Gorkem Ozbek

SymbSys 205

Spring 2005

Commentary on Week 9

The Real and the Simulated

In his article on simulacra and science fiction, Baudrillard argues that, at least in science fiction writing, the real is becoming indistinguishable from the imaginary (or the artificial, as the case may be) by way of simulation. We discussed this idea in class within the context of an example: a man loses a wife whom he loves dearly but nonetheless refuses to live with a simulation of his deceased wife which, in fact, would be indistinguishable from his wife as she was when she was alive. I would like to elaborate on this discussion and argue that in most cases the simulation of an entity can replace the entity itself.

Let us consider the example again. Can we justify the husband’s decision on grounds other than sentimentality and traditionalism? This is possible, as was suggested in class, if we consider the example from the wife’s point of view. If the simulation is good enough, and in the example we are led to believe that it is, the husband would gradually forget he is living with a simulation and be happily reunited with his “wife.” His real, deceased wife, however, can never get anything out of this new set-up. Therefore, if the husband values his marriage as something made unique by what he and his wife mutually experienced, then it would make sense for him to reject the proposal, out of respect for this marriage if nothing else.

Given this explanation one may be tempted to consider two points. First, one may ponder whether consciousness as a whole is achievable at all on the part of the simulation. The answer seems easy: theology aside, there is no substantial reason to assume that a good enough simulation would not achieve a consciousness of its own. More importantly, one may wonder whether it is reasonable to think that the simulation can adopt the consciousness of whatever it is simulating, given, of course, that what is being simulated has a consciousness to begin with. This is a trickier question. Let us return to the example. Provided that we somehow program the simulation to take into account as its starting parameters the wife’s entire set of experiences, beliefs, moral values – in short everything that maps her mental life uniquely to her body – up until the point of her death, is there any reason to assume that the simulation cannot adopt her consciousness? The answer, in my opinion, is no. Surely, we would need a much greater understanding of the brain and the mind, as well as a better and more formally detailed definition of consciousness. We might also need, depending on the complexity of our new definitions, machines with more computing power than current technology has thus far made available. The point is, however, that this can also be achieved such that there would be no distinction between the real wife and the simulation, at least as far as human perception is concerned. Given that we ensure this continuity in the consciousness of whatever entity, whether organic or not, that, at any time, happens to be “the wife,” we can disqualify the justification spelled out above with respect to why the husband is right in rejecting the offer. Indeed, with the unity in consciousness achieved, there would be no reason to assume that the simulation cannot replace the wife in all imaginable respects.

There is, however, one final point to consider. By arguing that the simulation of an entity can be indistinguishable from the entity itself, are we also arguing that the imaginary can be indistinguishable from the real? The answer is yes, if we assume that simulation belongs in the realm of the imaginary. Surely, opinions would differ as to whether such an assumption can be made. In my opinion, however, simulation can very well qualify as imaginary. Only, with simulations, we may not always fully understand that which we are imagining.