The Road to European Union Expansion

“The Grand Ambition, The Huge Challenge”

 

 

 

 

 

Megan Quinn

EDGE: Spring Quarter 2003

TA: Sahil Khanna

Section: Wednesday 6:15

 

The Road to European Union Expansion

 

            The European Union (EU) of 2003 is perhaps one of the single greatest example of economic, political, and social cooperation amidst nation-states in the history of modern society. It is a massive organization contrived of numerous bureaucracies and governing bodies that seeks to represent nearly an entire continent to the rest of the world. Yet it is an organization still in the making, an association still feeling its way through development and expansion. Indeed its history is short, its founding having really only taken place some fifty odd years ago. The EU has made unimaginable progress towards its many goals, yet it has now committed itself to perhaps its greatest task since its conception—the goal of eastern enlargement over the course of the next decade. Following the unanimous approval of the Treaty of Amsterdam and later the Treaty of Nice, the EU is on course to increase from 15 to 27 member states, almost doubling the total number of members in the organization. (See Appendix A) This enormous expansion promises to be the greatest challenge for the EU in the coming years, since such a dramatic change as enlargement cannot come without controversy. Indeed member states and ascension states have posed serious concerns about the process and implications of eastern enlargement and as such several controversial issues have been brought to the forefront of political debate within the EU. While some issues pertain to the reforms necessary to accommodate enlargement and others to the possible consequences of such massive change, these concerns will require substantial attention by the EU bureaucracy in order for expansion to successfully take place, and for the EU to continue it rapid and successful development.

‘An Ever Closer Union’: A Brief History of the European Union

            In order to understand the daunting task of EU expansion it is worth considering the history of the organization as an economic, political, and social alliance. Perhaps the first conception of the EU was invoked by Sir Winston Churchill in 1946. Following World War II Churchill gave a speech at Zurich University where he called for “a kind of United States of Europe” in order to promulgate an everlasting peace and assure future prosperity.[1] Churchill’s initiative gradually came into fruition and was greatly expanded on over the course of the next fifty years. The birth of the EU and its subsequent evolution can most easily and concisely be summarized through a timeline of treaties and agreements which can in no way do the process justice, but is suitable rather in providing a foundation upon which discussion of further EU expansion must be based. In 1950 and 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in the Treaty of Paris by six European nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands). The ECSC members agreed to a unified market for their collective coal and steel resources by abolishing trade restrictions amongst themselves and providing economic aid in an effort to unify their combined labor markets. In 1955 representatives for the six members met again and agreed to further economic integration for the purpose of greater fiscal growth, which was substantiated in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC had as its goal, “…the eventual economic union of its member nations, ultimately leading to political union. It worked for the free movement of labor and capital, the abolition of trusts and cartels, and the development of joint and reciprocal policies on labor, social welfare, agriculture, transport, and foreign trade.”[2] The Treaty of Rome was significant in that it was the first time political and social integration were ever referred to as a goal of the collective member states. In 1962 the nation-state members of the EEC agreed to regulations for a common agricultural market and in 1965 representatives again met and signed the Merger Treaty combining the ECES and the EEC into one organization re-named the European Community (EC).[3] In perhaps one of the most significant meetings in the history of the development of the EU, the Heads of State from the six member countries met at The Hague in 1969 and agreed to further EC integration and enlargement, completion of a single market, increased cooperation in political matters, and eventual economic and monetary union (EMU). This council of leaders also agreed to begin deliberations regarding the future possible membership of the UK, Ireland, Norway, and Denmark. In 1973, the EC officially accepted the UK, Ireland, and Italy into its ranks and the EC took full responsibility for the collective trade policy of its members. Over the course of the 1970s and ’80s the internal decision-making institutions of the EC were established (see Appendix B) and more nations joined the organization, including Greece, Spain, and Portugal. In 1986 the Single European Act was signed by all member states and the community continued to push for a single market.

The most historic agreement in the history of the EU was reached in 1992 with the unanimous approval of the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty of Maastricht was a turning point in the European integration process in that it modified all previous treaties. Further political and social union were established as priorities on par with economic integration through a symbolic “three pillar” organizational structure. The first pillar comprised the economic integration that served as the founding force behind the EC—economic and monetary union and the single European market. The second pillar represented the Union’s commitment to a common foreign and security policy. The third pillar symbolized a joint dedication to common security and judicial policy (see Appendix C). The introduction of a single EU currency, and a further general commitment to increased cooperation, integration, and organization were also hallmarks of the Treaty of Maastricht.[4] By 1993 the single market was essentially complete, in 1998 the European Central Bank opened in Frankfurt, and in 1999 the final stage of economic and monetary union went into affect as the euro became the official currency of the participating EU member states.

Progressing concurrently with this increased economic integration in the late 1990s was the major push by member states for further EU expansion into Eastern Europe. Two treaties, the Treaty of Amsterdam agreed upon in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice established in 2000 officially paved the way for EU expansion and presented member nations and candidate countries with a timeline of integration, and perhaps more importantly, a vision of requirements and reforms necessary for EU expansion to take place. 

The Commitment To Expansion: The Treaty of Amsterdam & The Treaty of Nice

One of the fundamental aims of the EU has always been the proliferation of the organization’s goals and objectives throughout the European continent. EU expansion proponents have argued that further enlargement brings nothing but benefits to all member and acceding countries, both in terms of economic prosperity and stability, and in terms of mutual social responsibility and political clout. Indeed the EU website points out that, “Numerous economic analyses have concluded that the benefits of enlargement far outweigh the costs. Although the benefits are relatively larger for the acceding counties, because they start from a lower economic base, there are gains for both sides.””[5] The argument for EU enlargement is supported by numerous economic analyses including a 1997 study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research that calculated a potential economic gain for the original 15 EU members of 10 billion Euro (roughly $10 billion US dollars) and an economic gain for new members of at least 23 billion Euro.[6] Moreover, the Commission of the EU estimates that the addition of the Eastern European bloc to the EU would increase the GDP of the acceding countries by between 1.3 and 2.1 percent annually and would increase the GDP of the original member states by .7 percent annually.[7]

The EU has always sought to increase its size and level of integration to form a cohesive “united state of Europe,” yet eastern enlargement was never a possibility until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the soviet bloc in the late 1980s. Following the dismantling of the eastern bloc, representatives of Western Europe sought to fundamentally unite Eastern Europe with the rest of the continent through cooperative trade and economic policies. In the early 1990s, this economic collaboration was formalized as the EU officially entered into negotiations with eastern European countries for membership into the EU. The candidacy and ascension of Eastern European nation-states to the EU was outlined and agreed upon in first the Treaty of Amsterdam, and then further in the Treaty of Nice.

The Treaty of Amsterdam served many purposes but one of its primary goals was to set the stage for EU expansion. The Treaty of Nice was wholly devoted to the expansion of the European Union from 15 to 28 member states, with the projected additions of Poland, Hungry, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta in 2004; Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; and likely Turkey within the decade. It was essentially a technical agreement that proposed institutional reforms necessary to accommodate the potential increase in the number of decision-making bodies within the organization. The Treaty of Nice was the unanimous and concluding agreement reached at the Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 after a comprehensive review of the revisions necessary for EU enlargement.

            Specifically, the treaty addressed the degree of representation of member states within the Commission and Council of Ministers, the two primary decision-making bodies of the EU. In regards to the Commission, the Treaty of Nice expanded upon agreements reached in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In the Treaty of Amsterdam it was established that in the future, large states would have their Commission members reduced to one as opposed to two, so that all states would be equally represented. This deal was confirmed under Nice, with the provisions that the reduction in large state’s Commission members would begin in 2005, and continue until the EU reached 27 members, at which point the right to nominate a Commissioner would rotate through all the member states on an equal basis.

            In addressing the representation of member states in the Council of Ministers, the Treaty of Nice more or less backed up conclusions reached in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Under Amsterdam the member states agreed that the number of votes each state should receive in cases of qualified majority voting needed to be readjusted, particularly since larger states were giving up their second representative in the Commission.  The Treaty of Nice laid out the number of votes each state would have once the EU reached 27 members, with smaller states remaining over-represented, but not to the same extent that they currently enjoy.

            The final major element of the Treaty of Nice was the detailing of the enhanced cooperation agreement also initiated in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Nice essentially outlined measures that must be met for enhanced cooperation to be acceptable, namely the inclusion of at least eight member states, the right of other member states to join at any point, the requirement of the authorization of the Council of Ministers, and the stipulation that it not undermine the single market or pertain to security issues.

Challenges & Obstacles to Expansion

The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice essentially paved the way for EU expansion and the granting of membership to primarily Eastern European nations. However, “The membership process itself was started on March 30, 1998 with a specific framework mechanism being drawn up. It is closely linked to the reinforced strategy prior to membership, the aim of which is that the prospective Member States are aligned as far as possible to Community legislation before they become members.”[8] Indeed for actual expansion to take place the future members needed to fulfill “all criteria for membership” and the Union needed “to prepare itself adequately to receive them.”[9] (See Appendix D) However despite such an extensive and well-planned framework for expansion, European enlargement has not proceeded without contention. It is a daunting task, bringing 28 countries under a common market, with goals of foreign and security cooperation and social and environmental policy cohesion.

Institutional Reforms

            The overwhelming undertaking of eastern enlargement has required changes at the most fundamental level—in the area of institutional organization. The institutional reforms proposed for expansion to take effect have brought substantial controversy to the enlargement process as a whole. Concerns over the loss of national sovereignty and the threat such changes pose to democratic accountability have been particularly notable. The future loss of an automatic Commission representative has left some countries (and voters) uneasy about the prospect of being subject to an institution where they have no voice and where no one is specifically accountable to them; while the re-weighting of votes to the benefit of larger states has current small member states and ascension states anxious about the possible development of a two-tier Europe where large states vote as a block and smaller states are dragged into perhaps unpopular or unbeneficial legislation. Likewise the potential implications of enhanced cooperation, where certain states can continue with policy that is not universally accepted, leaves some states wary of being left behind. Yet large states feel that through the institutional reforms they are actually surrendering some of their power to the extent that they give up their second Commissioner and become increasingly outnumbered by the addition of 12 more ‘smaller’ states. While the effects of a rotating Commission and the redistribution of votes in the Council of Ministers do indeed represent a general loss of influence for each country, there is seemingly few other alternatives for accommodating such massive institutional expansion.

Economic Distribution Effects & Reforms

The economies of the acceding countries represent only about 6% of the GDP of the original EU members[10] Indeed, “The expansion would add 75 million people to the 400 million already living in the EU, but the increase of population by nearly 20% adds no more than 5% to the union’s wealth.”[11] This disparity between the relative economic stability and development of the candidate countries and the member states has left many leaders and citizens concerned as, “Opponents of enlargement fear the arrival of the poor neighbors will drain money from the EU budget and slow down EU decision-making.”[12]

Indeed one of the more technical areas of the economic enlargement controversy relates to the economic distribution effects that may result with the addition of 12 or more member states to the EU. On this issue both ascension and current member states have expressed deep concern, perhaps because, “it is one of the main policies of the EU in budgetary terms, accounting for around 40% of EU expenditures…”[13] The specific issue of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), or farming aid and subsudues, is perhaps the largest current point of contention within the Union since, “Today’s EU devotes 80% of its budget to aiding farmers or poor regions, [and] simply extending its current policies eastwards would cost existing members huge sums.”[14] Indeed while currently 5.3% of the EU workforce is in agriculture, 22% of the labor force in the new member states work in farming. Additionally expansion is set to double not only the EU’s farm labor force but the total amount of agricultural land as well.[15] Consequently CAP reform is seen as a necessity, particularly for the countries that contribute the most to the EU budget such as Germany, France, and England, who would be required to contribute even more if aid levels were to remain the same. As a German diplomat attests, “If the CAP is no properly reformed, our total contribution to the EU could triple in a decade.”[16]

            The Commission has proposed to phase-in farming subsidies to newly joined nations over at least ten years, starting with 25% the amount paid to already established members. Additionally, the percent of the budget allocated to CAP agricultural aid will continue to shrink, thus substantially decreasing the regional aid new member states will receive compared to aid allocation standards now. This leaves new members angry (such as Poland and Hungary who hoped to reach equivalence by 2006) since comparatively wealthier countries such as Germany will continue to receive more economic aid, and some current members unsatisfied that it’s not going far enough: “The prospect of admitting ten new countries in 2004, most with large agricultural sectors, fills many current EU members with dread.”[17]

The Possibility of Large State Dominance & Public Opinion

            The culmination of the above controversial issues leads to a fear of potential large state dominance for smaller member states and in particular new member countries. For those states about to enter the EU, citizens have grown increasingly reluctant to jump on board, indeed “in only four of the 10 candidate countries do more than half of the population think accession is a good thing.”[18] In the short term at least new members will in their very position as newcomers be behind and subsequently there is concern that their interests will not always be recognized. Accession to the EU will also have preliminary negative national outcomes, including bouts of high unemployment and inflation, and even in the long run there will be economic losers such as the protected industries that will no longer succeed without national tariffs and subsidies. Farmers from the Eastern bloc will also suffer as trade blocks are removed and well-established, heavily subsidized EU farmers monopolize the market, driving them out of business. In addition, the proposed CAP reforms promise to keep new states behind and poorer than the rest of the Union, at least in the short term. Indeed an “unhappy realization beginning to dawn on the applicants is that the fraternity they’re joining is going to haze them,” and that their initial second-class status could potentially give way to policy monopoly by larger, more established states.

            Collectively the many controversial issues surrounding eastern enlargement pose a risk to successful and timely EU expansion, for “What began as a grand project to reunite the sundered halves of Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is ending in a cold calculation of structural funds and subsidy levels. What used to be about blood and passion—binding wounds, seizing the historical moment, forging a common future—is now about getting paid and looking out for No. 1.”[19] The institutional reforms, while perhaps initially jarring and troublesome in their effect on national sovereignty, will be instilled and with time, the controversy will pass.  However the issues of the CAP and economic aid, and on a larger scale the potential for large state dominance, if not appropriately addressed, promise to result in resentment and distrust in the future. Equilibrium between the nation states needs to be a priority, or else newer states will forever be playing catch-up. Such disparity, within an organization that promises economic union above all things, poses the greatest single threat to the stability of the enlarged union, and despite decades of planning and treaties galore, EU expansion still remains an uncertain and daunting challenge.


 

Appendix A

 

Current Member States

 

Belgium

Denmark

Germany

Greece

Spain

France

Ireland

Italy

Luxembourg

The Netherlands

Austria

Portugal

Finland

Sweden

United Kingdom

 

Candidate States for Ascension in 2004

 

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungry

Latvia

Lithuania

Malta

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

 

Candidate States for Ascension in 2007

 

Bulgaria

Romania

 

Candidate State with Unsure Ascension Date

 

Turkey

 

Appendix B

 

 

The Decision-Making Institutions of the European Union

 

 

 

Source: International UNESCO Education Server for Civic, Peace, and Human Rights Education


 

 

Appendix C

 

The Three Pillars of the European Union

 

 

 

 

 

Source: International UNESCO Education Server for Civic, Peace, and Human Rights Education


 

 

Appendix D

 

 

Criteria for Membership to the EU

 

 

 

Ø                        Democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities

Ø                        A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures

Ø                        The ability to take on the obligations of membership (in other words, to apply effectively the EU’s rules and policies)

 

 

EU Preparations for New Members

 

 

 

Ø                        Making Institutional changes necessary for enlargement: that means ratifying the Treaty of Nice; meanwhile, the applicant countries are already participating in the ongoing debate on the future of Europe

Ø                        Providing the budgetary means: that has already been done, with the European Council’s decisions in Berlin

 

Source: The European Union Online – Basic Arguments for Enlargement
Bibliography

 

BBC News, “The EU Reaches Landmark Expansion Deal” www.bbc.co.uk

10/9/02.

 

Brenton, Paul. “The Economic Impact of Enlargement on the European

Economy: Problems and Perspectives,” Centre for European Policy

Studies, 10/02.

 

Dinan, Desmond. An Ever Closer Union (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2nd Ed.)

1999.

 

International UNESCO Education Server for Civic, Peace, and Human Rights Education, http://www.dadalos.org 6/2/03.

 

Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice For Europe (Cornell University Press: New

York) 1998.

 

The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001.

 

The Economist, “Cutting the Cost of EU Enlargement” 1/31/02.

 

The Economist, “The EU After the Irish Referendum” 10/24/02.

 

The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.

 

The European Union Delegation to Japan,

http://jpn.cec.eu.int/english/generalinfo/5-2.htm 6/2/03.

 

Time, “The EU: Love It or Leave It” 10/14/02.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



[1] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.

[2] The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition 2001.

[3] The European Union Delegation to Japan, http://jpn.cec.eu.int/english/generalinfo/5-2.htm 6/2/03.

[4] Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice For Europe (Cornell University Press: New York) 1998.

[5] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.

[6] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.

[7] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.

[8] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.

[9] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.

[10] The European Union Online, www.europa.eu.int 6/2/03.

[11] BBC News, “The EU Reaches Landmark Expansion Deal” www.bbc.co.uk 10/9/02.

[12] BBC News, “The EU Reaches Landmark Expansion Deal” www.bbc.co.uk 10/9/02.

[13] Brenton, Paul. “The Economic Impact of Enlargement on the European Economy: Problems and Perspectives,” Centre for European Policy Studies, 10/02.

[14] The Economist, “Cutting the Cost of EU Enlargement” 1/31/02.

[15] Dinan, Desmond. An Ever Closer Union (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2nd Ed.) 1999.

 

[16] The Economist, “Cutting the Cost of EU Enlargement” 1/31/02.

[17] The Economist, “The EU After the Irish Referendum” 10/24/02.

[18] Time, “The EU: Love It or Leave It” 10/14/02.

[19] Time, “The EU: Love It or Leave It” 10/14/02.