Afghanistan, The United States, and the Legacy of Afghanistan’s Civil War

By: Katherine Harvey

Date: June 5, 2003

EDGE

Katherine Harvey

June 5, 2003

EDGE

Afghanistan, The United States, and the Legacy of Afghanistan’s Civil War

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President Bush declared, and subsequently launched an attack on "the axis of Evil". National, as well as international spotlight shifted to Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden, the presumed mastermind behind the September 11 attacks, was believed to be harbored. In the following months, Afghanistan became embroiled, for the second time in a century, in yet another major war.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, completely shocked and terrified Americans, many of whom had previously felt themselves immune to such unthinkable acts of violence. It, too, had the effect of raising questions, questions like: “why America? Who were these terrorists and for what reason would they sacrifice their own lives? What is the nature of Afghanistan’s involvement in these attacks and who, exactly, is Osama Bin Laden?”

In the aftermath of these attacks, I found myself among the majority of Americans struggling to find answers to these questions. Like most Americans, I knew next to nothing about the country of Afghanistan, our country’s involvement in its civil war during the years 1979-1988, or the legacy this involvement left there. My hopes in commencing the research for this paper was to learn more about the country of Afghanistan itself and the nature of the United States’ involvement in it, especially during the years 1979-1988. What this paper intends to show is the evidence of all this research: that, the legacy of United States involvement in the Afghanistan Civil War, and missteps made in our country’s foreign policy during these years was, in part, responsible for fostering the anti-American sentiment which so tragically culminated in the terrorist attacks of September 11.

Afghanistan: An Overview

Any real understanding of the present situation in Afghanistan necessitates a basic understanding of the country, its people, and its past.

The country of Afghanistan is small, rugged, and landlocked, situated between the present-day countries of Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. It is approximately 252,000 square miles (652,000 square kilometers) in area, roughly the equivalent to the state of Texas.^[1]

Historically, Afghanistan's strategic location at the crossroads of Asia has made the country the focal point of many imperialist ambitions and, throughout its history, the country has been subject to recurrent invasion and outside occupation.^[2]

The last century of Afghanistan’s history, has, in fact, been characterized, and replete with occupation by outside forces, all trying to wield their power within it. The country has become the arena where incessant jockeying for a secure foothold in, and influence over the region has played itself out.

From the period beginning in the 1820s and ending in 1919, Afghanistan was the unfortunate victim of the competing imperialist ambitions of Great Britain and Tsarist Russia.^[3] Viewing Afghanistan as a buffer state against Russian expansionism, the British invaded and occupied Afghanistan for close to a century before finally being driven out in 1919, with the 3rd Afghan war.

The years from 1979-1988 marked the second period of outside occupation in the country's last century history. This time, it was the Communist Soviet Union which, in the Cold War climate of the times, sought to wield its influence over the country. During these years, the United States engaged in a proxy war against the Soviet Union, its long-standing Cold War opponent. It was to become one of the bloodiest and most destructive wars ever fought; it would leave Afghanistan completely devastated. It would also leave behind scores of armed, well-trained Islam radicals, an international apparatus for, and network of terrorists, and a burgeoning anti-American sentiment. This will be addressed later on in the paper.

The U.S.-initiated retaliatory attacks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and our country’s commitment to “fight terrorism” now begins a third period of imposed invasion and occupation upon the country.

The People of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is an ethnically diverse country. Its inhabitants form a complex mosaic of ethnic and linguistic groups, a reflection of the country's geographic location as well as its history of frequent outside occupation.^[4]

Of the 27, 755, 774 million people which were estimated to live in Afghanistan in a poll conducted in 2002, 42% of them belong to the Pushtu-speaking Pathans of the east and the south.^[5] The Dari-speaking Tadjiks of the north and the south account for another 23% of Afghanistan's population. The Hazaras, of Mongol descent, live in the central highlands of the country, accounting for another 10% of the Afghani population. Another 8% of the population is comprised of the Turkmen and Uzbecks of the North. The remaining 13% of the Afghani population, are comprised of the Nuristans, an ancient people of Mediterranean descent, the Fariswan, the ethnic Shia Persians, the relatively few in number Balochi of the south, and the scattered members of the Kuchi and Aimaq nomads.

Pashto and Dari are considered the official languages of Afghanistan, and are spoken by 85% of the people.^[6] The Turkish languages, (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) are spoken, primarily in the North, by another 11% of the population. Thirty other minor languages are also spoken in Afghanistan, representing the last 4% of the population. There is also a large degree of bilingualism amongst the inhabitants of the country.

Islam remains the official religion of Afghanistan, and pervades all aspects of Afghan life. ^[7] About 99% of the population is Muslim, and of these Muslims, 84% belong to the Sunnah sect. Most of the Hazaras are Shi'ite Muslims, and, the 1% of the population which are not Muslims, are either Hindus, Sikhs, or Jews.

The History of U.S. Involvement in Afghanistan:

The United States involvement in the country of Afghanistan really first began in 1934. This was the year the United States officially recognized Afghanistan's independence and set up an embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan's capital.

At the time, King Amanollah Khan, a young progressive, who was opportunistic and ambitious was in power in Afghanistan. Amanollah had spent many of his early years touring around Europe and he was fascinated by the social, political, and economic developments of the countries he saw.^[8] By 1930, Amanollah was committed to turning Afghanistan, which was one of the most backwards and underdeveloped countries of all the third world countries, around. To accomplish this massive undertaking, Amanollah appealed to the great powers of the world for economic support.

Recognizing Afghanistan's strategically significant location at the crossroads of Asia, the United States responded to Amanollah's appeal by providing aid to Afghanistan during this early reconstruction period. The United States lent $20 million to Afghanistan for construction of the Kandahar-Herat highway in 1945; they later extended this loan to $51.75 million in 1954.^[9] In 1946, the U.S. Morrison-Knudsen Company agreed to loan the Afghanistan government $20 million for the construction of loans and irrigation systems. ^[10]

Although the United States demonstrated interest in the country's development, providing it with economic support, it was, nevertheless, interest that was limited in scope. Investigations into prospects for capital investment in oil in Afghanistan had proven unfruitful and the reports of entrepreneurs returning from Afghanistan all echoed similar sentiment: that, in terms of capitalist investments, Afghanistan didn't offer much.

Indeed, the great majority of the aid given to Afghanistan in its early years of reconstruction was provided by the Soviet Union. By 1973, it was estimated that the Soviet Union had lent close to a billion dollars to Afghanistan. According to one estimation, this accounted for 60% of all the civilian foreign aid reaching Afghanistan.^[11]

Two factors converged in the 1970's which would dramatically change the United States' estimation of Afghanistan’s importance. These two factors were the Cold War culture of the times and the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979. In the cold war atmosphere of the times, any gain by the Soviet Union or United States was viewed as evidence of a triumph of one system (capitalist or communist) over the other. The United States, by the 1970's, had become increasingly suspicious of Soviet expansionist tendencies. The pervasive mentality of Washington officials during these years was dominated by the communist domino theory which led many Washington politicians to believe that the Soviet Union sought to take over the entire world.

All this played out in the case of Afghanistan in 1979 when the pro-American shah of Iran abdicated his thrown. In exchange for massive economic and military aid, the shah had always safeguarded the United States interest in the Middle East, namely their oil interests in the region.^[12] For this reason, the increasingly friendly nature of Soviet-Afghanistan relations never posed a considerable threat to United States officials before 1979. ^[13]

Department of State Records from the early 1970's testify to the relative indifference, on the part of the United States, to the developing friendship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. A State Department record from 1976 reads: "[Afghanistan] is a militarily and politically neutral nation, effectively dependent on the Soviet Union."^[14] Its conclusion was that the United States "is not, nor should it be, committed to, or responsible for the 'protection' of Afghanistan in any respect."^[15]

This assessment changed dramatically with the fall of the shah of Iran, and his replacement with an Islamic and anti-American government. ^[16] The United States power and influence in the region was no longer assured and the issue of Afghanistan suddenly became one of endemic concern for officials in Washington. According to records provided in the Digital National Security Archive, the White House began describing Soviet policy towards Afghanistan as "the gravest threat to world peace since World War II." ^[17]

The concern of United States officials over the "Afghanistan issue" was further augmented when, in April 1978, Mohammed Daud, Afghanistan's reigning king, was overthrown and replaced by Afghanistan's newly-formed pro-Soviet, and Socialist-leaning People's Democratic Party (PDPA). Officials in Washington wondered whether Moscow was not in part responsible for the PDPA's overthrow of Daud.^[18]

In response to the PDPA's ascension to power in Afghanistan, Zbigniew Brezinski, the United States National Security Advisor at the time, warned President Carter of the grave threat this could pose to the interests of the United States. Echoing the pervasive Cold War paranoia which defined the times, Brezinski postulated that the Soviets' intention was to use Afghanistan in order to exert its power and influence over the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran and eventually over the entire region of South Asia. Every measure, it was decided, must be taken to counter the possibility of Afghanistan turning communist.

Fortunately for Brezinski and his Washington counterparts, the government of the PDPA was proving to be extremely unpopular among many Afghans. The PDPA, which, according to author David C. Isby, likened itself to a " ' Leninist vanguard': hauling a reluctant people into socialism" set out, in a policy which he describes as composed of "equal parts brutality, stupidity and ineptitude" to turn Afghanistan into a "Brummagem Stalinist Russia".^[19] The PDPA seized and redistributed land; they nationalized farm credit. This had the effect of paralyzing much of the country’s agriculture.^[20] But it was the PDPA's hostile policy towards the religion of Islam which would be the catalyst for unifying the Afghanistan people in opposition of the government’s policies.^[21]

Hence began what John K. Cooley, author of Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism likes to refer to as "America's love affair with Islam." ^[22] Of course, in light of the recent terrorist attacks on our nation, we know that this is a love affair which went disastrously wrong; but, in 1978, a year when our country's foreign policy was operating under the assumptions that the Soviet Union sought to subvert the world, the possible repercussions of allying ourselves with militant Islam's was the last thing on our mind. For, what we saw in these Afghan Islams, and in the religion of Islam itself, was a common ally in our cause against the Soviet "Reds".

Early in the year 1979, Brezinski managed to push a decision through the Special Coordination Council (SCC) of the National Security Council (NSC) to be "more sympathetic to those Afghanistan's who were determined to preserve the country's independence."^[23] CIA and state department records from that time also reveal that immediately following Brezinski’s SCC decision, the United States had begun quietly meeting with rebel representatives.^[24]

An interview in 1988 given by a former Pakistani military official further corroborates this. According to this Pakistani military official, eight months before the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad had asked Pakistani military officials to “to recommend a rebel organization that would make the best use of U.S. aid.

” ^[25]

Recently declassified Intelligence reports also reveal that the “official history record is false”.^[26] Contrary to the “official record“- - that the United States involvement in the Afghan civil war began following, and as a response to, the Soviet Union's invasion of the country- in truth, United States involvement in the Afghanistan Civil War began a full six months before the Soviet Union ever invaded Afghanistan.^[27] In an interview given to a French reporter in 1988, Brezinski confirmed this “little known fact” of history, admitting that the CIA had begun providing covert aid to Afghan resistance fighters fully six months before the Soviet invasion.^[28] Even more revealing and shocking is Brezinski's admission, later on in the interview, that the U.S. intention in providing this aid was to "draw the Russians into the Afghan trap." ^[29] When, in this same interview, the reporter, shocked at having discovered that the United States intentionally provoked the Soviet Union to enter into the war, asked Brezinski whether he harbored any regrets for doing this, Brezinski’s reply was: “Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea... The day the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.”^[30]

Afghanistan, then, in a sense, became the United States' pawn. The country became the means by which we could demoralize, and attempt to destabilize, our long-standing Cold War opponent- - with little to no cost to us. Indeed, official documents from the Soviet government (one of which I have attached) reveal that the Soviets’ entrance into the war was based, in a large part, on the grounds that secret involvement of the United States in Afghanistan was undermining the recent gains they had made in the country.

Providing covert aid to Afghanistan’s resistance fighters, (who called themselves mujahideen, or “fighters for the faith”; their struggle they called a jihad, a “war for the faith”) seemed, then, to United States officials in the year 1979, an extremely strategic move. The United States could get other people- what’s more, complete strangers in a distant country- to fight their war for them; it would require no commitment of ground troops of our own and would thereby ensure no American casualties. Or, at least this was the assumption the CIA, Brezinski, and other high-profile Washington officials were operating under in the year 1979.

It seemed that no one, during this time, stopped to consider the possible repercussions that the training and equipping of zealous Afghan Islamacists and their Muslim counterparts could have later on. An interview with a former CIA agent attests to the fact that during this time U.S. officials, resolute on their one-track agenda of combating the communists, failed to take into account the sort of consequences which arming Islam extremists could engender. In describing the CIA-Islamacist partnership the agent said: “we took the means to wage war, put them in the hands of people who could do so, for purposes for which we agreed.”^[31] Even more telling are Brezinski’s reflections on this matter, given in the 1988 interview. When asked if he had any regrets about favoring Islamicist extremists and arming and training the world’s future terrorists, Brezinski responded: "Which was more important in the world history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet empire? A few over-excited Islamacists or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the War?"^[32]

Of course, we know now that perhaps this might have been “a little more important” than Brezinski originally estimated; for these “few over-excited Islamicists”, as Brezinski put it, would be the very ones responsible for carrying out the September 11 attacks on our country.

The Soviet Union Enters the War

On Christmas Eve 1979, when tens of thousands of Soviet troops poured into Afghanistan, there was already armed resistance in twenty-five of Afghanistan's twenty-eight provinces.^[33] As the Soviet soldiers joined forces with the PDPA and its followers in an attempt to stabilize Afghanistan's government and suppress revolts orchestrated by Afghanistan's mujahideen, officials in Washington realized that economic aid alone to the mujahideen was not enough. Effectively battling the Soviets and sustaining the Afghan civil war, would, Washington officials soon realized, require the cooperation and support of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. Afghan refugees, it was posited, would need a safe haven to which to flee, and where, upon arriving, they could receive training and arms, enough to return back to Afghanistan and fight in this holy war.

A record from the Digital National Security Archive reports that "literally days after the Soviet invasion, Carter was on the phone with Zia [the king of Pakistan] offering him hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military aid in exchange for cooperation in helping the rebels.”^[34] Zia- who had his own agenda in Afghanistan- would agree as would the Saudi and Iran governments days later; and, what began as a CIA operation against our long-standing Cold War adversary was to now evolve into a global effort in the name of the religion of Islam itself.

This is how the operation was to work: the CIA would take a supervisory backseat role, letting Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) do most of the “donkey work.” According to the account given by Cooley, all of the arms supplies, finance, and training of the fighters was to be provided through Pakistan and not directly from the CIA. ^[35] This would enable the United States government to “plausibly deny” their involvement in the war if the need ever arose.^[36] Pakistan’s tribal Northwest Frontier was to provide sanctuary for refugees and become the base where fighters were to be raised, trained, and sent into battle.^[37] The ISI-in accordance with the CIA- was to become responsible for the selection, and distribution of weapons to mercenary armies. This army, according to the account given by Cooley, was to be drawn not only from the Afghanistan and Pakistan countries but from across the world; anyone who wanted to fight in this “holy war” of Islam was to be invited to do so.

In the years to come, the ISI would train a huge foreign mercenary army; according to Cooley, it was to be one of the largest ever seen in American military history. Cooley described the operation, and its dogma in this way:

Virtually all would be Muslim. They would fervently believe that God had commanded

them to fight his enemies, the Godless Communists and foreign Russian invaders. Their

earthly rewards would be glory and generous pay. For those who died as martyrs, reward would

be in heaven.^[38]

Largely in charge of the operation Zia, and his ISI, chose to favor the more radical Islamic rebel groups. Whether the United States “blindly yielded to” Zia’s preference or whether we were in collusion with it, still remains a topic of debate.^[39] Regardless, interviews indicate that U.S. officials were advised by ISI officials that “Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami was the most effective rebel organization.”^[40] Hakmatyar, it later turned out, was to become the leader, trainer, and inspiration to the terrorists and guerrillas of the Afghan international. ^[41]

In 1984, Wilson used his position on the House Intelligence Committee to convince the CIA to purchase the state-of-the-art, Swiss-engineered Oerlikon anti-aircraft missiles which “could pierce the heavy armor of the USSR’s most formidable counterinsurgency machine, the Hind MI-24 helicopter.”^[42] He was also able to allocate an additional $50 million for Afghan covert aid.^[43] By 1987, the U.S. was providing the rebels with nearly $700 million in military assistance a year and also sending a steady supply of 65,000 tons of arms to mujahideen.^[44] Ultimately, Congress doled out nearly $3 billion in covert aid to the mujahideen, which was more than all other CIA covert operations in the 1980's combined.^[45]

By late 1986, Soviet Intelligence Reports reveal that the Kremlin had become increasingly aware of the cost and the toll the war was taking. The Soviet soldiers who had returned home from fighting in Afghanistan brought with them “all signs of a losing, unpopular struggle: low morale, criticism of the government's Afghan policy, drug and alcohol abuse, and more.”^[46]

On February 11, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev shocked the world by announcing that the Soviet Union would withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan. Shortly after Gorbachev’s announcement the Geneva Accords were signed. Under the conditions of the Geneva accords, both the Soviet Union and the United States pledged to stop interfering in Afghanistan; additionally, the USSR agreed to begin withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan. On February 15, 1989, when the last Soviet soldier crossed over the Amudarya into the Soviet Union, State Department and CIA officials in Washington celebrated a Cold War victory with champagne at the White House.^[47]

In the War’s Aftermath: Afghanistan

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the country itself lay in ruins, completely devastated by a war which had raged on for nearly ten years within its confines. More than one million Afghans had died and close to 3 million had fled the country for refuge in neighboring Pakistan. Of those that remained, the great majority were either wounded, impoverished, or racked with drugs problems.

What Afghanistan needed now, more than at any other time during the war, was foreign support. Yet, the United States, its Cold War won- its mission complete- lost interest in Afghanistan, in the years when its interest was most needed. According to Ahmed Rashid, an expert on Afghanistan, and the author of Taliban, U.S. economic and military assistance to Afghanistan decreased dramatically after 1989, and no provisions were made for rebuilding the nation, demobilizing fighters or organizing relief aid.^[48]

Washington instead left its allies in the region, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to sort it out, giving them free reign to do so.^[49] “To many Afghans”, Rashid writes in Taliban, “the US withdraw constituted a major betrayel, while Washington’s refusal to harness international pressure to help broker a settlement between the warlords was considered a double betrayel.”^[50] The absence of the U.S. had the effect of leaving a major power vacuum, creating a situation which lent itself to more chaos, destruction, and in-fighting amongst Afghanistan’s many warlords, who, all out to consolidate their own individual power, proved unable to unite.^[51]

This situation continued in Afghanistan until 1994, when a group known as the Taliban emerged within the country. According to the Terrorism Project Report, the Taliban came together in Pakistan in 1994 as a militia of Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist students.^[52] These students, according to this report, had received training in Pakistan's religious schools attended by refugee men who had formerly fought as the CIA-backed mujahideen.^[53] Taking advantage of Afghanistan’s political fractiousness, the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and declared themselves the legitimate government of Afghanistan.^[54]

At first, the Taliban appealed to many Afghans with their promise of peaceful rule and their avowal to end the corruption, feuding, and bedlam which defined the country.^[55] But, as they rose in popularity, so to, the Terrorism Project reports, did their extremism. Armed and “inflamed by religious zeal”, the Taliban intensified in violence and in their intolerance for anything other than their Islam extremist policy.^[56] The training grounds that the CIA built, maintained and operated during the Afghanistan Civil War soon became camps and refuges for militant terrorists, among whom was Osama Bin Laden. ^[57]

Despite reports on, and knowledge of, the Taliban’s oppressive nature (the sequestration, and virtual enslavement of, the women of Afghanistan, the beatings for violations in dress code or prescribed beard length, the stoning to death of those accused of adultery, the burial alive for sodomy, etc.) the United States supported the Taliban government in the years 1994-1996.^[58] The main reason for this, as Rashid, Cooley, and other experts point out, is because our government believed the Taliban would support or Unocal project- and oil interests in- the region.

September 11, 2001 brought U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and its Taliban government full circle. From once accepting the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government- at times, even praising it- the United States government has come to demonize and, most recently, launch a full blown assault on it. To be fair, the Taliban was oppressive and horrendous and the U.S.- initiated retaliatory attacks made on Afghanistan following September 11 which has resulted in the Taliban’s fall, represents a major humanitarian victory which should not, nor is meant to be, in any way denigrated. Rather, what this paper has intended to do was merely to look beyond our government’s simplistic, one-dimensional explanations for the September 11 attacks on our country and at the more accurate (albeit harder to swallow) picture. This paper has attempted to illustrate that our country’s involvement in the Afghanistan Civil War, and the legacy we left behind there, as well as missteps made in U.S. policy during these years, is, in part, responsible for the burgeoning anti-American sentiment which was so tragically made manifest in the attacks made on September 11, 2001.

As we move forward in our “war against terrorism” it is crucial that we learn from, and are not condemned to repeat, mistakes from the past. Most importantly, we must remember, and accept responsibility for, the terrible toll these mistakes have taken on the country and people of Afghanistan. Bush has promised $320 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and claimed that he would introduce a new reconstruction program as soon as the country’s interim government (the AIG) was underway.^[59] It is up to us, as American citizens, to now ensure that Bush makes good on these promises.

Works Cited

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p. 427.

Cogan, “Partners in Time, the CIA and Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, vol. X, no.2, p.74

Cooley, John K. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism. Virginia: Pluto Press, 1999.

Digital National Security Archive. 12 May 2003.http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/afinitio.htm

Emadi, Hafizullah. State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.

“Interview with Zbigniew Brezinski”. Le Nouvel Observateur. Jan. 15, 1998, P. 76

Isby, David C. War in a Distant Country. New York: Arms and Armour Press, 1989.

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.

Terrorism Project. “Lessons from History: U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan, 1978-2001.” 5 October 2001. <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history-pr.cfm>.

United States Department of State. Annual Policy Assessment, March 9, 1976.

^[1] “Afghanistan.“ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 2003.Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 02 June 2003 http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=108468.

^[3] Emadi, Hafizullah. State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990. P.15.

^[11] Cooley, John K. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism. Virginia: Pluto Press, 1999. P. 3.

^[12] Digital National Security Archive. 12 May 2003.http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/afinitio.htm

^[14] United States Department of State. Annual Policy Assessment, March 9, 1976.

^[15] United States Department of State. Annual Policy Assessment, March 9, 1976.

^[19] Isby, David C. War in a Distant Country. New York: Arms and Armour Press, 1989. P.18.

^[23] Zbigniew Brzezinski. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p. 427.

^[28] “Interview with Zbigniew Brezinski”. Le Nouvel Observateur. Jan. 15, 1998, p. 76.

^[29] “Interview with Zbigniew Brezinski”. Le Nouvel Observateur. Jan. 15, 1998, p. 76

^[30] “Interview with Zbigniew Brezinski”. Le Nouvel Observateur. Jan. 15, 1998, P. 76

^[31] Cogan, “Partners in Time, the CIA and Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, vol. X, no.2, p.74

^[32] Interview with Zbigniew Brezinski”. Le Nouvel Observateur. Jan. 15, 1998, P. 76

^[48] Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. P. 176.

^[52] Terrorism Project. “Lessons from History: U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan, 1978-2001.” 5 October 2001. <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history-pr.cfm>.