Development in Morocco

Kate Brubacher

SUID 4863585

EDGE Winter Quarter

All countries are unique. Different and complex histories, mélanges of people, religions and a myriad of other factors shape the culture, politics and reality of each one. However, some countries appear to be more enigmatic than others. Morocco is one such case, and because of its nature it presents a unique dynamic for women and development. Generally among development programs there are problems reaching women and empowering women to become agents of change themselves, as females are often left out of statistics or caught in larger political and economic systems that hinder their progression. This general problem takes on different form when it is in the context of Muslim Morocco, a country which has millions of women who suffer in oppression, yet some of the most outspoken and instrumental women in the Muslim development world. The diverse combination of influences that define Morocco offer many challenges to the development effort while questioning the benefit of outside involvement, yet ultimately creates an environment in which Muslim Moroccan females are able to emerge as leaders in their communities and protectors of tradition, although the path to this status is ridden with difficulty and obstacles.

Morocco is distinguished from its neighbors and other Arab states by its actual history and the interpretation of that history, sometimes two entirely different things. Morocco’s past has been the target of much “updating” to provide the foundation and justification for today’s government and institutions (Slugett, Farouk-Slugett, 50). The result of this selective ordering of history is the simultaneous existence of Morocco as an Islamic state and an empire, completely distinct from its peers as it boasts centuries of consistent government and religious orthodoxy. It is not oppressive in its reforms and does not face direct political imposition from outside sources. However, the interpretation often invoked in Morocco is not always in direct correspondence with reality, “since those in power are well placed to control the way in which the past is projected for present consumption” (Slugett, Farouk-Slugett, 50). He contends that much of the political apparatus of modern Morocco was a creation of the first French Resident-General Lyautey and his successors, as much as the Moroccan monarchy (‘Alawite) (Slugett, Farouk-Slugett, 51). What is less of a debate is Morocco’s beneficial relationship with the French occupation. Morocco was never a colony, but rather a protectorate and because the French kept traditional institutions intact, those institutions were able to emerge strengthened and improved after the occupation. And because it was the Islamic reaction to the French rule that spurred the national movement, Muhammad V was able to re-validate his authority when the French left in 1956. Their exit, and Moroccan independence, was largely prompted by the union of urban and rural forces who demanded that French soldiers and administrators leave and the sultan be returned to the Moroccan people. But the unity of rural and urban was focused on this single issue, and once the objective was met, the separation became present once again.

Morocco also has immense Spanish influence. At their closest point the two countries are only separated by eight miles of ocean. Spain occupied Northern Morocco at one point, and its mark on the language and culture is still evident today, particularly in those northern regions. The southern regions are largely inhabited by Berbers and Bedouin tribes with their own languages. Depending on level of education and exposure, Berbers speak the Moroccan dialect of Arabic, but many have no immediate use for anything other than their native Berber tongue. This lack of common language adds further to the difficulty of cohesion in programs and inhibits the expansiveness of some efforts.

The language gap is a minor factor in the discrepancies existent in Morocco. Interviews with a successful businessman in Casablanca conducted in the summer of 2001, commenced with the words, “Morocco is a land of contradiction,” and remain a useful guiding principle while reading and searching for understanding in the scant available literature and reports on the country. (Interview notes) One of the salient contradictions is the position of Morocco on the economic and political scale as compared to the social factor scale. The World Bank describes Morocco as a “lower middle income” country, and there has been much political progress towards democracy. In 1998, Yousouffi, an opposition leader, was elected prime minister. King Mohammed VI, who took the throne in 1999, has made a new commitment toward further political opening, education reform, women’s conditions, transparency in the justice system, and a myriad of other social reforms. Morocco has a stable economy, although growth is slow. They have developed infrastructures, and relatively extensive export capabilities. However, on a scale of social factors, Morocco would be considered undeveloped. Although life expectancy and school enrollment have improved over the last few years, Morocco still fares worse than comparable countries in poverty, equity, health and education, and as is often the case, women fare worst in these social inequities. The average infant mortality rate in the Middle East and North Africa is 35 per 1,000 births. Morocco’s rate is 52 per 1,000. The regional average for illiteracy is one-third, while in Morocco one half of the population is illiterate. (World Bank Statistics)

There are decisive and persistent differences between rural and urban areas, particularly among women. Of the countries’ poor, 75% live in the countryside. Less than 15% of rural women are estimated to be able to read and write, and maternal mortality rates are 307 per 100,000 – a number comparable only with countries of much lesser economic capabilities. There is not equal access to public services – it is estimated that 18% of the rural population has access to electricity and 14% with access to clean water. To give this a context of the region one can look at the numbers of Tunisia where 64% of the rural population has access to electricity and 65% to water. The rates of girls in school are also very disproportionate – with numbers of urban girls in school is about double of the rural rate. Although the government is paying new attention, the indicators are not getting better – or really even stabilizing. Thirty percent of the 28 million population is considered living in poverty, while 19% of the population is living below the absolute poverty line, which is less than $1 US dollar a day. This is a 50% increase from 1991. The country spends 12% of its GDP on social programs – as opposed to Tunisia, Spain, Greece and Portugal (like countries) who allocate 20%. Further, the programs are often focused toward urban improvement and wealthier segments of the population. But even when there is improvement in access, poverty, low consumption rates, and tradition, sometimes in the name of Islam, subjugating women often prevent people from taking advantage of improvements. (World Bank Statistics)

Other distinct contradictions are present in the laws outlining the rights of Moroccan women. Like many other Arab countries, Morocco’s laws are a combination of civil and religious law. This presents blatant contradictions. The Moroccan constitution and acceptance of many United Nations statutes are clear about the equality of women. However, Family Law (Muduwana in Arabic) gives males dominance and places women in subordinate stature in the eyes of the law. (Mernissi, Country Reports, 25) The Family Law includes the following clauses of sexual inequality:

(a) Females must be represented by a guardian to enter marriage, she may not legally commit by herself.

(b) Muslim men may marry Christian, Jewish, or women of any faith, while Muslim women must marry Muslim men.

(d) Women are legally bound to obedience and fidelity to their husbands, while no like requirements are legally implicated for males.

(e) If a woman wants to divorce, there are explicit appropriate circumstances and the assistance of a judge is necessary. Men are able to divorce their wives without detailed explanation and processes.

(f) Males are legally obliged to support sons until they reach the age of 21, while there is no such requirement for support of the daughters.

(g) Inheritance Law grants daughters of the deceased one-half of what the sons receive. (Mernissi, Country Reports, 26)

Dr. Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist, who has worked extensively as a consultant for the United Nations, outlines further texts and customs that subordinate women. She includes the Penal Code which is lenient to men who murder or injure their wife or wife’s lover if the two are found in the act of adultery; the Social Security Law which grants benefits to only the husband if both husband and wife are eligible for social security; the Agricultural Land Reform Act of 1973 which only recognizes farmers whose main occupation is agriculture and excludes many women farmers whose work is often overlooked. (Mernissi, Country Reports, 26) Mernissi also notes culture dictates that necessitate wives to have their husband’s permission to receive a passport, and that women in business are still subject to their husband’s approval of their occupational activities. (Mernissi, Country Reports, 26)

The ratified United Nations statements that stand in contention with these civil laws include the Charter of the United Nations, the International Labor Organization Text on Discrimination in Labor and the Professions, ILO Convention on Equal Pay for Equal Work, UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, and the United Nations Supplemental Convention Relative to the Abolition of Slavery and the Slave Trade and to Institutions and Practices Analogous to Slavery. (Mernissi, Country Reports, 25) Dr. Mernissi holds that the recognition and analysis of these contradicting legislative texts and practices are paramount in “securing for Moroccan women their full rights to participate in the tolls and rewards of development.” (Mernissi, Country Reports, 26)

Dr. Mernissi brings into clearer view the complicated nature of women’s involvement and reception of development efforts. There is the persistent misconception that women are only on the receiving end of development. (Brouwers, 11) This is generated and perpetuated by the methods of data gathering and the foci of development efforts. Often numbers are drawn from economic indicators, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are concerned with Gross Domestic Product, export and import capability, currency value and other fiscal gauges. However, the contributions of women are not always present in this data. Work in the informal sector, on small family farms, or in the household is not considered ‘work’ under an economic definition. (Brouwers, 11)

The problem in the general development context, as dealing with women, was expressed in 1988 by Padmini Abeywardena from the Centre for Women’s Research of the Royal Dutch Embassy at their international conference to discuss ways in which women can be producers of rural development, a place not traditionally held by females. Abeywardena outlined conditions that must be met by the developing countries themselves, and the over-arching or funding agencies. She set the foundation for her conditions by noting that the “invisibility of women in agriculture in the unorganized sector and the lack of assessment of their contribution are important issues for the position of women.” (Breebart/Vos, 51) This reality is created by a lack of organization, insufficient access to profits, land, and credit. (Breebart/Vos, 51) Further, women are often entirely left out of the decision-making process of those issues in which they are directly involved. Abeywardena sets forth three conditions that need to be met to reach women as producers. They are:

(1) Funding agencies and bodies must be “sensitized” to the idea of women and development. There must be the realization and recognition that women are legitimate producers and must therefore be seen on equal terms with their male counterparts and must be involved in all stages of decision making.

(2) Avoid “cultural camouflage” where development agencies use the culture as an excuse to justify lack of focus on women. Some developing countries’ culture simply reflects the dominant male politicians and development planners. This commonly translates into the failure to recognize the needs and desires of women.

(3) One must look beyond the facts and statistics. There are inherent flaws in the systems of data-gathering and compiling, and one must take into consideration these biases. (Breebart/Vos, 51)

Women in the workshop also added their own observations about factors that hinder women’s development and development projects. These components included:

(1) Partner organizations (funding and resource-wise) often have male-dominated bureaucracies.

(2) Women’s organizations that are run by weak, elitist women can marginalize women.

(3) Projects which only add to women’s duties can be over-burdening.

(4) Many projects are too short (average 3 years) so there is not time for extensive studies and effectiveness assessment.

(5) “Culture” is used as an argument for justifying oppressive roles of women. (Breebart/Vos, 51)

Although these generalizations are not necessarily applicable to the issue, Mernissi assesses the situation of

Muslim Moroccan women – and those of the Arab world – without the sweeping statements Abeywardena suggests are applicable for females throughout the developing world. As Abeywardena, working for an international organization herself, presupposes the involvement of outside resources, Mernissi’s mission is for self-empowerment of the women. Mernissi makes a strong statement about the consequences of multinational efforts and Globalization. Speaking in the context of Morocco, but drawing her conclusions to the greater Arab community, she asserts that the Arab state has lost its power, and that the success of these societies depends on the ability of the citizens to organize themselves and disconnect from the states. Mernissi isolates several factors for the decline of the state, naming a salient one as governments still operating with colonial mentalities remnant from the days of occupation. Further factors include the IMF and the World Bank playing dual roles in the demise of credibility of the government. On the one hand they held the government accountable and made processes transparent. The internet and satellite television further allowed citizens to access information about their governments, and also introduced a new medium through which non-governmental organizations could gain prominence. (Lamy, website) But while the accountability that the IMF and the World Bank brought was positive, they also served to perpetuate the detrimental trend of making economics the top priority thus lessening the importance of all other factors. Mernissi’s assessment is that the strength of individual communities will grow inversely proportionate to the declining power of the state. She credits all improvements in development – from clean water, education for females, and micro-credit -- to community movements with aid from NGOs, not the tactics and money of multinationals. (Lamy, website)

The World Bank’s strategy is to focus on reducing poverty, social gaps and exclusion. This comes in the way of increased privatization, sustainable growth and structural adjustment. (World Bank website) The concern is paying back loans, and building a self-sustaining economy. One specific project sponsored by the World Bank is called The Basic Education Project. The project is enormous; its total cost is US$97.7 million borrowed by the Moroccan government. The plan consists of many components, including attempts to improve earlier projects by targeting the poorest populations, attempting to have a demand on both the supply and demand for education, and attempting to target pre and post education such as Koranic preschools and literacy education for adults. The hope is to make education available for populations for which it has previously been unavailable. The project is focused in specific regions in the thirteen selected areas called 'priority intervention areas" (Zones d'Intervention Prioritaire) because of their low female enrollment rates as well as other lacking social indicators. The project has five main goals:

(a) Improving access to and retention rates in remote rural areas by expanding the supply of

available basic schooling.

(b) Reducing the gap between the school participation rates of boys and girls.

(d) Improving the performance of Government literacy programs.

(e) Providing technical support to the MEN (Ministere de l'Education Nationale) to make operational and implement its Sector Action Plan, which aims to reallocate resources to priority programs and improve budgetary efficiency. (Staff Appraisal Report, 9, 10)

Mernissi’s skepticism of such enormous projects is clear; the answers will not be found in state

programs. Beyond her statements that the citizens no longer have full confidence in government, she does not see the efforts focused at the right elements. Some of Mernissi’s counter-actions are evident in a conference she held in Morocco in 1995 called “Pouvoir Est Communication” (Power is Communication) where she brought together women from all over the Maghreb (and a few male leaders) who work in Non-governmental Organizations to begin to mobilize their agencies to become more interconnected and help improve the lives of women. The main component of the conference was the training of the leaders in some basic computer skills that they would be able to pass on to the women with whom they work. One teacher from Fes remarked, “Young girls come out of school with absolutely no useful skills. I want them to learn word processing so they can get good jobs.” (ctcnet.org)

The other unique component in a conference such as Pouvoir Est Communication is the distinctly Muslim atmosphere. Although the women are working in the women’s movement of the Maghreb, many of them fighting against rigid fundamentalism (particularly the Algerians), they are all still upholding a culture and tradition of Islam and liberating women within that context. Mernissi’s goal is to firmly connect these Muslim women with shared experiences and obstacles so they will better serve their sisters. She is quick to expose where their oppression is rooted:

...it is neither because of the Koran nor the Prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because those [women’s] rights conflict with the interests of a male elite...Not only have the sacred texts always been manipulated, but the manipulation of them is a structural characteristic of the practice of power in Muslim societies... (Mernissi, xi, 8)

Mernissi keeps her efforts firmly rooted in Islam and Moroccan culture as she works towards women’s self-sufficiency and self-reliance. (ctcnet.org) She reiterates, “It is the social capital we must capitalize on here. It is the friendships and bonds created at meetings like this which allow us to do much more than if we are working alone.” (ctcnet.org)

In juxtaposition to Mernissi’s focus on human capital, the World Bank must be first and foremost accountable to its donors. This means that the number one priority must ultimately be the reimbursement of the loans, and they have highly developed structural adjustments and other economic strategies to ensure the maximum amount of the money is paid back. Thus the implications of such costly and expansive efforts are sometimes inhibiting. It is impossible for the World Bank to separate economics from social factors, and there is certainly a strong correlation between stable, successful economies and high social factors. However, Morocco seems to be a bit of an anomaly in this assumption. The World Bank acknowledges this contradiction within Morocco and provides the most comprehensive statistics backing up this statement, however they are still an outside lending agency and are not concerned with Mernissi’s “social capital.”

Another female Sociology professor and leader in the Socialist Party is Dr. Aicha Belarbi. She is a sociologist who is not focused on economics, but rather the empowerment and education of women within the Moroccan Muslim framework. Certainly her work, and Mernissi’s, has some of the same economic goals that of the IMF and the World Bank, but monetary matters are not the immediate impetus. Belarbi is Moroccan and left the country for higher education after which she returned to Morocco and began working for primarily for women’s educational opportunities. As a Moroccan, her understanding of the cultural contradictions and subtleties gives her the force with which she reaches and helps women. She is particularly concerned with the aforementioned Family Laws still enforced as part of tradition – but as she fights against this particular aspect of Moroccan culture, she simultaneously is an example of upholding and continuing tradition in her own family.

Belarbi and Mernissi have both served the role of “bridge” to outside organizations. Belarbi has worked with the United Nations through UNICEF and has done research on the effect of structural adjustment on the education of young girls. Mernissi is also a valuable link to the United Nations and writes everything from Country Reports to books discussing male elitism and the veiling of women. Their work makes evident the need for the existence of world organizations focusing on human rights, specifically the United Nations. Nevertheless, the United Nations is ideal for funding and as a platform for education, not as the driving force. The goal remains to empower women to help themselves in their very specified circumstances.

This view is certainly not held by all in development dialogue. Peter Waterman, author of “Globalization, Social Movements, and the New Internationalism” proposes systems that translate across the entire realm of development. In his book, he calls for an International Solidarity, where binary thinking is replaced by dialectical thinking, the recognition of our relation to distant others, and we realize and consider the subjectivism of our individual opinions (Waterman, 240). He suggests a new concept of Globalization that is socially committed and contains a more open world view where we move beyond the traditional dualisms of superiority/guilt and dependency/resentment into one in which “recognition, responsibility and reciprocity” are the guiding ideals (239). As Waterman points out, it is clear that we are forging new territory and the old theories no longer apply. It is true that while in the 60s and 70s Globalization was merely a prediction, it is now a reality. Still, Waterman is committed to one general theory and conception of development. He, like Abeywardena, presupposes the driving presence of multinationals. He is focused on avoiding Western-centric universalisms, but in his presupposition makes himself Western-centric. His Globalization theory is a generality. Women like Belarbi and Mernissi have the position and understanding to facilitate change on the specific terms called for, not the empty general statements that Waterman and many others propose only in theory.

Belarbi and Mernissi present a hopeful and successful future for Moroccan women, and I agree that this is where the key lies for Morocco. However, the hope that particularly Mernissi presents in her conferences and speeches (such as the Democratic Invention Lecture Series) is not always evident on the surface. On the one hand this is understandable because Mernissi sees the liberation of women in the grassroots efforts, and these are the organizations where information is sometimes scarce. Organizations are able to gather valuable information, and then lack the funds to have it published. Belarbi and Mernissi are in constant and hands-on communication with such ‘hidden’ organizations. Yet the common educated, elite Moroccans do not have this perspective. At this point the extreme disparities in Morocco once again manipulate the individual’s view. Those in the highest echelons have the comparative needs of an American and would fully support the proposals of the World Bank, specifically the focus on privatization. They, like many Americans, can benefit from the movement towards capitalism. I spent much time in dialogue with a very successful business man in Casablanca. He has held residence in Morocco his entire life, although has spent much time outside of the country for his college education, and spends much time traveling for business. He commented on how Western countries sometimes judge certain traits as Western when actually they are traits of industrialization, and a strong economy. Under this account it is not Western-centric universalisms that are imposed upon developing countries, it is rather trends that are inherent in the very structures and make-up of industrialized economies. He does not consider his wish for an industrialized Morocco to be the equivalent of “Westernizing” his country, but rather taking the steps toward an economy to support all of the people in the country. (Interview notes) The Casablanca businessman sees the answer for Morocco in strengthening the economic structure (improving banking, legal services, etc.) and education. His contention is that the disparity between rich and poor that currently exists in Morocco can be attributed to lack of education or poor quality of education. Those Moroccans with access to quality schooling are able to compete with the students from any other country in all areas from athletics to computer science. It is not that he is necessarily mistaken in his assessment, it is that he is incomplete and disconnected with the problems some of the other sectors of the population face. He lives in a world of luxury cars, villas and servants, and the ability to send his children to the most prestigious universities in the United States. He openly states that although he is Moroccan he feels he identifies more with many Americans or persons in industrialized countries than with a man living just a few miles from him. (Interview notes) His skewed view of the state of his country became particularly evident when discussing the discrepancies between urban and rural, and he was asked what percentage of persons in the countryside have electricity. He estimated the number to be 70%. As seen above, the World Bank reports it as 18%.

The differences in the approaches of the Moroccan women in development are once again highlighted. Mernissi considers this view, the blind thrust toward privatization and primary focus on the economy, an imposition from the outside. Mernissi’s statements are parallel with some who argue that this extreme dichotomy was created and perpetuated by misguided development efforts. When the French exited, the people expected their independent government to provide the things they had been previously denied, including employment, security, social mobility and dignity. (Hermassi, 55) There was a movement with the goal of society being taken up and improved by the state through laws, mandates and government social programs, but the project was eventually realized as too ambitious. As the government weakened, so did its legitimacy. Outside loans came with stipulations and greatly limited the government’s power over its funds. Discontent had always been present, but the faith in the ability of the government was greater in the years just following independence, and people were more willing to accept hardships in the hope that things would be better for everyone in the future. (Hermassi, 56) The presence of some development policy served to widen gaps and create new separations as the rich were able to benefit from privatization and increased capital flow, while the poor remained largely untouched, once again reiterating the failure of such broad efforts.

Belarbi, Mernissi, and the other Moroccan Muslim women who work within their system to target specific problems in specific populations offer the hope for the liberation and empowerment of the Muslim woman in Morocco. Entangled in a complicated mixture of forces, general formulas and outside missions are bound to fail. As Mernissi argues, even the Moroccan government is in no position to achieve any real change. Efforts must be driven by persons from within, and they must be supported by an expansive network with exchange of ideas, accurate statistics, and defined priorities.

Where does that leave the outsider? Despite the real and concerning obstacles, many persons from the West still feel obliged to help Muslim women in developing countries. Increased education and awareness often leads to the realization that one should share the wealth, in whatever form that may be, that he or she was afforded with those born in economically or socially less fortunate situations. But where is the appropriate platform for purely outside assistance? Without the knowledge that experience of a culture, as a part of that culture brings, there is blind movement. Morocco is producing women who are heading their own battle against the oppressive and contradictory forces in their country. No level of education can elevate a World Bank economist to this stature. Although often rooted in a desire to help women like those in Morocco, it is time to move away from “instant recipes and results,” and see the role of the West as “reflection on the means, the ways and the cost of transition.” (Hermassi, 64) The Westerners are left to inform themselves and fight for allocation of funding for grassroots efforts that enable the women to help themselves. The Moroccan women are left to find the strength in their “social capital,” faith, and tradition that will lift them out of subjugation.

Works Cited

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Producers of Development: New Challenges and Alternatives. Amsterdaam: Vrouwenberaad Nederlandse Ontwikkelingsinstanties, 1989.

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Hermassi, Abdelbaki. “State, Legitimacy and Democratization in the Maghreb.” Arab

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http://www.ned.org/events/deminvention/mernissi.html.

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Rights in Islam, trans. by Mary Jo Lakeland. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1987.

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Statistical Appraisal Report. The World Bank website, www.worldbank.org.

Waterman, Peter. Globalization, Social Movements, and the New Internationalism.

1997.** missing publisher information, book used in library in Morocco.

World Bank Statistics, The World Bank website, www.worldbank.org.