



**SCCR**

STANFORD CENTER FOR CHICANO RESEARCH  
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Policy Consequences and the Change from  
At-large Elections to Single Member Districts

Working Papers Series, No. 31

by

Luis Ricardo Fraga

Associate Professor of Political Science  
Faculty Associate, Stanford Center for Chicano Research  
Stanford University

March, 1991

The author would like to acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation through Grant No. SES-8809392, "Collaborative Research on the Implementation and Effects of the Voting Act," Bernard N. Grofman and Chandler Davidson, co-principal investigators. This essay was partially prepared while the author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I am grateful for financial support provided by The Spencer Foundation.

The purpose of the SCCR Working Paper Series is to publish works that significantly advance our knowledge about Chicanos and other Latinos. We invite your comments and critique. Please address your remarks to the author.

Stanford Center for Chicano Research, Cypress Hall, "E" Wing, Stanford,  
CA 94309

## Policy Consequences and the Change from At-large Elections to Single Member Districts

Although the Voting Rights Act (VRA) has often been referred to as the most significant piece of civil rights legislation enacted in the U.S., it is surprising that relatively little effort has been devoted to systematically assessing its impact on minority communities. This is an unfortunate omission and one which this analysis, in an exploratory way, will attempt to remedy both conceptually and empirically. This will be done by linking portions of the literature on voting rights with its focus on intent and implementation, to the literature on urban politics with its focus on governmental structure, ethnic and racial minority group political representation, public policy, and urban economic development. This linkage is provided within the analytical context of American political development. Political development is understood as the evolution of access by identifiable groups to the system of governance. Access is understood as the extent to which the systems of election, representation, and policy making serve the expressed concerns and needs of city residents.

The Voting Rights Act is a significant piece of legislation not only because it has, in much of the South since 1965, and in much of the Southwest and in selected areas of the Midwest and Northeast since 1975, contributed to much greater access to voting for African Americans, Latinos, and other language minorities, but because it provides social scientists with a rich opportunity to assess the nature of American political development in ways that are historically sensitive and policy relevant. I suggest that the VRA is best understood as the most significant event that has structured American political development in the post-WWII era, especially in cities and other substate levels of government where the VRA has affected the largest number of jurisdictions.

Unlike the national and state governments, city governments have with some regularity changed their basic structures of governance in response to popular efforts. Because cities have no legal standing within the national Constitution, they derive their authority and legitimacy directly from state legislatures (Dillon 1911). This dependence of course includes the determination of the basic structure of government. State governments have on their own, and at other times at the instigation of local constituencies, redesigned city governments. When home rule charters have been granted to cities, they have as well changed most often through a citywide popular referendum vote. These changes have taken the form of methods of selection and election of city council members, the size of the council, the authority of the mayor, the determination of the chief executive officer of the city, methods of personnel selection, and limits to taxing and borrowing capacities.

These alterations in urban governmental institutions had substantial consequences for interest articulation and interest responsiveness, and thus on the distribution of political influence. Not all identifiable segments of the population equally benefitted from changes in city government. In fact, these changes were most often the result of efforts of one segment of a city's electorate to enhance its own position in the distribution of political influence. For example, when the franchise was extended broadly to recently naturalized European immigrants, ethnic entrepreneurs arose who attempted to manipulate the structures of governance to enhance

their own private political influence, and at times that of their respective ethnic communities, through urban political machines. In response, previously dominant groups, most often native born Americans of substantial status and wealth, resisted such manipulation. Among the most effective strategies pursued by dominant groups was to restructure the systems of election, representation, and policy making to maintain their political influence, which led to the rise of the Municipal Reform Movement of the Progressive Era. In the strategic fashion described by E.E. Schattschneider (1960), leaders of each of these divisions of urban communities attempted to structure the scope of conflict through alteration of decision making procedures to ensure that their respective interests were served in public policy decision making.

These conscious alterations in structures of governance directly affected patterns of American urban political development. Not only were institutions altered, these alterations had direct consequences for the capacities of different segments of urban populations to have their needs identified and addressed. The changes in city government election and representation, with implications for policy making, as a result of intervention through the VRA, follow this pattern with two major distinctions. One, it is the national government, via the courts and the office of the Attorney General, who makes these changes possible. Two, these changes are explicitly designed to enhance the access of subordinate ethnic and racial minority groups, most often African Americans and Latinos.

### The Analytical Framework

The examination of ethnic and racial minority group participation in contemporary city politics has been enriched recently by the explication of three concepts: inclusion, political incorporation, and regime. Implicit in the application of these concepts is an understanding of political development, as we have defined it here. There exists a sense of change over time, i.e., development, and a sense of how that change has affected political access. These concepts comprise one foundation for the framework of analysis to be used. I shall refer to this framework as a model of *the changing urban regime*.

The concept of inclusion has its origin in the study of voting rights and systems of election, i.e., the single-member district v. at-large debate, where research has focused attention on minority group political participation and especially minority group representation (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Taebel 1978; MacManus 1978; Fraga, Meier, and England 1986). The most recent attempt at book-length analysis is that of Thernstrom (1987). A consideration of voting rights appropriately must focus on national and state governments; traditionally voting rights have been defined at the state level and the Voting Rights Act passed in 1965 gave elements of the national government, especially the federal courts and the attorney general, the capacity to alter decisions made at the state level through both Section 2 and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. However, it has been in cities and other substate levels of government such as counties and school districts, where these new federal relations have been implemented with greatest frequency. City governments have often had to cope with the continued development of voting rights law.

Moreover, this voting rights literature is replete with the explicit and implicit use of the concept of minority group formal representation, i.e., inclusion. Inclusion here simply refers to the presence on the formal legislature of one or several representatives who are the *first choice preferences* of a majority or plurality of a minority community, grouped within a specific representational unit. Although inclusion has often been misunderstood and misrepresented as minority elected officials, it is most accurately understood as a consequence of voting preferences grouped by a specified criterion, such as race or ethnicity. The representative so chosen can be either minority or non-minority. The essential element of inclusion then, is the presence within the local legislature of a representative of an identified constituency. However, a sole focus on inclusion can leave the analyst with the mistaken impression that changes in formal representation lead to meaningful changes in the distribution of political influence. This may or may not be the case. Our second concept allows us to examine this question directly.

Political incorporation has recently been successfully used by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) in their study of minority group politics in ten California cities in the San Francisco Bay Area. According to these authors, "[t]he concept of political incorporation concerns the extent to which group interests are effectively represented in policy making" (Browning, et al. 1984, 25). Thus, these authors focus upon the extent to which minority communities have formal representatives on city councils and more precisely the extent to which the policy preferences of these representatives are reflected in final governmental decision making. In doing so, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb are building upon the concept of active representation discussed by Pitkin (1967) in her seminal work, but note the necessity of placing such representation within the larger context of the governing majority coalition on the council. The implications for the distribution of political influence are evident. To the extent that minority communities are represented by officials who are part of a responsive majority governing coalition, they have political influence.

However, again our understanding can be incomplete. Policy options can be constrained by a variety of factors including market economics (Peterson 1981), long term budgetary commitments (Shefter 1985), state and national government mandates, ideology, and value discourses. Not all policy preferences are equally viable. A sympathetic majority governing coalition is extremely useful to the representatives of minority communities, however, what accounts for the likelihood that such a coalition will come to power and come to a specific policy consensus.

The concept of the urban regime, most convincingly articulated by Clarence N. Stone (1989) in his study of Atlanta, adds still another dimension to the study of urban political development which begins to address the above concerns. According to Stone, the urban regime should be understood "as the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions" (1989, 6). What Stone has done is to add an explicit recognition of the position of the city within the American political economy to caution against an unsophisticated, perhaps excessive, examination of formal, i.e, legal representation. Through a focus on the structure and operation of the urban regime, within the context of an American political economy with "popular control of the formal

machinery of government and...private ownership of business enterprise" (1989 6), Stone has allowed us to appreciate the complexity of decision making in local government and the opportunities and constraints it provides both its participants and aspirants. The implications for understanding the role of minority group politics in the distribution of political influence are also evident. Economic necessity places broad parameters on the policy options which public officials can pursue. Like all public officials, those whose constituencies are largely based in minority communities must operate within these economic parameters.

The previous discussion is relevant to my central argument. I have been able to integrate elements of each of the concepts of inclusion, incorporation, and regime within the context of cities which have been forced to change their structures of election and representation as a result of the Voting Rights Act, and build upon these ideas through the introduction of the new concept of the *informed public interest*. Succinctly stated, the central thesis is: imposed minority group inclusion in city politics through the Voting Rights Act can directly contribute to a transformation in the urban regime, not only through incorporation, but most significantly through the facilitated identification of the informed public interest. Explanation is in order.

It is noteworthy that the studies by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) and Stone (1989) deal with the development of minority politics in cities which have not been directly affected by the Voting Rights Act. The inclusion and incorporation of minority groups into the politics of these cities have resulted from the progression of a variety of factors including, preferences of the business elite, residential mobility, and party politics although often operating in nonpartisan systems. What did not appear in any of these cities was a considerable history of structured exclusion of minority groups from effective participation through a variety of mechanisms, primary among them the structural reforms of the municipal reform movement of the progressive era such as at-large elections, the place system, and exclusionary slating in nonpartisan elections, which have been found to lead to vote dilution in many municipalities (Davidson 1984).

The cities which are the focus of my analysis, San Antonio and Dallas, are cities with this history of systematic exclusion of African Americans and Mexican Americans. It is precisely in cities such as these where the development of inclusion into incorporation can be most difficult. Not only must minority communities contend with limited political resources and traditional political underdevelopment, they must contend with the onus of achieving their initial inclusion through special protection by the national government. Meaningful incorporation may be non-existent. However, it may also be time-lagged, depending upon a variety of factors such as the nature of the personalities and abilities of subsequently elected officials, the frequency of opportunities for coalition, and the consistency of voting blocs within the council. Lastly, cities such as these allow the careful consideration of whether policy responsiveness within a context of interest group competition is the best way to understand the significance of change in the urban regime. I will argue that it is not.

Adopting a dynamic framework for understanding the changing urban regime, four distinct stages can be identified in the political development of city governments as they have

accommodated ethnic and racial minority group interests. These stages are presented in Figure 1.

Exclusion is the stage at which African Americans and Mexican Americans were consciously kept out of meaningful participation in city politics. It will be shown that this was done largely through the adoption of a package of structural reforms promoted by proponents of the municipal reform movement of the progressive era. In particular, the overwhelming success of the reform electoral coalition as institutionalized in the nonpartisan slating group, made it virtually impossible for first choice preferences of minority communities to win public office. The second stage, inclusion, occurred as a result of the direct intervention of the national government, in the case of Dallas through the federal courts, and in the case of San Antonio through the Attorney General of the United States, in its efforts to enforce the Voting Rights Act. This inclusion of elected officials with undoubted standing in minority communities resulted from the adoption in each municipality of new systems of election and representation which included single-member districts. A new institutionalization has taken place; it is one where ethnic and racial minority communities now have their legitimate representatives.

The stage of incorporation is the stage at which the substance of policy making is examined to determine how it has changed since the imposition of new representatives from minority communities. Although minority communities now have their representatives, how effective are they as legislators? Is policy making now more responsive to the self-identified needs and interests of minority communities? The final stage of political development is that of governance. Counterintuitively, I will argue that this last stage in the current political development of these cities is best understood differently from the previous stage which focuses on policy parity. In the stage of governance, it is the policy process that is subsequently reexamined to determine the significance of change through the use of the informed public interest. I argue that a comprehensive understanding of the change that has occurred in the urban regime must consider new arenas of cooperative action where conflict and competition between substantial segments of the population are not only managed, but where that conflict and competition are used to broaden the legitimacy of the state so that its efforts are not only tolerated, but supported and valued by these segments of the population as well. This is what I mean by the *informed public interest*.

### Methodology

The focus will be the cities of Dallas and San Antonio from the early 1900's to 1988. The above described framework will be used to assess the political development of local institutions of governance with particular reference to their effects on African Americans and Mexican Americans. Throughout, the unique experiences of each city will be placed within the context of larger national trends and influences which have directly affected each city's politics.

It is of course recognized that these cities do not, in any sense, represent a scientific sample of cities in the United States. But in the tradition of some of the most rich urban scholarship, I am confident that my cities will allow the identification of patterns of

characteristics and experiences which are applicable to many other municipalities (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961). As well, cities of the Southwest, and particularly in the state of Texas, have not often been the focus of much systematic, longitudinal social science analysis (see Davidson 1972 for an exception). Each of these cities is today within the top ten most populous cities in the country and sits in a major metropolitan area. Of special significance, each city has maintained a sizeable community of African Americans and Mexican Americans with an increasing growth in both groups throughout the 20th century.

Notice that I have constructed a quasi-experimental design (Campbell and Stanley 1963) to examine the nature of regime change:

Pattern of Activity — Significant Event — Pattern of Activity

The major event is the forced change in the structure of government as a result of federal intervention through the Voting Rights Act. The period of exclusion occurs before this event. The patterns of incorporation and governance occur subsequent to the change.

Reaching valid conclusions of causality in such a framework can of course be problematic. It can suffer from under specification and thus an over reliance on the significant event to explain the phenomena examined. However, the design has three distinct advantages. One, by examining minority group political participation over time, I am inhibited from being unduly influenced by contemporary circumstances as is the case in many cross-sectional designs. The pattern of activity that I identify can be placed within a developmental context. This must help in assessing the significance of any *one* pattern of activity. Two, by focusing on two cities, I am able to appreciate their unique patterns of political development. Although there are thousands of city general purpose governments in the United States, and they can share many similarities, a city is a unique political jurisdiction. Cross-sectional studies can mask significant uniquenesses. An excessive use of cross-sectional designs, interestingly enough, masks the *politics* in city governments. Of course quasi-experimental designs are greatly aided by a control group where the significant event has not occurred. But although cities can be matched by socio-demographic characteristics, such as population size, density, economic growth, structure of government, and budget, it is much more difficult to match them by political, history.

The third and final advantage of this design is that the period of exclusion provides a baseline to which both representational and policy consequences in the periods of inclusion, incorporation, and governance can be compared. That is, it begins to provide a measurable basis for the determination of *change* and of *how much change* has occurred. In sum, an informed, sophisticated application of a quasi-experimental design will complement cross-sectional designs and should be a most useful methodology to understand the nature of American political development.

A History of Exclusion

Although the Municipal Reform Movement of the Progressive Era had its origins in the

Northeast where it was offered by its proponents to rid city governments of corruption, graft, mismanagement, high taxes, parochial decision making, government by ethnic politicians, and partisan politics which were linked to urban political machines, it is the case that it achieved its highest levels of success in the Southern, Southwestern, and Western parts of the United States. In some ways this is not at all surprising. In these parts of the country there were few, if any, political machines with power bases in largely white-ethnic electorates, as in the machines of Tammany Hall in NYC and the Curley machine in Boston. The most significant political divisions outside of the Northeast and Midwest were either racial, black v. white, or ethnic, Mexican American v. Anglo, and policies and practices of disenfranchisement often made the subordinate minority groups, at best, infrequent participants in local politics.

It is perhaps the absence of a highly organized opposition which gave the intellectual and practical justifications offered by structural reformers their overwhelming power to set the discourse on the public interest. The advantages of reform were many according to its proponents. Phrases such as "the interests of the city as a whole," "professionalism," "economic growth," "efficiency," "effectiveness," "honesty," and "harmony" were very common.

What must be equally appreciated is how this discourse had exclusionary consequences. Exclusionary, that is, in that the interests and concerns of distinct ethnic and racial segments of the population and electorate were not included within these characterizations. This did not occur by chance. The history of reform adoption in my two cities makes this very clear. It is this history of exclusion that sets the context for fully appreciating the significance of subsequent change in the urban regime through the Voting Rights Act.

I shall not endeavor in this essay to take you through the full history of reform adoption in these cities, and especially how their respective patterns of adoption very neatly fit into the national pattern described by revisionist historians such as Weinstein (1962) and Hays (1964; 1975), who focus on the dimensions of ethnic and class conflict during the heyday of municipal reform. I will, however, briefly discuss the *final stage* in the institutionalization of the reform electoral base: the establishment and success of *nonpartisan slating groups* in these cities. A fuller discussion of these organizations appears in Fraga (1988) with special attention to their national origin and promotion. Nonpartisan slating groups are organizations that recruit, nominate, finance, and campaign on behalf of a slate of candidates in a system of effective nonpartisanship. They are in essence *nonpartisan parties*. Here I will simply remind you of the level and thus severity of exclusion of ethnic and racial interest representation to complete our discussion of the period of exclusion and set the basis for our subsequent consideration of inclusion, incorporation, governance, and the informed public interest. In Dallas the organization was named the Citizen's Charter Association (CCA) and in San Antonio it was named the Good Government League (GGL).

#### The Citizens Charter Association and the Good Government League

The CCA was originally organized to campaign for the change to council-manger government. During the consideration of charter change in Dallas leaders of the CCA wrote in

the major newspaper the Dallas Morning News:

"Why not run Dallas itself on a business schedule by business methods under businessmen?...The city manager is after all only a business management plan...The city manager is the executive of the corporation under a board of directors. Dallas is the corporation. It is as simple as that..." (As quoted in Stone et al. 1940, 285-286).

And another editorial stated, "Dallas should be run by its businessmen because the biggest business in Dallas is business itself" (quoted in Stone et al. 1940, 187).

After the over two-to one margin of victory to enact the council-manager plan in 1930, leaders of the CCA decided that if council-manager government was to work as they desired, it was crucial that subsequently elected council members have the same values and policy preferences as themselves. As one of the first CCA presidents, W.D. Jones, put it in 1935:

"The Citizen's Charter Association [was] to provide an agency through which the forward-looking citizens of the community could draft for their service a capable group of men as city councilmen, leaving to the council after its election the duty of choosing a city manager and other administrative heads of the government" (Jones 1935, 14).

Louis P. Head, a leader of the CCA, wrote that it decided to run a complete slate of nine councilmanic candidates in 1931 "to exert every possible influence to prevent the political groups from gaining control under the new [council manager] plan." Only in this way, he added, could a "council free of all political influences...be elected in April" (Head 1930, 109).

The CCA ran slates of candidates for city council from 1931 to 1975. During this time it achieved a success rate of 85.8%, winning 181 of 211 seats contested and thus maintaining a clear voting majority on 21 of 23 councils during this period. Its only major defeats were in 1935 and 1937 when a split within the business community developed; it was overcome by 1939.

The GGL in San Antonio was organized in 1954, three years after the adoption of council-manager government. In response to a perceived effort by then mayor Jack White to dominate the city manager and council in openly disagreeing with their plan to annex eight square miles of land to the city, Tom L. Powell, president of the Chamber of Commerce, asked 60 influential San Antonians to his home to discuss the establishment of a nonpartisan slating group. Of those invited, 43% were owners of businesses, 17% were attorneys, and 14% were other professionals and clergymen. Three were heads of local business associations. Its membership soon enlarged to 3,000, however most of these members resided in the city's upper class Northside, and even in the nearby upper-class suburbs of Olmos Park, Alamo Heights, and Terrell Hills (Booth and Johnson 1983, 22-23).

According to the bylaws of the GGL, its primary purpose was to "promote honest, efficient and economical government through the council manager plan and to encourage and support capable, public spirited citizens to stand for election to public office" (Sanders 1975, 9).

It was to do this in three ways. First, it was to "eliminate unnecessary conflict [in city government] and thereby find solutions to common problems" (p. 9). Second, it was to promote the development of an atmosphere in San Antonio politics favorable to economic growth and expansion, especially through the expansion of certain municipal services. Third, it was to recruit, nominate, and campaign for the election of slates of candidates to city office (p. 9). One founder of the GGL stated, "We realized that you just couldn't run anyone and expect council manager government to work. That was our mistake in 1951 and 1953" (quoted in Sanders 1974, 60). Another founder stated, "We knew we had the best form of government and all we needed to do was to get the right people on the council" (quoted in Sanders 1975, 7).

The GGL ran slates of candidates from 1955 to 1975. During this time it won 87.6%, maintaining voting majorities in 10 of 11 city councils. It was in 1973 and 1975 that it faced its greatest defeats—forerunners to its subsequent demise.

#### Minority Representation and Patterns of Electoral Support

Did the CCA in Dallas and the GGL in San Antonio systematically exclude representatives of the African American and Mexican American communities? Examination of both representational and electoral data suggests that this was the case. Levels of racial, ethnic, and class diversity of slating-group candidates suggest that the upper- and middle-class, predominantly white, and business-oriented biases of structural reformers were maintained and institutionalized by these nonpartisan slating groups.

Between 1951 and 1975, the CCA nominated a total of 121 candidates. Of these candidates, 91.7% were white, 5.0% were Mexican American, and 3.3% were African American. The CCA did not include a minority group member in any of the 19 slates it ran for office from 1931 to 1967. In each of the years 1969 and 1971, it contained one African American and one Mexican American. In 1973 and 1975 it included two African Americans and one Mexican American. These limited levels of diversity were considerably below respective population percentages which for African Americans ranged from a low in 1930 of 14.9% to a high in 1980 of 29.4%. For Mexican Americans the population percentages ranged from a low of 2.3% in 1930 to a high of 12.2% in 1980.

Between 1955 and 1975, the GGL nominated 97 candidates. Of these, 67% were white, 26.8% were Mexican American, and 6.2% were African American. In 1955 the first GGL slate included one Mexican American and it did not contest the candidacy of non-GGL Mexican American, Henry B. González. Two Mexican Americans were included in every election year between 1957 and 1967. During 1969 to 1973 it included three Mexican Americans, and in 1975 it included four. The GGL did not include an African American within its slate until 1965. It included only one African American in each of the six slates it offered between 1965 and 1975. Similar to Dallas, these percentages were below population percentages. The range for Mexican Americans between 1955 and 1980 were 41.4% to 53.6%. For African Americans during this period the population percentage ranged from 7.3% to 7.6%.

This same pattern of homogeneity in slating-group candidates is apparent when one examines two measures of class background: occupation and place of residence. Most CCA and GGL candidates, including its minority candidates, were businessmen or professionals and lived in census tracts above the citywide median (Fraga 1988, 540-543).

It is of course possible that the above patterns of descriptive homogeneity misrepresent the nature of racial and ethnic representation on city councils. Although most slating group candidates and city council members were white, could they still not represent the first choice preferences of minority as well as majority communities?

Electoral preference data was examined for the city of San Antonio for the period 1955-1975. Vote polarization scores reveal that predominantly white precincts gave the GGL slate its highest levels of support compared to predominantly Mexican American or predominantly African American precincts in every election from 1955 to 1975. Although they vary considerably, the pattern of polarization is clear (Fraga 1988, 543-546).

Displayed in another fashion, Tables 1 and 2 reveal the same pattern. These data indicate that of 92 individual GGL candidates in contested races between 1955 and 1975, 77, or 83.7%, were the first choice of whites. However, the pattern of support from Mexican Americans and African Americans is significantly lower. Of the same 92 individual GGL candidates, only 25, or 27.2% were the first choice of Mexican Americans. Of the 40 individual GGL candidates slated in contested races between 1955 and 1963, only 9, or 22.5%, were the first choice of African Americans.

As previously stated, the GGL included minority candidates in each of its slates since 1955. Did these GGL minority candidates represent the first choice of minority communities? If so, this suggests that the GGL tried to ensure that minority communities were represented, not with tokens, but with candidates who had standing in these communities.

Table 2 reveals that GGL minority candidates were more likely to be the first choice of white voters than of Mexican Americans or African Americans. Of the 31 minority candidates slated by the GGL, 74% were the first choice of whites, whereas only 35.5% were the first choice of Mexican Americans. Of the eight minority candidates slated by the GGL between 1955 and 1963, only 25% represented the first choice of African Americans.

In sum, what appears in these communities is a consistent pattern of exclusion from effective participation in electoral politics. This exclusion was consistent with the goals of structural reformers of the municipal reform movement. But as I titled one of the first articles I published on this topic, what appears in these communities is "Domination Through Democratic Means." It is an exclusion justified with a rhetoric of democratic participation.. It was justified as well with a rhetoric of the public interest. If such rhetoric was reflective of majoritarian preferences, it should be no surprise that inclusion would only occur with outside intervention.

## Imposed Inclusion

Changes in the structures of election and representation in both cities resulted from national government intervention through interpretation and application of the Voting Rights Act. This occurred in Dallas in 1975 and in San Antonio in 1976.

In the City of Dallas the system of at-large election itself had been the focus of litigation since 1967. In that year Max Goldblatt, a hardware store owner, lost his at-large council race despite winning a majority of the votes cast from his residency district. He filed suit in U.S. district court charging that the at-large system of election was discriminatory in that it denied adequate representation to the citizens of Dallas. The district court found against Mr. Goldblatt, who is white, and the Supreme Court refused to hear the case for want of jurisdiction (*Fleischmann n.d.*; *Goldblatt v. Dallas* 279 Supp. 106, N.D. Texas, 1968).

In 1971, Albert Lipscomb, an unsuccessful African American candidate for city council, filed suit against the city charging that the at-large system of election violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and his Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. After four years of legal maneuvering, on March 25, 1975, U.S. District Judge John Mahon found that the at-large system of councilmanic election was discriminatory against African Americans because of the existence of several conditions. The conditions included: 1) a history of racial segregation, 2) a history of discrimination which inhibited current participation in the electoral process, 3) a history of racial vote polarization, and 4) a history of unequal access to the slating process by African Americans (*Lipscomb v. Wise*, 399 F. Supp. 782, N.D. Texas, 1975).

In his decision, Judge Mahon also accepted the council's adoption of an 8-3 plan as a remedy to the situation. Under this plan, eight council members would be elected from single-member districts and three, including the mayor, would be elected at-large. Two of the eight districts contained African American populations of 87.3% and 73.6%, and one contained a predominantly minority population of 25.9% African Americans and 20% Mexican Americans. The other five districts were predominantly white ranging from 87% to 94.6% of the district population.

It was in the city council election of 1975, under the 8-3 plan, that the CCA suffered its largest defeat since 1937. It lost two of the eight district races and the two at-large races, including the mayor's race, in which it filed candidates. Interestingly, the two African American candidates who were elected from predominantly Black districts were CCA candidates. Nonetheless, the CCA has not formally run a slate of candidates for office since 1975. Perhaps the likelihood of successfully putting together a coalition of diverse geographical, ethnic, and racial interests under an 8-3 plan was deemed too small to merit further CCA activity. The diversity of interests which could be elected under such an 8-3 plan had never characterized a previous CCA slate.

In San Antonio, the final demise of the GGL, which had experienced considerable internal dissension in 1973 and 1975, resulted from a decision by the Attorney General in 1976 to object

to the 1972 annexations by the city of 66 square miles of land representing an increase in the city population of 51,400 residents. Recall that the entire state of Texas was covered under the Section 5 Preclearance Provision in the 1975 extension and expansion of the Voting Rights Act.

Attorneys for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund argued to the Attorney General that these annexations diluted the votes of San Antonio's minority communities. In his letter dated April 2, 1976, to the city, he stated that because the annexed areas contained a population of 75% Anglos and 23% Mexican Americans, the expansion in the size of the eligible electorate diluted the voting strength of both Mexican American and African American communities by making them smaller percentages of the city-wide electorate. The Attorney General stated,

"...However, with regard to the other 13 annexations, we cannot conclude, as we must under the Voting Rights Act, that they, when coupled with an at-large majority vote, numbered post system, of city elections, in which racial-ethnic block voting exists, do not have the effect of abridging the right to vote of affected minorities in San Antonio..." (As quoted in Cottrell & Stevens 1978, 85).

The Attorney General also suggested a remedy. He continued:

"...one way to remedy this situation would be to adopt a system of fairly drawn single member wards. Should that occur, the Attorney General will reconsider the matter upon receipt of that information" (As quoted in Cottrell & Stevens 1978, 85).

The Attorney General had thus decided that decisions made by a GGL dominated city council violated the Voting Rights Act. In response to this objection the city council offered a 10-1 plan, 10 single-member districts and an at-large elected mayor, for a referendum vote by the electorate on January 15, 1977. Under this plan five of the districts would have total Mexican American populations of 54.4% to 91.4%; four would have Anglo populations of 66.6% to 86.6%; and one would have an African American population of 46.8%.

By a narrow margin of 51.4% to 48.6% of 61,387 total votes cast, the 10-1 plan was approved (Gibson & Ashcroft 1977, 31). The city-wide vote displayed a similar pattern to that of many past GGL campaigns. Predominantly Mexican American and African American areas voted overwhelmingly in favor of the plan and the Northside predominantly white areas largely voted against it (Gibson & Ashcroft 1977, 31). In December of 1976, the chairman of the GGL announced its dissolution (Gibson 1983, 106).

The consequences for descriptive representation, i.e., inclusion, of African Americans and Mexican Americans under the new plans of election are displayed in table 3 for Dallas. In Dallas, two African American council members have been elected from its two predominantly Black districts from the inception of the plan in 1975 to the last election in 1987. One Mexican American was elected from a mixed district in 79 and 81, one Mexican American was elected at-large in 1987. The magnitude of representational change is better indicated in figure 2.

Using the representation-population ratio as a measure of the inclusiveness of electoral preferences in the legislature of the local government, the level of inclusion that has been attained under the 8-3 plan exceeds that attained in the 9 and 11 at-large systems. A descriptive over representation of whites has, nonetheless, been maintained. In the two districts where African Americans have remained a majority of the residents, African American representatives have been elected with consistency. This is unlike the case for Mexican Americans who have only infrequently elected a representative from the majority-minority district. The Mexican American was also elected at-large in 1987 served only one term.

In the case of San Antonio, the level of institutionalized inclusion has been even more dramatic. As revealed in table 4 and figure 3, since the adoption of the 10-1 plan for the 1977 elections, whites, Mexican Americans, and African Americans have all been able to achieve a level of substantial parity. What is especially noteworthy is that the enhancement of representation for the Mexican American community has not reduced the levels of African American or white representational parity. Recall, however, that these descriptive data now capture the structured preferences of segments of the population. Tokenism is no longer an issue. All representatives have standing in their respective communities.

#### Determining Incorporation

Names, faces, ethnic origin of names, and colors of faces, have changed with inclusion. But what has really changed? What about public policy responsiveness? Has public policy changed "significantly" in city government as a result of enhanced racial and ethnic minority group representation? Stated succinctly, what difference does it really make?

Early efforts to examine the distribution of policy benefits in cities by such authors as Lineberry (1977) and Mladenka (1978; 1980), focused on services such as fire, police, parks, libraries, and garbage. The research question was deceptively simple; are these services distributed equitably across major geographical areas of the city? These areas of policy making were potentially useful, however they had two deficiencies. One, the saliency of these issues to all racial and ethnic communities across cities cannot be assumed. That is, although "unpatterned inequality" (Lineberry 1977, 183) does not indicate systematic geographical discrimination, it also does not indicate how responsive a governmental system is to the self-identified needs of neighborhoods. These self-identified needs were never specified. Two, the services these studies examined were not very controversial in many instances. Libraries and fire stations have rarely been the focus of much citizen protest. In sum, although unpatterned inequality may exist regarding some issues, the most pressing and self-articulated issues may display a very different pattern of distribution.

The areas of policy to be examined for determining incorporation must meet three criteria: 1) the policy area must logically be of direct interest and benefit to the minority community, 2) policies in this area must be within the influence of minority elected officials, and 3) the measure of policy must be sufficiently sensitive to identifiable variation over time.

The larger study from which this essay is drawn (Fraga, forthcoming) uses three measures of policy change which meet the above criteria to determine incorporation: 1) municipal employment, 2) appointments to city boards and commissions, and 3) minority firm contracting. Responsiveness to these issues has recently been accepted by many within urban politics as the best indicator of meaningful incorporation (For example see Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984).

I will present some initial findings regarding two aspects of municipal employment: total employment and employment in the three specific job categories of officials/administrators, protective service workers, and service and maintenance workers. These data are compiled from EEO-4 surveys entitled "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: State and Local Government Information," that municipalities have been required to complete since the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Because most municipalities receive federal funds, they are required to submit racial, ethnic, and gender breakdowns of their work forces on an annual basis. These data have been used as a measure of policy responsiveness to minority communities in studies of urban policy since the beginning of the decade as by Eisinger (1980; 1982) and most recently by Mladenka (1989). What has not been done previously is to note the trends in these employment data over time. The majority of studies that have used these data are cross-sectional. Using our quasi-experimental design, have the patterns of public employment for African Americans and Mexican Americans changed significantly since enhanced minority representation on the council through the Voting Rights Act?

Figures 4-7 display the patterns of employment in the city of Dallas for the period 1974 to 1988. These data are disaggregated by racial and ethnic group and by the above mentioned job categories. The data are presented for all years for which data are available. Lastly, the data are presented longitudinally to allow the determination of what the overall trend has been across the entire time period. For total employment, officials/administrators, protective service workers, and service/maintenance workers, there has been a significant increase in the percent of jobs held by both African Americans and Mexican Americans.

The patterns for San Antonio are somewhat different, as is evident in figures 8-11. Relative to Dallas, total employment for African Americans and Mexican Americans has risen very modestly. The greatest gain for Mexican Americans has been in officials/administrators, whereas the greatest gains for African Americans has been in protective service workers. There has been virtually no gain in service maintenance workers.

The above described patterns clearly display a linear trend. What analytical significance can be given to the impact of enhanced minority representation? Table 5 presents an analysis of the changes in the patterns of employment using relative percent differences. When one sums the total proportions for the pre-change period and compares it to the post-change period, allowing for a two year transition immediately after the change, the above described gains become very clear. In Dallas, very dramatic gains have been experienced by both African Americans and Mexican Americans in officials/administrators, 310% and 254% respectively, and in protective service workers, 103% and 89% respectively. In San Antonio, the greatest gain

for Mexican Americans in officials/administrators has been 61% and for African Americans it has been in protective service workers at 46%. Chi-square and z statistics were all significant at .01, except for service/maintenance workers in San Antonio.

I think it valid to state several conclusions from this initial analysis of the data. One, minority group municipal employment has increased substantially in each city since the change to single-member district representation. The differences have been more dramatic in Dallas, where the level of initial exclusion was also more severe. Two, the increases have been greatest in the job categories of officials/administrators and protective service workers. Again, with Dallas demonstrating the greatest relative gains. Three, these patterns are distinct from the patterns for service/maintenance workers, with traditionally lower skill jobs, where minority group members have consistently held a substantial number of jobs. In sum, enhanced minority group representation on the council contributes to greater access to municipal employment, especially in higher status jobs. This is consistent with the findings of Mladenka (1989) in his cross-sectional analysis of a national sample of cities.

Substantial caution is of course in order. The above analysis to a degree suffers from under specification. Nonetheless, major criticisms can be addressed. It is possible that the trends in increasing minority group employment are simply the result of greater social sensitivity on the part of the council generally. Post-change patterns in most instances are simply the result of a continuance of trends apparent in the pre-change period. This interpretation is improbable. The history of exclusion in each city makes it unlikely that a major public resource, municipal jobs, would be redistributed, however modestly, to subordinate racial and ethnic minorities. Recall the magnitude of the changes in Dallas. Additionally, interviews with minority council members revealed that they gave very careful attention to the evaluation of affirmative action plans. Personnel directors were often cited favorably or unfavorably.

It is also possible that the increases in minority employment in officials/administrators and protective service workers is the result of changes in the nature of the available labor pool in that there are now more qualified minorities applying for these jobs. This explanation is also unconvincing. Table 5 displays the percentage increase in population, 1970-1980, to compare with percentage increases in minority employment. In Dallas, the percentage change in African American overall employment is over two times greater than the increase in population, almost twelve times greater in number of officials/administrators, almost four times greater in protective service workers, and only one and a half times greater in service/maintenance workers. A similar pattern appears for Mexican Americans, with again the greatest changes occurring in the number of officials/administrators. It is also evident that the pattern for Anglos is one where in each instance the decline in their employment exceeds the decline in their percent of the city's population. In San Antonio, the changes are less dramatic. But similar to Dallas, the largest increase in employment is in the area of officials/administrators for Mexican Americans where the increase is just over two and a half times greater than the increase in population. The greatest increase for African Americans is in protective service workers where the increase is just over three times the increase in population. Of course, such population changes overstate the labor pool because they include children and those who are likely to be unqualified.

### Assessing Change in the Urban Regime

The analysis of change in the urban regime as an expression of general American political development is informative. It can provide us with an understanding of the barriers that ethnic and racial minorities have overcome in their efforts to gain substantial political equality, it can begin to provide us with guidance as to how to limit those barriers should the polity decide to do so, and it can begin to guide us in the development of expectations as to what difference, somehow defined, it will make to have ethnic and racial minority representatives in city politics. It is the latter concern that is, I think, of the greatest significance.

An impassioned argument is made by Thernstrom (1987) and other critics of the development of the Voting Rights Act, that such imposed enhancement of minority group inclusion leads to several undesirable consequences for the urban regime. Two such consequences are most worthy of consideration. One, such imposed inclusion disserves the long term interests of minority communities. By limiting the number of representatives a minority community can influence through the electoral process, i.e., allowing a minority community to select one or a few representatives, rather than allowing them to be a considerable swing vote in the election of all representatives, the electoral minority becomes an institutionalized legislative minority. Thus, incorporation and policy responsiveness are likely to be infrequent at best. Two, it is argued that such imposed representation of the minority community institutionalizes and thus makes permanent, ethnic and racial conflict within the urban regime. Minority and non-minority representatives, the argument continues, participate within a system of representation where an incentive system has been designed to reward ethnically and racially exclusive as compared to inclusive, constituency service. That is to say, cooperation and compromise, to the extent that they occur, represent aberrations in the structured legislative process. As a consequence, ethnicity and race continue to be dimensions through which both legislators and the public evaluate public policy. The elimination of ethnocentrism and racism in American society becomes even less likely.

The argument of limited electoral influence is summarily weakened by the simple recognition that the reason these two cities, and many others like them, were found to dilute the votes of their minority communities was because there was a pattern of identifiable and substantial vote polarization between minority and non-minority communities. In San Antonio and Dallas, uninformed assertion gives the swing vote theory its only credibility. In the general case, this point was already made by Davidson several years ago (1984, 9-10).

The logical weaknesses and inconsistencies of the argument noting the institutionalization of ethnic and racial conflict can also be identified. The transformation of the urban regime through imposed changes in the system of election and representation reflects identified cleavages within the polity. It neither initiates nor causes these divisions. Nonetheless, it can perpetuate their presence within the polity. To the extent that such perpetuation is achieved, it merely reflects the underlying divisions within the society which have existed for many decades. It is irrational to think that a constituency will continue to identify its political interests as distinctive from a majority solely because of its representative. The constituency will identify its interests

consistent with its understanding of reality. That reality is one where ethnicity and race are relevant in assessing the costs and benefits of public policy. Denying ethnic and racial cleavages does not eliminate them. Subordinating ethnic and racial segments of the electorate to a majority voting bloc, as is likely to occur in the maintenance of at-large elections in polities with documented histories of ethnic-racial vote polarization, will assuredly perpetuate such divisions.

A meaningful transformation of the urban regime through enhanced formal representation of minority communities not only brings new players to the legislative arena. These players are now in legitimate positions of public influence to contribute to the definition of the public interest which will flow from the urban regime. The municipal employment data examined in this study demonstrate the likely impact of minority representatives on the substance of public policy. This engenders some conflict. However, this should not be surprising given that the polity now has to consider the interests of communities systematically excluded in previous times from direct policy making. However, the level of conflict is not overwhelming. To the extent that ethnic and racial conflict is institutionalized within the legislative arena, it is now elevated to the level of societal decision making which is most appropriate to resolving issues of conflicting if not incompatible definitions of the public interest. Where better to begin to resolve difficult issues of land use, tax abatement, and expenditure of public revenues as they disparately affect ethnic and racial communities, than in governmental arenas? This is, precisely, the function of government.

In assessing the benefits of enhanced minority representation it is of course necessary to note what has not changed. Consistent with Reed's (1988), suggestions regarding the limits of change possible under a black regime, major social change has not occurred in the cities examined here. Structural constraints of both politics and economics appear. However, it is inappropriate to conclude that the incremental changes made possible through enhanced minority representation are therefore largely meaningless or worse yet, only superficially symbolic in that they contribute to a greater sense of political efficacy by minority voters, despite limited social change.

If the legitimate formally elected representatives of minority communities are unable to resolve difficult issues consistent with their understandings of their constituencies' self-interest, at least the political system has provided them the opportunity to affect legislative decision making through the exercise of responsibility and self-determination. Majoritarian decision making in legislative arenas has never guaranteed success for any electoral minority. The urban regime described here is no different. Stone's (1989) reminder of the parameters imposed by the political economy, especially the needs and interests of those with investment capital, shows us how even electoral majorities are not guaranteed policy success. The likelihood of success of minority communities is similarly constrained.

Nonetheless the one set of resources which ethnic and racial minority communities can bring consistently to the reconsideration of the public interest is its formal representatives. Ethnic and racial minorities often have little else with which to negotiate. A focus on formal representatives to understand the position of minority groups in American political development

through their standing in the distribution of political influence is therefore appropriate. When that public interest which reflects the system of governance encompasses the views of communities previously excluded from direct participation, the public interest is itself transformed into, if nothing else, a more *informed public interest*.

It is informed by varying perspectives. It is informed by viability; not all problems for which changes may be sought are within the purview of local governments. More segments of the electorate, through their representatives, will be aware of these constraints. Enhanced governmental legitimacy, when it does make decisions, should result. But this enhanced legitimacy is not based on false consciousness. The legitimacy should be based upon the presence of more opportunities for policy, evaluation from different interest perspectives which should, then, enhance the specification of policy consequences. Simply stated, "the folks will like it, or they won't," depending on whether it meets their thresholds of acceptability. These thresholds should have their advocates. Only now can the public interest become a public interest that is beyond the confines of constituency service; a public interest beyond interest group politics. The requisites of legislative cooperation now demand creativity on the part of all representatives. At least that creativity will be informed by more perspectives than have informed it in the past. Perhaps only then can we again begin to make progress toward a more inclusive discourse of politics. The Voting Rights Act has contributed directly to this end. It should not be surprising that it comes from cities. Issues of inclusion, incorporation, governance, and regime change are most prominent there.

## REFERENCES

Booth, John A., and David R. Johnson. 1983. "Power and Progress in San Antonio Politics, 1836-1970." In *THE POLITICS OF SAN ANTONIO: COMMUNITY, PROGRESS, AND POWER*, D.R. Johnson, et al, eds. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. 1984. *PROTEST IS NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Campbell, Donald T., and Julian C. Stanley. 1963. *EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Cottrell, Charles L., and R. M. Stevens. 1978. "The 1975 Voting Rights Act and San Antonio, Texas: Toward a Federal Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government." *PUBLIUS* 8: 79-99.

Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *WHO GOVERNS?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davidson, Chandler. 1972. *BIRACIAL POLITICS*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1984. "Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview." In *MINORITY VOTE DILUTION*, Chandler Davidson, ed. Washington, DC: Howard University Press.

Davidson, Chandler, and George Korbel. 1981. "At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence." *THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS* 43: 982-1005.

Dillon, Judge. 1911. *COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS*. Fifth edition.

Eisinger, Peter K. 1980. *THE POLITICS OF DISPLACEMENT: RACIAL AND ETHNIC TRANSITION IN THREE AMERICAN CITIES*. NY: Academic Press.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1982. "Black Employment in Municipal Jobs: The Impact of Black Political Power." *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 76: 380-392.

Engstrom, Richard L., and Michael E. McDonald. 1981. "The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clarifying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship." *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 75: 344-54.

Fleischmann, Arnold. *The Adoption of the 8-3 Plan in Dallas*. Unpublished manuscript, no date.

Fraga, Luis Ricardo, Kenneth J. Meier, and Robert E. England. 1986. "Hispanic Americans and Educational Policy: Limits to Equal Access." *THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS* 48: 850-876.

Fraga, Luis Ricardo. 1988. "Domination Through Democratic Means: Nonpartisan Slating Groups in City Electoral Politics." *URBAN AFFAIRS QUARTERLY* 43: 528-555.

\_\_\_\_\_. *THE CHANGING URBAN REGIME: MINORITY COMMUNITIES AND THE LIMITS TO DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES*. Book manuscript in progress.

Gibson, L. Tucker. 1983. "Mayorality Politics in San Antonio." In *THE POLITICS OF SAN ANTONIO: COMMUNITY, PROGRESS, AND POWER*, D.R. Johnson et al., eds. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Gibson, L. Tucker, and Robert A. Ashcroft. 1977. *Political Organizations in a Nonpartisan System*. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, TX.

Hays, Samuel P. 1964. "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era." *PACIFIC NORTHWEST QUARTERLY* 55: 157-169.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1975. "Political Parties and the Community-Society Continuum." In *THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM: STATES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT*, William Nesbitt Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds. London: Oxford University Press.

Head, Louis P. 1930. "Dallas Joins Ranks of Manager Cities." *NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW* 12: 806-809.

Hunter, Floyd. 1953. *COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.

Jones, W.D. 1935. "Dallas Wins a Place in the Sun." *NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW* 24: 11-14.

Lineberry, Robert L. 1977. *EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY: THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SERVICES*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

MacManus, Susan. 1978. "City Council Election Procedures and Minority Representation: Are They Related?" *SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY* 59: 153-161.

Mladenka, Kenneth R. 1978. "Organizational Rules, Service Equality, and Distributional Decisions in Urban Politics." *SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY* 59: 192-201.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1980. "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control." *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 74: 991-998.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1989. "Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics." *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 83: 165-191.

Peterson, Paul E. 1981. *CITY LIMITS*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. *THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Reed, Adolph Jr. 1988. "The Black Urban Regime: Structural Origins and Constraints." *COMPARATIVE URBAN AND COMMUNITY RESEARCH* 1: 138-189.

Sanders, Luther L. 1974. *Nonpartisanism: Its Uses as a Campaign Appeal in San Antonio, Texas, 1962-1971*. M.A. thesis, St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1975. *How to Win Elections in San Antonio the Good Government Way, 1955-1971*. San Antonio, TX: Department of Urban Studies, St. Mary's University.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA*. NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Shefter, Martin. 1985. *POLITICAL CRISIS/FISCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF NEW YORK CITY*. NY: Basic Books, Inc.

Stone, Clarence N. 1989. *REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA 1946-1988*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

Stone, Harold A., Donald K. Price, and Katherine H. Stone. 1940. *CITY MANAGER GOVERNMENT IN NINE CITIES*. Chicago: Public Administration Service.

Taebel, Delbert T. "Minority Representation on City Councils." *SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY* 59: 143-152.

Thernstrom, Abigail M. 1987. *WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Weinstein, James. 1962. "Organized Business and the City Commission and Manager Movements." *THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY* 28: 166-182.

**Table 1**  
**First Choice Preferences in General Elections<sup>a</sup>**

Voters	First Choice Preferences in Contested Races						Totals	
	GGL Candidates			Non-GGL Candidates				
	White	Hispanic	Black	White	Hispanic	Black	Races	Percent
Whites	58.7	19.6	5.4	11.9	3.3	1.1	92	100
Hispanics	15.2	12.0	0.0	28.3	39.1	5.4	92	100
Blacks <sup>b</sup>	17.5	5.0	c	50.0	22.5	5.0	40	100

a. "First Choice Preference" refers to that candidate who receives the highest percentage of support issued by an ethnic or racial group in a contested race.

b. Only includes races between 1955 and 1963 in which there were a total of 40 GGL candidates in contested races.

c. No black candidates were slated by the GGL between 1955 and 1963.

Table 2

**First Choice Preferences: Minority GGL Candidates<sup>a</sup>**

First Choice Preferences in Contested Races							
Voters	Minority GGL Candidates		Non-GGL Candidates			Totals	
	Hispanic	Black	White	Hispanic	Black	Races	Percent
Whites	58.1	16.1	12.9	9.7	3.2	31	100
Hispanics	<b>35.5</b>	0.0	19.4	<b>41.9</b>	3.2	31	100
Blacks <sup>b</sup>	<b>25.0</b>	c	37.5	<b>37.5</b>	c	8	100

- a. "First Choice Preference" refers to that candidate who receives the highest percentage of support issued by an ethnic or racial group in a contested race.
- b. Only includes races between 1955 and 1963 in which there were a total of eight GGL candidates in contested races.
- c. No black candidates were slated by the GGL between 1955 and 1963.

Table 3  
Councilmembers' Racial/Ethnic Backgrounds  
City of Dallas

Year	White	Mexican American	African American	Total
1931	9	0	0	9
1933	9	0	0	9
1935	9	0	0	9
1937	9	0	0	9
1939	9	0	0	9
1941	9	0	0	9
1943	9	0	0	9
1945	9	0	0	9
1947	9	0	0	9
1949	9	0	0	9
1951	9	0	0	9
1953	9	0	0	9
1955	9	0	0	9
1957	9	0	0	9
1959	9	0	0	9
1961	9	0	0	9
1963	9	0	0	9
1965	9	0	0	9
1967*	9	0	0	9
1969	9	1	1	11
1971	9	1	1	11
1973	8	1	2	11

*Structural Change to 8—3 Plan*

	AL	SMD	AL	SMD	AL	SMD	AL=3 SMD=8
1975	3	6	0	0	0	2	11
1977	3	6	0	0	0	2	11
1979**	3	5	0	1	0	2	11
1981	3	5	0	1	0	2	11
1983	3	6	0	0	0	2	11
1985	3	6	0	0	0	2	11
1987	2	6	1	0	0	2	11

\* Two additional councilmembers appointed to expand council to 11. Both appointees were white.

\*\* 1979 election postponed to 1980 due to litigation regarding new boundary lines.

Table 4  
Councilmembers' Racial/Ethnic Backgrounds  
City of San Antonio

Year	White	Mexican American	African American	Total
1955	7	2	0	9
1957	7	2	0	9
1959	7	2	0	9
1961	7	2	0	9
1963	7	2	0	9
1965	6	2	1	9
1967	5	3	1	9
1969	5	3	1	9
1971	5	3	1	9
1973	5	3*	1	9
1975	6	2	1	9

*Structural Change to 10-1 Plan*

	<i>AL</i>	<i>SMD</i>	<i>AL</i>	<i>SMD</i>	<i>AL</i>	<i>SMD</i>	<i>AL = 1</i> <i>SMD = 10</i>
1977	1	4	0	5	0	1	11
1979	1	5	0	4	0	1	11
1981	0	5	1	4	0	1	11
1983	0	5	1	4	0	1	11
1985	0	5	1	4	0	1	11
1987	0	5	1	4	0	1	11

\*One Mexican American resigned and was replaced by a white council member.

Table 5  
Relative Percent Difference,<sup>a</sup> Population and Municipal Employment

	African Americans	Mexican Americans	Anglos
<b>DALLAS</b>			
Population <sup>b</sup>	+26	+63	-7
Total employment <sup>c</sup>	+55	+54	-18
Officials/administrators	+310	+254	-14
Protective service	+103	+89	-10
Service/maintenance	+40	+61	-41
<b>SAN ANTONIO</b>			
Population <sup>d</sup>	+15	+23	+17
Total employment <sup>e</sup>	+15	+8	-16
Officials/administrators	+10	+61	-20
Protective service	+46	+19	-16
Service/maintenance	+1	-.2	-1

<sup>a</sup> Relative percent difference (RPD) was calculated with the formula:

$$RPD = \frac{P2 - P1}{P1} \times 100$$

P = proportion of population or worker category from a racial/ethnic group

1 = pre-structural change period

2 = post-structural change period

P1 and P2 are aggregations for the entire period, not the average with each year weighted equally.


<sup>b</sup> These figures represent the population changes from 1970 to 1980.

<sup>c</sup> These figures and those that follow represent the worker category changes from 1974-75 as the pre-change period, and 1978-1988 as the post-change period. Years 1976 and 1977 are excluded because they are the years of initial transition.

<sup>d</sup> These figures represent the population changes from 1970 to 1980.

<sup>e</sup> These figures and those that follow represent the worker category changes from 1974-1977 as the pre-change period, and 1980-1988 as the post-change period. Years 1978 and 1979 are excluded because they are the years of initial transition.

Figure 1.1 The Changing Urban Regime



**Figure 2**  
**Representation/Population Ratio**  
**City of Dallas**




Figure 3  
 Representation/Population Ratio  
 City of San Antonio




Figure 4  
 Total Municipal Employment  
 City of Dallas





Figure 5  
Officials/Administrators  
City of Dallas




Figure 6  
Protective Service  
City of Dallas




Figure 7  
Service/Maintenance  
City of Dallas




Figure 8  
 Total Municipal Employment  
 City of San Antonio




Figure 9  
**Officials/Administrators**  
 City of San Antonio




Figure 10  
Protective Service  
City of San Antonio




Figure 11  
Service/Maintenance  
City of San Antonio

