In the following, "TCIA-chapter x" refers to chapter
x of the textbook, M. Aoki, Toward
a Comparative Institutional Analysis, MIT Press, 2001.
Articles indicated by [JS] are available
through JSTOR on the web, and those by [EJ] are through
Jackson Library E-journals.
| 1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT ARE INSTITUTIONS?
HOW SHOULD THEY BE APPROACHED? |
| Topics: |
 |
three views of institutions; a game-theoretic
definition of institutions; game form; five
basic types of domains of game; possibility
of a trans-disciplinary approach to institutions |
| Reading: |
| - |
TCIA-chapter 1. |
| - |
D. North (1990). Institutions, Institutional
Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press.
|
| - |
L. Hurwicz (1993), "Toward a Framework
for Analyzing Institution and Institutional Change," in
S. Bowles, H. Gintis and B. Gustafsson (eds.), Markets and
Democracy, Cambridge University Press, pp.51-67. |
| - |
A. Greif (1997), "Microtheory and Recent Developments
in the Study of Economic Institutions through Economic History,"
in D. Kreps and K. F. Wallis (eds.), Advances in Economics
and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, Vol. II, Cambridge
University Press, pp. 79-113.
[LINK] |
| - |
[W. R. Scott (1995), Institutions and Organizations,
Sage Publications.] |
| - |
[Barkow, J. H., L.Cosmides and J.Tooby (1992).
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation
of Culture, Oxford University Press.] |
| - |
[Powell, W. W., and P. A. DiMaggio (eds), The
New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, University
of Chicago Press, 1991.] |
| |
| PART I. PROPTO-INSTITUTIONS AND
BASIC CONCEPTS |
| |
| 2. CUSTOMARY PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR |
| Topics: |
| |
customary property rights; two kinds of orders
and law; private protection of property rights |
| Reading: |
| - |
TCIA-Chapter 2.1 |
| - |
H. P. Young (1993), "An Evolutionary
Theory of Bargaining," Journal of Economic
Theory, 59, pp. 145-68. [EJ]
-- (1998), Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary
Theory of Institutions, Princeton University Press. |
| - |
H. Demsetz (1967), "Toward a Theory of
Property Rights," American Economic Review, 57, pp.347-59. [JS] |
| - |
F. A. Hayek (1973), Law, Legislation and
Liberty, Volume 1, Rules and Order. University of Chicago
Press |
| - |
[R. C. Ellickson (1991), Order Without Law:
How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Harvard University Press.] |
 - |
Ikeda, N. (2003). "The Spectrum as Commons:Digital Wireless Technologies
and Radio Administration."[LINK] |
| - |
[Gambetta, D. (1993), The Sicilian Mafia, Harvard University Press.] |
| - |
Olson, M. (1993), "Dictatorship, Democracy,
and Development", American Political Science Review, pp.567-576. [JS]
|
| |
| 3. COMMUNITY NORMS: INDIVIDUAL VS. GROUP SELECTION |
| Topics: |
| |
free-riding in commons; linked games; social
embeddedness; geography vs political factor in equilibrium selection;group vs.individual selection |
| Reading |
| - |
TCIA-Chapter 2.2 |
| - |
[D. B. Klein (1990), "The Voluntary Provision
of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America,"
Economic Inquiry, 8, pp.788-812.] |
| - |
[E. Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons,
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge
University Press.] |
| - |
M. Granovettor (1985), "Economic Action
and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American
Journal of Sociology, 91, pp.480-510. [JS]
-- (1992), "Economic Institutions as
Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis,"
Acta Sociologica, 35: pp.3-11. |
| - |
B. D. Bernheim and M. Whinston (1990), 'Multimarket
Contact and Collusive Behavior,' Rand Journal of Economics
21: pp.1-26. [JS] |
| - |
M.Aoki and Y. Hayami (eds.)(2001), Communities and Markets:
in Economic Development, Oxford University Press.] |
| - |
Field, A. (2003) "Group Selection and
Economic Theory," mimeo.
-- (2001), Altruistically Inclined? Evolutionary Theory,
the Behavioral Sciences, and the Origins
of Reciprocity, University of Michigan Press. |
| - |
Bergstrom, T. C. (2002), "Evolution
of Social Behavior: Individual and Group
Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (Spring): pp.67-88. |
| - |
D. Acemoglu, S.Johnson and J. A. Robinson (2002).
"Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making
of the Modern World Income Distribution," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, pp.1231-129. [EJ] |
| |
| 4. MODES OF PRIVATE-ORDERED GOVERNANCE
OF EXCHANGES |
| Topics: |
| |
social norms, gift exchange; club norms, multiple
equilibria in market reputations, cultural beliefs; bilateral
commitment to relational contracting; private-ordered third-party
enforcement (law merchant); moral sentiments; digital enforcements;
complementarity and substitutability among various modes of
governance. |
| Reading: |
| - |
TCIA-Chapter 3. |
| - |
M. Kandori (1992). "Social Norms and Community
Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, 59, pp.63-80. [JS] |
| - |
L. Carmichael and W. B. MacLeod (1997), "Gift
Exchange and the Evolution of Cooperation," International
Economic Review, pp.485-509. [JS] |
| - |
A. Greif (1994). "Cultural Beliefs and
the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection
on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal
of Political Economy, 102, pp.912-50. [JS] |
| - |
W. B. MacLeod and J. M. Malcomson (1989), "Implicit
Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment,"
Econometrica, 57 (March 1989), pp.447-480. [JS] |
| - |
P. Milgrom, D. North and B.Weingast (1990).
" The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs,"
Economics and Politics, 2, pp.1-23. |
| - |
J. P. Platteau (1994). "Behind the Market
Stage Where Real Society Exist. Part 1: The Role of Public and
Private Order Institutions". Journal of Development
Studies, 30, pp.533-73; "Part II: The Role of Moral
Norms," ibid., pp.753-817. |
| - |
K. J. Arrow (1967), 'The Place of Moral Obligation
in Preference Systems," reprinted in Collected Papers of
Kenneth J. Arrow, Vol. 1, Harvard University Press. |
| - |
Dixit, A. (2003), "On Modes of Economic Governance,"
Econometrica, 71: 449-481. -- (2004) , Lawlessness
and Economics, Princeton University Press. Chapter 1 [LINK] |
| - |
[Lessig, L. (1999), Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace, Basic Books.] |
| |
| 5. MODES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE
AND GOVERNANCE |
| Topics: |
| |
organizational architecture as an information
system; information differentiation, assimilation, and encapsulation;
property rights and other modes of organizational governance;
modularity and option values; gains from organizational diversity. |
| Reading: |
| - |
TCIA-Chapters 4, 5, 10-12 |
| - |
J. Cremer (1990), "Common Knowledge and the
Co-ordination of Economic Activities," in M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson,
and O. E. Williamson (eds.), The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties,
Sage Publications, pp.53-76. |
| - |
O. Hart and J. Moore (1990), 'Property Rights
and the Nature of the Firm,' Journal of Political Economy
98: 1119-1158. [JS]
O. Hart (1995), Firms, Contracts and
Financial Structure, Oxford University Press. |
| - |
Langlois, R.N. and P. L. Robertson (1992), "Networks
and Innovation in a Modular System: Lessons from the Microcomputer
and Stereo Component Industries, Research Policy, 21,
pp.297-313. |
| - |
Baldwin, C. Y. and K. B. Clark (1997), "Managing
in an Age of Modularity," Harvard Business Review, Sept/Oct:
84-97. -- (2000), Design Rules: The Power of Modularity,
Vol. 1, MIT Press. |
| - |
Aoki, M. and H. Takizawa (2002), "Information,
Incentives and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model," Journal
of Comparative Economics, 30, pp.759-786. [LINK] |
| - |
Tirole, J. (2001), "Corporate Governance," Econometrica
69:pp.1-35 forthcoming. |
| - |
R. La Porta, R., F Lopez-de-Silanes, A.Shleifer
and R. Vishny (1998), "Law and Finance," Journal of Political
Economy 106: pp.1113-1155. [JS] |
| - |
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales (2000), "The Governance
of the New Enterprises," in X.Vives (ed.), Corporate Governance:
Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge University
Press, pp.201-232. |
| - |
M. Aoki (1998), "Organizational Conventions
and the Gains from Diversity: an Evolutionary Game Approach",
Industrial and Corporate Change, 7, pp.399-432. |
| |
| 6. MODES OF STATES AS STABLE
EQUILIBRIA |
| Topics: |
| |
the state as an equilibrium of a polity game
with the government as a player; liberal, collusive, predatory
states and their variants; complementarity between the state
and market/organizational governance; political accountability;
comparative states and public finance. |
| Reading: |
| - |
TCIA-Chapter 6. |
| - |
B. Weingast (1997), "The Political Foundations
of Democracy and the Rule of Law," American Political Science
Review, 91, 245-63. [JS]
-- (1995), "The Economic Role of Political
Institutions: Market-preserving Federalism
and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 11, pp.1-31. |
| - |
Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2000), "Why
Did West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth
in Historical Perspective," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1167-1199. [EJ] |
| - |
Persson, T. , G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000),
"Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political
Economy, 108, pp.1121-1161. [JS]
-- (1997) "Separation of Powers and
Political Accountability," Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.1163-1202. [JS] |
| - |
Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (2001) "The Politician
and the Judge: Accountability in Government", mimeo. |
| |
| PART II. GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
FOR INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS |
| |
| 7. A GAME THEORETIC CONCEPT OF
INSTITUTIONS |
| Topics: |
| |
institutions as a summary representation of
equilibrium or as a system of shared beliefs regarding how the
game is being played; summary statistics of equilibrium; complementarity
between classical and evolutionary gamer approach |
| Reading: |
| - |
TCIA-Chapter 6. |
| - |
A. Greif (1998), "Historical and Comparative
Institutional Analysis: Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks
and Empirical Methodology," Part I of Genoa and the Maghribi
Traders: Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis,
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. |
| |
| 8. SYNCHRONIC LINKAGES OF INSTITUTIONS |
| Topics: |
| |
embeddedness, bundling, institutional complementarities;
super-modular games |
| Reading: |
| - |
TCIA-Chapter 7, 11 |
| - |
P. Milgrom, and J. Roberts (1990), "Rationalizability,
Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarityies,"
Econometrica, 58, 1255-77. [JS] |
| |
| 9. SUBJECTIVE GAME MODELS AND
THE MECHANISM OF INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION |
| Topics: |
| |
mental models and subjective game models, inductive
game; punctuated equilibrium; dynamic institutional complementarity,
overlapping embeddedness, Schumpeterian dis-bundling and re-bundling;
roles of policy and statutory law in institutional change |
| Reading: |
| - |
TCIA-Chapter 8. |
| - |
A. T. Denzau, and D. North (1994). "Shared
Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos,
pp.3-3.1
|
| - |
[J. Holland et al (1989), Induction: Processes
of Inference, Learning, and Discovery, MIT Press.] |
| - |
M. Kaneko and A. Matsui (1999), "Inductive
Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices," Journal
of Public Economic Theory, 1, pp.1-37. |
| - |
P. Milgrom, Y. Qian and J. Roberts (1991), "Complementarities,
Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing," American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 81(2), pp.84-88.
[JS] |
| - |
Kawagoe, Y. and H. Takizawa (2003), "Instability
of Babbling Equilibrium in Cheap Talk Game: Some Experimental
Results," mimeo. |
|
Course Requirement