Co-organizers: Alberto
Diaz-Cayeros and Beatriz Magaloni
Conference
Agenda
Bellagio
Center, Rockefeller Foundation
Co-sponsored
by Stanford Center for International Development (SCID), the Center
for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Rule of
Law Program at Stanford University.
November 28-
December 2, 2005
The agenda is structured to give enough time for the working group to engage in informal discussions. The first day will be devoted to theoretical approaches in an effort to perhaps converge into a common analytic framework, to illuminate the empirical papers. In the country case discussions emphasis will be placed in drawing implications from a comparative perspective. The last session will be devoted to discussion about databases, implications for policy makers and future research directions.
Monday November 28, 2005
- Arrival to Bellagio
Tuesday November 29, 2005
9:00-9:30
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros
and Beatriz Magaloni -- Welcome and introductory remarks
9:30-11:00
Phil Keefer --
“Clientelism, Credibility
and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies”
Supplement: “Democracy,
Credibility and Clientelism “
Disc: Alberto
Diaz-Cayeros
11:15-12:45
Andreas Schedler (with Frederic Schaffer) – “What is Vote Buying? The Limits of the Market Model”
Disc: Steve Wilkinson
2:00-3:30
Kimuli Kasara
- “Tax
Me if You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy and the Taxation of Agriculture
in Africa ”
Disc: Eliana LaFerrara
3:45-5:15
John Londregan
and Andrea Vindigni – “Voting
as a Credible Threat”
Disc: Guido Tabellini
Wednesday November 30, 2005
9:00-10:30
Miriam Golden
– “Distributive
Politics in Postwar Italy
”
(new version)
Disc: Simona Piattoni
10:45-12:15
Leonard Wantchekon
(joint with Christel Vermeersch) – “
Information, Social Networks and the Demand for Public Goods: Experimental
Evidence from Benin. ”
Disc: Dan Posner
2:00-3:30
Valeria Brusco
and Marcelo Nazareno (with Susan Stokes) – “The
Electoral Consequences of Particularistic Distribution in
Argentina ”
Supplement: “Vote
Buying in Argentina ”
Disc: Federico
Estevez
3:45-5:15
Break-up into small groups:
1) Keefer – Khemani – Wantchenkon (Experiment in
Benin
and
India
)
2) Magaloni – Diaz-Cayeros – Estevez (Portfolio Choice)
3) Golden – Kunicova – Posner (Distributive Politics Project)
4) Kitschelt –
Wilkinson (Patrons and Clients)
5)
LaFerrara – Tabellini – Torvik (Modelling Clientelism)
7) Londregan – Vindigni (Voting)
8) Schedler –
Piattoni – Kasara – Brusco (Limits of the Market Analogy)
Thursday December 1, 2005
9:00-10:30
Stuti Khemani
“Clientelism in
India
(presentation) ”
Supplements: Part 1 | Part 2
Disc: Alberto Diaz-Cayeros
10:45-12:15
Jana Kunicova
(with Thomas Remington) – “The
Effect of Electoral Rules on Distributive Voting: Some Evidence from
the Russian
State Duma, 1994-2003
Disc: Herbert Kitschelt
2:00-3:30
Beatriz Magaloni,
Federico Estévez and Alberto Diaz-Cayeros – “Clientelism
as Risk Hedging ”
Supplements: Part
1
Disc: Andreas
Schedler
3:45-5:15
Tentative conclusions, datasets and directions for further research
Friday December 2, 2005 - Departure
Additional papers:
Ragnar Torvik
(with Jim Robinson) -- “A
political economy theory of the soft budget constraint"
This is what we
did before the conference:
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