Charlie Wagner

Final Edge Paper

Abstract:

In July of 1990, my sister was murdered in the streets of Panama City because one of the passengers in her car was involved in the drug trade. This was just one year after the indictment of General Noriega and the claim that the United States was working to clean up the corruption and drug trade that had taken over Panama. The person that murdered my sister was never brought to justice, although Panamanian police hinted at the fact that they knew who the gunman was and due to corrupt practices, would not try him. For mainly this reason, I have decided to write a paper on this topic.

December 5^th, 2002

Drugs are a complex problem with widespread political, economic and social implications for producing, transit, and consumer nations. In the area of foreign policy, political and economic instability in drug producing areas around the world—and particularly in Latin America is an epidemic that can not be ignored. The objective of this paper is to asses the past issues, current status, and future prospects of the US war on drugs in Latin America—specifically Panama. It begins with a brief overview of the basic problems of drug use in America, and examines how the United States has handled the specific situation of General Noriega and the Panamanians. Finally, I will examine an array of policy options presently available to the United States in its campaign against drug trafficking in Panama and other Latin American countries.

During the late 1980’s, the presence of narcotics trafficking in the world grew rapidly. Many claimed that the United States was facing a national security crisis as far as drugs were concerned. In 1988, as may as 75 percent of more criminals arrested in major American cities tested positive for drugs[1]. A Justice Department study backs up this allegation finding that one-half to three-quarters of the men arrested for serious crimes in 12 major cities tested positive for the recent use of illegal drugs whereas a similar study done four years prior showed that only 56 percent of those arrested for serious crimes were abusing drugs prior to their arrest[2]. In addition, out of 1.2 million intravenous drug users in America, 250,000 of them are infected with AIDS. It was estimated that the cost of drugs to American society measured in terms of death, illness, crime, lost productivity, law enforcement, overcrowded jails, and drug treatment are nearly $100 billion per year[3]!

Drugs are a problem of epidemic proportions. They kill and destroy lives. In the 5 years leading up to the trial of Manual Antonio Noriega, cocaine-related deaths increased nationwide by 500 percent, and heroin-related deaths in the United States increased 64 percent[4]. Drugs are also a major cause of infant fatalities and birth defects. A study of 95 children who died before the age of 5 shows that in three-quarters of those cases, at least one of the parent’s abuse drugs. In 1987, the New York’s Harlem Hospital, one of the few hospitals in New York Sate to keep detailed figures declared that over 400 babies tested positive for drugs at birth[5]. In addition, it was estimated that in one day, 5,000 Americans will use cocaine or crack for the very first time and at least 20 million Americans have already tried cocaine while at least 1 million Americans are addicts.

As a result of statistics such as those presented above, President Reagan declared a “war on drugs” in the early 1980’s. In 1983, Congress enacted the Rangel-Gilman-Hawkins amendment. This amendment requires the State Department annually to report on the efforts of major drug exporting countries. In theory, these reports would act to curtail production. If a country fails to make reasonable efforts at curtailment, the sanction is the loss of economic aid. In March of 1988, the State Department reported to the President as the act required, however, the report only recommended three countries for sanctions: Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria, none of which had been receiving any economic aid from us to begin with[6]. In 1986, the President signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act promising “total commitment of the American people and their Government to fight the evil of drugs.” “Our goal,” he said, was “nothing less than drug-free operation.” Drug use was “too costly for us not to do everything in our power not just to fight it, but to subdue it and conquer it”[7].

It was at this time that United States entered a new era of drug diplomacy in its foreign policy towards Latin America--specifically, Panama. During this era, it was politically popular to claim that control of drug trafficking ranked higher in importance than immigration, foreign debt, and the communist expansion in Central America. In Senator Helms’ opening statement to the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate, he declared, “There are several countries in Latin America that have become major drug producing or drug trafficking countries. But without a doubt, Panama is now at the center of drug and money-laundering operations in the hemisphere”[8].

Senator Helms continued to explain how evidence built up over two years of surveillance showed that the Panamanian General, Manual Antonio Noriega and other high-level official’s committed illicit activities of nearly every kind. Helms explained that Noriega turned Panama into a criminal’s paradise, declaring that these “gangsters” will stop at nothing to rob and betray the Panamanian people.

To understand the underpinnings of the relationship between Noriega and the cartels, it is important to understand a bit of the history of Noriega’s rise to power. In 1968, General Omar Torrijos Herrara came to power and he began a series of important changes in the life of Panama. Torrijos worked to make a commitment to not only his own citizens of Panama, but those of the world to establish full democracy in Panama through free elections and a government under the leadership and control of the civilians. During Torrijos’ reign, social and education reform were given the highest priority. Torrijos also spurned the development of mass transportation and of a health care system in the country.

After General Torrijos’ unfortunate death in 1981, Panama fell victim to an intense internal struggle within Panama’s Defense Forces. Three different leaders began to struggle for control of the military. One of these leaders was General Manual Antonio Noriega, the head of Panama’s Intelligence Agency. In August 12, 1983, it was agreed that Noriega would head the military regime, while another leader, Paredes, was to lead the political arena. Noriega, after legally taking half the power in Panama, changed what at the time was called the national guard of Panama to the Panamanian Defense Forces, thereby expanding their control over many institutions[9].

The Panama that Torrijos had been striving to create was turned upside down by Noriega. Instead of returning to normal duties of the military, forces expanded their involvement in government at all levels, including such normally civilian responsibilities as immigration, customs, and airports. Carefully selected civilians, acceptable only to Noriega were placed in key positions in ministries and the courts. Noriega and his small group worked to turn Panama into a machine for various criminal activities and enterprises[10].

In America, it was known for quite a while that General Noriega was making money in very diverse ways and making a lot of it. As early as June 1986, the New York Times publicly announced that Noriega was involved in illegal drugs. It was reported that between 1986-1987, Noriega had approximately 12 houses in which to live in the Republic of Panama. He also had several BMW cars, and three specialized vans personally made to him. Noriega’s official salary at the time was between $3,500 to 4,000 balboas, which came to about $50,000 to $60,000 dollars per year. Noriega also had a number of planes, helicopters, jets, and several homes in France filled with furnishings brought over specifically from Asia. His military boots were made of sold gold and silver, and a medal that he decorated himself with was worth over $85,000 dollars[11].

. The Noriega problem began in 1985 as an internal Panamanian affair. Between 1985 and the 1989 US invasion, it went though a serious of five minicrisis. A turning point occurred in February 1988, when the United States declared drugs to be the major threat to American society at the same time that Noriega was indicted in Florida for drug trafficking and money laundering (Galboa Pg 539). Following the indictments, the United States declared drugs to be the major threat to American society at the same time that Noriega was indicted in Florida for drug trafficking and money laundering. Following the indictments, the United States sough to remove Noriega from power.

Many believed that Noriega should have been prosecuted a long time before he actually was considering the strong rhetoric that President had reciting about the war on drugs. For example, 1982, $47,000 to $60,000 was the price range of cocaine per kilo. In 1987, the price was between $12,000 and $15,000 on the street. As one senator said, “I think it is no coincidence that in 1983 General Noriega and Panama began a closer relationship with the Cartel.” Also, evidence came forth that the Panamanian Air Force, led by General Noriega was one of the most important instruments in drug and weapons trafficking. Therefore, in 1989, the US invasion of Panama became the first American use of force since 1945 that was unrelated to the cold war. It was also the first large-scale use of American troops abroad since Vietnam and the most violent event in Panamanian history. It ended with the unusual capture of Manuel Antonio Noriega who was then brought to the United States and tried for criminal drug operations[12].

Why then, did the government wait so long to act against Noriega? The answer may depend on who you ask. On one hand, if the drug trade was viewed as an emergency of such proportion that it was above and beyond any other pressing US interest, the question may be answered by implications of inefficiency of the Federal Drug Task Force, or even larger allegations of corruption and under the table dealings between the CIA and Noriega. On the other hand, many people believed that although the drugs were most definitely a national epidemic, the paramount US interest in Panama was the continued viability of the Panama Canal.

American policy makers have long recognized that the single greatest threat to the Panama Canal comes from the instability inside Panama and the danger that a hostile government to the US would one day take power in that country. In the past, this link between security for the Canal and stability inside Panama has led past administrations to treat the Panama Defense Forces led by Noriega as the key to stability inside Panama and the single most important factor in assuring the security of the Canal. US policy-makers tried to develop close and supportive relations with the Defense Forces and ousting Noriega immediately would have made it much more difficult to accomplish these goals. Instead, the US was forced to promote the cause of democracy that included the fight against the drug trade inside Panama without producing the kind of social upheaval that could rage out of control and result in a non-popular, anti-American, repressive government, as well as a fiery situation within the Canal[13]. The US was forced to maintain pressure on the military, without throwing too much gasoline on the fire.

The long-term interests of the United States—both with respect to the future security of the Panama Canal and with respect to a restoration of democracy and respect for human rights inside Panama—were believed to be served by a policy that provided unswerving support for a rapid restoration of democracy to Panama. The United States realized that it could not be forced to go along with an anti-democratic Noriega regime in the long run, even though interests such as the Canal would be jeopardized. The committee reported that “The indefinite presence of General Noriega as the Commander in Chief of the Panama Defense Forces is inconsistent with Panama’s transition to civilian rule, inconsistent with the objective of holding free and fair elections, and inconsistent with the restoration of genuine democracy to the people of Panama”[14] It was at this point, that the US government came to a consensus that long-term stability in Panama required democracy and such a process cannot occur with General Noriega as Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces.

This belief that General Noriega could no longer stay in power was suddenly translated into vigorous and effective policy in 1988. The delegation concluded that none of the conditions set forth in Senate Amendment 723 had been met by Noriega. Congress terminated all US economic and military assistance to the Government of Panama as well as cut off all further contact with General Noriega. Moreover, the United States government should use its influence to support negotiations aimed at achieving an early departure of General Noriega from office.

As I believe I have demonstrated using the specific case of Manual Noriega, when it comes to combating drugs, a faulty premise is that the effort to stop drug trafficking, although important, is never truly a top priority in the international arena. The United States has a variety of interests in Latin America which have often subdued or diluted America’s commitment to fighting drug trafficking. Among the most obvious of these competing foreign policy interests are anti-communism, democratization, regime stabilization, and economic development. As a result of the need to balance these priorities which are often contradictory, American administrations repeatedly use strong rhetoric about anti-drug campaigns, yet avoid serious actions or sanctions[15]. Quite predictably, present administrations are denounced by critics for failing to put up a harder fight against the war on drugs, yet in the real world, the US foreign policy agenda includes a range of interests which cannot easily be reconciled.

Even when the United States is forced to take actions against countries involved in the drug trade like Panama, there is no assurance that those sanctions will have the intended consequences. For example, despite a full year of intense US economic sanction which seemed to impose irreversible damage to the Panamanian economy, General Noriega was able stay away from complete economic collapse by obtaining financial assistance from governments that were unfriendly to the United States or unsympathetic to US policy toward that country. Therefore, the assumption that US economic dominance can cause political control of other countries is clearly fallacious. Furthermore, Noriega did an incredibly good job at exploiting Panamanians nationalism and anti-Americanism sentiments to tighten his political control over the Panamanians[16].

The prognosis for resolving the drug trafficking problem in Latin American countries—specifically Panama, is a bleak one. Statistics show that demand for drugs in the United States will remain high. Simple economics accepts the fact that supply will find a way to meet demand. Over our lifetimes, drug consumption and trafficking are likely to remain as major issues for US domestic and foreign policy. Despite the end of the cold war, dictators such as Noriega, Saddam Hussein, and Serbian leaders Slobodan Milosevic will continue to exist and to challenge the international order. How should the United States, the only remaining superpower, deal with these kinds of authoritarian leaders? What lessons can we learn from the Noriega situation and others like it? I hope this paper has given some insight into these questions and shown that the drug trade is simply one issue in an entangled web or issues and agendas and the best policy the United States may have at its disposal is not to destroy strands of the web, but just try to keep it from growing out of control.

WORKS CITED

Craig, Richard B. “US Anti-drug Policy and US-Columbian Relations,” A Paper prepared for the seminar on the “The US-Latin American Drug Trade,” held at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, February 5-6, 1988.

Inciard, J (1986) “Drug Control and Abuse: Prevention, Treatment, education.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 88-1052 EPW. December 18^th.

Gilboa, Eytan, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era” Political Science Quarterly Volume 110 (November 4) 1995-96.

Moss, A. (1988) “Drugs and Politics in Panama.” Paper prepared for the “Drug Trafficking in the Americas” Conference. The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institute, Washington, D.D. (30 September)

Sciolino, E. & Endelberg (1988) “Narcotics Effort Failed by US Security Goals.” New York Times (April 10^th): Y

“Columbia and the War on Drugs.” Foreign Affairs, 67, 1 (Fall) 70-92.

“Drugs and Latin America: Economic and Political Impact and US Policy Options” Proceedings of a seminar held by the congressional research service, April 26, 1989; US government printing Office, Washington: 1989.)

“Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: Panama” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. February 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1988.

Hearing before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control House of Representatives. “Heroin Trafficking and Abuse: A Growing Crisis” United States Government Printing Office; Washington: 1991.

Wight, Robert III. “Thoughts on the Drug War in Latin America.” A paper prepared for the seminar on the “The US-Latin American Drug Trade,” held at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, February 5-6, 1988.

---

[1] Hearing before the Select Committee on Narcotic Abuse and Control House of Representatives One hundred first congress. First session. May 31, 1989. “The Drug Enforcement Crisis at the Local Level.”

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (1988): Controlling Drug Abuse: A status report.” Washington, DC: GAO/GGP-88-39. (March 1^st)

[3] New York Times (NYT) (1988) “The Drug Bill’s 2.3 Billion Promises” (October 25^th): Y 26

4 Wright, Robert III. “Thoughts on the Drug War in Latin America.” A paper prepared for the seminar on the “The US-Latin American During Trade,” held at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, February 5-6, 1988.

[5] Hearing before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control House of Representatives. “Heroin Trafficking and Abuse: A Growing Crisis” US Government Printing Office; Washington: 1991.

[6] Sciolino, E. & Endelberg (1988) “Narcotics Effort Failed by US Security Goals.” New York Times (April 10^th): Y

[7] Richard B. Craig, “US Anti-drug Policy and US-Columbian Relations,” A Paper prepared for the seminar on the “The US-Latin American Drug Trade,” held at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, February 5-6, 1988.

[8] Gilboa, Eytan, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era” Political Science Quarterly Volume 110 (November 4) 1995-96.

[9] Wright, Robert III. “Thoughts on the Drug War in Latin America.” A paper prepared for the seminar on the “The US-Latin American Drug Trade,” held at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, February 5-6, 1988.

[10] Moss, A. (1988) “Drugs and Politics in Panama.” Paper prepared for the “Drug Trafficking in the Americas” Conference. The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institute, Washington, D.D. (30 September)

[11] Sciolino, E. & Endelberg (1988) “Narcotics Effort Failed by US Security Goals.” New York Times (April 10^th): Y

[12] Sciolino, E. & Endelberg (1988) “Narcotics Effort Failed by US Security Goals.” New York Times (April 10^th): Y

[13] “Columbia and the War on Drugs.” Foreign Affairs, 67, 1 (Fall) 70-92. (1988)

[14]“ Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: Panama” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States

[15] Sciolino, E. & Endelberg (1988) “Narcotics Effort Failed by US Security Goals.” New York Times (April 10^th): Y

[16] Moss, A. (1988) “Drugs and Politics in Panama.” Paper prepared for the “Drug Trafficking in the Americas” Conference. The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institute, Washington, D.D. (30 September)