| Chapter 1. What are Institutions?
How Should We Approach Them? |
 |
1.1. |
Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic
Perspective |
|
1.2. |
Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary
Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the
Game |
|
1.3. |
Organization of the Book |
| |
| Part I. PROTO-INSTITUTIONS: INTRODUCING
BASIC TYPES |
| |
| Chapter 2. Customary Property Right and Community
Norms |
|
2.1. |
Customary Property Right as a Self-Organizing
System |
|
2.2 |
Community Norms as a Self-Enforcing Solution
to the Commons Problem |
|
Appendix: History vs.
Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea |
| |
| Chapter 3. The Private-Ordered
Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets |
|
3.1. |
Traders' Norms |
|
3.2. |
Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment
Contracts |
|
3.3. |
Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant |
|
3.4. |
Moral Codes |
|
3.5. |
Overall Market Governance Arrangements |
|
Appendix. Money as an Evolutive
Convention |
| |
| Chapter 4. Organizational Architecture
and Governance |
|
4.1. |
Organizational Building Blocks: Hierarchical
Decomposition, Information Assimilation and Encapsulation |
|
4.2. |
Types of Organizational Architecture |
|
4.3. |
Governance of Organizational Architecture: A
Preliminary Discussion |
| |
| Chapter 5. The Co-Evolution of Organizational
Conventions and Human Asset Types |
|
5.1. |
Types of Mental Programs: Individuated vs. Context-oriented
Human Assets |
|
5.2. |
The Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizational
Conventions |
|
5.3. |
The Interactions of Organizational Fields and
Gains from Diversity |
|
5.4. |
The Relevance and Limits of the Evolutionary
Game Model |
| |
| Chapter 6. States as Stable Equilibria
in the Polity Domain |
|
6.1. |
Three Prototypes of the State |
|
6.2. |
Various Forms of the Democratic and Collusive
States |
| |
| Part II. A GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
FOR INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS |
| |
| Chapter 7. A Game-Theoretic Concept
of Institutions |
|
7.1. |
Exogenous Rules of the Game and Endogenous Action-Choice
Rules |
|
7.2. |
The Institution as a Summary Representation
of an Equilibrium Path |
|
7.3. |
Feedback Loops of Institutionalization |
| |
| Chapter 8. The Synchronic Structure
of Institutional Linkage |
|
8.1. |
Social Embeddedness |
|
8.2. |
Linked Games and Institutionalized Linkages |
|
8.3. |
Institutional Complementarity |
| |
| Chapter 9. Subjective-Game Models
and the Mechanism of Institutional Change |
|
9.1. |
Why Are Overall Institutional Arrangements Enduring? |
|
9.2. |
Subjective Game Models and General Cognitive
Equilibrium |
|
9.3. |
The Mechanism of Institutional Change: The Cognitive
Aspect |
| |
| Chapter 10. Diachronic Linkages
of Institutions |
|
10.1. |
Overlapping Social Embeddedness |
|
10.2. |
The Reconfiguration of Bundling |
|
10.3. |
Diachronic Institutional Complementarity |
| |
| Part III. AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL
DIVERSITY |
| |
| Chapter 11. Comparative Corporate
Governance |
|
11.1. |
Governance of the Functional Hierarchy |
|
11.2. |
Co-Determination in the Participatory Hierarchy |
|
11.3. |
Relational-Contingent Governance of the Horizontal
Hierarchy |
| |
| Chapter 12. Types of Relational
Financing and the Value of Tacit Knowledge |
|
12.1. |
A Generic Definition of Relational Financing
and Its Knowledge-Based Taxonomy |
|
12.2. |
The Institutional Viability of Relational Financing |
| |
| Chapter 13. Institutional Complementarities,
Co-Emergence, and Crises: The Case of the Japanese Main Bank
System |
|
13.1 |
The Main Bank Institution as a System of Shared
Beliefs |
|
13.2. |
Institutional Emergence: Unintended Fits |
|
13.3. |
Endogenous Inertia, Misfits with Changing Environments,
and a Crisis of Shared Beliefs |
| |
| Chapter 14. Institutional Innovation
of the Silicon Valley Model in the Product System Develpment |
|
14.1. |
Information-Systemic Architecture of the Silicon
Valley Model |
|
14.2. |
The VC Governance of Innovation by Tournament |
|
14.3. |
Norms and Values in the Silicon Valley Model |
|
Appendix The Stylized Factual Background
for Modeling |
| |
| Chapter 15. Epilogue: Why Does
Institutional Diversity Continue to Evolve? |
|
15.1. |
Some Stylized Models of Overall Institutional
Arrangements |
|
15.2. |
Self-organizing Diversity in the Global Institutional
Arrangement |
Table of Contents (unabridged)
