The colloquium meets generally three times per quarter on Thursdays at 4:15 in the Lane History Building, Room 307, unless noted below.
Structuralism in Philosophy of Physics: Alternatives to Realism
October 6 - 8th, 2011
Stanford Humanities Center, 424 Santa Teresa St., Stanford CA
Ian Burney, University of Manchester, UK
"Spaces and Traces: The Making of the Modern Crime Scene"
noon, October 10, 2011
location: History 307
Please RSVP for lunch to email@example.com
Richard Healey, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona
November 10, 2011
4:15pm, Room 217 of History Building 200
"Quantum Theory without Beables: a Desert Pragmatist View"
Abstract: J.S. Bell introduced the term 'beable' to apply to things "which can be described in 'classical terms', because they are there." By 'classical terms', he "refers simply to the familiar language of everyday affairs, including laboratory procedures, in which objective properties—beables—are assigned to objects." Finding contemporary formulations of quantum theory frustratingly vague because these mention local observables but no local beables, Bell proved that predictions of a "serious" theory of local beables meeting a condition of local causality conflict with experimentally confirmed predictions of quantum theory. Some take this to mean that any acceptable account of these experimental results must involve non-local causation that is in serious tension with relativity. I maintain, on the contrary, that quantum theory's lack of beables helps explain these results locally and in harmony with relativity. Neither quantum states nor Born probabilities describe "what is there", while acceptance of quantum theory even undermines Bell's claim that "The beables must include the settings of switches and knobs on experimental equipment, the currents in coils, and the readings of instruments".
Robert Batterman, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
November 17, 2011
4:15pm, Room 217 of History Building 200
"The Tyranny of Scales"
Abstract: This paper examines a fundamental problem in applied mathematics. How can one model the behavior of materials that display radically different, dominant behaviors at different length scales. Although we have good models for material behaviors at small and large scales, it is often hard to relate these scale-based models to one another. Macroscale models represent the integrated effects of very subtle factors that are practically invisible at the smallest, atomic, scales. For this reason it has been notoriously difficult to model realistic materials with a simple bottom-up-from-the-atoms strategy. The widespread failure of that strategy forced physicists interested in overall macro-behavior of materials toward completely top-down modeling strategies familiar from traditional continuum mechanics. The problem of the "tyranny of scales" asks whether we can exploit our rather rich knowledge of intermediate micro- (or meso-) scale behaviors in a manner that would allow us to bridge between these two dominant methodologies. Macroscopic scale behaviors often fall into large common classes of behaviors such as the class of isotropic elastic solids, characterized by two phenomenological parameters—so-called elastic coefficients. Can we employ knowledge of lower scale behaviors to understand this universality—to determine the coefficients and to group the systems into classes exhibiting similar behavior?
Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami
Thursday, December 1, 2011
4:15pm, Room 217 of History Building 200
"Visual Evidence in Scientific Practice"
Abstract: An account of visual evidence is provided and its changing roles in different domains of science are examined. The various roles are discussed in the context of molecular biology, biochemistry, and particle physics.
Neil Safier, University of British Columbia
as part of "Cultural Synchronization and Disjuncture" series on cultural theory and Latin Americanism of the Division of Literatures, Cultures and Languages at Stanford
Piggot Hall room 216
February 3, 2012, 2pm
Co-sponsored with the Division of Literatures, Cultures, and Languages
- Andrew Janiak, Duke University Department of Philosophy
February 23rd, 2012
"Isaac Newton at the boundary between theology and natural philosophy."
History Building 200 Room 205
Abstract: It is well known that Newton regarded Descartes as his principal philosophical interlocutor when composing the first edition of the Principia. The arguments in the Scholium on space and time, for instance, can be interpreted as focusing specifically on the relativist conception of space and motion in Descartes's Principles. What is less well known, however, is that this Cartesian conception, along with Descartes's attempt to avoid Galileo's fate in 1633, serves as an essential background to understanding Newton's own (poorly understood) view of the theological implications of his theory of space, time and motion. In particular, after withdrawing Le Monde from publication in 1633 because of its Copernican leanings, Descartes later introduced a "fudge factor" into the theory of motion in the Principles, concluding that in one sense the earth does move, but properly speaking, it does not. This background highlights the novelty and originality of Newton's own attempt to indicate how Scriptural passages concerning the motion of the Earth could be reconciled with the philosophical views he developed during the period from 1680-1687. New evidence from archival sources and correspondence supports this argument, shedding new light on the Scholium itself.
Susan Reverby, Wellesley College
"Escaping Melodrama: Reflections of an Historian on the U.S. Public Health Service Infamous Studies in Tuskegee and Guatemala"
Co-sponsored with the Global Health Program of the Medical School
March 14th, 2012
History Building 200 Room 307
Mathematics as Literature Workshop
Organized by Reviel Netz
Tuesday, April 13th, 2012, 9am-6pm
location: Classics Building 110, Room 112
9:00am Roi Wagner, Hebrew University of Jerusalem - "Productive Repetitions and double entendres in Mathematical Texts"
10:15am Alain Herreman, University of Rennes, France - "Introducing Inaugural Texts: Three Examples"
12:45pm Reviel Netz, Stanford University - "Spirals, Spliced and Bundled"
2:00pm Amir Alexander, UC, Los Angeles - "The Builder and the Explorer: Narratives of Mathematical Proof"
3:30pm Jacqueline Feke, Stanford University - "Ptolemy's Polemical Prolegomena"
4:45pm Courtney Roby, Cornell University - "Where the Action is: Narrative Ekphrasis in Greek and Roman Mechanical Texts"
Download the program as PDF
Co-sponsored with the Departments of Classics
Emma Spary, University of Cambridge
"On her new book, Eating the Enlightenment: French Food and the Sciences, 1670-1760"
Monday, April 16th, 2012, 4:15pm
Building 380 Room 380Y
Alexei Grinbaum, Philosophy of Science Lab (LARSIM), French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), Saclay
"Prometheus, Pandora and the Golem in a science lab"
Abstract: Novel nanomaterials require new toxicological studies, but do we need a new ethics for nanotechnology? I'll argue that the change in the human condition induced by emerging technologies (ICT, synthetic biology, etc.) calls for an approach based on comparing our new situation with the ethical questions asked in old narratives, from Antiquity to 21st century. These narratives help to reflect on the human condition by establishing a chain of meaning that informs our own evolution from revolutionary scientific discoveries to their societal integration.
May 3rd, 2012, 4:15pm
Building 240 Room 101
Martin Lin, Rutgers University
"The Modal Status of Absolute Space and Time in Leibniz."
May 8th, 2012, 4:15pm
Wendy Parker, Department of Philosophy, Ohio University
"The Target of Testing: Models, Adequacy and the Aims of Science"
May 10th, 2012, 4:15pm
Abstract: Models of real-world systems are widely used in science. It is often suggested that these models are tested or confirmed when their results are compared with observational data. I contend that this way of thinking is misguided; what we can sensibly aim to test or confirm via such comparisons are not scientific models themselves, but rather their adequacy for particular purposes. I then argue that testing a model's adequacy-for-purpose involves challenges beyond those faced when testing whether a model embodies a true hypothesis about the workings of a target system, and I illustrate with some examples, including the case of climate modeling. Finally, I offer some exploratory remarks on how the notion of adequacy-for-purpose could figure in our understanding of the aims of science more generally.
Erik Curiel, Rotman Institute of Philosophy,
The University of Western Ontario,
"On the Meaning and Role of the Principle of Equivalence in General Relativity"
Abstract: The principle of equivalence played a crucial role in Einstein's
original arguments for and formulation of the theory of general
relativity. It is therefore somewhat surprising to learn that there
is still, to this day, no general agreement on exactly what the
principle says, or ought to say, and even no general agreement on
whether any known formulation of it plays an important role in the
theory, or even holds true in the theory. I shall canvass several
of the leading proposals for ways to try to capture the spirit of
the principle, and argue that none of them actually are even
formulable in a rigorous, precise sense in the theory; it trivially
follows that there can be no question of their truth. The proposal
made in recent years by Harvey Brown and Eleanor Knox is of
particular interest, as it does in fact seem to be more or less
rigorously formulable in the terms of the theory. I argue, however,
that it still fails, and the way it does so is not only subtle but,
of even greater interest, illuminates the way that the peculiar
features of general relativity as a theory militate against the
possibility of such a formulation's holding true. I propose a novel
explication of the principle which does, in some sense, seem to hold
true in the theory, and does seem to capture much of what the
principle is supposed to, but does not seem to admit of rigorous
formulation in the theory. In the end, it seems that there is no
rigorous, true statement of the principle. I conclude with a few
remarks on what status, if any, we ought to accord the principle,
such as it is.
May 15th, 2012, 4:15pm
Joyce Chaplin, Department of History, Harvard University
"Earthsickness: Circumnavigation and the Terrestrial Human Body, 1520-1800."
May 21st, 2012, 4:15pm
Lane History Building 200, room 305
From the 1500s into the early 1800s, most of the mariners who tried to go around the world died, mostly of scurvy. Commentary on their suffering represented a meaningful event in the conceptualization of the human body as a planetary entity: circumnavigation offered their scorbutic bodies as evidence that humans were terrestrial creatures, physically suited to the earthly parts of a terraqueous globe.