The US-Mexico War on Drugs

 

How Both Sides of the Border Have Contributed to its Alleged Success and Futility

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GRADUATING SENIOR!

 

 

 

 

 

 

J. Brad Foreman

Spring 2003

EDGE

 

 

INTRODUCTION

           

            Illegal narcotic drugs represent a $60 billion market in the U.S., and this year alone the State and Federal governments will each spend roughly $20 billion in attempting to stifle this market.  The amount of money involved in the drug trade, substantially inflated due to prohibition, makes both systemic corruption and violence inevitable.  The illegal drug trade is a sophisticated international network, and while no nation’s involvement is limited to one economic function, one relationship is crystal clear:  Mexico serves as a high-volume channel of drugs into the United States, and drug traffickers will go to great lengths to continue serving the American consumers as long as their demand exists.  A 1997 article stated that narcotics funnel as much as $30 billion into the Mexican economy each year, “more than the country’s top two legitimate exports combined.”[1]

            Despite decades of attempts to control this illegal activity, the public perception is that the United States’ war on drugs has failed to substantially reduce both the supply and demand of illegal drugs.  Supply-side efforts have been plagued by conflicting political priorities and corruption in both American and Mexican administrations, while the costly anti-drug advertising campaigns and increased incarcerations of drug users have had only limited success in decreasing the demand for drugs.  Furthermore, the inherent difficulty of international coordination in such an effort has hindered the success of the drug war. As James Finckenauer, Ph.D. of the National Institute of Justice states, “The complexity of the worldwide drug market and the vast resources available to narcotic producers and traffickers requires afflicted countries to collaborate if a successful end to the campaign against drugs is to be achieved.”[2]

            Today, no two bordering nations are more immersed in an anti-drug campaign than the U.S. and Mexico. This paper examines the nature of the illegal drug market, the obstacles faced by the US and Mexico in their war on drugs, as well as the current developments and a proposed alternative to the allegedly futile and misguided effort.

 

BACKGROUND

           

            Over the past decade, Mexican drug organizations secured a prominent position in the cocaine market that was formerly dominated by Colombian drug cartels, and opened the doors for Mexican groups to dominate the drug trafficking market. According to a Drug Intelligence Brief by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Mexico continues to be the principal transit route for cocaine available in the United States—an estimated 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United States is smuggled across the U.S. Southwest border.[3] Mexico is also a source country for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine available in the United States, as well as various pharmaceutical drugs.

            Drug production and trafficking, as well as the laundering of drug proceeds, is currently controlled by powerful and well-organized Mexican organizations. A major trafficking group might contain 200 or more members in the Mexico base, with hundreds of additional members throughout the organization's network. Not surprisingly, the most prominent trafficking organizations, such as the Arrellano-Felix cartel, control the drug trade across broad tracts of northern Mexico along the US-Mexico border.  “The Arrellanos developed their stronghold in Baja by charging other traffickers to use the region to ship drugs to the U.S.  Those who did not pay risked being killed.  The cartel also used bribes and threats to establish ties with police, including some at the highest levels.”  In 2002, one third of Tijuana homicides were attributed to organized crime, most of which involves drug trafficking.  Interestingly, most drug related violence seems to be the result of small-scale drug traffickers battling among themselves.”[4]            Nonetheless, these independently operated groups have created a loose partnership called the Federation in order to establish a greater degree of security and profitability. A recent estimate suggests the annual income accrued by these organizations is in the tens of billions of dollars. In comparison, the entire country of Mexico had an estimated nominal GDP of $557 billion last year.

 

FIGHTING THE Supply

           

            The 2,000-mile border between the U.S. and Mexico has long been portrayed as the primary battlefield for this drug war, as it is the channel through which much of the drugs consumed in the U.S. reach American soil.  Cracking down on the import of drugs at the border has suffered for two primary reasons.  First, promoting free trade and fighting a war on drugs are conflicting political priorities.  In order to facilitate the movement of goods, labor and tourists across the border, U.S. agents currently allocate approximately 30 seconds per vehicle to determine whether or not to perform an inspection.  Naturally, this time pressure hinders their capability of preventing the trafficking of drugs into the States.  Despite this constraint, 2002 witnessed an increase in drug seizure at the border.

            The second factor is a recurring theme in the arguably futile war on drugs: corruption. Numerous border agents have been convicted of both accepting and demanding bribes in exchange for unobstructed passage into the United States.

            The role of the US in fighting the supply side of this war is certainly not limited to border duties.  One method of disrupting the operations of those who supply drugs to the US is to target their money supply – banks, bank accounts and bulk cash – a tactic adopted by Federal agents circa 1981.  However, every time the U.S. Treasury closes one financial channel, the drug lords quickly create another.  As stated by Jim Butler, former chief of the Coral Gables Police Department, “They are very innovative.  They run their narcotics and money laundering businesses like a Fortune 500 company.”[5]

            Another method of fighting the supply of narcotic drugs involves using local law enforcement officers to seize illegal substances and incarcerate drug dealers in our neighborhoods. Unfortunately, corruption once again plagues the drug war in this aspect, as many police officers fall victim to the temptation of financial gain through participation in the drug network.  One high-profile example of this is the recent Rampart Scandal, uncovered when a renegade officer was caught stealing cocaine from an evidence room in Los Angeles.  This discovery exploded into a full-scale investigation of the Rampart police force, which identified 82 additional cases of potential law enforcement agent corruption.[6]

            Mexico’s most crucial role in the war on drugs pertains to attacking this supply side of the equation.  The Mexican government has been dangerously intertwined with drug trafficking since the 6-year term of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, which began with a rigged election in 1988.  Many feel that it was President Salinas who “sold the country’s soul to the drug lords,” forming ties that hinder the nation to this day.[7]  In 1997, the DEA reported that 90 percent of police, prosecutors, and judges in Tijuana were in the pay of the drug cartels.[8]   

            However, the fate of the nation changed on July 2, 2000, when Vicente Fox Quesada was elected President of Mexico in the nation’s “first peaceful handover of power to the political opposition in 179 years.”[9]  The election marked the end of 71 years of PRI rule, which left the country constrained by the remains of a rusted-out authoritarian system in which a privileged minority divided up the spoils and flouted the laws.  Naturally, a high priority on Fox’s presidential agenda was the minimization of corruption to “normal” levels in the Mexican government.  For example, almost immediately after becoming president in, 2000 Fox formed the federal police force AFI, which replaced several agencies that had been tainted by corruption and ties to drug traffickers.[10]

             Fox did not waste any time in pursuing the kingpins of Mexico’s major drug cartels, starting with the multi-billion dollar Arrellano-Felix Organization.  Ramon Arrellano-Felix was killed in a police shoot-out in February, 2002, and his brother Benjamin was arrested the following month.  The remaining two Arrellano brothers, Javier and Eduardo, are believed to be controlling the cartel in Ramon and Benjamin’s absence.  One year later, Gulf Drug Cartel kingpin Osiel Cardenas was arrested by the Mexican military near the Texas border on March 14th. In reference to the arrest, the U.S. State Department proclaimed, “This is the latest of a series of impressive blows dealt by the administration of President Vicente Fox to dismantle the major drug trafficking cartels.”[11]

            Despite the new administration’s valiant effort and noticeable progress, corruption and violence still exist. “In January of 2003, six Tijuana federal agents were arrested on suspicion of trying to force a drug trafficking group to pay for the release of nearly five tons of marijuana.  Such extortion attempts have led to many incidences of violence.”[12]   Furthermore, much recent violence is linked to other drug trafficking groups testing the Arrellanos’ new leadership. Others see the violence as “an intimidating response to Mexican president Vicente Fox’s efforts to create a clean police force.”[13]   The apparent inevitability of such violence and corruption indicate that a strategy for winning the war on drugs must also include plans to curb the demand for these illegal substances.

 

FIGHTING THE DEMAND

           

            There are three primary means of diminishing the demand for illegal drugs: deterrence through enforcement, anti-drug advertising, and emphasizing drug treatment rather than simply incarceration.  Many articles and reports regarding the U.S. war on drugs allege that the anti-drug campaign in the United States has failed miserably in decreasing demand.  Recent statistics released by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) somewhat validate these concerns.  According to the DHHS report “Healthy People 2000,” drug use rose twice in the twentieth century:  in the 1970s and again in the 1990s.  The decrease in drug use that occurred in the later part of the 1980s was not sustained throughout the nineties, indicating that anti-drug education attempts were not sufficient to effectively decrease the demand for drugs.  In fact, annual surveys measuring the impact of drug education efforts consistently indicated that the advertising campaign had, at best, no effect on this demand. 

            Granted, if it is true that we cannot decrease demand, then any supply-side progress in Mexico or at the San Ysidro border is rather trivial. However, despite these fluctuations, present drug use rates are half of what they were in the late 1970s—the percent of Americans 12 years and older who were current drug users decreased from 14.1% of the US population in 1979 to 6.7% of the US population in 1999.[14]  Specifically, cocaine use has been reduced by an astonishing 75% since the 1970s.[15]              Additionally, and contrary to popular belief, American prisons are not filled with simple users and possessors—95% percent of federal prison drug cases are for trafficking charges, and much of the remaining 5 percent consists of multiple-offense cases.  Many prosecutors would say that it is rather difficult to get jail time for simply using drugs.  Moreover, a new program known as drug treatment courts have witnessed a 70% success rate.  These courts, offered only to addicted users, assign convicted criminals to treatment programs and dismiss their charges upon completion.

            Despite these successes, there are other indications that controlling the demand for drugs is still a substantial challenge: for example, there was an alarming increase in the number of emergency room visits attributed to illegal substance abuse between 1991 and 1998.[16]   Furthermore, the aforementioned corruption in law enforcement agencies suggests inherent, critical flaws in their ability to sufficiently deter illegal drug consumption. All of these statistics indicate that regardless of past attempts, United States administrations are a long way from controlling the demand for drugs.   

           

NOT FIGHTING AT ALL: LEGALIZATION?

           

            With the drug war making little progress other than the recent success of Mexico’s new administration, the legalization argument is picking up steam as a viable and cost-effective alternative to the United States war on drugs.  In addition to the arguments regarding freedom of choice, fiscal irresponsibility, and the opportunity costs of drug war financing, advocates of legalization firmly believe that the negative consequences of the current U.S. drug policy outweigh those which would result from free, unrestricted drug use. 

            Many believe that prohibition unleashes powerful forces that “inevitably make the underlying drug problem worse while adding a series of costly unintended side effects.”[17]  Furthermore, the war on drugs is expensive: both state and federal governments will spend roughly $20 billion each this year, up from $100 million when Nixon began the “war on drugs” in 1972.[18] Additionally, some believe that we are using the drug war as a reason to interfere in foreign politics. They fear that our “war on drugs” masks hidden agendas, for we are tainting the reputations of various Latin American countries and American minorities when the true root of the problem – the huge demand for drug consumption – is within the predominantly Caucasian, U.S. upper-middle class.  As mentioned previously, although 80 percent of drug users are Caucasian, an astonishing 80 percent of drug arrests are non-white.[19]  This statistic is quite scary when considering that California law can sentence a 3-strike drug criminal to life in prison.

 

CONCLUSION

           

            The United States has a terrible narcotics habit.  The extensive demand for these illegal drugs has created a multi-million dollar, international black market that begets both corruption and violence. Despite relatively little progress since President Nixon coined the term “the war on drugs” in 1972, our costly efforts continue.  Mexican President Vicente Fox correctly stated that in order to achieve success, the war on drugs must be “a coordinated international effort,” for “(no) country by itself can solve this cancer.”[20]  Under the leadership of Fox, Mexico has embarked on an ambitious – and thus far promising – mission to minimize drug trafficking and corruption on their side of the fence.  However, without equally effective changes on the American side, particularly in regards to the demand for narcotic drugs among wealthy Americans, this alleged war will continue to be viewed as a hopelessly impractical use of our nation’s tax revenues.

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

“The Slippery Slope: Unmasking the Drug War.” http://globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico.

 

Vega, Gregory.  “Former US Attorney, Southern District of California.”  The San Diego Union Tribune, June 17, 2001.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

 

Arellano, Gustavo.  “The Marginalized of the Margins.”  Orange County Weekly, January 4, 2002.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

 

Wilkie, Dana and Cantlupe, Joe.  “Bush administration targets 27 entities linked to drug lords.”  Copley News Service, January 31, 2002.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

 

McGirk, Tim. “Vicente Fox Quesada.”  TIME EUROPE, December 25, 2000, Vol 156, No. 26.

 

“Your body, their profits.”  San Francisco Chronicle, February 6, 2002.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

 

“DEA Chief:  War on drugs has cut drug usage.”  Copley News Service, March 13, 2002.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

 

Washburn, David.  “Bad neighbor policy; Charles Bowden uses on crime story to illuminate two nations’ corruption.”  The San Diego Union Tribune, December 8, 2002.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

 

Wilborn, Paul. “LAPD scandal flares up with police chief demanding an independent review.” The Associated Press, February 28, 2003.

 

Cearley, Anna.  “After a lull, little has changed:  Drug cartel loses leaders, but war, killings continue.”  Copley News Service, February 18, 2003.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

 

Serrano, Richard.  “A deadly serious border dispute.”  Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2003.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe  

 

Kammer, Jerry.  “Mexico’s foreign minister on fence-mending trip to U.S.”  Copley News Service, May 6, 2003.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

 

“Healthy People 2000 Final Review.”  Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and National Center for Health Statistics.  October, 2001.

 

Community Epidemiology Work Group.  “Epidemiologic Trends in Drug Abuse: Advance Report.”  National Institutes of Health and National Institute on Drug Abuse.  December, 1999.

 

“News from the DEA.”  Speech by Asa Hutchinson, September 16, 2002.  Baylor University.  http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches

 

“The War Against Drug Profits.” America’s Drug War: from American Radio Works, Minnesota Public Radio, http://www.americanradioworks.org/features/drug_wars. 4/29/03.

 

“Supply and Demand.” America’s Drug War, www.americanradioworks.org/features/drug_wars.


[1] “The Slippery Slope: Unmasking the Drug War.”  http://globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/slope, p.2

[2] Finckenauer, James.  “Mexico and the United States: Neighbors Confront Drug Trafficking.”  National Institute of Justice.

[3] “Drug Intelligence Brief: Mexico.”  US Drug Enforcement Agency, July, 2002.

[4] Cearley, Anna.  “After a lull, little has changed:  Drug cartel loses leaders, but war, killings continue.”  Copley News Service, February 18, 2003.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

[5] “The War Against Drug Profits.” http://www.americanradioworks.org/features/drug_wars. 4/29/03.

[6] Wilborn, Paul. “LAPD scandal flares up with police chief demanding an independent review.” The Associated Press, February 28, 2003.

[7]

[8] “Supply and Demand.” America’s Drug War, www.americanradioworks.org/features/drug_wars.

[9] McGirk, Tim. “Vicente Fox Quesada.”  TIME EUROPE, December 25, 2000, Vol 156, No. 26.

[10] Cearley, Anna.  “After a lull,…Copley News Service, February 18, 2003. 

[11] Dickerson, Marla.  “Mexico arrests alleged drug lord.”  Los Angeles Times,  March 15, 2003.  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe

[12] Cearley, Anna.  “After a lull,…Copley News Service, February 18, 2003. 

[13] Cearley, Anna.  “After a lull,…Copley News Service, February 18, 2003. 

 

[14] “Healthy People 2000 Final Review.”  Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and National Center for Health Statistics.  October, 2001.

[15] “News from the DEA.”  Speech by Asa Hutchinson, September 16, 2002.  Baylor University.

[16] Community Epidemiology Work Group.  “Epidemiologic Trends in Drug Abuse: Advance Report.”  National Institutes of Health and National Institute on Drug Abuse.  December, 1999.

[17] www.drugsense.org

[18] “Gangster Cops,” a lecture by Joseph McNamara, Stanford University.  Engineering 297,  April 30, 2003.

[19] “Gangster Cops,” a lecture by Joseph McNamara, Stanford University.  Engineering 297,  April 30, 2003.

[20] “Vicente Fox on the Transition, NAFTA, Corruption, Drugs, the Economy...” Business Week: July 17, 2000.