

of the risks and rewards of global expansion. They will develop trade ties with and invest in countries that offer environments friendly to multinational corporations. That will be a loss for countries whose citizens perceive multinationals as an enemy, even though their economies could benefit from expanded trade and the inflow of capital and expertise that direct foreign investment provides. Forming alliances with domestic partners has often been a key element in companies' global strategies and will become even more desirable going forward.

Emerging markets have already been hurt by slow growth in the global economy, given their heavy dependence on exports. The growth forecast for these countries for 2001 had been cut to about half of the growth they achieved in 2000. Along with declining exports, emerging markets are finding the international flow of capital to their economies is declining sharply, too.

The end of the global boom should serve as a reminder to emerging countries of the need to maintain the economic reform effort even when economic growth picks up again. The right response to current economic conditions must come primarily from within emerging economies.

The international financial institutions can play a role in easing the short-term difficulties of emerging economies. They should monitor events and stand ready to make larger loans if contagion effects of the crisis begin to spread. It would be a mistake, however, to hand out large sums of money just because world growth has slowed down. Countries need to have in place policies that are robust and that can withstand the vagaries of the business cycle.

Since the destruction and loss of life at the World Trade Center, at the Pentagon, and in western Pennsylvania, the world has changed. The terrorist attacks exacerbated economic problems that were already apparent. But the fundamentals of the U.S. economy are very strong. Economic growth and the pace of globalization may be a bit slower in the next decade than they were in the 1990s, but globalization will proceed. Economic fears will be overcome.

THE HOME FRONT

AMERICAN SOCIETY RESPONDS TO THE NEW WAR

ALAN WOLFE

The terrorist attacks against the United States, meant to divide Americans from one another, have united them as at no time since World War II. Immediately before the events, we were still discussing the 2000 presidential election and whether the person elected with more blue states than red ones—or was it the other way around?—held office legitimately. The issues we debated then included whether frozen embryos were human beings and whether the Boy Scouts could exclude homosexuals from their ranks. People talked seriously about a deep chasm between one America that was presumed to be devout and another that was routinely described as secular. Political speculation focused on whether President George W. Bush could cut taxes and expand the military at the same time and what the Democrats would do to ensure that he could not. And underlying the whole discussion was a debate taking place over whether Americans were losing their sense of civic participation and concern for the direction of their society.

It takes a real war to make Americans realize how insignificant our culture war has been. Twice in recent years Americans have been victims of murderous terrorist attacks at home: one took place in Oklahoma, the other in lower Manhattan and on the outskirts of Washington, D.C. Oklahoma, in many ways the most conservative state in the union, symbolizes the side in the culture war that stands for a return to the religion, values, and morality of years past. Lower Manhattan, probably the most liberal slice of America, represents modern urbane cosmopolitanism, racial and ethnic diversity, and openness to the rest of the world. And

Washington, as the nation's capital, stands in the conservative mind for big government and in the liberal mind as the embodiment of U.S. military power. Yet what the terrorists proved by their acts is that, no matter how different Americans may be from one another in their religious beliefs or political views, they are all equal before the onslaught of machinery transformed into weapons. The United States really is one nation, even if it needs other nations, or international bandits without a nation, to remind it of that fact.

America was the target of the September 11 attacks because its commitments to free speech, religious liberty, gender equality, and racial and ethnic diversity were intolerable to theocrats persuaded that only one truth exists and that it is their mission to ensure that no one thinks otherwise. The United States was made vulnerable to terrorist attack because it has open borders, a dedication to civil liberties, an aversion to discrimination on the basis of group characteristics, a free market, and a strong belief that the pursuit of the good life and the quest for zealotry are incompatible. How much will change as a result of September 11? Certainly airport security will be tightened, electronic and other forms of communication will be more closely monitored, and police will be more forthright in their use of profiling—racial and otherwise—to stop violent acts before they happen. But none of these steps will change America's commitment to liberal and democratic values. Instead, the most likely effect of the terrorist attacks will be to strengthen American liberties by grounding them in reality and underscoring why we value them in the first place.

RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE

Illustrative of what is likely to emerge in the America shaped by the events of September 11 is a firmer sense of the proper role for religion in a society no longer shaped by a common faith tradition. Although the Constitution formally separated church and state, America was nonetheless governed throughout the nineteenth century by an unofficial Protestant morality that structured

its educational system, political values, approach to child-rearing, work ethic, and even foreign policy. As Catholics and Jews increasingly made the United States their home, however, the nation's understanding of morality could no longer be based on the assumptions of one faith. Not without serious conflict, American morality did change. For a time, the term "Christian" came to replace "Protestant" in descriptions of the nation, so as to include Catholics. Then, as the country fought a war against the most anti-Semitic regime in modern history, it broadened the description once again to "Judeo-Christian," even though Jews and Christians had been fighting each other for two thousand years.

Before September 11, there were already more Muslims in the United States than Episcopalians, and it is only a matter of time before adherents of Islam replace Jews as the largest non-Christian religious group in the country. Scholars were engaged in an effort to develop a replacement term for "Judeo-Christian" that would cover this new reality, with "Abrahamic" emerging as the leading candidate, since Muslims, like Jews and Christians, trace their origins back to Abraham. Although this term has its limits—it does not encompass Hinduism, Buddhism, or many other religions now practiced by large numbers of Americans—it does continue a long-standing process of recognizing the increasing religious diversity that characterizes American society. When President Bush spoke at a Washington mosque on September 17, praising Muslims for their "incredibly valuable contribution to our country," his words could be understood as an official recognition of post-Judeo-Christian America. (And when, in the aftermath of attacks on turban-wearing Sikhs across the country he invited a group of Sikhs to the White House to reassure them, he moved beyond "Abrahamic" religion as well.) It took an act of Middle Eastern terrorists to make Americans realize that many peaceful, hard-working, and law-abiding Muslims live in their country.

Just as Americans have learned something about their religious diversity from the attacks launched on them, they have also learned something about the proper role for religion in a society committed to separation of church and state. Before September

11, the U.S. Supreme Court tended to draw a sharp wall between these two institutions. In June 2000, for example, the Court ruled that prayers before a high school football game, amplified over loudspeakers, created a coercive atmosphere and thus amounted to an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Although the Court's jurisprudence in this area has often been inconsistent (it has also ruled that student fees collected at a public university cannot be denied to a conservative Christian student publication) the trend has been in the direction of questioning an active role for faith in the American public square.

Yet in response to the terrorist attacks, the country's entire political elite assembled in the National Cathedral and was led in prayer by religious leaders of many faiths—and no one thought to object. The fact that religion and politics were so seamlessly blended, and that no danger to the Republic followed from their mixture, suggests that in an emergency the right balance will be found. One side in the debate over religion and politics can take heart from the fact that Americans, even when they assemble in public, need the healing that faith offers to overcome tragedy. And the other side can recognize that, under contemporary conditions of religious diversity, no single religious point of view will be used to coerce others. The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks brought out common sense on one of our most contentious issues, a lesson that may be found useful as future court decisions are handed down in this area.

One American who showed no appreciation for common sense in the days following the attacks was the Rev. Jerry Falwell, and one of the more important cultural responses since September 11 has been the widespread revulsion against his hateful message blaming gays, feminists, and civil libertarians for the tragedy. In an odd way, the terrorists were more egalitarian than Falwell: they cared not a whit whether the Americans they killed were gay or straight, left-wing or right-wing, devout or secular, male or female, black or white—or even whether they were Americans. Hatred that indiscriminate reminds us why more discriminate forms of hatred are un-American. So long as Falwell was viewed as a man who might deliver votes, politicians bent over backward to

appease him. Now that he is rightly seen as a man who instead delivers hate, they will avoid him. Falwell's intolerance establishes a barrier than no preacher of hate will be able to scale for the foreseeable future. Let someone start attacking people for the fact of their difference in the years ahead, and someone else will remind them that our enemies make no such distinction.

FREE TO BE

But surely, it will be said, the United States has responded by going to war, and war is harmful to the exercise of civil liberty. At one level, this is obviously true: depending on how we pursue this war, we can expect pressure on newspapers to support their government, accusations against dissenters that they are aiding and abetting our enemies, and greater suspicion of those whose appearance or language marks them as somehow "different." Those who fear a potential encroachment on civil liberties can point to the Bush administration's proposal to Congress for new legislation that would loosen restrictions on wiretapping and would allow police and the courts to rely on foreign evidence gathered by means that did not meet U.S. constitutional standards. Yet the fact is that Congress has raised serious questions about the administration's more draconian proposals, reminding everyone of why we insist on the importance of civil liberties in the first place. There is no reason to believe that a U.S.-led campaign against terrorism will make such extensive inroads into civil liberties that anything like a police state will result.

There are two additional reasons why we are unlikely to see substantial encroachments on freedom as we mobilize for a response to terror. The first is that America has become a much more tolerant society than it was throughout most of the twentieth century. It was not that long ago when, in response to World War I, we banned the teaching of German in our schools or when, during the next world war, we locked up people who shared the same heritage—Japanese—as the enemy we were fighting. Nor can it easily be forgotten that, during the McCarthy

period, we practiced a politics of intolerance that stigmatized the guilty and the innocent alike. The periods of intolerance that have marked our past have raised legitimate questions about how we will respond in the future.

Yet how we have changed! In interviews I have conducted with middle-class people from every corner of the United States, I have seen that a culture of nonjudgmentalism has become widespread in this country. With the exception of homosexuality and, to a lesser degree, illegal immigration, Americans seem increasingly reluctant to insist that certain ways of life are wrong, cruel, sinful, or misguided. Such nonjudgmentalism can have its downside; as the terrorist attacks remind us, there are times when we need to insist that some kinds of acts are so evil that no excuse or justification for them is possible. But this particular variant of nonjudgmentalism has made few appearances in the aftermath of the attacks. Except for a few isolated voices on the left who found moral equivalence between the destruction of the World Trade Center and events such as the U.S. invasion of Grenada, most people in this country made the snap, and quite correct, judgment that the perpetrators of such evil acts can and ought to be punished for their deeds.

There is also a positive side to nonjudgmentalism: compared to intolerance, it allows people to find the good among the bad. That may be why we are not likely to enter a new McCarthy period in the wake of the terrorist attacks, despite the fact that most of the terrorists were entered this country surreptitiously and that their religion is one that historically has fought wars against both Christians and Jews. It is true that in the days immediately following the attacks, incidents of hatred were directed not only against Muslims but also against others, such as Sikhs, who were mistaken for Muslims. There are no excuses for such deplorable acts. Yet they were not contagious; nothing in the response of the American people suggests anything like a hysterical, panic-driven movement to find scapegoats and hold them responsible. September 11 was not Pearl Harbor and we are no longer the country of the Ku Klux Klan.

Another reason exists for concluding that a war against terror will fail to result in a serious diminution of civil liberty. Past wars,

for all the restrictions on free speech they brought, also significantly expanded other kinds of liberty. Before World War II, America had no modern welfare state and individuals had few protections against corporate power. In part because war demands that all of those recruited to fight it be at the peak of physical and mental health, World War II, even more than the Great Depression, modernized the American state. Once the war was over and the troops returned home, no one could make the case that veterans did not deserve access to housing through a subsidized mortgage program, to education through the GI Bill of Rights, or to health care or death benefits. One of the effects of the war was to lift an entire generation of Americans into the ranks of the middle class and, by doing that, to expand their opportunities and those of their children. Despite the subsequent election of conservative presidents such as Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan in the decades after the war, Republicans chose not to stop the expansion of government that the war started. It is fair to say that the old isolationist and small-government right wing never really survived World War II.

A GOVERNMENT OF ALL THE PEOPLE

In a similar way, the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, as well as the need to mobilize the country to retaliate, will further diminish the influence of the extreme right. Americans were already prepared for this by the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Once it became clear that Timothy McVeigh saw himself as the enemy of government, the attack on "big government" led by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich came to an end. Suddenly talk of black helicopters and conspiracies to deprive Americans of their liberties were revealed for the dangerous words they had always been. America's political culture matured in the aftermath of Oklahoma City. When the Republican leadership in Congress tried to shut down government later that year, Americans quickly realized why they have government in the first place.

It is true that in his campaign for president, George W. Bush

echoed conservative distrust of government when he talked about how tax revenues really belonged to the people. Yet no one paid much attention. Tax-cutting remained a peripheral issue for most Americans, even after Congress, responding to Bush, cut taxes. Unlike during an earlier mania for supply-side economics, the Bush tax cut was not fueled by popular pressure from below but was passed because the president was able to persuade the Republican majorities that then existed in both houses of Congress to support his signature policy.

Situations of war and national emergency, because they require a response from government, are conducive to raising taxes, not lowering them. Already in the aftermath of the attack, one can begin to see a new centrist approach establishing itself. For one thing, the idea that we can rely on the market to solve all our problems has taken a double blow, from the recession that seems to have begun shortly before the attacks and from the failure of the airlines, concerned with cutting costs and raising profits, to provide sufficient security. Even *The Wall Street Journal*, a longtime champion of unrestrained market competition, has criticized the market failure that allowed terrorists to board planes without scrutiny. This does not necessarily mean that the federal government will assume vastly increased responsibility for airline security; once the crisis subsides, a certain amount of lobbying by groups that stand to benefit from one policy or another can be expected, and conservative Republicans in Congress have already begun to object to an expanded government role in the aftermath of the tragedy. But outside of Washington, most Americans are more likely to view the market as a means rather than as an end—to be encouraged when it works, but to be questioned when it does not.

At the same time, it is also difficult to imagine government operating blatantly in the interests of only one class of people when people from all walks of life were killed in the attacks. The idea of cutting corporate or capital gains taxes to stimulate the economy, without offering any comparable benefits to Americans on the lower rungs of the income ladder, is likely to be a political nonstarter. Even the immediate effort by Congress to give a

“bailout” to the airline industry was met with skeptics who asked what well-paid airline executives have done to deserve such generosity. It is one thing to reward the richest and most powerful Americans in a time of peace, as Bush’s tax cut primarily did. But such forms of class politics cannot easily be practiced in a time of war. Bush’s popularity does not give him a free hand; instead, it and he has rightly decided that he does—he cannot afford to appear to be the president of only some of them. In that sense, the terrorist attacks represented the end of the Bush campaign, even as they symbolized the beginning of the Bush presidency. Compared to the first six months of his administration, when his popularity was relatively low and his proposals contentious, Bush’s support has broadened as his proposals have become more inclusive.

The sense of solidarity that emerged out of the terrorist attacks has altered the complexion of American politics. In good, bipartisan fashion, it is fair to say that Americans have not been blessed with great leaders in recent years. This may be because they did not want or need great leaders. Times of peace and prosperity, as beneficial as they are for our economic well-being, are not always conducive to our political well-being; times of war and crisis, however much they cause pain in our private lives, usually elevate the character of our public life. After years of not even knowing what good leadership is, Americans responded to the example of New York’s mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, as if discovering for the first time what leadership can do. It was not Giuliani’s controversial proposals and shoot-from-the-hip style that inspired such devotion; it was his ability to strike the right note in the right way at a traumatic time. Leadership, it turns out, is not about securing your political base and getting legislation passed by one or two votes; it is about speaking and acting from the heart. The more room there is for that kind of leadership, the less room there is for ideological posturing and finger-pointing. Mobilization will make it difficult for the Democrats to shift to the left in the next election, but it will also make it difficult for Republicans to shift to the right. We will no doubt soon begin to hear screaming

talk-show hosts blaming the attack on their favorite targets. But it is increasingly unlikely that most Americans will pay much attention.

CIVIC RE-ENGAGEMENT

One of the unanswered questions stemming from the September 11 attacks is whether Americans will return to the culture of civic disengagement and lack of interest that, according to critics such as Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam, has characterized U.S. society since the passing of more civic-minded generations. In some ways, the question answers itself. If rates of participation and involvement do in fact vary with generations, then the generation that will deal with the aftermath of September 11 is also the generation that will change the most. Americans in their 20s and 30s have never experienced recession or a war that threatened their homeland. Now they are getting both at the same time. That may be enough to shift their attention from dot-com start-ups to blood donation. Who, after all, would have thought that there would be more Americans prepared to help the injured than there were injured? Yet there were, and not only because the sheer violence of the attack left so few survivors, but also because those who survived wanted to do something, anything, to help. Americans went in a flash from bowling alone to surviving together.

It is also unlikely that one aspect of the recent civic disengagement—a tendency to ignore anything that takes place outside U.S. borders—will be sustainable in the aftermath of the attacks. As the president brings more foreign leaders to the White House and travels around the world in search of new partners, Americans will inevitably find themselves learning more about other countries and how their citizens view the world. No one at this point can predict how forceful and persistent the American response to terror will be. But it is not hard to predict that America will be more engaged with the rest of the world than it has been for the past two or three decades.

War cannot cure any of the pathologies that afflict the country. If indeed Americans have lost the sense of moral wholeness that conservatives believe they once possessed, they are unlikely to recover it just because some of their fellow citizens will be called on to sacrifice their comforts, and perhaps their lives, to combat terrorism. America may give too much to rich white males and too little to women and people of color, as many on the left charge, but neither the attacks themselves nor the responses to them will eliminate inequality and privilege. Then again, perhaps America was never in quite as bad shape as many of its critics suggested. To be sure, its moral condition has changed, just as its civic life has. But such changes have always been part of American history. And they rarely go only in one direction or only at one pace. If the attacks and their aftermath have effects on American civic culture, those effects are likely to be gradual rather than dramatic. They will take the form of reminders: suggestions that there are good reasons to be concerned with public life and warnings not to turn our backs on the needs of our fellow citizens.

Public life in the aftermath of September 11 will have its frustrations and restraints. We may never be able to stop terrorists from doing what they do. Americans may never get used to the new restrictions on the freedom to travel where and when we want. Political leaders may start looking for new moral campaigns at roughly the same time that economic leaders start putting profit first. Yet some aspects of the country's public life will be better for having lived through the attacks of September 11. Before that day, the American political system, for all its faults, guaranteed a level of personal freedom and democratic stability rare anywhere in this world. That has not changed and will not change because some fanatics hate us so much for doing so many things so well. If the tragedy generates a moment to pause and to reflect on who we are as a people and how we have changed from the days when we wrongly believed that the world's problems would never affect us, we will have matured as a nation.