed
12	out, we also were thinking we would stop in Helena,
13	again just to get state perspectives on on Indian
14	land issues in Montana, and again we would not be
15	discussing anything relevant to this case.
16	MR. FOX: Your Honor, might I approach?
17	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: You certainly
18	may.
19	MR. FOX: First and foremost, where do I
20	sign up? Obviously, all of the issues that your
21	students will be studying and you'll be teaching
22	about are very near and dear to the hearts of Wyoming
23	and Montana. As Your Honor is probably aware,
24	Montana and Wyoming are actively engaged in the coal
25	port expansion issues in both Washington and Oregon.

1	which intriguingly had a conflict between the
2	tribal the Pacific Coast tribes and the Plains
3	tribes such as the Crows, who have a very substantial
4	coal mine, which as I would surmise is one of the
5	reasons you're visiting the Crow Agency.
6	But subject to Wyoming's approval, you
7	know, we would lend ourselves, our staff, to you to
8	the extent that you would want to visit with us.
9	Mr. Joscelyn is heavily engaged in all of those
.0	issues with the Crow tribe and, of course, the coal
.1	port issues as well.
.2	And that's my home, as you know. And
.3	incidentally, here in about three weeks I will be
.4	adopted into the Crow Tribe, I've been told, which is
.5	a great honor for any individual. We also have a
.6	ranch, as you know, that's close to the Tongue River
- 7	and the Tongue River Reservoir, but I don't know
. 8	how many students you have, but we've actually put up
9	I think as many as 25 people there. But would offer
20	all of our services and help in any way, shape or
:1	form, subject again to Wyoming's approval.
12	And we also have particular expertise,
1.3	Mr. Joscelyn and I, on the Otter Creek coal tracts,
2.4	which are something that the Northern Cheyenne Tribes
:5	are really interested in. We work very hard on any

1	of those i	ssues,	both be	efore and	d after.	So we	have	а
2	perspectiv	e we mi	ght be	able to	lend to	that.		

Now, having said all of that, I'm up for re-election. That's about a month or two before the election and my schedule probably will be somewhat crazy, but to the extent I might be able to help at all, I would be willing to do that.

SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: So I appreciate that particular offer. I'm going to try as much as possible to avoid any hints of having any type of favors bestowed upon by either side in my faculty position, but I do appreciate the offer. I might call on both sides at some point to have contacts with that. That's where that can sometimes be used.

But for me, as I said, what I would really appreciate is just to let me know if you have any concerns on either side and send them to my assistant. You don't have to send me anything.

MR. FOX: Your Honor, if I could add one thing I neglected to mention, my oldest brother, Dr. Richard Fox, is the foremost authority on the archeology of the Custer battle at Little Bighorn Battlefield, and I don't know that I can offer his services at this moment, but if you have any free time at all and you are going to be in that area,

1	that's a very I think important national cemetery and
2	park to visit. And if you had need of someone to
3	show you around, I might be able to get my brother to
4	do that, again subject to Wyoming's approval.
5	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: I appreciate
6	that. Without going into too much on sophomore
7	college, there's actually a sophomore college that's
8	been offered for 10 years now, which is called Field
9	Battle. And it basically goes both to the Little
LO	Bighorn Battlefield as well as Gettysburg, and stop
L1	by one of our former Secretary of State no,
L2	Secretary of Defense is at Stanford, and he actually
L3	goes to the battlefield and walks them through the
L4	entire battle. And thankfully he's going to be at
L5	the Little Bighorn with our class. And the Crow have
16	also offered to take us on the battlefield. So you
17	can begin to see how this is actually going to be a
L8	great class.
L9	MR. KASTE: Well, you've asked us to give
20	some thought to whether we have concerns. Wyoming
21	does not. We don't need to think about it anymore.
22	Like I said, we were aware of the agenda previously,
23	and it didn't cause us concern then and it doesn't
24	now. We appreciate you bringing it to our attention,
25	and we have every confidence that there will be no

1	appearance of impropriety. And, you know, if
2	something comes up and you have any concerns, please
3	give us a call and let us know whatever happened.
4	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And for both
5	sides I'll send Montana as well as anyone else in the
6	courtroom, I'm happy to send you the agenda for this
7	particular class so you know exactly what it's going
8	to be looking at. And again, I recognize both sides'
9	generosity in helping out on this particular matter.
10	And so do not fear that I certainly think one side
11	more than the other is helping out. You've been very
12	generous to offer that.
13	So again, if you have any concerns, let me
14	know.
15	Ms. Whiteing?
16	MS. WHITEING: Yes, I just wanted to say
17	that I'm sure that the Northern Cheyenne Tribe would
18	welcome a visit on the ground, and I would be happy
19	to facilitate
20	THE REPORTER: I'm sorry.
21	MS. WHITEING: I'm also a member of the
22	Blackfeet Tribe, and was involved in their water
23	settlement.
24	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: And would be
25	happy to help facilitate that as well.

1	SPECIAL MASTER THOMPSON: Okay. I very
2	much appreciate that particular offer.
3	Okay. So with that, I think we can
4	adjourn for the day. I will take both of the two
5	motions now under advisement and, as I say, issue a
6	decision in early September.
7	So with that, we're adjourned. Thank you
8	very much.
9	(The proceedings adjourned at 1:00 p.m.,
10	July 27, 2016.)
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1	STATE OF COLORADO)
2) ss. REPORTER'S
3	CERTIFICATE
4	COUNTY OF DENVER)
5	I, Pamela J. Hansen, do hereby certify that
6	I am a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified
7	Realtime Reporter and Notary Public within the State
8	of Colorado; that this hearing was taken in shorthand
9	by me at the time and place herein set forth, that it
10	was thereafter reduced to typewritten form, and that
11	the foregoing constitutes a true and correct
12	transcript.
13	I further certify that I am not related to,
14	employed by, nor of counsel for any of the parties or
15	attorneys herein, nor otherwise interested in the
16	result of the within action.
17	In witness whereof, I have affixed my
18	signature this 5th day of August, 2016.
19	My commission expires September 3, 2018.
20	Pamele G. Hansen
21	Pamela J. Hansen, CRR, RPR, RMR
22	216 - 16th Street, Suite 600 Denver, Colorado 80202
23	
24	

HEARING 7/27/2016

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