Sheela Subramanian

Professor Bruce Lusignan

Engineering 297

14 March 2003

 

            China in the International Realm: Does Economic

                 Strength Justify the Outright Violation of Human Rights? 

 

Since the drafting of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the Chinese Communist Party has continually been defending its repression of political rights to international critics. Despite condemnation from the international realm about its poor human rights record, China has consistently argued in favor of the primacy of economic rights over political freedoms. Instead of adopting a rights system comparable to Western countries, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has preserved its Confucian and Marxist- Leninist ideals of collectivism and duty. Although China has received threats and pressures from other countries, its economic strength has allocated space to escape substantive repercussions. In 2002, China ranked second in world rankings for its GDP of 1.23 trillion US dollars (10 trillion yuan) and first in its annual growth rate of 8.0 percent.[1] Although the international realm has attempted to coerce China to improve its human rights record, economic and national security interests have prevented any substantive measures from being taken. This has been exemplified through past US policies, particularly during the period after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Furthermore, the salience of economic and security interests over the protection of human rights has been manifested in recent policies. Included in these policies are the IOC’s consideration of China for the 2000 Olympic Games, the IOC’s decision to allow Beijing to host the 2008 Games, as well as the US decision to grant China permanent Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status. Additionally, in the current context of the “war on terrorism,” China’s support of the United States has put human rights issues on the back burner in the bi-lateral relationship.  



Since the emergence of the “universal human rights” concept, Western and Asian countries have battled over the definition of the term “human right.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been tailored to allocate each government the appropriate amount of space to implement this set of rights, based on the individual structure of the society. According to article 29, “everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of...society.”[2] Although there are apparent differences between capitalist and communist societies, the document aspires to ensure the political and civil rights, as well as socio-economic rights of all countries. In the drafting of the document, “the international instruments did not assume any conflict or hierarchy between some rights and others, between one category of rights and another.”[3] This concept of universal human rights sought to induce nations to respect the rights of their citizens; it did not seek to impose Western norms and standards on “uncivilized” countries.

            Despite the flexibility of the articles, conflict arose, particularly among Asian countries, over the intentions of the Declaration. Using the justification of national sovereignty and power, Chinese scholars rejected the notion that universal ideals could be imposed on their societies: “The rights of each country to formulate its own policies on human rights protection in light of its own conditions should… be respected and


guaranteed.”[4] Given this argument, China argued that the treatment of their citizens should be their business, and the imposition of the Western notion of rights was undeserved. In a paper written during the 1994 JUST conference, Bohua Xie stated: “Imposing the human rights standard of one’s own country or region on other countries or regions is an infringement upon other countries’ sovereignty and interference into other countries’ internal affairs.”[5] Because its cultural values and political system are unique to its society, China refused to shift the basis of its structure to appease the demands of human rights activists.

            The universal human rights mechanism is rooted in the ideals of individualism and personal rights, whereas the Chinese tradition is premised on collectivism and the duties of its citizens. According to the tradition, the road to harmony is li, which encourages hierarchical social responsibilities and relationships centered around zhong (loyalty) and xiao (filial piety). “This system of values is incompatible with the vision of equal and autonomous individuals that underlies international human rights norms…[It] is likely to seem little short of moral inversion.”[6] Compared to the relatively new American society, Chinese society is rooted in the ideals of Confucianism and has developed over the millennia.

 

In traditional society the ideal was not individual liberty or equality but order and harmony, not individual independence but selflessness and cooperation, not the freedom of individual conscience but conformity to orthodox truth.[7]

 

An individual’s participation in society is not voluntary, but mandatory. The purpose of Confucian society is not meant to cultivate individual liberties and freedoms. Rather, it is to ameliorate the condition of the state to benefit the collective whole.

Furthermore, the Marxist-Leninist system further de-legitimizes the effort towards the recognition of individual rights. Not only does socialism involve a commitment to the welfare of the collective, but in the Marxist-Leninist socialist system “there [is] no place for individual rights” and the individual is “the beneficiary of a socialist society.”[8] Although the socialist system may be viewed to be oppressive to its citizens, it provides many guarantees to its citizens. “In such a society, freedom and other individual rights are an illusion and a deception.”[9] Rather, the technical structure of the command economy and socialist structure provides Chinese citizens with basic economic and social rights.

            According to current President Jiang Zemin, the “right of survival of China’s population is more important than political rights.”[10] Even since the emergence of The Universal Declaration, China has argued that economic rights and an individual’s economic situation was more effectively preserved relative to Western capitalist systems. Through the elimination of exploitation and unemployment, China secures basic economic needs for its citizens, including health care, education, social security, property rights and other forms of welfare. In an effort to preserve the economic and social rights guaranteed by the socialist state, numerous political freedoms have been infringed upon, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and the right to privacy. China has not claimed to change this behavior, but it has been hoped that international pressures would be an effective mechanism. In this paper, a brief history of the Communist government’s control over the right to free speech will be given, as well as a discussion of the hesitancy of outside powers to intervene due to security and economic interests.

 

In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party emerged into power and implemented the Marxist-Leninist model as its economic system. “Mao tried to disconnect China from the international economy by pushing for self-sufficiency (autarchy).” During the early 1950s foreign assets were seized, in an effort to discourage foreign investment and make it a point that it was no longer accepted by the new regime. In 1953, China began its first Five-Year Plan based upon the Stalinist "heavy industry first" model and at commenced its efforts to nationalize domestic industry. Under Mao’s regime, numerous human rights abuses occurred, most notably the Cultural Revolution. Launched by CCP Chairman Mao on 8 August 1966, the Cultural Revolution was a crusade to preserve the “revolutionary spirit fostered by the early guerrilla experience of reliance on the masses and egalitarianism.”[11] This revolution was based on the belief that representatives of the bourgeoisie and the counterrevolutionaries had permeated into the party structure, military, organizations and departments. In order to prevent the government from being overthrown and tyranny from overtaking the country, it was absolutely vital to “purge” the society of these individuals. Furthermore, by regulating literature, music, as well as other facets of the arts, the government would be able to prevent subversive ideals from defiling the party’s ideology.

Because Mao’s regime was under such a strict rule, the issue of human rights was not even broached within the country’s borders. However, even though The Universal Declaration of Human had been drafted, it did not gain popularity in the international realm until the late 1970s. The formation of advocacy networks and NGOs had not gained strength, and international pressure groups were virtually non-existent. The United States, for example, was primarily concerned with elevating its power relative to the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War. Because of weakening Sino- Russia relations due to the policies of the former, Mao viewed the United States as “the counterweight to an increasingly hostile Soviet Union.”[12] Through the formation of a relationship between President Nixon and Chairman Mao, China was granted entry into the United Nations in 1971. Human rights abuses were a salient factor taken into consideration.

 

-          The emergence of Deng Xiaoping into power.

After the 1976 death of Chairman Mao, myriad factions vied for control of the government. Among the major contenders were the Restorationists, Radicals and the Reformers. However, In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, a Reformer, sought to overthrow the current rule of Restorationist Hua Guofeng.  His platform focused on repairing the damage that was sustained during Mao’s reign. Using his “seeking truth from facts” policies, he strove to devalue the “two whatevers” policies advocated Hua.[13] By constructing the Xidan Democracy Wall, Deng Xiaoping sought to reverse the oppressive policies of the Maoist period, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, he received adequate public support to overthrow the Restorationist faction from power. The Democracy Wall served as an accountability mechanism to the government, and they claimed to be listening to the criticisms of the people. Through the construction of this wall, activist groups within China began to form.

During December 1978, the activists involved in the movement became frustrated with the limitations of the poster campaign and began searching for other venues to expand their pursuits. Through the publication of underground journals, and formation of dissident groups, international media were exposed to the complaints and gripes of these factions.

 

Some of the underground publications soon attracted worldwide attention as American, British, Canadian, and French reporters were given copies for overseas consumption. Excerpts from underground journals, such as Beijing Spring…were translated and published in foreign newspapers all over the world. The appearance of these underground journals, and the topics they discussed (freedom of speech, democracy, law and justice, human rights, and modernization of science and technology… Pressures now mounted on Deng Xiaoping to curb the dissident movement.[14]

 

Deng suppressed the Democracy Wall movement because he feared that this dissident movement would spark a large-scale counterrevolutionary struggle against the government.  However, international knowledge of the injustices within China’s borders began to develop through the formation of domestic groups. 

Contact with international markets, particularly in the West, did not occur until after Mao’s death. When Deng Xiaoping emerged into power, he realized that the economic guarantees provided by Communist China were no longer viable. By opening up the markets to liberalization, as well as foreign investment, he embarked on China’s “road to modernization.” Through the liberalization of China’s economy, as well as the development of international human rights advocacy networks, international attention soon focused on the human rights abuses occurring within the borders. In an effort to gain favor with international markets, China gradually reformed its policies. It realized that “the PRC’s economic development can be inflenced by the rest of the world,” and good favor needed to be gained to prevent sanctions and other trade restrictions.[15] The late 1970s marked a period in which the struggle for human rights in China emerged, as well as the salience of the international accountability mechanism. 

 

Throughout the 1980s, student protests focused on the need for minzhu, a Chinese word meaning “power to the people,” or democracy. Chinese university students “dared to jeopardize their future careers by expressing dissent and criticism over the fundamental question of Chinese politics: the legitimacy of CCP rule.”[16] In 1989, high rates of inflation, widespread corruption, and a host of other financial problems sparked popular complaint over the government’s policies. These conditions spontaneously sparked popular complaints against the government’s economic reforms. For a period of two months, students demonstrated over the need for political rights, including the freedom to think and speak without government persecution. The mass demonstration was initiated by the death of former Party Secretary Hu Yaobong, who supported the movement towards democracy and free speech. As students gathered to mourn his death, a demonstration arose. United with workers and intellectuals, as well as discontent party members, thousands of people rallied against the government’s policies.

 

Writers and scholars, many of them members of the party, demanded the release of political prisoners and observance of human rights. They not only expressed opposition to the mass campaigns of spiritual pollution and anti-bourgeois liberalization but also demanded political reform that would include proposals for a multiparty system and the speedup of privatization of enterprises.[17]

 

Evidently, the government viewed the protest as a threat to its legitimacy. Yet, it is important to note that the students were rallying for dialogue, not the overthrow of the government.

The protests soon escalated to a level where neither side was willing to renege, and the point of fruition for negotiations was difficult to reach. On the one-month point of the movement and the seventh-day of a student-led hunger strike, both sides conceded their stances minimally. Although Premier Li issued a warning to students to cease their protests, he also agreed to conduct a nationally televised meeting with the protesting students. Furthermore, the next day, Party Secretary Zhao begged the students to end their hunger strikes. Due to these conciliatory measures, the students decided to cease their hunger strike.

            The government had appeared to assuage the protests through peaceful means, and sent in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops to restore order in Tiananmen Square. After ten days of martial law, the government had become impatient with the protesters and vied to launch an offensive movement to save the country. “Tanks rolled in [Tiananmen Square] and overran the Goddess of Democracy statue and the tents…The soldiers were chasing and shooting randomly at the retreating students…The shooting and carnage went on until sunrise; the casualties mounted.”[18] Although estimates range from 300 to about 3,000 casualties, the evidently biased Chinese government pinpointed the casualty figure to be twenty-three students and 300 soldiers. However, the number of casualties is not the point of issue. Rather, it is the fact that the government quashed a peaceful protest through violent and overly repressive means. The protesters viewed themselves as patriots, while Deng and his party comrades regarded them as plotters inciting turmoil. Similar to the Democracy Wall movement, the Tiananmen Square massacre exhibited the tensions behind free speech: the people’s desire to move towards democratic activism, yet the CCP’s need to preserve its legitimacy. However, the event also marked the effect of market reforms on the Communist system. The re-opening of the markets sparked the citizens’ reduced dependency and obedience of the system, and the Chinese government was unprepared of how to act in these unfamiliar circumstances.  

 

Although the party’s repression of freedom of speech has been condoned in past policy implementations, the events during the Tiananmen Square massacre were a signal for change. The re-opening of markets and the loss of party control over “economic well-being” marked the citizens’ reduced dependency on the system.[19] Consequently, “...the left and right factions in the Party and the government were locked in a vicious struggle – with the right trying to help the former Democracy Movement people and the left trying to apprehend and punish them.”[20] The right faction was legitimate in its protests, and the Tiananmen Square massacre was a signal for our government to heed the gripes of the protesting students.

However, Chinese policies began to shift in an opposite direction. “The changes that occurred during [1990] were not of the type to suggest a return altogether to a Maoist totalitarian system, but they were for the most part movements in that direction.”[21] Instead of opening up a channel of communication between the citizens and the government, the latter opted to tighten the restrictions on its dissidents. The government did not take the context of the society into consideration, and tightened controls similar to the policies of the Maoist period.

 

Coincidentally, the international media was in China to document Gorbachev’s meeting with Deng Xiaoping during the Tiananmen Square Massacre. As the international community watched the battle between the students and the PLA in horror, China was officially exposed of its human rights abuses before the very eyes of the world. In the days of the aftermath, President Bush announced that: “the imposition of a package of sanctions on China, to include ‘suspension of all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons,’ and the ‘suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese military leaders.’”[22] However, these measures did not satisfy some critics of China’s human rights practices, who contended that the U.S. should apply even more rigid trade restrictions against China.

China never acknowledged, nor apologized for the Tiananmen Square Massacre to its people or to the international community. However, by 1992, China was in the midst of a booming economy. In 1992, “its domestic growth product…was over twelve percent…The International Monetary Fund reported in the spring of 1993 that the Chinese economy had become the third largest in the world.”[23] During the 1990s, the Clinton administration received criticism for its failure to implement some sanctions. However, it based its policies on “‘comprehensive engagement,’ which holds that long-term U.S. goals such as human rights improvement are more likely to be achieved through sustained contact and open trading than by further isolating China.”[24] Although this policy may be legitimate, human rights critics argued that it served as another US excuse to benefit from China’s thriving economy.

 

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is the main determinant in choosing which city Olympics will be held. The decision is not merely based on simple criterion, like the beauty of the location, the history of the city, or the prestige of the area. Rather, it is also based on the potential of the city to reap the benefits of investment, develop effectively and host a successful event.  Each host of the Olympic Games is allocated a specific set of revenues by the IOC, used for the purpose of developing and preparing the city to develop the infrastructure to contain the tourists, athletes, and events that will occur during the Olympic year. Furthermore, the city itself can expect millions of dollars in profits, from investment from outside parties interested in accumulating a substantial profit. Evidently, the International Olympic Committee’s decision making process cannot be simplified using a few variables; it is one that requires deliberation and extensive thought.

            In 1993, seven years before the 2000 Olympics, the International Olympic Committee met to hold its basic decision-making meeting; this standard meeting usually occurs seven years before the event. The candidates to host the summer Olympics were Sydney, Australia; Manchester, England; Istanbul, Turkey; Berlin, Germany; and Beijing, China. China, however, did not fail to impress judges and the International Olympic Committee. According to The Wall Street Journal, “Beijing has spared no expense to impress the IOC, lobbying delegates and dressing up the city during the visit last month… the Chinese government even donated a life-size, 2,200-year-old terracotta soldier to the IOC's museum in Lausanne, Switzerland.”[25]

However, this decision making process deviated from the norm. Contrary to the past, activists, transnational advocacy networks for human rights intervened, and they were prepared to take any measures necessary to prevent Beijing from being granted the 2000 Games.

 

U.S. human-rights groups worry that such gestures will sway the 91 IOC delegates who will vote on the host city. The activists see no shortage of reasons to disqualify Beijing: the 1989 killings of pro-democracy demonstrators at Tiananmen Square; the continued detention of dissidents; alleged use of prison labor by state-owned companies and suppression of religion and free speech. [26]

 

 

Even four years since the massacre that killed 3,000 students, the ghost of Tiananmen Square followed China in their pursuit for the Olympic Games. However, in order to take a few conciliatory steps to appease international critics, China agreed to release several political prisoners. One of such prisoners was “Wang Dan, 23 the most wanted of the student leaders at Tiananmen. [He] remained dedicated to continuing his work for a democratic China. (However, Wang was rearrested … in November 1996 and sentenced again to eleven years in prison.)”[27] Basically, by taking small steps towards ameliorating its human rights record, China attempted to veil the judgment of the IOC; it was almost successful in fulfilling this task. Although there were mass demonstrations and compelling reasons against Beijing over the other candidates, it lost to Sydney, Australia by a mere two votes. This vote margin is almost nothing in the IOC voting realm. Eighty to ninety representatives from each country that participates in the Olympic Games comprise the International Olympic Committee; two votes among all of these members is a sliver of collective opinion. 

            However, China’s fight for the summer Olympic Games was not lost. In 2001, it remounted its Olympic horse, and tried one more time. Placed against Paris, France; Toronto, Canada; Istanbul, Turkey, and Osaka, Japan, China emerged as the leading contender, with Toronto and Paris in a close second. However, once again, China was attacked for not being an accurate representation of “the Olympic spirit.”[28] Yet, the Olympic Committee upheld the ideal to remain entirely separate and above the relationships between states and nations, including wars and conflicts. This human rights issue, it was argued, was not one of interstate conflict. Rather, it was an issue of promoting ethical standards within a country. For example, the International Charter of the Olympic Games states that one of the basic ideals of the Games is to retain a “respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.”[29] What is more fundamental an ethical principle than regarding and respecting one’s right to be treated humanely and compassionately? 

            If one uses this criterion, it should be argued that China’s human rights record should have played a key role in hindering its right to the 2000 and 2008 Games. National Governmental Organizations, as well as human rights activist groups, from Amnesty International to the Human Rights Watch, all concurred on China’s abuse of human rights. Furthermore, there was a uniform stance on the fact that the abuse record was both extensive and remained unchanged over the past decades. Despite international pressure, threats and attempts at coercion, China had maintained a disregard for the notion of human rights. For example, according to Jeffrey Wang:

 

There are still as many as 4,000 political prisoners, those who committed ‘crimes of counterrevolution,’ languishing in the Chinese gulags (prison labor camps). Many of them must endure a daily regimen of torture (chaining, whipping, shocking with electric batons, and overdosing with pills). As late as 1992, dissidents, some of them ex-government officials who took part at Tiananmen or lent support to the protesting students, were sentenced to jail for terms as long as seven years. A number of the dissidents who were put on trial by the people’s courts were given five-year prison terms (a gesture of leniency) for counterrevolutionary activities related to the Tiananmen democracy movement.[30] 

 

China was also accused of arbitrary executions, persecution of religious sects, obstructing free speech, and refusing the right to a fair trial; all of these factors violated myriad international human rights covenants. Overall, these accusations were prevalent in the discussions of why Beijing would not be a good venue for the 2008 Olympic Games.

            As noted earlier, China never acknowledged the occurrence of the Tiananmen Massacre, nor apologized for its occurrence. Rather, they tightened the reins on its repressive regime and continued the subjugation of political freedoms, in the name of economic rights. In 1993, the Tiananmen Square incident was brought up as a reason why Beijing was not an effective venue for promoting the Olympic ideals; a large-scale government imposed massacre had occurred just four years earlier. According to Yalai Zhang, a Chinese scholar who watched the horrors of the massacre firsthand, stated:

 

Selecting Beijing which remains under the shadow of one of the most tragic events in modern history [the Tiananmen Square Massacre], the Olympics would stand for forgetting the tragedy too soon. Forgetting the June 4th massacre suggests tolerance for the killing that happened yesterday and could happen tomorrow. [31]

 

The notion that the Olympic Games, which served as a symbol of freedom, individuality and liberty, was to be held in the same Square in which thousands of protesters were murdered was absolutely unfathomable to human rights activists.

            In 2001, controversy continued. Despite having a new mayor, China was still in a state of controversy amongst human rights groups and NGOs. Issues that arose were the US spy plane incident, China’s occupation of Tibet, the persecution of the Falun Gong sect, and the country’s relationship with Taiwan. However, despite international pressure, little change in the human rights record occurred. According to Amnesty International, “Since 1989, the Chinese government has not made any fundamental changes to its human rights policies and practices.”[32] The question arose: is it more effective to give China an impetus towards development by awarding them an Olympic bid, or should the Summer Games be a carrot, or reward for a job well done?

            The proponents of the second alternative used the 1988 Seoul Olympics as the foundation for their argument. Due to the massive exposure from mass media, as well as the foreign investment, Korea was sparked to engage in a massive reform. Dick Pound, of the International Olympic Committee stated: “If [the IOC] waited until a nation qualified for sainthood, nobody would make it [as an Olympic host.]”[33] However, the rebuttal to such claim is the case of the 1936 Germany Olympic Games. Not only did they propagandize the Nazi regime, they gave Hitler added mobility to implement his policies. The IOC refused to get involved in such arguments, and based their claims on the fact that they were above politics and over nationalism. “IOC members quite literally represent no one but themselves and each other. They do not represent the National Olympic Committees, they do not the International Federations…they do not represent the public.”[34]

            At the end of the controversial deliberations, China won the award with a margin of whopping thirty-four votes ahead of Toronto. Controversy erupted. Senator John McCain commented,

 

The Olympics have become big business. However, the organizations that hold the public trust, the keepers of the Olympic flame, have failed to adjust the reality. They have failed to change the organizational structures of their institutions to ensure accountability and transparency.[35] 

 

Furthermore, wrote dissident Harry Wu, "I know that today's decision has made the hearts of the Chinese people swell with pride. But in my heart I can only feel caution that the IOC has perhaps made a horrible mistake.” Also, he “deeply regret[s] that [his] native land will not have the honor and the reward of hosting the Olympic Games as a free and democratic nation."[36]

Rather than taking human rights issues into consideration, as well as upholding the Olympic standard for ethical principles, the International Olympic Committee sold out to economic interests. “One cannot ignore the obvious benefit of the selection…from a financial perspective. The…major corporate sponsors are giddy in light of this prime opportunity to carve a sizable niche in the massive Chinese marketplace.”[37] According to Barry Hildebrand:

 

Paris had the backdrop of the century — for example, they were planning to hold the equestrian events in the Tuilieries. it would have been spectacular. And Toronto had a very compact, very interesting site proposal.  But Beijing will mount credible games because they’ll have great audiences and spend a lot of money making sure the structures are good. . They’ll do a wonderful job on the technical front. It’s the spirit and soul that I’m worried about.[38]

 

The International Olympic Committee’s vested economic interests superseded any attention to human rights. China boasted a massive one fifth of the world’s population, which on an economic front, translated into roughly 1.2 billion consumers. Evidently, every major firm and corporation was vying for Beijing, and the IOC complied. China was a potential goldmine, which was simply waiting for an international event to act as a catalyst in opening its resources and markets to the world’s investors. And as a consequence, these factors superseded human rights issues in the IOC’s decision.

 

·        A Proponent of Human Rights: The United States’ anti - Bejing 2008 stance 

            Although the United States claims to have opposed the Beijing bid due to human rights measures, their assertions were mainly based on the US spy-plane incident and China’s sale of arms to Iraq. When the news broke that Beijing was one of the finalists in the 1993 competition for candidacy, the United States House of Representatives and Senate Committees met separately to discuss the news. The Congress passed a non-binding resolution against the bid for China, citing human rights concerns, including the Tiananmen Massacre, as a motivating factor. Sixty US Senators also sent a bipartisan letter to the chairman of the IOC, expressing a similar message as the Congress. The letter contended that the granting China the right to host the Olympics “would confer upon China’s leaders a stamp of approval by the international community they do not deserve.”[39] Furthermore, Senator Bill Bradley argued:

 

[The authors of the letter] don’t believe that we should allow the Chinese a huge propaganda victory while it routinely tortures and imprisons political dissidents, severely restricts the freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, brutally suppresses religious practices and oppresses the native people of Tibet.[40]

 

Although national security interests played a significant role in the United States’ opposition, it used China’s human rights record as an issue of leverage.

 

·        The Hypocrisy of United States Behavior

Despite the fact that the United States opposed China’s 2000 and 2008 Olympic bids, due to “human rights interests,” they have not exhibited similar rationale in their trade and national security policies. Rather than take a vested regard in enforcing their human rights ideals, the United States has pursued policies based on their own interests. 

 

-         Trade: The Guarantee of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR) to China

Passed in both the Senate and the House in 2000, the United States granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status. In the past, the United States legislative branches had to vote annually on the renewal of Normal Trading Status, which is also known as Most Favored Nation status. Over the last decade, the US was shifted its stance on China. In 2000, however, they granted them permanent good standing despite their poor human rights record. According to The White House, “granting permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR) will give the United States broad new rights and strong mechanisms to enforce them.”[41] Other benefits for the United States included “new leverage to ensure fair trade and to protect the US agricultural and manufacturing base,” “increased leverage for intellectual property enforcement,” as well as increased enforcement of various other sectors.[42] In the past, the trade status between China and the United States was affected by the former group’s human rights record. However, because the US received benefits from China’s accession into the WTO, as well as the guarantee of of NTR status, the primacy of economic rights prevailed over human rights concerns.

  

-         National Security Interests: the War Against Terrorism

During a recent visit to China, Secretary of State Colin Powell hailed a “new dimension” in Sino-US relations. After meeting with Chinese officials seeking Beijing’s backing for America’s push to engage in war against Iraq and to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear activity, Powell stated, “Relations with China have really moved in a new dimension.”[43]Although non-proliferation and human rights have been major points of contention between China and the United States, bilateral ties have ameliorated ever since China agreed to join the US ranks against terrorism. Powell did express concerns about “setbacks” in China’s human rights record, and he criticized the recent execution of a Tibetan man, as well as repression of democracy movements. However, he glossed over these topics, and proceeded to commend China for “tracking down terrorist finances, stepping up law enforcement coordination and sharing information.”[44] Additionally, according to Human Rights Watch, “China has used the war on terrorism as an excuse to crack down on its small Muslim population and on suspected enemies of the state.”[45] Because of the United States’ interest in promoting the war on Iraq, it is grasping for whatever allies it can find to promote its security interests. Rather than focus on the repressive behavior of the government, security interests have overshadowed international justice. 

 

·        Concluding Remarks

Based on its observance of international covenants, some may argue that China has ameliorated its human rights record over the past two decades. For example, in September 1995, Beijing hosted the Fourth World Conference on Women. In defense of its record on human rights, China has argued that it has “approved or acceded to 18 such conventions,” including the ratification of The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.[46] However, China has also signed the UN Convention on Torture in 1988, yet continues to engage in such inhumane practices. The United States, as well as the international realm, must no longer fall victim to China’s rhetoric. Although national security and economic interests are vital to the stability of the international realm, countries must realize the emerging importance of human rights. China currently has a seat in the United Nations, and is one of five countries to hold a coveted spot on the United Nations Security Council. Too many carrots, and not enough sticks have been given to China for its human rights record. Countries should not single out China, but instead condition all its bilateral and multilateral trade and investment programs with respect to internationally recognized labor and human rights. The torture of promoters of democracy, as well as the arbitrary execution of “state threats” should no longer be permitted. The time has come for the formulation of a uniform policy against the violation of human rights.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

             

 



[1] “China’s GDP Hit 1.23 Trillion US Dollars in 2002.” The People’s Daily. 30 December 2002. The English People’s Daily. 13 March 2003 < http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200212/30/eng20021230 _109314.shtml>.

[2] All Human Rights for all. Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948-1998. 1 February 2003 <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>.

 

[3] Henkin, Louis. “The Human Rights Idea in China.”  Human Rights in Contemporary China. Ed. R.Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin, Andrew J. Nathan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 11.

[4] Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. London: Cornell University Press, 2003. 108.

[5] Ibid, 108.

[6] Ibid, 116.

[7] Henkin, 20

[8] Ibid, 21.

[9] Ibid, 22.

[10] Donnelly, 112. Quoted in Cooper 1994:56.

[11] Wang, James CF. Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction. London: Pearson Education, 2002.  26.

[12] Langguth, AJ. “Nixon in China.” USC Trojan Family Magazine. Spring 2001. University of Southern California. 13 March 2003 < http://www.usc.edu/dept/pubrel/trojan_family/spring01/Vietnam/ Vietnam_sidebar2.html>.

[13] Wang, 26.

[14] Ibid, 272.

[15] Wu, Yuan-Li, Franz Michael. “Let the Record Speak for Itself.” Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China. Ed. Yuan-li Wu, Franz Michael, John F. Copper. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 293.

[16] Ibid, 273.

 

[17] Ibid, 277.

[18] Ibid, 282.

[19] Oi, Jean C. Lecture. 26 February 2003.

[20] Copper, John F. and Ta-ling Lee. Tiananmen Aftermath: Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China, 1990. Maryland: University of Maryland School of Law, 1992. 11.

[21] Ibid, 15.

[22] Tiananmen Square, 1989: the declassified history. The National Security Archive. 1 June 1999. George Washington University. 13 March 2003 < http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA EBB16/index.html>.

[23] Wang, 56.

[24] Kourous, George. “US China Policy: Trade, Aid and Human Rights.” 1.5 (November 1996). 13 March 2003 < http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol1/china_body.html>.

[25] Wilson, Michael J. “US Human Rights Activists Don’t Want Beijing to Host 2000 Olympics.” The Wall Street Journal. 2 April 1993. World Tibet Network News. 10 March 2003 <http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/1993 /4/10_1.html>.  

[26] Ibid.

[27] Wang, Jeffrey. Contemporary Chinese Politics – An Introduction. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002. 287.  

[28] “AFP Ties Beijing’s Olympic Bid with Human Rights Issue.” Daily Report. Hong Kong, 2001.

[29] US Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. Hearing on Prohibition of Olympic Games in Beijing. 103rd Congress, 1st Session. S. Res 117 and 124. Washington: GPO, 15 July 1993. 19.

[30] Ibid, 287.

[31] US Senate, Hearing on Prohibition of Olympic Games in Beijing, 33.

[32] US Senate, 22.

[33] Proudfoot, Jim. “IOC Find Sydney an Irresistable Choice for 2000.” Toronto Star. 24 September 1993. E1.

[34] US Senate, 18.

[35] US Senate, 2.

[36] “US Lawmakers, Chinese Dissident decry Olympic committee decision.” Associated Press. 2000 July 14. Yahoo! News. 13 March 2003 < http://in.news.yahoo.com/010714/6/1189x.html>.

[37] Wenn, Stephen. “IOC Came, Committed to Beijing.” Record [Kitchener-Waterloo]. 14 July 2001. A11.

[38] Reaves, Jessica. “Beijing Gets the Games.”

[39] Spencer, Geoff. Associated Press [Sydney]. 4 September 1993.

[40] Manthorpe, Jonathan. “Ghost of Tiananmen Haunts Bid for Games.” Calgary Herald. 5 September 1993. B3.

[41] “Enforcement of the US-China WTO Accession Deal.” The White House Office of the Press Secretary. 8 March 2000. The White House. 13 March 2003 <http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/200000308_3.html>.

[42] Ibid.

[43] “US Relations with China reached ‘new dimension.’: Powell.” Agence France Presse. 24 February 2003. Lexis Nexis. 13 March 2003< http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=5c5b1a58a976a9280>.   

[44] Ibid.

[45] “Our Turn; Sino-US relations require balancing; While the United States wants good relations, it cannot ignore China’s human rights record.” Express-News. 11 November 2002. Lexis-Nexis. 13 March 2003 <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=5c5b1a58a976a9280aac126e08ccb48c>.

[46] Full Text of White Paper on China’s Human Rights. Lexis Nexis. 13 March 2003 <www.lexisnexis.com>