
TA:
Sahil Khanna
Section:
Wednesday 6:15
The European Union (EU) of 2003 is perhaps one of the
single greatest example of economic, political, and social cooperation amidst
nation-states in the history of modern society. It is a massive organization
contrived of numerous bureaucracies and governing bodies that seeks to
represent nearly an entire continent to the rest of the world. Yet it is an
organization still in the making, an association still feeling its way through
development and expansion. Indeed its history is short, its founding having
really only taken place some fifty odd years ago. The EU has made unimaginable
progress towards its many goals, yet it has now committed itself to perhaps its
greatest task since its conception—the goal of eastern enlargement over the course
of the next decade. Following the unanimous approval of the Treaty of Amsterdam
and later the Treaty of Nice, the EU is on course to increase from 15 to 27
member states, almost doubling the total number of members in the organization.
(See Appendix A) This enormous expansion promises to be the greatest
challenge for the EU in the coming years, since such a dramatic change as
enlargement cannot come without controversy. Indeed member states and ascension
states have posed serious concerns about the process and implications of
eastern enlargement and as such several controversial issues have been brought
to the forefront of political debate within the EU. While some issues pertain
to the reforms necessary to accommodate enlargement and others to the possible
consequences of such massive change, these concerns will require substantial
attention by the EU bureaucracy in order for expansion to successfully take
place, and for the EU to continue it rapid and successful development.
In order to understand the daunting task of EU
expansion it is worth considering the history of the organization as an
economic, political, and social alliance. Perhaps the first conception of the
EU was invoked by Sir Winston Churchill in 1946. Following World War II
Churchill gave a speech at Zurich University where he called for “a kind of
United States of Europe” in order to promulgate an everlasting peace and assure
future prosperity.[1] Churchill’s
initiative gradually came into fruition and was greatly expanded on over the
course of the next fifty years. The birth of the EU and its subsequent
evolution can most easily and concisely be summarized through a timeline of
treaties and agreements which can in no way do the process justice, but is
suitable rather in providing a foundation upon which discussion of further EU
expansion must be based. In 1950 and 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) was established in the Treaty of Paris by six European nations (Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands). The ECSC members agreed
to a unified market for their collective coal and steel resources by abolishing
trade restrictions amongst themselves and providing economic aid in an effort
to unify their combined labor markets. In 1955 representatives for the six
members met again and agreed to further economic integration for the purpose of
greater fiscal growth, which was substantiated in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome
and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC had as its
goal, “…the eventual economic union of its member nations, ultimately leading
to political union. It worked for the free movement of labor and capital, the
abolition of trusts and cartels, and the development of joint and reciprocal
policies on labor, social welfare, agriculture, transport, and foreign trade.”[2]
The Treaty of Rome was significant in that it was the first time political and
social integration were ever referred to as a goal of the collective member states.
In 1962 the nation-state members of the EEC agreed to regulations for a common
agricultural market and in 1965 representatives again met and signed the Merger
Treaty combining the ECES and the EEC into one organization re-named the
European Community (EC).[3]
In perhaps one of the most significant meetings in the history of the
development of the EU, the Heads of State from the six member countries met at
The Hague in 1969 and agreed to further EC integration and enlargement,
completion of a single market, increased cooperation in political matters, and
eventual economic and monetary union (EMU). This council of leaders also agreed
to begin deliberations regarding the future possible membership of the UK,
Ireland, Norway, and Denmark. In 1973, the EC officially accepted the UK,
Ireland, and Italy into its ranks and the EC took full responsibility for the
collective trade policy of its members. Over the course of the 1970s and ’80s
the internal decision-making institutions of the EC were established (see Appendix
B) and more nations joined the organization, including Greece, Spain, and
Portugal. In 1986 the Single European Act was signed by all member states and
the community continued to push for a single market.
The most historic agreement in the history of the EU
was reached in 1992 with the unanimous approval of the Treaty of Maastricht.
The Treaty of Maastricht was a turning point in the European integration
process in that it modified all previous treaties. Further political and social
union were established as priorities on par with economic integration through a
symbolic “three pillar” organizational structure. The first pillar comprised
the economic integration that served as the founding force behind the
EC—economic and monetary union and the single European market. The second
pillar represented the Union’s commitment to a common foreign and security
policy. The third pillar symbolized a joint dedication to common security and
judicial policy (see Appendix C). The introduction of a single EU
currency, and a further general commitment to increased cooperation,
integration, and organization were also hallmarks of the Treaty of Maastricht.[4]
By 1993 the single market was essentially complete, in 1998 the European
Central Bank opened in Frankfurt, and in 1999 the final stage of economic and
monetary union went into affect as the euro became the official currency of the
participating EU member states.
Progressing concurrently with this increased economic integration in the
late 1990s was the major push by member states for further EU expansion into
Eastern Europe. Two treaties, the Treaty of Amsterdam agreed upon in 1997 and
the Treaty of Nice established in 2000 officially paved the way for EU
expansion and presented member nations and candidate countries with a timeline
of integration, and perhaps more importantly, a vision of requirements and
reforms necessary for EU expansion to take place.
One of the fundamental aims of the EU has always been the proliferation
of the organization’s goals and objectives throughout the European continent.
EU expansion proponents have argued that further enlargement brings nothing but
benefits to all member and acceding countries, both in terms of economic
prosperity and stability, and in terms of mutual social responsibility and
political clout. Indeed the EU website points out that, “Numerous economic
analyses have concluded that the benefits of enlargement far outweigh the
costs. Although the benefits are relatively larger for the acceding counties,
because they start from a lower economic base, there are gains for both
sides.””[5]
The argument for EU enlargement is supported by numerous economic analyses
including a 1997 study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research that
calculated a potential economic gain for the original 15 EU members of 10
billion Euro (roughly $10 billion US dollars) and an economic gain for new
members of at least 23 billion Euro.[6]
Moreover, the Commission of the EU estimates that the addition of the Eastern
European bloc to the EU would increase the GDP of the acceding countries by
between 1.3 and 2.1 percent annually and would increase the GDP of the original
member states by .7 percent annually.[7]
The EU has always sought to increase its size and level of integration
to form a cohesive “united state of Europe,” yet eastern enlargement was never
a possibility until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the
soviet bloc in the late 1980s. Following the dismantling of the eastern bloc,
representatives of Western Europe sought to fundamentally unite Eastern Europe
with the rest of the continent through cooperative trade and economic policies.
In the early 1990s, this economic collaboration was formalized as the EU officially
entered into negotiations with eastern European countries for membership into
the EU. The candidacy and ascension of Eastern European nation-states to the EU
was outlined and agreed upon in first the Treaty of Amsterdam, and then further
in the Treaty of Nice.
The Treaty of Amsterdam served many purposes but one
of its primary goals was to set the stage for EU expansion. The Treaty of Nice
was wholly devoted to the expansion of the European Union from 15 to 28 member
states, with the projected additions of Poland, Hungry, the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta in 2004;
Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; and likely Turkey within the decade. It was
essentially a technical agreement that proposed institutional reforms necessary
to accommodate the potential increase in the number of decision-making bodies
within the organization. The Treaty of Nice was the unanimous and concluding
agreement reached at the Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 after a
comprehensive review of the revisions necessary for EU enlargement.
Specifically, the treaty addressed
the degree of representation of member states within the Commission and Council
of Ministers, the two primary decision-making bodies of the EU. In regards to
the Commission, the Treaty of Nice expanded upon agreements reached in the
Treaty of Amsterdam. In the Treaty of Amsterdam it was established that in the
future, large states would have their Commission members reduced to one as
opposed to two, so that all states would be equally represented. This deal was
confirmed under Nice, with the provisions that the reduction in large state’s
Commission members would begin in 2005, and continue until the EU reached 27
members, at which point the right to nominate a Commissioner would rotate
through all the member states on an equal basis.
In addressing the representation of
member states in the Council of Ministers, the Treaty of Nice more or less
backed up conclusions reached in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Under Amsterdam the
member states agreed that the number of votes each state should receive in
cases of qualified majority voting needed to be readjusted, particularly since
larger states were giving up their second representative in the Commission. The Treaty of Nice laid out the number of
votes each state would have once the EU reached 27 members, with smaller states
remaining over-represented, but not to the same extent that they currently
enjoy.
The final major element of the Treaty of Nice was the
detailing of the enhanced cooperation agreement also initiated in the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Nice essentially outlined measures that must be met for enhanced
cooperation to be acceptable, namely the inclusion of at least eight member
states, the right of other member states to join at any point, the requirement
of the authorization of the Council of Ministers, and the stipulation that it
not undermine the single market or pertain to security issues.
The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice
essentially paved the way for EU expansion and the granting of membership to
primarily Eastern European nations. However, “The membership process itself was
started on March 30, 1998 with a specific framework mechanism being drawn up.
It is closely linked to the reinforced strategy prior to membership, the aim of
which is that the prospective Member States are aligned as far as possible to
Community legislation before they become members.”[8]
Indeed for actual expansion to take place the future members needed to fulfill
“all criteria for membership” and the Union needed “to prepare itself
adequately to receive them.”[9]
(See Appendix D) However despite such an extensive and well-planned
framework for expansion, European enlargement has not proceeded without
contention. It is a daunting task, bringing 28 countries under a common market,
with goals of foreign and security cooperation and social and environmental
policy cohesion.
The overwhelming undertaking of
eastern enlargement has required changes at the most fundamental level—in the
area of institutional organization. The institutional reforms proposed for
expansion to take effect have brought substantial controversy to the
enlargement process as a whole. Concerns over the loss of national sovereignty
and the threat such changes pose to democratic accountability have been
particularly notable. The future loss of an automatic Commission representative
has left some countries (and voters) uneasy about the prospect of being subject
to an institution where they have no voice and where no one is specifically
accountable to them; while the re-weighting of votes to the benefit of larger
states has current small member states and ascension states anxious about the
possible development of a two-tier Europe where large states vote as a block
and smaller states are dragged into perhaps unpopular or unbeneficial
legislation. Likewise the potential implications of enhanced cooperation, where
certain states can continue with policy that is not universally accepted,
leaves some states wary of being left behind. Yet large states feel that
through the institutional reforms they are actually surrendering some of their
power to the extent that they give up their second Commissioner and become
increasingly outnumbered by the addition of 12 more ‘smaller’ states. While the
effects of a rotating Commission and the redistribution of votes in the Council
of Ministers do indeed represent a general loss of influence for each country,
there is seemingly few other alternatives for accommodating such massive
institutional expansion.
The economies of the acceding countries represent
only about 6% of the GDP of the original EU members[10]
Indeed, “The expansion would add 75 million people to the 400 million already
living in the EU, but the increase of population by nearly 20% adds no more
than 5% to the union’s wealth.”[11]
This disparity between the relative economic stability and development of the
candidate countries and the member states has left many leaders and citizens
concerned as, “Opponents of enlargement fear the arrival of the poor neighbors
will drain money from the EU budget and slow down EU decision-making.”[12]
Indeed one of the more technical areas of the
economic enlargement controversy relates to the economic distribution effects
that may result with the addition of 12 or more member states to the EU. On
this issue both ascension and current member states have expressed deep
concern, perhaps because, “it is one of the main policies of the EU in
budgetary terms, accounting for around 40% of EU expenditures…”[13]
The specific issue of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), or farming aid and
subsudues, is perhaps the largest current point of contention within the Union
since, “Today’s EU devotes 80% of its budget to aiding farmers or poor regions,
[and] simply extending its current policies eastwards would cost existing
members huge sums.”[14]
Indeed while currently 5.3% of the EU workforce is in agriculture, 22% of the
labor force in the new member states work in farming. Additionally expansion is
set to double not only the EU’s farm labor force but the total amount of
agricultural land as well.[15]
Consequently CAP reform is seen as a necessity, particularly for the countries
that contribute the most to the EU budget such as Germany, France, and England,
who would be required to contribute even more if aid levels were to remain the
same. As a German diplomat attests, “If the CAP is no properly reformed, our
total contribution to the EU could triple in a decade.”[16]
The Commission has proposed to
phase-in farming subsidies to newly joined nations over at least ten years,
starting with 25% the amount paid to already established members. Additionally,
the percent of the budget allocated to CAP agricultural aid will continue to
shrink, thus substantially decreasing the regional aid new member states will
receive compared to aid allocation standards now. This leaves new members angry
(such as Poland and Hungary who hoped to reach equivalence by 2006) since
comparatively wealthier countries such as Germany will continue to receive more
economic aid, and some current members unsatisfied that it’s not going far
enough: “The prospect of admitting ten new countries in 2004, most with large
agricultural sectors, fills many current EU members with dread.”[17]
The Possibility of Large State Dominance & Public Opinion
The culmination of the above
controversial issues leads to a fear of potential large state dominance for
smaller member states and in particular new member countries. For those states
about to enter the EU, citizens have grown increasingly reluctant to jump on
board, indeed “in only four of the 10 candidate countries do more than half of
the population think accession is a good thing.”[18]
In the short term at least new members will in their very position as newcomers
be behind and subsequently there is concern that their interests will not
always be recognized. Accession to the EU will also have preliminary negative
national outcomes, including bouts of high unemployment and inflation, and even
in the long run there will be economic losers such as the protected industries
that will no longer succeed without national tariffs and subsidies. Farmers
from the Eastern bloc will also suffer as trade blocks are removed and
well-established, heavily subsidized EU farmers monopolize the market, driving
them out of business. In addition, the proposed CAP reforms promise to keep new
states behind and poorer than the rest of the Union, at least in the short term.
Indeed an “unhappy realization beginning to dawn on the applicants is that the
fraternity they’re joining is going to haze them,” and that their initial
second-class status could potentially give way to policy monopoly by larger,
more established states.
Collectively the many controversial
issues surrounding eastern enlargement pose a risk to successful and timely EU
expansion, for “What began as a grand project to reunite the sundered halves of
Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is ending in a cold
calculation of structural funds and subsidy levels. What used to be about blood
and passion—binding wounds, seizing the historical moment, forging a common
future—is now about getting paid and looking out for No. 1.”[19]
The institutional reforms, while perhaps initially jarring and troublesome in
their effect on national sovereignty, will be instilled and with time, the
controversy will pass. However the
issues of the CAP and economic aid, and on a larger scale the potential for
large state dominance, if not appropriately addressed, promise to result in
resentment and distrust in the future. Equilibrium between the nation states
needs to be a priority, or else newer states will forever be playing catch-up.
Such disparity, within an organization that promises economic union above all
things, poses the greatest single threat to the stability of the enlarged
union, and despite decades of planning and treaties galore, EU expansion still
remains an uncertain and daunting challenge.
Appendix A
Current Member States
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Candidate States
for Ascension in 2004
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungry
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Candidate States for Ascension in 2007
Bulgaria
Romania
Candidate State with Unsure Ascension Date
Turkey
Appendix B
The Decision-Making Institutions of the European Union

Source: International UNESCO Education Server for
Civic, Peace, and Human Rights Education
Appendix C
The Three Pillars of the European Union

Source: International UNESCO Education Server for
Civic, Peace, and Human Rights Education
Appendix D
Criteria for Membership to the EU
Ø
Democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for
minorities
Ø
A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with
competitive pressures
Ø
The ability to take on the obligations of membership (in
other words, to apply effectively the EU’s rules and policies)
EU Preparations for New Members
Ø
Making Institutional changes necessary for enlargement: that
means ratifying the Treaty of Nice; meanwhile, the applicant countries are
already participating in the ongoing debate on the future of Europe
Ø
Providing the budgetary means: that has already been done,
with the European Council’s decisions in Berlin
Source: The European Union Online – Basic Arguments
for Enlargement
Bibliography
BBC News, “The EU Reaches
Landmark Expansion Deal” www.bbc.co.uk
10/9/02.
Brenton, Paul. “The Economic
Impact of Enlargement on the European
Economy:
Problems and Perspectives,” Centre for European Policy
Studies,
10/02.
Dinan, Desmond. An Ever
Closer Union (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2nd Ed.)
1999.
International UNESCO
Education Server for Civic, Peace, and Human Rights Education, http://www.dadalos.org 6/2/03.
Moravcsik, Andrew. The
Choice For Europe (Cornell University Press: New
York)
1998.
The Columbia Encyclopedia,
Sixth Edition, 2001.
The Economist, “Cutting the Cost of EU Enlargement” 1/31/02.
The Economist, “The EU After the Irish Referendum” 10/24/02.
The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.
The European Union
Delegation to Japan,
http://jpn.cec.eu.int/english/generalinfo/5-2.htm
6/2/03.
Time, “The EU: Love It or
Leave It” 10/14/02.
[1] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.
[2] The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition 2001.
[3] The European Union Delegation to Japan, http://jpn.cec.eu.int/english/generalinfo/5-2.htm 6/2/03.
[4] Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice For Europe (Cornell University Press: New York) 1998.
[5] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.
[6] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.
[7] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.
[8] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.
[9] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.
[10] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.
[11] BBC News,
“The EU Reaches Landmark Expansion Deal” www.bbc.co.uk
10/9/02.
[12] BBC News,
“The EU Reaches Landmark Expansion Deal” www.bbc.co.uk
10/9/02.
[13] Brenton, Paul. “The Economic Impact of Enlargement on
the European Economy: Problems and Perspectives,” Centre for European Policy
Studies, 10/02.
[14] The Economist, “Cutting the Cost of EU
Enlargement” 1/31/02.
[15] Dinan, Desmond. An Ever Closer Union (Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2nd Ed.) 1999.
[16] The Economist, “Cutting the Cost of EU Enlargement” 1/31/02.
[17] The Economist, “The EU After the Irish Referendum” 10/24/02.
[18] Time, “The EU: Love It or Leave It” 10/14/02.
[19] Time, “The EU: Love It or Leave It” 10/14/02.