

Geography of Institutional Choice: Presidential and Parliamentary Systems

Abstract

The relationship between political system type and democracy has been the subject to one of the most heated debates in comparative politics in the last decade. This paper establishes that this strand of research ignores the geographical clustering of presidential and parliamentary systems and argues that the relationship between system type and democracy may be spurious. When controlled for spatial correlation, income level, population size, Spanish colonial legacy, being post-communist or a sub-Saharan African country remain significant associates of political system type. Through case studies, the paper shows that elite bargaining and uncertainty are critical in the choice of institutions and that common historical trajectories leading to similar elite bargaining and uncertainty positions account for the geographical clustering.

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I. Introduction

Why are most Latin American countries presidential whereas most European countries are parliamentary? This question is a very simple way to state the main puzzle this paper tries to address. More specifically, the paper aims at empirically showing the extent of geographical clustering of presidential and parliamentary systems and testing the effects of geographical location on the choice of political system. It then suggests a causal mechanism for why countries choose the political systems they do; however, it does not aim at explaining the consequences of this choice -such as democratic government or economic performance. In that sense, this paper is a step from the literature on institutional choice towards the literature on the consequences of presidential and parliamentary systems.

If we look at the distribution of political systems around the world, we see a striking picture. Map 1 shows the countries with presidential and parliamentary systems. While the Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa and Former Soviet Union are dominantly presidential, Europe, South Asia and Oceania are dominantly parliamentary. Map 2 presents the same picture with a more refined definition of system type, the clustering remains. Yet, the literature dealing with the choice or consequences of political systems ignores the geographical distribution of these systems.

In what follows, I will first discuss the importance of studying choice of political systems arguing that a focus on choice of systems will shed new light on the debate on political system-democracy relationship. Second, I will present the empirical evidence for geographical clustering and test for the determinants of political system controlling for spatial autocorrelation. Then, I will demonstrate through case studies that the geographical clustering exists because historical trajectories which led to choice of institutions were shared by neighboring countries. The final section concludes.

II. “The Perils of Presidentialism”?

Political system type became a topic of scholarly interest coterminous with the third wave of democratization. As more countries became democratic, sustenance of these new democracies became an important concern. Scholars inquired which

institutional arrangements were more fertile ground for democracy. Among the institutions of interest was political system type, the question being whether presidentialism or parliamentarism is more prone to democratic breakdowns. The pioneering study was the Linz article titled “The Perils of Presidentialism” (Linz 1990).¹ He argues that presidential systems are more prone to democratic breakdowns and authoritarian regimes are likely to emerge and last in presidential systems.

Linz substantiates his argument by listing institutional features of presidential systems that make them vulnerable to authoritarian tendencies. Popular election of the president leads to dual democratic legitimacy, where both the legislature and the president can claim democratic legitimacy and the conflicts between the two branches may undermine the democracy and the stability of the regime. Fixed terms of the president, which is intended to foster stability by relieving the president from pressure by the legislature, may lead to inter-branch conflicts and inefficiencies. A lame duck president may stay in the office waiting for the end of the term while an effective president may have to leave office due to “no reelection” rules. The “winner take all” nature of the presidential elections is probably the most “undemocratic” aspect of presidentialism.² Although a one person executive is attractive in terms of identifiability³ and accountability, it is not favorable in terms of representativeness.

Linz’s criticism of presidentialism has been accompanied by a praise of parliamentary systems by Stepan and Skach (Stepan and Skach 1994). The authors find that of 93 countries that became independent between 1945 and 1979, only 15 were continuous democracies between 1980 and 1989 and all of these 15 countries had parliamentary systems (Stepan and Skach, 126). They also find that pure presidential systems have a military coup susceptibility rate of 40% compared to 18% of pure parliamentary systems. They conclude:

“We believe we are now in a position to say that the explanation of why parliamentarism is a more supportive constitutional framework lies in the following theoretically predictable and empirically observable tendencies: its greater propensity for governments to have majorities to

¹ Linz’s argument against presidentialism found its final statement in his contribution to an edited volume titled “The Failure of Presidential Democracy” (Linz 1994).

² Winner takes all renders democracy vulnerable because the winner may count on his support and prey on the losers as in the bargaining game in Weingast (1997).

³ See Strom (1990) for the definition of “identifiability.”

implement their programs; its greater ability to rule in a multiparty setting; its lower propensity for executives to rule at the edge of the constitution and its greater facility at removing a chief executive who does so; its lower susceptibility to military coup; and its greater tendency to provide long party or government careers, which add loyalty and experience to political society” (Stepan and Skach, 132).

Shugart and Carey (1992) and the volume edited by Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) are the two major studies in defense of presidentialism.⁴ Shugart and Carey first present empirical evidence against the argument that “presidentialism *as a regime type* [is] prone to breakdown, while parliamentarism contain[s] conflict-regulating mechanisms that would ordinarily shield it from breakdown” (Shugart and Carey 42, italics in original).⁵ They argue that presidentialism has advantages which are just the flip side of the disadvantages suggested by its critics. It is a majoritarian, one-man regime but accountability and identifiability are the advantages. Voters know they will get what they are voting for rather than seeing campaign promises falling prey to coalition building bargains after the elections. Voters also know who to hold responsible for bad policies, whereas in a parliamentary system there is an uncertainty about whether it is the coalition parties, the specific minister or the prime minister who is responsible for a bad policy. Fixed terms causing temporal rigidity and popular elections causing dual legitimacy are crucial for an independent and stable executive. Moreover, this independence enables the president to assume the role of an arbiter in party politics (Shugart and Carey 43-49; also Mainwaring and Shugart 33-40).⁶

An evaluation of the debate yields three main shortcomings that should be addressed. First, the debate is oriented too much towards presidentialism, and

⁴ One could also add the volume edited by Von Mettenheim (1997).

⁵ From my reading of the empirical evidence from either side of the argument, the results are VERY sensitive to the criteria for “democratic-ness” and to the choice of cases by these criteria. Stepan and Skach include cases which were democratic for at least one year between 1973-89 and exclude OECD countries in some analyses. Shugart and Carey focus on countries which had at least two democratic elections as of 1991 –where Mexico’s elections do not meet the criterion.

⁶ Two important arguments about the “methods” of the critics of presidentialism are that presidential systems have considerable variety, they are not all the same; and that presidentialism is not an institution in vacuum, they perform within an institutional framework. The former is the main argument of the Mainwaring and Shugart volume, which includes case studies from Latin America, showing the differences between presidential systems. Another example is Frye (1997) which shows the popularly elected post-communist presidents have considerably different presidential powers. The latter argument is exemplified by Mainwaring (1993) which evaluates presidentialism in the context of multiparty systems.

parliamentarism is reduced to the role of “the alternative” rather than being studied for its own sake. Second, it either focuses on a region or is overgeneralized. Lastly, the debate pays insufficient attention to how these systems came about or why these systems were chosen in the first place. I suggest that we take a step back and address these problems before we make claims about the political system-democracy relationship. This paper addresses the last problem –insufficient attention to institutional choice- in the next section.

The debate has started and still continues as attacks on and defense of presidentialism. It regards the parliamentary system as the alternative rather than studying it on its own. While recent studies focus on the different varieties of presidentialism and different levels of presidential powers, variety among parliamentary systems are only mentioned in the passing.⁷ Nevertheless, different designs of parliamentary procedures may make a big difference in terms of the presidentialism-parliamentarism debate. For example, Germany and Hungary have a constructive vote of confidence system, where a vote of confidence demand has to be accompanied by an alternative government proposal. This eliminates the instability caused by the vote of confidence procedure without temporal rigidity.

The debate originated from the empirical observation that Latin America’s presidential systems were prone to go authoritarian. Latin American presidentialism was compared with European parliamentarism and the natural conclusion that Europe (thus parliamentarism) is more democratic was reached. Focusing on a region inherently means a huge *ceteris paribus* assumption and it selects on the dependent variable. By focusing on Latin America, for example, the researchers are holding some historical and social factors constant.⁸ It is possible that it is not presidentialism but these factors which leads to the breakdown of democracies. As Shugart puts it “[g]iven the concentration of presidential democracies in one part of the world (namely, Latin America), how can we be sure that the region’s poor record of democracy is not due to historical or social factors

⁷ **citations about veto points.** One of the important variety is about who has most say within the executive: the cabinet as a whole, the prime minister or the independent ministries. Legislatures in parliamentary or presidential systems are studied extensively especially by formal theorists (See especially various issues of *Legislative Studies Quarterly*). However, these studies are not referred to in the political system – democracy debate.

⁸ See below, the third shortcoming, for an elaboration of this point.

rather than presidentialism?” (Shugart 1995, 169). In another vein, focusing on Europe and claiming that all parliamentary systems are democratic selects on the dependent variable because the regional focus ignores non-European parliamentary systems which had democratic breakdowns, such as Turkey and Pakistan.

More recent studies are cross-sectional, including cases from every region of the world. The results of these studies are very sensitive to the specification of what is democratic and the classification of countries according to their political systems.⁹ They typically control for income level or level of economic development and British colonial legacy; however, they do not account for other possible regional effects (which the regional focus holds constant).

The third shortcoming of the debate is closely related to the previous one. While the scholars involved in the debate focus on a region or conduct cross sectional analyses, they may be mixing up the causal arrows. To be more explicit, the relationship between political system and democracy may just be spurious. There may be factors that both give rise to the political system and ensure the survival of democracy, and if this is true they are neglected in most of these studies. Shugart criticizes Stepan and Skach’s findings arguing:

“If countries that are highly unlikely to sustain stable democracy owing to noninstitutional factors such as economic conditions or class structure are the same ones that, for historical reasons, tend to adopt presidential forms of government, we will observe a strong correlation between presidentialism and nondemocratic rule even in the absence of a causal link between them.” (Shugart 1995, 169-170).¹⁰

At this point, we need to stop speculating about correlations and start fleshing out the causal links between political system type and democracy. The first step in this direction is answering why countries choose the political systems they choose. Once we have established the factors that lead to the institutional choice, we can see whether these factors are also related to regime type. The main puzzle presented in this paper – geographical clustering- can give us clues about the origins of these systems: If clustering

⁹ These cross sectional studies may include new African and post-communist countries without paying enough attention that their systems are still being consolidated and that it is too soon to make definitive judgements. Special caution must be paid in comparisons of Latin American presidencies with Central Asian presidencies due to the differences in the length of their history.

¹⁰ Exceptions are Mainwaring and Shugart (pp.24) and Shugart and Carey (pp. 41) who consider the possibility of confounding factors.

is indeed significant, then the causal factors of interest are highly likely to have a geographical component to them.

III. A. Institutional Choice:

Until recently, where institutions come from had been a lesser concern in political science, because scholars focused on the outcomes of the institutions. Early studies on the origins of institutions emphasize culture (Almond and Verba, 1963) and structural factors such as political cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Sociological approaches to institutions emphasize coercive, mimetic and normative processes (Di Maggio and Powell 1983) whereas transaction cost economics emphasizes efficiency gains by minimizing transaction costs (Williamson 1975). New institutional analysis approaches institutions as equilibria sustained by interests and beliefs of rational actors (North 1991, Greif 2001). Institutions emerge as a result of strategic bargaining under uncertainty (Geddes 1996).¹¹

Most of current studies on institutional choice focus on choice of electoral systems (Boix 1999, Lijphart and Waisman 1996, Nohlen 1996, Siavelis and Valenzuela 1996, Luong 1997). Studies on political system choice emphasize institutional legacies (Jowitt), diffusion /mimicking (Elkins 2001) and strategic bargaining (Lijphart 1992, Geddes 1996, Shugart 1998, Frye 1997).¹² Cultural factors and diffusion are the two explanations that have a geographical component. Neighboring countries tend to share similar cultures and they may be mimicking each other's systems or the system of a common model which is geographically proximate. Section III.B. presents the statistical analysis of the associates of system type controlling for spatial autocorrelation and Section III.C. discusses the proposed explanations for political system choice in the light of the statistical analysis and case studies.

III.B. Empirical Analysis: Associates of Political System Type

¹¹ The difference from TCE is that the outcome does not have to be the most efficient option and thus the equilibrium does not have to be stable.

¹² It has to be noted that these studies consider institutional choice during democratic transitions and they mostly focus on the post-communist transitions. However, in many countries, the choice of political system did not coincide with democratization. These countries adopted a system after independence and retained it after democratization.

The starting point for the statistical analyses to be presented is the section titled “Democracy, regime type, and background conditions since the 1970s” in Mainwaring and Shugart (Ch.1, pp. 21-9). In this section, they argue that “if a background condition that is conducive to democracy is correlated with parliamentarism, then any attempt to correlate parliamentarism and democracy may be spurious unless some effort is made to control for background conditions” (pp. 24). They identify British colonial heritage, income level and size (population) as background factors that are conducive to democracy. The authors then suggest that these factors may be causing a spurious relationship between democracy and political system type. Their cross tabulations show that these factors are indeed correlated with system type. I will empirically test the relationships between these factors¹³ and political system and show that the estimates of these relationships are going to be biased if geographical distribution of the systems is not taken into account.

Maps 1 and 2 show that presidential and parliamentary systems are clustered together both when we specify political systems dichotomously and categorically. Is the clustering in the picture an illusion or real? New statistical tools enable us to test the hypothesis that there is a spatial autocorrelation between a country’s political system and those of its neighbors. I conducted a spatial autocorrelation analysis for both specifications of the political system variable using the neighborhood matrix generated by Arcview. The results in Table 1 show that the spatial correlation coefficient in both cases is around .5 and is statistically significant. This is a high enough correlation that has to be taken into account in both theoretical and empirical work.

Table 2 presents the relationship between political system and the three background factors Mainwaring and Shugart have identified: income level, population size and British colonial heritage. In this table and the following tables, model 1 refers to a simple OLS regression, model 2 refers to a linear regression with robust errors and model 3 refers to a linear regression including a lagged dependent variable.¹⁴ Interestingly, being a British colony is not statistically significant at the 5% level of

¹³ I have some other variables which I include in the analyses. My income level and population size variables are somewhat different than Mainwaring and Shugart’s. See the appendix for descriptions of variables used.

significance and it is less influential when the errors are corrected for spatial autocorrelation. Again comparing model 1 to model 2 in Table 2, income level is statistically highly significant in both models whereas population size is not. Now, comparing models 2 and 3, the magnitude of the effect of income level decreases while the lagged dependent variable has a substantively and statistically significant effect: hypothetically, if a country's neighbors move one category towards parliamentarism, the country in question is highly likely to move towards parliamentarism. However, under model 3, effects of being a British colony is statistically insignificant.

I have conducted the same analysis using years under British rule rather than a dummy variable as the control for British colonial heritage. In models 1 and 2, the association between income level and political system can be matched by two centuries of British rule. That is, two centuries of British rule has the same effect as moving up, say, from low income to middle income category. In model 3, years under British rule is not statistically significant, but substantially a time span of approximately a century is enough to match the association between income level and political system.

Table 3 introduces a control for Latin America and years under military executive between 1975 and 1995. Arguing that military rule leads to presidential regimes would be anachronistic for a majority of cases. Rather, I intend to see if there is an association between military rule and political system, probably caused by a third factor. If we do not take spatial autocorrelation into account, this association is statistically insignificant at the 5% level of significance, no matter which specification for British colonial heritage is used. The dummy for Latin America nicely establishes the importance of correcting for spatial autocorrelation. The sign of the coefficient confirms the observation that presidentialism dominates the region. However, when we correct for spatial autocorrelation, the significance of the region decreases although it remains statistically significant (at 10% level of significance under Model 3). Model 3 shows that the region dummy had been capturing some of the neighborhood effect and thus its effect diminishes when the neighborhood effect is controlled for.

¹⁴ See the Appendix for the discussion of the statistical techniques used and for an explanation of how the coefficients may be interpreted.

British colonial heritage is argued to be significant because the British Commonwealth was ruled by direct rule. The empire implanted British institutions and trained civil servants in the colonies. If this legacy continued after the independence, British legacy should be associated with parliamentary systems. The analysis above shows that this is true only if we neglect the effects of geography.¹⁵ How about legacies of other colonial powers? I add dummy variables for Spanish and French colonies and post-Communist countries to the initial model to see the effect of different political legacies comparatively. The results in Table 4 are striking: Being either a British or a French colony or being a post-communist country does not have significant effect on political system type. However, being a Spanish colony is significant at all levels of significance in all three models. Income level remains robust in this specification in terms of magnitude of effect and statistical significance. Population size is statistically significant at 10% level of significance in model 1 and at 5% level of significance in model 2 but it is less significant under model 3.¹⁶

Table 5 is the final calibration of the specification above I add a dummy variable for Sub Saharan Africa. It is significant both substantially and statistically. Interestingly, the communist legacy becomes more statistically and substantively significant when spatial autocorrelation is controlled for. Focusing on Model 3, all variables are statistically significant at 10% level of significance. A country is likely to be presidential if its income level is low, population size is large and if it has either Spanish colonial or communist legacy or if it is in Sub-Saharan Africa –the largest of these effects being the Spanish colonial legacy. The lagged dependent variable captures the geographical effects not accounted for by the region/legacy dummies and by the variation within the region.

To sum up the results from the empirical analysis, there are two important and robust results: structural factors and history matter, and since these are likely to be geographically clustered, neighborhood effects matter. However, not all historical legacies are significant. While Spanish colonial or communist legacies significantly

¹⁵ A big majority of African countries were parliamentary when they gained independence because the British imposed a parliamentary system and conducted parliamentary elections as a condition for granting independence. In 1998, African countries were all presidential or semi presidential except for four. This is an important factor in understanding the coefficient of British (or French) colonial legacy variable.

¹⁶ See notes on model specification in the Appendix for excluded cases under Model 3 and how they are related to this outcome.

favor presidentialism, British or French colonial legacy is not related to political system type. Sub-Saharan African countries have some factors in common which favor presidentialism, however, colonial legacies is not among them.

III. C. “Why did they Choose the Systems they Chose?”

*“One Rule seems to be, that if one Knight hits the other, he knocks him off his horse; and, if he misses, he tumbles off himself” **Through the Looking Glass** –L.Carroll.*

The critical question to be answered next is: Now that we have a pretty good idea about the associates of political system and the nature of the association, what is the causal mechanism behind these associations? Or in other words, since we know the answer to “what?” the next task is answering “why?” And this will necessarily lead us back to theories of institutional choice.

Consider the diffusion argument. Modeling after systems which are perceived to be more legitimate or successful (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983) is a compelling idea and it can also account for geographical clustering. When we look at constitutions of countries, we sometimes see that they are word by word imports of American, British or French (1958) constitutions. If neighbors look at the regional super power (e.g. the US for Latin America, Britain for Europe) at the time of constitution writing, then it is natural that we see neighborhood effects. Elkins (2001), for example, studies Brazilian 1987-88 constitutional assembly’s discussions on presidentialism and parliamentarism. He concludes that members who were educated in or have occupational linkages to the US and Europe voted for presidentialism and parliamentarism respectively.

This diffusion effect is even more pronounced in the ex-colonies of European powers. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire Handloff notes that:

“As in much of the Ivoirian political system, French influence weighed heavily in the preparation of the Constitution. Houphouët Boigny and its other authors had received much of their formal political education and experience in France, and Houphouët-Boigny himself had served in successive French governments in the 1950s. Not unexpectedly, the 1960 Constitution was largely taken (often verbatim) from the 1958 constitution of the Fifth Republic of France” (Handloff 1988, Ch.4)

Diffusion is a dubious process, however. Nobody will reinvent the wheel but taking another country’s constitution or institutions as models does not mean that

everything will be exactly copied. Côte d'Ivoire used the 1958 French model as an example. However, in Côte d'Ivoire, as in other ex-French colonies, presidentialism were "even more powerful than the original Gaullist model. By March 1963, all ten of the states had installed such 'reinforced' presidencies" (Le Vine 1986, 88).

Most often, mimicking is selective. Not all modern, civilized, efficient or legitimate models are adopted. Simon Bolívar rejected "a monarchy that is part aristocracy and part democracy although with such a government England has achieved much fortune and splendor," (cited in Herring 257) because he realized how easily executive powers vested in a single person can "degenerate into tyranny or into an absolute monarchy" (Herring 257). He thought the British system would not work in Latin America because "[o]nly a people as patriotic as the English are capable of controlling the authority of a king and of sustaining the spirit of liberty under the rule of scepter and crown" (cited in Herring 257). He concluded "[S]ince it is not possible for us to select the most perfect and complete form of government, let us avoid falling into demagogic anarchy or monocratic tyranny. These opposite extremes would only wreck us on similar reefs of misfortune and dishonor; hence, we must seek a mean between them. I say: do not adopt the best system of government, but the one which is most likely to succeed" (cited in Herring 257).

Fifty years later, in 1872, Namik Kemal¹⁷ wrote favorably about the same British model. He saw the British parliament as "the cradle of most of the political principles that we see in the world [...] and the embodiment in stone of the indomitable power of public opinion against authority"(Lewis 145). The Young Turks, inspired by Kemal's political thought, indeed followed the British model in establishing a constitutional monarchy with a parliament; however, Bolívar's prophecy for Latin America came true in Turkey when the Young Turk government degenerated into authoritarianism. The Constituent Assembly which wrote the 1924 constitution of the Turkish Republic was more careful about mimicking. "In its written report the Constitutional Commission stated that in the drafting of this constitution the Commission had examined the constitutions of other countries, but that all these examinations were limited by the spirit of the Turkish Revolution [anti-Sultanate]and the needs of the nation" (Kili 1971, 30)

¹⁷ Namik Kemal is the theoretical father of the 1876 Constitution, the first one in Turkish history.

If mimicking is indeed imperfect and selective, then the clustering of the chosen institutions is not because neighboring countries look up to a single model or each other. Rather, we observe clustering because neighboring countries find themselves under similar circumstances which lead them to choose similar institutions.

The institutional legacy argument suggests that the inherited institutions persist and continue to shape politics under new circumstances. The empirical analysis above has shown that British and French colonial legacies are not significant whereas Spanish colonial legacy is. What makes some legacies persist and others wither away is a question that is not answered by this argument. Britain tried to implant a parliamentary system before it granted independence to its colonies. Some of them (e.g. Ghana, Tanzania) rejected this system soon after they gained independence while others kept it (Australia, India). Estonia is a parliamentary system while Russia is semi-presidential although they inherited the same communist legacy (Frye). On the other hand, we observe similar political systems originating from different institutional legacies. The systems of Former Soviet Republics of Central Asia are more similar to African presidential systems rather than that of other Soviet Republics'.

How do we know what will be adopted and what will be changed in the model constitutions? How do we know which of the available models will be chosen? How much of the inherited institutions will prevail under new circumstances? Mimetic processes or institutional legacies cannot answer these questions. While not rejecting the possibility of mimetic processes or institutional legacies, we have to understand that these do not entail blindly mimicking a model or holding on to inherited institutions. While available models and institutional context at the time of institutional choice are important, they only set the stage. In order to understand the choices made, we need to take the argument to the micro level, analyzing why the actors, who were in the position to write the constitution, made certain choices and what their incentives were.

Institutional choice process can best be characterized as bargaining among boundedly rational actors under uncertainty. Strategic actors make choices (read: write or amend constitutions) after a bargaining episode and they try to make the best choice for themselves in a setting of varying levels of uncertainty. History and institutional

context are important, not on their own but because they determine who the actors are, their relative bargaining powers and the level of uncertainty.

The choice is on different institutional arrangements that divide the executive power differently between the president and the parliament.¹⁸ Then the decision will be made by the members of the parliament and the presidential candidate, who “pursue their own individual interests above all else, and [...] their interests center on furthering their political careers”(Geddes 1996, 18). Furthering political careers involves securing a position as a president or as an MP and having as much powers attached to that position as possible. Thus, both parties prefer the political system that assigns more power to their institutions.

The choice of political system, then, depends on the perceived bargaining power of the two sides. Bargaining power, in turn, is determined by the level of dependence on the other party for political survival or continuation of the political career. Or in other words, bargaining power becomes a question of who owes its political existence to whom. The level of dependence is a function of power bases (the military, the Soviet army, electoral base) and uncertainty over the power bases. Power bases and the level of uncertainty are, in turn, determined by the historical process that leads to the writing of constitution.

When we study the historical processes leading up to the choice of political system, we can distinguish four main types¹⁹:

1. Monarchies gradually devolving powers to parliaments
2. Colonies gaining independence after a period of transition under colonial power
3. Colonies gaining independence without a period of transition under colonial power
4. Post-communist transitions^{20 21}

¹⁸ Replace president with monarch in the case of constitutional monarchies, such as the UK, Malaysia or Denmark.

¹⁹ Except post-communist countries, very few countries changed political systems when they democratized. The changes were always from presidentialism to president-assembly or semi-presidentialism. E.g. Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sao Tome e Principe, Senegal. There has not been changes from a pure presidential system to pure parliamentary system.

²⁰ Which may or may not involve gaining independence. The common historical process is non-communist political forces allying with reformist communists in order to liberalize politics.

²¹ Von Beyme (2000, pp.2) suggests that the parliamentary regimes that developed after the French Revolution follow the sequence of parliamentarization –democratization -reconsolidation whereas the transitions in 1990s follow the sequence of liberalization-democratization-consolidation.

In the first case, we observe a rising class gradually restricting and taking over the powers of the sovereign by rallying the public support behind them (Europe, Thailand, former British colonies who still recognize the Queen). In the second case, nationalist movements flourish under the transitory democratic regimes set by the colonial powers, they challenge the colonial power and dominate party politics after independence (former British and French African colonies). In the third case, the colonial power leaves abruptly, and the vacuum of power is filled either by the strongest of existing groups or civil war breaks out (Spanish America, Belgian Congo). In the fourth case, the communist party's power is challenged by democratic groups at varying levels of strength or unity.

Considering these historical trajectories and the bargaining power endowments they are likely to produce, the following hypotheses can be suggested:²²

H1: If one of the parties in the bargaining is a monarch, then the choice will be parliamentarism. If the monarchy is abolished during the bargaining, then the choice will follow from H2-6, whichever applies.

H2: If the presidential candidate controls the military, then the choice will be presidential.

H3: If the majority of members of parliament have local bases of power, then the choice will be parliamentarism.

H4: If the majority of members of the parliament “ride on the coattails”²³ of the presidential candidate, then the choice will be presidentialism.

H5: If there are multiple presidential candidates and there is uncertainty about their chances of winning, then outcome will be semi-presidentialism.

H6: If the parliament is fragmented, then the outcome will be semi-presidentialism, president-parliamentarism or presidentialism depending on the level of fragmentation.

²² Some combinations are possible: e.g. Coexistence of H2 and H3 yields a semi-presidential or president-assembly depending on the perceived possibility of a coup threat.

²³ By “riding the president’s coattails” I do not exactly mean members of the party of the President getting into the assembly in coterminous presidential and parliamentary elections. What I mean is that the MP is nominated by the party not because of his popularity or constituency and s/he gets votes for being in the party supported by the President.

H7: Once the system is chosen, it will persist unless an endogenous or exogenous shock disturbs the system. The shock can be a change in the composition of actors,²⁴ information or constraints and is necessary but not sufficient for change.

In order to demonstrate how these hypotheses work, or in other words, how bargaining power leads to different political system choices, I will present brief case studies of institutional choice. I will study the republican Turkey, and Chile and Côte d'Ivoire at independence.

Republican Turkey:

The effects of European ideas and institutions on Turkish politics cannot be denied. The ideas fostered by the French revolution, which coincided with the declining phase of the Ottoman Empire, influenced the Turkish society and politics in many respects.. However, the political developments cannot be explained by diffusion of ideas only. Some groups in the society adopted them and found it in their interest to adopt these ideas. In Turkey, the group which promoted European style parliamentarism was the intelligentsia –western educated elite who were aware how backwards the Ottoman Empire was compared to Europe and who, at the same time, were dissatisfied by not having enough voice in politics. In 1876 and 1908, these revolutionaries were successful to make the Sultan accept (short lived) constitutions and commence parliaments consisting of representatives of the provinces of the Empire.²⁵

Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 after the WWI and the War of Independence that followed. During the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal was also taking steps towards the political establishment of the new country. He collected various

²⁴ The overlapping generations model we had in Baron's class... When the new generation was more than half of membership the model unraveled... examples for how information and constraints may change and in turn change the system... maybe in case studies.

²⁵ It should be noted that the revolutionaries' efforts were also aided by the European powers. Lewis writes of Tanzimat that "[t]his was not the first time that a major reform had come at a moment when the goodwill of the Western powers was needed. The Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber, of 1839, came soon after the disastrous defeat of the Ottoman army at Nezib, when European support was needed against the victorious Muhammad Ali of Egypt; the Imperial Rescript of 1856 had followed immediately on the Crimean War, when Western goodwill was required in securing a peace treaty favourable to Turkey; and now the appointment of a reformer as Grand Vezir and the proclamation of a liberal constitution were perfectly timed to circumvent plans for intervention and protection, and to rally Western support in the war with Russia that was looming ahead"(165-6).

local Associations and Societies for the Defense of Rights under one roof, which later became Republican People's Party, the single party until 1945. Soon after the Sultan dissolved the Ottoman parliament in 1920, elections to an emergency assembly were called by the nationalists and Grand National Assembly became a rival government in Ankara to that of the Sultan in Istanbul. After the Sultan declared the Ankara government traitors, even those who desired a constitutional monarchy became loyal to the republican cause. The emergency constitution of 1921 said that the sovereignty belongs to the nation Grand National Assembly represents the nation.²⁶ The main pillar in government was the concentration of powers, where legislative and executive powers were both vested in the Assembly.

After the victory, a general election was held for 286 deputies, the new Assembly declared the Republic and elected Mustafa Kemal to the Presidency of the republic. This constitutional amendment was Mustafa Kemal's political maneuver to abolish the Caliphate and to remove the ambiguities and confusions about the political system. It was passed with 158 votes, many abstentions but no dissension.

In 1924, a constituent assembly met to write a new constitution. Presidential powers were debated extensively. On the proposal for 7 year presidency Celal Nuri Bey of Gelibolu said: "The personality, the name, of Gazi Pasha [Mustafa Kemal] is not the point under consideration here. This Constitution has been prepared ... under the assumption that different people will hold the office of the Presidency" (cited in Kili 46). During the discussions on presidents' power to hold chief-of-staff position, Niyazi Bey from Mersin said: "Every President may not be a great soldier as Gazi" (cited in Kili 50) and the final decision was an article saying "The supreme command of the armed forces is vested in the Grand National Assembly and is represented by the President of the Republic."

In the case of the Turkish Republic H1 and H3 apply. Since the early years of parliamentarism, deputies were involved in the politics at the center. The National Assemblies, as well as the Associations during the war, consisted of people who had local power bases. This is not to say that they were selected democratically, especially in the earlier periods, or that there were not any intelligentsia or military members, who do not

²⁶ Thus the Sultanate was abolished.

have local power bases, in the Assemblies.²⁷ In terms of party politics, the deputies knew they needed to be nominated by RPP leadership to get into the parliament, but also that the party needed to nominate them in order not to lose its strength in the localities.²⁸

Mustafa Kemal was reluctant to become a new monarch. Knowing that the Assembly would let the “father of the Turks” run the show during his lifetime anyway, he did not want to institutionalize presidential power. Deputies, on the other hand, were reluctant to create a new monarch or losing the power vested in the Parliament as the representative of the nation. Although they acknowledged the special status of Mustafa Kemal, The parliament retained the power.

Independent Chile:²⁹

The Chilean case is interesting because it was a presidential system when it gained independence in 1810. After a period of coups and political instability, it stabilized as a semi-presidential system in 1891. This era, which is named “parliamentary republic” ended in 1924, where the current presidential system was established.

The Chilean independence, like all of Spanish America, can be characterized as an abrupt end of colonialism. Chile did not even have a mass liberation movement against the royalist armies. When the French took over the Spanish crown, the Chileans were left with the question of who was in charge: the Spanish crown under French rule, the spanish rebels or the local notables. The local notables were the *criollos*, who were native or mixed people who had increasing economic power that did not translate into political power during the colony. In 1810, the *criollo* leaders of Santiago formed a government (*junta*) claiming that they would assume government in the name of the ousted King of Spain. The elite were divided between those who remained loyal to the Spanish King and those who wanted full independence. Civil wars between two groups

²⁷ Turan (198X) writes “Deputies tended to come from two types of backgrounds. Some were men who could best be described as local notables who had joined the Nationalists during the war and who had continued to support the Republican People’s Party in their respective provinces. Others were men who hd distinguished themselves in the service of the state or were accomplished intellectuals” (113).

²⁸ Ilter Turan (1988, 71) names this a “tacit agreement” which collapsed after WWII when the local notables evolved into a stronger economic class and which resulted in the establishment of Democrat Party in 1945.

²⁹ Historical account based on Hudson (1994) and Edwards (1931).

continued until 1830. After the victory led by Portales and the stabilization of the country, elections for a National Congress and a President were held in 1831. In the same year a Constituent Convention was summoned, which produced the 1833 constitution. The constitution was an aristocratic constitution written under the authoritarian regime of the triumvirate including President Prieto and victorious Portales.

Towards the mid 19th century, Chile had stabilized, governed by Conservative presidents with peaceful presidential successions. However, there was discontent by Liberals and regionalists, who opposed the centrist and elitist governments.³⁰ Liberals won the upper hand after their rebellion against President Montt Torres in 1851. He was followed by Liberal presidents.

Between 1833 and 1925, only one president was removed by force, Balmaceda in 1891. Hudson writes:

“Although scholars have debated whether the uprising against Balmaceda was mainly a fight over political or economic privileges, the bulk of research has supported the primacy of political over economic issues. From the 1830s to the 1880s, Congress had gradually asserted more and more authority over the budget and over cabinet ministers. Balmaceda tried to circumvent that budgetary power and break the hold of congressmen and local bosses on congressional elections. Complaining about the heavy-handed rule of the president, and in particular his interference in congressional elections, Congress led a revolt against Balmaceda in 1891. Conservatives generally supported the rebels; Liberals and Democrats backed the president. Along with some renegade Liberals, the newly emergent Radical Party aligned with the so-called congressionalists, not wishing to see legislative prerogatives curtailed just as the party was gaining clients and strength. Those provincials resentful of the growing centralization of political and economic power in and around Santiago also backed the rebellion, especially in the north. Initially, the navy, the armed service that included the highest percentage of aristocrats, sided with the rebels; the army sided with the president. The insurgents won the bloody but brief Civil War of 1891, when the army decided not to fight the navy. As a result of the rebel victory, Congress became dominant over the chief executive [...].

This rebellion marked the beginning of the “Parliamentary Republic.”

The early history of Chile supports H2, H3, H6 and H7. In the early years, whoever had the support of the military became the president and there was either no assembly or it was subdued. As economic conditions changed, central elites started

³⁰ By 1857, the three party blocs that survived through years were formed: Liberal Party, National Party and Conservative Party. See Montes et al. (2000) for details.

losing their grip on politics (H7) and new actors were introduced. The Congress became gradually more powerful, backed by the discontent people (H3). Finally, they led a rebellion against the President. However, the Congress was fragmented and some parties supported the President. The resulting system was semi-presidential (H6).³¹³²

Independent Côte d'Ivoire (CIV):³³

The anti-colonial movement of CIV was led by the native planters. With the income from cash crops, the new planter class composed of traditional and official chiefs became more significant. However, there were two problems: First the competition from existing European planters and second forced labor. After the Brazzaville conference in 1944, African planters established their own organization, *Syndicat Agricole Africain* or SAA. SAA choose Houphouët Boigny, an official chief, as president. Soon it was organized in most parts of the country and managed to get Houphouët elected to the French Parliament. SAA took a anti-forced labor position and Houphouët sponsored the law that abolished forced labor.

The success against forced labor brought Houphouët, SAA and his supporters great prestige. Those who rallied behind Houphouët *formed Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*³⁴ in 1946 and used the SAA organization to spread throughout the country. The public support was overwhelming and electoral victories for PDCI followed. However, there was dissension among party members. Although PDCI tried to negotiate a balance among ethnic and occupational groups before the elections, Bete-Socialists and Agni-Progressistes left the party in 1947.

The second victory for Houphouët and PDCI was replacement of Governor Péchoux. He was appointed in 1948 and he challenged the PDCI. He supported the

³¹ Chilean return to presidentialism in 1925, which I do not study here, reminds of French 5th Republic. A fragmented and debilitated parliament, with political parties unable to bring the new political forces into the system reformed by the President. The President's proposal for a presidential system was rejected by the Congress, but the Congress had to accept the same proposal when it came from General Ibáñez (H2 and H6).

³² On an additional note, the political parties lost their popular support against the president later on. Montes et al. (2000,820) argue that in the periods 1932-1973 and 1988/89-2000, which are presidential periods, "the Chilean parties have been powerful vis-à-vis other political actors (though apparently with some erosion in the 1990s), but they have not been particularly strong in the electorate." These periods are characterized by voter fluidity.

³³ History based on the account in Morgenthau.

³⁴ PDCI also became the CIV representative in *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*.

dissenter groups and repressed its supporters. His goal was preventing PDCI/RDA from gaining another victory in 1951 elections. PDCI resisted and 1951 elections were falsified by the French government, Pécoux was sent to Togo. The attempts of the French administration to regain its authority eroded its public approval considerably and discredited its institutions. The aftermath was the beginning of independence:

“The French authorities accepted, after the incidents, the power of the PDCI. It grew steadily clearer that the government of France would yield to each successive demand of the PDCI. [...] Soon, like for the BDS of Senegal, the French government replaced any officials, including governors, who displeased the PDCI. By 1956, when Houphouët became a French minister, administrators knew their jobs depended upon the PDCI, and as a result backed down or asked the party for help when they had to implement unpopular decisions “(Morgenthau 203).

Although the repression ended with a victory for PDCI, the repression weakened the party. The educated leader cadre shrunk and the links between the headquarters and the village committees. This only strengthened Houphouët’s position (Morgenthau 210-212) as the country headed towards independence in 1960.

At the time of independence, PDCI was still the dominant party, but Houphouët was the person who kept the party and the state together. During Houphouët’s presidency, the National Assembly has always been in the shadow of the Presidency. Zolberg argues that “as the national organs of the party have come to include other components –especially wings and government officials- [...]members of the parliament or *députés* have become but one set of representatives, alongside others such as party officials, etc.”(Zolberg 113).

Was there any room for bargaining? Zolberg argues that

“[w]ith the elimination of political competition, recruitment to [legislative] bodies, albeit formally by election, is tantamount to appointment by the executive. But although the executive can always make sure that the men it wishes to include in it will be included and the men it does not want included will not be, there is a large margin for bargaining between the central authorities and various groups and localities between these limits”

as evidenced by high turnover rates (Zolberg 113-114). The aspiring MPs needed the name of the PDCI and Houphouët to win.³⁵

³⁵ Barkan (1976) shows that in Kenya, the MPs are expected to perform linkage activities such as telling the government what the people in the district want and obtain projects and benefits for the district. If local

The single party rule by definition means there was not fragmentation in the parliament. However, there were divisions within the party and there were potential challenges –especially from non-Bauole ethnic groups- which could not enter the parliament. The parliament depended on the President to keep its composition as it was.

The history of PDCI and CIV independence confirm H4 and H6. The dependence on the president’s popularity and authority to keep their party strong and in power and to keep their positions in the parliaments, the MPs of Côte d’Ivoire –and of many other African countries like Ghana and Tanzania for that matter- submitted to a presidential system.

Conclusion:

Neither literature on the political system-democracy relationship nor the literature on institutional choice pay attention to this geographical clustering of political system. I have empirically shown that income level, population size, having a Spanish colonial legacy, being a post-Communist or a sub-Saharan Africa country are associates of political system type when geographical clustering is controlled for. I suggested that it is the common history of neighboring countries that lead to similar bargaining situations, which in turn determine the choice of political system. Being a Spanish colony, a post-Communist country or a sub-Saharan country gives these countries presidential tendencies because parliaments were dependent on or weaker relative to the president at the time of institutional choice these countries.

people are “already trying to penetrate the center” as Barkan argues, then it is common knowledge that it is being on the list of the single party and having the support of the President that brings the vote. This means that the individual MPs do not have local power bases although they may have name recognition in the localities.

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TABLES:

Table 1: Spatial Autocorrelation Analysis for Political System:
Dichotomous and Categorical specifications

	<i>Dichotomous Variable</i>	<i>Categorical Variable (Four categories)</i>
<i>Correlation Coefficient</i>	.5634	.5002
<i>Normal Statistic</i>	8.61	7.655
<i>p-value (2-sided)</i>	7.289 e-18	1.928 e-14
<i>Null hypothesis: There is no spatial autocorrelation</i>		

Table 2: Testing the relationship suggested by Mainwaring and Shugart

	<i>Controlled for British Colony</i>			<i>Controlled for Years Under British Rule</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Intercept</i>	1.91 (5.36)	2.11 (6.17)	.198 (.84)	1.9 (5.6)	2.09 (6.43)	.251 (1.11)
<i>Income Level</i>	.476 (5.95)	.411 (4.52)	.238 (2.95)	.452 (5.68)	.386 (4.26)	.223 (2.82)
<i>Population Size</i>	-.159 (-1.57)	-.145 (-1.52)		-.135 (-1.36)	-.121 (-1.27)	
<i>British colony</i>	.313 (1.56)	.276 (1.42)	.233 (1.11)			
<i>Years under British rule</i>				.0025 (2.42)	.0023 (2.37)	.0016 (1.54)
<i>Lagged DV</i>			.702 (7.99)			.696 (7.94)
<i>df</i>	157	156	121	157	156	121
<i>RSE</i>	1.12	1.00	.91	1.11	.996	.91
<i>R-squared</i>	.22		.486	.238		.491

t-statistics in parantheses.

Table 3: Latin America Dummy and Years Under Military Executive added to Mainwaring and Shugart model.

	<i>Controlled for British Colony</i>			<i>Controlled for Years Under British Rule</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3*
<i>Intercept</i>	2.17 (6.31)	2.26 (6.52)	.513 (1.59)	2.097 (6.46)	2.23 (6.75)	.568 (1.818)
<i>Income Level</i>	.437 (5.37)	.387 (4.22)	.275 (3.16)	.417 (5.18)	.365 (4.00)	.264 (3.09)
<i>Population Size</i>	-.123 (-1.27)	-.124 (-1.28)		-.09 (-.94)	-.0963 (-.999)	
<i>British colony</i>	.198 (1.04)	.217 (1.12)	.195 (.929)			
<i>Years under British rule</i>				.0026 (2.34)	.0022 (2.33)	.0016 (1.54)
<i>Years under military executive (1975-95)</i>	-.0194 (-1.28)	-.013 (-.849)	-.0049 (-.346)	-.0190 (-1.27)	-.0126 (-.822)	-.0049 (-.351)
<i>Latin America</i>	-1.05 (-4.41)	-.796 (-2.61)	-.462 (-1.79)	-1.06 (-4.53)	-.82 (-2.75)	-.483 (-1.898)
<i>Lagged DV</i>			.589 (5.47)			.577 (5.38)
<i>Df</i>	155	154	119	155	154	119
<i>RSE</i>	1.06	1.00	.91	1.04	.993	.9
<i>R-squared</i>	.321		.5	.34		.51

t-statistics in parantheses.

Table 4: Comparative Effect of Colonial Legacies

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Intercept</i>	2.26 (5.82)	2.66 (7.04)	1.2 (2.71)
<i>Income Level</i>	.472 (5.81)	.357 (3.96)	.261 (2.94)
<i>Population Size</i>	-.173 (-1.87)	-.179 (-1.98)	-.123 (-1.22)
<i>British colony</i>	-.0032 (-.014)	-.068 (-.324)	-.0667 (-.274)
<i>Spanish colony</i>	-1.68 (-5.85)	-1.49 (-4.85)	-1.095 (-3.94)
<i>French colony</i>	-.065 (-.209)	-.137 (-.427)	-.179 (-.624)
<i>Post-Communist</i>	-.147 (-.684)	-.621 (-1.897)	-.324 (-1.4)
<i>Lagged DV</i>			.541 (5.7)
df	155	153	117
RSE	1.02	.953	.87
R-squared	.382		.55

t-statistics in parantheses.

Table 5: Associates of Political System -Final Specification

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Intercept</i>	2.66 (7.895)	2.8 (8.27)	1.93 (3.99)
<i>Income Level</i>	.36 (4.31)	.308 (3.37)	.179 (2.1)
<i>Population Size</i>	-.158 (-1.81)	-.163 (-1.89)	-.170 (-1.72)
<i>Spanish colony</i>	-1.85 (-7.05)	-1.57 (-5.62)	-1.37 (-5.02)
<i>Post-Communist</i>	-.396 (-1.72)	-.627 (-2.14)	-.57 (-2.62)
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>	-.609 (-2.63)	-.513 (-1.94)	-.656 (-2.77)
<i>Lagged DV</i>			.47 (4.94)
Df	156	154	118
RSE	1	.947	.84
R-squared	.408		.577

t-statistics in parantheses.

APPENDIX: Empirical Analysis –Variables, Techniques and Model Specifications

Variables:

POLITICAL SYSTEM:

The dependent variable used in all analyses is a categorical variable with 4 categories. The political system is coded using Shugart and Carey’s criteria of the 4 **categories (see fn. 2 for exceptions)**.

Presidential	=1
Presidential-Parliamentary	=2
Premier-Presidential	=3
Parliamentary	=4

The criteria for Shugart and Carey’s categories are as follows:

Presidential:

1. “the popular election of the chief executive;
2. the terms of the chief executive and assembly are fixed, and are not contingent on mutual confidence;
3. the elected executive names and directs the composition of the government; and
4. the president has some constitutionally granted lawmaking authority” (Shugart and Carey 19).

Premier-Presidential:

1. “the president is elected by popular vote;
2. the president possesses considerable powers; and
3. there also exist a premier and cabinet, subject to assembly confidence, who perform executive functions” (Shugart and Carey 23, based on Duverger 1980).

President Parliamentary:

1. “the popular election of the president;
2. the president appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers;
3. cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence;
4. the president has the power to dissolve parliament or legislative powers, or both” (Shugart and Carey 24).

Assembly-independent:

“executive is chosen by the assembly but not removable by it” (Shugart and Carey 26).³⁶

The authors do not explicate the criteria for parliamentary systems, but we can say that systems which do not fit either of these four categories are parliamentary. This means, presidency is symbolic and the presidents are not popularly elected, the chief executive is elected by the legislature not by popular vote, she does not have a fixed term, and her cabinet is subject to confidence of the legislature.^{37 38}

³⁶ The two assembly independent cases they have are Switzerland and Bolivia. I coded these cases under the system they were closest to: Switzerland as parliamentary and Bolivia as parliament-presidential.

³⁷ Beck et al. have developed a Database on Political Institutions (DPI) which covers 177 countries over 21 years between 1975 and 1995. The database includes a variable for political system (SYSTEM). The authors ask a few questions to understand whether the countries are presidential, assembly-elected presidential or parliamentary. If there is a single executive elected by popular vote, the system is presidential. If chief executives who are called presidents and who are elected by the legislature, the crucial criterion is the procedure of recalling this president. If two-thirds vote or dissolution of the legislature is necessary for recalling the president, then the country is assembly-elected presidential. Otherwise, the country is parliamentary. In cases where there are both a president and a prime minister, the authors focus on the legislative powers of the president. A system is presidential if the presidential vetoes of legislation can be overridden only with a supermajority, if they can appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers and dissolve the legislature or if they have both of these powers.

I used various resources to decide which country fits into what category. I coded the situation in 1998, so if a country had a coup or change of system since then, these changes are not reflected here. The primary resources were CIA World Factbook 2000, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profiles, Library of Congress Country Studies and documents submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Commission by some member countries available at Human Rights Internet (<http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1997/documentation/coredocs/>).

I checked my codings with Shugart and Carey and Mainwairng and Shugart and they were consistent.

In coding for political system, some countries had to be excluded because they did not fit any of the four categories. These countries have communist systems (China, Cuba, North Korea) or are governed by monarchies (e.g. Monaco, Brunei, Monaco, Saudi Arabia). Another set of countries were excluded because the system they constitutionally have (if any) does not mean anything in practice. These countries were ruled by military executives during all years between 1975 and 1995 (as coded by Beck et al.). I double checked my exclusions by using the indices of electoral competitiveness coded by Beck et al. The cases I excluded received a score of less than 3 when I averaged competitiveness of legislative and executive elections. (1=[no executive/legislature] and 2=[unelected executive/legislature]).

INCOME LEVEL:

I used World Bank's classification of 1999 per capita GNP.

(See <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/report/index.htm>). The four per capita GNP categories identified by the world bank are:

low(1)	=[$\$775$ -less]
lower middle (2)	=[$\$776$ - $\$2995$]
upper middle (3)	=[$\$2996$ - $\$9265$]
high (4)	=[$\$9266$ -more]

(See <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/report/map.pdf>)

I was intending to use the Beck et al. coding as my dependent variable, but I realized that although the criteria are more or less acceptable, the coding is somewhat inconsistent with the criteria. The most important flaw was that they coded monarchies such as in Saudi Arabia and dictatorships as presidential systems. Using this coding there would be 22 transitions to parliamentarism, which are indeed transitions from authoritarianism. As Shugart and Carey put it "no existing presidential system has ever changed to a parliamentary system" (Shugart and Carey 1992, 3). I decided to code my own dependent variable, and I chose the Shugart and Carey criteria -with one exception: I do not have the assembly-independent category. I found Shugart and Carey's criteria most helpful among those in the literature because they are explicit and because the number of categories captures the variation in the different types of executive-legislature relationships.

³⁸ I also used a dichotomous dependent variable where I collapsed the original four category dependent variable in two categories such that presidential and parliament-presidential systems are coded presidential and premier-presidential and parliamentary systems are coded parliamentary. Map 1 is based on this dichotomous variable and Map 2 is based on the 4 category dependent variable coded based on Shugart and Carey criteria.

The minor difference between my coding and Mainwaring and Shugart's is that they use Worldbank's 1994 data and thus their cutoff points are different (pp. 21).

POPULATION SIZE:

I use CIA World Factbook 2000 estimates of country populations. My coding is as follows:

Micro (1) = [less than 500,000]
Small (2) = [500,000- 5,000,000]
Medium (3) = [5,000,000- 50,000,000]
Large (4) = [50,000,000- more]

The cutoff points are the same as Mainwaring and Shugart except for the fact that they collapse Medium and Large into one category (thus they have 3 categories).

BRITISH COLONY, FRENCH COLONY, SPANISH COLONY:

I used CIA World Factbook 2000 to see which colonial power the countries gained their independence from (if any). I did not consider mandates (such as the British and the French had in the Middle east between 1918-1948).

YEARS UNDER BRITISH RULE:

This is based on two resources: First, CIA World Factbook 2000's report of the year the country gained independence from the British. Second, various resources such as Library of Congress Country Studies were used to see when the British established the colony. I tried to use the official year the country was declared a (or a part of a) colony rather than the country was occupied or was a protectorate.

YEARS UNDER MILITARY EXECUTIVE:

Beck et al. have coded whether a country's chief executive is a military member [MILITARY] for years between 1975-1995. I use the total number of years the country has been ruled by an executive chief who is a military member.

LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE: See below.

Techniques:

Spatial autocorrelation is similar to temporal autocorrelation in essence. If it is significant, the error terms of OLS regressions will violate the independence assumption because (in our case) the error term for one country will be correlated with its neighbors. This consideration is rarely taken into account in political science. An exception is Nathaniel Beck who discusses the issue (See his lecture notes: <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~nbeck/longitude200012short.pdf> pp. 6.)

There are two correction methods for spatial autocorrelation. The first is GLS with a corrected error variance-covariance matrix. What the new statistical software and the GIS technology enable us to do is construct a neighborhood matrix and use this matrix to correct the error variance-covariance matrix. This method is used in Model 2. The second model, suggested by Beck, is including a lagged dependent variable.

The lagged dependent variable is practically a weighted sum of the values of the dependent variable of a country's neighbors. Although different weights could be assigned to different neighbors, I assign equal weight so my lagged dependent variable is the mean of the dependent variables of neighbors. Inclusion of this variable in the regression is effectively including the factors that have affected the political system of the neighbors. Thus, if my neighbor is a post-communist country then it has some effect on my system type. The lagged dependent variable, thus, is a way to account for the geographical distribution of background factors that may influence the choice of system type.

Interpreting the sign of the coefficients is straightforward. Since increasing values of the dependent variable mean a more parliamentary system and decreasing values of it mean a more presidential system, negative coefficients indicate factors that favor presidentialism and positive coefficients indicate factors that favor parliamentarism. Interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients is not straightforward because we cannot say for sure how big of an effect a coefficient of .38 means. The best way to interpret the coefficient magnitudes is, then, comparing the magnitude of associations of different explanatory variables with the political system. With dummy variables, the comparison is easy. With categorical variables such as income level and population size, one has to take into account the full extent of their effect. For example, the full extent of income level effect is four times the coefficient of this variable, and this shows how much increasing the per capita income from zero to more than 9266 affects the political system.

Notes on Model Specifications:

Models 1 and 2 are the same except for the spatial autocorrelation correction and the extra 1 degree of freedom lost in the correction process.

Model 3 is different from Models 1 and 2 because it includes the Lagged Dependent Variable which is based on the neighborhood matrix as discussed above. Naturally, a country needs to have neighbors to have a lagged dependent variable entry. This leaves out the cases which are islands and also those countries whose neighbors are all excluded from the analysis in the stage of coding political systems (see above, description of political system variable). To give examples, Japan, Australia and many micro island states are excluded for the first reason while Korea and Papua New Guinea are excluded for the second reason. These exclusions leave 125 of the initial 192 cases. However, the exclusions are not unbiased. 22 of the 67 excluded cases are parliamentary, 23 of them have population size of less than 500,000 and 30 of them are former British colonies. Thus, the exclusion is somewhat influential in the diminished effect of British colonial legacy under Model 3. I excluded population size in some specifications of Model 3 because the variable turned out statistically insignificant due to the exclusion of the micro and small states. This is supporting evidence for Mainwaring and Shugart's argument that parliamentarism has some size advantage (pp. 23). To check for robustness, I ran the regressions for Models 1 and 2 using only the 125 cases used in Model 3. The coefficients of variables other than British colony and population size are not dramatically affected.

I used Europe region dummy, but it is not significant, possibly because Income level accounts for it. Obviously, Latin American region dummy cannot be used in the specifications that include Spanish Colony in order to avoid the high multicollinearity. I added years under military rule in order to see whether it will change the magnitude of the effect of past political systems in Table 4. Years under military rule is statistically insignificant under all three models and the effects and significance of colonial legacies or being a post-Communist country remain robust.

MAPS: